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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE JUNE 1 MOVEMENT: COMPELLING JIANG TO RESIST JAPAN AND
THE CLIQUES ROLE IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT
The previous chapter discussed the background to the launching of the anti-
Japanese movement, with its supposedly suspect motives, by the Guangxi Clique and the
Southwestern leaders. This chapter will analyze how the Clique put the forcing Jiang to
resist Japan policy into practice and examine the measures carried out by Jiang when
dealing with the June 1 Movement, its development and result. The issues of how the two
parties reached reconciliation and to what extent the Clique contributed to the AJNUF will
also be dealt with. Through the analysis of these issues, I will argue that the June 1Movement was a test in the formation of the AJNUF and an important factor in the
reconciliation between the Clique and Jiang. I will also discuss the significance of the
movement for the important events which followed, in particular, the Xian Incident,
which took place three months later.
Forcing Jiang to Resist Japan
The June 1 Movement lasted three months until early September 1936. it can be
divided into two phases: the first from June 1 to July 18, in which Guangdong and Guangxi
were the main force, and the later phase when Guangxi proceeded its own. Guangxi was
the only participant of the June 1 Movement from beginning to end.
In the first phase, with Guangzhou as its centre and the Guangdong-Guangxi
alliance its main pillar, the activities of the movement included the military measures taken
by the Clique and Chen Jitang and the constant political pressure on Nanjing urging it to
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declare war immediately against Japan, and, in response, Jiangs various tactics to counter
this movement. In other words, the bi-Jiang kangri policy was carried out by a
combination of propaganda campaigns and military pressures. Along with the developing
and changing situation with the two Guangs, the movement eventually fixed on constantappeals to Nanjing to promise to take the lead in national resistance on the lines that the
Southwest had propagandized. Of course, the real sponsors of the movement, according to
Joseph Stilwell, were Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi.1
For this reason, the discussion of the
main activities is focussed on the Clique.
The Southwest Political Council of the GMD and the Southwest Executive
Committee of the Nationalist Government at Guangzhou issued a circular telegram on May
26, only one day after the funeral of Hu Hanmin, urging Nanjing to protect the countryagainst the increase in the number of the Japanese troops in North China.
2According to
Liu Fei, Bais aide at that time, it aimed to express the Southwests anti-Japanese attitude
and determination to sway public opinion. Through openly publishing this telegram they
expected to attract people's sympathy for their stand and to arouse patriotic feelings against
Japanese aggression, on the one hand, and to incite people's discontent with Nanjing for its
impotence and non-resistance in its failure to deal with the further Japanese aggression in
both North and South China after 1935, on the other. Meanwhile, issuing such a circulartelegram was also an exploratory action of the Southwest in its preparation to implement
the forcing Jiang to resist Japan policy.3
Thus, this event seemed to be a prelude to the
official launching of the June 1 Movement.
On June 1, the Southwest Political Council and the Southwest Executive
Committee held an official meeting and moved to submit a petition to the Nanjing
Government and central party headquarters of the GMD calling on the Nationalist
Government to take the lead in resisting Japan. The petition stated that China was facing a
1U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9408 (June 19, 1936).
Hereafter as U. S. Military.
2For details of the increase in Japanese military forces in North China in the first half of
1936, see The Major Events of the Week, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 20 (May 25, 1936), p. 5;
and SMZYYK, Vol. 8, No. 1-2 (August 31, 1936), pp. 33-54.
3Liu Fei, Liangguang liuyi shibian, GXWSZL, No. 29 (1990), pp. 290-291 (hereafter
as Liangguang).
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moment when the country's fate hung in the balance as Japan speeded up its aggression in
not only North but also South China. It emphasized that only resistance could ensure the
survival of the country, and that the nation had no way out except for the whole country to
rise together with force and spirit to fight a last-ditch battle against the enemy. In thepetition they pledged full support if Nanjing would resist with armed forces. The
concluding paragraph of the message, which was strongly worded throughout, stated that
feeding the enemy with territory is like feeding fire with firewood and is national suicide.
We insist that not one more inch of Chinese territory be alienated.4
Perhaps seeking to
exploit the occasion as propaganda, the two Guangs issued another circular telegram to the
entire nation, publishing the contents of the petition in full on June 2. In the telegram they
asked the Central Government to permit them to march northward to fight Japan andrecover the lost territories. The telegram also expected all parties and groups throughout
the nation to press Nanjing to pass a resolution to fight Japan.5
Two days later, scores of
army generals in the provinces of the two Guangs led by Chen Jitang and Li Zongren issued
another circular telegram of support for the earlier resolution of the Southwestern
authorities calling for resistance against Japan and pledging to lead their men to avenge
the age-old humiliation of the country and strive to ensure the continued existence of the
nation.
6
This telegram was the manifesto of the Southwest, and it reflected theirconsciousness of striving for national independence and liberation. Of course, it was a very
good platform from which the Southwest could launch the movement. Whatever the
motive, the message reflected a strong anti-Japanese feeling. As Bai emphasized on June 5,
4U. S. Military, No. 9392 (June 5, 1936); and Guangxi gejie kangri jiuguo lianhehui
(ed.), Guangxi kangri jiuguo zhongyao wendian huiji, Nanning, 1936, p. 103 (hereafter as
Huiji).
5For details of the telegram, seeNanning minguo ribao, June 3, 1936. Also see Liu Fei,
Liangguang, p. 291; Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe,
1987, p. 88, and the same author, Liangguang shibian, GXWSZL, No. 22 (1985), pp. 48-
9; Huang Xuchu, Guangxi yu zhongyang nian yunian lai beihuan lihe yishu, CQ, No. 127
(16/10/1962), p. 17 (hereafter as Guangxi); Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The
Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979, pp. 307-8; and Huiji,
pp. 102-4.
6Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 307-8; andHuiji, pp.
49-50, and p. 104.
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they would rather die free men than live as slaves under Japanese domination.7
Meanwhile, as the advocate of scorched earth resistance, Li also called on military
leaders throughout the country to shed their blood in the cause of anti-Japanese
salvation.
8
Soon the two Southwestern organizations accepted the request of these armygenerals and reorganized the troops of the two Guangs as kangri jiuguojun, marching
northward under the flag of fighting Japan.9
The bi-Jiang kangri policy was in action.
These events marked the beginning of the June 1 Movement. The two provinces,
particularly Guangxi, carried out a general mobilization to meet the needs of anti-Japanese
activity. Thus, Guangxi, together with Guangdong, politically and militarily completed
preparation for bi-Jiang kangri.
At the same time, the Clique publicised in the province that the movement was apatriotic action with the sole aim of fighting Japan. This policy was widely propagated by
the provincial authorities not only in the mass media but also to the people through its
militia system. The entire province of Guangxi was mobilized under the anti-Japanese flag.
Militia and army were reorganized. Various anti-Japanese mass organizations, such as, the
National Salvation Association of Guangxi Cultural Circles (Guangxi wenhuajie jiuguohui)
and the National Salvation Association of Guangxi Workers (Guangxi gongren jiuguohui),
were established throughout the province. Women, students, and workers, all joined themovement.
10Students of tertiary and middle schools were more radical than others, but
their patriotic enthusiasm was well used and guided by the Clique. As a result, they were
organized as the Guangxi Student Army Corp.11
They were soon divided into many small
propaganda units and then sent to the countryside in order to mobilize the peasants and
7Hansu Chan, Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?, China Today, Vol. 2, No. 10, p. 188.
8Ibid.
9Huiji, p. 104.
10For details of these mobilizations, see Guangxi daxue wenfa xueyuan zizhihui (ed.),
Liuyi yundong jinian tekan, Guilin, 1937; and Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way in
Kuomintang China, 1931-1939, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993, chapters 4, 8,
and 14.
11Shenbao, June 29, 1936, p. 3.
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other masses for the patriotic cause of fighting Japan and saving the nation.12
It seemed
that a tide of anti-Japanese movement promoted and sponsored by the Clique had already
appeared in Guangxi.
In fact, the Southwest had already mobilized in both military preparation andpropaganda before June, even before the death of Hu Hanmin. Utilizing the alleged
menace of imminent Japanese invasion to impress the people with their patriotic
obligations, the authorities had enlisted the service of the newly organized National
Propaganda Commission to spread the doctrine of national defence and were enlisting
popular cooperation by various means for starting a war against Japan.13
This was a
response to the rising tide of national unity for resisting Japan since the end of 1935, which
many parties and groups had called for.
14
Further evidence might also explain theapparently spontaneous action in the two Guangs. In May, a special Guangdong
Commission made a tour of inspection in Guangxi, one of its main objects being to study
the provincial military system, particularly that of the militia.15
These might also be
considered as coincidental actions of the two provinces in preparation of mass mobilization
for action under the slogan of resistance.
To add fuel to the flame of the movement and to provide it with a just cause for the
action, the Guangxi leaders also frequently emphasized that their aim coincided with thecall of the Southwestern authorities. For example, when the Guangxi troops were on the
way northward, Li and Bai both repeatedly reiterated, through a series of orders and public
notices, that the movement was only for resisting Japan and national salvation, not for
opposing any individuals.16
For example, Bai clearly announced in his official declaration
at the launching of the movement and mass mobilization on June 1:
12Guangxi daxue wenfa xueyuan zizhihui (ed.),Liuyi yundong jinian tekan, pp. 14-7, 50-
6.
