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Sudan Strategic Assessment: A Strategic Multilayer Analysis (SMA) Effort

Summary

December 2007

This briefing, in its entirety is:

UNCLASSIFIED

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Agenda

• Introduction

• Key Findings

• Potential Actions

• Actionable Recommendations

Unclassified

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CENTCOM Operational Objectives

• Reduce human suffering

• Promote regional peace and stability

• Deny safe haven for international terrorists and criminals

Unclassified

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Sudan Strategic Assessment

• 180-day proof-of-concept effort conducted for US CENTCOM• How to assess a complex state like Sudan…

– Lack of borders– Many competing interests– Representative of many countries in Africa– Lack of “analytical” products and vetted data

• Span spectrum of the instruments of national power– Emphasis on the Diplomatic, Information and Economic aspects

of DIME and less emphasis on Military aspects

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• All Source Data

• Modelers

• Analysts

• Sudanese SMEs• Social Scientists• Interagency, IC

• DoS, USAID• Military Planners

Social Science Models:• Political Capacity Model• Econometrics Model

• State Stability Dynamics Model

• Individual/Group Belief Diffusion Model

• Individual/Group Social Identity Model

• Geo-Political-Social Trends Model• Resource Model

• Insurgency Model

Data and Experts

DIME Actions

Social ScienceModeling and

Analysis

1. End human suffering2. Ensure Sudan stability

3. Deny safe haven

CENTCOM Operational Objectives

Forecasts and Hypotheses Re

com

men

datio

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Sudan Strategic Assessment Process

Seven Hypotheses:1. GOS is perceived as legitimate by its people2. The GOS is in collusion with the Janjaweed

3. Competition for natural resources is driving violence & instability

4. Cultural identity is driving violence & instability

5. Ecological factors are driving violence & instability

6. Outside forces are driving violence & instability7. The Sudanese people support partitioning

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Sudanese SME TeamLed by ONR, IDA, and LLNL:University of Indiana PurdueUniversity of Pennsylvania

University of California, Berkeley University of Nebraska

Kettering UniversityRhode Island College

SOCOM Cultural Advisor

Project LeadershipProject Guidance: CENTCOM

Project Oversight: OSD DDR&E, JS J39, STRATCOM

Data Collection, RFI, Taxonomies Team

MITREIDAONR

IC SupportNSANGACIADIAOSC ~80+ People Actively Engaged

Across ~27 Organizations

DIME Threads TeamLed by CENTCOM:SS Modeling Team

Social Science Modeling Team

Led by NSI:MIT

SentiaActive Computing

Evolving LogicAptima

USC-MITRENPS

JFCOM Component

Analysis TeamNSI

LLNLIDA

MITRE

Multidisciplinary and Multi-organizational

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Outreach

• Prof. John Voll, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

• Dr. Paul Moorcraft, director, Centre for Foreign Policy Analysis, writer, editor,, former senior instructor, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.

• Dr. Paul Hoile, contraversial British activist, Author of “Darfur in Perspective”, Adjunct professor at University of Khartoum, alleged “mercenary author” Bashir’s government.

• Dr. Abubaker Al-Shingieti, Regional Director, International Institute for Islamic Thought, Formerly head of the Department of Politics, GOS with rank of ambassador, advisor to Pres. Bashir

• Dr. Ibrahim Ahmed Elbadawi, lead economist, Development Economic Research Group, World Bank, Washington DC

• Deng Deng Nhial, Trade and Investment Officer, Mission of the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) to the USA

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Outreach(Cont’d)

• David Choat, Public Relations & Congressional Affairs Officer,

GOSS Mission to USA

• Mohamed Elfatih Saeed, Researcher on Peace and conflict,

• Mahdi el-Khalifa, Sudanese Umma Party (political party of the

Islamic Ansar)

