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Strategies to Tackle Fourth GenerationWarfare (4GW): An Aerial PerspectiveArjun SubramaniamPublished online: 23 Aug 2010.
To cite this article: Arjun Subramaniam (2010) Strategies to Tackle Fourth Generation Warfare(4GW): An Aerial Perspective, Strategic Analysis, 34:5, 756-765
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Strategic AnalysisVol. 34, No. 5, September 2010, 756–765
Strategies to Tackle Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW):An Aerial Perspective
Arjun Subramaniam
Abstract: The changing nature of warfare, as the twentieth century drew to a close,saw the increased proliferation of conflict between non-state actors and the state. Smallwars, wars of liberation, insurgencies, terrorism, proxy wars, sub-conventional warfareand a host of other terminologies emerged that attempted to fingerprint this genre oflow spectrum warfare. Initially, it was felt that it was risky to use air power in this kindof warfare and that surface forces were best equipped to fight these wars with onlysuperficial support from air forces. However, as the twenty-first century unfolded, theuse of air power in Kargil, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Sri Lanka in diverse roleshas sparked off a fresh debate on the effective employment of air power at the lower endof the spectrum of warfare.
If India is to secure itself from terror, it must, first, unlearn the way it currently thinks aboutthe issue. India’s responses to terrorism and, indeed, even the country’s capacity to respond hasbeen enormously inhibited by an absence of clarity. (Dr. Ajai Sahni)1
Changing nature of war
The nature of war has seen significant change over the last four centuries. From thecavalry charge and the orderly line and column tactics of the infantry, set piece
manoeuvres with minimal changes marked the Napoleonic era of First GenerationWarfare. The industrial revolution offered a wide range of firepower options thatsparked the onset of Second Generation Warfare, which relied on overwhelming fire-power and massed troops to capture ground that was considered so essential for victoryin war. The aftermath of World War I led to a realisation that mankind could ill affordthe kind of attrition caused by such warfare. This, coupled with increasingly ambi-tious nation states like Germany, which wanted to expand their spheres of influenceto combat the British Empire, led to the emergence of manoeuvre warfare and whatis commonly called Third Generation Warfare. This is where air power and the tankemerged as key weapons of war, sparking off concepts like Blitzkreig in the early daysof World War II, to ‘The Shock and Awe Campaign’ of Iraq 2003. Third Generationwars can be said to have dominated conflict for over six decades from the 1930s to the1990s as long as nation states waged war with each other and as long as the Cold Warensured an artificial stability in the world.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and creation of a unipolar world with the US seenas the sole superpower saw the emergence of asymmetric warfare that saw non-stateactors wage war against established states over myriad disputes and aspirations. Slowlybut surely, non-state actors eroded the might of the state and its monopoly on war. They
Arjun Subramaniam is a PhD scholar with the University of Madras, and is currently undergoing the50th NDC course at New Delhi.
ISSN 0970-0161 print/ISSN 1754-0054 online© 2010 Institute for Defence Studies and AnalysesDOI: 10.1080/09700161.2010.501597http://www.informaworld.com
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did this by employing tools and tactics such as insurgencies, proxy wars, wars of libera-tion and terrorism. The state, however, continued to develop Third Generation Warfarewith a focus on dislocating and shocking the enemy by targeting what is commonlycalled Centres of Gravity or COGs by using air power. By the 1900s, air power hademerged as a safe and potent option in the hands of powerful militaries, and it wasassumed that air power could win a war on its own. This is when the non-state actorprecipitated a shift in the genre of warfare by evolving methods, strategies and tacticsthat would nullify the overwhelming advantage of the state when it came to conven-tional war-fighting capabilities, leading to what is now commonly referred to as FourthGeneration Warfare or 4GW.2 William Lind, a retired Marine Corps officer, has been apioneer in fingerprinting 4GW and defines it as:
Fourth Generation Warfare is not novel but a return, specifically a return to the way war workedbefore the rise of the state. Now, as then, many different entities, not just governments of states,will wage war. They will wage war for many different reasons, not just ‘the extension of politicsby other means.’ And they will use many different tools to fight war, not restricting themselvesto what we recognise as military forces.3
Wikipedia defines 4GW as ‘conflict characterised by blurring of lines between war andpolitics, soldiers and civilians’.