13U. S. Military, No. 9369 (22/5/1936); Giu Guo Sh Bao, 25/6/1936; and Hu zhuxi
zhisang weiyuanhui ed., Hu xiansheng jinian zhuankan, Guangzhou, 1936 (hereafter Hu
xiansheng).
14Giu Guo Sh Bao, January 4, 1936.
15U. S. Military, No. 9369 (22/5/1936), p. 3. Also see Guangxi of the Month, CJYK,
Vol. 3, No. 9 (1936), p. 12.
16Huiji, p. 61.
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When the entire nation has already reached the point of extinction, all existing
personal feelings of the past, gratitude or resentment between different groups and
parties, should be put-aside. From now on Chinese should not fight each other
anymore. Instead we Chinese should reunite and fight Japanese imperialism,
standing on one front.17
Indeed, these proclamations stated clearly that the Guangxi authorities were
building up a strong momentum which opposed civil war and regarded resistance as the
sole aim of the projected northern expedition. Obviously, it aimed, through mass
mobilization and wide propaganda, to put pressure on Jiang and Nanjing to make a
resolution for war against Japan.18
In so doing they renounced or concealed their personal
ambitions, if these really existed, which lay behind this movement from its inception. The
demands of national affairs came first, and they openly linked their ambitions with struggle
for national salvation. The CCP followed the same tactics at this time, or at least it seemed
to be so on the surface, possibly because they recognised that the tide of the time favoured
any groups and parties taking action against Japanese aggression; but certainly their
influence added to the anti-Japanese tide, regardless of what their motives were.19
As Bai
stated, the Guangxi group had issued many manifestos and petitions to Nanjing calling for a
war of resistance since 1931, now they found themselves no longer able to tolerate
Japanese aggression. Therefore, it was the time to put their anti-Japanese policy into
action, instead of enduring Nanjings continuing impotence.20
The Guangxi troops publicly declared their aim to the public in order to win popular
support. They strongly believed their action was for universal principles of nature and
society (gongli), and justice (zhengyi), for existence (shengcun) and self-defence (ziwei),
and for national conscience (liangxin) and moral personality (renge). This reflected a belief
that, as the Clique repeatedly emphasized, the people of the Pearl River valley should
17Bai Chongxi, Kangri jiuguo, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, Hong
Kong: Zhujiang ribaoshe, 1937, p. 58.
18Huang Xuchu, Guangxi, CQ, No. 127, p. 17.
19Giu Guo Sh Bao, June 25, 1936.
20Bai Chongxi, Kangri jiuguo, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.),Jiaotu kangzhan, p. 56.
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shoulder more responsibility in fighting Japan.21
For this reason, they clearly declared their
aims as follows:
1) We insist that the national government immediately break off all relations
with Japan, and abolish all humiliating treaties and agreements with Japan.
2) We oppose any kind of civil war and oppose any policy which results inChinese and the Chinese troops fighting each other.
3) We invite all anti-Japanese forces, no matter which region or party and
which army or section of the masses they belong to, to join us in order to
form a national revolutionary front for resistance.
4) On marching northward, we will not attack any towns and individuals or
troops, but we will join forces with the national people and strenuously fight
any one or group who declare themselves to be Chinese traitors and
endeavour to impede our progress northward.22
There is evidence that the Guangxi troops marching northward at that time were
mobilized by the above policies. Even Joseph Stilwell did not deny this. He recognized
that the policies sounded good and that morale of the Guangxi people was high under the
influence of such political propaganda.23
To demonstrate more widely their declared
purpose, the Clique also distributed large numbers of propaganda leaflets with slogans such
as Expand the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement, Japanese Is Our External
Enemy, Down with Japanese Imperialism, Down with Opponents of the Anti-Japanese
Movement, Down with All Sino-Japanese Treaties Signed Under Duress, and so on.24
They expected a broad and positive response throughout the country to this call. Thus, they
completed preparation for influencing public opinion for bi-Jiang kangri through such
propaganda.
It can be seen that the Cliques bi-Jiang kangri policy had already become
apparent. Its spearhead, at least outwardly, was directed against Japanese aggression, not
internal disputes. It sent Nanjing a message that resistance was the responsibility of every
Chinese. The message had a dual content. First, all of the people should rise to resist
Japan; and secondly, if some powerful people did not want to do this, then the Clique
21Ibid, pp. 53-54.
22Huiji, p. 48.
23U. S. Military, No. 9446 (July 31, 1936).
24During the movement, the newspapers in Guangxi published anti-Japanese slogans
daily, among themNanning minguo ribao was a best example. SeeNanning minguo ribao,
June 1936. Also see Hansu Chan, Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?, p. 188.
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would lead the Chinese people to do so without hesitation.25
The Clique thus tried to
convince the whole country that they were not only sincere themselves in wanting to resist
Japan but also willing to promote Nanjing in the movement of national liberation. In that
way, bi-Jiang kangri was put into effect. Meanwhile, the Pearl River ValleyRevolutionary theory, in which the people of the two Guangs were lauded as the main force
of the national revolution with the Clique as the leader, was closely linked with the anti-
Japanese movement they launched. Thus, personal purposes and ambitions, even if they
still existed, were increasingly weakened as the movement developed. Once Jiangs policy
was changed, for example, he came to cooperate with other groups and parties for
resistance, and any ideas of anti-Jiang action were no longer relevant to the universal ideal.
In such circumstances, fatong (orthodox legitimacy) was widely endorsed. Li and otherSouthwestern leaders consequently recognized, until the war was won, Nanjing as the sole
government of China, even though it was actually under the control of Jiang, whom they
distrusted and even opposed. Before even considering any chance of replacing Jiang, they
wanted to fight Japan to convince that their actions reflected the wishes of the majority of
the people.26
On the other hand, the differences between them, which were frequently
emphasized, were mostly concerned with policies towards Japanese aggression. They
never missed an opportunity to explain their different measures in dealing with Japan.
27
That is to say, the situation forced the Clique to avoid, as much as it could, building up the
image of a region actually opposing the central government for power only; but they
fostered the bi-Jiang kangri policy because it could attract more public support and
legitimate its opposition to Jiang.28
Once the bi-Jiang kangri movement was initiated, the Clique had to follow this
direction; otherwise, their actions would make no sense. As the Chinese saying goes,
water can either carry or destroy the boat. The movement was the boat sailing in thewater of the masses who were imbued with patriotism. The Guangxi leaders of course
25See Liuyi yulun yiban, in Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi yundong hou Bai
Chongxi de yanlun, Nanning, 1937, p. 266.
26Huang Xuchu, Guangxi, CQ, No. 127, p. 17.
27Ibid. Also see Hu Yugao, Gongfei xicuan ji, Guiyang: Yugao shudian, 1946, p. 110.
28Huiji, pp. 107-110.
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knew how to use the masses, particularly the popular tide they had set in train and they
emphasized the importance of the masses and mass mobilization, which later could also
become a powerful force used by the Clique in opposition to Nanjing.29
As Liu Fei pointed
out, the only thing that the Clique could do was to elevate the banner of resisting Japan at atime when the movement for that purpose was already on the way. This was also the way
to avoid any suggestion of a regional image which might cause unfavourable criticism of
them.30
Resistance against Japan became the basis of Guangxi reconstruction and
mobilization, and this was recognized within and outside the province. Visitors, whether
from overseas or from other provinces, commented favourably on Guangxi and lauded it
with the title of model province,
31
for the Clique imbued the population generally withenthusiasm for its policies of both reconstruction and mass mobilization (dealt with in
Chapter Four). The enthusiasm of the masses was of course channelled by the Clique into
self-defence, which could effectively serve both the national and provincial levels.
Recognising the powerful force created by the mobilization of the masses in the province,
Sherwood Eddy said, I see in Guangxi a hope of the new China.32
Of course, Li and Bai
paid great attention to these comments, which were regarded as a clear indication that their
pursuit of correct policies had been recognized by the people.
33
However, these
29Bai Chongxi, Kangri jiuguo, Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.),Jiaotu kangzhan, pp. 54-6; and
Li zongsiling zuijin yanjiang ji, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935, pp. 157-65, and pp.
203-12.
30Liu Fei, Liangguang, p. 293.
31For details of those peoples comments on Guangxi reconstruction and mass
mobilization such as speeches and articles of Chen Baoyin, Chen Lijiang, George
Sherwood Eddy, Huang Tianshi, Jiang Kanghu, Hou Zhenqiu and Wang Heng, see LengGuan et al, Guangxi jianshe jiping, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935; Liang Wenwei
et al, Guangxi yinxiang ji, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935; and Guomin gemingjun
disi jituanjun zong zhengxunchu (ed.), Li-Gui zhongwai mingren yanjiang ji, Shanghai:
ZHSJ, 1936; Sherwood Eddy,Is There A Model Province in China? Shanghai, January 7,
1935, printed by the author himself; and U. S. Military, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936).
