STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGEMENT: GOVERNMENT AND NATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENT EDUCATION PROVIDERS IN SOUTH ASIA

public administration and development

Public Admin. Dev. 31, 294–305 (2011)

Published online in Wiley Online Library(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/pad.607

STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGEMENT: GOVERNMENT AND NATIONALNON-GOVERNMENT EDUCATION PROVIDERS IN SOUTH ASIA

PAULINE ROSE*

University of Sussex, UK

SUMMARY

It is often assumed that non-government education providers prefer to operate without ‘interference’ from government. How-ever, in practice, they inevitably need to form relationships. There is also a common view that non-governmental organisations(NGOs) have to choose between service delivery and advocacy. As this article shows, these objectives are often not independentof each other. Drawing on evidence from established national non-government education providers in Bangladesh, India andPakistan, the article identifies different strategies adopted in balancing their service delivery and advocacy objectives. In allcases, the NGOs find ways to ensure a cooperative rather than conflictual relationship with government to pursue their goals.Strategies vary according to the strength of the national policy context, the formality of the relationship and the degree of de-pendence on funding sources, with the latter being most influential. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

key words—NGOs; education; partnership; South Asia

INTRODUCTION

There has been increasing recognition in recent years that non-state education providers are extending access tothose excluded from state provision. At the same time, concerns are raised that unplanned growth in non-state pro-vision has resulted in the fragmentation of service delivery, with insufficient attention to quality control. In re-sponse, policy makers are increasingly paying attention to the development of ‘partnerships’ betweengovernments and non-state providers.

Debates on NGO–government relationships have centred on the role of international NGOs, with concerns overtensions between their advocacy and service delivery roles. In recent years, some international NGOs involved ineducation have shifted away from seeing themselves primarily as service providers towards playing a more directrole in advocacy. For many international education practitioners, this move has been justified on the grounds thatbasic education provision should primarily be a state responsibility (Archer, 2010).

This international picture tends to obscure the reality of how NGOs work within countries. Although there area variety of factors affecting relationships between NGOs and governments (Batley, this issue; Mcloughlin, thisissue), this article focuses on three areas that were identified as being particularly significant in our research—namely, the explicit assertiveness of national government policy, the level of the formality of contractual arrange-ments and the strategic decisions by NGO leaders over funding. Not only are these factors inter-connected, but theyhave evolved over time partly in response to changes in the broader political policy environment and also becauseof the growing reputation and status of the NGOs, which has afforded them the flexibility and authority to makedecisions that shape their interactions with government officials.

The article challenges three common perspectives put forward in much of the literature that has focused on con-ceptual frameworks for assessing the degrees of cooperation or conflict between governments and non-governmentservice providers (see Mcloughlin, this issue). First, these conceptual frameworks often assume that it is governmentbehaviour that determines whether the relationship is cooperative. Governments do seem to have shaped the recent

*Correspondence to: P. Rose, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK. E-mail: [email protected]

Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

295GOVERNMENT AND NON-GOVERNMENT EDUCATION PROVIDERS IN SOUTH ASIA

engagement of NGOs in policy advocacy in recent years. On the basis of evidence from four countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Mundy et al. (2010) find that national education-sector planning has provided more space for gov-ernments to consult with civil society actors than ever before, although governments generally still decide how andwhen these actors can participate and have not established transparent processes for engagement. Even so, NGOeducation provision remains largely neglected within government plans (Rose, 2009). Our research finds that thisleads to governments having limited interest or capacity in determining the terms of relationships and that, in re-ality, established non-government service providers have the opportunity to take control over shaping the relation-ship, a point noted by Najam, (2000).

Second, the conceptual literature frequently poses service delivery and advocacy as conflictual. The articleadopts the approach advocated by Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2002) of looking at both service delivery and ad-vocacy, given that there is often an interaction between the two. Our research supports the framework proposed byNajam (2000: 391) that cooperative relationships in service delivery can promote ‘persuasive advocacy’. The orga-nisational motives of the selected NGOs influenced how closely they engaged with government in both service de-livery and advocacy aimed at improving government provision. Recent studies of education NGO–staterelationships in sub-Saharan Africa support the findings of our research that NGOs often engage in service deliveryand advocacy simultaneously. One study of Oxfam GB’s education work in Tanzania finds that the effectiveness ofthe NGO’s advocacy role is achieved by actions that are ‘gently nourished’ through its service delivery activities(Aikman, 2010). Similarly in Ghana, the success of the non-government School-for-Life programme has been usedto demonstrate to government officials the potential of flexible approaches. Through deliberate efforts to build aconstructive relationship, the NGO programme has both become integrated into national planning and providedlessons for improving government’s own provision (Casley-Hayford and Hartwell, 2010).

