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A ORN L/5ubI8343374/1JWl
STUDY TO ASSESS THE EFFECTS OF
ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE ON
ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS
PHASE I
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
O A b P l D G E N A T I O N A L L A S O R A T O R Y
C E N T R A L R E S E A R C H L i E R A R Y C I R C U L A l I O N S i C T i O N
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DO NOT T R A N S F E R TO AHOTHER PERSON ! + y o u w i s n s o m e o n e e l s e t o h e r t h l s r e p o r t , s e n d i n n u n l e w l t h r t p o r t a n d t h e l i b r a r y w i l l a r r o n g e u l o o n
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This report was prepasred as an account of work sponsored by an agency oif the nment nor any agency express or i~mplied. or
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I
b
ORNL/Sub/83- 43374/.1/V1 D i s t . Category UC-97a ,b ,c
P
Energy D i v i s i o n
STUDY TO ASSESS THE EFFECTS OF ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE ON ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS
PHASE I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
J. R. Legro N. C. Abi-Samra J. C. Crouse A. R. Hileman
V. J . Kruse E. R. Tay lor , Jr.
F. M. Tesche
Date Publ ished - September 1985
Prepared f o r t he U.S. Department of Energy, Ass i s tan t Secretary fo r Conservation and Renewable Energy, O f f i c e of Energy Storage and D i s t r i b u t i o n , E l e c t r i c Energy Systems Program.
Report Prepared By:
Westinghouse E l e c t r i c Corporat ion Advanced Systems Technology
777 Penn Center Boulevard P i t tsburgh, PA 15235
Under Subcontract 19X43374C
f o r
P. R. Barnes, P r o j e c t Manager Power Systems Technology Program
Energy D i v i s i o n Oak Ridge Nat ional Laboratory
Oak Ridge, TN 37831 Operated by:
MARTIN MARIETTA ENERGY SYSTEMS, INC. f o r t he
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Under
Contract No. DE-AC05-840R21400
I 3 4 4 5 b 0002311 4 a__--_
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CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD .......................................................... v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................... v i i
L I S T OF FIGURES ................................................... i x
ABSTRACT.. ........................................................ x i
1. INTRODUCTION.. .............................................. .1
2. HIGH-ALTITUDE DETONATION NUCLEAR EMP ENVIRONMENTS.. ......... .6 3. SURFACE. DETONATION NUCLEAR EMP ENVIRONMENTS. ................ -10
4. HIGH-ALTITUDE DETONATION NUCLEAR EMP METHODOLOGY.. .......... .17
5. SURFACE DETONATION NUCLEAR EMP METHODOLOGY.. ................ .24
6. PHASE I1 RESEARCH .......................................... .31
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................... 33
iii
FOREWORD
The Division of Electric Energy Systems (EES) of the United States Department o f Energy ( D O E ) has formulated a program for the research and development of technologies and systems for the assessment, operation, and control of electric power systems when subjected t o electromagnetic pulse (EMP). The DOE/EES EMP program p l a n i s documented in a DOE report entitled, Program Plan for Research and Development of Technologies and Systems for Electric Power Systems Under the Influence of Electromagnetic Pulses, DOE/NBB-003, May, 1983. The research documented in this Oak Ridge National Laboratory ( O R N L ) report was conducted under Program Plan Elements E l , "EMP Surge Characterization and Effects" and E2, "EMP Assessment Methodol ogy Devel opment and Testing . I'
The information presented in this volume i s an Executive Summary of the Phase I e f for t t o explore the interaction between electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and civilian electric ut i l i ty systems. The results o f this work will be used in subsequent phases of the research program t o simulate such interaction, assess the possible consequences, and explore relevant mitigation techniques.
All EMP environmental da ta have been obtained from public domain documents and unclassified source materials. Such information i s presented herein for i l l ustrative purposes only and does not represent actual weapon characteristics or maximum threat environments.
T h i s document i s Volume 1 of a four-volume series t h a t describes an EMP assessment methodology for c iv i l i an electric power systems. Volume 1 ( this document) i s an Executive Summary; Volume 2 discusses high-altitude EMP (HEMP); Volume 3 discusses magnetohydrodynamic EMP (MHD-EMP) ; and Volume 4 discusses nuclear surface burst source region EMP (SREMP).
V
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
c
The research for this report se r ies was sponsored by the Division of Electric Energy Systems, United States Department of Energy under Contract No. W-7405-ENG-26 w i t h the Union Carbide Corporation, and Contract No. DE-AC05-840R21400 w i t h Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. The work as performed by Westinghouse Advanced Systems Technology under Subcontract No. 19X-43374C with Martin Marietta Energy Systems , Inc.
The authors wish to acknowledge and thank Mr. K. W . Klein of the United States Department of Energy, Mr. P. R. Barnes, and Mr. P. A. Gnadt of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Appreciation i s also acknowledged t o the ORNL Electric Uti l i ty and EMP Advisory Teams for t he i r thoughtful comments and constructive guidance. Special acknowledgment i s given to Dr. V . Albertson, University o f Minnesota, for his assistance i n the understanding of geomagnetic storms, and t o Dr. C . Longmire, Mission Research Corporation, for his fundamental insights concerning electromagnetic pulse.
The physical preparation of t h i s en t i re report ser ies could not have been accomplished without the extensive e f fo r t s of Ms. C . Brown and Mr. 3 . E. Lokay of Westinghouse Advanced Systems Technology.
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v i i
.
Figure
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
1 2 3
4
5
6
7 8
9 10
11 12
Phase I research organizat ion ................................ 4 Phase I study approach ....................................... 5 Spatial extent of selected effects from a one-Megaton surface nuclear detonation (plan view). .................... ..13 Transient current surge induced on an overhead line and an underground power cable located w i t h i n the source region of a surface nuclear detonation.. .................... .14 Representation of the current surge formed w i t h i n the source region, on an overhead line, by a Norton equivalent source located a t the source region boundary.. ... .15 Time-domai n waveform for vertical , radiated SREMP electric field a t a distance of 10,000 meters from the or igin of a one-Megaton surface nuclear detonation.. .... .16 Elemental divis ion of power system.. ........................ .21 Overview of HEMP assessment methodology t o subsystem level.. ..................................................... .22 Overview of MHD-EMP assessment methodology.. ................ .23 Overview of SREMP assessment methodology for civilian electric u t i l i t y systems.. ......................... .28 Overview of source region surge assessment methodology ....... 29 Overview of system stabi 1 i t y assessment methodology.. ....... .30
.
.
i x
STUDY TO ASSESS THE EFFECTS OF ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE
ON ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS
c
J , R. Legro N. C. Abi-Samra J. C. Crouse A. R. Hileman
V. J . Kruse E. R. Taylor, Jr.
F. M. Tesche*
ABSTRACT
The high-altitude detonation of a nu 1 ear devi over the continental United States can expose electric utility power systems to intense, transient electromagnetic pulses (EMP). In addition to the initial transient fields designated as early-time, high-altitude EMP and intermediate-time, high-altitude EMP, electromagnetic signals are also produced at times from seconds to hundreds of seconds after the burst. This signal has been designated as Magnetohydrodynamic-EMP (MHD-EMP) .
Nuclear detonations at or near the earth's surface can also produce transient EMP. This electromagnetic phenomena has been designated as nuclear surface burst, source region EMP (SREMP).
This volume presents an executive summary of the preliminary research effort to: (1) investigate the nature and coupling of EMP environments to electric power systems, (2) define the construction of approximate system response models , and (3) document the development of a methodology to assess equipment and system vulnerability.
The research to date does not include an attempt to quantify power system performance in EMP environments. This effort has been to define the analytical methods and techniques necessary to conduct such assessments at a later time.
*LuTech , Incorporated , Lafayette, CA
xi
1. INTRODUCTION
.
A s ing le , h i g h - a l t i t u d e detonat ion of a nuc lear dev ice over t h e c o n t i n e n t a l Uni ted States can expose l a r g e geographic areas t o t r a n s i e n t electromagnet ic f i e l d s known as electromagnet ic pulse (EMP). The i n i t i a l e lectromagnet ic f i e l d s produced by t h i s event have been de f ined
as h i g h - a l t i t u d e electromagnet ic pu lse (HEMP). Later- t ime, low-frequency f i e l d s , produced by t h e same detonat ion, have been de f ined as magnetohydrodynamic electromagnet ic pulse (MHD-EMP) . Nuclear detonat ions, a t o r near t h e e a r t h ' s surface, can a l s o produce t r a n s i e n t EMP f i e l d s . This electromagnet ic phenomena has been def ined as source reg ion electromagnet ic pulse (SREMP).
The D i v i s i o n o f E l e c t r i c Energy Systems (EES) o f t h e Uni ted States Department o f Energy (DOE) has developed a Program Plan [ l ] t o
i n v e s t i g a t e p o t e n t i a l v u l n e r a b i l i t y of c i v i l i a n e l e c t r i c power systems t o Nuclear EMP events. Th is u n c l a s s i f i e d research e f f o r t i s being conducted under t h e techn ica l leadersh ip o f t h e Oak Ridge Nat ional Laboratory (ORNL).