32Sherwood Eddy,Is There A Model Province in China? p. 2.
33SeeLi zongsiling zuijin yanjiang ji, pp. 259-65;Bai fu zongsiling yanjiang ji, Nanning:
GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935, pp. 19-24; and Bai Chongxi xiansheng zuijin yanlun ji,
Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1936, pp. 14-6.
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appreciations were often the result of encouragement or pressure from the Clique itself. To
defend further their reputation as the leading figures in resistance, they had ultimately to
succeed with the policy of forcing Jiang to resist Japan.
In fact this latter stance as a central pillar of the Cliques policy represented a subtlechange in emphasis. Before his death, Hu had repeatedly emphasized downfall of
dictatorship as a prerequisite to resisting Japan.34
According to Xiao Focheng, a GMD
veteran and a senior leader in the Southwest, although the Southwest still insisted that it
must carry out Hus three deathbed calls, as mentioned in Chapter Seven, at present
resistance was more important and urgent than the others.35
This, of course, still left the
Clique with excellent reasons to take action against Jiangs non-resistance; and their
propaganda took this into account.Another factor affecting the actions of the Clique was the tactics of the Communists
and the Red Army in their Eastern Expedition which ended just before the June 1
Movement began. The Eastern Expedition of the Red Army took place between February
and May 1936; the army marched eastward, passing through Shanxi province towards
Hebei province under the flag of fighting the Japanese. After fighting with both Yan
Xishans troops and Jiang's Central Army which rushed to Shanxi province as a
reinforcement for Yan, the Red Army withdrew to their base in northern Shaanxi with thestated purpose of avoiding further civil war with Jiang and other regional troops.
36
Whatever reasons might be given to account for this action, during the expedition the Red
Army widely propagandized their position on stopping civil war in the cause of unity for
34For details of Hus ideas on downfall of dictatorship, resistance against Japan and
suppression of Communism, see Hu Hanmin xiansheng wenji, Taipei: Guomindang
zhongyang dangshihui, 1978; Hu zhuxi zhisang weiyuanhui (ed.), Hu xiansheng; and
Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, Guangzhou:, 1934, pp. 1-2. Formore details of these, see Hu Hanmin (ed.), Sanmin zhuyi yuekan (SMZYYK), Guangzhou,
1933-36.
35Huiji, p. 117.
36For details of the Red Armys Eastern Expedition, see Jiang Shunxing and Li Liangyu,
Shanxi wang Yan Xishan, Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS, 1989, pp. 141-4; Zhonggong
zhongyang dangxiao (ed.), Yan Xishan pingzhuan, Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang
dangxiao chubanshe, 1991, pp. 256-61; Jiang Kefu (ed.), Minguo junshi shi luegao,
Beijing: ZHSJ, 1991, Vol. 2, pp. 435-9; and Donald Gillin, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in
Shansi Province 1911-1949, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967.
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resisting Japan,37
which to a great extent coincided with the mood of the growing tide of
national resistance. It was a clever political tactic of the Communists and the Red Army,
and their propaganda was used to real purpose, and helped to expand their strength. The
Clique was aware of the positions and tactics of the Red Army because Li and Bai senttheir representative to contact the Communists and the latter also sent their agents to
Guangxi before and after the June 1 Movement.38
Under these circumstances, the Clique
learned a lot from the experience of the Communists.
However, the Clique was regarded at that time as having been the most important
opponent of Jiang since 1931, which was another reason for careful planning to implement
the bi-Jiang kangri policy. Indeed, each time Nanjing yielded to Japanese demands or
carried out some suspect policies and measures under Japanese pressure, Li and Bai alwaysstood in opposition. It was a vulnerable position because the supporters of Jiang found
excuses to criticize them as remnant warlords.39
For example, after the June 1 Movement
was launched, a newspaper suggested it to be a case of giving vent to personal spite.40
Li
and Bai must have anticipated this,41
for even before the movement, they had foreseen the
many difficulties ahead. As Li himself pointed out, when the movement really began, they
had mounted a tiger and could not get off.42
The situation, however, propelled them
forward and, once committed, they had no choice but to follow wherever it led.
37Zhongyang tongzhanpu and Zhongyang dangan guan (eds.), Zhonggong zhongyang
kangri tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian, Beijing: DACBS, 1985, Vol. 2, pp. 108-41
(hereafter as Wenjian xuanbian).
38Liu Zongrong, Xian shibian de huiyi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 9, pp. 49-56 (hereafter as
Xian); and the same author, Huiyi wo zai Guixi gongzuo shi de jijianshi, WSZLXJ,No. 73 (1981), pp. 29-36. Also see Chen Dunde, Guigen - Li Zongren he Mao Zedong he
Zhou Enlai woshou, Beijing: JFJCBS, 1990, pp. 23-45.
39See, for example, Anonymous, Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi, n.p., 1936; and
Anonymous,Liangguang panluan neimu, n. p., 1936.
40Shenbao, June 13, 1936, p.3.
41Huiji, pp. 4-8; and pp. 53-66.
42Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 307.
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The development of the movement indicated that the purpose of bi-Jiang kangri
was not easy to achieve. It quickly became apparent that the Clique and Chen Jitang had
underestimated the strength of the measures Jiang would take.
While the two Guang troops marched northward into Hunan, Jiang published aseries of telegrams and speeches in response. On the one hand, Jiang expressed his
sympathy with the anti-Japanese action of the Southwest; on the other, he emphasized such
action should be taken only in unity, that is, he declared that the Southwest should take
action only after Nanjing had made a firm decision to deal with the new Japanese
aggression.43
In this way, he hinted that the Southwest was doing what suited itself. In
addition, he sent some representatives to negotiate with the Southwest on future mutual
cooperative action against Japan.
44
It seemed that Jiang was successful, because, under thecover of these statements, he secretly and rapidly moved large numbers of the Central
troops to the borders of the two Guangs and its neighbouring provinces, and, as a result,
blocked the way of the two Guang troops marching northward.45
As stated earlier, before launching the movement, the Clique believed there would
be a positive response from people all over the nation once their action took place. Now
that the flag had been raised, however, the expected patriotic reaction did not appear, and
this was particularly evident in Hunan, the passageway through which the two Guangtroops would march. To enlist the sympathy and support of Hunan, the Clique, in fact,
even while the movement was being prepared, sent General Liu Fei to Changsha calling on
He Jian, ruler of Hunan province. He Jian expressed his support for this movement and
promised to join once the Guangxi troops arrived at Changsha. But this was merely an
empty promise. In fact, He Jian proved to be a double agent. He secretly reported to Jiang
43For details of Jiangs telegrams and speeches, see Anonymous,Dui liangguang yidong
zhi renshi, pp. 29-36; and Jizhe, Yue-Gui wenti zhi zhankai, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24
(June 22, 1936). Also see Fragments of newspaper cuttings in 1936, Archives of the
Nationalist Government, Vol. 787, serial No. 919, in The Second History Archives of
China, Nanjing.
44Giu Guo Sh Bao, June 25, 1936.
45Luo Ziwen, Liangguang liuyi shibian zhong He Jian wanlong liangmian shoufa,
HNWSZLXJ, No. 5 (1963), pp. 185-91 (hereafter as He Jian).
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the action the Southwest would take.46
After the movement began and the Guangxi troops
entered Hunan on their northward march, the Clique sent General Li Pinxian, former
colleague of He Jian and now Chief of General Staff of the Guangxi troops, to Changsha to
discuss the same matter. Again, He Jian played the same trick. The Guangxi troops wastedtime on the Hunan border waiting for the promised action from He Jian but it did not
eventuate. Li Pinxians mission to Hunan failed.47
Instead, a large number of the Central
troops led by General Chen Cheng, the most trusted follower of Jiang, flooded into Hunan
and occupied Hengyang, the very important city and strategic point in southern Hunan. He
Jian soon joined Jiang to oppose the Southwest. Jiang had taken advantage of this
situation, at least in military terms. Under these circumstances, the Guangxi troops stopped
marching northward and were ordered to withdraw to the border of their home province toshow their sincerity in avoiding a fight with other Chinese troops as they had promised in
all their propaganda, because they did not want to provoke a civil war against Jiang.48
In fact, the delay had ruined a favourable chance for the Clique and Chen Jitang to
defeat Jiang if they had exploited the advantage they had. When the June 1 Movement was
launched, a good chance existed for the Southwestern leaders to gain an initial advantage
quickly by a swift move into Hunan. If, when they showed their hands and marched into
Hunan, they had gone in wholeheartedly and vigorously attacked Hengyang, they couldprobably have taken it at once, as they had in 1930.
49Then a rapid advance on Changsha
46Liu Tingfang, Wo shuofu Jiang Jieshi xiansheng huajie yichang neizhan weiji - ji
liangguang shibian weiceng gongkai de yiduan neimu,HNWSZL, No. 29 (1988), pp. 199-
206 (hereafter as neimu); and Liu Fei, Liangguang, p. 289. Also see Shenbao,
15/6/1936, p. 9.