• Bashir Ishaq, Dar Fur, The Federal Alliance, part of the National

Democratic Alliance

• Adil A. Salih, Sudanese Congress Party, seeking secular

government

• Robert Whitehead, returning US head of delegation, Khartoum –

posted 2004

• John Lueth Ukek Ukek, Head of Sudanese Embassy to US – posted

2007

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SRG Members

• Dr. Chuck Perkins (OSD)-Chair• Mr. Ben Riley (OSD)• Mr. Kevin Williams (GISC)• Maj Gen (Ret) Scott Gration• Maj Gen (Ret) Bill Usher (OSD)• CAPT(S) Todd Veazie (Joint Staff)• Dr. Lin Wells (NDU)• Mr. Joe Eash (NDU)• Dr. Susan Bradley (USAID)• Dr. Rob Johnston (USG)• Mr. Don Mulligan (DoS)• Lt Col Fulaytar (CENTCOM)• Maj Rob Renfro (CENTCOM J8)• Maj Couch (CENTCOM J3)• Mr. Russ Townsend (CENTCOM J2)

Unclassified

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Agenda

• Introduction

• Key Findings

• Potential Actions

• Actionable Recommendations

Unclassified

Unclassified11

SME solicitation, documentation, and IDA Analysis

• Center vs Periphery– May not be declared policy, but is a practical reality– Unifying the marginalized across the peripheral regions may not be possible

because of lack of trust and conflicting interests among the people.

• Diversity and Fractionalization– Deeper and more extensive than expected because sense of Identity is NOT

Sudanese, but has its roots in tribal, ethnic, religious and political realities that date back centuries.

– Self-interest and corruption are a way of life in Khartoum and the periphery (Darfur, South, East,…). Sometimes corruption is a strategy, sometimes it is a necessity and sometimes it is a function of incompetence

• Conflict in Darfur, while a problem for Khartoum, benefits Khartoum by diverting resources and attention from the CPA

• Refugee camps as they currently exist (South, Darfur, East) break down functional identity, disenfranchise residents and do not build for recovery in the future.

• Members of the Sudanese Diaspora in the US are discovering and utilizing their power

– Recognizing and using this resource presents both opportunity and hazard—they are not precise mirrors of their counterparts in Sudan

• US policy on Sudan is perceived as confused, at best, with Hollywood in the forefront of communications from the US on Sudan

Unclassified12

SME solicitation, documentation, and IDA Analysis(Cont’d)

• The CPA orchestrates a plebiscite but has no design for its aftermath – this could fracture the country– Re-engage the international partners who helped build the CPA to

monitor its progress (Khartoum has “slow rolled” progress and South has been unable to use shared resources or power effectively)

– Focus resources to assist the South in developing the human and physical infrastructure needed for self-government whether as an independent state or part of Sudan

– Make the democratization process expressed in the CPA the focus of US communications on Sudan

• Darfur: a tactical issue that is not likely to destabilize the country– Use the mandatory (CPA) census as a reason to build an international

panel to “assist Sudan with the census” under armed protection as needed to protect the census takers in Darfur

• Without intervention, Darfur could distract enough attention from the CPA for it to fail in the worst way causing resumption of full scale civil war

• Sanctions appear to have done more to rob the US of leverage in Sudan than to break Sudan’s economy– Consider increasing US leverage on Sudan by lifting of US sanctions

after Khartoum complies with UN demands – Re-examine the policy and specific sanctions based on new privatization

and corporate ownership

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Summary of Model Findings

• Likelihood of conflict increases if resources more evenly distributed– Especially true between North and South

• Egypt is the dominant regional power in the Horn of Africa (HOA)– Egypt prefers status quo– Egypt supports a united Sudan under leadership of North– Anticipated massive oil revenues (from South) not expected to change

Egypt status as predominant player in HOA

• US and western nations are most important stakeholders in region– China and Malaysia are large players in oil, but provide little security

• Sudan is on path towards escalating instability– Low levels of regime capacity– High level of dissidence amongst different population groups in Sudan– Difficult to achieve successful outcomes from current mitigation options

