Submission #: 12716

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WHAT IS CRITICAL REALISM? A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO ITS CONCEPTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH

Abstract

Research based on a critical realist philosophy of science has begun to appear in the management

and information systems research literature. Critical realism presents itself as a ‘third way’ of

philosophizing about science along side positivism and interpretivism. It claims to resolve many

of the criticisms that have been leveled against these philosophies. While the articles that have

appeared in the management and IS literature have each presented an overview of critical

realism, there has not been to this point a comprehensive introduction that allows students and

researchers to gain a foundational perspective of critical realism with which to assess its potential

contribution to their research and indeed to approach the often difficult primary literature. This

article presents an attempt to provide such an introduction. It provides an overview of the

ontology and epistemology and concept of causation in critical realist philosophy in comparison

to positivism and interpretivism, and then shows how those concepts are applied in social science

and research methodology. It then overviews the primary source literature. It follows with a

discussion of the implications for management and information systems research.

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Introduction

The critical realist philosophy of science (CR) (Bhaskar, 1979, 1997) is a relatively

recent development in philosophy of science as it is only 30 years old, but has been attracting

interest in both the management (Mutch, 2005; Reed, 1997; Tsang & Kwan, 1999; Tsoukas,

1989) and IS literature (Mingers, 2004; Mutch, 1999a, b; Smith, In Press). CR positions itself as

an improvement upon positivism and interpretivism in that it posits an improved realist ontology

while accommodating a relativist epistemology which allows a real basis for the scientific

endeavor.

Criticisms of both positivism and interpretivism has been asserted that have raised serious

doubts about their validity to the extent that some authors have asked if they are on their

deathbed (Caldwell, 2003). Positivism has been attacked, among other criticisms, for its

adherence to a correspondence view of truth in the face of what we know about human

perception. Similarly, interpretivism has been criticized for leading to despair about any

knowledge. CR seems to hold the ability to solve both of those issues by a radical divergence at

the ontological level from both positivism and interpretivism creating a philosophy of science

that allows for real world without reliance on the correspondence theory of truth and a relativistic

epistemology without despair about knowledge.

The original sources from Bhaskar, Archer et al, tend to be long, multi-volume and laden

with philosophical content and thus difficult to glean information from. Introductory books have

been written to introduce critical realism (Archer, 1998a; Collier, 1994), however they also tend

to be voluminous and sometimes jargon laden and not suitable for a quick introduction. While

papers have been written from the CR position in which each attempts to articulate the critical

realist position, with the exception of Mingers (2000; 2004), whose efforts were compromised by

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space limitations, there has not been an effort to summarize CR in an accessible manner. This

paper is therefore intended to fill that gap and be a general introduction to critical realism

targeted for the doctoral student or researcher who wants an overview of this new philosophical

development. It is offered with the aim of allowing them to assess the validity and usefulness of

CR without having to access the often difficult and voluminous primary literature. We do

however wish to point them to the primary literature so that they may read further into the

subject. Thus the object is to provide a high level introduction to the concepts of CR and

comparisons to current concepts in the philosophy of science and social theory in order to

provide a grounding for the student or researcher to approach the primary sources without being

overwhelmed by the novelty of the concepts. It also seeks to outline some of the important

methodological implications of CR for research.

In this paper, we cover the basic concepts of CR. We recognize that additional

developments have been made in the explanatory critique, dialectic and transcendence of the

material to spiritual realm. However for the sake of simplicity in this introduction, we focus only

on transcendental realism and critical naturalism. We begin with an introduction to the basic

metatheoretic position of CR, a comparison to the existing paradigms of positivism and

interpretivism, a discussion of how those concepts apply to the social sciences, followed by a

look at the methodological implications and a review of the published books and articles utilizing

CR in the management and IS literature. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for

management and IS research.

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What is Critical Realism?

There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

Shakespeare, Hamlet, I, v, 166

The Critical Realism we discuss here is the the philosophy of science as defined by Roy

Bhaskar and elaborated by others. The Shakespeare quotation stated above is an apt summary of

the challenge that Bhaskarian CR makes to positivism and interpretivism. It challenges directly

their ontology that declares that only those things that can be sensed exist and asserts that there

must be things that cannot be sensed that yet are real. The name ‘Critical Realism’ is an elision

of two different terms descriptive of parts of the philosophy: ‘transcendental realism’ which

describes the reasoning process by which explanations are developed and ‘critical naturalism’

which is the term for the approach to social science in which a method is used similar to that

used with natural science (naturalism) only it is used subject to known limitations (critical).

We provide here a discussion of the basic tenets of this philosophy, some key published

works and a discussion of some variant uses of the term by other authors.

Ontology

CR is a realist philosophy of science. That means that CR holds that there exists a real

world of objects that exist separately of man and his conception of it. This is not unique. While

interpretivism rejects a realist view in favor of one where the world is a social construction,

positivism also holds to a realist position. The hallmark of CR that differentiates it from

positivism is its structured and layered ontology. This marks a dramatic break with both

positivism and interpretivism in that it posits a structured ontology as opposed to a flat ontology.

Following Hume, both positivism and interpretivism assert that only that which can be sensed

can be said to exist and therefore, if there are other things that cannot be sensed we cannot say

anything about them or even assert that they exist. While explicitly denying that the possibility of

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an ontology exists, they hold to an implicit ontology composed of atomistic events that have no

necessary connection with each other (Bhaskar, 1997). Bhaskar goes on to criticize this ontology

as destructive of science since atomistic events with no necessary connection destroy the concept

of causation as shall be shown below.