Third, some authors propose that governments will attempt to co-opt and control non-government service pro-viders by using formal contracts that create a subordinated relationship—and some argue that this type of relation-ship could become increasingly common. Experience from the three countries included in this study (Bangladesh,India and Pakistan) suggests that this is not yet the case in the education sector. Although the reasons why suchcontracts have not become more common are not entirely clear, one explanation is that governments are wary offormalising the role of non-government service providers because they see education provision as their responsi-bility. Recent research from other developing countries lends weight to this view. One comprehensive review of10 NGO education programmes finds that the interaction between these providers and the government was oftenlimited to government allowing the non-state actors to provide education. Although interaction has been evolvingin some countries to include more government promotion of non-state provision in national plans, this very rarelyextended to governments providing funding to support the activities (DeStefano and Moore, 2010). Our researchshows that even where government contracts are available, they usually provide one of a variety of sources of fundsavailable to established non-government service providers. As such, these service providers have a choice aboutwhether to participate in a formal contract with government, and so their relationship is not necessarily determinedby such agreements.

This article begins with a brief overview of the NGO education providers included in our research. It then looksat the nature of the relationships between these NGOs and government in the three countries and some of the keyfactors that shaped these relationships, focusing on the influence of the national policy environment, the formalityof contracts and the diversity of funding (Table 1).

BACKGROUND TO EDUCATION CASES—VALUES, LEADERSHIP AND RESOURCES

The article draws on an in-depth research on relationships between government and established national non-government education providers in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan.1 The research involved an extensive reviewof resources, including unpublished programme documents, contracts and memoranda of understanding. Key

1For further information about the methodology and the case study selection, see http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/schools/government-society/departments/international-development/research/projects/service-providers.aspx

Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 31, 294–305 (2011)

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Table 1. Factors affecting NGO–government relationships

National policyinfluence

Nature of relationshipwith government

Diversity offunding

Service delivery/advocacy motives

DSS, India Medium Unwritten relationshipplus formal contract

High Advocacy to supportservice delivery: localised

FIVDB, Bangladesh Weak Unwritten relationshipplus formal contract

Low Advocacy to supportservice delivery: localised

ITA, Pakistan Medium Mutual agreement High Service delivery tosupport advocacy:national and international

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government and NGO staff were interviewed (including in central and district offices), and visits were made toNGO programme sites. After an initial round of interviews and visits, NGO leaders were re-interviewed to fol-low-up on some of the key issues that had been identified. The selected cases were complemented by interviewswith other key NGOs involved in education and other basic services within each of the countries.

NGOs in the three countries, including those in our study, are often involved in direct provision of primary ‘non-formal’ education to ‘hard to reach’ children who would otherwise be out of school (including those living in urbanslums and in remote rural areas). In India and Pakistan, NGOs are also indirectly involved in provision by supportingimprovements in the quality of government schools through ‘school adoption’ or ‘school improvement’ programmes.The activities of NGO education providers are not viewed by government or NGOs as permanent arrangements but asways of filling gaps in government provision or of bringing new and improved practices into government services.Unlike private provision, they are not seen as being in competition with government provision but rather an alterna-tive, or complementary, to it—offering services where government is unable to provide (Rose, 2009).

Following a review of non-state education provision in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, three non-governmentservice providers were selected for in-depth study of their relationships with government. The organisations werechosen to reflect the opportunities and challenges facing established and reputable national non-government serviceproviders in each of the countries. The selected NGO in Bangladesh—Friends in Village Development (FIVDB)—has been involved in child education programmes for more than two decades, extending its provision over the yearswhile maintaining its base in Sylhet. The Indian NGO, Door Steps School (DSS), has also been active for morethan 20 years. Rather than broadening its scope, it has chosen to work in more depth within selected slum areasin Mumbai and neighbouring Pune. Idara-Taleem-o-Aagahi (ITA) in Pakistan was established more recently (in1998) but has quickly achieved a national and regional reputation over the past decade. Of the three NGOs, its ac-tivities are most widespread both in terms of its geographical coverage and range of activities (see Bano, this issue).

The nature of an organisation is shaped by its values, leadership and resources (see Figure 1 in Batley and Rose,this issue). Each of these factors influence strategies adopted by NGOs that affect their relationships with govern-ment. In terms of values, there are commonalities across the three cases as well as some differences. There is a con-sensus over purposes of public action—namely, a commitment to ensuring Education for All (EFA) of acceptablequality with particular concern for extending access to the poor, the vulnerable and the marginalised. The missionsof the NGOs included in the study see education as a human right and aim to play a role in ensuring that all childrencan realise this right. Common to non-government education providers more generally, they all aim to draw on in-novative and flexible approaches to fulfil their commitments.

