Student Number: 130774011 - UBIRubir.bolton.ac.uk/954/1/Adamson Mkandawire Final... · Web viewMalawi receives 40% in budgetary support ... A review of ratings over the past three

Student Number: 130774011

Assessing the Effectiveness of the National Integrity System Institutions in the Fight against Corruption: The Case of Malawi Parliament

By

Adamson Joseph Kuseri Mkandawire

This Dissertation was submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Masters of Public Administration (MPA)

Awarded by

University of Bolton

April, 2015


Declaration

I, Adamson Joseph Kuseri Mkandawire, declare that I am the

sole author of this dissertation, which has been written in partial

fulfilment of the award of a Master of Public Administration Degree

by the University of Bolton and that during the period of

registered study I have not been registered for any other academic

award or qualification, nor has any of the material been submitted

wholly or partly for any other award. This dissertation is a result of

my own research work, and where other people’s research was

used, they have been duly acknowledged.

Adamson Joseph Kuseri Mkandawire

………………………… …………………….Student Signature Date

Professor Mustafa Hussein

……………………… ……………………Supervisor Signature Date

Dr. Becky Ward

………………………….. ……………………….. Supervisor Signature Date

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Dedications

This Dissertation is dedicated to my loving wife Theresa Mkandawire, who

patiently stood by my side as I struggled to complete this work and to my

wonderful children Memory, Jenny, Rhoda and Nathan, for their extraordinary

understanding as I devoted most of my time to studies. They will surely not

ask again; “Daddie, are you still studying?”

Glory be to God the Almighty, whose grace is beyond comprehension.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the University of Bolton and Malawi

Institute of Management team of lecturers and staff for the support

throughout the duration of my studies.

To my office, DFID Malawi, I am sincerely thankful for the full

academic sponsorship provided.

I would also like to sincerely acknowledge my supervisors; Dr

Becky Ward and Professor Mustafa Hussein for their unwavering

support and guidance which made this work a success.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms used

FDGs : Focus Group Discussions

MP : Member of Parliament

NACS : National Anti-Corruption Strategy

NGO : Non-Governmental Organisations

NIS : National Integrity System

OECD : Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

TI : Transparency International

UNCAC : United Nations Convention against Corruption

USAID : United States Agency for International Development

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Abstract

The introduction of the National Integrity System (NIS) in 1998 was seen as a

bold step in the fight against corruption in Malawi. But against the backdrop of

numerous cases of corruption in recent times, the question to ask is; how

effective are the National Integrity System institutions in fighting corruption?

This motivated the research which sought to assess the effectiveness of the

NIS institutions in the fight against corruption in Malawi. Using Malawi

Parliament as a case study, the objectives of the research were:

a) To establish effectiveness of Parliament as a National Integrity System

institution in Malawi,

b) To determine the level of influence of Parliament in the fight against

corruption

c) To recommend how Parliament as an Integrity System institution can

better support the fight against corruption.

Based on the case study findings, the study concludes that parliament as an

integrity institution is not effective to fight against corruption ostensibly due to

weak capacity which includes lack of budgets and technical skills for staff and

MPs, an executive arm of government which is arrogant and uncooperative,

highly divisive political and personal interests in the National Assembly

making debate on corruption issues highly difficult and untenable, dismal

transparency and accountability by parliament itself due to removal of

legislation that would have fostered horizontal accountability of Members of

Parliament and house decisions and lack of linkages and coherency with

other integrity and governance institutions.

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Table of Contents

Declaration......................................................................................................1Dedications.....................................................................................................2Acknowledgements........................................................................................3Abbreviations and Acronyms used..............................................................4Abstract...........................................................................................................5Chapter 1: Fighting Corruption in Malawi: The problem, the context and

argument...…………………………………………………………………………..8

1.1 Introduction.......................................................................................81.2 Background: Problem definition and current status of corruption in Malawi....................................................................................................101.3 Motivation to study the effectiveness of the National Integrity System Institutions...................................................................................111.4 Why study Parliament as integrity institution..............................131.5 Research aim, objectives and questions......................................141.6 Structure of the report....................................................................14

Chapter 2: Literature Review......................................................................152.1 Introduction.....................................................................................152.2 Conceptualising corruption, the theoretical framework, the National Integrity System and integrity institutions..............................16

2.2.1 Understanding Corruption: Notion and definition.................162.2.2 Corruption: Theoretical framework.........................................192.2.3 The National Integrity System (NIS)........................................222.2.4 The National Integrity System Institutions.............................242.2.5 National Integrity System Institutions in Malawi...................25

2.2.6 Legal framework........................................................................31 2.2.7 Anti-Corruption Initiatives........................................................322.3 National Integrity System- Tools and methodology of assessment...............................................................................................332.4 Determinants of effective integrity institutions............................372.5 Conceptual framework....................................................................512.6 Research questions........................................................................522.7 Conclusion.......................................................................................52

Chapter 3: Research Methodology.............................................................543.1 Introduction.....................................................................................543.2 Selected research philosophy, approach and strategies............55

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3.3 Validity, Reliability and Ethics.......................................................573.4 Limitations of the study..................................................................58

Chapter 4: Data collection and analysis.....................................................584.1 Introduction.........................................................................................594.2 Malawi Parliament General Background..........................................594.3 Research Participants Demographic configuration........................604.4 Key findings........................................................................................614.5 Conclusion..........................................................................................81

Chapter 5: Discussions, Recommendations and Conclusions................815.1 Introduction.........................................................................................825.2 Discussions of findings.....................................................................825.3 Recommendations..............................................................................865.4 Areas for future research...................................................................875.5 Conclusion..........................................................................................88

Appendix 1: Case Study Research Interview Guide................................107Appendix 2: Focus Group Discussions Guide........................................109Appendix 3: Letter of Introduction to carry out the research.................110

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Chapter 1

Fighting Corruption in Malawi: The problem, the context and argument

1.1 Introduction

The recent revelations about massive loss of public resources through

corruption commonly dubbed as “cash-gate” has raised serious concerns

about how prepared the country is to detect, prevent and holistically fight

corruption (Gwede, 2015). Since 1994 when Malawi embraced multi-party

form of government, every government that has been elected, has put the

fight against corruption at the centre of its policy drive (Malawi National

Integrity System Assessment Report, 2013). However, the spate of corruption

in recent times indicates that there is a critical gap between policy intentions

and the reality on the ground as more cases of corruption have come to the

fore, raising public interest and questions about whether the country is

winning the fight against corruption or in fact losing the much taunted battle.

The architecture to fight corruption has mostly thrived on political rhetoric

rather than clear commitment and support to infrastructure that will

comprehensively root out corruption. The introduction of the National Integrity

System (NIS) in 1998 (National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS),1998 ) was

seen as a bold step in the fight against corruption. But against the backdrop of

numerous cases of corruption in recent times, the question to ask is; how

effective are the National Integrity System institutions in fighting corruption?

This leads to the examination and assessment of the effectiveness of the NIS

institutions in the fight against corruption in Malawi and this is the central

theme of this study. Rather than testing a theory, this study is a policy impact

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assessment of the National Integrity System institutions in Malawi to

determine whether they are effective to fight against corruption. In order to

carry out this policy assessment, various assessment tools have been

examined ranging from the NIS Assessment toolkit championed by

Transparency International (2010) to the OECD Public Sector Integrity: A

Framework for Assessment (2005) to determine and establish clear

benchmarks and criteria for judging integrity institutions’ effectiveness.

However, before delving into these and in order to understand the

seriousness of corruption in Malawi, the research discusses the problem of

corruption in its sub-section 1.2 and shows that due to corruption, the country

has suffered aid cut and the impact of this on the development of the country

has been significant.

1.2 Background: Problem definition and current status of corruption in

Malawi

Just like in many other nations in African and the Su-Saharan region,

corruption has stood as a serious bottleneck for Malawi’s development

Nawazi (2012). The country reels from various forms of corruption ranging

from “political corruption”, petty but equally serious cases of bribery that

negatively affect public service delivery to the most subtle and entrenched

patronage and nepotism that aggravates inequality and poverty in the society.

Mustafa (2005) noted that each year Malawi loses millions of public resources

through “corruption, payments to ghost teachers, rentals for ghost houses and

funding for ghost projects”. Currently, Malawi is grappling with a corruption

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scam involving public officers, top political elites and business gurus in which

billions of public funds have been lost in what is called the “cashgate”. The

impact of this is stark as reported in the following:

“Several donor nations are withholding aid to Malawi in reaction to a

growing scandal over government graft known as Cashgate. The latest

to announce the delay of funding are donors under the Common

Approach to Budget Support (CABS) who are meeting in the capital,

Lilongwe. Government authorities say this is likely to pose economic

problems in a country where 40 percent of its national budget comes

from donor aid”. (Masina, 2013).

Malawi receives 40% in budgetary support from donors and donors also

support nearly 80% of Malawi’s development budget. However, due to

corruption and poor governance, donors have cut their aid and this has

affected development programmes. A review of ratings over the past three

years shows that corruption is getting worse in Malawi. Based on the World

Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (2010), Malawi scored 42.1% in

terms of the control of corruption indicator. This was noted as a great

improvement considering that in 2005 the country scored 27.3%. However,

scores dived deep in the subsequent years. The 2011 Transparency

International’s Daily Lives and Corruption, Public Opinion in Southern Africa

survey (2011) found that 57% of Malawians saw corruption as having

increased in public service delivery in the past 3 years. 58% of those

interviewed confessed to have paid a bribe to access public services within

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the 1 year prior to the survey. On the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic

Freedom, “freedom from corruption” (2012), Malawi received a score of 34 out

of 100 and the assessment found that corruption is serious and widespread.

The 2013 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index gives

Malawi a score of 37 out of 100 (the lower the score, the worse the corruption)

and this shows that overtime corruption has steadily worsened in Malawi.

1.3 Motivation to study the effectiveness of the National Integrity

System Institutions

There is little evidence about the effectiveness of the National Integrity

System Institutions in the fight against corruption in Malawi. Established in

2009 through the launch of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS), the

National Integrity System in Malawi has been in operation for 5 years and

there has been no focus on how the integrity institutions have changed the

dynamics in the fight against corruption.

Although Transparency International carries out National Integrity System

(NIS) country assessments, and the recent one being in 2013 for Malawi (NIS

Assessment report, 2013), the focus is on identifying weak and strong

performers of the NIS and not on their effectiveness in the overall fight against

corruption. The NIS assessment does not provide a critical analysis of how

these institutions (pillars) have contributed to the fight against corruption. The

NIS Tool Kit (2010) emphasises that the NIS Assessments create an

empirical basis that “adds to the understanding of strong and weak

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performers” but this is based on the criteria which assess the institution’s

enabling environment (NIS Tool Kit, 2010) and not their effectiveness. In the

wake of increasing public concerns about corruption, it calls to question

whether the National Integrity System institutions have any effect on rooting

out corruption or the system is another “white elephant”. The problem here is

that the NIS assessments do not focus on the contribution and influence the

NIS institutions have on the broader fight against corruption. So although

strong NIS pillars can be identified, but without a deep assessment of the

effect these pillars have on fighting corruption, it will remain a mystery why

Malawi is still facing increasing corrupt practices. Although Malawi established

the NIS with its 8 pillars (institutions) that includes the legislature, corruption in

the country still soars. The 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index shows that

Malawi performs far below average; nursing a score of 37 out of 100 and

ranking 91 out of 177 countries assessed (Transparency International, 2013).

Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom (2014) shows that Malawi

has a score of 31.9 out of 100 on “freedom from corruption” and this means

that corruption is a serious challenge.

1.4 Why study Parliament as integrity institution

According to the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2008), parliament is a

crucial pillar of the National Integrity System and studying parliament within

the context of the effectiveness of the National Integrity System institutions as

a key policy option for Malawi to fight against corruption would better reveal

whether the introduction of the integrity system has changed the way

corruption is being dealt with in Malawi. Parliament is a governance institution,

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makes laws and holds other branches of governance to account. Alamgir,

Mahmud, Iftekharuzzaman (2006) in the paper entitled “Corruption and

Parliamentary oversight: Primacy of the political will” observe that the

“Success of anti-corruption efforts is a function of the degree of the strength, independence and effectiveness of key institutions of the national integrity system like the parliament, the executive, the law enforcement agencies, the judiciary, the anti-corruption commission, and the media. The lead must be taken by the public representatives, especially members of the parliament who should develop their own self-regulatory mechanisms and set examples for others to follow”

By choosing parliament, this research will study the effectiveness of the

central infrastructure to fight corruption in Malawi.

1.5 Research aim, objectives and questions

Research aim

The aim of this research is to understand the effectiveness of Parliament as

National Integrity System institution on the fight against corruption in Malawi.

