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The Implications of the South Sudan Conflict for Sudan
Sudan Democracy First Group - 03/02/14
The conflict that broke out in South Sudan on 15 December,
2013,between factions of the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement/Army(SPLM/A) has made for strange bed-fellows. President
Omar Bashir haspledged support to the elected government of
President Salva Kiiragainst former Vice President Riek Machar, the
man who fought the SPLAon Khartoum's side during a significant part
of the twenty-year civilwar. The primary reason for this is the
dire need of both Presidentsto maintain oil production in order to
bankroll their politicalpositions. With Ugandan President Museveni
sending troops to lend afighting hand to the southern army, Sudan
and Uganda's often divergentregional agendas converged. On the
other hand, the administration ofUS President Obama sent barely
veiled threats of crippling sanctionsto discourage Machar from
carrying through with his threat to takeJuba by force. Ironically,
while continuing the heavy summer offensiveagainst the Sudan
Revolutionary Forces (SRF), President Bashir hasbeen able to
position himself as a force for peace and stability. Yetthe focus
on the South has taken the pressure off any progress oneither the
implementation of the September 2012 Agreements or thetalks with
the SPLM-N under the auspices of the AU's HighImplementation Panel
(AUHIP).
Just as the return of war in South Kordofan and Blue Nile in
2011, andthe continued violence in Darfur and popular protests
across Sudan'scities in September illustrate the shortcomings of
the 2005Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), so does the recent
crisis inSouth Sudan reflect the failure to address key issues
related togovernance, democracy, reconciliation and justice in the
new Republicof South Sudan. The parties and the international
community now facethe same challenges in the South as in Sudan: to
support an elite,exclusionary, and short-term peace deal which will
take us back to thestatus quo, or be bold and push for a principled
and inclusiveprocess, which is accountable to the wider population
and seeks toaddress the root causes of conflict. Khartoum's
interest revolvesaround ensuring the conflict has minimal effect on
the Sudaneseeconomy, as the NCP's survival is based on the economic
stability ofthe country.
Implication on Khartoum
President Bashir's visit to Juba on 6 January, accompanied by
theDefence, Foreign and Oil Ministers, was a gesture of support to
theKiir government. "We come so that we can bring peace to South
Sudan,to our brothers and sisters in South Sudan. Our relationship
is veryimportant," Bashir was quoted as saying. Support so far has
beenpolitical and symbolic, not military, despite the declaration
thatrebel forces would not be allowed to operate from within
Sudan'sborders and the offer of joint patrols of the oil fields
which waslater denied. This is despite the historic ties between
Machar andKhartoum during the 1990s. The ongoing economic crisis in
Sudan haspolitical implications, as showcased during the protests
in September2013 and the need to maintain the patronage system, in
particularamong the security services. For Khartoum, as long as the
oilcontinues to flow, and its transit and refining fees are
notthreatened, it will have little interest in being involved
militarily.The crisis in the South has allowed el-Bashir to
position himself to
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the international community as a necessary stabilizing force and
apeacemaker. UK Minister for Africa, Mark Simmonds, was quoted in
mediareports commending the role of Sudan in the conflict. It also
takespressure off Bashir to deliver progress with the SPLM-N talks
underthe AUHIP and on humanitarian access to the Two Areas.
According to the Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA),
violenceerupted on 19 December in Unity state, affecting the
Greater PioneerOperating Company base and later the Thar Jath
oilfield and other oilfields near Leer. Fighting continued to
Bentiu and other areas ofUnity State on 20 December. Workers from
the oilfields, including theChina National Petroleum Corporation
and India's Oil and Natural GasCorporation, were evacuated.
According to HSBA, all production inUnity has ceased, with at least
4 facilities undergoing emergencyshutdowns, amounting to the
suspension of a fifth of South Sudan's245,000 barrels a day.
According to the IMF, transit fees will beworth approximately $1.4
billion to Sudan in 2014. Fighting has alsoaffected oil fields and
production in Upper Nile. Furthermore, Sudanis interested in
ensuring South Sudan will be able to pay theestimated $3.2 billion
as part of the compensation package agreed toin September 2012. In
the longer term, the Government of Sudan needsgood relations with
the South in order to help secure internationaldebt relief, which
totals over $40 billion.
Implication on the Armed Groups
On 28 December, forces allied with former Vice President Riek
Macharaccused the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) of supporting
thegovernment of South Sudan. The JEM has publically denied this,
sayingit would not engage in the conflict. There has been no
evidence todate that the SPLM-N has engaged in the fighting or has
taken apolitical side. However, clearly the SRF leadership, and in
particularthe SPLM-N, have connections with both the Kiir and
Machar camps.Nevertheless, the conflict in the South poses a
dilemma for thealliance. Every day the conflict continues puts
pressures on the SRFconstituent movements to join one side or the
other. The stillun-demarcated border is very porous and the
presence of SRF forces inSouth Sudan has been known for some time.
The conflict will thereforeaffect supply lines and rear-operating
bases, and if the conflict inthe South brings Kiir and Bashir
closer, this could create a newsituation for the SRF.
Humanitarian Implications
More immediately, the conflict in the South has a direct impact
on theover 200,000 Sudanese refugees in South Sudan in addition to
southerncivilians caught in the crossfire. Entire communities are
bearing thebrunt of the hostilities between belligerents in the dry
seasoncampaign in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states. IDPs and
refugees inthe transitional zone between the two countries are
trapped; theycannot seek refuge on the other side of the border
where seriousfighting is underway. Fighting in Unity spread to
Pariang on December20th, very close to the Yida refugee camp and
other refugee sites. Notonly has the threat of direct violence
increased, in particular giventhe fighting in Unity and proximity
of Yida to Jau and Pariang, butinternational aid workers were
evacuated on 22 December and pipe linesto the camps severely
disrupted. According to aid agencies, since thestart of the
fighting in Unity up to 1,850 people have crossed intoSouth
Kordofan, including refugees returning to the conflict-affected
