Strategic Snapshot 5

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Syria: a responsibility to protect?The just case versus the valid case

By Joachim A. Koops

In current debates on the applicability and implementation of the principle of the Re-

sponsibility to Protect, there is frequently a dividing line between those arguing that

there is a moral duty to intervene and protect and those warning about the feasibilityof an intervention. Indeed, when deliberating and deciding on an external intervention,

criteria ofjustness protecting civilians from death and serious harm inflicted by their

own government and validity feasibility in terms of internal conditions, external

conditions, regional consequences and balance of interests need to be taken into ac-

count in equal shares. For the European Union, the core challenge at present in Syria is

not only the lack of knowledge about the conditions on the ground and, externally, a

deadlocked Security Council, but also the more fundamental weaknesses of its military

capacities and its Common Security and Defence Policy in general.

Group on Grand Strategy | Strategic Snapshot No. 5 | 12th March 2012 1

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Strategic Snapshot No. 5 12th March 2012


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Just ca(u)se versus valid case

Even if causes for interventions may be equally just in specific cases (e.g. the moral re-

sponsibility to protect civilians in Syria is comparable to the responsibility of protecting

civilians in Libya arguably generating equally just causes for intervention) it is un-avoidable that specific internal, externaland regionalconditions and configurations

fundamentally affect the likely success and overall justification of an intervention. A

validcase for intervention thus requires additional context-driven conditions other

than ajust cause.A valid case for military intervention (as the most extreme measure of

last resort under the responsibility to protect) would thus presuppose the following.

Favourable internal conditions:

Conditions inside the target country where an intervention is planned to take placemust include first of all internal support. A clearly identifiable group inside the country

actually needs to call for an external intervention. This might be an obvious point, but it

also needs to be sufficiently clear who this group is and how it relates to other, compet-

ing factions of society. Since in almost every case an intervention changes power con-

figurations and balances between different sections of society, interventions need to be

informed by a basic knowledge of the different sections of society in the target country

in the first place. Otherwise, interveners risk causing more harm than good.

Furthermore, are internal conditions favourable enough to enable the intervening ac-

tors to easily assume their responsibility to rebuild?1In other words, does an interven-

tion promise long-term success by providing conditions for sustainable peace-building

schemes across various sections of society (the current situation in Libya highlights the

relative ease of the responsibility to protect through the Atlantic Alliances swift inter-

vention on the one hand, but the protracted difficulties of external influence in long-

term peace-building). Does an intervention risk the escalation of violence? Might it ac-

celerate acts of killing? In situations that are difficult to assess, alternative options short

of full-scale military action need to be considered (e.g., a no-fly zone, safe havens, rein-forcement of humanitarian aid or the supply of medical equipment).

Favourable external conditions: There are only a handful of countries at present

that are both actuallywilling and capable to intervene militarily in other countries.

1. Political will and national interest: In order to facilitate a valid case for in-

tervention, the external intervening parties need to be politically willing to

launch an operation. Political will is rarely disassociated from core national in-

terests (arguably the only post-cold war intervention to date that was not based



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on the promotion of a clear national interest was the United States intervention

in Somalia in 1992). Therefore, it is clear that differing national interests need to

converge (particularly within the United Nations Security Council but also

among regional coalitions) for a joint operation in another country.

2. Robust rapid reaction capacities: Swift and decisive military action re-quires technical and military capacities that are increasingly rare. The case of

Libya highlighted the continued reliance of European countries on the United

States armed forces. At the level of the United Nations, rapid reaction capabili-

ties no longer exist. The most far-reaching attempt at creating capacities close to

a United Nations Army was the Standby High-Readiness Brigade for United

Nations Operations founded in the wake of the massacres in Rwanda and Sre-

brenica in 1996. By 2009, it had conducted six United Nations operations on

the African continent (Ivory Coast, twice in Sudan, Liberia, Eritrea/Ethiopiaand Chad) and contributed to the build-up of the African Standby Force. Out of

its twenty-three members and observers, sixteen were European Union Mem-

ber States. In 2009, however, the United Nations brigade was closed down

due to, amongst other factors shifting interests and priorities of the European

Unions Member States.2

One core shift was the move from United Nations-backed initiatives to Atlantic

Alliance- and European Union-led ones, such as most notably the Atlantic

Alliances Response Force and the European Unions Battlegroups. The fact that

the Battlegroups have so far not even once been deployed aggravates the prob-

lematic decisions taken by the European Union (such as the Nordic countries)