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Summary of Model Findings (Cont’d)

• Enforcement of CPA can lead to consolidation of anti-regime forces– CPA can lead to reduced cleavages among diverse anti-regime factions

in South, causing them to organize, mobilize and rebel against GoS

• Mixed results about the impact of cultural and ethnic intolerance– Collier’s economic grievance model suggests increasing social

fractionalization leads to greater conflict– Collier’s economic greed model suggests increasing social

fractionalization reduces conflict, as it reduces power of any one group

• A North-South partition of Sudan has mixed outcomes– Model results show simultaneously reduction in the likelihood of conflict

within the new “partitioned” states– But increases in the possibility of conflict between partitioned states

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Agenda

• Introduction

• Key Findings

• Potential Actions

• Actionable Recommendations

Unclassified

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ObjectiveIdentify an ordering of the most-to-least efficacious DIME actions as a function of their merits, as indicated by the study’s models

An Analysis of DIME Actions

ApproachSurvey modeling teams for their assessments of the degree their findings confirm or disconfirm the attractiveness of each DIME actionExecute algorithms that locate the optimal DIME action in the set of competing actions and rank them accordingly; call this an Analysis of Competing DIME Actions (ACDA)

ACDA InterpretationThe list of prioritized DIME actions must be viewed as provisional; further follow-up on the ACDA results and modeler inputs is warrantedThe analytic methodology of the ACDA executed well; a full trace of the most diagnostic factors and sources that drive DIME rankings is also producedACDA is a new analytic variant of Heuer’s Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) protocol, and created to support this Study

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Abbreviated DIME Actions from Modeling and Analysis Activities

• 1. Deploy a UN-led multinational protection force to take over from the under- resourced AMIS [UN Multinational Protection Force]

• 2. Deploy a hybrid UN-AU multinational protection force to take over from the under-resourced AMIS [Hybrid Multinational Protection Force]

• 3. Deploy a US-led protection force to take over from the under-resourced AMIS [US Protection Force]

• 4. Influence debt assistance provided to Sudan by international financial institutions to be dependent on the GoS ceasing atrocities [Link Debt Assistance to Human Rights]

• 5. Encourage a major divestment campaign targeting companies that are complicit in the genocide in Darfur [Encourage Divestment]

• 6. Enforce and enhance a set of targeted economic sanctions [Economic Sanctions]

• 7. Provide economic assistance to Southern Sudan specifically for infrastructure development and investment in human capital [Economic Assistance to South]

• 8. Pressure the North to more equitably share resources and wealth with the South (i.e., enforcing the CPA) [Encourage Wealth Sharing with South]

• 9. Do Nothing• 10. Support a coup whereby the GoS is taken over

by African-centric vs. Islamic-centric leaders [Support Coup]

• 11. Pay the GoS to stop the humanitarian crises in Sudan [Pay GoS to Relieve Crisis]

• 12. Institute Programs in the HOA that strengthen and stabilize the area surrounding Sudan [HOA Programs to Stabilize Region]

• 13. Actively remove key GoS/Janjaweed personnel that play a role in the violence in Sudan [Remove GOS/Janjaweed Personnel]

• 14. Unite Darfur rebel groups to develop unity militarily, collective bargaining, diplomatically, and economically [Unite Rebel Groups]

• 15. Lift US and western sanctions against the GoS, enabling market forces to modify behavior and to provide an influx of Western human rights values to the region [Lift Sanctions]

• 16. Engage GCC countries to politically influence the GoS to take responsibility for the humanitarian crises within its borders [Encourage GCC Pressure on GoS].

• 17. Enforce the 2005 UN Security Council Resolution demanding the GoS cease offensive military flights by establishing a "no fly zone” [No Fly Zone].