Oak Ridge Nat ional Laboratory has implemented t h e DOE Program Plan as a sequent ia l s e r i e s o f t h r e e research phases. The Phase I research concentrates on t h e development o f a p p l i c a b l e power system models and assessment methodologies necessary t o inves,tigate power system performance under Nuclear EMP condi t ions. Phase I 1 employs the models and methodologies of Phase I t o perform p r e l i m i n a r y system assessments f o r se lected nucl ear weapon scenarios. Phase I I1 encompasses d e t a i 1 ed system assessments and t h e e x p l o r a t i o n of poss ib le hardening approaches, where necessary, t o m i t i g a t e adverse power system performance due t o Nuclear EMP.
A four-volume r e p o r t documents t h e ORNL Phase I research conducted
by Westinghouse Advanced Systems Technology and i t s associated sub-
cont rac tors . The Westinghouse Phase I research team organ iza t ion i s
2
shown i n Figure 1. The o rgan iza t i on was cons t ruc ted t o complement the
Westinghouse power system c a p a b i l i t y w i t h t h e EMP exper t i se o f LuTech, Inc. E l e c t r i c u t i l i t y perspec t ive was provided by the Arizona Pub l i c Serv ice Company and t h e Southern C a l i f o r n i a Edison Company.
The Phase I study approach i s shown i n Figure 2. For each type o f
nuclear detonat ion, t h e i n i t i a l research focused on t h e development of u n c l a s s i f i e d EMP environmental desc r ip t i ons app l i cab le t o t h e assessment o f e l e c t r i c u t i l i t y systems. EMP i n t e r a c t i o n modes w i t h power systems were i nves t i ga ted t o develop t h e necessary system models. An assessment methodology was then developed t o assess poss ib le EMP/system i n t e r a c t i o n and the range o f system response(s). An experimental program was s p e c i f i e d t o support re f inement o f bo th models and methodology. The f i n a l task was t h e d e t a i l e d development o f t h e Phase I 1 techn ica l scope.
The Westinghouse Phase I research program was conducted under guide1 ines provided by t h e Oak Ridge Nat ional Laboratory. These gu ide l ines , discussed i n d e t a i l i n t h e app l i cab le r e p o r t volume(s), a re summarized as fo l l ows :
The Phase I research was conducted as an u n c l a s s i f i e d program. A l l data p e r t a i n i n g t o nuc lear weapon e f f e c t s was obta ined f rom u n c l a s s i f i e d sources. Such in fo rma t ion should - not be i n t e r p r e t e d t o represent ac tua l nuclear weapon c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o r maximum EMP t h r e a t environments.
The EMP t r a n s i e n t f i e l d s of i n t e r e s t a re those produced by t h e high-a1 t i t u d e and/or surface nuc lear de tonat ion(s ) . The phenomena known as "Nuclear Lightning," assoc iated w i t h nuc lear surface detonat ions, was i n t e n t i o n a l l y excluded from t h e Westinghouse scope o f work.
Power system i n t e r a c t i o n models were devel oped f o r EMP frequencies ranging f r o m mid-frequencies on t h e order o f 10 MHz t o frequencies l e s s than 60 Hz.
.
3
0 The methodology was cons t ruc ted so t h a t major subsystems, such as generat ion p lan ts , cou ld be separately assessed and t h e r e s u l t s used i n an assessment o f t he t o t a l system.
This Executive Summary presents an overview o f the Phase I research documented i n successive volumes o f t h i s repo r t . A discussion i s
presented o f t h e approach t o in tegra ted , mu1 t i - b u r s t nuclear EMP events. Th is document inc ludes a summary o f t he research conclusions and recommendations reached du r ing Phase I o f t h e program.
.
4
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY I WESTI NGHOUSE
ADVANCED SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY -I
- WESTI NGHOUSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER
- WESTI NGHOUSE DEFENSE CENTER
- LUTECH, I N C .
- ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY
- SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY
.
Fig . 1. Phase I R e s e a r c h O r g a n i z a t i o n
5
\7 SPECIFY NEEDED
EXPERIMENTS
9
DOCUMENT PHASE I RESEARCH >
1 RESEARCH I
SPEC1 FY PHASE I 1 RESEARCH
DETERMINE DIGITAL CODE DEVELOPMENT
DEVELOP APPLICABLE EMP
ENVIRONMENTS
F ig. 2. Phase I Study A p p r o a c h
.
6
2 . HIGH-ALTITUDE DETONATION NUCLEAR EMP ENVIRONMENTS
When a nuc lear weapon i s detonated a t a l t i t u d e s grea ter than 40 k i lometers, weapon ef fects i n t e r a c t w i t h t h e e a r t h ' s upper atmosphere and geomagnetic f i e l d t o produce t r a n s i e n t electromagnet ic f i e l d s (EMP). For
these heights of detonat ion, EMP i s t h e s i g n i f i c a n t weapon e f f e c t experienced by t h e e l e c t r i c power system. I n t ime-order o f appearance, components of t h e t o t a l EMP s igna l have been designated: 1) ear ly - t ime HEMP, 2 ) in termediate- t ime HEMP, and magnetohydrodynamic EMP (MHD-EMP).
Any methodology developed t o i n v e s t i g a t e the i n t e r a c t i o n o f
high-a1 t i t u d e nuc lear EMP and e l e c t r i c power systems must incorpora te appropr ia te, e lectromagnet ic d e s c r i p t i o n s as t h e t h r e a t s p e c i f i c a t i o n ( s ) . Such s p e c i f i c a t i o n s necessar i l y inc lude an apprec ia t ion o f t h e physics associated w i t h EMP product ion and t h e phys ica l and f u n c t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e system under i n v e s t i g a t i o n .
For e a r l y - t i m e and in termediate- t ime HEMP, de f ined as i n c i d e n t e l e c t r i c f i e l d s a t t h e e a r t h ' s surface, complete s p e c i f i c a t i o n requ i res knowledge o f t h e f o l l o w i n g :
0 Area o f i l l u m i n a t i o n 0 F i e l d peak magnitude 0 F i e l d time-domain waveshape 0 F i e l d angle o f incidence 0 F i e l d p o l a r i z a t i o n
The e l e c t r i c f i e l d magnitude, waveshape, angle o f incidence, and p o l a r i z a t i o n a r e n o t constant throughout t h e area o f i l l u m i n a t i o n . Instead, they vary as funct ions o f t h e o r i e n t a t i o n o f any l o c a l observat ion p o i n t w i t h respect t o t h e o r i g i n o f detonat ion.
Previous i n v e s t i g a t i o n s of s p a t i a l l y small systems [2,3] have adopted a "worst-case" HEMP t h r e a t s p e c i f i c a t i o n . The i n c i d e n t e l e c t r i c f i e l d waveform i s expressed as a bounded double exponent ia l o f t h e form:
E ( t ) = Eo(e-"t-e - 8 t )
7
Where : 4 = 5.25 x 10 V/m EO
6 a = 4.0 x 10 sec'l'
f3 = 4.76 x 10 8 sec -1
The waveform of Equation (1) is assumed to be at an angle of incidence, and polarization which provides maximum excitation to the system under examination. Such a "worst-case" specification, although physically unrealizable, does serve to place an upper bound on HEMP interaction with a spatially small system.
The civilian power system of generation, transmission and distribution is - not a spatially small system within the total area o f HEMP illumination. For system level analysis, the use of a spatially invariant HEMP threat specification can seriously overestimate HEMP interaction and system response. For example, numeric calculations of open-circuit voltage(s) at the end of electrically long lines using the "worst-case" threat can overestimate the voltage peak magnitude by an order of magnitude.
The Phase I research strongly suggests that, for system level electric power system assessments, at least the early-time HEMP threat specification should retain the spatial variation of the signal in order to more accurately investigate the range of possible system response(s). An approximate technique to estimate the Eo, in terms of Equation ( l ) , as well as the local angle of incidence and polarization, is discussed in detail in Volume 2 o f this report series.
A more recent approach to HEMP threat specification is to separate the total HEMP signal into an early-time HEMP signal and an intermediate-time HEMP signal. The early-time HEMP incident electric field specification retains the time-domain waveform of Equation (1). In the case of intermediate-time HEMP, little unclassified data is available
8
to develop as complete a definition. Intermediate-time HEMP incident electric field(s) have been described as follows:
0 Average peak magnitude of 100 V/m 1 5 0 Frequency spectra from 10 to 10 Hz
0 Signal duration from 1 ysec to 1 second
In the absence of additional information, an unclassified definition for the intermediate-time HEMP incident electric field has been chosen as:
E(t) = El e Y t
Where : El = 100 V/m
3 y = I O sec-l
The complete specification assumes that the spatial area of illumination, angle(s) of incidence and polarization(s) are the same as specified for early-time HEMP.