Differences in values and approaches amongst the selected NGOs are partly evident with respect to the role thatthey see government as playing in education provision. DSS and FIVDB share the view that is common with manyother NGOs, namely that the government should play the main role but seek to contribute to this by supplementinggovernment provision to those it is unable to reach (see Rose, 2009). The aim of their service provision is to iden-tify sustainable solutions for their target populations with a relatively modest and localised advocacy agenda. Asone of the founders of DSS noted, ‘NGOs’ job is to demonstrate efficient strategies and methods and not to take


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over from the State’—rather she highlighted the importance of working within the state system. ITA has a broaderperspective, taking the view that different actors should play a role in education provision (including philanthro-pists, the private sector, donor agencies, NGOs and government) and is keen to work with any of these. Evenso, like DSS and FIVDB, the vision of the leader of ITA, is that

‘basic education is really a continuum where formal and non-formal are not opposed to each other but forma continuum. We feel both are government responsibility and our role should be to support the governmentrather than rival it’.

Although DSS and FIVDB primarily see themselves as service providers, ITA sets itself a much more ambitiousagenda with a stated ambition to influence public policy. For ITA’s leader, the NGO’s public action agenda doesnot have boundaries:

‘My future vision is to see ITA as a national and regional player within education at all levels. We will liketo see our work and research recognised as legitimate knowledge. We want to be key players in shaping theSouth Asia Education Forum. We want to see ourselves as key players in education reforms and implemen-tation. In the longer term, I want ITA to lead a new movement in education learning and theory. I wantto shift the knowledge generation for education to the third world given that much more exciting work ishappening at our end’.

Interactions between government and NGOs often grow out of personal, informal relationships between NGOleaders and government officials (for a review, see Teamey and Mcloughlin, 2009). The leadership styles of NGOshave an important bearing on how they relate to government. In all our three cases, the original founders haveremained the leaders of the NGOs and are a dominant force within their organisation. The values of each of theNGOs and the scale and scope of its activities are very strongly influenced by their leaders, all of whom are closelyinvolved in day-to-day activities. The leader of ITA previously worked with international agencies and as a gov-ernment advisor to the ministry of education, providing her with high-level contacts she can draw on and givingher an influence through the recognition of her technical expertise (Bano, this issue). The leaders of DSS andFIVDB had a lower profile when these NGOs were established. The founders of DSS previously worked at a col-lege of social work in Mumbai (a lecturer and her student), whereas FIVDB grew out of the commitment of a groupof volunteers working with the International Voluntary Services. In all cases, the commitment of the founders hasensured that the organisations have developed a strong reputation nationally for their activities.

Over the years, the NGOs have been able to extend and diversify their resource base because their reputation hasgrown. They are all registered nationally as not-for-profit organisations. Although precise information on financialflows to the different activities of NGOs is extremely difficult to gauge, all three NGOs receive funding from a va-riety of sources, including directly from aid donors, via national governments as well as from philanthropic andcorporate sources. There is variation, however, in the extent to which they have chosen to diversify their resourcebase. The ITA leadership has been very active in identifying additional resources, extending its activities to meetthe demands of different funders. FIVDB and DSS have been less proactive, drawing mainly on funders who aresupportive of their core activities, relying on the strong reputation that they have built up. These different strategieshave implications for their relationship with government as explored further in the following sections.

ASSERTIVENESS OF THE NATIONAL POLICY CONTEXT

The overarching concern of the education Millennium Development Goal and EFA agenda is to ensure all childrenget access to primary schooling of appropriate quality. The governments of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan are allcommitted to these goals. In principle, the goals could be achieved regardless of who is providing the education,but in practice most governments, international agencies and international NGOs view provision as a state respon-sibility on the grounds of education being a right and having public good elements. Many governments, includingthe three included in this study, have a constitutional commitment to providing universal (free and compulsory)access to primary schooling with state systems mainly taking responsibility for enrolling children. The view that


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government is responsible for provision is related to ideological and political motives (education’s role in formingnational identity), which could be argued to be stronger in the education sector than the others included in our re-search (health and sanitation; see Batley and Rose, this issue). Even so, in reality there is a multitude of actors in-volved in providing education to primary school-aged children to meet different forms of demand and to extendsupply where state provision is inadequate. Increasingly, governments are recognising the need to see non-state ed-ucation provision as complementary to their efforts as a means to achieve EFA goals (Rose, 2009).

In all three cases, the activities of the selected NGOs are designed to contribute towards government policies andobjectives. However, there is variation in the visibility of NGO activities in government education plans, althoughweak concern for the formal development of relationships with NGOs is apparent in all of them. In India andPakistan, education plans recognise that NGOs can help government in achieving its objectives. Pakistan’s policytowards private–public partnerships is the most forthright, although its recent white paper has been less articulateon the role of the non-state sector. To the extent that there has been some government recognition of non-stateproviders, this has primarily occurred as part of a donor-driven policy approach and focused mainly on for-profitprivate providers.