Statistics have revealed that conventional wars have been outnumbered manifold by‘small wars’ since the end of WWII.4 Yet armed forces all over the world, while recog-nising the paradigm shift in warfare, continued to build up conventional and nuclearcapability for deterrence; little realising that neglecting the lower end of the spectrumof warfare has the potential to jeopardise national security and sovereignty, just as theLiberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) did to the Sri Lankan state for almost 20years, before the state fought back. States have also assumed that existing capabilitieswere enough to defeat the non-state actor and have been on the back foot almost every-where in the fight against the non-state actor. There is also a need to recognise the exis-tence of not only 4GW, but also of hybrid warfare5 wherein the non-state actor pros-ecutes war against the state using the tools of both conventional and sub-conventionalwarfare. Typically, the tools of conventional warfare are supplied by a ‘proxy state’,while the tools of 4GW could vary from terrorism to insurgency or guerrilla warfare.
Consequences of 4GW
The primary consequence of the inability of a state to cope with 4GW is the emergenceof a threat to its very sovereignty. Were not the 9/11 and Parliament attacks in India andthe 26/11 attacks, attacks on sovereignty? Coupled with the proliferation of religiousfundamentalism and extremism, what we have is a grave danger to the very fabric ofthe state. Totalitarian states or dictatorial regimes ruthlessly tackle insurgencies andterrorism. However, democracies like India and the US are considered ‘soft states’ andemerge as prime battlegrounds for 4GW.
Strategies to fight 4GW
Unlike conventional conflicts where there is a clear delineation between military actionand politico-diplomatic tools for conflict resolution, strategies to combat 4GW are farmore complex and nebulous. Military action, political attempts, diplomatic parleysand socio-economic action have to be synergised to defeat proponents of 4GW. This is
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where established states have been found wanting. The failure of the US-led coalitionin Iraq to stabilise the situation post-op Iraqi Freedom is because of the lack of fore-sight that the reconstruction process needed to be dovetailed with the military plan.What happened, instead, was the inability of the coalition forces to effectively tran-sit from military to civic action. On the other side of the curve, the prolonged proxywar in Kashmir continues despite the Indian army embarking on a policy of Winningthe Hearts and Minds of the People (WHAM). The Kandahar hijacking is one suchinstance of feeble action by the state. The success of the Sri Lankan state in defeatingthe LTTE will only be complete if decisive military action is followed by equally deci-sive socio-political action to rehabilitate and provide the Tamils with an identity andsome degree of autonomy. Therefore, a seamless integration of military might, politico-diplomatic finesse and social integration is the only way forward when it comes toevolving workable strategies to tackle 4GW.
Insurgencies must transit three phases before gaining victory: strategic defensive,stalemate, and strategic offensive. In short, insurgents must eventually organise, equip,and fight as a conventional army without any air cover. In doing so, the insurgentspresent a key weakness to aerial weapons. This third and final stage is the insurgents’crucial weakness; something that air power must be ready to exploit. Is the Naxalitemovement in this strategic third phase? Difficult to pinpoint, but a look at their majoroffensives since early 2003 indicates a trend towards large-scale guerrilla tactics witha build-up towards conventional operational capability. All pointers indicate that theNaxals may be gearing up to launch calibrated attacks on the government securityforces in areas where state governments are seen to be weak and indecisive. Thus it isimperative that policy-makers have a clear understanding of the capabilities, competen-cies and risks of any future employment of air power at the lower end of the spectrumof conflict.
Historical pointers and an Indian perspective
The first four decades after WWII mainly saw the employment of ground forces tocombat insurgencies and guerrilla movements that stretched across the globe fromVietnam, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Kurdistan and Gaza in the Middle East to Irelandin Europe. Except for the rather aimless offensive employment of air power by the USin Vietnam and the effective use of air power against the Malayan insurgency, air powerin other places was mainly used only in supporting roles. It was the Israelis who realisedthe potential of air power as a powerful tool of the state when faced with a literal strug-gle for survival as a state in the late 1980s. The Israelis were also amongst the first touse air power in conjunction with Special Forces to conduct anti-terrorist operationsduring the famous raid on Entebbe. Since then, air power has been used offensively byTurkey against Kurdish insurgents, by Russia against the Afghan and Chechen rebels,by US and coalition forces in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, by Sri Lanka against theLTTE, and most recently by Pakistan in their drive against the Taliban in the Swatregion of north west Pakistan. From a purely Indian perspective, the hue and cry in themedia over the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) request to fire back in self defence when firedupon by Naxals is perplexing to say the least. There seems to be a feeling of disbe-lief that the Indian state can even think of such a thing. In 1936 the first operationalsquadron of the IAF, No. 1 Squadron, cut its teeth in Waziristan to quell a rebellionby tribals of the North Western Frontier Province.6 The operation involved both offen-sive and recce missions by slow moving Wapiti aircraft against tribesmen who adopted
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hit and run tactics.7 Despite the rugged and mountainous terrain, air power acted as asignificant deterrent.