In its place, Bhaskar substitutes a structured ontology (figure 1). He develops the concept

from a transcendental analysis of what is necessary for science to be possible. He

refers to it as transcendental since he must go beyond (transcend) what is experienced to

describe must be in order to have a possibility of a science. His analysis goes like this:

FIGURE 1

Critical Realist View of Ontology

When a scientist performs an experiment, he initiates a series of events, but he does not control

them. The events that occur are dependent upon the structures and properties of the things

experimented upon. For example, if we hold a pencil over a table and let it go, the logical

possibilities are that it can fall down toward the table, float in the air, go sideways either way or

even go up. However, the pencil (at least on the part of the earth that we inhabit) always falls

down. Why is that? Because the earth (the structure) exerts a gravitational force (property) upon

the pencil drawing it to itself. The gravitational force is then a causal mechanism that makes the

Empirical Actual Real

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pencil fall down. This gravitational force is not always visible. For example, when we held the

pencil it did not move. The gravitational force was still extant, but it was obscured by another

mechanism, the force of our hands to uphold the pencil.

Therefore reality must have several realms. There is the realm that we experience, the

empirical in figure 1. We experience the pencil falling or the pencil being held in our fingers. We

feel the force of gravity as we stand or sit. The empirical is a subset of events that actually occur,

the realm of the actual in figure 1. The actual is the realm of all the events that occur whether or

not a human senses them. There are sound waves below and above out ability to hear them.

Gravity still exists even if a pencil doesn’t fall. If a tree falls in a forest with no one to hear it, it

still makes a noise. These events are caused by properties inherent in structures of real things.

This is the realm of the real from figure 1. The earth is a structure that has properties such as

gravitational force. For Bhaskar, a thing is real if it is capable of causing events in the Actual

realm (Bhaskar, 1997). The events that occur actual and empirical realms are caused by the

structure and properties of the objects in the Real realm. These properties may or may not

manifest effects in the other realms since they may not always be in operation or visible or may

be over ruled by properties of other objects.

Now the realm of the real is also not a flat domain, but each level of structures and

mechanisms that are identified begs the question as to what is the explanation for their existence.

For example if we look at the composition of salt from (Bhaskar, 1997, p. 169):

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Stratum I 2Na + 2HCl = 2NaCl + H2

explained by

Stratum II theory of atomic number and valency Mechanism 1

explained by

Stratum III theory of electrons and atomic structure Mechanism 2

explained by

Stratum IV [competing theories of subatomic structure] [Mechanism 3]

we see that we can explain the phenomenon of salt at the chemical level. We can then explain the

chemical level by appeal to atomic number which is in turn explained by electron theory, which

is turn, can be explained by a theory of subatomic structure so on. Each level above is caused by

powers emerging from the lower level. This is normally the sequence by which scientific

discovery proceeds that will be discussed in more detail below.

This area of knowledge is referred to as the intransitive realm of since these are

structures that do not change in response to human mental activity.

Epistemology

This area of knowledge is known in CR as the transitive realm of knowledge since

knowledge is held to be a material production by human activity and thus subject to error and

change. CR holds that knowledge of the intransitive realm is mediated by means of theories. We

know things only by the interpretation that our concepts give phenomena. It is a social product

constructed from previously derived social products that point to objects in the realm of the real.

We see that knowledge is not only produced but is in an ongoing process of transformation. We

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see then that knowledge may change independently of the Real objects or the Real objects may

change independently of knowledge. There is no necessary connection between them.

Since we only have access to the empirical realm of events, to gain a conception of the

Real structures and mechanisms that cause the observed phenomena, we must perform

transcendental analysis. This consists of asking the question as to what structures and

mechanisms must exist to cause these phenomena. We transcend the empirical facts to arrive at

that which is not empirically sensible but required for the phenomena to exist. While this bears a

resemblance to interpretive methods such as phenomenology, it is different in that it is based on

the structured ontology described above as opposed to the flat ontology proposed for

interpretivism and a different conception of generalization. The concept of generalization

employed by positivism or interpretivism is one of extent; seeking to expand the range of areas

where the rule applies. In CR, generalization is vertical, it seeks to penetrate the layers of

phenomena to arrive at the basic structures and mechanisms that cause them. The critical realist

concept of science is thus an ongoing social activity with the aim of production of knowledge

about the mechanisms about production of the phenomena in nature that combine to produce the

flux of the phenomena of the world. It is the systematic attempt to express in thought the

structure and ways of acting of things that exist and act independently of human thought

(Bhaskar, 1997). The basic process of scientific discovery is a dialectic as illustrated in figure 2.

A regularity is discovered, a number of attempts are made to build models that explain the

regularity by means of generative mechanism. These in turn are subjected to empirical test. More

about this concept will be discussed in the methodology section below.

These concepts differ significantly from that of positivism and interpretivism. Both of

these approaches hold that only things which can be sensed can be known. While interpretivists

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would agree on the conceptual nature of knowledge, the positivists, following Hume (1999),

would argue that rational analysis cannot assist to arrive at the truth, only empirical experiment

can do that. They also differ on how they can be known. Positivism holds that we can have a

clear unbiased perspective on reality while interpretivism denies that view. It holds that our view

is obscured either by our finitude, our biases, distortions of perception or other issues that cause

us not to be able receive a true perspective.