Research objectives

The research objectives are as follows:

d) To establish effectiveness of the Parliament as a National Integrity

System institution in Malawi,

e) To determine the level of influence of Parliament in the fight against

corruption

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f) To recommend how Parliament as an Integrity System institution can

better support the fight against corruption.

1.6 Structure of the report

This dissertation is organised into five chapters. This chapter has introduced

the problem of corruption in Malawi, discussed the context and argument for

this research and presented research objectives. Chapter two presents

various concepts related to corruption and focuses on relevant theories vis-à-

vis the Principal Agent and Public choice theories. It also reviews the National

Integrity System and discusses available literature on determinants of

effective National Integrity System institutions. Chapter three lays out the

research methodology and shows that this is a qualitative research based on

interpretivist paradigm. In Chapter four, the research presents data collected

based on Malawi Parliament as a case study. This chapter also highlights the

key findings. Chapter five is the last and discusses the key findings and sets

out recommendations for various stakeholders.

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Chapter 2

Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews literature on corruption; its definition, relevant theories,

the National Integrity System institutions in Malawi and determinants of

effective integrity institutions. The purpose of the literature review is (i) to

understand scholarly discourse about corruption (ii) to identify the right tools

and methodology for assessing the effectiveness of the integrity institutions,

and (iii) discuss determinants of effective NIS institutions and identify pieces

of literature that will help to answer the research questions.

2.2 Conceptualising corruption, the theoretical framework, the National

Integrity System and integrity institutions.

It is important to establish a basic understanding of the key terms that have

been extensively used and are at the centre of this dissertation. These terms

are corruption, the National Integrity System (NIS) and the integrity

institutions. The literature review finds that corruption is a diverse concept that

is difficult to reconcile and has remained so since the time of Aristotle. The

concept of the National Integrity System has not received much attention in

literature but it’s an emerging subject in the current scholarly discourse.

Integrity institutions or also known as National Integrity System institutions

have been described as pillars of the National Integrity System without which

the National Integrity System cannot operate (Pope, 2000).

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2.2.1 Understanding Corruption: Notion and definition

Scholars have discussed corruption from various viewpoints. Dobel (1978)

notes that corruption is not a unique issue of the modern world as it has been

there in ancient times. Plato (1955/c380Bc) and Aristotle (1962/350Bc) talked

about inequality in its various forms as creating the necessary conditions for

corruption and this demonstrates that corruption is not a new issue. However,

literature shows that there is no common understanding regarding the

meaning of corruption. Tehelka (2011) views corruption as what “you pay for

actually receiving your entitlement”. This definition does not explain where

corruption happens and by whom and therefore not easy to apply in this

research. However, it illuminates the subtle implications of corruption in the

sense that instead of receiving what one is entitled to, through corruption in

fact one pays for what is their entitlement (something they should have freely

received). The notion being espoused is that in whatever circumstances, one

will suffer double loss; as first they will lose their entitlement and second they

will pay for what they should have freely received. Okokgbule (2006)

understands corruption as “a device or strategy usually employed to sway

people away from the right course of action, duty or conduct, either in the

performance of their official duties, or in activities relating to economic or

political matters”. In this definition, corruption is placed in a specific context

vis-à-vis performance of official duties and in economic or political spheres.

This definition is interesting in the sense that it narrows corruption to specific

contexts, which in turn means that any similar occurrences outside the so

called official duty or economic and political activities do not necessarily

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amount to corruption. The Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary (2000) partly

supports this notion by defining Corruption as ‘dishonest or illegal behaviour

especially by people in authority’. In this definition, like the one before it,

corruption relates only to those who hold authority. However, in these

definitions, authority is not placed in any specific context; is it in formal

settings or informal, private or public office? So we still grapple with the subtle

contextual issues here. Transparency International (2006) defines corruption

as an ‘abuse of entrusted power for personal gain’. The notion espoused here

is that corruption is not just any abuse of entrusted power but that which is

made for “personal gain”. This is aptly supported by Kaufmann (2004) who

considers ‘corruption as an abuse of public authority for the purpose of

acquiring personal gain’. However, the departure here is the clear emphasis

on “public authority” which means by this definition corruption only relates to

those in public office.

In the eyes of international conventions corruption has also failed to be seen

from the same perspective. As Mirigu-Mukundi (2006) notes, The United

Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) (2003) in its article 15(b)

provides a litany of prohibited acts as “the solicitation or acceptance by a

public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official

himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official acts or

refrains from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties’. According to

this convention corruption relates to actions of a public official to “solicit or

accept undue advantage”. In this definition the public official is either an active

or a passive participant. The African African Union Convention on Preventing

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and Combating Corruption (2003) defines acts of corruption in its articles 4 (b)

as “the offering or granting, directly or indirectly, to a public official or any

other person, of any goods of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift,

favour, promise or advantage for himself or herself or for another person or

entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his or her

public functions”. Corruption relates to actions of “offering or granting” by a

certain person to a public official. The notion espoused here is that the public

official is a passive participant to this corrupt act.

Locally, The Malawi Corrupt Practices Act (1998) defines corruption as the act

of “offering, giving, receiving, obtaining or soliciting of any advantage to

influence the action of any public officer or any official or any other person in

the discharge of the duties of that public officer, official or other person”. This

definition embraces the view of both the United Nations Convention against

Corruption (UNCAC) and the African African Union Convention on Preventing

and Combating Corruption.

What is common amongst these definitions is that corruption involves taking

advantage of one’s authority or power for personal gain. However, for the

purpose of this research, corruption will be defined as the abusive exercise of

entrusted power, authority or position by a public official for personal gains or

satisfaction contrary to the laid down rules and procedures. This definition

embraces all the common notions and concepts about corruption and adds

the factor of rules and procedures which misses in the other definitions

explored.

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Having adopted a working definition of corruption, this research reviews

literature about the theoretical framework of corruption.

2.2.2 Corruption: Theoretical framework

Two strands of theoretical research are relevant to corruption in this study.

These are the Principal-Agent and Public Choice theories. The two theories

illuminate why corruption happens and define the relationship between public

officials and the general public. In the definition of corruption adopted by this

research, a public official abuses his/her entrusted power and authority for

personal gains and this happens in defiance of laid down rules and

procedures. This resonates with both theories as discussed by various

scholars.

The Classic Principal - Agency Model of Corruption

Jensen and Meckling (1976) view the principal agency relation in terms of a

contract where one, the principal, hires another, the agent to provide certain

services on behalf of the principal and this relationship is characterised by the

agent assuming autonomy in decision making and carrying out tasks in line

with the terms of the agreement. However, the agent because he assumes

autonomy and has more information than the principal, tends to maximize his

private benefits at the expense of the principal’s. In line with my definition of

corruption, the public official is the agent who is hired by the public (principal).

However, as Rose-Ackerman (1978) argues, corruption happens where the

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public official (agent) behaves opportunistically and maximizes his own

ulterior motives and private benefits instead of that of the public (principal).

The public official controls information and has authority over distribution of

government resources. As Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) observe, the key

challenge for the principal is to prevent this from happening and making sure

that the agent respects the established rules and procedures. Usually the

principal does not know the actions of the agent and fails to control him and

corruption happens because the agent takes advantage of this (Grossman

and Hart 1983, Holstrom and Milgrom 1991, Guesnerie and Laffont 1984,

Sappington 1991, Rose-Ackerman 1978, Klitgaard 1988, Gambetta 2002).

This research argues that The National Integrity System (NIS) comes into the

Principal –Agent equation here where the citizens (principals) need to be

given more information through public awareness and creating multiple

structures of governance (integrity institutions) to hold public officials to

account and inform them about the official’s ill behaviour. As Rose-Ackerman

(1978) observe, this will create a World of perfect information which will deter

public officials from corrupt actions.

Public Choice Theory

The foundation of Public choice theory according to Gorringe, 2001 is that

human beings are rational and that self-interest influences their behaviour and

how they do things. Politicians and bureaucrats tended to abuse power and

this needed to be controlled (Pallot, 1991). In developing World, institutions

are weak and this result into politicians and their kinsmen, the bureaucrats

using these institutions for private benefit at society’s expense (Yadav, 2005).

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Corruption happens when these calculating individuals according to Rose-

Ackerman (1978) consider that the potential benefits outweigh the costs. For

example if politicians and bureaucrats feel that they will not be caught or held

to account, then they have all the incentive to be corrupt. Their choice to be

corrupt is purely rational. The research expands this by arguing that where the

National Integrity System institutions are weak, politicians and bureaucrats will

make rational choices to be corrupt because they are sure they will not be

caught or held to account. Effective and functioning NIS institutions will

therefore offer less incentive for corruption and where institutional reforms are

appropriately strengthened corruption is significantly reduced (Felkins, 2009

and Hanson, 2009).

Having adopted a working definition of corruption and having established the

relevant theoretical frameworks, the research now turns to the notion of

National Integrity System as a model of fighting corruption.

2.2.3 The National Integrity System (NIS)

Numerous studies have been done on the concept of National Integrity

System (NIS) (Hindess, 2005, Langseth, p. et al, 1997, Valentina, T., et al,

2013, Doig, and McIvor, 2003, Doig, 2006, Pope, 2007, Brown et al, 2004,

Dye et al, 1998). The National Integrity System (NIS) was introduced by

Transparency International (TI), the anti-corruption NGO. Transparency

International was founded in 1993, as a not-for-profit organisation whose

mandate is to monitor and make public; corporate and political corruption

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within international development (TI Website). The Mission of Transparency

International is to “Stop corruption and promote transparency, accountability

and integrity at all levels and across sectors of society”,(TI website) . Doig et

al (2003) note that a National Integrity System is “proposed as a

comprehensive method of fighting corruption” which encompasses the

involvement of various institutions of governance in a concerted fashion to

fight corruption. The term NIS was coined by Jerome Pope (1996), one of the

founding directors at Transparency International and arose out of the

realisation that the best way of fighting corruption is not through a single law

and anti-corruption agency. Pope (2000) argues that the use of “top-down

methods” such as creating a strong anti-corruption agency have not yielded

successful results. He strongly argues that there is a need to move away from

a system where elites at the helm of power give orders which are followed to

a certain degree by those down the hierarchy to a system of “horizontal

accountability” where power is much dispersed, where no individual has a

monopoly, and where each is held to account. In such a system the idea is

not to blame individuals but to change systems so that a system of agencies

of restraint are established to check abuses of power by branches of

government and other agencies. Based on this, a ‘National Integrity System’

encapsulates the interconnecting institutions, laws, procedures, practices and

attitudes that promote integrity and reduce the likelihood of corruption in

public life. The long and short of this is that a National Integrity System is a

new model of fighting corruption that departs from relying on Independent

Anti-Corruption Agencies and punitive laws where corruption is dealt with after

it has happened to the use of multiple institutions and their interrelationships

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to prevent corruption, offering checks and balances and holding other

agencies of governance to account. The idea of the “National Integrity

System” was seen as a framework through which to systematically identify

and address issues of corruption at country level and many countries have

adopted the NIS as a key policy and approach to fight corruption. Doig and

McIvor, (2003) studied National Integrity System in practice and found that the

National Integrity System does not look at individual institutions, activities,

rules, or practices but rather focusses on inter-relationships of governance

institutions and their combined effectiveness in dealing with corruption. Brown

and Uhr (2004) in their study of NIS Assessment support this and argue that it

is important to recognise that NIS cannot work in a vacuum but “how they

perform is dependent on their capacity… and their coherence (or operational

relationships)”. If these perform sufficiently well, they form a healthy and

vibrant National Integrity System that is well grounded in combating corruption

as “part of the larger struggle against abuse of power, malfeasance and

misappropriation in all its forms” (TI Tool Kit, 2010). Out of these, the

understanding of the National Integrity System which this research adopts is

that the National Integrity System (NIS) is a policy approach to fighting

corruption where all governance institutions cooperate and complement each

other in order to effectively, efficiently, and with transparency and

accountability, fulfil their roles.

This section has discussed the notion of National Integrity System as a

modern approach to fight against corruption. Various countries have adopted

this as a policy approach and is being implemented worldwide. However, as

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noted in this section, it is important to discuss what integrity institutions are

and how centrally they fit within the NIS model. The section below discusses

this to some length.