At elapsed times of seconds to hundreds of seconds after the weapon detonation, the power system is excited by very low frequency, magnetohydrodynamic EMP. Power system interaction to MHD-EMP is an important issue due to the existence of long transmission lines which are grounded at each end. MHD-EMP electric field specification requires know1 edge of:
0 Area of illumination 0 Field peak magnitude 0 Field waveshape 0 Field orientation
9
The above parameters a l s o vary s p a t i a l l y w i t h i n t h e t o t a l area o f i l l u m i n a t i o n . As discussed i n Volume 3 o f t h i s r e p o r t ser ies , an MHD-EMP e l e c t r i c f i e l d s p e c i f i c a t i o n i s developed as f o l l o w s :
The term E 2 ( t ) i s t h e s p a t i a l dependence o f t h e e l e c t r i c f i e l d peak magnitude. The term 6(x,y) r e f l e c t s t h e s p a t i a l dependence o f e l e c t r i c f i e l d d i r e c t i o n . The term f (t) represents a normalized , s p a t i a l l y i n v a r i a n t , t ime domain waveform.
The MHD-EMP e l e c t r i c f i e l d c a l c u l a t e d by Equation (3) i s t h e t o t a l f i e l d . Th is i s i n c o n t r a s t t o Equations (1) and ( 2 ) where t h e E ( t ) term i s o n l y the i n c i d e n t HEMP e l e c t r i c f i e l d . The peak magnitude o f t h e MHD-EMP e l e c t r i c f i e l d may be on t h e order o f 10 V/km depending on e a r t h conduct i v i t y .
A complete d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e EMP produced by a s i n g l e h i g h - a l t i t u d e detonat ion requ i res both HEMP and MHD-EMP s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . The u n c l a s s i f i e d 1 i t e r a t u r e does n o t con ta in u n i f i e d environmental descr ip t ions f o r m u l t i p l e , h i g h - a l t i t u d e nuc lear detonat ions, The authors suggest t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g approximations may be acceptable f o r such scenarios :
0 For simultaneous detonat ions ( t ime-separat ion grea ter than a few microseconds b u t l e s s than one second), where t h e areas o f d i r e c t i l l u m i n a t i o n do n o t overlap, t h e t o t a l s p e c i f i c a t i o n i s t h e independent s p e c i f i c a t i o n f o r each detonat ion.
0 For simultaneous detonat ions where t h e HEMP areas o f d i r e c t i l l u m i n a t i o n do i n t e r s e c t , t h e a p p l i c a b l e t o t a l s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f t h e i n c i d e n t e l e c t r i c f i e l d i s t h e t ime-superposi t ion o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l i n c i d e n t f i e l d s .
0 For detonat ions time-spaced grea ter than one second, t h e HEMP s ignal of t h e second detonat ion i s considered t o be a f a s t t r a n s i e n t s igna l occur r ing w i t h i n the MHD-EMP environment of t h e f i r s t detonat ion.
0 For detonat ions time-spaced grea ter than 300 seconds, each detonat ion i s t r e a t e d as an independent, separate event.
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3. SURFACE DETONATION NUCLEAR EMP ENVIRONMENTS
When a nuc lear weapon i s detonated a t o r near t h e sur face of t h e ear th , in tense t r a n s i e n t electromagnet ic f i e l d s a r e produced i n a s p a t i a l l y l o c a l area surrounding t h e b u r s t o r i g i n . Th is area i s known as the source (depos i t ion) region. A t d is tances beyond t h e source reg ion s p a t i a l boundary, a t r a n s i e n t r a d i a t e d electromagnet ic f i e l d i s a l s o created. The phenomena a r e designated as Source Region EMP (SREMP).
As presented i n Volume 4 o f t h e r e p o r t ser ies , elements of t h e e l e c t r i c power system p h y s i c a l l y near t h e b u r s t o r i g i n w i l l experience t h e f u l l range o f weapon e f f e c t s i n a d d i t i o n t o SREMP e x c i t a t i o n . Non-EMP e f f e c t s inc lude: 1 ) c r a t e r i z a t i o n and e jec ted m a t e r i a l , 2) f i r e b a l l , and 3 ) peak-overpressure shock waves i n a i r . F igure 3 dep ic ts t h e s p a t i a l e x t e n t o f these se lected weapon e f f e c t s w i t h respect t o t h e s p a t i a l e x t e n t of t h e EMP source r e g i o n f o r a nominal one-Megaton sur face nuc lear detonat ion.
C i v i l i a n e l e c t r i c power systems, as p r e s e n t l y cons t i tu ted , have n o t been i n t e n t i o n a l l y designed t o wi thstand t h e weapon e f f e c t s o f sur face nuc lear detonat ions. The Phase I research s t r o n g l y suggests t h a t , f o r d is tances o u t t o t h e 3.5 p s i peak-overpressure contour (Fig.3), t h e power system w i l l be damaged t o a l e v e l where it can no longer perform i t s intended funct ion(s) . For weapon y i e l d s g rea ter than 100-k i lo tons, a v a i l a b l e data suggests t h a t t h e 3.5-psi pea k-overpressure s p a t i a l boundary w i 11 exceed t h e EMP source reg ion s p a t i a l boundary. Based on t h e concept of "balanced s u r v i v a b i l i t y ' ' o f a
system t o nuc lear weapon e f fec ts , i t i s n o t c o n s t r u c t i v e t o assess SREMP e f f e c t s on t h e power system loca ted deep w i t h i n t h e nuc lear source
reg ion. System response t o SREMP t h r e a t environments may be s i g n i f i c a n t beyond the d is tance o f t h e i n i t i a l , non-EMP d i r e c t damage.
The Phase I research, presented i n Volume 4 o f t h i s r e p o r t ser ies, suggest t h a t a reasonable l o c a t i o n t o begin t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e SREMP environment, f o r c i v i l i a n power system assessment, i s a t t h e source
11
reg ion s p a t i a l boundary. The SREMP environmental d e f i n i t i o n focuses on
t h e f o l l o w i n g phenomena:
0 Trans ient e l e c t r i c a l surges induced on power l i n e s and cables p h y s i c a l l y t r a v e r s i n g t h e source reg ion boundary. These e l e c t r i c a l surges a r e conducted away from the source reg ion on l i n e s and-cables t o t h e remaining power system before t h e l i n e o r cable i s p h y s i c a l l y destroyed by o t h e r weapon ef fects .
0 The SREMP t r a n s i e n t electromagnet ic f i e l d s e x i s t i n g f o r some d is tance beyond t h e source reg ion.
Unclass i f ied i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f e l e c t r i c a l surges, formed w i t h i n t h e source reg ion and conducted away t o t h e system v i a power l i n e s and cables, may be f a c i 1 i t a t e d by t h e adopt ion o f "canonical I' surge waveforms de f ined a t t h e source r e g i o n boundary. Such a s p e c i f i c a t i o n may take t h e form of t h e time-domain waveform f o r t h e s h o r t - c i r c u i t cur ren t . An example o f such surge waveforms f o r an overhead l i n e and an underground cable a re shown i n F igure 4. The source r e g i o n conducted surge may then be modeled by a Norton equ iva len t source and appropr ia te source impedance loca ted a t t h e source r e g i o n boundary. An i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h i s approach i s shown i n F igure 5. The Norton source approach f o r a f f e c t e d power l i n e s and cables a l lows f o r system assessment i n t h e absence o f d e t a i l e d c a l c u l a t i o n s o f EMP f i e l d i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h i n t h e source region.
The phys ica l asymmetry o f t h e nuc lear surface detonat ion source region, due t o t h e a i r -ground i n t e r f a c e , produces ne t t r a n s i e n t SREMP f i e l d s o u t s i d e t h e source reg ion. These f i e l d s propagate i n r a d i a l d i r e c t i o n s away from t h e source reg ion. Again, a r a t i o n a l l o c a t i o n t o d e f i n e t h i s aspect o f t h e SREMP t h r e a t i s a t t h e source reg ion s p a t i a l boundary. The time-domain waveform f o r t h i s r a d i a t e d SREMP e l e c t r i c f i e l d i s shown i n F igure 6. The e l e c t r i c f i e l d p o l a r i z a t i o n i s taken t o be v e r t i c a l . E l e c t r i c f i e l d s t rength a t t e n u a t i o n w i t h inc reas ing
d is tance from t h e source reg ion i s conserva t ive ly approximated as a
f u n c t i o n o f distance-' .
12
The above discussion is concerned with the appropriate SREMP threat specification for a single nuclear surface detonation. For investigations which include multiple surface detonations, the authors suggest that the following approximations may be acceptable:
0 For simultaneous surface detonations where the respective source regions do not physically intersect, the total SREMP threat specification may be taken as independent source regions and superimposed radiated fields.
0 For simultaneous surface detonations, spaced such that the source regions do physically intersect, the two individual detonations can be replaced with a single weapon detonation of combined equivalent yield.