47For details see Luo Ziwen, He Jian. Also see The Major Events of the Week, and
Jizhe, Yue-Gui wenti zhi zhankai, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24; Cheng Siyuan, Wo suo
zhidao de Bai Chongxi,XSLT, No. 4, 1987, p. 81, and Cheng Siyuan,Bai Chongxi zhuan,Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe, 1989, p. 187.
48U. S. Military, No. 9408, (June 19, 1936). Also see Li Zongrens speeches on the
days of June 8, 13, 29, and Telegrams of Li Zongren and others on June 18 and 21,
Huiji, pp. 1-9, and pp. 50-4.
49For details of the occupation of Hengyang by the joint forces of the Clique and Zhang
Fakuis Ironside in 1930, see Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-
jen, pp. 278-9; Zhang Dihai, Zhang-Gui jun fan-Jiang zhong de Beiliu ji Hengyang
zhanyi, GDWSZLXJ, No. 19, pp. 45-8; and Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, Hangzhou:
Fengyun chubanshe, 1945, pp. 206-7.
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would have given them an even chance of overrunning Hunan and perhaps drawing He Jian
into the camp of the Southwest. The possibility of success would have attracted to their
side all the many elements that were always ready in a Chinese civil war to rush to the aid
of the victor, and the action of He Jian later joining Jiang was just an example. WithHunan in their possession, other provinces in Southwest and Northwest, particularly those
factions under the leadership of generals such as Liu Xiang of Sichuan province, Zhang
Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, leaders of both the Dongbeijun (the Northeast Troops) and
theXibeijun (the Northwest Troops) now stationed in Shaanxi province, could have been
counted on,50
and Jiangxi province, which was under the firm control of Jiang, directly
threatened. Such a situation could have made their chances of success rosy, for Jiang could
not have counted on any help from the provinces of Shandong, Hebei and Shaanxi, wherethe Clique also had sent representatives and asked them to join and support its side. These
factions also had made positive response to the movement, although secretly.51
But,
instead of pushing ahead and putting it to the test, as soon as they crossed the Hunan border
earlier in June, the Guangxi troops sat down in expectation of He Jians participation in the
movement and later in dismay as their concern grew about a civil war when Jiangs troops
rushed into Hunan. The Southwest undoubtedly made two serious miscalculations, i.e. it
overestimated the active response of other groups and parties to its policies and itunderestimated the speed and force of Jiang's measures against the movement. Although
Zhang and Yang as well as Liu Xiang had made certain plans which coincided with the
action of the Southwest, they could not carry out these plans once the troops of the two
Guangs remained their northward march and stayed at their home borders.52
Immediately
the two Guang armies stopped, Hunan at once began to fill up with Jiangs troops. The
50For details of Liu Xiangs active response to the June 1 Movement and his coincidental
action with the Clique, see Chapter Five of the thesis; also see Qiao Cheng and Yang
Xuyun, Liu Xiang, Beijing: HXCBS, 1987, pp. 193-6. The detailed actions of Yang and
Zhang will be accounted for in the following section.
51SeeHuiji, p. 29; and Ying Detian, Zhang Xueliang yu Xian shibian, Beijing: ZHSJ,
1980, p. 75 (hereafter asZhang Xueliang).
52For details of these actions, see Liu Zongrong, Xian. The reasons for the failure of
implementation of these plans worked out by Yang Hucheng and Zhang Xueliang will be
further discussed in the following section.
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chance had been lost, and the tide at once turned against them.53
The result was contrary to
their expectations, and by hesitating, they had put themselves in a dangerous situation and
were forced to expend a great deal of energy to escape and recover lost ground.
Would the Southwestern leaders, particularly Li and Bai who were alwaysconsidered to be the best Chinese militarists and commanders, not have known the chance
which they were missing? I think they would have known. One reason for missing this
chance might be that, according to Joseph Stilwell early in 1936, they did not want civil
war, but if war came they would take every chance it offered to protect and improve the
position of the Southwest provinces.54
In my opinion, another possible answer was the
positive response from the Red Army.55
Although there is no corroborative evidence to
indicate that a practically cooperative action existed between the Clique and the Red Army,the tactics carried out by the latter during their Eastern Expedition, such as the use of the
political propaganda of resistance to serve their march eastward through Shanxi, averting a
crucial military clash with the strong Central Army, might have influenced the Clique to
take similar action.56
Moreover, the statement and manifesto of the CCP coinciding with
the action of the Southwest might have encouraged the Clique in their hope that a wide
positive response to their action would soon spread throughout the country. The Clique
also contacted the Communist branches in both Hong Kong and Tianjin before and after thelaunching of the movement.
57However, regardless of their possible hopes, it was wise of
the Clique to make the decision to withdraw the troops to the border of Guangxi in order to
avoid a civil war. Under these circumstances, the Cliques action indicated that it insisted
53Joseph Stilwell also had the same opinion when the Southwest authorities ordered the
two Guang troops to stop on the Hunan border, failing to take advantage of the chance to
defeat Jiangs troops. See U. S. Military, No. 9446 (July 31, 1936).
54U. S. Military, No. 9271 (January 13, 1936).
55Wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 2, pp. 161-164.
56Ibid, pp. 108-41.
57Ibid, pp. 161-4. For details of the Cliques contact with the CCP, see Yun Guangying,
Liuyi yundong qianhou wodang zai Nanning huodong de pianduan, GXWSZLXJ, No. 9,
pp. 45-8 (hereafter as Liuyi); Chen Dunde, Guigen, pp. 9-10, and pp. 23-48; and
Zhonggong Guangxi Zhuangzu zizhiqu weiyuanhui dangshi ziliao zhengji weiyuanhui
(ed.), Zhonggong Guangxi dangshi dashiji, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1989, pp. 98-100
(hereafter asDashiji).
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on the policy of bi-Jiang kangri rather than that of overthrowing Jiang only. The
withdrawal also clearly indicated their purpose focused more on Japanese aggression than
on fighting Jiang, for there is no evidence to suggest the Guangxi troops were engaged in a
battle.The Clique seems to have badly underestimated the impact of the power of
censorship by Nanjing, as a result of which their voice hardly spread outside the Southwest.
While it is true that the policies of the Southwest appeared to be sound and to meet the
needs of the time, theirs was a difang (regional) voice, which worked to the detriment of
both Guangxi and Guangdong. The Jiang group could freely use the mass media they
controlled to condemn the whole movement as part of a Japanese conspiracy, and as a
regional rebellion against the central government backed by the Japanese; it moreoverbanned all newspapers in their territory from printing the opinions of the Clique and the
Southwest (as discussed earlier). They criticized the movement as a disruptive element
hindering the plan of the Central Government in preparing for resistance.58
Further, Jiang
organised all his subordinate generals and other factions and associations to issue circular
telegrams in opposition to the Southwest. Through this, a campaign of fear and distrust
against the Southwest, particularly the Clique, was influential in forming public opinion.59
The Southwest was placed in a negative position.
60
In this way, Jiang cleverly guidedpublic opinion, and successfully transformed the Southwest's demands for resistance into a
regional quarrel with Nanjing, that is to say, a regional revolt against the centre.61
Moreover, Jiang was able to manipulate the mass media to convert this quarrel between the
Centre and the region into one of contradictions between region only, i.e. between
Guangdong and Guangxi, or even one of internal dissension within Guangdong itself
58See, for example, Anonymous, Dui liangguang yidong de renshi; and Anonymous,
Liangguang panluan neimu. In fact, the Nanjing Government did carry out some measuresin preparing for resistance against Japan. For details see Le Jiaqing and Jiang Tianying,
Ping kangzhan qianxi Guomindang Nanjing zhengfu de kangri zhunbei, FDXB, No. 5,
1987.
59Huiji, pp. 28-9; and Liuyi yulun yiban, Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi
yundong hou Bai Chongxi de yanlun, pp. 268-71. Also see 1936 nian jianbao shanpian,
Archives of the Nationalist Government, Nanjing.
60See 1936 nian jianbao shanpian.
61See Anonymous,Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi, pp. 29-34.
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only.62
Jiang no doubt realized that he could not overtly deny the demands of the
Southwest for resistance; he could not overtly suppress their actions, as these demands and
actions were ultimately justified by events and were an expression of a good deal of
Chinese public opinion. Instead of a military clash with the Southwest, he therefore electedto use the mass media, by condemning the suspect contacts of the Clique with the Japanese
to create the image of a treasonable and devious Southwest leadership.63
Following the
apparent initial success of the above measures, Jiang announced that the Second Plenum of
the 5th Central Executive and Supervisory Committees of the GMD was scheduled to be
held in Nanjing in July. He stated that vital decisions would be made at that session.
Through this tactic, he won time to complete his plans to deal with the movement, while
leaving the Clique and the Southwest in limbo.Faced with this unfavourable situation, the Southwest was placed in a passive
position. Under the pressure of Jiang's counter-measure, the Southwest was obliged to
explain their aim as one of asking Nanjing and Jiang Jieshi to take the lead in resistance,
and the Clique had to fall back on the policy of bi-Jiang kangri and to disclaim their
personal purpose of achieving Jiang's downfall.64
Their original scheme having led them
into the trap that Jiang had set for them, the only thing that the Southwest could do to
escape from this was to continue to express the need to resist Japan and force Jiang tocommence the war against Japan. Thus, the policy of bi-Jiang kangri gained emphasis as
a result of the developing situation.