2.2.4 The National Integrity System Institutions

As noted in the section above, in the National Integrity System, the idea is to

fight corruption using a system of agencies of restraint and watchdogs acting

in holistic and comprehensive fashion. These agencies are what is called

National Integrity System Institutions, or integrity institutions or indeed pillars

of the National Integrity System (, Pope 2000, Uhr 2004 and Barret 2004) and

they include: the courts, independent electoral tribunals, auditors general,

central banks, professional organisations, Parliaments (and Public Accounts

Committees), and a free and independent media, (Pope, 2000, OECD 2010,

NIS Tool kit 2010). These are public institutions or can be groups of actors

with official or unofficial powers to influence how a country is being governed,

and impact on the country’s degree of national integrity. The NIS Tool kit

(2010) notes that in “some countries, local conditions will be such that

additional indicators or even an additional pillar might be desirable and/or

required to accurately capture the entire set of governance actors in a

country”. This means that these integrity institutions or pillars may vary from

one country to the other. For Malawi, the integrity institutions available will be

covered in the section below.

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2.2.5 National Integrity System Institutions in Malawi

Studies have shown that country strategies to deal with corruption vary

greatly. However, based on the foundational model of the National Integrity

System propagated by Ibrahim Seushi (Dye and Stapenhurt, 1998) the

National Integrity System involves certain interdependent institutions and in

most countries these are the country’s parliament, judiciary, media, private

sector, ombudsman, political will, administrative system, watchdog agencies

and public awareness. A key element here is that these pillars have to support

one another and if one pillar gives way, the integrity of all the pillars (the

system) will be shaken and consequently the pillars will not hold. In effect

therefore, if one part of the National Integrity System is corrupt, then the entire

system does not retain its integrity. In the case of Malawi, there are eight

pillars of the National Integrity System in form of key governance and

developmental institutions (National Anti-corruption Strategy, 2008) and these

institutions are as follows:

Legislature (Parliament)

The new Malawi Legislature (parliament) is established by section 48 of the

Republican Constitution which was adopted in 1994 after the country

embraced multi-party democracy in 1994 (Constitution of the Republic of

Malawi, 1994). This institution of governance is recognised as one of the three

branches of government and is vested with all powers of legislation and

holding the other branches to account. Patel and Tostensen (2013) studied

parliament and noted that “the ability of parliament to fulfil its accountability

task is a key determinant of the quality of the government and this does reflect

25


the role of this integrity pillar in fighting corruption”. In 1994, a bicameral

system of parliament was adopted (National Integrity Assessment report,

2013). However, before the Upper House could be constituted, it was

repealed by the lower house hence currently Malawi’s Legislature is

unicameral with the Head of State and the National Assembly which consists

of 193 members elected from single member constituencies. According to the

National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2008), parliament is a crucial pillar of the

National Integrity System.

Judiciary

The Judiciary is one of the arms of government in Malawi and it has a big role

to play in fighting corruption. Gloppen and Kanyongolo, 2013) observe that as

in any constitutional democracy, the judiciary in Malawi is responsible for

interpreting laws and adjudicating on disputes between individuals or the

state. The National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2008) observes that as an

interpreter of laws, the Judiciary plays a vital role in promoting good

governance which includes fighting against corruption. Where the Judiciary is

weak, corruption thrives as perpetrators are sure not to be punished by the

laws in place and this results in the institutionalisation of corruption in both its

political and economic form.

Executive

Dulani (2013) has written about the Executive in Malawi and notes that the

Executive determines and directs government policy and controls the public

26


purse in Malawi. The National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2008) notes that the

Executive has a very important role to play in the fight against corruption.

Amongst other things, the Executive ensures that within public institutions,

there is capacity to fight against corruption, demonstrate good example

through political will to fight corruption, promote a spirit of transparency and

accountability in its dealings and table in parliament necessary bills to support

the fight against corruption.

Civil Society Organisations

Mwalubunju and Chisi (2013) view Civil Society as the body of organised

social life that sits above individual but below government. In the National

Anti-Corruption Strategy (2008), Civil Society is considered as “Non-

Governmental Organizations (NGO’s), community based organizations, anti-

corruption clubs and any other legally registered “not for profit” organizations

that are engaged in the development and delivery of social, economic, and

human development services”. The London school of Economics (2006) and

Scholte (1999) view Civil Society as “uncoerced collective action around

shared interests, purposes and values”. Civil Society Organisations have a

vital role to play in the fight against corruption especially through educating

the masses about the evils of corruption, lobbying parliament and the

executive to pass the necessary laws to stump out corruption and hold

government to account.

27


Public Sector

Under Chapter 20 of the Constitution of Malawi, the public sector consists of

the civil service and para-statal organisations that are established by acts of

parliament. Tambulasi and Kayuni (2013) define public sector as “the

implementing agency of the state … an institution that is responsible for the

delivery of goods and services by or for the state.” National Integrity

Assessment (2013) argues that the public sector is supposed to be a servant

of the state who is obedient, credible and main high integrity. However, in

practice and as literature shows, the Malawian public sector reels from

corruption (Mustafa, 2005) poor performance (Durevall, 2001) and political

involvement (National Integrity Assessment, 2013). Being the engine of

Malawi’s service delivery, the public sector plays a very central role in fighting

corruption. However, as literature shows, the public sector in Malawi is

seemingly riddled with corruption as exemplified by the “cashgate” scandal

where billions of public resources were lost to corruption (Masina, 2013)

Media

The media’s role in the fight against corruption cannot be overemphasised. As

Manda (2013) argues, the media is known as the “fourth estate” because it

comes, after the three arms of government, as the most influential player in

the politics and societal issues. In terms of the fight against corruption the

media is expected to publicise information on corruption, investigate and

denounce corrupt practices, monitor activities of agencies and institutions and

expose individuals and institutions involved in corruption (National Integrity

Assessment, 2013).

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Traditional leaders

Huessein and Muriaas (2013) define Traditional Leadership as a position

which one holds in the tradition hierarchy. The Chiefs Act (1976) looks at

Traditional Leaders as chiefs and their structure starts with Village Headman

to a Paramount Chief. In the African setting, there is greater value accorded to

Traditional Leaders and this is succinctly contained in the following maxims:

The Basotho in Lesotho say of their chiefs: “A chief is a chief by the people”

(Donnelly, 1984)

The Lovedu of Transvaal, in the Republic South of Africa revere their chiefs

and say: “Chieftainship is people” (Forde, 1954)

While the Ndebele of Zimbabwe say: “The King is the people. To respect the

King is to respect oneself. He who despises our king despises us. He who

praises our king praises us. The King is us” (Sithole, 1959)

Traditional Leaders are expected to be role models and their communities

look up to them. In terms of the fight against corruption, Traditional Leaders

interact with the grassroots regularly and can influence them to desist from

corruption. They can also report on corruption and demand accountability

from public officials and other groups. They are supposed to educate their

subjects on corruption and promote a culture of fear of corruption.

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Faith Based Organizations

The Nation Master Survey (2014) shows that 98.5% of the people in Malawi

consider religion as most important in their lives. As a result religious or faith

based organisations have flourished over the years. Furness and Gilligan,

(2012) observe that Faith Based Organisations have supported service

delivery to vulnerable groups for so many years. They offer the best

infrastructure in the poorest communities considering that places of worship

are the focal points for the communities they serve (Naidoo, 2000). The

organisations are religious or church based and are characterised by values

based on their faiths but demonstrate clear commitment to social justice.

Faith Based Organisations are founded on deep moral convictions and

espouse a moral and just world. Contrastingly, in Malawi corruption is a moral

issue (National Anti-Corruption Strategy, 2008) and it thrives where there is

apparent moral decadence. That is why teachings and principles followed by

Faith Based Organisations play a critical role in the fight against corruption.

Some of the roles include preaching against corruption, promoting

transparency and accountability, educate their membership about corruption,

report and expose corruption when it occurs.

Having identified the various National Integrity System Institutions in Malawi,

this research delves into the legal regime to establish the existence of laws

that support institutions’ role in fighting corruption. The subsection below

discusses the legal framework and other enabling legislation and finds that

the legal framework is adequate to support National Integrity Institutions’

effectiveness.

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2.2.6 Legal framework

Both local and international scholars have studied Malawi’s anti-corruption

legal framework and the general conclusion is that the legal framework is

adequate. In 2007, the country ratified two conventions on corruption; the

United Nations Convention against Corruption and the African Union

Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (Business Anti-

Corruption Portal (2011). In 1996, Malawi passed the Corrupt Practices Act

(1995) which criminalises acts of corruption, extortion and bribery of any form.

The Penal Code also provides any act of bribery as criminal (Penal Code,

2000). Malawi also has an Asset Declaration Act which provides for public

officials and members of parliament to declare their assets. In 2006, Malawi

passed the Money Laundering, Proceeds of Serious Crime and Terrorist

Financing Act (Business Anti-Corruption Portal (2011) which criminalises

money laundering. Political party financing is not regulated and there is quite

intense debate around this (Magolowondo, et al 2012). Putting it generally,

the legal framework to support the effectiveness of National Integrity System

Institutions is enabling.

While noting the existence of the enabling legal framework, this research now

looks at the historical picture in the fight against corruption. The section below

investigates the various initiatives to fight against corruption.

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2.2.7 Anti-Corruption Initiatives

Literature notes various anti-corruption initiatives that have been put in place

by Malawi government over the years. Yikona et al (2011) documents the

establishment of the Anti-Corruption Bureau under the Corrupt Practices Act

(1995). The National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2008) was officially launched in

January 2009 which sets up the National Integrity System and identifies

integrity institutions (NIS Assessment, 2013). The Office of the Ombudsman

which is empowered to investigate any cases of injustice perpetrated by a

public official or abuse of office by the same was established by the 1994

Constitution. The Supreme Audit Institution was established under the Public

Audit Act (2003) and is empowered by the Malawi Constitution to carry out

audits and ensure transparency and accountability in public institutions and

para-statal organisations. Office of the Director of Public Procurement was set

up under the 2003 Public Procurement Act and is responsible for public

procurement and guiding public institutions on procurement procedures to

avoid corrupt dealings. The Whistle blowing facility was established under the

Corrupt Practices Act of 1995. How this facility works is surely a subject of

another research work.

2.3 National Integrity System- Tools and methodology of assessment

Although still an emerging industry, literature covers some tools that have

been used to assess anti-corruption measures including the integrity systems.

A more recent approach has been the Public Integrity Index issued by the

Center for Public Integrity in Washington, DC which utilises both perception

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data and aggregate data to provide qualitative evaluations in different

countries (Macaulay and Mulcahy (2014). Other tools available in literature

include The World Bank Anti-Corruption Toolkit which includes a series of

questionnaires designed for institutional assessment of policymaking; the

Organisation of American States which “assesses the existence and

adequacy of the legal framework and enforcement mechanisms related to

corruption” (OECD Public Sector Integrity: Aframework for Assessment 2005);

The United Nations Global Programme Against Corruption, (introduced in

1999) which provides a framework for standardised assessment to document

corruption in public administration and business, the Organisation for

Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Public sector Integrity

Framework which has been developed to assess integrity measures of public

sector organisations (OECD Public Sector Integrity: Aframework for

Assessment 2005) and Transparency International’s National Integrity System

Assessment which assesses the National Integrity System as a whole system

of integrity (NIS Tool kit, 2010).

So how do we choose what tool to use amongst these for understanding the

effectiveness of integrity institutions? Literature does not offer much empirical

guidance although some approaches can be identified. The first approach is

to avoid tools that are mostly prescriptive and presume the fundamental

answer “… when they emphasise the same factors everywhere, and thus do

not really fit anywhere” (Johnson in Quah 2003: 244; Lindsey & Dick 2002: v-

vi; Jayasuriya 2002). The second is to find tools which no not focus on

individual institutions but provide room for comparison with other institutions

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or probe about the interrelationships that make up an effective integrity

system –whether between these institutions or other elements. This is

addressed in Pope (2000:37) who raises the need to provide a “new form of

diagnosis” for understanding the “interrelationships, inter-dependence and

combined effectiveness [of integrity measures] instead of looking at separate

institutions…and then focusing on stand-alone reform programmes”. The third

approach to integrity system assessment focuses on assessing methods of

governance, focusing less on which institutions exist and their interactions.

Rather the focus is on how they perform, discharge their agreed purposes and

responsibilities; if the answer is yes, the ‘effectiveness’ or ‘implementation’

model says integrity has been achieved (Brown and Uhr, 2004). This

approach looks at Integrity systems assessment as a more administrative

exercise.

Reflecting on literature on tools for assessing an effective integrity system, the

conclusion is that two tools vis-à-vis Transparency International’s National

Integrity System Assessment Tool kit (2010) and the OECD Public Sector

Integrity: A Framework for Assessment (2005) are relevant in this assessment

as they directly focus on integrity systems and both provide some focus on

methods of governance as discussed in the sections below.