0 Time-spaced surface detonations at the same or physically separate locations can be treated as independent events.
For scenarios that include joint high-altitude plus surface detonations, the authors suggest that the following approximation may be acceptable:
0 For simultaneous high-a1 titude plus surface detonations, the joint EMP threat specification consists of any SREMP conducted surges combined with the high-altitude radiated HEMP and MHD-EMP specification.
0 In the case of time-separated joint detonations, each detonation is treated as an independent event.
It is important to stress that the above EMP threat specifications have been developed to support unclassified assessment o f civilian electric power systems. All assumptions and approximations should not be construed as applicable to any other type o f system.
13
4 -
3 -
(KM) 2
I -
0 -
- I
-2
-3
4 ,
-5
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6l 5
-
- -
-
-
PEAK OVERPRESSURE > 3.5 PSI \
1 I I I 1 I I I I I I I -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -I 0 I 2 3 4 5 6
(KM)
Fig. 3 . Spatial extent of selected effects from a one-Megaton surface nuclear detonation (Plan View).
14
Y
106 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 l I I 1 .
OVERHEAD LINE
WRIED CABLE
I 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I I I 1 1 1 1 1 I I I 1 1 1 1
164 10-3 10'2 TI ME
(SECONDS)
.
Fig. 4. T rans ien t c u r r e n t surge induced on an overhead . l i n e and an underground power cab le loca ted w i t h i n t h e source r e g i o n o f a surface nuclear de tonat ion [4].
15
I
t I
BURST SOURCE REGION BOUNDARY
I A Y * X 0 xo+ L * X xo+ L
a ) Physical Configuration
NORTON I S0uRCE7 Io
b) Equivalent Circuit Model
F ig . 5. Representation of the current surge formed w i t h i n the source region, on an overhead l i ne , by a Norton equivalent source located a t the source region boundary.
16
V/m
Seconds
Fig. 6 . Time-domain waveform for vertical, radiated SREMP electric f i e ld at a distance of 10,000 meters from the origin o f a one-Megaton surface nuclear detona- tion [5].
17
4. HIGH-ALTITUDE DETONATION NUCLEAR EMP METHODOLOGY
Methodology is a system of principles, practices, and procedures applied to a set of knowledge to achieve a specified objective. The power system (or utility) network) is that group of equipment which, taken together, generates, transmits, and del ivers electrical energy to customer load areas. Included are the communication and operational '
control necessary for this process.
This section presents a summary of the methodology developed to assess the effects of high-altitude nuclear EMP on civilian electric power systems. The total methodology incorporates assessment techniques for: 1) early-time HEMP, 2) intermediate-time HEMP, and 3) MHD-EMP threat environments. Since there are significant differences in the parameters of HEMP transient environments when compared to MHD-EMP transient envi ronments, the relevant methodologies have been developed as separate modules. The linkage between the modules is the ability to characterize the power system "state" at an elapsed time subsequent to HEMP interaction but prior to MHD-EMP interaction. Thus, the output "state" of the HEMP assessment becomes the power system "state" set of initial conditions for MHD-EMP assessment.
The HEMP module of the total assessment methodology begins with a specification of the HEMP threat environment and the power system to be evaluated. The utility network is delineated into power delivery and communication systems. Examples of subsystems in the two systems include: 1 ) power generation stations, 2) generation, transmission, subtransmission and distribution substations, 3) 1 ines between substations, 4) distribution networks, and 5) operations centers. The equipment within each subsystem can be further grouped according to the function they perform. Examples of such functional groups include: 1) the power delivery group, 2) the control group, 3) the protection group, 4) the instrumentation group, and 5) the communication group. It should be noted that all functional groups may or may not exist within
18
each subsystem, Each functional group is considered to consist of sets of circuits and devices. A circuit is a conductor or system of conductors in which an electrical current is intended to flow [6]. A device is an assembly of components to serve a specific purpose [6]. The device or circuit is the smallest entity considered by the methodology. An illustration of this system division is shown in Figure 7.
A key assumption embedded within the methodology is that for the initial period of time when HEMP interacts with the system, each functional group can be assessed separately and independently of all other functional groups. This parallel development is shown in Figure 8.
The probable response( s) o f individual circuits or devices are incorporated in appl icable "fault trees" to ascertain functional group and/or subsystem-level response. The complete system response is developed via conventional power system study techniques including load flow and stability studies.
A primary objective of the system-level analysis is to define the power system "state" at an elapsed time of seconds after the detonation. This state definition may be dynamic in the sense that the system may still be responding to the HEMP excitation at this time. This "state" definition serves as the system initial conditions for the MHD-EMP assessment module.
The MHD-EMP assessment methodology has been adapted from power system analysis techniques developed to explore the interaction o f geomagnetic storms and electric power systems. The Phase I research, as discussed in Volume 3 of this report series, supports the validity of t hi s approach.
An overview of the MHD-EMP assessment methodology is shown in Figure 9. The methodology focuses on the transient electromagnetic environment/power system interaction modes known to exist during geomagnetic storms. The initial system response o f interest is the quasi direct-current(s) flowing in the system due to MHD-EMP excitation. The quasi-dc f l o w is considered to be simultaneous with normal 60 Hz current
1.9
f low. The j o i n t , quasi-dc, and ac e x c i t a t i o n o f e lectromagnet ic equipment, such as a f f e c t e d power and instrument t ransformers, may be t h e mechanism f o r equipment damage, upset , and/or system s t a b i 1 i ty concerns.
The h i g h - a l t i t u d e nuc lear EMP assessment methodology requ i res a s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l of d i g i t a l code development as p a r t o f the Phase I1 scope o f work. It i s n o t intended t h a t t h e t o t a l methodology should o r can be accomplished as a s ing le, u n i f i e d s imu la t ion code. The
methodology incorporates spec i f i c code modules as ana lys is t o o l s t o be
used by knowledgeable power systems engineers. The d i g i t a l codes used i n t h e methodology can be d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e categor ies:
0 EMP Environment Codes 0 EMP I n t e r a c t i o n Codes 0 System Response Codes
The EMP environment codes serve t o t r a n s l a t e a given h i g h - a l t i t u d e nuc lear detonat ion, a t a given l o c a t i o n , t o t h e s p a t i a l l y l o c a l EMP envi ronments experienced by t h e power system. Environmental code development i s requ i red f o r both HEMP and MHD-EMP. The EMP i n t e r a c t i o n codes t r a n s l a t e t h e l o c a l e lectromagnet ic environment i n t o t h e corresponding se t (s) o f t r a n s i e n t stresses. HEMP coding requ i res a s i g n i f i c a n t development e f f o r t . MHD-EMP codes can be adapted from e x i s t i n g codes developed t o study geomagnetic storm/power system i n t e r a c t i o n . The requ i red power system response(s) can be drawn from e x i s t i n g " f a u l t t r e e " r i s k assessment codes and from convent ional power system ana lys is codes.
The a n t i c i p a t e d Phase 11 experimental program, discussed i n Volumes 2 and 3 o f t h i s r e p o r t ser ies, focuses on equipment and dev ice- level t e s t s t o determine and/or v a l i d a t e : 1 ) device t r a n s f e r func t ions , 2 ) inherent s t rength o f se lected devices t o wi thstand EMP induced surges, and 3 ) selected equipment performance under EMP cond i t i ons .
Where possible, t h e h i g h - a l t i t u d e EMP assessment methodology has been l n t e n t i o n a l l y developed t o b u i l d upon e x i s t i n g power system assessment techniques convolved w i t h experience gained from m i l i t a r y EMP
20
assessments. It is anticipated that the methodology may be refined and/or modified as the result of the Phase II research.
.'
CONTIGUOUS BORDERS 7 UT I L I TY NETWORK BE1 NG ASSESSED
POWERLINE
4- SUBSYSTEM e SUBSYSTEM
1 UTILITY NETWORK I INTERCONNECTED I
I I
---------
i I- 0 W z z
I I I
I
I I I _- - - _-_ -__ J
8 I a
z
FUNCTIONAL - FUNCTONAL 1 GROUPS GROUP INTERACTIONS
C 1 RCU ITS
DEVICES
F ig . 7. Elemental d i v i s i o n o f power system.
22
I i
WEAPON LOCATION AND T I M E
SOURCE REGION HEMP ENVIRONMENT
GROUP-WITH I N - I I SUBSYSTEM
HEMP LOCAL TO SUBSYSTEM
HEMP COUPLING TO I I
I I I
I OR I CIRCUIT
DEVICE OR CIRCUIT
I ASSESSMENT OF STATE OF
FUNCTIONAL GROUP
ASSESSMENT OF STATE OF
FUNCTIONAL GROUP
ASSESSMENT OF STATE OF I FUNCTIONAL GROUP
1
ACTIONS BETWEEN
ASSESSMENT OF STATES
OF SUBSYSTEM
Fig. 8 . to subsystem level.