First, the Clique and Chen Jitang worked energetically to break the blockade of
Jiangs censorship and to refute the criticism from Nanjing,65
then to draw sympathy for
62Giu Guo Sh Bao, October 8, 1936.
63In fact, Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi and Liangguang panluan neimu, two
confidential documents of Nanjing published in June 1936, have clearly indicated this
purpose and the measures used against the movement.
64For details of propaganda used in the Guangxi Cliques policies towards Japanese
aggression and urging Nanjing to take the leadership of fighting Japan, seeHuiji, pp. 49-66.
65See Liu Fei, Liangguang, pp. 291-2. Also see Liuyi yulun yiban, in Nanning
Gengsheng baoshe (ed.),Liuyi yundong hou Bai Chongxi de yanlun, pp. 255-279.
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their anti-Japanese stand through increased numbers of circular telegrams as well.66
For
example, Chen Jitang further stated the aim of their action to the mass media in mid-June:
We have also requested Chiang Kai-shek to assume the leadership of our armies
and to lead the way across the Yellow River. But our wire (telegram) has not been
answered. We do not care through what provinces the route lies. Any way that willlead northward will be agreeable.
67
At the same time, Li and Bai continually and frequently telegraphed to Jiang urging him to
lead the resistance. No doubt, all of these were published through the propaganda organs of
the Clique and those which supported it.68
For example, in a circular telegram to Jiang on
June 29, Bai said that he would personally command the Guangxi troops in the field to
follow the former in fighting Japan if Jiang would resolutely lead a national resistance;
furthermore, Bai claimed he would like to be a fighter or a maqian xiaozu
(cats paw) ofJiang at the front.
69Here the Guangxi leaders clearly sent a message to Jiang, i.e. if he
cared to fight Japan, his leadership would be recognized by his most important rival. This
was an expression of the bi-Jiang kangri policy. Moreover, in their telegrams to other
Nanjing leaders, Li and Bai as well as Chen Jitang repeatedly asked them to push Jiang to
proclaim immediately a war against Japan to save the nation.70
Meanwhile, they warned
Jiang that he would shoulder the responsibility of civil war if it really occurred, as he had
not used the Central Army which was stationed in the front line of the provinces close toNorth China to resist Japan but had moved them down to South China in order to wipe out
the forces whose one desire was to fight Japan. They gave Jiang dubious praise by
claiming he was brave in civil war but nervous in resisting foreign aggression.71
In fact,
it became a telegram war between the two sides. This term enunciates a characteristic of
the June 1 Movement. In this way, each side attempted to justify its actions with good
excuses.
66For details of these telegrams, seeHuiji, pp. 49-101.
67Hansu Chan, Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?
68For details of these telegrams, see Huiji. Also see Guangxi gejie kangri jiuguo
lianhehui (ed.),Duiri kangzhan de qiantu, Nanning, July 1936.
69Huiji, p. 57.
70Ibid, pp. 60-6.
71Ibid, p. 52.
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The Clique also used their regional mass media and organized political propaganda
teams to go to the countryside to enlist the support of the people of Guangxi and to inspire
patriotism for national salvation and resentment against Nanjing's non-resistance.72
In the
local region this was quite successful. For example, Zhao Biyun, a girl student of themiddle school at that time, in explanation of her reasons for joining the Student Army
Corp, stated that her motives came from the long-term patriotic education in resisting Japan
and national salvation that she had had since her primary school, and from her discontent
with Jiang's non-resistance against foreign aggression but military suppression of anti-
Japanese forces at home.73
Even in the small villages, a journalist found such propaganda
slogans as Down with Japanese Imperialism and We Will Be Slaves Without A Nation
If (Jiang Jieshi, or Nanjing) Still Maintains Non-Resistance.
74
At the same time, theClique used other mass media sponsored by some minority groups and parties located in
Hong Kong and the Shanghai Concession to support their policy and action.75
They also
sent several senior members of the Southwest authorities to Nanjing to attend the Second
Plenum in July. To strengthen their propaganda campaign, they submitted to the Plenum
five proposals relating to the resistance. These proposals included: 1) immediate
declaration of breaking off relations with Japan; 2) the abrogation of all Sino-Japanese
treaties signed under duress after the September 18 Incident; 3) immediate prevention ofthe increase of the Japanese troops in North China by military force; 4) the guarantee and
support of the freedom of the people's patriotic speech and movement; and 5) the national
general mobilization for resistance against Japan under the leadership of the Central
72For details of the Cliques practice in propaganda, see CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 12(September 1936); and Hansu Chan, Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?. Also,Nanning
minguo ribao published many articles and reports during the June 1 Movement.
73Zhao Biyun, Wo de juexin (My Determination), CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 12.
74Zhujiang ribao, 9 June 1937.
75Zhonghua minguo guomin geming kangri jiuguojun disi jituanjun zongsilingbu
zongzhengxunchu (ed.), Xinan fadong kangri hou gefang zhi yulun, Nanning, August
1936; and Liuyi yulun yiban, in Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.),Liuyi yundong hou Bai
Chongxi de yanlun, pp. 255-279.
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Government.76
In a word, they wanted to use all legal forms in furthering the policy of
forcing Nanjing to fight Japan.
To a considerable extent, this propaganda helped the Clique to consolidate its image
as a firm anti-Japanese group, and won sympathy and support of all other parties andgroups which themselves had insisted on resistance.
77One hundred and fifty-six Huangpu
officers headed by Generals Li Xinjun and Lai Gang lodged a petition with Jiang urging
their xiaozhang (principal) to fight Japan instead of suppressing the anti-Japanese
forces.78
Most of these officers later joined Guangxi.79
Even some units of the Central
Army, such as the 51st Division and 77th Division at that time stationed in Hunan and
Jiangxi separately, turned to support the Southwest in June, as they were discontented with
Jiangs policy of suppressing the anti-Japanese forces, even though these rebels were soonput down and disarmed by Jiang after their uprising.
80
Furthermore, the Clique worked to strengthen the Guangdong-Guangxi alliance.
Only the existence of this alliance could force Jiang to be conciliatory with them and
eventually accept their demands. The two Guang troops allied themselves with Cheng
Jitang as Commander in Chief and Li Zongren as Deputy in late June.81
To maintain the
76Huiji, pp. 110-115.
77See comments of Ma Xiangbo, in Nanning minguo ribao, May 1936; and U. S.
Military, No. 9423 (July 3, 1936); and Cai Tingkai, Cai Tingkai zizhuan, Harbin:
HLJRMCBS, 1982, pp. 443-4. In his memoirs, T. G. Li also states that the reason for his
heading to Guangxi from Paris in the summer of 1936 for participation of the anti-Japanese
movement was that he was enthusiastic about joining them in Chinas coming struggle
against the Japanese invader. See T. G. Li, A China Past: Military and Diplomatic
Memoirs, Lanham: University Press of America, 1989, p. 46.
78CYGL, No. 2 (July 5, 1936), p. 1. Huangpu officers refer to those who graduated from
the Huangpu Military Academy and held posts in different levels of the Central Army
under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi. Jiang had been Principal of the Huangpu Military
Academy since its establishment in 1924.
79Lai Huipeng, Liuyi shibian jieshu qianhou xin Guixi anpai fashe de liangzhi
lengjian, GXWSZLXJ, No. 4, pp. 152-60. Lai himself was one of these officers, including
Li Xinjun and Lai Gang, defected from Jiang Jieshi.
80Giu Guo Sh Bao, June 30, 1936; andHuiji, p. 42.
81Guangzhou minguo ribao, July 16, 17, 1936; and Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.),
Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, Guangzhou: Guangdong Provincial Archives, 1985, pp. 366-74;
Nanning minguo ribao, July 16, 17, 1936.
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force,86
and then General Yu Hanmou, Commander of the 1st Guangdong Army and a
leader of less importance than Chen Jitang in the Guangdong army, declared himself
against the whole movement. From then on defections increased by leaps and bounds, and
every lukewarm element hastened to leave the sinking ship. The result was that allGuangdong troops, including air force and navy, betrayed Chen Jitang and changed their
loyalty to Jiang after the latter had spent several million dollars.87
Chen reluctantly left
Guangdong on July 18 and headed overseas for a study of foreign affairs, an excuse for
saving his face. Guangdong was finally taken over by Jiangs troops. Li returned to
Guangxi on the same day. Encouraged by this success, Jiang tried to take advantage of the
occasion to wipe out the Clique and move his rivals, both Li and Bai, away from the
province. As a result, the centre of the movement was transferred into Guangxi.There is little doubt that the Clique put its anti-Japanese policy into practice in the
June 1 Movement, with bi-Jiang kangri as its concrete form, and that the movement
reflected the common demand of most people. As was pointed out at that time, in making
the demand on Nanking to resist Japan, Canton (i.e. the Southwest) is not only speaking for
itself, but is actually expressing the sentiment of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese
86See Chen Shaoxiao, Heiwang lu, Hong Kong: ZCCBS, 1966, pp. 75-80; and
Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, p. 419.