Have we forgotten the use of air power in joint operations against the Mizo insur-gency in the mid-1960s? In February 1966, two Mi-4 helicopter squadrons were taskedto airlift troops of the Indian army to relieve and reinforce the Aizwal garrison that wasbeing threatened by well trained cadres of the Mizo National Front (MNF) who hadsurrounded the treasury and five other posts nearby.8 The initial attempts to heli-landthe troop were met with fire from the MNF cadres and had to be aborted. A Cariboutransport aircraft of the IAF on a recce mission over Aizwal was also shot at and dam-aged. Without wasting much time, a decision was taken at HQ Eastern Army Commandthat was headed by the then Lt. Gen. SHFJ Manekshaw to request HQ Eastern AirCommand to provide armed escorts to the mission. Following this, all waves of heli-copters were escorted by four Toofani jets that strafed and fired rockets at the MNFpositions and gave covering fire while the troops disembarked and forced the MNFto retreat. On following days too, Toofanis and Hunters operating from Kumbhigramand Jorhat airfields continued to independently target MNF positions. Little known isalso a fact that the first serious attempt at executing Special Heli-borne Operations orSHBO was attempted by the Indian army along with IAF Mi-4 helicopters in the MizoOperations.9 These operations successfully intercepted MNF cadres on the move andintroduced an element of speed and urgency into the operations, something that hasbecome so essential in today’s anti-naxal operations.
Moving away from India but staying in South Asia, the turning point in Elam–IV,the last war between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan armed forces was when the SriLankan Air Force (SLAF) effectively targeted LTTE leadership, killing many of them,injuring some and forcing even Prabhakaran to change his location on a daily basis.Coupled with this was the synergistic targeting of Sea Tiger10 assets by the SLAFand Sri Lankan navy that choked the LTTE completely. Ironically, the dominance ofthe Sri Lankan army has resulted in very little public credit being given to the SLAFfor the victory against the LTTE. All recent successes against the Al-Qaeda leader-ship in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen can be attributed to effective targetingby coalition air power. Similarly, the Pakistan air force has successfully targeted theTaliban in SWAT, federally administered tribal areas (FATA) and South Waziristan withCobra helicopters and fighter aircraft, albeit with some collateral damage. The use ofair power by India in Kargil does not typically fall under the use of air power againstnon-state actors, but falls under the use of air power at the lower end of the spectrumof warfare that lies on the fringes of 4GW by virtue of the mix of regular troops andforeign terrorists who made up the infiltrating force that occupied the icy heights ofKargil.
The advent of precision weapons and advanced aerial and space based sensors tocreate ‘unblinking situational awareness’ has given the state an additional and viablemilitary option provided it can handle intense media and international pressure relatedto collateral damage and civilian casualties. Whenever offensive application of airpower has been followed by surgical ground operations, the non-state actor has beenpushed to the verge of defeat. However, whenever attempts have been made to defeata non-state actor by using only air power, nation states have been less than success-ful. In all this debate, the non-kinetic and support roles of air power continued to beextremely relevant in the war against non-state actors. Keeping the Indian template asthe Mizo operation, our air power utilisation in anti-naxal operations is likely to befar more restrained, calibrated and defensive in nature, the aim being to first send a
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coercive and deterrent message before engaging in any kind of offensive operations.Hopefully, this should sow the seeds of doubt within the movement that if pushed fur-ther, the state would not hesitate to respond aggressively, thereby hastening a negotiatedsettlement.