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Transparency International Tool kit National Integrity System

Assessment Tool kit (2010)

Transparency International developed an assessment tool that is globally

used to assess the National Integrity System in various countries (TI tool kit,

2010). This tool uses generic set of indicators to capture data that is used to

analyse the performance of National Integrity System institutions. The tool

assesses all the pillars of the National Integrity System. The TI tool kit (2010)

assesses institutions along the following lines:

“…(1) the institution’s overall capacity to function, (2) its own internal

governance in terms of integrity, transparency and accountability,

(3) its role in contributing to the overall integrity of the national

governance system…”

This tool has been in use since its inception in the late 1990s and many assessments

have been conducted by TI. The assessments are used to examine the

formal institutional frameworks, as well as institutional practice as

happens in reality, highlighting incongruences between the formal

aspects and reality on the ground. This investigation is embedded in

a context analysis of the broader political, socio-economic and

socio-cultural conditions in which such institutions operate

(Transparency International, 2011).

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The OECD Public Sector Integrity: A framework for Assessment

OECD countries recognise that while they have emphasised on improving

their legal, institutional, procedural and management frameworks, there is less

attention on assessing the implementation of the National Integrity measures

that have already been put into place and the impact they are making (Public

Sector Integrity: A Framework for Assessment, 2005) As a result, the main

focus of their Assessment tool is to study the effectiveness of the integrity

system and judge its overall value. The Framework is an ex post assessment

which is carried out when the integrity policy has been completed. The

assessment tool helps to provide evidence which can be used to verify

integrity system policy effectiveness and provide directions for policy

adjustments, show what progress has been made in promoting integrity and

preventing corruption.

In order to fully assess the effectiveness of the National Integrity System and

capture adequate data that can fully meet the criteria to judge how effective

National Integrity System Institutions are, hybrid tools will be developed

combining certain features of the Transparency International Tool kit (2010)

and the OECD Public Sector Integrity: A Framework for Assessment (2005).

The rationale is that, on their own, both tools do not adequately meet all the

determinants of effectiveness but when they are combined, they offer a

comprehensive framework to assess the effectiveness of the National Integrity

System institutions. Based on these tools, this research identifies and

reviews relevant literature.

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2.4 Determinants of effective integrity institutions

Although research is still weak in understanding effectiveness of integrity

institutions, some key determinants of an effective integrity institution have

emerged and include “institutions” as rules of the game (North, 1990)

where various strands such as socio-cultural, socio-economic focusing on

political accountability (Bardhan,1997; Leftwich 2005), ability to offer

checks and balances (McGovern,1907; Persson et al. 1997; Rose-

Ackerman, 1999 and Laffont and Meleu, 2001) transparency (Fackler and

Lin, 1995; Rose-Ackerman, 1999 and Djankov et al. 2001) and political

independence (Hanretty, 2010; Hayo and Voigt ,2007 and Rosas,2009).

Others include having the right capacity (Smith 2004; Brown and Sampford

2005; Brown and Head 2005), institutional and personal integrity (Preston in

KCELJAG & TI 2001:1; Uhr 2005a:194), coherence of the integrity system

focusing on Collaboration and networking (Doig 1995; Quah 1999; Pope and

Vogl 2000; De Speville 2000; Dionisie and Checchi 2007; de Sousa 2006;

Jean Cartier-Bresson, 1997)

Institutions

North (1990:3) defines Institutions as “rules of the game … or… humanly

devised constraints” that guide human interaction in political, economic or

other social spheres. Veblen (1899) defines institutions as “settled habits of

thought common to the generality of men…” North emphasises on the aspect

of “constraints” while Veblen highlights “commonality”. However, in both

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cases, it is clear that human interaction requires certain parameters within

which to happen. For the purpose of this research, North’s notion of

institutions is adopted especially because his notion highlights the fact that

institutions are rules that are made by man to structure interaction or

relationships in political, economic and social spheres (North, 1990). The

notion of Institutional architecture refers to “the complex totality of a country’s

basic political institutions – the rules, usually enshrined in a constitution and

other key laws that determine how the leadership of a state is configured and

how state authority is exercised” (Macintyre, 2003:1). A strong NIS institution

entails existence of rules that support the fight against corruption. Lamour

and Barcham (2005) researched about institutions and noted that “the NIS

model sees institutions providing checks against corruption in each other”.

Where institutions are strengthened, the fight against corruption is strong.

Another strand of literature is stemming from economic and structural policies

emphasises the role of institutions in rooting out corruption. This literature is

summarised in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004), La Porta, Lopez-de-

Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) and Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-

de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003) who argue that institutions such as economic

and political capture restrictions that may help to control corruption . For

instance, mechanisms that promote political accountability, either by way of

punishing corrupt individuals or by sorting out problems related to

dissemination of public information, tend to reduce cases of corruption. At the

same time, institutions that offer competition in the provision of public goods

tend to minimise the extraction of rents and in the process reduce corruption

(Lederman, Loayza, and soares, 2005).

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Political institutions

Leftwich (2005), defines politics as “all the activities of cooperation,

negotiation and conflict, within and between societies, whereby people go

about organising the use, production or distribution of human, natural and

other resources in the course of the production or reproduction of their

biological and social life”. Heywood (2011) defines politics as “the activity

through which people make, uphold and revise the general rules under which

they live”. This research, adopts the notion of politics as defined by Heywood

(2011). Politics plays a significant role on the effective and therefore the

impact of the National Integrity System institutions. Literature sets

benchmarks regarding how political institutions affect the National Integrity

System and the fight against corruption. Bardhan (1997) has discussed this at

length. Failure to deal with corruption in the public realm usually is a direct

consequence of the nature of government policy intervention. This means that

policy interventions supported by good political institutional designs

contributes significantly to a well performing anti-corruption regime. Political

science and economics literature shows that there are two key variables here

vis-à-vis political accountability and checks and balances.

Political accountability

Many scholars have discussed accountability; teasing the term from its Anglo-

Norman origin (Dubnick (2002: 7-9) to its contemporary notion that

encompasses loosely defined political concepts such as transparency,

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efficiency, responsiveness, responsibility, and integrity (Mulgan 2000b: 555;

Behn 2001: 3-6; Dubnick 2002). The term ‘has come to stand as a general

term for any mechanism that makes powerful institutions responsive to their

particular publics’ (Mulgan 2003: 8). Literature categorises accountability as

political, legal, professional, and social (Abbot 1988; Freidson 2001;

McCandless 2001; Pollitt and Summa 1997; Power 1994, Friedman 1985;

Behn 2001: 56-58; Flinders, 2001; Strom, Müller & Bergman 2003)

In the National Integrity System the accountability is an extremely important

parameter that determines whether the system is effective or not. Here,

accountability is viewed along the chain of principal-agent relationships

(Strom, 2000) where voters delegate their powers to elected representatives,

who in turn, especially in parliamentary democracies, delegate their

authorities to the executives. The mechanism of political accountability

operates precisely in the opposite direction to that of delegation. In such a

system, public servants and their departments are accountable to their

ministers, who in turn render political account to parliament (Flinders, 2001;

Strom, Müller & Bergman 2003). During election times, people’s

representatives render account to the voters. The link falls within the notion

and theory of principal –agent. Where the National Integrity system institutions

are effective to root out corruption, they offer mechanisms for agents to

explain and to justify his or her conduct to the principals. Political

accountability has been covered by many scholars arguing that this plays a

significant role in generating good governance ideals; see Fackler and Lin

(1995), Linz and Stepan (1996), Nas et al. (1986), Bailey and Valenzuela

(1997), Persson et al. (1997), Rose-Ackerman (1999), Djankov et al. (2001),

40


and Laffont and Meleu (2001). The issue here is that accountability is a key

determinant of the National Integrity System as it allows for punishment of

politicians who adopt ‘‘bad policies,’’ thus pushing alignment of politicians’

interests with those of their citizens. The extent of the accountability in the

system is defined, in turn, by features of the political system. Literature points

to three specific strands vis-à-vis political competition, checks and balances

and transparency. The first strand – political competition – has for ages been

seen as a critical element in determining political outcomes (Downs,1957). In

summary, the practice of fair elections ensures that politicians can, to some

degree, be held accountable to the actions taken while holding public office

(Linz and Stepan, 1996; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Any institution or rule that

offers a punishment regime for politicians, for example, the loss of elections or

the likelihood of being kicked out of office, can entice politicians to improve

the way they behave by aligning their personal interests with those of the

general public or constituents. The more the system ensures that politicians

face their electorate, the higher they are incentivised to stick to good

governance and maintain personal integrity. This entails for example, that

political systems that offer (credible and fair) executive elections would have

more electoral minded politicians; therefore, less prevalence of corruption;

see Linz (1990), Linz and Stepan (1996), Bailey and Valenzuela (1997), and

Rose-Ackerman (1999).

Checks and balances and executive oversight

The second strand relates to the checks-and-balances mechanisms across

different branches of power. An effective National Integrity System ensures

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checks and balances for example where parliaments would scrutinise national

budgets and the expenditure statements prepared by the executive arm of

government or where Supreme Audit Institutions check on sector

expenditures. Where checks and balances exist, different government bodies

discipline each other in the citizens’ favour. This has been largely covered by

McGovern (1907), Persson et al. (1997), Rose-Ackerman (1999), and Laffont

and Meleu (2001). This is a true reflection of the relationship regarding the

executive, legislative, and judiciary powers, and as well as among different

layers of the executive power. A good example would be where a

parliamentary system allows the legislature to provide a stronger and

immediate monitoring of the executive because in this case parliaments have

the legal and political power to remove politicians from executive office; see

Linz (1990), Linz and Stepan (1996), Bailey and Valenzuela (1997). However,

this capacity in legislative systems might be threatened where there is

dominance of the legislature by a single party. In a well-functioning National

Integrity System, separation of powers provides clear mechanisms to police

and punish officials that misbehave, thereby stemming the equilibrium level of

corruption. Literature also recognises that developing adequate checks and

balances may take time, either as a result of an earning institutional process

or inertial feature of corruption (Tirole, 1996; Bailey and Valenzuela, 1997;

Treisman, 2000).

Transparency

Literature has looked at transparency as a critical determinant of a well-

functioning National Integrity System. Where transparency exists right and

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wrong-doings on the part of the government officials can be publicized, and

this reduces the informational problems between citizens (principles) and

governments (agents); thus improving overall corruption fight and a

governance regime; see Fackler and Lin (1995), Rose-Ackerman (1999), and

Djankov et al. (2001). Literature has covered various elements of

transparency. First, transparency means that the public (principal) has access

to information the state and other institutions (agents) hold, especially relating

to their decisions and actions (Brown 2013) Transparency is necessary

because of its contribution to more effective, efficient, and equitable

governance. Citizens have a right to information and this is strengthened by

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Official

Information Act (1982). Second, transparency increases institutional

effectiveness and public trust in institutions. World Bank (2010) provides

evidence that citizens’ trust in government increases compliance with

regulations and legal obligations, and political participation. This research

extends that trust in the integrity of institutions a valuable asset in the fight

against corruption. Third, transparency is a form of “information-age

governance”. This is addressed by Fung et al (2007) who describe

transparency policies as “a third wave of modern regulatory innovation, at a

time of optimism about advances in information and communications

technology”. Fourth, citizen participation in policy discourse and

implementation is a complement to transparency, and is regarded as

contributing to better policies and their implementation. This is covered in

Brown (2013). Literature has also covered the important role of the press and

press freedom. Effective Integrity institutions allow for the press to play its role

43


and encourage good relations with them and this also goes for broader

political outcomes and fight against corruption. This is addressed, for

example, in Peters and Welch (1980), Fackler and Lin (1995), Giglioli (1996),

and Djankov et al. (2001). Transparency can also be determined and

improved by decentralization. The argument is that because it is easier to

monitor, informational problems are not very severe at the local level. Smaller

constituencies enable the monitoring government officials to be easier and

assess the performance of elected representatives. Thus, in this sense,

corruption is lowered (Nas et al., 1986; Rose-Ackerman, 1999).

Independence

Independence of integrity institutions is a fundamental requirement for the

proper and effective exercise of their functions. The important of

independence as criteria for an effective integrity institution is closely linked

with the nature of the phenomena of corruption (OECD, 2008). It is argued

that corruption in many ways equals abuse of power and in contrast with other

illegal public acts, in corruption cases at least one perpetrator is connected

with ranks of persons holding a public office and the higher the office, the

more power the person exercises over other institutions. The level of

independence of an integrity institution is therefore closely tied with the level

of corruption and effectiveness of that institution. Literature notes that

agencies can be independent from a wide range of actors such as regulated

industries, civil society groups and the public at large (Elgie 1998:55) but; is

this the type of independence that can help to study the effectiveness of these

integrity institutions? The answer is provided in Elgie (1998:55) who point out

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that the major issue is political independence which means the day to day

decisions of integrity institutions are formed without the interference of

politicians. Hanretty (2010); Hayo and Voigt (2007) and Rosas (2009) concur

and argue that formal independence (political) is worth studying if we are to

truly test institutions’ effectiveness. However, the same authors are quick to

stress that while studying formal independence, it is important to contrast with

actual independence so that we test if institutions are really in exercise of the

required independence to perform effectively.