87The defection of the Guangdong officers was not only caused by Jiangs silver bullet
policy but also the result that Chen Jitang distrusted his subordinate commanders,
according to Li Jiezhi, a senior commander of the Guangdong troops. Li claims that at that
time they did not believe that Chen could lead them to defeat Jiangs army which was
marching to Guangdong and besieged this province from Hunan, Jiangxi and Fujian. They
also suffered heavily from rumours throughout Guangdong and even outside of the
province that Chen had made some secret deals with the Japanese when he joined forces
with the Guangxi Clique to launch the June 1 Movement. Li Jiezhi adds, they deeply
believed that the movement served the Guangxi Cliques own purposes only. As a result,in their view, Guangdong would be a scapegoat of the Clique. See Guangdong sheng
dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, pp. 414-20. Certainly, some evidences from
materials mentioned above may support all these claims. In fact, reasons for the defection
of these Guangdong generals are various. Namely, it was a result of the mixture of
personal, economic, political reasons and so on. For details of the defection of the
Guangdong generals in the Movement, see Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs
of Li Tsung-jen, p. 308; Chen Shaoxiao,Heiwang lu, pp. 75-80; and Lin Hu, Xian shibian
shi Jiang Jieshi xiang liyong wo dao Chen Jitang de yimu, GXWSZL, No. 17, pp. 164-8;
Cheng Siyuan, Liangguang shibian, GXWSZL, No. 22; Chen Cheng, Liangguang liuyi
shibian chuli jingguo, ZJWX, Vol. 53, No. 3; Kan Zonghua, Chen Jitang, Li Zongren,
Bai Chongxi fadong liangguang liuyi shibian jingguo, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1.
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people.88
Although Jiang put enormous pressure on his opponents, his action provided
them with a motive for practicing the bi-Jiang kangri policy more positively and clearly.
When the movement suffered heavy setbacks such as the fall of Chen Jitang in
Guangdong, how did the Clique deal with this crisis and would Li and Bai continue thecourse which they had pursued in their propaganda?
The Attempt to Establish A Broad-Based Anti-Japanese National United Front
There were two options available to the Clique after Chens collapse in the
movement. One was to abandon their action and surrender to Jiang without preconditions.
But, in so doing, the result would justify the image promoted by the Jiang group that themovement was selfish. This was what the Clique strove to avoid.
89Another option was to
continue the movement, even if they failed in the end, so that the nature of the movement
they engaged in would be confirmed as that of determined resistance against Japan, not for
themselves, but in terms of their policy and their demands.90
If so, the result would be
beneficial to the reputation of the Clique, to the saving of face and to the maintenance of
their notable history in the GMD. Their resistance could still make them heroes, as Cai
Tingkai and his 19th Route Army had become in Shanghai in 1932. Obviously, the secondoption coincided with the policies of the Clique and was more easily accepted by it. Under
these circumstances, Nanning, capital of Guangxi, became the centre of practising the bi-
Jiang kangri policy, which brought the June 1 Movement into the second phase.
If Jiang had now kept his promise made to Huang Xuchu in the previous year, he
would have reached reconciliation and cooperation with the Clique in July 1936 instead of
September, in order to unite other groups within the GMD earlier and to concentrate more
energy on dealing with Japanese aggression. If this had happened, the movement wouldhave been already completed. Such an opportunity actually existed at that time.
91Before
he drove Chen out of Guangdong, Jiang stated at the Second Plenum that he and the
88Hansu Chan, Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?
89Wei Yongcheng, Zaitan liuyi yundong,ZJWX, Vol. 37, No. 1, p. 56.
90Liu Fei, Liangguang, pp. 293-4.
91Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 309.
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Nanjing Government would maintain the status quo of Guangxi. However, perhaps the fall
of Chen added to Jiang's confidence and determination to eliminate the Clique and also
provided more excuses to the Jiang group to criticize this most dangerous political rival
within the GMD. Perhaps Jiang adopted the suggestion of his political adviser XiongShihui (Chairman of the Provincial Government of Jiangxi at that time) that this was the
right time to finally settle scores with Li and Bai in Guangxi.92
At the same time, his
subordinate generals, particularly those young officers originating from the Huangpu
Military Academy (Huangpu junxiao), were even more radical and keen to teach a lesson
to this opponent.93
Therefore, Jiang altered his original decision and ordered Li to Nanjing
as a member of the Standing Committee of the Military Affairs Council and Bai to
Zhejiang as governor of the provincial government. These were high positions, but actuallywithout any power. To force both Li and Bai to leave Guangxi, Jiang even strengthened his
forces in the encirclement of the province with over 400,000 troops, including those of
Guangxis former ally - the Guangdong troops now under the command of General Yu
Hanmou. In addition, Jiang tried to divide the Clique with the same tactics employed to
subvert Chen Jitang. There is evidence that along with his successful occupation of
Guangdong, Jiang sent millions of dollars in silver bullets over the Guangxi border.94
However, Jiangs efforts were in vain. He also underestimated the power and theinternal consolidation of his rival. All of his efforts in both military blockade and his
silver bullets campaign failed. On the contrary, these inspired the Clique and the people
in Guangxi to greater efforts for consolidation of themselves and insistence on their
previous demands and policy. Within a few days the provincial defence force had
expanded from fourteen to forty-four regiments and the militia was reorganized, ready to
92Ibid. Other sources show that the idea came from Yang Yongtai, Chairman of the
Hubei Provincial Government, and senior member of the Political Studies Faction of
Nanjing. See Liu Fei, Liangguang, p. 294; and Cheng Siyuan, Liangguang shibian, p.
54. Xiong was also a senior member of the Political Studies Faction.
93For details see Luo Ziwen, He Jian. Also see Huang Xuchu, Guangxi, CQ, No.
126 (October 1, 1962), p. 14.
94U. S. Military, No. 9458 (August 28, 1936).
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engage in battle with Jiangs troops.95
In the judgement of Joseph Stilwell, at a
conservative estimate Kwangsi could put 1,000,000 men in the field, - poorly armed and
equipped, it is true, but fairly good soldiers as Chinese go.96
Only the militia of Guangxi
was an inestimable force. Stilwell emphasized in a report,Aside from her regular troops, Kwangsi depends for defence upon a large well
drilled militia which is spread over the entire province and difficult to estimate, but
it is believed that more than 100,000 could be mobilized and equipped without
great difficulty.97
It seemed that the people of Guangxi became deeply involved in support of their
leaders and the Clique, because they commonly regarded Jiang and his government as a
more fierce and dangerous opponent and they were determined not to allow Jiangs
influence to enter Guangxi.
98
Indeed, according to Stilwell, there is an air of greatenthusiasm all over the province. No objection could be heard anywhere to the policies
which are being followed by the provincial authorities.99
The Guangxi people made an
anti-Japanese pledge to support their leaders and urged the Clique to continue with its
policy. There were even many examples of taking an oath in public meetings to follow the
pledge throughout the entire province.100
Such a consolidation welded the province into a
force which could counter an attack by Jiangs troops. Under these circumstances, Jiang
had to modify his projected measures against the movement.In continuing the bi-Jiang kangri policy and countering possible attacks by Jiang
at this stage, the Clique also sought to maintain and strengthen its contacts with other
parties and groups who were willing to fight Japan. That is to say, they had put the AJNUF
into action during the movement. Its theoretical foundation derived from the scorched earth
resistance policy (as discussed earlier). In their view, once the movement for resisting
95The Guangxi forces were expanded to 200,000 soldiers and reorganized in twenty-one
divisions, which was a powerful force Jiang Jieshi could not underestimate. For details of
the systems and organization of the Guangxi troops during the movement, see Appendix 4.
96U. S. Military, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936).
97Ibid, No. 9426 (July 3, 1936).
98Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 310.
99U. S. Military, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936).
100Nanning minguo ribao, September 2, 1936, p. 1.
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Japan was launched, all parties and groups throughout the country, whatever differences in
political belief held, had a duty to China to form a firm united front to strive for national
liberation. Nanning minguo ribao repeatedly discussed this issue and loudly called for it
during the movement.
101
They believed such a movement should obtain broad support.
102
There were several steps taken by the Clique in the formation of a wide anti-
Japanese united front. First, Guangxi protected freedoms of speech and the press in
contrast to Nanjings restriction of speech and movement that was anti-Japanese. Aside
from the areas under the control of the CCP, Guangxi might claim to be the only place
where anti-Japanese propaganda and mass demonstrations were not interferred by the
government under the flag of the GMD before 1936.103
For example, Chuangjin yuekan
(Pioneer Monthly), organ of the Guangxi troops, even published some speeches and thesesof Karl Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and other popular international Communist politicians, whose
names often appeared in publications of the CCP.104
The Clique used them to serve their
own propaganda, or, perhaps these came from its Brains Trust who were familiar with the
Communist doctrine (as dealt with earlier), as this journal in 1936 was calling for the
formation of the AJNUF to fight Japan. Whatever the underlying reason, there was
projected a generous attitude towards the mass media on the part of the Clique. Shen
Junru, a well-known figure throughout the country at that time, and his organization, i.e. theFederation of the National Salvation Associations (quanguo gejie jiuguohui), expressed
appreciation of this practice,105
which was perhaps the reason for the participation of his
101For example, seeNanning minguo ribao, May 26, 1936, August 16, 1936, October 14,
1936. Also see CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 12.
102Huang Xuchu, Guangxi, CQ, No. 127 (Oct. 16, 1962), p. 16.