FIGURE 2

Critical Realist View of Scientific Activity (from Bhaskar, 1997, p. 145)

Causality and the Concept of Closure

Positivist Approaches

The positivist approach has its foundation in the epistemology of Hume. Hume argued a

radical form of empiricism in opposition to the rational empiricism of Descartes and Locke. He

posited the following main points: 1) Knowledge does not come by reasoning, but only by

experience (Hume, 1999, p. 84). We cannot reason a priori to determine causality; 2) In terms of

causality, causes are distinct events from effects (ibid. p. 85). In other words, we cannot discern

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effects from causes or causes from effects. It is vain to attempt to discover causality by reason or

mathematics (ibid); 3) Even if we experience with constant and regular conjunctions that seem to

be related as cause and effect, we cannot form a conclusion about what the connection is

between the events (ibid, p. 86) because; 4) the past is not a reliable predictor of the future (ibid,

pp. 87, 88). Consistently following this line of thought leads to a thoroughgoing skepticism about

ever being able to inductively identify cause and effect. Hume’s subsequent followers have not

been consistent. In deed, he was not so consistent himself. He identified three conditions

necessary for inferring causation: 1) contiguity between the events presumed to be cause and

effect; 2) temporal precedence of the cause over the effect; 3) constant conjunction of the cause

and effect (Cook & Campbell, 1979). Mill held similar views with the addition of the concept of

elimination of all other explanations of cause and effect (ibid, p. 18).

Hempel (1966) has given what is the dominant articulation of the positivist approach.

Following Hume’s lead, he argues that any hypothesis proposed as an explanation for a cause

and effect relationship must be grounded in experience and has empirical test implications (ibid,

p. 48). Amassing an increasing number and variety of successful empirical tests without

falsification leads to increasing confidence in the veracity of the hypothesis (ibid, pp. 32-38). To

discern between true laws and accidental generalizations, he argues that laws can serve as

counterfactual conditionals, if A had occurred then B would have been the case and subjunctive

conditions, if A should occur then so would B. Additionally, laws can be used to explain whereas

accidental generalizations cannot. (Ibid, p. 56). A law of cause and effect can be generalized

from empirical data or derived from existing verified theory, if implied by that theory. (Ibid, p.

58).

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In summary, for the positivist, laws are statements about events that assert that “A is the

cause of B” if and only if a constant conjunction of A and B has been empirically detected with

no disconfirming events. It implies that the law will have deductive implications at the sensory

level in all times and places.

Critical Realist approach

The critical realist criticizes the positivist approach as being one in which the possibility

of science is endangered because it has no real basis on which to identify a sequence of events

due to causation and one that is accidental. The positivist concept of laws makes no distinction

between the events and the law, i.e. if a series of events occurs and continues to occur, then a law

is held to occur. Hempel (1966) struggles with this problem. He holds that constant conjunctions

should be considered as a law only when there is reason to believe that the law is true (ibid, p.

55). He also relaxes the definition to include statements that “hold only approximately and with

certain qualifications” (ibid, p. 55). He draws the distinction between accidental and causal

generalizations by indicating that causal generalizations will support counterfactual conditionals

and subjunctive conditionals about potential instances and serve as the basis for explanation.

(ibid, p.56). Finally, he states that a constant conjunction can be considered a law if it does not

contradict accepted theory (ibid, pp 57,58). He gives as examples of accidental conjunctions a

statement such as “all rocks in this box contain iron.” (ibid, p. 56). This cannot be a law

statement because it cannot support the statement, “if this pebble had been put into the box, it

would contain iron.” (ibid, p. 56). Similarly, he argues that the statement cannot explain why all

the rocks in the box contain iron.

This example can be argued against in the following manner. The problem seems to be

with the size of the box. Suppose the box were as big as the earth or even contained all rocks in

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the known universe. In this case, the proposed law would necessarily be true because it

encompasses everything even though it cannot meet Hempel’s conditions. Additionally, Hempel

states that many “empirical generalizations” are accepted without theoretical grounding such as

Galileo’s, Kepler’s and Boyle’s laws (ibid. p. 58). It is difficult to see how a generalization

formed on the basis of a finite set of data is different from the box of rocks generalization.

In contrast, the critical realist approach is founded in its ontology. Given that reality is

structured in terms of structures and mechanisms, causation is determined by showing that a

causal mechanism exists that can produce that effect. Thus causation for the critical realist is

founded in necessity by virtue of relationship of structures and mechanisms in the Real realm

rather than by inference from correlation of events in the Empirical. Additionally, for the critical

realist, law statements are not statements about empirical events, but statements about actions

characteristic about things in the world.

For the critical realist, then, determination of causation requires not empirical

demonstration of conjoined events, but rather transcendental reasoning as described above.

Causation is developed by determination of the state of nature that must exist to cause the effects

observed. Further, the critical realist realizes that causality may exist but not be manifest in the

empirical realm. This occurs do to causal mechanisms that are not always active or where the

effects of one mechanism can be overridden by another mechanism or set of mechanism. The

example of the pencil above demonstrates how that mechanisms can be overridden. If I hold a

pencil in my fingers, gravity still is active, it is just not manifested. Thus experimental

demonstration of causality is not always possible because of the interaction of mechanisms. Thus

in CR, causality is often referred to as a tendency and causal laws are statements about the

tendencies of things.