Overview o f HEMP assessment methodology
. 23
CALCULATE DC BRANCH CURRENTS
P I I DEFINE MHD-EMP
ENVIRONMENT
EVALUATE EQUIPMENT RESPONSE DUE TO OVEREXCITATION OF
ELECTROMAGNETIC EQUIPMENT
EVALUATE SYSTEM RESPONSE HARMON I CS LOAD FLOW r STAB1 L I T Y
END ASSESSMENT FOR r NUCLEAR DETONATION HIGH-ALTITUDE
F ig . 9. O v e r v i e w of MHD-EMP Assessment M e t h o d o l o g y
24
5. SURFACE DETONATION NUCLEAR EMP METHODOLOGY
This section presents a summary of a structured process t o assess the effects of surface nuclear SREMP on civilian power systems. The nature of the surface detonation i s such t h a t , i f EMP did not exist, the civilian power system may s t i l l be severely affected by the remaining weapon effects. The methodology summarized herein i s focused t o investigate the additional risk due t o electromagnetic pulse associated with the detonation. A complete assessment of a l l effects of the surface nuclear detonation on the civilian power system is beyond the scope of this EMP research program.
The methodology acknowledges three distinct, transient environments produced by the nuclear surface detonation. In terms of spat ia l coverage, the smallest of these environments is the source region. The threats for evaluation are transient electrical surges formed on lines exiting this region. These surges propagate away from the boundary i n t o the grid prior t o physical damage t o the line. The system responses of interest include: 1 ) direct and/or consequential damage t o equipment and faci l i t ies beyond the extent of non-EMP physical damage, and 2 ) system instability due t o system protective reaction t o such surges.
The second environment, a l so spa t i a l ly local i n area, is the area o f
i n i t i a l , non-EMP direct damage. The methodology incorporates this threat by acknowledging: 1 ) the time-progressive physical destruction o f the power system in this area, 2 ) the relevant loss of generation and/or load, and 3) system protective reaction t o isolate this damaged portion o f the g r i d from the rest o f the system.
The third transient environment, of greatest spatial coverage, i s system illumination by the SREMP radiated (free) fields beyond the source region. The questions and concerns associated w i t h this phenomena are similar t o those associated with HEMP investigation.
25
Prel iminary analysis of the above environments strongly suggests that the order of consideration proceed as follows:
0 Investigation of the SREMP radiated (free) field interaction with the system outside the source region.
(I Evaluation of the consequences of surge propagation on 1 ines intersecting the source region boundary.
0 Incorporation of non-EMP physical damage in time-sequence of events .
An overview of this assessment progression is shown as Figure 10. Recursive load flow/stabil ity simulations are necessary to investigate the magnitude and extent of system disturbance.
The initial conditions for power system assessment include the f ol 1 owi ng data :
0 Surface nuclear detonation environmental threat pa ramet er s .
0 Power system initial conditions; the state of the system
0
at the time of detonation.
The geographic origin of the detonation.
Unlike high-altitude detonations, where EMP can illuminate vast areas, EMP environments for surface detonations are relatively local in extent. It is important to note that a spatial shift of a few kilometers in the origin of the surface weapon detonation may result in significantly different power system assessment results for otherwise identical scenarios.
The SREMP radiated field assessment methodology is qualitatively similar to that summarized for high-altitude HEMP. Electrical surges on lines, due to SREMP radiated field excitation, have similar time-domain waveforms to those induced by 1 ightning. Unlike early-time HEMP excita- tion, the surge peak magnitude, expressed in terms of an open-circuit voltage at a location of interest, may not be maximum for increasing
26
i nc reas ing lengths o f l i n e . Th is d i f f e r e n c e i s due, i n p a r t , t o t h e a t t e n u a t i o n as a func t ion o f inc reas ing d is tance from t h e o r i g i n o f the SREMP i n c i d e n t e l e c t r i c f i e l d magnitude.
As discussed i n Volume 4 o f t h i s r e p o r t ser ies, t h e canonical surge waveform, ascr ibed t o t h e source reg ion surge, has a r i s e t ime o f hundreds o f microseconds and a decay t ime o f several m i l l i seconds. Th is
waveshape i s q u i t e s i m i l a r t o t h a t de f ined f o r power system swi tch ing impulse [7]. Thus, e x i s t i n g power system swi tch ing surge ana lys is can be adapted t o develop poss ib le system responses. An overview o f t h i s methodology i s shown i n F igure 11.
Given t h a t t h e time-domain waveshape o f t h e SREMP surge i s s i m i l a r
t o t h a t de f ined f o r swi tch ing impulse, t h e prospect ive c r e s t and energy contained i n t h e SREMP surge f a r exceed anyth ing experienced by the system i n normal operat ion. The methodology addresses: 1 ) t h e p r o f i l e o f SREMP surge t r a n s i e n t overvo l tage a long t h e l i n e , 2) operat ion, and p o t e n t i a l damage o f surge a r r e s t e r s , 3) poss ib le damage t o power t ransmiss ion and d i s t r i b u t i o n equipment , and 4) penet ra t ion o f t h e SREMP surge i n t o t h e network.
A t t h e conclus ion o f t h e source r e g i o n surge analys is , t h e elapsed rea l - t ime i n t o t h e scenar io i s several m i l l i seconds. The methodology now incorporates se lected non-EMP phys ica l damage t o t h e system. Such damage cannot be taken t o occur a l l a t t h e same elapsed t ime. Above ground
l i n e s and f a c i l i t i e s , loca ted a t t h e 3.5 p s i contour, may n o t experience d i r e c t damage f o r elapsed t imes of seconds a f t e r t h e detonat ion. An overview of t h i s p o r t i o n o f t h e complete methodology i s shown i n F igure 12.
The non-EMP damage may be d i v i d e d i n t o a minimum o f two
areas: 1) an inner area defined by t h e f i r e b a l l radius, and 2) an ou ter area de f ined by t h e 3.5 p s i peak-overpressure contour. If t h e system
remains s t a b l e a f t e r t h e f i r e b a l l damage i s added, t h e peak-overpressure damage i s inc luded and t h e s t a b i l i t y a n a l y s i s continued. A concluding assessment i s done f o r system s ta te .
27
DEFINE SURFACE DETONATION AND POWER SYSTEM
I N I T I A L CONDITIONS
SREMP RADIATED F IELD ASSESSMENT FOR LINES
AND F A C I L I T I E S
SOURCE REGION SURGE ASSESSMENT FOR LINES
AND F A C I L I T I E S
NON-EMP I N I T I A L DAMAGE ASSESSMENT( S) FOR LINES
AND F A C I L I T I E S
POWER SYSTEM STATE ASSESSMENTS
- STABILITY - LOAD FLOW
SREMP THREAT ASSESSMENT EVALUATION
F i g . 10. O v e r v i e w of SREMP a s s e s s m e n t m e t h o d o l o g y f o r c i v i l i a n e l e c t r i c u t i l i t y s y s t e m s .
28
I I IDENTIFY LINES FOR 1 SREMP SURGE ASSESSMENT
I MODEL STATE I OF L INE(S)
I I CALCULATE OVERVOLTAGE ALONG L I N E
COMPARE VOLTAGE TO SWITCHING CRITICAL FLASH-OVER VALUE
I MODIFY MODEL TO I INCLUDE FLASHOVER
CHARACTERIZE SURGE AT STATION ENTRY
ASSESS ARRESTER PERFORMANCE AND
EQUIPMENT DAMAGE
CHARACTERIZE SURGE ON LINES OUT OF STATION
Fig. 1 1 . assessment methodology.
Overview o f source region surge
29
I DETERMINE SYSTEM STATE I AFTER SREMP ASSESSMENT
INCLUDE PROMPT
P Y PERFORM
STABILITY STUDY
COMPUTE NEW LOAD FLOW
6 I NCLUDE ADD I T 1 ONAL -4 NON-EMP DAMAGE
6 DETERMI NE SYSTEM STATE I AT END OF ASSESSMENT
F ig . 12. Overview o f system s t a b i l i t y assessment methodology.
30
6. PHASE I1 RESEARCH
A Phase I t a s k was t h e development o f Phase I 1 - research recommendations. The p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e Phase I1 work are: v a l i d a t i o n o f t h e models and methodology developed i n Phase I , and a p r e l i m i n a r y assessment o f power system performance under EMP cond i t ions
f o r se lected weapon scenarios. '
The areas se lected f o r f u r t h e r research c o n s i s t o f t h e f o l l o w i n g :
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Develop Scenario d e f i n i t i o n s f o r Power System/EMP S imula t ion and Assessment. I n t h i s task, a s e t o f "reasonable," worst-case weapon scenarios w i l l be s p e c i f i e d t o support methodology v a l i d a t i o n and p r e l i m i n a r y assessment. It i s planned t h a t t h e scenarios w i l l i nc lude both h i g h - a l t i t u d e and sur face nuc lear detonat ions.