103See Liuyi yulun yiban, in Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi yundong hou Bai
Chongxi de yanlun, p. 269;Jiuwang qingbao (Newsletter of National Salvation), July 26,
1936; and Meng Guanghan et al (eds.), Kangzhan shiqi guogong hezuo jishi, Chongqing:
Chongqing chubanshe, 1992, Vol. 1, pp. 104-5 (hereafter as Kangzhan).
104CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 9 (June 1936), pp. 1-5.
105Meng Guanghan et al (eds.), Kangzhan, Vol. 1, pp. 98-109; and Liuyi yulun yiban,
in Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi yundong hou Bai Chongxi de yanlun, pp. 274-
279.
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comrades and this popular organization in support of the June 1 Movement.106
Even
Western observers also recognized that freedom of speech and movement which was anti-
Japanese existed in Guangxi.107
In so doing, according to the Clique itself, it attempted to
achieve a united front in public opinion.
108
As freedom of speech was a major concern of those other groups and parties at that
time, the practice of the Clique attracted much support in those sections of the dissident
media and propaganda organs which had suffered heavily under Jiangs iron censorship.
All bodies concerned with the anti-Japanese cause were moved to assist the Clique in
countering the Jiang groups criticism.109
Meanwhile, personalities and representatives of
all patriotic parties and groups rushed to Guangxi from all directions. In a short period
Guangxi became a medley of voices from various figures with different interests, speakingfor resistance or advocating opposition to Jiang, even seeking positions or ranks in both the
army and the government if an opposition government to Nanjing was to be set up there.110
Indeed, as the Fujian Rebellion before, these people were prepared to form a united
government to carry out their own policy of resistance against Japan, and to oppose Jiang as
well, if he still attempted to suppress the movement. A dangerous anti-Jiang atmosphere
106
For details of the relationship between the Guangxi Clique and the Federation of theNational Salvation Associations, see Chen Dawen, Guixi yu jiuguohui de guanxi,
NNWSZL, No. 5 (1988).
107A. Bisson,Japan in China, New York: The Macmillam Company, 1938, p. 140.
108Nanning minguo ribao, May 26, 1936, p. 3.
109These organs included Dazhong ribao, Chaoran bao, Jiuwang qingbao, Yongsheng
Weekly, Giu Guo Sh Bao, and others published in the foreign concessions, Hong Kong, and
overseas. For details see Zhonghua minguo guomin gemingjun disi jituanjun zong silingbu
zong zhengxunchu (ed.),Xinan fadong kangri hou gefang zhi yulun, Nanning, 1936; andLiuyi yulun yiban, in Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.),Liuyi yundong hou Bai Chongxi
de yanlun.
110These people were representatives of the following parties and groups: the Hu Hanmin
Faction, the Reorganization Faction, the Li Jishen Faction, the Federation of National
Salvation Associations and its branches in many provinces, the CCP, the former 19th Route
Army,Zhonghua minzu geming tongmeng (the Chinese National Revolutionary Coalition),
Shengchan renmindang (the Productive Peoples Party), the Third Party, Zhonghua zhiye
jiaoyushe (the Chinese Professional Education Association), the Rural Reconstruction
Faction, the Chinese Youth Party, the Democratic Socialist Party, and other public figures
without party affiliation. For details see Liu Fei, Liangguang, p. 295.
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existed in Guangxi. Li and Bai were, of course, willing to encourage this even if they did
not expect it to culminate in a military clash with Jiang and his Central troops. According
to Liu Fei, who later became the person who carried the messages between the Guangxi
leaders and Jiang for a peaceful settlement of their differences in the movement, this was alla tactic of Li and Bai to counter the pressure from Jiang.
111Whatever the reason, it
indicated that such a broad united front formed in Guangxi, at least partially, from aversion
to Jiang's high pressure policy against the Clique.
At the same time, the Clique strengthened its contact with the CCP in the
movement, to counter Jiangs pressure and to plan for possible joint resistance. Apart from
frequent meetings between their representatives, there were permanent contacts both within
and outside the province.
112
The most important result was a draft agreement worked outwith the CCP in forming an alliance for resistance and for forcing Jiang to resist Japan as
well.113
Although there is no corroborative evidence at present to show the detailed
contents of the entire agreement, the event itself indicated that the Clique paid great
attention to the CCP in their search for partners in concerted action. Here the CCP and the
Red Army were believed by the Guangxi leaders to be the most important force in
compelling Jiang to give up his plan of eliminating the Clique, but to accept the demands of
the latter. Furthermore, the former were regarded as a balanced force between the Cliqueand Jiang, as Bai once foretold in 1934 when the Guangxi troops were ordered to check the
Red Army passing through the Guangxi border from Jiangxi for the Long March:114
only
111Liu Fei, Liangguang, pp. 293-4.
112See Yun Guangying, Liuyi; and the same writer, Teshu shiming, GMSZL, No. 10.
Yun was the representative of the Red Army under the CCP and came from northern
Shaanxi. Before the movement, the Clique sent its representative Liu Zongrong to Tianjin
to establish contact with the CCP. See Liu Zongrong, Huiyi wo zai guixi gongzuo shi de
jijianshi, WSZLXJ, No. 73.
113See Wenjian xuanbian, pp. 278-9. For details of discussion of the agreement, see
Chapter Five of this thesis.
114For details of the Guangxi troops' checking the Red Army coming from Jiangxi by
passing through the Guangxi border for Guizhou and then northward, see Zhonggong
Guilin diwei (ed.), Hongjun changzheng guo Guangxi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1986; Mo
Wenhua,Huiyi hongqijun, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1979; Quanguo zhengxie wenshi ziliao
yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), Weizhui dujie hongjun changzheng qinli ji: yuan Guomindang
jiangling de huiyi, Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1990; and recollections of Tang Yao and YanDaogang in the Bibliography of this thesis.
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the existence of the CCP and the Red Army could guarantee our survival.115
It is safe to
say that the establishment of close contact with the CCP undoubtedly added confidence to
the Clique in confronting Jiang, and was an important factor in reaching a final conciliation
with Jiang Jieshi and joint forces between them for resistance against Japan.Furthermore, reorganization of the 19th Route Army in the province to form an
alliance with the Clique was another important counter-measure against Jiang.116
The
reputation of the 19th Route Army, won in fighting Japan in 1932, was legendary, and the
alliance between this army and the Guangxi troops indicated determination to resist further
invasion. This expanded strength added confidence to the Guangxi people, and was a
convincing warning to Jiang against military action.
While the Clique speeded up the formation of the AJNUF, a rumour spreadthroughout the entire country that Li and Bai would unite with other parties and groups
which opposed Nanjing, and form a military government in Guangxi with the aim of
resistance against both Japan and Jiang.117
The choice of persons in the planning of such a
government, including Li Jishen and former leaders of the Fujian Rebellion, had in fact
been already prepared for.118
If Jiang pushed his Central troops further into the province of
Guangxi, the Clique would immediately declare the establishment of this new government
in Nanning. Of course, this was a tactic of the Clique. Once irrevocably committed to thepolicy of calling for resistance, the Clique had to declare its intention to meet a real or
115Tang Yao, Hongjun changzheng zhong Bai Chongxi kaifang Xiang-Gui bianjing de
neimu, GXWSZL, No. 17, p. 162.
116For details of the reorganization of the 19th Route Army, see Cai Tingkai, Cai Tingkai
zizhuan, pp. 441-6; and Lin Yiyuan, Liangguang liuyi shibian zhong shijiu lujun yidu
zai-Gui huifu de jingguo, GDWSZLXJ, No. 3 (1961), pp. 150-5. This army was disarmedby Jiang Jieshi after he defeated the Fujian Rebellion early in 1934. For details see Wang
Shunsheng et al, Fujian Shibian, Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1982; Xue Moucheng
and Zheng Quanbei (eds.), Fujian shibian ziliao xuanbian, Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin
chubanshe, 1983; Cai Tingkai, Huiyi shijiu lujun zai-Min fan-Jiang shibai jingguo,
WSZLXJ, No. 59; Jiang Guangnai, Dui shijiu lujun yu Fujian shibian de buchong, ibid,
No. 59; and Xu Xiqing, Fujian renmin zhengfu yundong, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1 (1961).
117Shenbao, June 13, 1936, p. 3.
118Liu Fei, Liangguang, pp. 295-302; and Huang Xuchu, Guangxi, CQ, No. 127, pp.
18-9.
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invented public demand for the formation of a united government willing to fight Japan.119
Although this planned government was never established, it seemed that a united front for
national salvation had already appeared in Guangxi. According to the writers of the Clique,
the existence of a united front was proclaimed to act as a coalition against the Chinesetraitors front (hanjian zhenxian) which appeased Japanese aggression but suppressed the
internal elements and forces who wanted to fight Japan.120
Actual war between the two parties was finally averted when Jiang decided to
compromise with the Guangxi leaders. Perhaps Jiang had known that, if a civil war against
Guangxi occurred, it would be a prolonged one.121
If so, before he defeated the Clique,
Jiang would face another vital threat from the CCP, which was planning to form a similar
government as that planned in Guangxi by joining forces with both Yang HuchengsXibeijun and Zhang Xueliangs Dongbeijun in the Northwest.