Pay-offs and risks of using air power in an Indian scenario
The single biggest dilemma facing democracies relates to the ethical dimension ofcivilian casualties and collateral damage whenever offensive or kinetic air power isused against non-state actors, especially if they are embedded in the local populationor constitutionally belong to the same stock of people that comprise the nation state.This is where the US experience is different from the one that India has been facingsince independence. Whenever the US or Israel have used offensive air power againstnon-state actors, it has been on foreign soil against non-state actors who, presumably,were a danger to their sovereignty, way of life and national interest. In that context,as far as the US or Israel is concerned, they are at war and are willing to pay theprice for protecting their sovereignty even if it causes international condemnation andcensure. The bottom line as far as they are concerned is that any action that saves livesof American or Israeli soldiers and results in the neutralisation of the non-state actoris justified. This strategy is not without merit, particularly when non-state actors ofrecent times have become so ruthless, unethical and unscrupulous in their war fightingtechniques.
India presents a fascinating case study when it comes to analysing national strategyto fight 4GW. Even though India has fought insurgencies and a proxy war for overfour decades, been the victim of numerous terrorist attacks that have killed leadershipand hundreds of citizens, and experienced fighting a ‘ruthless guerrilla turned terroristforce’ ( LTTE) in Sri Lanka, national strategies to fight 4GW at home or abroad havebeen slow to evolve. What has happened instead is that each situation involving anon-state actor is treated first as an internal security matter of state and handled bythe state police. When the situation escalates, it then becomes a matter of nationalsecurity requiring intervention first by the para-military forces that are controlled bythe Home Ministry, and then assisted by the armed forces, which are controlled bythe Defence Ministry. Vital time is lost in this process, allowing the non-state actor tostay continuously ahead of the state. Added to this have been the pitfalls of a multi-party democracy that causes unacceptable delay in decision-making, something that isdisastrous in 4GW. This is a far cry from the quick decision-making that marked theend of the Mizo insurgency. At that time India was recovering after the Chinese debacleof 1962 and the 1965 war with Pakistan and had no intention of soft pedalling with aninsurgency that had covert foreign support and was threatening her sovereignty.
If one looks at the whole dilemma of using offensive or kinetic air power in 4GW,it ultimately boils down to the ‘attrition threshold’11 that a state is able to lay down foritself. The higher the threshold, the greater will be the power of the non-state actor andhis ability to adversely impact the sovereignty of the state. From this threshold flowsthe strategy to fight 4GW. The very fact that the Pakistani dictator Gen Zia-ul-Haqplanned his strategy of ‘bleeding India with a thousand cuts’ to wage a successfulproxy war in J&K, is indicative of a correct assessment of India as a ‘soft democracy’.Notwithstanding the success of the Indian security forces in restoring near normalcy inJ&K through a combination of surface action and WHAM, the Indian security forcescontinue to lose officers and soldiers on a regular basis against infiltrating ‘jehadis’,
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foreign terrorists or indigenous Hizbul Mujahideen. Yet offensive air power has notbeen used because it could cause collateral damage. While this argument is perplexingto some, it does reflect India’s restraint and maturity in the face of provocation. Inthis context, there is an ongoing debate within India’s strategic community on the prosand cons of hardening state response in the face of increasingly belligerent non-stateactors.
Credibility in international affairs revolves around a country’s reputation for actionand the expectation other countries have about its behaviour.12 India’s credibility hassuffered over the last 50 years because of strategic indecisiveness on a number of occa-sions. Prominent amongst these have been the reluctance to use air power in 1962against the Chinese,13 the unwillingness to engage in ‘hot pursuit’ whenever terroristattacks emanate from Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and many other punitive anddeterrent actions that needed to be taken against non-state actors. The reluctance to useoffensive air power could have its roots in this strategic diffidence and may need reviewin light of India’s increasing vulnerability to 4GW.
In the ongoing anti-naxal operations, effective and widespread use of ‘soft’ airpower and defensive fire power could prove decisive in hastening a negotiated set-tlement. Any prolonged operation that sees the Naxals escalate violence and progresstowards conventional war fighting should be seen as unacceptable, and countered withcalibrated use of offensive air power. This would have to be against target systems likeleadership, camps and known weapons cache areas. This would re-assert the primacyof the state in the ‘red corridor’ and accelerate the process of militarily crushing theinsurgency. Morale of security forces is something that is grossly underplayed in inter-nal security operations as compared to combat operations against external threats. Airpower has the ability to lift the morale of security forces exponentially by its merepresence. Use of air power at this juncture would also send a message to the Naxalsnot to attempt to gather external support for the movement at a time when India-Chinarelations are going downhill.