to withdraw from the United Nations Brigade. As an alternative follow-up

scheme, the international coalition for promoting a United Nations Emergency

Peace Service seeks to provide in time a valuable tool for operationalising the

Responsibility to Protect in terms of rapid reaction capacities that unite both ci-

vilian and military means.3 Yet, Europeans should not stand idle by. It is essen-

tial to revise the European Unions Battlegroups scheme it would be too costlyto lose this tool, not only for the European Unions own credibility as a security

actor, but also for global security governance as a whole. Close co-ordination be-

tween the European Union and the United Nations (including the envisaged

Peace Service) would be desirable too.

Favourable regional conditions: Finally, regional conditions clearly matter for a

valid case of intervention. The support of regional organisations neighbouring the tar-

get country (such as the Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council and African Union in



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the case of Libya and Syria) is important for building legitimacy and capabilities for in-

tervention, but increase the complexity of coalitions and diverging national interests. In

the case of Libya, for example, the exact motivations and role played by Qatar are still

unclear. Regional contexts also matter in terms of alliances, neighbouring countries in-

terests and potentially uncontrollable chain reactions that might turn local and national

acts of atrocities into a regional conflict. Careful deliberations of the likely regional con-

sequences are part and parcel of building a valid case for intervention.

Just and valid case: a role for the European Union?

In case of large-scale atrocities and crimes against innocent civilians, asking for addi-

tional conditions and requirements in order to build up a valid case for interventionsoften seems inhumane and too reminiscent ofRealpolitik. However, we should not for-

get that the original formulation of the Responsibility to Protect included further re-

quirements than just a just cause. The overall chances for success and proportionality

of means are firmly embedded elements in the Responsibility to Protects operationali-

sation. Furthermore, in the United Nations World Summit Outcome Document of

2005 all one hundred and ninety three states reaffirmed the responsibility to protect,

but stressed that its implementation needs to be carefully advanced on a case-by-case

basis and this depends both on making a just and feasible case for intervention.4

Thatsaid, however, in situations today like in Syria, measures short of military intervention

should be pursued with vigour. The European Union has a wide range of instruments at

its disposal for alleviating suffering of the civilian population. The reinforcement of

humanitarian aid and the possibility of a humanitarian corridor and safe havens

should not be seen as an off-limit option. Unfortunately, as the situation stands at the

moment, the European Union does not have the will nor the right multilateral incen-

tives in place to take action beyond these options even in the case of a more unified

position of the Security Council. In the long-run, however, serious questions need to be

asked about the future and purpose of the European Unions Common Security and De-

fence Policy. If it is not for operations to alleviate human suffering, such as in the Lib-

yan case, whats the purpose of it beyond merely being a tool of clever public diplomacy

during the Solana Decade?

Joachim A. Koops is Director of the Global Governance Institute and Assis-

tant Professor of Political Science, Vesalius College, Free University of Brussels.

http://www.globalgovernance.eu/http://www.globalgovernance.eu/http://www.globalgovernance.eu/


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Notes


1 It is often overlooked that the original formulation of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine by the In-

ternational Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty placed equal emphasis on the post-

intervention obligation of the responsibility to rebuild see the Responsibility to Protect Report ofthe International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, Chapter 5.

2 For a more in-depth analysis of the Standby High-Readiness Brigade and its relationship with the

European Unions Battlegroups, see: Joachim A. Koops, The European Union as an Integrative

Power? Assessing the EUs Effective Multilateralism towards NATO and the United Nations (Brussels:

Free University of Brussels Press, 2011), pp. 393-428 and Joachim A. Koops, Effective Inter-

organisationalism? Lessons Learned from SHIRBRIG, inStudia Diplomatica, Vol. 62, No. 3, October

2009, pp. 81-90.

3 For more information on United Nations Emergency Peace Service, see the website of the Global Ac-

tion to Prevent War and Conflict.

4 See the United Nations General Assemblys 2005World Summit Outcome, para 139.

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eign, security and military policies for the European Union in the twenty-first century.

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contemporary strategic issues in the European Union, while offering new insights and ways for dealing with them.
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