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The positivist might respond that the demonstration of a conjunction of events requires

the proper closure of the environment to ensure that only the causal mechanism desired is

manipulated. For the positivist, closure has three characteristics. First, it is free from affects

external to the environment to be examined. This characteristic of closure is known as extrinsic

closure. Another characteristic of closure is intrinsic closure, that the internal state of the

environment to be manipulated does not change so that it always generates the same response to

a certain stimuli. The CR argues that this type of closure is possible only under specially

constructed experiments not in the unmanipulated natural world and is not possible in the realm

of social science because of the nature of man.

Critical Realist Social Science Implications

One of the essential questions in philosophy of science has been the methodological

question of the relationship between the methods of natural science and social science. To what

extent can the methods of natural science be employed in the social sciences? This is the

question of naturalism. Naturalism holds that social science can be studied using the same

methods as natural science. Grossly over-simplifying, positivists to a more or lesser extent have

adopted a naturalistic position and seek to employ the rigorous methods of natural science to

attempt to identify constant conjunctions within the realm of social science while interpretivists

on the other hand reject naturalism and argue that social science is concept dependent and we

don’t therefore have a clear view of the phenomena and we must use different methods in the

social sciences.

CR recognizes a difference between natural and social science. Social science differs in

that it does not deal with a constant relationship of unchanging objects. Rather it deals with

relationships of people who are capable of observing their world, consideration of that

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experience and changing behavior. Social science is therefore always an open system. On the

other hand, it posits that concept dependence does not mean non-existence. While our

conceptions of the ultimate reality might be unique to us, there exists an ultimate reality to be

considered. CR therefore adopts a “constrained” view of naturalism where it is realized that

social structures do not exist independently of the activities that they govern, do not exist

independently of their agents’ conception of them and are only relatively enduring (Outhwaite,

1998).

The social ontology of CR is populated by social forms that are structures of relationships

between agents and also by the agents themselves. The major set of activity focuses around the

relationship between structure and agency. The structure and agency controversy focuses around

attempts to define their relationship. Prior to CR, three main approaches have been taken to

attempt to resolve the issue. Weber, Popper and J. S. Mill adopted an individualist approach

(Model I) in which they argued that social phenomena could be reduced to the actions of

individual agents (Bhaskar, 1979). This methodological individualism flounders in the face of

attempts to explain individual behavior in the context of social phenomena, as each action

presupposes a social context e.g. a tribesman a tribe, cashing a check presupposes a banking

system (Bhaskar, 1979). Durkheim, on the other hand, adopted a collectivist approach (Model II)

in which the collective, e.g. society, creates the individual. This view has two problems. It tends

to reify the concept of the social collective, making it a concrete reality when it is not one. The

other is that it has difficulty explaining how society changes over time.

The third model (Model III), propounded by Peter Berger adopts an approach in which

the society creates the individual and then the individual produces society in a continuous

dialectic (Bhaskar, 1979). In this model, society is an externalization of man and man is an

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internalization of society. Trying to avoid individualism and reification of society, it combines

both (Bhaskar, 1979). A similar criticism is made against Giddens’ Structuration theory.

Structuration is held to consider society as a “continuous flow of conduct . . . which changes or

maintains a malleable social world” (Archer, 1982, p. 457) and to be predicated on a duality of

structure as opposed to a dualism. In addition to (or perhaps because of) conflating structure and

agency, it ignores the historicity of structures and additionally is unable to provide an analytical

perspective on when in the face of significant change initiative, structural stability or change will

prevail(Archer, 1982). In these models, we see society disappearing into the individual (Model

I), the individual disappearing into society (Model II) or both being conflated (Model III).

CR holds structure and agency to be separate and distinct ontological entities. Social

forms has emergent properties that are separate and distinct from the individual entities that

make it up. What makes the social form what it is, is the relationship between the individuals that

make it up. Thus this model can be called a relational model. The model that describes societal

relationships is called the Transformational Model of Social Action(TMSA) (Archer, 1998b;

Bhaskar, 1979). This encompasses six main points:

1) Societies are irreducible to people

2) Social forms are a necessary condition for any intentional act

3) The pre-existence of social forms establishes their autonomy as possible objects of

investigation

4) The causal power of social forms establishes their reality

5) The pre-existence of social forms entails a transformational model of social action.

6) The causal power of social forms is mediated through human agency

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Point 1 is rules out Methodological Individualism. It implies that a bridge is necessary to to

connect structure and agency (Archer, 1998b). In point 2, it argues similarly to structuration that

social structures condition the actions of agents by applying incentives and restrictions to them.

Point 3 marks a real departure from structuration in that in CR temporarility or “tense” is

very important in the analysis. Structuration holds that structures exist only through the current

actions of agents. CR holds that these structures exist separately from agents and that individuals

come into a world already populated with these structures. CR argues that even if a society

should decide at a point in time to change the structures, they cannot be changed in a split second

but require time to change. Archer (1982) cites the example of Castro’s attempt to eliminate

illiteracy from Cuba in the aftermath of the revolution.

CR also makes an ontological distinction between structures and agency making them

separate entities as opposed to an ‘elision’ (Archer, 1998b) of them. Point 4 establishes the

ground on which they are to be identified as real, as opposed to the conception of Interpretivism,

which in some articulations, holds that structures are an interpretation of the subject. This

distinction is held to be the correction of the errors of Model I, II and III. Only by maintaining a

dualism and historicity, can a proper explanation of intentional acts be made.

Because of the pre-existence of social forms, agents do not create the forms, they either

reproduce or transform them (point 5). This is opposed to the idea that agents “structurate” the

social forms in the present. According to CR, we are never free of the dead hand of the past; it

lays on us in the structure of the social forms that they have created. We can only react to them

by accepting and reproducing them or rejecting, partially or completely and changing them,

either partially or completely.