Naxal leadership roams around the forests of Dantewada, Gadchiroli and AbujMarh with impunity. Increased air activity is certain to drive them underground andmake it difficult for them to direct cadres. The main risk while using ‘soft’ or non-kinetic air power is the security of these expensive assets while they are deployed inNaxal infested areas. Additional security would have to be provided at airfields andhelipads, which is not a very difficult task. The repercussions of using offensive airpower could be far more complicated to handle and would demand a great deal ofmedia/public sensitisation and patience when it comes to coping with collateral dam-age. Temporary alienation of the local populace may have to be dealt with and there isa remote possibility that successful employment of offensive air power may induce anauthoritarian streak in operations, which is an undesirable trait in a democracy.
Aerospace missions for maximum effect
Advances in air power have resulted in the application of almost all the roles of airpower at the lower end of the spectrum of warfare. The most acceptable roles havebeen the non-kinetic and supporting roles of air power that have been subordinateto action by ground forces. However, advances in modern weaponry, such as longerranges, precision delivery and more destructive conventional munitions, create cir-cumstances encouraging the pre-emptive use of force14 to avoid direct engagementby surface forces until sufficient attrition has been caused to the non-state actor.
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Aggressive ISR
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) remains the most importantaerospace mission in 4GW. To locate, fix, identify, track, target and engage the non-state actor is significantly different from doing the same for conventional targets ina conventional scenario. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and satellites would formthe primary tier of sensors that need to be synergised as part of a ‘persistent staremosaic’ that needs to be created to continuously monitor the activities of non-stateadversaries. Aggressive ISR immediately puts the terrorist or insurgent on the backfoot and demands that all sensors be linked to a centralised intelligence disseminationcentre that can be immediately accessed by the apex decision-making or crisis man-agement group. Put very simply, decision-makers should be able to ‘see and hear thenon-state actor’ on a real time basis and transfer relevant information to the soldier onthe ground or pilot in the air who is being tasked with targeting. The only way thatthe ‘fog of uncertainty’ in such warfare is penetrated, in the requisite time frame, is ifthere is synergy between all intelligence agencies. This is something that is an absoluteimperative if we want to stay ahead of the non-state actor.
Non-kinetic or supporting missions
There never was any doubt about the importance of all the non-kinetic and supportingroles of air power, ranging from casualty evacuation to humanitarian relief and logisticsupport missions at the lower end of the spectrum of warfare. These missions are vitalin showing the ‘human face’ of the state and accelerating the process of ‘Winning theHearts and Minds’ of citizens affected by 4GW. The IAF has been performing theseroles admirably, whether in J&K, the north eastern or in the Naxal infested areas ofJharkhand, Chattisgarh and Orissa. These missions have invariably stretched the oper-ational capability of the IAF to the limits of sustainability and call for increased forcelevels. Key acquisitions would be of UAVs equipped with suitable all-weather sensors,medium airlift aircraft of the An-32 or C-130 class and additional heli-lift capability ofthe Mi-17 class, especially if the IAF is called upon for increased involvement in thefight against Naxals.
The present operational scenario involving combat support missions by the IAF is ahighly complex one with most of the effort being taken up to meet conventional threatson two fronts. The amount of air effort to sustain the Indian army and other para-military forces like the Border Security Force (BSF), the Indo-Tibetan Border Police(ITBP) and the Border Roads Organisation in the mountains of Ladakh, HimachalPradesh, Uttaranchal, Sikhim and all the north eastern states that have a border withChina and Pakistan along conventional lines of operations, makes it extremely difficultfor the IAF to sustain operations against non-state actors; be it against insurgents in thenorth east, Naxalites in the hinterland or even infiltrating Mujahideen and terrorists inthe proxy war against Islamic Jehadis across the Line of Control (LOC) from POK.
Employment of offensive air power
Use of offensive air power in 4GW has always been a debatable and contentious issue.It has been indiscriminately used by the US and Russia in Iraq, Afghanistan andChechnya with mixed results; effective if one looks at the target systems that wereengaged that mainly comprised non-state and terrorist leadership/feeder systems, andineffective if one looks at the collateral damage and inability to control the alienation
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of the local population. At the middle end of the spectrum is the extremely high pay-offin the use of air strikes to eliminate, demoralise and soften the LTTE leadership by theSri Lankan air force along with synergised action by the Sri Lankan army and SpecialForces. It is important here to draw attention to the fact that numerous Al-Qaeda lead-ers have been eliminated over the last few years by air strikes. Completing the spectrumis the complete absence of the use of offensive air power in recent times by India inits proxy war against terrorists and Mujahideen in J&K, against insurgents in the northeast and most recently in the war against the Naxalites.