Develop E l e c t r i c U t i l i t y Power System Data Base. Se lec t s p e c i f i c e l e c t r i c u t i l i t i e s f o r assessment. The necessary data bases w i l l be developed f o r these systems.
Develop D i g i t a l Computer Codes f o r EMP Power System
necessarv t o Derform t h e assessment w i l l be w r i t t e n . It ; i s inte6ded t h a t e x i s t i n g bodies o f code w i l l be used where app l icab le .
Perform Pre l im inary Parametric Studies on EMP I n t e r a c t i o n w i t h Power Systems. f i e t a s k o b j e c t i v e i s t o develop a s e t of EMP t e s t surges t o be used i n t h e experimental program. The task w i l l i nc lude an i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e f e a s i b i l i t y o.f s p e c i f y i n g a standard EMP t e s t surge(s) f o r equipment c e r t i f i c a t i o n .
Exper imenta l ly Determine Component Response. I n t h i s task, a s e t o f experiments w i l l be performed t o determine t h e response o f se lected power system equipment t o EMP f i e l d s and surges. The r e s u l t s o f t h e experiments w i l l be i ncorpo r a t ed i n t o t h e a ssessment met hodol ogy . Perform I n t e r a c t i o n Studies on EMP I n t e r a c t i o n w i t h t h e Power System Grid. Th e r e s u l t s o f Tasks 1 t o 5, and the methodology developed under t h e Phase I research, w i l l be
31
7.
8.
8 9.
10.
11.
12.
The months.
used t o perform a s imu la t ion study o f EMP coupl ing w i t h se lected power systems.
Assess the E f f e c t s o f EMP Induced Transients on Transmission and D i s t r i b u t i o n Systems. I n t h i s task, a p r e l i m i nary assessment w i 11 be performed on selected T&D sys tems . Assess the E f f e c t s o f EMP on Power System Control and Communication. I n t h i s task, a p re l im ina ry assessment w i l l be performed t o i nves t i ga te the performance o f se lected power system operat ional con t ro l and communi - c a t i o n func t i ons under EMP cond i t ions .
Assess the E f f e c t s o f EMP on Generation. I n t h i s task, a p re l im ina ry assessment w i l l b e performed t o assess the performance o f se 1 ec ted e l e c t ri c power generat ion s t a t i ons under EMP cond i t ions . This task w i l l a l so inc lude a review o f t h e Uni ted States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report NUREG/CR-3069 [2] conclusions regard ing 'nuclear power p l a n t safe-shutdown under EMP cond i t ions .
P re l i m i nary Power System Assessment. Based on the preced- i n g Tasks and the Phase I research, a p re l im ina ry assessment w i l l be accomplished as t o the o v e r a l l p e r f o r - mance o f se lected e l e c t r i c u t i l i t y systems under EMP cond i t ions o f i n t e r e s t .
Def ine Phase I11 Research A c t i v i t i e s . Near the end o f the Phase I 1 work, a techn ica l d e f i n i t i o n o f Phase I11 research a c t i v i t i e s w i 1 1 be devel oped.
A l l work performed under t h e Phase I1 research m 1 1 be documented i n a se r ies o f i n d i v i d u a l Task Reports and a F ina l Report.
Phase I1 tasks w i l l be accomplished i n 24 consecutive calendar
32
7 . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This sec t i on presents a summary o f t h e Phase I research conclus ions and recommendations documented i n Volume 2, Volume 3, and Volume 4 of t h i s r e p o r t ser ies .
I n the areas o f h i g h - a l t i t u d e nuc lear HEMP environmental d e f i n i - t i o n s , methodology development and systems ana lys i s , t h e f o l l o w i n g conclusions are presented :
For e l e c t r i c u t i l i t y system assessment, t h e environmental d e s c r i p t i o n o f ear ly - t ime HEMP should r e t a i n t h e s p a t i a l v a r i a t i o n o f t h e i n c i d e n t HEMP e l e c t r i c f i e l d i n l i e u o f a s p a t i a l l y i n v a r i a n t "worst case" d e f i n i t i o n .
The e x i s t i n g , u n c l a s s i f i e d data f o r in termediate- t ime HEMP i n c i d e n t e l e c t r i c f i e l d ( s ) a r e no t s u f f i c i e n t t o develop a system-1 eve1 environmental d e s c r i p t i o n t o t h e same d e t a i 1 as ea r l y - t ime HEMP. The d e s c r i p t i o n discussed i n Sect ion 2 o f t h i s volume represents an i n i t i a l e f f o r t by the authors t o inc lude in termediate- t ime HEMP w i t h i n t h e methodology.
For power system assessment, HEMP e x c i t a t i o n o f e lec - t r i c a l l y long 1 ines can be accomplished by t ransmiss ion 1 i n e techniques.
The na ture and t ime-dura t ion o f i n i t i a l power system e x c i t a t i o n by ea r l y - t ime HEMP i s such t h a t major sub- systems can be i n i t i a l l y assessed as a p a r a l l e l set o f tasks. The concept o f " c r i t i c a l 1 i n e l eng th ,I' combined w i t h power system t ime constants, supports t h i s con- c l usion.
A major unce r ta in t y , i n t h e assessment o f power system components and equipments, i s t he absence o f e x i s t i n g "s t rength" data bases requ i red f o r d i r e c t comparison t o HEMP s t ress .
The use o f f a u l t - t r e e assessment techniques provides a s t ruc tu red methodology t o exp lo re t h e i n t e r a c t i o n o f power system f u n c t i o n a l groups, devices and c i r c u i t s . S p e c i f i c f a u l t - t r e e development requ i res the i n t e r a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f knowledgeable power system engineers.
33
0 Significant digi ta l code development will be required, i n the Phase I1 research, t o incorporate the HEMP coupling techniques and environmental parameters presented i n Volume 2 of this report ser ies . Ex i s t ing power system analysis codes for: 1 ) short-circuit studies, 2 ) load flow studies, and 3 ) s t ab i l i t y studies can be direct ly incorporated i n the methodology.
In the areas of high-altitude nuclear MHD-EMP environmental def ini t ion, methodology development and systems analysis, the following conclusions a re presented:
0 For power system analysis, the MHD-EMP environment can be defined as a spatial and time dependent, surface tangential, t ransient e l ec t r i c f i e ld .
0 Previously developed MHD-EMP environmental formats are not in a format that can be direct ly used i n power system analysis. An approach fo r a suitable environmental definit ion i s presented in Volume 3 of th i s report ser ies .
0 The nature o f MHD-EMP power system excitation exhibits suff ic ient similari ty t o geomagnetic storm electromagnetic environments that a parallel assessment methodology can be defined .
0 The i n i t i a l power system response of in te res t are the t ime-varyi ng induced direct currents flowing simultaneously with 60 Hz currents.
For surface nuclear SREMP environmental def ini t ions, methodology development and systems analysis, the following conclusions are pres en t ed :
0 . The SREMP t ransient , electromagnetic environments, created by a surface nuclear detonation, are i n a d d i t i o n t o the i n i t i a l , non-EMP weapon effects. Based on the concept of I'bal anced survi va bi 1 i ty , 'I the t o t a l envi ronmental definit ion must include selected non-EMP weapon effects .
34
0 For c i v i l i a n power system assessment, a r a t i o n a l s p a t i a l l o c a t i o n t o d e f i n e t h e sur face nuc lear SREMP environment i s a t t h e source r e g i o n boundary, The t r a n s i e n t source r e g i o n surge, conducted o u t o f t h e source r e g i o n v i a power l i n e s and cables p h y s i c a l l y i n t e r s e c t i n g t h e source r e g i o n boundary and t h e time-domain waveform o f t h e SREMP rad ia ted e l e c t r i c f i e l d a t t h e source reg ion boundary a r e t h e EMP t h r e a t environments o f i n t e r e s t .
0 For power l i n e s and cables, j o i n t l y exposed t o e l e c t r i c a l surges formed w i t h i n t h e source r e g i o n and e x c i t e d by the r a d i a t e d f i e l d beyond t h e region, t h e source r e g i o n surge may domi nant system response.
The Phase I i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f nuc lear EMP i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h c i v i l i a n e l e c t r i c power systems has revealed several areas o f a d d i t i o n a l research necessary t o b e t t e r 1 i m i t assessment uncer ta in ty . Such recomnendations a r e beyond t h e a n t i c i p a t e d scope o f work f o r Phase I1 research.
The recommendations f o r a d d i t i o n a l research are:
0 D e t a i l e d development o f an u n c l a s s i f i e d HEMP environmental d e f i n i t i o n , i n c o r p o r a t i n g both ear ly - t ime and i n t e r - mediate-t ime HEMP s ignals , a p p l i c a b l e t o c i v i 1 i a n power system assessment.
0 A d d i t i o n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s are necessary t o determine t h e e f f e c t s of corona on ear ly - t ime HEMP i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h overhead 1 ines. These i n v e s t i g a t i o n s should i n c l u d e experimental v a l i d a t i o n o f a n a l y t i c a l models.