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Lastly, CR holds that social forms exert their causal powers through the actions of agents

(point 6). Social forms do not exist of themselves. In fact they are invisible. One cannot point to

anything and say there is a particular social form. Agents enact the social forms. Per CR, it is a

truism that without people there are no social forms. However, CR does not hold that a social

form exists only because of this existing set of people. Archer (1998b) uses two analogies to

discuss the differences in conception. The latter conception, “this people here present” might be

analogous to an “endless bale of material unrolling through time” (Archer, 1998b, p. 362). It can

be grasped only in its totality and at most can be described as having a pattern. In the CR

analogy, society might be viewed as a garment handed down over time that shows wear and is

patched and overpatched, let out and taken in and some whole parts replaced. Over time, very

little of the original material or design might be retained. Actors in the past have enormous

influence on the present and future. This image of societal change allows inspection of the

various changes, how they were applied and how they wore. For this analogy to be applicable,

social forms and agency must be ontologically separate.

The basic conception of the CR model of social action is shown in figure 3 (Archer,

1998b). Two basic assumptions as described above are that 1) structures predate any actions that

transform them and 2) structural change/reproduction follow them. The model describes social

action as follows. Previous cycles of activity have produced the existing structures (T1). These

structures have arisen as the unintended results of past actions on the part of actors. These

structures condition the actions of actors by the fact of the actors’ limited understanding of the

structures and why they exist. The actors’ limited understanding of their own motives

compounds this lack of understanding. This creates a “production” process in which the actors

interact with the existing structures and begin a process of responding to them (T2 to T3). That

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interaction results in either a reproduction (morphostasis) or transformation (morphogenesis).

This transformed set of social forms is then the input for the next cycle.

Figure 3

Archer (1998b)’s Combined TMSA and Morphogenetic/Static Model of Social

Action

Methodology in the Social Sciences

We focus on the social sciences since the management and IS realms are social science

areas. The critical realist methodology for social science stems from all that has gone before.

Given that we have a reality that is structured into empirical, actual and real realms in which the

structures and mechanisms create events in the actual and real realms; that our knowledge of

those structures and mechanisms are known indirectly through transcendental analysis of events

that occur; and that causation is therefore determined by identifying the structures and

mechanisms that are involved in the production of the events, explanatory methodology must

provide a process by which we move backward from the empirical events to hypothesize the

causal mechanism and then forward again to the empirical to test the hypothesized mechanism.

This process is what Bhaskar has identified which is pictured in Figure 2, above. That

figure illustrates Bhaskar’s concept of the process of scientific discovery. As he describes it, a

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regularity (or actually an invariance of result) is identified, a plausible explanation for it is

developed by means of creative model building and then the reality of the entities and processes

described in the explanation is verified (Bhaskar, 1997). He further argues that the positivist

stops after identification of the regularity, the interpretivist stops after the second step, only the

critical realist continues to the third step. Only if the third step is taken, can there be adequate

demonstration of causal laws.

Bhaskar has developed two different methodologies for explanation within an open

environment such as a social system which go by the name RRRE and DREI(Bhaskar, 1979;

Collier, 1994). However, Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen, & Karlsson (2002) consider these

methodologies too complicated and present their own consolidated methodology:

1) Description – describe the event or phenomena to be studied. Here we seek to

describe the regularity of result that we wish to study. Many different kinds of studies

may be used to describe the regularity.

2) Analytical Resolution – separate the phenomena by distinguishing the various aspects

components or dimensions. Identify many potential factors that impinge upon the

phenomena under study.

3) Abduction/Theoretical Redescription – interpret and redescribe the phenomena under

various potential different theories about structures and relationships. Abduction is

the logical inference method developed by Charles Peirce that exists beside deduction

and induction in which reasoning is done from the results and a possible rule to a

case. For example, if I have a handful of white beans and a rule that all the beans

from sack A are white then abductively I reason that the beans came from sack A.

This method does not generate logical certainty, but can generate one or more logical

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possibilities to be considered. The objective here is to generate many possible

theories of explanation that can be compared and possible integrated.

4) Retroduction – Here for each of the components/dimensions selected in phase 2, we

describe what are the fundamental structures and mechanisms required for the

hypotheses developed in stage 3 to be. Stages 3 and 4 are often closely related in

practice.

5) Comparison – Here each of the theories developed in stages 3 and 4 are investigated

as to their explanatory power for the phenomena under study. The theory with the

largest explanatory power is considered to be the better theory.

6) Concretization – How do the structures and mechanisms hypothesized manifest

themselves in concrete situations? Here we can review case studies that caused this

study or we can perform new studies to attempt to isolate the mechanisms under

study.

It can be seen that the progress of research flows from the concrete to the theoretical

(stages 1-4) and then back to the concrete (states 5-6). This follows the pattern described by

Bhaskar and represented in figure 2. Identification of a regularity (stage 1), model building

(stages 2-5), empirical evaluation (stage 6). Roman (1994) is given as a paradigm example of

research from this standpoint.

Methods

In general, CR adopts a “critical methodological pluralism” (Danermark et al., 2002)

toward methods used in research. There is no “critical realist method” but rather methods are

selected based on the metatheoretical assumptions inherent in CR. When using these methods

which have developed in other metatheoretical environments, the critical realist must take care to

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understand where the metatheoretical assumptions of the method vary from CR and make

approprate adjustments.

