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Structure-Conduct-Performance Industrial Economics

Structure-Conduct-Performance Industrial Economics

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Page 1: Structure-Conduct-Performance Industrial Economics

Structure-Conduct-Performance

Industrial Economics

Page 2: Structure-Conduct-Performance Industrial Economics

Objectives

• Look at what factors make market power a ‘problem’

• What is the evidence on market power?– How do we test?– The deadweight welfare loss triangle

• Harberger

• Posner

• Cowling & Mueller

Page 3: Structure-Conduct-Performance Industrial Economics

Oligopoly Models

• Dominant firm models. • Models of potential competition and entry

deterrence. • Models of co-operative oligopoly.• Models of non-co-operative oligopoly such as the

Cournot model • Models of oligopoly with product differentiation. • Models of the interaction between vertically related

firms with market power.

Page 4: Structure-Conduct-Performance Industrial Economics

When is market power most likely to become a 'problem' by allowing firms to

earn 'excess' profits and/ or creating a social welfare loss?

• Existence of a dominant firm. • Barriers to entry. • Firms are price takers and quantity makers• Existence of conditions conducive to collusion.

Page 5: Structure-Conduct-Performance Industrial Economics

Conditions are conducive to collusion when ...

• Firms are few in number and roughly equally sized

• The product is roughly homogenous.• Demand is slow growing and stable.• Cost conditions are similar amongst firms.• Fixed costs are a small proportion of total cost.• Assets are highly function specific.• Its is easy to act against cheats.

Page 6: Structure-Conduct-Performance Industrial Economics

Testing the relationship

Profits = f (conc., entry barriers, product differentiation, exit costs)

Is the relationship linear and continuous, or non-linear and discontinuous?

Should we be estimating a single equation model or a simultaneous equation model?

Page 7: Structure-Conduct-Performance Industrial Economics

Results

• In 14 out of 98 investigations in one period by the MMC profits were found to be 'excessive'.

Page 8: Structure-Conduct-Performance Industrial Economics

Does this mean anything

• Not according to the Chicago critics of the SCP paradigm.

They argue as follows:

Market power and above normal profits are not in fact causally related but are both products of a common force which is the superior competitive ability of some firms over others.

Page 9: Structure-Conduct-Performance Industrial Economics

The Welfare loss triangleaka the Harberger triangle

W = TR PCM2

Harberger concluded in 1954 that the losses arising from market power in the US economy were very small, less than 0.1% of GNP.

Page 10: Structure-Conduct-Performance Industrial Economics

Was Harberger Right?

Probably not because

• his 'estimate' for (the elasticity of demand) was -1 which is inconsistent with profit maximisation.

• If we use the Lerner index for market power and substitute it into Harberger's expression we get the result that the loss is equal to half of all above normal profits!

Page 11: Structure-Conduct-Performance Industrial Economics

What do others say?

• Scherer

• Posner

• Cowling & Mueller