In India, formal recognition of non-state provision in education, including of NGOs, is apparent over severaldecades (Srivastava, 2010). Under the recent national education plan, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (Universalisationof Elementary Education Programme), NGO activities are recognised within the ‘Alternative and Innovative Edu-cation’ strand (Rose, 2009). In both India and Pakistan, national policy at least provides a framework for establish-ing a relationship with the state, although it does specify the parameters and does not have a direct influence over it.

By contrast, in Bangladesh, there is silence about NGO provision in recent education planning documents andthe 1990 Education Act. This is perhaps ironic given the renown of locally developed NGO education provision,including by BRAC that has a well-established non-formal education programme which has now been replicated inother countries. Although NGOs are not visible in policy documents in Bangladesh, there is a unit within theMinistry of Education for contracting NGOs, the Bureau for Non-Formal Education (BNFE). BNFE coordinatesprogrammes funded by agencies, which have to work through government (including the UNICEF-supported‘Hard-to-Reach’ programme, through which FIVDB has been contracted for part of its work).

Given the limited policy framework in each of the countries, government officials in our research largely deter-mined the terms of their engagement with NGOs outside formal arrangements. Those interviewed were generallyless interested in investing in building on-going relationships (or had less time to do so)—the initiative for this inthe three countries invariably originated from NGOs. The starting point for government officials was most oftenone of hostility and suspicion. They were antagonised by their perception that NGOs viewed government as notworking effectively, together with a view that NGOs are not honest or accountable to government or citizens,and that they try to wield too much power. The frustration of government officials arose in part from the lack ofcontrol that the ministry of education usually has over NGO activities. Government officials were also scepticalof the main motivations of NGOs, viewing them often as being driven more by their own ambitions than improvingthe situation in the country. In Pakistan, a senior government official noted:

‘Why does civil society not regulate crime and corruption rather than provide non-formal education?—Becausethere is no money in it! . . . NGO voices are becoming very strong because they are not run by poor people. Whydoes civil society want to take on service delivery? What are their ethics?’

As NGOs take on a larger role and potentially become a stronger threat, government concern to control the re-lationship can change. During our research in Mumbai, the municipal government began to take charge of NGOsworking within government schools that had previously been able to operate largely outside a formal framework. Inthis case, government officials raised concerns that there were too many NGOs working in an uncoordinated wayand that government was losing control over provision. They also felt that NGO activities could sometimes be dis-ruptive to schools and so needed to be controlled. In order for the municipal authority to exert greater authority overNGO activities, a Public Partnership Cell (PPC) was established in November 2006, under the guidance of the Dep-uty Municipal Commissioner (DMC). The announcement of the establishment of the PPC raised concerns amongstsome NGOs who saw it as an attempt by the municipal authority to clamp down on their activities. They were also


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concerned that the PPC was framed mainly in terms of seeing NGOs as a provider of resources rather than ac-knowledging their technical expertise and grassroots experience. They feared that the PPC could change the exist-ing cooperative informal NGO–state relationships by making communications more centralised, moving awayfrom more locally based relationships between community development officers and NGOs. They also saw dangersthat the process would become more bureaucratic and time consuming. Unlike some other established and reputa-ble NGOs in Mumbai, DSS chose not to be critical of the government’s initiative, as the Director noted:

‘I want the government to take up the ownership. It is not our job to run the schools. The current DMC said thatthe BMC [Bombay Municipal Corporation] should be responsible for the education of the children and I tend toagree with him’.

She was impressed with the BMC deputy commissioner’s vision and receptiveness to discussion with NGOs andbroadly welcomed his initiative. Like other NGOs who were more supportive of the PPC, she thought that the policydocument outlining responsibilities of both NGOs and government more clearly would make it easier for NGOs towork together with government. This attitude was in part a strategic response, aimed at maintaining a smooth rela-tionship with government to avoid undermining the positive relationship that the NGO had developed.

Despite the negative image that government officials often expressed towards NGOs in general, across the threecountries they recognised variability amongst NGOs, often noting that the NGOs selected for this study were dif-ferent to the general image and were more trustworthy. The status of these NGOs with government is apparent bythe ways in which they have been called upon to take part in discussions to shape more formal state–NGO relation-ships—in Bangladesh for the design of contractual arrangements for the BNFE’s Hard-to-Reach programme, in In-dia in the development of the PPC and in Pakistan more generally in advising on areas of policy.

FORMALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT–NGO RELATIONSHIP

Conceptual frameworks suggest that formal, written contracts can limit the room for manoeuvre of NGOs and sub-ordinate them to government interests, thus limiting their potential for public action (see Batley, this issue;Mcloughlin, this issue). Our research found that whether there were written or unwritten rules, cooperative relation-ships required considerable investment of time by the selected NGOs and that these NGOs adopted deliberate strat-egies to avoid tensions. More successful ‘mutual agreements’ as well as formal contractual relationships betweenNGOs and government tended to grow out of a history of informal relationships, with some flexibility in the roomto manoeuvre on both sides of the relationship. Governments were generally more willing to engage in a writtenagreement once the NGO had become sufficiently established. This meant that a degree of trust had already devel-oped. At the same time, NGOs were willing to engage in written agreements with government when they felt theycould shape the relationship rather than be subordinated to it. This was most likely to be successful where the NGOhad a diverse resource base, and so its formal contract with government was supplementary.

Unwritten relationships

The three NGO education providers included in our study all began by developing relationships with governmentoutside written contracts. Even without formal agreements, from their inception the NGOs have inevitably engagedwith government in a variety of ways—and made conscious decisions about how and when to do so. In all threecases, the NGO leaders have invested time in building cooperative forms of engagement with government officials,although they recognised that this could be time consuming and frustrating. However, they have been keen to avoidconfrontation to ensure their organisation developed a strong reputation in the long run. This is important where,for example, NGOs are dependent on government for access to resources such as textbooks and also want to ensureequivalency of qualifications so graduates from their centres could enter government schools.

Where there are no written rules, some NGOs prefer to keep a distance, primarily working in parallel with gov-ernment structures. Such parallel arrangements were particularly apparent in Bangladesh where most of FIVDB’s


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provision (like many other NGO education providers in the country) had been directly funded by aid donors inde-pendently of any formal contract with government. Even under such circumstances, NGOs engage informally withgovernment for a variety of reasons. One reason for FIVDB’s engagement was an attempt to ensure that graduatesfrom its schools could subsequently gain access to state secondary schools. As there was no system for NGOschools to gain formal approval, this proved difficult. Their students were not allowed to take the scholarship ex-amination for secondary schooling. The absence of written rules also led to confusion over whether the NGO couldaccess government textbooks for free. According to a government circular, these would be made available to NGOswho have ‘government approval’. Although FIVDB had negotiated access to the textbooks, there was some ner-vousness given the lack of clarity about the process, and so the possibility for the informal rules to change. BecauseFIVDB rarely engaged with government officials unless they needed to, as in these situations, the absence of anongoing relationship meant that they were unable to resolve uncertainties in the longer-term.

Similar to FIVDB, DSS largely chose to work separately from government. Even so, there are several ways inwhich DSS needed to engage with government and has performed so more proactively than FIVDB. DSS graduateswere allowed to sit for entrance examinations to secondary school and, on gaining the appropriate level, get admis-sion into government schools. To achieve this, the director of DSS deliberately invested time in identifying relevantgovernment officials by going to their offices (and staying until they were ready to see her, which was sometimes along wait) and developing their trust. Although DSS successfully manoeuvred a cooperative relationship with gov-ernment, the leaders admitted that they could face problems at times, for example, where government schoolteachers opposed NGO interventions that they felt as an unnecessary interference.

These examples suggest that even where NGOs and government do not have a formal contractual relationship,there are various ways in which they interact, particularly for the NGO to access government resources (textbooks,scholarship examinations, etc.). In these circumstances, the lack of written rules can lead to government officialsexerting control over the NGO. A hierarchical relationship is therefore not dependent on formal contracts. The suc-cess of the NGOs in negotiating the relationship depends on their closeness to government. In the case of FIVDB, itwould seem that while the NGO had developed a cooperative relationship with government through the recognitionof the quality of their provision, the NGO’s desire to keep a distance meant that the government was able to play amore dominant role.

Formalising informal relationships—‘mutual’ agreements

For ITA, investing time in the relationship is key to the organisation’s mission of influencing government policy.Although the NGO is the only one of the three selected that does not receive any funding directly from government,over time it has chosen to draw up written guidelines for the relationship to clarify roles and responsibilities on bothsides. The ‘mutual agreements’ aim to support complementary forms of provision within a shared vision (in thiscase, of improving the quality of education). The NGO leader was clear about her motives for drawing up theseagreements:

‘I wanted the understanding to be formal. [Another NGO] has many problems in its work because it did nothave formal relationship. Also we had to have formal agreement especially because we are giving technicalsupport as a partner. In our case, we have to enter the government schools and we have to work throughthe teachers who are government employees so we simply cannot start the work without formal permissionfrom the government. Thus, the MOU [memorandum of understanding] is very important for us. This wayboth us and they have some pressure for accountability’.