In looking at methods, in explanatory research, CR indicates that we are interested in

identifying the structures and mechanisms involved in creating the empirical phenomena that we

observe. Thus we are interested in moving from the empirical to the real realms. Similarly, since

different layers of reality are emergent from layers below, we are focused on working with

multiple strata, so our method must accommodate multiple levels. We also do not assume that

we are working in a closed system. Our methods must be focused on working in open systems

since social systems are open systems. Similarly, we cannot reduce society to aggregation of

individuals nor reify society, nor can be conflate them, but rather we must maintain their

separateness and focus on their relationships (Danermark et al., 2002).

Sayer (1992) divides various methods into categories based on their areas of focus.

Figure 4 illustrates the different kinds of research types. Concrete research focuses on the

different events that occur in the empirical realm extending to the structures and mechanisms that

cause them. Abstract research deals only with the structures and mechanisms that they possess

and their relationships. Generalization (extensive) research goes across a large number of events

seeking to identify formal relationships among them. Finally, synthesis seeks to create “grand

theory” that explain large groups of events, structures and mechanisms by creating

generalizations that cover a large area of these entities (Sayer, 1992), In a larger context, they

could be categorized as “extensive” or “intensive”. Extensive methods are used to identify such

things as regularities, common patterns, taxonomic distinctions. It seeks to create a large scale

description of the phenomena under observation. It deals almost exclusively with the empirical

realm and thus has limited explanatory power. Intensive methods deal with how a process works

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in this or a small number of cases and seek to identify causal properties of the environment under

observation.

Figure 4

Research Types from Sayer (1992)

We will now look at the specific categories of statistical methods and qualitative methods

and see how they interact with critical realism.

Statistical Methods

Since the dominant paradigm within the research communities has historically been that of

positivism, CR has been forced to deal with the issue of the role of statistical methods early in its

existence. The use of statistics for causal inference has usually been held in low esteem due to

the differing concepts of causality and as Mingers (2004) has indicated, the meta theoretic

assumptions of CR clash with those of statistical methods. The key criticism seems that

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statistical methods are confined to the empirical realm and have no penetrative value to the real

realm and therefore we cannot determine the causal mechanisms. As an example, Danermark et

al (2002, p. 168), cite the example of a quantitative study in which elderly people were examined

for the cause of ill health due to forced relocation due to housing reconstruction. It seems that the

elderly experienced higher rates of mortality and morbidity when subjected to forced relocation

than those allowed to remain in place. A statistical analysis shows that both men and women

suffer equally from this action, gender being non-significant in the analysis. A strictly

quantitative approach would then move on to consider other attributes such as class and age. This

conclusion would be correct in stating that both men and women suffer in relatively the same

proportion but in correct in saying that gender has no role in the cause of the ill health. It might

be true that women suffer more psychologically than men in the loss of “home” and this stress

might be the cause of their illness. Similarly, we might find that men have a lot of practical and

domestic work and thus worn out physically, have increased sickness. This illustrates the

limitations of statistical methods. In traditional analysis, CR holds that statistical methods are

appropriate for extensive research, identifying demi-regularities to be examined or perhaps for

verifying that certain causal mechanisms exists but not for intensive research such as identifying

causation.

There is a minority viewpoint. Several scholars, (Finch & McMaster, 2002; Olsen, 1999;

Pratschke, 2003; Ron, 2002) have argued for a larger role for statistics within explanatory

analysis. Finch and McMaster argue that non-parametric techniques can be used retroductive

analysis of causes of economic phenomena. Amit Ron argues that social scientists use regression

analysis in a way described by the CR account of science rather than that described by

positivism. Pratschke also argues that CR can resolve problems in the use of statistical models

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and that the use of causal modeling is consistent with CR. He argues that Structural Equation

Modelling can be used to evaluate theoretical hypotheses involving structures and mechanisms.

Qualitative Methods

Qualitative methods have received a more favorable reception within CR, probably due

to the fact that the epistemological assumptions of CR are more in line with the interpretivist

roots of the methods than the positivist roots of quantitative methods. In qualitative studies, the

focus is often on cases. We study in depth particular examples in their natural environment in an

attempt to gain insight into the phenomena and generate a theory about them. Most qualitative

methods begin with a hermeneutic or phenomenological metatheoretic (Danermark, 2002). CR

recognizes the need for hermeneutics within the study process. We recognize that the data that

we receive from the survey or interview or even observation cannot be taken at face value and

must be interpreted. Also, we know that the researcher’s background and experience color their

interpretations. This is all part of the transitive realm where our knowledge is concept dependent.

Here the concepts that enter into the picture are those of the subject and the researcher.

The other predominant metatheoretical base is phenomenological methods such as

ethnomethodology. Phenomenology begins with perception. The researcher then attempts to get

behind the perception to get to the “thing itself.” This is done by means of abstraction to get at

the essence or essential elements of the phenomenon (Danermark, 2002). This form of

abstraction is quite different from that used in CR which seeks to delve into the phenomenon to

determine the structure and causal mechanisms behind it. Generalization is also used but here it

means to identify what various things have in common as opposed to the meaning that CR gives

it, the transfactual conditions that must exist for the phenomena to exist (Danermark, 2002).

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Thus while phenomenological analysis is possible for CR, it must be aware of and transform

those aspects that are not in accord with the CR metatheoretical base.