Capacity

Smith (2004) has noted that the capacity of integrity institutions can be

measured by comparative data on staffing levels and budgetary expenditures.

When integrity agencies are relatively well resourced in both staff and budget

areas, they are well positioned to deliver. Brown and Head (2005) have also

noted that resourcing is one useful determinant of the capacity of the different

integrity institutions of different governments. Smith (2004) further observes

that fluctuations in the jurisdictional responsibilities of these agencies must be

considered when estimating capacity. He argues that money and staffing

levels do not in themselves resolve the debate over where capacity ought to

be directed. Evidence from other literature suggests existence of polarised

debate between those who want capacity directed to coercive investigations

and those who want it aimed at systemic and cultural change. The key issue,

given this diverse thinking, is how to judge the adequacy of the capacity

present in a particular integrity system at a particular time. This is covered by

Brown and Head (2005) who point out that integrity institutions who have

45


adequate capacity are those (a) whose mandates are clear, and (b) whose

powers and resources are adequate to the tasks. Brown and Sampford (2005)

dissect capacity and show various variables that constitute capacity in

integrity institutions as:

Legal capacity (constitutionality and formal powers or jurisdiction), financial

(right budgets for their tasks and allocation of resources to integrity functions),

human resource (sufficient numbers of employees dedicated to integrity

functions), skills, education and training (professional training and background

to discharge their roles), political/community will (genuine leadership in

integrity matters), community capacity (broader community understanding and

support to integrity processes) and balance (adequate sharing of resources

between different strategies in the integrity system).

Capacity is a recurring theme in any integrity system. Even where integrity

institutions exist, such as anti-corruption agencies, the most common concern

is that they are not sufficiently funded, staffed or legally empowered to have

an impact. As a result, many institutions might be present, satisfy a superficial

check-list approach but, in fact, they might be totally broken or ‘hollow’ in

practice.

Coherence

The fight against corruption cannot be won by one institution operating in

isolation; this is well argued in (Doig 1995; Quah 1999; Pope and Vogl 2000;

De Speville 2000; Dionisie and Checchi 2007; de Sousa 2006). This

46


resonates with Jean Cartier-Bresson (1997) arguments that much public

sector corruption is conceptualised in terms of networks that evolve amongst

officials in different bureaucratic agencies. In order for agencies to get things

done in such compartmentalised bureaucracies, they need to establish

networks across. “These networks are characterised by ‘concrete hidden

practices’—legal and illegal—that do not register on the official charters and

practices of institutions” (Cartier-Bresson 1997: 53). The National Integrity

System institutions cannot be effective without the integrity agencies having

work relationships with others. However carefully compartmentalised their

formal powers are, the nature of the integrity problems that they are trying to

deal with necessitates collaboration with others. This rings true with the

original promise of the NIS concept which was to provide a “new form of

diagnosis” for understanding the “interrelationships, inter-dependence and

combined effectiveness [of integrity measures] in an holistic approach…

instead of looking at separate institutions…and then focusing on stand-alone

reform programmes” (Pope 2000: 37). Brown and Sampford (2205) raise

significant questions which any assessment needs to consider:

“… i) Is there effective mutual accountability between the major integrity

institutions?;

ii) Are the different functions of integrity institutions effectively coordinated?

Are there gaps or conflicts in legal jurisdiction? Are the policy objectives of

different integrity measures properly aligned?;

iii) Is there effective cooperation between agencies on day-to-day operational

matters? Is there effective integration of different ethics functions into the

responsibilities of officials and officeholders?;

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iv) Are there checks on the abuse of power by integrity agencies? Is there a

provision for filling in the cracks? …”

These questions go to show that there exists a complex matrix of

relationships between various elements of the integrity system, some are

formal and others informal and may fall into three major categories: i)

Constitutional relationships such as ones reinforcing mutual accountability; ii)

Policy relationships which are necessary for consistency in the way integrity is

managed across sectors or jurisdictions, including coordination of enabling

and regulatory legislation; and iii) Operational relationships for example

investigations, public outreach, intelligence-gathering and sharing.

These issues show the difficulty of establishing a ‘perfect’ degree of

coherence in an integrity system and a valid central question to grapple with is

how to arrive at an evaluation of coherence that is specific to each institution

and how to obtain empirical evidence of how different core integrity agencies

interrelate.

Integrity

Integrity has been covered by various pieces of literature, from definition of

the word to how integrity is viewed in various societies. How the integrity

system is assessed largely depends on how integrity is understood in the

context of personal integrity as well as that of institutions invested with

political and economical power in a given society (Brown and Sampford,

2005). The present English word ‘integrity’ comes from the Latin word

integritas, which means ‘unaffected, intact, upright, reliable’; the this very root

48


has given us ‘integer’, the term in mathematics for a ‘whole’ number as

different a fraction (Preston in KCELJAG & TI 2001:1; Uhr 2005a:194). Other

literature available discuss ‘Integrity’ as a conceptual term opposite to

‘corruption’, meaning ‘decay, deterioration or perversion from an original or

‘whole’ state’ (Oxford English Dictionary; Heidenheimer & Johnson 2002:6-9).

When applied within an institutional context, integrity refers to the manner in

which institutions and individual office –bearers act which is true to values,

purposes and duties expected of them. As one Canadian integrity

commissioner said, ‘the virtue of integrity… includes honesty, together with

worthiness, respect and an expectation that a promise made will be kept,

absent some factor or circumstance beyond the control of the promiser’

(Evans 1996). But the key question is how to identify the values, purposes

and duties held by individuals and institutions? Brown and Sampford (2005)

cover this and observe that “often these benchmarks are publicly stated and

defined in advance, in law or explicit agreements, undertakings or codes; but

they can also be implicit, understood, or change in meaning or implication

over time, and only become subject to discussion after things appear to go

wrong”. Literature categorises integrity into two strands vis-à-vis rule based

integrity which is the result of rational choices. People comply with rules

usually after calculating the costs of potential penalties which outweigh the

benefits of breaching the integrity rules. On the other hand, value based

integrity is a result of internalised values usually emanating from

organisational practices such as fairness, sound leadership which cultivates

shared values and desire to live them; see (Trevino & Weaver, 2003; OECD

2008b). The second question to be had is how do we judge institutional

49


effectiveness on the basis of integrity especially personal or value based?

What “integrity test” do we administer? Research does not answer this but

recognises that personal goals and self-interest are fundamental to

performance in office and effectiveness of institutions (Dobel 1999: 10-11,

130). As Brown and Uhr (2004:20-21) observe:

“…an individual can be surrounded by, and satisfy a web of

accountability systems, but when it comes to the crunch of individual

judgment they can still fail. Equally in daily human interaction, we often

recognise people ‘of integrity’ simply through gut feeling, without

analysing their past technical performance in delivering on promises or

honouring their word”.

Although not broadly covered by literature, the answer to how we can test

integrity lies in what Dobel (1999:xii) calls “trust”. He argues that “trust

remains the ultimate measure of our integrity system, and gauge to how it

might be improved”. This is somewhat supported by (Bouckaert & Van de

Walle 2003) who note that trust can be measured both qualitatively and

quantitatively such as in sociology, organizational psychology and political

science even if not providing “the catch-all indicator of good governance some

may have hoped”.

Having mapped out the determinants of an effective integrity institutions, the

research presents a concept map that will guide the interrogation and

investigation about the effectiveness of the national Integrity System

Institutions with parliament as a case study.

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2.5 Conceptual framework

Concept Area of interrogation Elements of interrogation Political accountability Vertical accountability Accountability of MPs to their

constituents and general public Checks and balances and Executive oversight

-Accountability between parliament and other state institutions-public officials to parliament

Transparency Access to parliamentary information Openness of parliamentary decisions Public participation

Capacity Legal capacity Legal basis and foundation Financial capacity Control and autonomyStaffing Committee clerks and researchers Technical capacity Research and Investigation on

corruption issuesIndependence Political independence Influence of party politics

Executive influenceConflict of interest Personal interests

Coherence Mutual accountability Parliament and other integrity agencies

Policies Alignment of policy objectives Operational Cooperation on day to day matters

on corruption issues Integrity Integrity committees Existence and functioning of

integrity committeesIntegrity of Members of Parliament

Code of ethics, discipline of members

2.6 Research questions

This research will answer the following questions:

a) What mechanisms are in place for effective operations of Parliament as

an Integrity Institution?

b) How do these mechanisms position parliament as an Integrity

Institution to contribute to the broader fight against corruption?

c) How does Parliament work with other Integrity Institutions in the fight

against corruption?

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d) How effective is Parliament as an Integrity Institution to contribute to

the fight against corruption?

2.7 Conclusion

The Chapter has reviewed literature and shows that corruption is a complex

concept with varying definitions. In terms of effective integrity institutions, the

literature has shown that indeed the framework to assess effectiveness of

integrity system institutions although they luck maturity exists with key

determinants such as institutions especially political and governance and also

other fundamental building blocks such as capacity and coherency. In

assessing effectiveness of these institutions, attention therefore needs to go

both to political dynamics such as whether institutions are able to act

independently from undue political influence and whether as organisations

they have the necessary ingredients to fulfil their obligations or goals. Where

literature is proving insufficient is how then to judge that these institutions are

bringing about the right impact which may be felt by the society such as

change of culture or attitude within the society or public offices. How do we

stretch this correlation to directly link effectiveness of an individual institution

or even a collection of them to that change? What empirical attribution

framework can we establish to achieve this? Answers to these questions lie

far beyond the scope of this research. What the literature has also not

covered are other key variables such as internal policies of the institution.

Does policy existence mean that the institution is effective, and what are the

necessary policies that must exist to ensure the integrity institution acts

effectively? The other difficult questions relate to benchmarking. For example

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on capacity, how shall we know what capacity is good enough to make an

integrity institution effective? What is the yardstick of qualifying capacity? On

coherence, this research notes that there is little attention as to when and how

the different institutions in the integrity systems should interact.

From this literature review the general conclusion which is also shared by

Brown and Head (2008: 285) is that performance measurement regimes for

measuring the effectiveness of integrity systems is fragmented, uncoordinated

and largely subjective. The difficult task for this research is now how to apply

the fragmented measurement regime to judge whether the Legislature in

Malawi as an integrity institution is effective.

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Chapter 3

Research Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the research aims and research questions. It also

discusses research design and methodologies of collecting and analyzing

data.

3.2 Selected research philosophy, approach and strategies

Research Philosophy and approach

The philosophy behind this research was interpretivisim which furthers the

knowledge that the researcher enters the social world of the subjects and

understands how they feel about things (Saunders, 2009). Consistent with this

philosophical theorising, the approach adopted to answer the research

questions is inductive or otherwise called qualitative. Qualitative research is

about description and understanding, not predication and control (Streubert

Speziale and Carpenter, 1995). It explores attitudes, experience and

behaviour and attempts to get in-depth opinion from the research subjects

(Dawson, 2002) and in the case of this research, this approach helped in

documenting and describing the experiences of Parliament as a under the

National Integrity System institution. (Creswell 1998) further observes that

Qualitative research is often used when it is difficult to easily identify variables

and when little is known about the present phenomenon. The choice of this

approach was relevant to this research in the sense that data was obtained

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through interacting with subjects to get their understanding and individual

perspectives about the effectiveness of Parliament and its roles in dealing

with corruption. Answering whether Parliament as an NIS institutions is

effective in the broader fight against corruption depended on individual

impressions and not on hard facts and deduction.

Research strategies and sampling methodology

There are various strategies that can be used to conduct qualitative research.

Ethonography, phenomenology and case study are some of the strategies.

For the purpose of this study, a single unit case study was deemed

appropriate and focused on the legislature (Parliament) as one of the pillars of

the National Integrity System (NIS) in Malawi. Adams et al (2007) defines a

case study as an in-depth study which focusses on past and present issues

as they relate to and affect one or more units of the organisation, persons or

departments. Ideally, this research would have focussed on more units

(pillars) of the NIS in Malawi but due to limited time and resources, the focus

was only on one unit (parliament) upon which a picture was formed about the

effectiveness of the National Integrity System institutions in Malawi. This is

what is called critical incident study (Vanderstoep and Johnson, 2009)

because it focused on one unit of the NIS (legislature)

The sampling used is non-probabilistic and purposive. Russell (2006)

considers that nonprobability sample is appropriate for a case study based on

the fact that there are no ranges of definite samples to randomly choose from

and that the study is in-depth and labour intensive. Although Quota and

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snowball samples were relevant for a nonprobability sampling, these were not

used because there were no subpopulations that necessitated quota sampling

and there were no hard to find or scattered populations that would necessitate

chain referrals. Purposive sampling was therefore the most suitable method

especially that the research was focusing on the pinnacle of the system that

deal with corruption in Malawi. Data was collected through a case-study

methodology of a mixture of desk-based analysis, key informant interviews

and Focus Group Discussions. Interviews and FDGs used separate tools

(refer to appendix 1 for Interview guide and appendix 2 for FDGs guide).