122If this happened, it was
possible that his rule would be shaken to its foundations. At the critical time, some GMD
veterans with potential influence in both military and political circles, such as Cheng Qian,
Feng Yuxiang, Zhu Peide, Ju Zheng, and Huang Shaohong, persuaded Jiang to compromise
with the Clique, and played the role of intermediary between the two sides.123
The Clique
had thus successfully used the consolidation of Guangxi and its influence in the practice of
the AJNUF, in fact, to form a threat strong enough to compel Jiang to sit down and to talk
119For details see the discussions ofGiu Guo Sh Bao at the end of 1935 and in the early
of 1936.
120CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 12.
121Huang Shaohong told Jiang that the Guangxi Clique would not be easy to defeat and
might resist an external attack for over three months or more according to historical
experience, and the morale of the Clique and consolidation of the interior, as well as thevaried topography of Guangxi. See Huang Shaohong, Wushi Huiyi, p. 310. Also see Yong
Sou (pseud., i.e. Zheng Renmin), Jiang-Li diyici lihe neimu, CQ, No. 62 (February 1,
1960), p. 5.
122Wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 2, pp. 171-81.
123Liu Fei, Liangguang, pp. 296-302; Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of
Li Tsung-jen, p.310; Huang Xuchu, Guangxi, CQ, No. 127, p. 19; and Guiju dayou
zhuanji (A favourable turn for the situation of Guangxi), GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 35; and
Guiju heping jiejue jingguo (The story of the peaceful settlement of the situation in
Guangxi), GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 37.
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with Li and Bai.124
Showing his flexibility to seize the moment to compromise, Jiang
ordered all Central Government and Guangdong troops to withdraw fifty li125
from the
Guangxi border in order to avoid clashes, and the Guangxi leaders began to talk with their
old rival.
126
After discussions between the two parties through Liu Fei and other politiciansand militarists, the main points of the terms that Li and Bai put forth to end their radical
action against Jiang instead of compromise with the latter are as follows:
1) The Central Government reaffirms the freedom of the anti-Japanese
movement, speech, publication, and assembly.
2) The Central Government promises that China will prepare for resistance
positively based on the present situation existing between China and Japan.
If the Japanese advance one more inch, China will carry out the nationwide
resistance. Once resistance begins, Guangxi will immediately send its
troops to join in.3) Nanjing should make the anti-Japanese plan and schedule, and must carry it
out as soon as possible.
4) The status quo of Guangxi should be maintained and Nanjing should assist
the Guangxi troops with military expenditure.
5) Nanjing should provide three designations of the army (jun) to the Guangxi
troops and ensure Li Zongrens commandership.
6) After the achievement of the agreement above, Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi
will pledge allegiance to the leadership of Jiang Jieshi by a circular
telegram.127
In addition, except that item 3 above should be kept secret as military intelligence,the Clique insisted that Jiang must announce these terms to the public by a speech to show
his trustworthiness. Although there was some small retrogression from their original
demand of immediate resistance, these terms still basically reflected the efforts of the
Clique in forcing Jiang to the stage of resistance, and showed that the Guangxi leaders were
realists in the Chinese political game - avoiding too drastic action to cause a result being
124Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 310.
125One li = 500 meters.
126For details that suggest Jiang Jieshi took action on his own initiative in peaceful
settlement of the differences between himself and the Guangxi leaders in August 1936, see
Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, pp. 91-3; Liu Fei, Liangguang, pp. 296-302; and U. S.
Military, No. 9458 (August 28, 1936), and No. 9460 (September 11, 1936). Also see
Chongqing shi dangan guan (ed.), Liangguang liuyi shibian hou Jiang Jieshi yu Li Zongren
deng laiwang handian,LSDA, No. 4, 1987, pp. 75-9 (hereafter as Handian).
127Liu Fei, Liangguang, pp. 297-8; and Chen Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, pp. 91-4; and
Huang Xuchu, Guangxi, CQ, No. 127, p. 19.
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contrary to their original intention. It also indicated that the achievements of the practice in
the AJNUF was in fact a tactic used by the Clique to force a compromise with Jiang. In
the end, the latter adopted all terms demanded by the former in early September.128
Moreover, to show his willingness to unite all other political figures of the GMD, forresistance, Jiang even ordered the wanted circular on Generals Li Jishen and Chen Mingshu
to be repealed, and pardoned them for having fomented the Fujian Rebellion in 1933 and
for having insisted on resisting Japan and opposing Jiang (i.e. kangri fan-Jiang) after
this.129
The result of the June 1 Movement indicates that, in most respects the Clique
achieved its objectives of bi-Jiang kangri. A number of writers suggest that the success
of the Clique in the promotion of the AJNUF was largely due to the CCP.
130
However, thedevelopment of modern Chinese history indicates that the formation of the AJNUF was a
reflection of the context, a requirement which many parties and groups, not the CCP only,
had called for from time to time. It is true that the CCP worked out the famous slogan -
anti-Japanese national united front - in 1935, which led this party not only to survive at
the eleventh hour but also to strengthen itself in the Sino-Japanese war until it successfully
overthrew the rule of the Nationalists on the mainland in 1949.131
There is no
corroborative evidence to show any close affinity with the CCP in the actions of the Clique,even though both advocated similar policies but different tactics. For example, both of
them pushed for the formation of a united government or a national defence government for
resistance.132
In fact, the positions and policies of all parties and groups who insisted on
resistance against Japan were influenced by each other. In the case of the June 1
128See The major events of the week, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 38, p. 1.
129U. S. Military, No. 9458 (August 28, 1936).
130For example, see articles written by Wang Jingxia, Zhang Qi, Shi Shunjin, Luo
Yunshu, Li Ming, Lu Jiaxiang, Guo Xiaohe, Luo Jianing, Gu Guanlin, Cao Yuwen, Cao
Guangzhe, Chen Mingzhong, Li Jingzhi, Zhang Meiling, Zhang Guangchuan, Xia Chao,
Wang Qingshan and Deng Xueyi, in the Bibliography of this thesis.
131For detailed discussion of the CCPs road to the final victory based on the AJNUF, see
Kui-Kwong Shum, Chinese Communists Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National
United Front, 1935-1945, Hong Kong and London: Oxford University Press, 1988.
132For details of these discussions of the Clique, see CJYK, Vol. 3, Nos. 8 and 9, 11-12.
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Movement, the work of the Clique in the formation of the AJNUF was, to a great extent, on
their own initiative. The CCP preferred at that time to form a national united front with the
lower and middle classes in resisting both Japan and Jiang (fan-Jiang kangri).133
The result
of the movement indicated that reconciliation or unity with Jiang for resistance had beenthe purpose of the Clique in the formation of the AJNUF, i.e. bi-Jiang kangri, although
preparation for fan-Jiang kangri proceeded during the movement, in case Jiang refused
reconciliation. The Clique always treated Jiang as an important element of the AJNUF.
This was perhaps a stance which suited their propaganda, for both the Clique and Jiang
were always more likely to compromise than Jiang and the CCP. As Li Zongren said on
June 8, 1936,
If the Central Government resists Japan, of course it is the fortune of our nation,because we are willing to unite all of the people for fighting Japan with one mind.
If now they still hesitate, we simply must resist Japan by ourselves.134
The performance of the Clique in the Sino-Japanese War proved that Li and the Guangxi
troops not only put forth the political rhetoric for resistance themselves but also put it into
execution.135
As Diana Lary emphasizes, while fighting in central China, the Guangxi
troops acquitted themselves well - far better than the majority under Nankings
command136
throughout the War.
It was also a factor that the Clique, from 1931 onward, strove to build up and
develop its relationships and cooperation with other GMD factions, in particular, with those
of the Southwest region (as discussed in Chapter Five), in order to foster resistance to the
Japanese.
The Clique's AJNUF served the purpose of bi-Jiang kangri, which was the key to
all parties and groups who later came under Jiangs leadership for resistance, whether they
were willing or not. In this sense, the AJNUF of the Clique was beneficial to resistance,
whatever the motive. Many writers recognize that the Clique practiced the policy of bi-
133
For details of speeches and resolutions of the CCP in the formation of a national
united front for fan-Jiang kangri, see Wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 2, pp. 1-166.
134Li Zongren, Kangri jiuguo de zhengzhi baogao, in Meng Guanghan et al (eds.),
Kangzhan, p. 291.
135Cheng Siyuan,Zhenghai mixin, pp. 155-156.
136Diana Lary,Region and Nation, p. 206.
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Jiang kangri in the movement, but they attribute it to the influence and collusion of the
CCP, or believe it was only with the assistance of the Communists.137
However, that was
not the case.
CCP documents before the June 1 Movement emphasized the anti-Japanese andopposition to Jiang policy as their main task, although they called for a national united
front. Theoretically, this united front was based on a national defence government in which
the CCP would be the