A Brief History of Published Work in Critical Realism

Critical Realism has it foundation in the work of Roy Bhaskar (1979; 1997). The

publication of A Realist Theory of Science (1975) (RTS) marked the beginning of the CR

revolution. In it, Bhaskar lays out his description of transcendental realism in which he lays out

his conception of the intransitive and transitive realms of knowledge, the ontology of structured

and layered reality, his critique of empiricist science (both positivist and interpretivist), a

revision of the concept of causality, and his view of the scientific activity. The second edition

was published in 1997. His next book, The Possibility of Naturalism (1979) (TPN), marked the

appearance of critical naturalism, which applies the transcendental methods of RST to social

theory and especially the concepts of structure and agency. Collier (1994) has published what

has been termed a useful summary of Bhaskar’s thought. A useful compilation of basic readings

on CR is Critical Realism Essential Readings by Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson, & Norrie

(1998b). This latter work focuses on and expands upon various ideas within RST and TPN. An

interdisciplinary set of articles contrasting CR with postmodernism has been published by Lopez

and Potter (2005).

In terms of social theory, the key work is Archer’s, Realist Social Theory: the

Morphogenetic Approach (1995). In this work, Archer expands upon and corrects Bhaskar’s

concept of the relationship between structure and agency presented in TPN. She takes especial

aim at Gidden’s Structuration theory, describing it as “conflating” structure and agency and

ignoring the time related nature of structure. Archer has published other articles dealing with

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relationship of structure and agency. Tony Lawson has published Economics and Reality (1997)

which applies CR to the field of economics.

In methodological literature, Andrew Sayer’s Method in Social Science is the seminal

methodology text, bringing out the social science methodological conclusions of CR. Danermark

et al’s Explaining Society Critical Realism in the Social Sciences (2002) extends Sayer’s work

with the valuable methodology described above.

There are several associations dedicated to the development and propagation of CR. The

International Association for Critical Realism (IACR), founded in 1997 seeks to be a facilitating

resource for those interested in CR. It sponsors a number of workshops and seminars

geographically centered in the UK, an annual summer conference and The Journal of Critical

Realism. The Center for Critical Realism (1996) of which IACR is an outgrowth, is a charitable

trust for the development of CR theory and philosophy.It currently sponsors a book and seminar

series. The Web Site for Critical Realism (WSCR) (www.criticalrealism.com), archives articles

from contributors on the various subject areas of CR.

In the management field, the earliest article found was an Academy of Management

Review article by Haridimos Tsoukas, The Validity of Idiographic Research Explanations

(1989). A widely cited initial article is Michael Reed’s, In Praise of Duality and Dualism:

Rethinking Agency and Structure in Organizational Analysis (Reed, 1997). Published in

Organization Studies, it argues that recent studies in the structure and agency debate based on

postmodern (interpretivist) methods have weakened the ability of researchers to explain the

forces that lie outside of the control of actors. Another Academy of Management article that have

brought CR into the management literature is Tsang and Kwan with their article: Replication and

Theory Development in Organizational Science: A Critical Realist Perspective (1999). Mingers

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has also brought CR into the OR area with his article, The Contribution of Critical Realism as an

Underpinning Philosophy for OR/MS and Systems (Mingers, 2000). Ackroyd and Fleetwood

(2000) in their Realist Perspectives on Management and Organization have created a

compendium of articles including the Reed article summarizing key articles in the management

and organization studies area from a CR perspective.

In the information systems field, relatively little has been published in major journals.

The journal Information and Organization has been instrumental in introducing CR into major IS

journals with his special edition on CR featuring Mingers’ article, Real-izing information

systems: critical realism as an underpinning philosophy for information systems (Mingers,

2004). This special issue features responses by Emmanuel Monod and Heinz Klein with a

rejoinder by Mingers. This potentially valuable introduction, is constrained by space limitations

from being a full orbed summary. Matthew Smith has also contributed to Information and

Organization with his article, Overcoming theory-practice inconsistencies: Critical Realism and

Information Systems Research (Smith, In Press). Alastair Mutch has been researching IS from a

CR perspective since the mid 1990s (Mutch, 1999a, b). As can be seen by limited number of

citations, the CR is still somewhat of a novelty in management and information systems research

circles.

This literature review is not a complete listing of all literature by any means, but it

demonstrates the breadth and depth that the literature has achieved to this point.

All that is called Critical Realism is not Bhaskarian Critical Realism

There are a number of references to CR in various sources that actually refer to other

philosophies. For example, Trochim (2001, p. 19) states “The difference (between a critical

realist and a positivist) is that the post-positivist critical realist recognizes that all observation is

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fallible and has error and that all theory is revisable. In other words, the critical realist is critical

of a person’s ability to know reality with certainty. Whereas the positivist believed that the goal

of science was to uncover the truth, the post-positivist critical realist believes that the goal of

science is to hold steadfastly to the goal of getting it right about reality, even though this goal

can never be perfectly achieved. (italics in the text)” This unfortunately makes critical realism to

be only a perspective difference with positivism, differing only in that it believes that knowledge

and theories are fallible. As we saw above, critical realism has significantly different ontological

and epistemological positions and a different view of causation from that of positivism that

should be addressed. Similarly, Cook & Campbell (1979, p. 29,92) writing only four years after

the publication of Bhaskar’s Realist Theory of Science, while aware of some of Bhaskar’s

thought, use the term ‘critical-realist’ to refer to ‘an evolutionary perspective’ that ‘enables us to

recognize causal perceptions as “subjective” or “constructed by the mind”’ (p. 29).