Notwithstanding all the arguments against the use of offensive or kinetic air poweragainst the non-state actor in a particularly India-centric context, it is opined thatshould the Naxal situation deteriorate, calibrated use of offensive air power usingprecision engagement tactics against high value targets like leadership would resultin high pay-offs. These missions would have to be undertaken on the basis of unim-peachable electronic intelligence that is backed by equally reliable Human Intelligence(HUMINT), and followed up with swift ground action for maximum effect.
Joint operations and employment principles
It is extremely important to reiterate that even if air power has the ability to coerce anddeter the non-state actor, it can do very little on its own. The levels of synergy that arerequired between air and surface forces in 4GW are far greater than in conventionalwarfare. Unlike conventional wars wherein the main synergy is largely between thethree services, in 4GW the synergy has to include the para-military forces, police andcivil administration. To amplify this further, in conventional warfare, most target sys-tems are known well in advance with a certain amount of predictability even as far asmobility patterns are concerned, thanks to the ‘persistent stare’ capability of modernISR systems. This means that strategies and tactics of joint force application can beworked out well in advance and rehearsed adequately before hostilities break out. Jointforce and integrated operations in 4GW demand far greater synergy and responsivenessgiven the fluid and unpredictable nature of the adversary. Synergies cannot be createdovernight. They have to be developed systematically and honed up first in conven-tional scenarios, before being applied in contingencies arising from counterinsurgency(COIN) and terrorism.
While suggesting in various forums that the para-military forces in India mustemploy their own air assets in anti-naxal operations, security analysts have forgot-ten the two basic principles of air power: indivisibility and centralised command andcontrol with an aviator. In India today, the air arm of the para-military forces does notpossess the requisite expertise to conduct air operations other than routine communica-tion duties and peace-time casualty evacuation under benign environmental conditions.Training for other operational roles like combat search and rescue, escort missions,armed recce and other typical counterinsurgency missions could take years and proveunacceptably expensive as all military aviation training is only conducted by the IAF.Even though it is only in recent years that there has been a significant enhancement andexploitation of the Indian army’s and the IAF’s ISR capability, lack of thermal imagingand adequate all-weather capability on helicopters has hampered operations in J&K. Ina similar vein, ownership of air assets, while a live issue that could have hampered airoperations in COIN or low intensity conflict operations (LICO) is not an issue in thisarticle as it dilutes the essence of the argument, which revolves around the exploitationof aerospace power, not by whom, but how!
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Future imperatives
The issue of homeland defence has to occupy centre stage if India is to work out acoherent strategy to fight 4GW. While strategic thinkers agree that homeland defenceneeds greater attention in the aftermath of 26/11, there is widespread ambiguity onthe precise nature of the threat. While terrorists pose the main threat to the US home-land, the variety of non-state actors that threaten India makes it even more difficultfor us to formulate a viable strategy against non-state actors. A top down approachto macro decision-making and ‘bottom up approach’ with initiative and flexibility asfar as execution is concerned, is the only way to review our existing strategy of fight-ing 4GW. The first task of national leadership is to dispel the image of India being a‘soft state’. This is only possible when the nation is capable of demonstrating punitiveand deterrent capability in the face of attacks from non-state actors, whether externallymotivated or internally fermented. Instead of seeking approval from the media, theinternational community and religious groups, or worrying excessively about periph-eral issues like vote bank politics, the overriding concern of the government should beprotecting national sovereignty and the physical security of its citizens. The variousinitiatives of Mr. Chidambaram, the Indian home minister, in articulating a pro-activestance to tackle Naxalism are laudable and need to be supported by the strategiccommunity.
The second important task involves creating greater synergy between politicalleadership, bureaucracy, para-military forces, intelligence agencies and the armedforces when it comes to tackling unconventional, irregular or sub-conventional threats.Today’s terrorist or non-state actor initially understands only a language that initiallyflows from the barrel of the gun. Maybe it is time to change our national strategy tofight 4GW from one of pacifying and integrating the non-state actor, to one of first‘terrorising the terrorist’ and making him see the futility of his actions before usingdiplomacy and soft power to integrate him into society, especially if he belongs to thesame stock of people. In the Indian context, Islamic militancy in J&K must be dealtwith more firmly, using all the tools of deterrence that the state possesses. Similarly,the Naxalite movement must be dealt with firmly rather than wait for the movement toexhaust itself. Changing national strategy is not an easy task; what makes it even moredifficult is the fact that India’s strategic culture is a product of its multi-cultural andmulti-religious polity and a historical legacy of tolerance and restraint.