Sixteen interviews were done with individual Members of Parliament, House

Leaders and Senior Staff. Three Focus Group Discussions were done with

Members of Parliamentary Committees, Junior Staff and Members of

Parliament who represented Political Parties. In total, thirty respondents were

involved, twenty two of which were male and eight female. Verbal reports and

documentation were also used to augment the data collected and therefore

triangulate the data. Data was analysed using Excel and Word computer

packages.

3.3 Validity, Reliability and Ethics

Peat et al (2001) defines validity as the “estimate of the accuracy of an

instrument or study results”. Joppe (2000) reliability as the “extent to which

results are consistent over time and an accurate representation of the total

population under study…” In this research these were measured by the use

of various data collection methods so that there was no reliance on one set of

method to collect data. This is what Hoskins and Mariano (2004) describe as

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triangulation. Research instruments such as interview guides were checked

by a third party and this measured internal validity. The research made fair

interpretations and controlled generalisations to ensure the results were

reliable. In terms of ethical considerations, all interviews were confidential in

the sense that no names have been included in the research report and that

participation in this interview was obtained by mutual consent.

3.4 Limitations of the study

Certain limitations surrounded this study. Being a sensitive and usually

secretive issue, respondents were not open enough to provide information

about corruption and it took careful assurance and probing to be able to

gather useful data. Most respondents were Members of Parliament and it was

difficult to set up meetings during the busy parliamentary session such that a

lot of compromises had to be reached to make useful progress. Some

respondents were clearly biased by taking a political party line and this

affected quality of data which had to be carefully sifted to form clear picture.

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Chapter 4

Data collection and analysis

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents data collected and analysis of the study on

effectiveness of the National Integrity Institutions in the fight against corruption

in Malawi using the Malawi Legislature (Parliament) as a case study. The

chapter features demographic characteristics of the participants (demographic

data), research findings, analysis and interpretations. Data analysis is structured

in accordance with the factors in the conceptual framework in table 1 above as

these form determinants of an effective integrity institution. The findings show

that parliament is a duly constituted institution under the laws of Malawi and is

recognised as crucial pillar of the National Integrity System. Parliament is not

operating effectively as an integrity institution largely undermined by its own

internal organisational weaknesses, executive arrogance and highly divisive

political interests.

4.2 Malawi Parliament General Background

Documents reviewed show that the new Malawi Legislature (parliament) was

established by section 48 of the Republican Constitution which was adopted

in 1994 after the country embraced multi-party democracy in 1994

(Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1994). Section 49:1 of the 1994

Malawi Constitution states that “Parliament consists of the National Assembly,

58


the Senate and the President as Head of State”. However, the lower house of

parliament repealed the senate in 2001 thus currently the Legislature is

unicameral with the Head of State and the National Assembly which consists

of 193 members elected from single member constituencies. This institution of

governance is recognised as one of the three branches of government and is

vested with all powers of legislation and holding the other branches to

account.

4.3 Research Participants Demographic configuration

Participants in this research came from parliament with representations from

various sections and categories of parliamentary structures as follows: Five

members of Junior staff with three being male and two females, three

members of Senior staff, all being male, ten Members of Parliaments with

seven being male and three female, four MPs who represented political

parties with three being male and one female, three House leadership with

two being male and one female, three Members of Parliamentary committees

with two being male and one female. The demographic configuration is

presented in figure 1 below.

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Figure 1: Participants demographic configuration

Junior staff

Senior s

taff

Individual M

Ps

Party r

epres

entati

ves

House lea

dership

Staff In

tegrit

y committee

Palriam

entar

y Committee

members

0

4

8

12

MaleFemaleTotal

The demographic configuration shows that the largest group of participants

were MPs who participated as individuals and they were represented by ten

people and the lowest was the House leadership and Senior staff with each

group represented by three members. Across gender, the configuration shows

that there were more male participants (twenty two) than female (eight).

Together, thirty members were involved in this case study.

4.4 Key findings

Capacity : extent to which supportive environment exists to the legislature as

a National Integrity System Institution

“…capacity of the parliamentary committees needs to be increased. The Parliament is committed to providing training for the committee staff and Researchers providing additional Technical Assistance to committees and developing guidance for committees…” The Malawi National Assembly Strategic Plan (2010-2015):16.

The capacity of Malawi Parliament to perform effectively as an integrity

institution was interrogated through two key questions.

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i) What capacity does parliament have to discharge its role as an integrity institution?

The answers to this question have been analysed in accordance with the

conceptual framework and have been placed into the following themes: i)

legal basis, ii) budget, iii) staffing, and iv) technical capacity.

Legal basis

Focus Group Discussions with Parliamentary committee members revealed

that the legal basis for the functions of Malawi is very clear and strong and its

basis is section 48:1 of the constitution of Malawi. The Literature review in

Chapter two shows that Section 48:1 of the 1994 Constitution mandates

parliament i) to enact the necessary legislation for the good of the nation, ii)

maintain oversight of the executive branch of government, iii) represent the

interest of the citizens for promotion of democratic governance and

development. One of the House Leaders interviewed said that the mandate of

parliament is also strengthened by the corresponding laws such as the

Parliamentary Service Act of 1998 and other statutory laws.

The finding here is that the constitution and the enabling statutes provide

Parliament with the legal basis to carry out its functions.

Budget

Although the law allows parliament to prepare its own budget and exercise

due control over the budget, Senior Parliament officers pointed out that

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parliament annual budgets are dictated by the budget ceilings made by the

Minister of Finance. This affects parliament financial resources. They said that

for example, under vote 080, the 2014-2015 budgets for parliament suffered a

deficit of 1.7 billion from the estimates made by parliament for the fiscal year

due to budget cuts by the Treasury. As a result, parliament suffers perennial

funding gaps and is unable to support important functions such as

Parliamentary committees which are supposed to meet in every quarter to

conduct committee businesses. Through FGDs, Parliamentary Committee

members interviewed agreed that funding is flawed and said that

Parliamentary committees fail to meet and those that have met on scheduled

meetings have done so through donor support but not with government

financing. Pressed to give examples, the Parliamentary Committee members

cited the example of November, 2014 when all committee meetings were

cancelled due to funding problems. This particularly affected the timely

approval of diplomatic appointments which were expected to happen that

month. The finding here is that the inability of parliament to prepare and

control its own budget undermines the capacity to perform its functions.

Parliamentary committees play a very critical role in providing oversight

functions and dealing with various bills and reports. Not being able to meet

due to inadequate budgets has very serious repercussions on the overall

governance.

Staffing

Both Senior and Junior Parliamentary staff pointed out that while the general

staffing levels seem to be adequate; the area that has suffered inadequacy of

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staffing is the parliamentary committees. One of the respondents said that

“the current parliament has twenty four parliamentary committees but has only

six committee clerks who were hired under a USAID project to serve all the

committees… This is obviously in adequate and a serious challenge in the

work of parliament”. At the time of the research, parliament had just received

approval from government to recruit three more committee clerks which if

implemented would move the number of committee clerks to nine. This

research finds that parliamentary committees are not adequately served and

this has a very big effect on their operations. Six clerks cannot write reports,

conduct research and investigations and offer professional advice to twenty

four committees.

Technical capacity

Parliamentary committee members observed that committee clerks have

serious capacity gaps to serve the committees effectively. The capacity issues

were raised in relation to research and investigation skills as well as analysis

of policies and bills. When Senior Parliament staff were asked about the

capacity of committee clerks, they observed that the trainings for committee

clerks were done when the USAID project was at the peak of its

implementation. Capacity issues were also raised in relation to Committee

members. Through key informant interviews, House Leaders noted that while

some Members of Parliament especially those with higher academic

qualifications have better capacity to serve in various committees, the majority

of them have capacity gaps. The example given was that some Committee

Chairpersons have low leadership skills and since the new parliament started

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its business after the May, 2014 elections, no orientation of the committee

chairpersons has happened. This further undermines the performance of the

parliamentary committees and the overall performance of parliament.

ii) What capacity does parliament have to do formal investigations and gather evidence to hold executive and other public institutions to account on issues related to corruption?

When asked specifically about capacity of parliament to do formal

investigations on corruption issues, Parliamentary Committee members

pointed out that both Committee clerks and Members of Parliament serving in

various committees have not undergone trainings to investigate corruption

cases. Instead parliament relies on reports from investigations agencies which

are sometimes highly technical and needing to be interpreted by experts.

These reports are sometimes not available in time for committees and the

whole assembly to discuss. They gave the example of the “cashgate” report

which took a long time to be submitted to parliament. The report was

discussed by the Public Accounts Committee between 29th July and 15th

August, 2014 but is yet to be formally discussed in the house. Asked whether

the “cashgate” would be discussed during the February 2015 sitting of

parliament, both House Leaders and Parliamentary Committee members

indicated that it was not on the agenda and there are apparent divisions on

whether this should be discussed.

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Independence: The extent to which parliament as an integrity institution acts

independently from external influence.

There were two key questions on the independence of parliament which were

supported by follow up questions.

i) To what extent is parliament independent and free from

subordination to external actors by law?

Asked about the independence of parliament in terms of law and how free it is

from external subordination, one of the House Leaders said that the law

allows parliament to act independently, work independently and control its

own affairs such as budgets and parliamentary staff appointments. Senior

Parliament staff echoed this and said that Parliament under the law is

supposed to conduct its business without due influence of the other arms of

government be it executive or judiciary. Pressed to give examples, these

respondents said that the law is very clear on several things such as

parliamentary proceedings, election of speaker, appointments and recruitment

of staff. However, a House leader noted that in some cases there is a huge

difference between the law and practice. This respondent cited the case of the

former Clerk of Parliament which was shrouded in controversy over who was

responsible for her suspension and argued that the independence of the

Parliamentary Service Commission was compromised because the whole

case showed executive underhand. Eight of the MPs interviewed also said

that there is some degree of influence from the executive on what business to

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transact during a particular sitting as most of the business is around bills

which are prepared by the executive, chosen by them and parliament has little

choice of what business to handle. They cited an example of the Access to

Information Bill which has not been brought to parliament by the executive

despite a series of campaigning by the civil society organisations.

ii) How does political party allegiance affect debate in parliament on

issues of corruption?

Respondents were also asked about political party allegiance and how this

affects debate on corruption issues. 7 of the MPs said that political allegiance

affects members’ position on debate on corruption issues, giving “Cashgate”

corruption as an example. These MPs said that political allegiance derailed

debate on “cashgate” corruption reports as members are divided on which

report to discuss in the August House. While some members who belong to

the party currently in power were happy to discuss the Baker Tilly Forensic

Audit report, majority of the members of opposition were asking for the

K92billion report which covers more years before the “cashgate” to be

discussed first. This has thrown the debate over the recent corruption case

into jeopardy. MPs who represented political parties said that the division

amongst members is a direct result of influence of political party allegiance.

They also said that political party allegiance can also be seen at committee

levels where it is very difficult for members to agree on agenda especially

when the agenda is seemingly against the executive as members belonging

to the ruling party take a protective stand. They also said that sometimes the

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committee chairpersons don’t know how to deal with committee issues and

become seemingly partisan and obsessed to accuse the government.

Overall, it can be deduced from responses that the independence of

parliament while protected by law, is highly compromised in practice. This

shows that parliament cannot deal with critical issues especially related to

corruption in an effective manner. The independence of members of

parliament is vital for sanity in the house as well their effective contributions to

debate. If political party influence takes central role, it means the members

are not fully serving the citizens as citizens’ interests will not be the driver for

their decisions but those of their political parties.

Transparency: The extent to which parliament as an integrity institution is

transparent and promotes transparency.

“Each Chamber shall provide access to the press and members of the public, except where a motion is passed with reasons prohibiting public access in the national interest”. Section 56:5; The 1994 Malawi Republican Constitution

Two key questions were asked to obtain information about transparency of

parliament.

i) What provisions are in place to ensure that the public can obtain relevant information on the activities and decision-making of the parliament?

Respondents were asked about provisions in place to ensure parliament is

transparent in its activities. To this, Senior Parliamentary staff said that the

law allows the general public to access and watch parliamentary proceedings.