0 S p e c i f i c a t i o n and implementation o f a t e s t program t o i l l u m i n a t e power system f a c i l i t i e s w i t h f r e e - f i e l d HEMP s imulators .
35
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\
37
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
71-80. N. C. Abi -Samra, Westinghouse E l e c t r i c Corporat ion, Advanced Systems Technology, 777 Penn Center Boulevard, P i t t s b u r g h , ,PA 15232
81. W. E. Adams, D i r e c t o r f o r Radiat ion, Defense Nuclear Agency,
82. V. D. A lher tson, Department o f E l e c t r i c a l Engineer ing, 123 Church
Washington, DC 20305
S t r e e t , S .W., Uni v e r s i t y o f Minnesota, M i nneapol i s , MN 55455
83. H. W. Askins, Jr., The C i t a d e l , Char leston, SC 29409
84. C. E. Baum, NTYEE, K i r k l a n d AFB, NM 87117
85. D. W . Bensen, Federa l Emergency Management Agency, Research D i v i s i o n , 500 C S t r e e t , S.W., Washington, DC 20472
86. T. B o l t , ED-SD, U.S. Army Engineer ing, USAEDH, P.O. Box 1600, Huntsvi 11 e, AL 35087
87. J. N. Bombardt, R&D Associates, 105 E . Vermi j o S t r e e t , S u i t e 450, Colorado Spr ings, C O 80903
Hampshi r e Avenue, S i 1 vet- Spr ings, MD 20903-5000
A k t i e n g e s e l l Schaf t , Post fach 351, D-6800 Mannheim 1, West Germany
88. G. E. Bracket t , Code H25, Navy Surface Weapons Center, 1091 New
89. E. H. Brehm, Department GK/CN32, Brown, Bover i , and Cie,
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J. F. Buck, Wisconsin E l e c t r i c Power Company, 231 W. Michigan, Milwaukee, W I 53201
L. M. Burrage, McGraw-Edison, P.O. Box 100, 11131 Adams Road, F ranksv i l l e , W I 53126
H. S. Cabayan, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, P.O. Box 5504, L i vermore, CA 94550
F. L. Cain, Georgia I n s t i t u t e o f Technology, Engineer ing Experiment S ta t ion , A t lan ta , GA 30332
R. N. C a r l i l e , Department o f E l e c t r i c a l and Computer Engineering, Uni ve rs i t y o f Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721
I . J. Carney, Nuclear S u r v i v a b i l i t y Organization, Boeing Aerospace Company, P.O. Box 3999, Seat t le , WA 98124
V. L. Char t i e r , Bonnev i l l e Power Admin is t ra t ion , P.O. Box 491-ER, Vancouver, WA 98666
K: K. Chen, Sandia Nat iona l Laboratory, Drawer 1333, P.O. Box 5800, K i r k l a n d AFB, NM 87185
H. E. Church, Aluminum Company o f American, 1501 Alcoa Bu i l d ing , Pi t tsburgh, PA 15219
B. Cikotas, DNA/RAEE, 6801 Telegraph Road, .Alexandria, VA 22310
C. F. Clark, Bonnev i l l e Power Admin is t ra t ion , P.O. Box 3621, Port land, OR 97208
I .
102. R. E. Clayton, Power Technologies, P.O. Box 1058, 1482 E r i e Boulevard, Schenectady, NY 12301-1058
103. A. C l e r i c i , Sanelmi, V ia .Pergo les i 25, 20.124 Milano, I t a l y
104. H. W. Colborn, North American E l e c t r i c R e l i a b i l i t y Counci l , Research Park, Terhume Road, Princeton, NJ 08540-3573
105. D. E. Cooper, Southern C a l i f o r n i a Edison Company, P.O. Box 800, 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue, Rosemead, CA 91770
106. R. Cort ina, ENEL-Centro Ricerca, Automatica, V I A Vo l ta 1, Cologno Monzese (Ml) , I t a l y
107. G. Dahlen, Royal I n s t i t u t e o f Technology, S-100-44, Stockholm, Sweden
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108. J. Darrah, Headquarters NORAD/G5, Peterson AFB, CO 80914
109. Defense Technica l I n f o r m a t i o n Center, Cameron S t a t i o n , A lexandr ia , VA 22314
110. J. J. Dougherty, E l e c t r i c Power Research I n s t i t u t e , P.O. Box 10412, Palo A l to , CA 94303
111. W . M. Druen, 8200 South Memorial Parkway, S u i t e D, H u n t s v i l l e , AL 35802
112. J. C. Engimann, Commonwealth Edison, 1319 S . F i r s t Avenue, Maywood, I L 60153
113. D. M. Er icson, Jr., Sandia Nat iona l Laboratory , D i v i s i o n 6414, K i r k l a n d AFB, NM 87185
114. W . E. Ferro, E l e c t r i c Research and Management, Inc., P.O. Hox 235, Thomaston, ME 04861
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P. B. Fleming, Science and Engineer ing Associates, Inc., Mar iners Square, Sui te .127, 1900 Nor th Nor th lake Way, P.O. Box 31819, Seat t le , WA 98103
R. Fullwood, Science A p p l i c a t i o n s , Inc., 5 Palo A l t o Square, S u i t e 200, Palo A l t o , CA 94304
M. R. Gent, Nor th American E l e c t r i c R e l i a b i l i t y Counci l , Research Park, Terhume Road, P r i nceton, NJ 08540-3573
S. M. G i l l i s , Economic and P u b l i c P o l i c y , Department o f Economics, Duke U n i v e r s i t y , Durham, NC 27706
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I. S. Grant, Power Technologies, Inc., 1482 E r i e Blvd., Schenectady , NY 12305
A. R. G r i t z k e , U.S. Department o f Navy, Theater Nuclear Warfare P r o j e c t O f f i c e , Washington, DC 20360
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126. J. Gut, Research I n t i t u t e f o r P r o t e c t i v e Const ruc t ion , Auf der Mauer 2, CH-8001 Zur ich , Swi tzer land,
127. V. Guten, K-52, Nat iona l S e c u r i t y Agency, F o r t G. Mead, MD 20755
128. R. J. Harr ington, George Washington U n i v e r s i t y , Department of €1 e c t r i c a l Engi n e e r i ng and Computi ng S c i ence, Washi ngton, DC 20052
129. M. F. Hebb, F l o r i d a Power Corp., P.O. Box 14042, M a i l Code AB, S t . Petersburg, FL 33733
130. M. H. Hesse, JEC 5008, Rennselear P o l y t e c h n i c I n s t i t u t e , Troy, NY 12181
131. D. Higgins, JAYCOR, Santa Barbara F a c i l i t y , P.O. Box 30281, 360 South Hope Avenue, Santa Barbara, CA 93105
132. D. W. H i lson, Tennessee V a l l e y A u t h o r i t y , 1100 Chestnut S t r e e t , Tower 2, Chattanooga, TN 37402
133. F. C. Holdes, P a c i f i c Gas ti E l e c t r i c Company, 3235-18th S t r e e t , San Francisco, CA 941 10
134. W. S. Howington, Noranda Aluminum, Inc., P.O. Box 70, New Madrid, MO 63869
135. R. Hutchins, BDM Corporat ion, 1801 Randolph, S.W., Albuquerque, NM 87106
136. 3. Hunt, Emergency Preparedness A d m i n i s t r a t o r , San Diego Gas and
137. V. I n k i s , O n t a r i o Hydro, U7E1, 700 U n i v e r s i t y Avenue, Toronto,
E l e c t r i c Company, P.O. Box 1831, San Diego, C A 92112
Canada M5GlX6
138. Wasyl Jan i schewsky j, E l e c t r i c a l Engi n e e r i ng Dept . , Uni v e r s i ty o f Toronto, Toronto, Canada M5SlA4
139. H. P. Johnson, Georgia Power Company, 270 Peachtree S t r e e t , 11 th F l o o r , A t l a n t a , GA 30303
140. V. K. Jones, Science and Eng ineer ing Associates, Inc., Mar iners Square, S u i t e 127, 1900 Nor th Nor th lake Way, P.O. Box 31819, Seat t 1 e, WA 981 03
141. F. R. Kalhammer, D i r e c t o r , Energy Management and U t i l i z a t i o n D i v i s i o n , E l e c t r i c Power Research I n s t i t u t e , 3412 H i l l v i e w Avenue, P.O. Box 10412, Palo A l t o , CA 94303
142. W . Karzas, R&D Associates, P.O. Box 9695, Mar ina Del Rey, CA 90291
143. K. W . K l e i n , C h i e f o f Power D e l i v e r y Branch, Department o f Energy, CE-143, D i v i s i o n o f E l e c t r i c Energy Systems, F o r r e s t a l B u i l d i n g , Room 5E-052, 1000 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20585