Verstegen (2000) has added valuable contribution by providing an article that describes a

philosophy that flourished in the United States in the first half of the 20th century. Roy Sellers

used the term critical realism to refer a form of realism that he used to oppose the dominant

philosophies of his day. This doctrine was one of “non-reductive scientific materialism”

(Verstegen, 2000). His philosophy had much in common with Bhaskarian CR, including the

structuredness of the world, its transcendent status and our variable access to it. Lovejoy, another

of these critical realists provided an early defense of the transitive/intransitive distinction. But

while today’s CR is a normative discipline, the older CR was an epistemological doctrine.

Discussion

This review of CR and its literature in the management and information systems fields

has shown that this philosophy of science is still in its initial phases of development. The

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metatheoretic levels are well defined having been ironed out in controversy over the past 30

years. Social theory has also had some significant work done with the contributions of Archer to

the structure/agency issues. However, in the methodology area, work is really just beginning.

Danermark et al (2002) have proposed a social science explanatory research methodology that is

an important contribution to the field. Some important controversy is occurring about the use of

statistical methods, additional work needs to be done with qualitative research methods. In the

applied fields, CR has just begun appearing in major management and IS journals. Much work

needs to be done to develop to develop CR approaches to the management and IS domains.

How should researchers approach CR? Mingers (2004) categorizes the reaction of

researchers to the diversity of opinion as “Imperialists [who} argue for the dominance of one

particular paradigm . . . either on epistemological grounds or in the belief that it is necessary to

create a strong discipline. Isolationists . . . [who argue that] there are distinctively different

paradigms and that these are generally incommensurable—therefore research should develop

separately within each paradigm. . . . [P]luralists accept, and indeed welcome, a diversity of

paradigms and research methods. Within this group, we can distinguish between those who

welcome diversity for its own sake those who see different methods as being more or less

appropriate for particular research questions or situations and those who argue that research

should strive to be trans-paradigmatic, routinely combining philosophi-cally distinct research

methods” (Mingers, 2004, p. 88). It seems then that CR should be welcomed by all research sects

except for the imperialists of positivism or interpretivism. CR itself would argue for an

imperialist position. Believing as it does that its metatheoretic principles are more correct

(although corrigible) compared to positivism or interpretivism, it holds that they should be used

as opposed to others.

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Conclusion

This article has provided a summary of the major tenets of critical realism in a small

space. CR advocates a structured ontology, composed into realms of the empirical events, actual

events and the real structures and mechanisms that cause the events, in contrast to the flat

ontology of atomistic events postulated by postivism and interpretivism. Epistemologically, it

holds that our knowledge of the real world is socially constructed and conceptually known

similar to that held by some interpretivists. Its concept of causation is that of necessity, being that

the structures and the mechanisms in the real realm cause the events that we see. This is opposed

to the positivist and interpretivist conceptions of conjoined events. It holds to a modified version

of naturalism, the same methodologies used in the study of natural sciences may be used in the

social sciences with allowances for the nature of the social environment. Archer has proposed the

morphogenetic theory of social action which provides a proposal for the structure and agency

problem that is unique. Structures and agency are separate ontological entities that are related to

each other and interact with each other so that structures are either reproduced or transformed.

Danermark et al have proposed a six step social science explanatory methodology that provides a

methodology to probe beyond the concrete appearances to the structures and mechanisms that

cause those appearances. We also examined various methods commonly used and found that CR

advocated a “critical methodological pluralism (Danermak et al, 2002). Statistical methods we

found limited to examining taxonomic/formal relationships in the empirical realm. Qualitative

techniques such as hermeneutic and phenomenological analysis were shown be consistent with

CR given a careful watchfulness to ensure that the metatheoretic principles of CR are retained.

We found that the literature related to the metatheoretic aspects of the philosophy are relatively

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complete as are key parts of social theory, however as relates to concrete methodologies, much

work needs to be done.

For the researcher, CR seems to provide metatheoretical underpinnings that provide a

more sure foundation for research activities in the management and information systems field.

Much work however needs to be done to develop the methodological practices. Rob Stones

articulated this at the CCR conference in 1998. He indicated that critical realists had not

“developed enough sensitivity to . . . thinking and tracking the methodological consequences of a

realist methodology” (Archer, Sharp, Stones, & Woodiweiss, 1998). While some progress has

been made, additional work needs to be done. The six-step methodology offered by Danermark

et al, while offering a more rigorous approach than either positivism or interpretivism needs to be

explicitly tried within the management and IS fields. This will lead to further refinements and

maturation of the methodology. Similarly examining the qualitative methods to understand how

they can be integrated into CR methodologies is needed. Additionally, the existing concepts

within the fields need to be integrated into a domain ontology that describes what the structures

and mechanisms are that exist within the domains of management and information systems.

Another activity that needs to be done is to examine existing research in the fields in the

light of CR metatheory and methodology to determine what additional research is required. For

example, the Technology Adoption Model (Davis, 1989; Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis,

2003) which indicates that intention to adopt a new technology or actual usage of a new

technology is caused by perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use of the the technology is

based on a set of statistical models. From a CR standpoint, they have identified a set of demi-

regularities. What are the structures and mechanisms that cause these phenomena? Work needs

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to be done to take this research further. Similar work can be determined for other existing

conceptions.

Critical Realism is a promising but immature philosophy of science that may be able to

improve the rigor and usefulness of research. There is much additional work to be done to bring

this beginning to maturity.

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