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An Analysis of DIME Actions

- 2 Model Findings Very Strongly Disconfirms Undertaking DIME Action- 1 Model Findings Strongly Disconfirms Undertaking DIME Action0 Model Findings Neither Confirming Nor Disconfirming Undertaking DIME Action

+ 1 Model Findings Strongly Confirming Undertaking DIME Action+ 2 Model Findings Very Strongly Confirming Undertaking DIME Action

DIME Action

ACDA Input TableModeling team assessments of the degree their findings confirm or disconfirm the attractiveness of each DIME action

Provisional

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Agenda

• Introduction

• Key Findings

• Potential Actions

• Actionable Recommendations

Unclassified

Prioritized DIME List

Unclassified

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

Encourage Divestment

Do Nothing

US Protection Force

Link Debt Assistance to Human Rights

Support Coup

Remove GOS/Janjaweed Personnel

Economic Sanctions

Hybrid Multinational Protection Force

UN Multinational Protection Force

Pay GoS to Relieve Crisis

Unite Rebel Groups

Lift Sanctions

HOA Programs to Stabil ize Region

Economic Assistance to South

No Fly Zone

Encourage Wealth Sharing with South

Encourage GCC Pressure on GoS

Results from a Confirming ViewDIME with the largest score is most confirmed by model findings OR DIME with

smallest score is least confirmed by model findings

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Recommended DIME Actions*

CENTCOM Operational Objectives: Reduce human suffering; Promote regional peace and stability; Deny safe haven for international terrorists and criminals.

1. Diplomatic: Engage GCC countries, primarily Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, to politically influence the GoS to take responsibility for the humanitarian crises within its borders.– Influence Kuwait via its critical ties to Sudanese banking.– Influence Qatar via its ties to Sudan’s oil exploitation. – Influence Saudi Arabia using as a lever its interests in maintaining

Sudan as an Arab-Islamic country vice a more purely African country.

Caveated Recommendations – Read Sudan Strategic Assessment Key Findings Report. DIME Actions are not optimized for any one single objective but are equal across all three.

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Recommended DIME Actions*

2. Diplomatic, Information, Economic: Pressure the North to more equitably share resources and wealth with the South (i.e., enforcing the CPA). – Encourage the PRC to pressure the GoS using the lever of the Beijing

Olympics.– Enforce and enhance a set of targeted economic sanctions including

travel bans, asset seizures, selected sanctions on the petroleum sector, and sanctioning the off-shore accounts of the regime's commercial entities.

– Engage the AU to politically influence the GoS to enforce the CPA.– Engage the Arab League to politically influence the GoS to enforce the

CPA.– Launch an anti-corruption campaign in the North and the South.– Make public the revenues coming into the North from lucrative oil

deals.

3. Military: Enforce the 2005 UN Security Council Resolution demanding the GoS cease offensive military flights by establishing a "no fly zone”.

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Recommended DIME Actions*

4. Information, Economic: Provide economic assistance to Southern Sudan specifically for infrastructure development and investment in human capital.– Institute transparency of financial transactions.– Launch an anti-corruption campaign in the South.– Provide self-governance training.– Launch an information campaign to tell the people of Southern Sudan

what the government of South Sudan is doing with the aid.– Institute a broad spectrum of training programs designed to train while

providing needed infrastructure projects to the region (e.g., wells, roads, buildings, irrigation, etc).

– Provide training and assistance in stemming desertification in Southern Sudan.

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Recommended DIME Actions*

5. Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic: Institute Programs

in the HOA that strengthen and stabilize the area surrounding

Sudan.

– Establish a UN peacekeeping mission with a strong civilian protection

mandate in Chad and the Central African Republic, aimed at deterring

the movement of insurgent armed groups across the borders.

– Positively influence debt assistance by international financial

institutions (e.g., the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund)

to the HOA.

– Provide self-governance training.

6. Diplomatic, Economic: Lift US and western sanctions against

the GoS, enabling market forces (i.e., competition) to modify

behavior and to provide an influx of Western human rights values

to the region.