The process of drawing up the initial MOU was not entirely straightforward and took time—up to 6 months be-fore the first one was finalised. In part, this was due to different perceptions of the government and the NGO. Thegovernment saw ITA’s role primarily as giving money to support classroom construction, whereas the NGO wasmore concerned with providing professional support. At first there was also some reluctance on the part of govern-ment officials to sign written agreements as they were unsure of the legal implications. A compromise was reachedwith the MOUs expressing expectations on the part of government as being ‘provisional’, without specifying whenor how the MOU would hold them to account. Once government officials became more familiar with the


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documents, the process was no longer as time consuming. ITA considered that it had helped to build the capacity ofdistrict government in drawing up MOUs to support their relationships with other NGOs. The advantages for bothsides were noted by one district official—for ITA, the investment meant that the NGO had the government on itsside while government officials benefit in terms of training while not having to make any financial commitment.

ITA’s development of loose, written agreements has helped to address some of the uncertainties that FIVDBfaced in its engagement with government. ITA’s approach has been part of a deliberate strategy of aiming to influ-ence government, so it is not to say that either FIVDB or ITA have achieved greater success. Rather, their motiveshave led to different ways of working with government.

Formal contracts

Established NGOs have different strategies and motivations for entering into formal contracts with government. Inthe cases studied here, the NGOs had a choice of whether to do so and would only choose this if the governmentprogramme was in line with their organisation’s objectives. Although most of the activities of the three NGOs werebeing undertaken outside formal contracts with government, DSS and FIVDB had some experience of entering intothese relationships. In both cases, the NGOs were not entirely dependent on government contracts for their funding(see below), which meant that they had some control over the terms of engagement. However, FIVDB’s room formanoeuvre was more constrained given its less diverse resource base and more distant (if generally cooperative)relationship. It was a ‘reluctant partner’ with its reported motivation for involvement in government contracts beinga means to ensure the organisation did not put all its eggs into one basket to secure employment for its staff, par-ticularly given uncertainty about the future of its main source of donor funding at the time. DSS, by contrast, choseto work directly with the government contracts in part to give it closer links with officials, in ways that could ben-efit its own service delivery more generally.

In both cases, the contracts were for NGO provision of non-formal education and primarily based on stipulationsof inputs (salaries of staff, size of classrooms, etc.) rather than outputs. Although this was for a good reason, giventhe difficulties of measuring education outputs, it led to inflexibility in the form of the provision that NGOs couldprovide, which was at odds with their vision for developing innovative approaches. This created some tensions,with the NGOs making strategic decisions over how to respond. Confrontation could not always be avoided, butconflict over specific issues was resolved in ways that allowed a continuation of the existing collaborative relation-ship in their favour.

Although most of FIVDB’s activities were undertaken in parallel with government, in recent years it chose totake part in a government programme (funded by UNICEF) requiring a formal contract. FIVDB participated alongwith other established and reputable NGOs in the design of the programme. Involvement in the programme was putout to tender, and FIVDB was successful in its bid, along with several other NGOs. From the outset staff saw someproblems with the contract, most notably the salary of supervisors and the amount that could be spent on rent forcentres that were considered too low. The NGO knew that there was no room for negotiation over this and hencesigned the contract as it was. Although the contract was very rigid, FIVDB tried to make adaptations through im-plementation and sought verbal agreement from UNICEF and project officials to do so. For example, to increasethe salary of supervisors, it tried to reduce the amount spent on rent partly by using premises in a two-shift system.Government officials were not supportive of this, referring them to the contract. They were able to assert controlover the NGO by withholding the release of money for the centres. As such, the written document in this caseserved as a means to enforce the terms of the contract. FIVDB was very keen to resolve the difficulties. AlthoughFIVDB had not already established a close working relationship with the government previously, government offi-cials recognised the wider reputation of FIVDB, and the NGO was keen not to damage the investments it had madeoutside the formal contract. FIVDB carefully considered its options and strategies to pursue and, after some initialtension, decided to follow the path that would cause least antagonism by accepting government demands.

In India, DSS entered into formal contracts with government by applying for funding to run non-formal educa-tion centres under the government’s Mahatma Phule programme. Similar to Bangladesh, the contract defined thenature of centres to be opened and the funding norms and rules to be followed by the NGO. The first part of the


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contractual agreement indicated the criteria for locating the centres, the minimum and maximum size of the centre,the prescribed hours of teaching per day and the number days per month to be allocated for classes and counsellingas well as the profile of the volunteer to be hired for the centre. The payment of the volunteer’s honorarium wouldbe made on the basis of the number of students per centre, a cumbersome clause as the number of students fluctu-ates in the slums centres. As with Bangladesh, stipulations about paying staff were again an area of tension betweenthe NGO and government. DSS was able to overcome the low funding because it could supplement teacher payfrom other its sources.