Conclusion
India’s strategic objectives have to revolve around strengthening defence capability totackle conventional threats on two fronts, sub-conventional threats on multiple fronts,and protection of its expanding global interests and influence. Air power assets arecapital intensive and demand significant gestation periods before they are operationallyinducted. Therefore, it is important to induct platforms, technologies and processes thatstay relevant across the spectrum of conflict. The underlying essence of the article alsoaims at reinforcing the argument that air power as an instrument of stated nationalpolicy can be used effectively even at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict in gen-eral, and in 4GW. The proliferation of terrorism and myriad aspirations of non-stateactors along with their capability to target the soft underbelly of established democ-racies and nations has created an ‘asymmetry’ that is cause for some concern. Thisasymmetry has led to the emergence of new genres of warfare that have placed fresh
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Strategic Analysis 765
challenges on militaries the world over. In such a scenario, it is important to realign theroles, missions and capabilities of air power to tackle sub-conventional threats fromguerrillas, insurgents, terrorists and religious fundamentalists who threaten nationalsecurity.
Air power resources must be effectively networked with intelligence sources, com-mand and control elements and other parallel lines of operations, both military andcivilian, to respond rapidly and precisely. Air power has the unique capability of exer-cising the ‘carrot and stick’ policy over non-state actors and the environment theyoperate in by operating simultaneously over multiple lines of operation (LOOs). The‘carrot’ is offered in the form of non-kinetic missions that include humanitarian andrelief missions, casualty evacuation and supply drops in hostile territory, while the‘stick’ can be effectively employed, only when absolutely necessary, in the form ofwell-orchestrated precision strikes against non-state leadership and infrastructure andfire support to ground forces. Most importantly, weighing the pay-offs and the risksof employing air power in a calibrated manner would be the hallmark of a maturedemocracy.
There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncer-tain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order to things. (NicoloMachiavelli)15
Notes1. Speaking at a seminar on ‘War against Global Terror’ organised by the Centre for Joint Warfare
Studies at DRDO Bhavan on April 16, 2009. The author also presented a paper on ‘Air Threatand Responses’ at the same seminar. See http://cenjows.in/conference.php.
2. The essence of this argument is once again derived from the thought process of WilliamLind, Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare, at http://www.artiwar.com/lind/index.php?articleid=1702 (accessed July 20, 2010).
3. Ibid.4. Martin Van Creveld, ‘Modern Conventional Warfare’, Discussion Paper, Hebrew University,
August 2004, pp. 2–4.5. In recent years, the term ‘hybrid wars’ has emerged as an alternative to describe the new con-
vergence between irregular and conventional tactics that is being exploited by groups likeHezbollah and Taliban. ‘Irregular Warfare and Air Power’, Pathfinder, Royal Australian AirForce Air Power Development Centre, Issue 107, March 2009, pp. 4–6.
6. Jasjit Singh, The Icon, Knowledge World Publishers, New Delhi, 2009, pp. 14–17.7. Ibid.8. Ahluwalia, H.P.S., ‘Helicopter Operations in the IAF’, Indian Defence Review, no. 20, 2005,
pp. 25–28.9. Ibid.
10. Sea Tigers was the naval element of the LTTE.11. ‘Attrition threshold’ is a term coined by the author to highlight how much punishment a state
can allow a non-state actor to inflict on it.12. Wayman, Frank Whelon, ‘Rivalries: Recurrent Disputes and Explaining War’, in John Vasquez
(ed.), What Do We Know about War, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., London and NewYork, 2000, pp. 219–233.
13. R. Sukumaran, ‘The 1962 Indo-China War and Kargil 1999: Restrictions on the Use of AirPower’, Strategic Analysis, 27, July–September 2003, pp. 332–356.
14. Excerpts from ‘Mapping the Global Future’, Report of the US National Intelligence Council’s2020 Project, December 2004, Washington, DC, pp. 56–65.
15. Nicolo Machiavelli, ‘Concerning New Principalities which are Acquired by One’s Own Armsand Ability’, The Prince, chapter VI, at http://www.constitution.org/mac/prince06.hm.
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