Strategy, Money, and the New Look, 1953-1956 by Richard M. LeightonReview by: Eliot A. CohenForeign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2002), p. 158Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033173 .

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Recent Books

missile defense will not and cannot work, would be terribly dangerous if it did, and will cause vast and unnecessary in ternational political turbulence merely by being in train. The contradiction between the first contention and the last two is common in the anti-missile defense literature, just as quasi-religious faith in technology characterizes its counterpart on the other side.

Far better than either book is Graham's thorough account of the resurrection of the ballistic missile defense debate in the 1990s. In his exhaustively detailed look at both policymaking and technology, two large facts become clear. First, the impulse to defend one's country against attack from long-range missiles is durable and, in the final analysis, compelling. Second, the technological capability to do so remains unproven. From these points one may conclude that Democrats and Republicans alike find themselves impaled on the horns of a dilemma. People tend to be obsessed with either the logic of missile defense or its technology, but they never take both into account. That dilemma is why Bill Clinton, not George H.W. Bush, began nudging the United States in the direction of na tional missile defense, and why a dialogue of the deaf on this subject will persist.

Strategy, Money, and the New Look, 1953-1956. BY RICHARD M. LEIGHTON.

Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001, 8o8 pp. $74.oo.

The third volume in the massive official history of the office of the secretary of defense, this book upholds the same

weighty standards of integrity and thoroughness as its predecessors. It summarizes one of the most interesting periods in Cold War defense policy,

when American planners settled in for the long competition with the Soviet

Union, adapted to new technologies (particularly in the nuclear realm), and cut force size while embarking on what is known today as "defense transformation." Intercontinental ballistic missiles, conti nental air defense, the permanent sta tioning of U.S. forces in Europe, and the

Army's revolt against massive retaliation are all impartially examined by a dedicated historian who has been at the job since

World War II. If policymakers had time to read big books, this one should be high on their required list.

OperationsAgainst Enemy Leaders. BY STEPHEN HOSMER. Santa Monica:

Rand, 2001, 151 pp. $20.00 (paper). Hosmer is one of Rand's best analysts, a sober student of contemporary military affairs. This volume breaks little new ground, but it does document concisely and clearly the difficulty the United States has had in overthrowing or killing enemy leaders. Hosmer considers direct attacks, coups, rebellions, and invasion and comes to a gloomy conclusion: leadership attacks are difficult to pull off. And yet it is remarkable how many times the United States has done just that-from Japanese

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto in 1943 to Panama's Manuel Noriega in 1989. Judging from the newspapers, it would appear that Hosmer will soon have

more cases to consider.

Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War,

1939-40. EDITED BY ALEXANDER 0.

CHUBARYAN AND HAROLD

SHUKMAN. Portland: Frank Cass, 2002, 299 pp. $80.00.

In April 1940, the leaders of the Soviet

[158] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume8.zNo.3

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