Another set of clauses in the contract concerned the management of funds. Although separate accounts for theproject were to be maintained, DSS had to submit regular statements for money to be released. The responsibilitiesof the BMC was defined as the regular release of funds and the stopping the funding arrangements in case of abreach of contract. DSS on the other hand was expected to run the centres as specified and to complete the curric-ulum in the stipulated time of 2 years. DSS was also expected to ‘. . .receive and follow the instructions/orders sug-gestions given by the supervisory staff of Education Department and give information about the progress of theeducational program from time to time’. DSS found it difficult to keep pace with the procedural and reportingrequirements. The stated reason that DSS chose to access State funds despite its unattractiveness was the strongconviction that it is the right of the NGOs and the children for whom they work to access available governmentfunds. Although it had to work within the government remit set by the contract, it was not dependent on govern-ment for funding and so had some flexibility in how it responded.

More broadly, despite the weak formal recognition of NGO activities in government plans, strong views wereexpressed by some education NGO stakeholders across the three countries of a tendency by governments increas-ingly to favour more formalised relationships. NGOs anticipated a shift towards donor funding being channelledvia governments rather than directly provided to NGOs, as donors seek to fulfil Paris Declaration pledges of coor-dination and country ownership. NGOs expected such arrangements to be accompanied by more hierarchical writ-ten agreements or contracts, placing governments more firmly in the driving seat. This intensified NGO awarenessand interest in trying to work more closely with government officials. ITA’s leader saw that these arrangementscould become a growing trend:

We must remember that now government has the largest amount of funds. Within the shift toward directbudgetary support, the big donors are increasingly channelling more funds through the government. Underthis system the NGOs are required to get the funds through the state rather than getting them directly fromthe donor agencies. So, the state is going to have increasingly large amounts of development funds at its dis-posal. Also, the government’s own revenues are increasing through introduction of more extensive taxationsystem. So, it is foolish not to engage with the government.

These concerns of NGOs do not yet seem to have been realised in the education sector, however, with most aiddonors continuing to favour direct funding to NGOs, while governments themselves are generally unwilling tocommit their own resources to other providers.

DIVERSITY OF FUNDING

The vision of the NGOs, the government policy environment and the formality of relationships all shape and areshaped by the extent and diversity of funding that NGOs are able to receive. The research found that establishedand reputable NGOs have options about their sources of funding. This choice meant that they were not powerlessin their relationships with government, regardless of whether they entered into formal contracts. Rather, they wereable to pursue strategies for funding that enabled them to fulfil commitment to their own goals, including with re-spect to their desired balance between service delivery and advocacy.

There were variations in the extent to which the NGOs made efforts to diversify their funding base. Both ITAand DSS chose to draw on a range of resources—including from philanthropy, corporate social responsibility andinternational agencies. The latter was particularly important for ITA, which was involved in large USAID pro-grammes, as well as ones associated with child labour for the US Department of Labor. However, international


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agency funding was insignificant for DSS, which drew more on locally based funding resources as well as acces-sing some government funds. The aspects of FIVDB’s education work addressed in this study were mainly depen-dent on the UK Department of International Development (DFID), although, as discussed earlier, more recently theNGO has also taken on government contracts (drawing on UNICEF funding). An important reason for this diver-sification was the realisation that DFID funding might not be sustained, hence the need for alternative sources toensure the continuation of its education programme (with DFID actively encouraging FIVDB to develop a strategicplan as a means of identifying new funding sources).

In general, for DSS and FIVDB, the NGOs’ service delivery vision influenced from which sources it chose toseek funding, rather than them accepting funds from a variety of sources regardless of the activities in which theywould be expected to engage. By contrast, for ITA, the acceptance of diverse funding sources was associated withits overall agenda of influencing government policy. As such, ITA engaged in diverse activities ranging fromstrengthening government provision in school improvement programmes to supporting a major voucher schemeenabling the expansion of private schooling, whereas the activities of the two other NGOs remained focused onextending education provision to marginalised groups.

In general, the research identified three funding patterns associated with the NGOs’ strategies. The first strategyof avoiding dependence on any one funding source, pursued by ITA, was as a means to retain capacity to shaperelationships with the aim of having a broader advocacy influence. Perhaps paradoxically, the Pakistan educationNGO was the only one of the three that did not receive funding directly from government but probably engagedmost closely with government officials. The NGO’s director successfully established herself in the role of knowl-edge broker between government and external agencies (see Bano, this issue). Applying for funding from aid agen-cies enabled her to pursue this role effectively. More broadly, through her previous work with these agencies, she isfamiliar with the idea and language of ‘partnership’ and with new approaches to public management. In addition,thanks to her high level of technical expertise, she has been able to explain and ‘sell’ new approaches to collabo-ration, not only to support the NGO’s own provision. Engagement with corporate social responsibility nationallywas also part of this broader strategy. She noted that

‘We are increasingly engaging with them [the corporate sector] to mobilise funds. We must remember thatin our culture there is a strong sense of social responsibility where those who have resources feel the pres-sure to share some of their wealth with the bigger community for individual satisfaction as well as socialstatus. Also, with the changing corporate rules under WTO [World Trade Organisation], corporation andmedium scale businesses have to invest in social responsibility. Even here we feel that the corporate sectoris more willing to come forward if the services are geared towards improving the state education system.’