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However, through interviews, one of the MPs observed that the general public

are asked to apply to attend a parliamentary session and can only do so when

they get letters of approval from parliament secretariat. The respondent

further said that the process is however, not commonly known to the general

public. Parliamentary Committee Members also said that the media and

general public can even attend Parliamentary committee meetings. However,

Senior Parliamentary staff observed that in line with Section 8 of the National

Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act, Cap 2:04, the Speaker reserves the

right of admission and this means that in the event that the Speaker considers

that attendance of some individuals or group of people is not acceptable, they

may be denied access to parliament. One of the Senior Staff said that “the

law also allows the media to cover live parliamentary proceedings after

obtaining consent from the House leadership”. However, one of the MPs

interviewed noted that the media face some significant challenges to cover

parliament sessions especially if some media houses are not favoured by

parliament as was the case with Zodiak Private Radio in October, 2005 whose

application to cover live parliamentary proceedings was denied by parliament.

Instead, parliament favoured the state Broadcaster, Malawi Broadcasting

Corporation to cover the proceedings.

ii) What internal arrangements are there in place to ensure that the public has full access to information about parliament?

When asked about internal mechanisms in place to ensure the public

accesses parliamentary information, Junior Parliamentary staff cited the

example of Malawi Parliament Website, Malawi Parliament Facebook and the

Library and said that these are the key mechanisms Parliament has put into

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place to enable the public to access parliamentary information. However, they

noted a number of challenges with public access to parliamentary information.

For example, parliament has been planning to have its own radio station but

this has been in pipeline for a long time due to lack of funding. Another

example given was that due to funding problems, Parliament has failed to roll

out its flagship programme, “Bringing Parliament to the People” which was

designed to establish District Parliamentary Information Centres. The

Hansards are not produced and disseminated on time and are not accessible

to common people. When this was verified with the Malawi Parliament

Website, it showed that the latest Hansard uploaded was that of 20 th June,

2014 during the 45th Session of Parliament. Apart from the Hansards for the

45th Session of Parliament, the other Hansards on the website are those from

the 39th Session of Parliament which was in March, 2007. One of the Senior

Parliamentary staff said “…other countries make Order Papers available to

the general public, but this is not possible with us.”

These findings show that the transparency of Parliament in the manner it

conducts its business in the house is constricted. Although the sessions are

open, its records are difficult to access for the public who would like to have a

deeper understanding of parliamentary decisions and resolutions considering

that the Hansards are not regularly uploaded on the website which would be

easily accessed by citizens and there are no other outreach initiatives for

citizens. Other more administrative information such as budgets, expenditure

reports, vacancies, staff and procurements issues are not readily accessible.

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Accountability: The extent to which parliament as an integrity institution is

accountable to the public and holds other arms of government to account.

“All legislative powers of the Republic shall be vested in Parliament which shall have the powers and responsibilities set out in this Constitution”. Section 48:1; The 1994 Malawi Republican Constitution.

i) What provisions are in place to ensure that parliament has to report

on and be answerable for its actions?

Respondents were divided regarding the accountability of the

legislature. While nine of the MPs said the law demands parliament

to be accountable to the constituents who voted them into office,

two of the House Leaders observed that parliament is accountable

to the other arms of government such as the judiciary and

executive. These findings show that respondents see three

accountability lines for parliament. First line of accountability is with

MPs to their constituents, secondly accountability line is for

parliamentary decisions which can be questioned by the courts and

the third is to executive and this is purely on administrative lines. However,

MPs who represented their political parties also said that politically, MPs are

accountable to their political parties where they awe allegiances.

ii) To what extent do members of parliament actually answer for their

actions?

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When asked to what extent members of parliament and the legislature answer

for their actions in practice, Senior parliament staff said that parliamentarians

do not answer to anyone as the only provisions in the constitution which

would have forced them to answer to people in practice were section 64

commonly known as the recall provision which was repealed through

Constitutional Amendment Act No. 6 of 1995 and section 68 (the Senate)

which was repealed through Constitutional Amendment No. 2 of 2001. Junior

Staff echoed this and said that with these provisions removed from the

constitution, members of Parliament are not really accountable to anyone as

nothing forces them to do so. Most of the MPs interviewed said that even

when faced with threats of losing the next elections, most members do not

care as they believe they can still win an election through giving out campaign

materials and money.

These findings reveal that parliamentary accountability is not there. With the

removal of the “Recall provision” (section 64) and the Senate, it means both

vertical accountability (accountability of Members of Parliament to their

constituents and the accountability of Parliament to the Senate) have been

closed. Under the governance structure, these were the only mechanisms that

would have enforced accountability of parliament in a more pragmatic and

practical sense.

Integrity mechanisms: the extent to which parliament maintains its integrity

and the integrity of other institutions.

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“…during the period 2010-2015 the national Assembly will develop and introduce a Code of Ethics for Members of Parliament. The Code of Ethics will specify the public duties of Members of Parliament, the personal conduct expected of them in public and in the parliament.” The Malawi National Assembly Strategic Plan (2010-2015)

i) What mechanisms are in place to ensure Members of parliament act with integrity?

Respondents were asked about the mechanisms in place to ensure the

integrity of the Members of Parliament. One of the House leaders said that the

Constitution of Malawi is not explicit in terms of the conduct and integrity of

members of Parliament. However, Senior Parliament staff referred to section

61 of the constitution which talks about the conflict of interest of members

where they are required by law to make a declaration if there is a material

interest in an issue under deliberations in Parliament. A cross reference to the

Constitution showed that the Constitution also requires Members of

Parliament and their spouses to declare their assets and business interests.

In an interview, one of the MPs pointed out that apart from the Constitution,

other laws place specific requirements for the behaviour of MPs. One such

law cited was the Public Officers’ (Declaration of Assets, Liabilities and

Business Interests, 2013) law which provides that the Speaker and Deputy

Speakers, Members of Parliament and Leader and Treasurer of a Political

party represented in Parliament should declare their assets under that law.

When asked a follow up question whether MPs have declared their assets,

Senior Parliament staff indicated that all the current Members of Parliament

have declared their assets. The Integrity Committee members said that I

terms of parliamentary staff, their behaviour is covered under the

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Parliamentary Service Commission Act, 1998 which covers in section 5 what

is expected of employees working with parliament in terms of integrity.

ii) Does parliament have integrity committees for both staff and

members of parliament, if yes, how effective are their operations?

Both Senior and Junior Parliamentary staff said that they have a staff Integrity

Committee as provided for in the National Anti-Corruption Policy (2008).

However, they observed that MPs do not have such a committee. When

asked about how the Integrity Committee operates, 9 of the MPs said that

they don’t even know about this committee because they are not involved in

parliamentary staff affairs. But Junior staff said that the committee does not

operate as expected as it does not have any budget and therefore no

incentive to operate effectively. When asked if Members of Parliament have

any special mechanisms that deal with their behavioural issues, House

Leaders said that Members of Parliament have been asking for an integrity

policy especially the development of the Code of Ethics. A cross reference to

the Malawi National Assembly Strategic Plan (2010-2015) shows that the

Code of Ethics was identified as one of the areas that needed to be

developed but all the MPs interviewed observed that there has not been much

progress hitherto. One of the MPs interviewed went on to say that “because of

the lack of clear guidance on the conduct of MPs, the integrity of Members of

Parliament is a serious concern”. He noted as an example that that there is a

lot of jostling for favours especially when Parliamentary Committees are being

formed to the extent that some bribes were being given to senior Political

Party leaders just to secure membership to important committees. Junior staff

73


also bemoaned the behaviour of MPs and gave the example of how Members

of Parliament treat parliament staff, saying that this is another serious area of

concern. They cited the case which was going on at the time of this research

of a Member of Parliament who assaulted a member of staff and was

suspended for ninety days.

Integrity of members of parliament and therefore the house at large can be

seen to be a huge problem. While mechanisms are in place to discipline irate

Members of Parliament, the bigger integrity issues are difficult to deal with

without clear policies and Code of Ethics. The integrity committee available for

staff is not effectively operational as it suffers from lack of financing.

Executive oversight: the extent to which parliament plays its oversight role.

“The President shall be called to Parliament to answer questions at such times as may be prescribed by the Standing Orders of Parliament or on a motion of the National Assembly or Senate”. Section 89:4; 1994 Malawi Republican Constitution.

i) How does parliament provide oversight of the executive?

One of the House Leaders said that the constitution of Malawi bestows

powers of oversight of the executive to parliament under various provisions. A

cross reference to the constitution of Malawi shows that one of the important

sections is section 89 which gives parliament powers to call the president to

parliament and answer questions, asking questions to cabinet ministers and

other public officials on public interest issues, confirmation of key public

appointments such as Chief Justice in accordance with corresponding section

74


111 of the constitution of Malawi, and national budget scrutiny and approval in

accordance with corresponding sections 175, 176, 177, 178 of the constitution

of Malawi. Parliamentary Committee members also said Parliament plays

oversight roles on various ministerial and department issues using its various

Parliamentary Committees which include Health, Public Appointments, Public

Accounts, Legal Affairs, Transport and Public Infrastructure, Social and

Community Affairs, Parliamentary Service Commission, Natural Resources

and Climate Change, Media, Information and Communications, Local

Authorities and Rural Development, International Relations, Education

Science and Technology, Budget, Agriculture and Irrigation, and

Commissions, Statutory Authorities and State Enterprises.

When asked to explain how the oversight functions have been played in

recent years, ten of the MPs observed that checks and balances are a serious

concern when it comes to practice. The first example given was the failure by

parliamentary committees to conduct regular meetings to focus on critical

oversight of various issues and public sector departments. They explained

that there is no budget for Committee meetings and Parliament has to seek

the favour of the Treasury to fund committee meetings. The Treasury only

funds meetings which are in the interest of the executive. A Parliamentary

Committee member gave the example of the donation of funds from Central

Medical Stores and National Aids Commission to Beautify Malawi Trust (a

Charitable Organisation run by the First Lady) which parliament through its

relevant committee wanted to follow up and question the relevant authorities.

When funding was requested for meetings on these issues, Treasury did not

75


provide the funds and the meetings never took place and parliament never

brought the authorities to account. Another member gave the example of the

issue of sale of Malawi Savings Bank which was an issue at the time of this

research. Parliament had disapproved the sale of the Malawi Savings Bank

and passed a resolution that the matter be investigated further by its relevant

committee. However, the executive continued with the process of the sale of

the bank against the resolution of parliament.

On public appointments, one of the MPs said that parliament has the legal

power of confirming key appointments but when it comes to dismissals,

parliament is not consulted due to i) the law itself as it only provides for

consultation of parliament when it comes to the dismissal of the Director of

Anti-corruption Bureau and not any other positions, so executives can dismiss

anybody without parliamentary consultation; ii) executive impunity as has

been the case with dismissals of the Directors of Anti-Corruption Bureau who

despite the law allowing for consultation with Parliament, past Directors have

been dismissed without involvement of parliament.

On parliament summoning the president to answer questions, most MPs said

that this has never materialised. For example, one of the MPs said that there

were several public calls for parliament to summon the president in 2014 over

the “cashgate” corruption issue but parliament never exercised this power of

law to summon the president to answer questions. The MP said “political

interests came into play and there was no agreement over the way to handle

“cashgate” issue”. When pressed to explain the current position of parliament

76


on the “cashgate” corruption issue, one of the Parliamentary committee

members said that the issue is not going any further. He observed that the

current Public Accounts Committee met from 29 th July to 15th August, 2014

and came up with a clear report to parliament based on the Forensic Audit

report supported by the United Kingdom. However, the report has not been

formerly discussed in parliament and it was not clear if it ever will.

ii) How is parliament engaged in the fight against corruption?

Asked about the efforts of parliament to fight against corruption, one of the

MPs said that in practice there is little and no clear direction especially on

current issues. This was supported by one of the House leaders who

observed that the way “cashgate” was handled by the previous parliament

and the current parliament shows that parliament is weak in this area. He said

that … “the previous parliament failed to summon the president and never

quizzed the ministries involved, the current parliament is confused on which

report to discuss either the United Kingdom supported Forensic Audit report

or the K92 billion corruption report which Peoples Party government compiled

or both reports”. In supporting this observation, another House leader said

that… “the divisions are irreconcilable between current ruling party and the

opposition and this has left parliamentary role on the current corruption issue

in serious jeopardy”. So while procedures are in place, parliament is not using

them to hold executive to account.

iii) Has parliament initiated any investigations in the recent past on corruption issues?