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R. C. Latham, Duke Power Company, P.O. Box 33189, Char lo t te , NC 28242
A. La t te r , R&D Associates, P.O. Box 9695, Marina Del Rey, CA 90291
J. S. Lawler, Department o f E l e c t r i c a l Engineering, U n i v e r s i t y o f Tennessee, Knoxvi 11 e, TN 37916
K. S. H. Lee, Dikewood D i v i s i o n o f Kaman Science Corp., 2800 28th St ree t , S u i t e 3780, Santa Monica, C A 90405
J. R. Legro, Westinghouse E l e c t r i c Corporation, Advanced Systems Technology, 777 Penn Center Boulevard, Pi t tsburgh, PA 15235
M. Lessen, Consu l t ing Engineer, 12 Country Club Dr ive , Rochester, NY 14618
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J. Locasso, Kockwell I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 3370 Meral oma Avenue, P.O. Box 4192, Ma i l Code 031-BB17, Anaheim, CA 92803
C. L. Longmire, Miss ion Research Corporation, P.O. Drawer 719, Santa Barbara, CA 93102
W. C. Maklin, I R T Corporation, 6800 Poplar Place, McLean, VA 22101
R. M. Maliszewski, American E l e c t r i c Power Service Corp., 1 R ive rs ide Plaza, P.O. Box 16631, Columbus, OH 43216-6631
J. N. Mal lo ry , Southern C a l i f o r n i a Edison Co., P.O. Box 800, Rosemead, CA 91770
J. D. Mart in, H a r r i s Corporation, PRD E lec t ron i cs D i v i s i o n , 6801 Je r i cho Turnpike, Syossett, NY 11791
P. S. Maruvada, Hydro-Quebec I n s t i t u t e o f Research, 1800 Montee Ste-Jul ie, Varennes, Quebec, CANADA JOLZPO
R,. G. McCormack, CERL, Corps o f Engineers, P.O. Box 4005, Champaign, I L 61820
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I . N. Mindel, I I T Research I n s t i t u t e , 10 West 35th S t ree t , Chicago, I L 60616
0. L. Mohre, Cajun E l e c t r i c Power Corp., P. 0. Box 15440, Baton Rouge, LA 70895
B. B. Mrowca, Ba l t imore Gas & E l e c t r i c Co., P.0. Box 1475, Balt imore, MD 21203
K. Mu l le r , IABG, E ins te ins t rasse 20, 8012 Ottobrunn, West Germany
Este-M Murtha, Booz A1 l e n and Hamilton, General Services Admin is t ra t ion, 18th & F S t ree ts , N.W., Washington, DC 10405
H. P. Neff , Department o f E l e c t r i c a l Engineering, U n i v e r s i t y of Tennessee, Knoxvi 11 e, TN 3791 6
B. 0. Ne t t l es (Code 203), Naval E l e c t r o n i c Systems Engineer ing Center, Charleston, 4600 M a r r i o t t Dr ive , North Charleston, SC 29418
D. R . Nevi us, North Ameri can E l e c t r i c Re1 i abi 1 i t y Counci 1, Research Park, Terhume Road, Princeton, NJ 08540-3573
G. B. Ni les, Ba l t imore Gas & E l e c t r i c Company, P r i n c i p a l Eng. Room 1020, P.O. Box 1475, Balt imore, MD 21203
B. Noel, Los Alamos Nat ional Laboratory, Ma i l S t a t i o n 5000, P.O. Box 1663, Los Alamos, NM 87545
B. Nowlin, Arizona P u b l i c Service Company, P.O. Box 21666, Phoenix, AR 85036
R. Oats, Atomic Weapons Research Establ ishment, B u i l d i n g D57, Aldermaston, Reading, RG74PR, England
G. Or re l 1 , Dep. Associate D i r e c t o r f o r Nat iona l Preparedness, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C S t ree t , S.W. , Washi ngton, DC 20555
L. Par is, U n i v e r s i t y o f Pisa, Via D i o t i s a l v i 2, 56100 P I S A
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W . A. Radaski, Metatech Corp., 358 South Fa i rv iew Avenue, S u i t e E, Goleta, CA 93117
J. J. Ray, Bonnev i l l e Power Administrat ion, P.O. Box 3621, Port land, OR 97208
T. J. Reed, Westinghouse E l e c t r i c Corporation, Advanced Systems Technology, 777 Penn Center Boulevard, Pi t tsburgh. PA 15235
I?. L. Retal lach, American E l e c t r i c Power, 1 R ive rs ide Plaza, Columbus, OH 43216
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D. H. Sandell, Harza Engineer ing Co., 150 South Wacker Dr ive , Chicago, I L 60606
J. A. Sawyer, MITRE Corp., MS-H070, P.O. Box 208, Bedford, MA 01703
R. A.-Schaefer, Metatech Corp., 20 Sunnyside Avenue, S u i t e D, M i l l Val ley, CA 94941
M. Schechter, A.D.A., P.O. Box 2250(81), Haifa, 31021, I s r a e l
H. Singaraju, A i r Force Weapons Laboratory, K i r k l a n d AFB, NM 87117
A. C. Smith, Jr., Beam Research Program, Lawrence Livermore Nat ional Laboratory, P.O. Box 808, Livermore, C A 94550
J . C. Smith, 1 Adarns Avenue, P.O. Box 44, Canonsburg, PA 15317
R. Smith, DNA, RAEE, 6801 Telegraph Road, Alexandria, VA 22310
W . S o l l f r e y , RAND Corp., 1700 Main St ree t , Santa Monica, CA 90406
H. Songster’, E l e c t r i c Power Research I n s t i t u t e , E l e c t r i c a l Systems D iv i s ion , 3412 H i l l v i e w Avenue, P.O. Box 10412, Palo A l to , CA 94303
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210. G. K. Soper, Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington, DC 20305
211. S. Spohn, DB4C2, Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency, Washington, DC 20301
212. J . R. Stewart, Power Technologies, Inc., P.O. Box 1058, 1482 E r i e Boulevard, Schenectady, NY 12301-1058
213. R. L. Su l l i van , Department o f E l e c t r i c a l Engineering, Col lege o f Engineering, U n i v e r s i t y o f F lo r i da , Ga inesv i l le , FL 32611
214. I. 0. Sunderman, L inco ln E l e c t r i c System, P.O. Box 80869, L inco ln , NE 68501
215. R. W . Sutton, Science App l ica t ions , Inc., 1710 Goodridge Dr ive , P.O. Box 1303, McLean, VA 22102
216-225. F. M. Tesche, LuTech, Inc., 3742 M t . D iab lo Boulevard, Lafayette, CA 94549
226. L. Thione, C E S I - V i a Rubatt ino 54 20734, Milano, I t a l y
227. R. J . Thomas, 302 P h i l l i p s Ha l l , Cornel1 Un ive rs i t y , I thaca, NY 14853
228. R. Torres, BDM Corporation, 1801 Randolph, S.W., Albuquerque, NM 87106
229. W . Ty le r , NT, K i r k l a n d AFB, NM 87117
230. M. A. Uman, Department o f E l e c t r i c a l Engineering, U n i v e r s i t y o f F lo r i da , Ga inesv i l le , FL 32611 ,
231. E. F. Vance, Route 3, Box 268A, F o r t Worth, TX 76140
232. D. R . Volzka, Wisconsin E l e c t r i c Power Company, 231 West Michigan St ree t , Milwaukee, WJ 53201
233. J. Vora, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, MS 5650 NL, Washington, DC 20555
234. C. 0. Whitescarber, Mar t i n M a r i e t t a Orlando Aerospace, Sandlake Road Complex (SLRC), M a i l P o i n t 399, P.O. Box 5837, Orlando, FL 32855
235. W. P. Wigner, 8 Ober Road, Pr inceton, NJ 08540
236. M. W. W i k, Forsvarets Ma te r ie l verk, S-11588 Stockhol m, Sweden
237. C. 9. Wil l iams, I R T Corp., 7650 Convoy Court, P.O. Box 80817, San Diego, C A 92138
45
238. W. H. Wil l iams, D i v i s i o n Manager, AT&T Informat ion Systems, B u i l d i n g 83, Room 1B23, 100 Southgate Parkway, Morr istown, NJ 07960
239. D. D. Wilson, Power Technologies, Inc., P.O. Box 1058, S,chenectady , NY 12301
240. U. P. Wissmann, AEG-Telefunken, General E l e c t r i c Company, 1 R i v e r Road, B u i l d i n g 36-444, Schenectady, NY 12345
H. W. Zai n i nger, Zai n i n g e r Engineer ing Company, 3408 Vance Court , San Jose, C A 95132
241.
242. I n s t i t u t e f o r Energy Analys is , ORAU - L i b r a r y
243. A s s i s t a n t Manager f o r Energy Research & Development, DOE/ORO Oak Ridge, TN 37830
UC-97a,b,c ( E l e c t r i c Energy Systems) 244-897. Given f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n as shown i n DOE/TIC-4500 under Category
Y