The second strategy was avoiding dependence on any one source (whether government, donor or other source)in ways that enabled them to collaborate with government as a means to supporting their own provision. This strat-egy was most apparent in the case of the Indian education NGO. Its ability to exploit funding from independent(philanthropic) sources enabled it to decide whether and for what purpose to acquire government resources directlythrough the government’s ‘Alternative and Innovative Education’ programme. Given its successful record inproviding education to marginalised groups of children, the NGO did not face problems in getting funds for itswork—rather, given its reputation, funders (including international agencies) would seek them out. As such, fun-ders become involved in supporting DSS’s vision rather than trying to influence it. In contrast to ITA, DSS focusedits efforts more on accessing local sources of funding, in keeping with its strategy of having a more in-depth, localinfluence with limited concern for strengthening its own profile. It showed less interest in accessing internationalfunds or having an influence on the international agenda. It was very clear that its engagement with governmentshould not compromise its activities.

Although DSS did not actively engage in collective forms of advocacy (e.g. in discussions over the developmentof the PPC), it did use its connections with government officials to strengthen its own work. This sometimes hadwider implications for improving service delivery to disadvantaged groups, even if this was not necessarily the de-liberate aim. An example is its influence in persuading government officials to abolish the mandatory requirementof a birth certificate to allow its graduates to gain access to municipal schools. It not only achieved this for its own


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304 P. ROSE

students but also initiated a broader process that led to a wider policy change. Another example of its successfulnegotiations was the agreement that the municipal corporation would conduct examinations in mathematics, Hindiand general knowledge and issue certificates to graduates from the NGO centres. This was important in givingcredibility to the programme as well as in offering children the opportunity to continue with their education inthe formal school system or to access employment opportunities. Again, its success had implications for NGOsmore broadly.

The third strategy that was observed was accepting dependence on fewer sources of funding, which meantadapting the NGO to funders’ requirements. In such cases, the NGO was in a weaker position to influence publicpolicy which, in any case, was not part of their ambition. This was most apparent for the education NGO inBangladesh. FIVDB had been particularly dependent on one aid donor. The relationship with the donor had beenrelatively relaxed, enabling the NGO to operate at a distance from government. However, as greater accountabilitywas being demanded for aid delivery by the donor’s own government, the conditions under which the NGO couldreceive funding were being tightened. One of the conditions was that the NGO should work more closely with gov-ernment, given the ultimate aim of the donor was to strengthen government’s own programmes. This was challeng-ing for the NGO, in part raising questions within the organisation about whether it saw this as its role because, overthe two decades of its existence, it had focused on its own direct service provision largely outside the scope of gov-ernment influence.

With the danger of losing funding from its predominant source, the NGO in Bangladesh had to diversify to otheravailable sources. Paradoxically, the key alternative source most immediately available was funding through a gov-ernment programme that involved the direct contracting of NGOs (see previous sections). Although a certainamount of trust had been built, the relationship was not as close as the other two NGOs, and there was a risk ofcompromising the NGO’s independence. However, given its resource dependence, it did not have much choice.The NGO has subsequently been able to substitute direct funding from one donor source by another (the Nether-lands). This has enabled it to retreat to its original vision focusing on service delivery in parallel with state provi-sion, with plans to extend its number of schools significantly.

CONCLUSIONS

The research identified that the basic strategies of all the non-government education providers studied were ulti-mately to avoid confrontation with government and, to varying degrees, to invest time in developing informal rela-tionships to build trust. They made strategic choices about how closely to engage with government, depending onwhether service delivery is a means to the end of broader policy advocacy (as in the case of ITA) or whether ad-vocacy is a means to improve their own service delivery (as in the cases of DSS and FIVDB). In addition, theywere in a stronger position to make these choices where they had a broader base of funding sources. Formal, writ-ten contracts could affect the nature of their interaction but, depending on the extent to which the NGO was relianton government funding secured through these contracts, they did not necessarily result in a subordinatedrelationship.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The article draws on working papers and publications written by the research team, which are available at http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/schools/government-society/departments/international-development/research/projects/service-providers.aspx. The research was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council under the Non-Governmental Public Action Programme (Project Number RES-155-25-0045).

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STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGEMENT: GOVERNMENT AND NATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENT EDUCATION PROVIDERS IN SOUTH ASIA