77


Regarding whether parliament has initiated investigations into corrupt

practices, respondents said this has never happened. Parliamentary

committee members said that through its committees, Parliament tries to

initiate investigations but government always uses funding to sabotage such

investigations. Another dimension added was that there are serious political

interests even at committee level such that it is very difficult to agree on

issues because committee members always fight over what issue to cover

due to varying political interests. As regards to corruption issue at present,

House leaders said that parliament has not taken any initiative to demand any

kind of investigations into the current corruption issues. Hey observed that

while the mechanisms are there as allowed by law, parliament has never

summoned any of the institutions related to anti-corruption issues such as

Anti-corruption Bureau partly because there has been repeated dismissals of

the Directors by the executive and also because parliament does not have

clear direction how to deal with corruptions issues. The only tangible action

parliament has taken was the rejection of the “Cashgate” Forensic Audit

report which the Minister of Finance submitted to parliament in 2014 which

had no names of suspected individuals and parliament asked that a report

with full names of suspected officials be submitted.

These findings reveal that parliament is not providing effective oversight over

the executive largely due to executive arrogance and political interests. While

the legal framework is enabling, parliament has not exercised its powers

effectively.

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Collaboration and networking: the extent to which parliament collaborates

with other integrity institutions in the fight against corruption

i) How does parliament initiate interaction with other integrity institutions?

Respondents were asked about the initiative parliament makes to interact with

other agencies of state on corruption issues. Senior Parliamentary staff said

that these interactions and links are basically statutory. They observed that

Parliament receives reports from some of the agencies as provided by law

such as Anti-corruption Bureau, Law Commission, Malawi Human Rights

Commission and other state institutions. These are usually normal annual

reports although the practice is not consistent across state institutions. House

Leaders noted that when it comes to issues of corruption, interaction with

other agencies is usually through formal meetings of the committees such as

with the Public Accounts committee but due to funding issues, these do not

happen as needed. Further, most MPs observed that political interests

amongst members make it difficult to see clear direction in terms of how

parliament can have meaningful interaction with other agencies of state on

corruption as committee members are usually divided over how to deal with

corruption matters.

ii) How does parliament interact with non-state integrity institutions?

Asked how the legislature interacts with non-state agencies with the National

Integrity System, House Leaders said that there are no formal arrangements

79


to interact with them. Sometimes non-state agencies call members of

parliament to their meetings just as participants, not formal interaction on

corruption matters.

iii) What role has parliament played to ensure that the other organs of

state curb corruption?

On what role parliament has played to ensure that other agents of governance

curb corruption, House leaders said that the main role is legislative such as

passing of the laws on corruption related areas giving examples of the Asset

Declaration law which was passed recently.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the findings from the case study research

conducted with Malawi Parliament. The study wanted to find out if parliament

operates effectively as an integrity institution. The findings show that while the

legal framework is largely enabling for parliament to be transparent, have

adequate capacity to perform its functions, offer checks and balances and

executive oversight and other fundamental building blocks, its practices are

failing and therefore not able to perform effectively. This will be discussed at

length in chapter five below.

80


Chapter 5

Discussions of Findings, Conclusion, and Recommendations

5.1 Introduction

This chapter, discusses findings made in Chapter four, reflects on the

literature review presented in Chapter two and answers the research

questions presented in Chapter three. The aim of this case study research

was “to understand the effectiveness of the National Integrity System

institutions on the fight against corruption in Malawi”. The research used

Malawi Parliament as a single unit case study.

5.2 Discussions of findings

Four research questions guided this case study research. The findings in

Chapter four respond to these research questions with the following

conclusions:

On mechanisms in place for effective operations of Parliament as an

Integrity Institution to fight corruption;

The findings show that legal and practical mechanisms are in place to enable

parliament to operate and fight against corruption. The legal framework is

clear in mandating parliament to provide oversight functions of the executive

and pass the necessary legislation that can support the fight against

81


corruption. Clear mandate is one of the critical indicators for an effective

integrity institution (Brown and Head, 2005). Parliament has indeed passed

important laws to give the legal basis to fight against corruption such as the

Asset Declaration law passed in 2013. Parliament is also empowered by the

Malawi republican Constitution to investigate various issues including cases of

corruption and hold the executive to account for their actions. Parliament has

the power to summon the President, cabinet minister and any government

officials to answer questions in parliament. This is one way of ensuring

Political accountability (Strom, 2000) which is one of the important measures

of an effective integrity institution as discussed in Chapter two. In terms of

practicalities, the procedures for doing this are well laid out in Parliamentary

Standing Orders and other laws. However, as the findings revealed in Chapter

four, parliament has not been able to hold anyone to account on corruption

issues. The former president under whose term corruption was discovered

was never summoned by parliament to specifically answer questions on

corruption issues. The current president has not been summoned either to

explain how corruption happened when the current ruling party was in power

during which the K92billion was lost to corruption as covered by a parallel

report to the “Cashgate” Forensic audit report. No one is accounting to the

lost funds uncovered through that report. Has parliament brought anyone to

account on the current corruption scam? The findings showed none.

Parliament has not even formally discussed the report in the house.

While mechanisms for executive oversight, checks and balances exist at least

in law and standing orders of parliament, Parliament has not used them to

82


discipline government officials on corruption issues. As discussed in literature

review in chapter two, where checks and balances exist, government bodies

discipline each other (McGovern, 1907, Persson et al, 1997, Rose-Ackerman,

1999, and Loffont and Meley, 2001) but this has not been the case with

Malawi Parliament.

The independence of parliament is guaranteed by law and again by standing

orders. As literature review in Chapter two noted, day to day discussions of

integrity institutions are formed without interference of politicians (Elgie, 1998-

55, Haretty, 2010, Hayo and Volgt, 2007). However, the findings have shown

that when it comes to discussions on corruption matters, political interests are

high to the extent that the house has not even had formal discussions of the

“Cashgate” corruption issues and there has not been adequate funding of

relevant committees to discuss corruption issues in their relevant ministries

and sectors as exemplified by the Health Committee which could not discuss

transfers of funds from Central medical Stores Trust and National Aids

Commission to Beautify Malawi Trust.

On how these mechanisms position parliament as an Integrity

Institution to contribute to the broader fight against corruption

The conclusion this research makes is that the legal framework is very

enabling for parliament to perform as an integrity institution especially in

ensuring that other arms of governance are not corrupt and brought to

account when they become corrupt. However, as the findings have shown,

this is not enough to position parliament to effectively contribute to the

83


broader fight against corruption. The number of shortfalls revealed in this

research such as weak capacity especially lack of budgets for committee

meetings and weak technical capacity to carryout investigations, political

interests and an executive that cannot be brought to account mean that

parliament is virtually not in position to contribute effectively to the broader

fight against corruption.

On how Parliament works with other Integrity Institutions in the fight

against corruption

The research concludes that parliament does not have any practical

mechanisms in place for achieving this. There are no formal arrangements put

in place by parliament to interact with the other integrity institutions such as

civil society, media, chiefs, private sector and the others. As Doig (1995),

Quah (1999), Pope and Vogl (20000) observe in the literature review,

corruption cannot be fought with institutions operating in isolation. Parliament

does not organise formal discussions and interaction on corruption issues with

the other stakeholders and as findings show only waits to be invited to

meetings and workshops when organised by the other integrity institutions.

On how effective Parliament is as an Integrity Institution to contribute to

the fight against corruption

The conclusion this research makes is that parliament is not effective. Again

the research sees that while the legal framework is enabling for it to perform

its functions effectively as an integrity institution to fight corruption, parliament

84


is in effect constrained by various factors such as lack of funding for

committee operations, technical capacity in investigations of corruption

issues, integrity issues amongst members themselves, an executive that

cannot be controlled, highly divisive political and personal interests and the

clear lack of leadership direction how to deal with corruption issues in the

house. The simple, and yet serious conclusion this research makes is that

parliament as an integrity institution is not effective in contributing to the fight

against corruption in Malawi. In order for this to be reversed, this research

makes the following recommendations:

5.3 Recommendations

Based on the findings, this research makes the following recommendations:

Recommendation to Malawi Government

i) The National Integrity System (NIS) as a government approach to

fighting corruption should be locally and comprehensively reviewed

to ensure that any impediments to its proper performance be

identified and dealt with;

ii) The Treasury should ensure that Parliament budget is adequate for

its proper functions and operations and should be controlled by

parliament itself in line with the law;

Recommendation to Malawi Parliament

iii) Parliament should complete the process of developing the Code of

Ethics for Members of Parliament to ensure that there is clear

85


expectations and sanctions for the Behaviour of Members of

Parliament;

iv) Parliament should ensure that its records are accessed by the

general public and such crucial records as Hansards should be

speedily completed and made available to the public suing its

website and other outreach initiatives;

v) Members of Parliament should ensure that they serve the interest of

the citizens, not their own or their political parties’ interests;

vi) Parliament should work jointly with other integrity institutions to fight

corruption by initiating formal discussions and meetings to deal with

current corruption matters;

vii) Parliament should ensure that it uses its legal powers to bring to

account public officials and other arms of government on corruption

issues.

5.4 Areas for future research

Through the literature review, this research has noted that a critical gap that

needs further research is to assess the impact of the National Integrity

System as a whole on the fight against corruption. It is important to establish

as a policy approach to fight corruption in Malawi, whether the National

Integrity System has real impact in terms of empirical evidence of whether

cases of corruption are being reduces or not as a results of the NIS approach.

86


The research has further revealed that as regards to corruption, there is a

serious gap between policy and legal framework and practice. This needs to

be researched to establish the root cause. Another important area of research

is the funding to parliament especially to committees to understand whether

the executive is deliberately suffocating parliamentary committees through

sporadic funding to committees.

5.5 Conclusion

Using parliament as a case study, this research wanted to find out the

effectiveness of the integrity institutions in Malawi in the fight against

corruption. To achieve this aim, the research reviewed a wide range of

literature focusing on scholarly positions and empirical evidence around

integrity institutions and the National Integrity System. Various assessment

tools were reviewed and the research identified the National Integrity System

Assessment Tool (NIS Tool Kit, 2010) and the OECD Public Sector Integrity:

A framework for Assessment (2005) as guides to interview questions. The

research findings have shown that parliament as an integrity institution or

pillar of the National Integrity System in Malawi has a strong legal basis to

fight corruption. However, parliament is not effective in its role due to various

factors which include political interest, executive arrogance and in adequate

budget which at the same time is being controlled by the executive.

87


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http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/Ill_gotten_money_and_economy.pdf

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/Ill_gotten_money_and_economy.pdf


Appendix 1: Case Study Research Interview Guide

Capacity: extent to which supportive environment exists to the

legislature to implement the National Integrity System

1. What capacity does parliament have to discharge its role as an integrity institution?

2. What capacity does parliament have to do formal investigations and gather evidence to hold executive to and other public institutions to account on issues related to corruption?

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Independence: The extent to which parliament as an integrity institution acts

independently from external influence.

1. To what extent is parliament independent and free from subordination to external actors by law?

2. How does political party allegiance affect debate in parliament on issues of corruption?

Transparency: The extent to which parliament as an integrity institution is

transparent and promotes transparency.

1. What provisions are in place to ensure that the public can obtain relevant information on the activities and decision-making of the parliament?

2. What internal arrangements are there in place to ensure that the public has full access to information about parliament?

Accountability: The extent to which parliament as an integrity institution is

accountable to the public and holds other arms of government to account.

1. What provisions are in place to ensure that parliament has to report on and be answerable for its actions?

2. To what extent do members of parliament actually answer for their actions?

Integrity mechanisms: the extent to which parliament maintains its integrity

and the integrity of other institutions.

1. What mechanisms are in place to ensure Members of parliament act with integrity?

2. Does parliament have integrity committees for both staff and members of parliament, if yes, how effective are their operations?

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Executive oversight: the extent to which parliament plays its oversight role.

1. How does parliament provide oversight of the executive?

2. How is parliament engaged in the fight against corruption?

3. Has parliament initiated any investigations in the recent past on corruption issues?

Collaboration and networking: the extent to which parliament collaborates

with other integrity institutions in the fight against corruption

1. How does parliament initiate interaction with other integrity

institutions?

2. How does parliament interact with non-state integrity institutions?

3. What role has parliament played to ensure that the other organs of

state curb corruption?

Appendix 2: Focus Group Discussions Guide

1. Since the launch of the National Integrity System in 2008, what steps has parliament taken to entrench the NIS within parliament as an institution?

2. What key activities has parliament implemented since the launch of the NIS?

3. What capacity does parliament have to discharge its role as an integrity institution?

4. What capacity does parliament need in order to effectively play its role as an integrity institution?

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5. How independent is parliament in discharging its duties and playing its role in the fight against corruption?

6. What internal arrangements are there in place to ensure that the public has full access to information about parliament?

7. To what extent do members of parliament actually answer for their actions?

8. What mechanisms are in place to ensure Members of parliament act with integrity?

9. How does parliament provide oversight of the executive?

10.What role has parliament played to ensure that the other organs of state curb corruption?

Appendix 3: Letter of Introduction to carry out the research

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