Strategic Pragmatism_Book Review

8/2/2019 Strategic Pragmatism_Book Review

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A Review

Of the Book

Strategic Pragmatism

By Edgar H Schein

Done under the Aegis of

Sumedhas IAOD Program

By

Milind Agnihotri([email protected])

April 2011

Pune, India
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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1.0IntroductionA few years back I came across an illustrated story. Heres how it went..

A group of scientists placed 5 monkeys in a cage and in the middle, a ladder with bananas

on the top. Every time a monkey went up the ladder, the scientists soaked the rest of themonkeys with cold water. After a while, every time a monkey went up the ladder, the

others beat up the one on the ladder. After some time, no monkey dared to go up the

ladder regardless of the temptation.

Scientists then decided to substitute one of the monkeys. The first thing this new monkey

did was to go up the ladder. Immediately the other monkeys beat him up. After severalbeatings, the new member learned not to climb the ladder even though never knew why.

A second monkey was substituted and the same occurred. The first monkey participated

in the beating of the second monkey. A third monkey was changed and the same was

repeated (beating). The fourth was substituted and the beating was repeated and finally

the fifth monkey was replaced.

What was left was a group of 5 monkeys that even though never received a cold shower,continued to beat up any monkey who attempted to climb the ladder.

If it was possible to ask the monkeys why they would beat up all those who attempted togo up the ladder, I bet you the answer would be.

I dont know thats how things are done around here!

UNQUOTE.

In my work with organizations both, when I worked in one and now that I am

consulting with them, I have often felt and heard this statement

I dont know thats how things are done around here!

This statement, expressed in its various forms, introduced me to the concept of Culturein an organization context and left me intrigued with the subject. What is organization

culture? What influences its creation? What are its implications for the present and

future state of the organization? What are the implications for the people working there?

A series of such questions led to me to the path of studying the phenomena of

Organization Culture. It was and probably still is a must engage concept for ODpractitioners. Diagnosing and changing organization culture is a practice area I have often

read on the profiles of many successful OD practitioners/consultants. Its a high-end

practice area for me, I have often heard OD practitioners saying.


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Filled with curiosity, about two years back, I started researching the topic. In this pursuit,

I came across three very interesting books:

1. Organization Culture and Leadership by Edgar Schein2. Strategic Pragmatism by Edgar Schein and3.

Diagnosing and Changing Organization Culture by Kim S. Cameron & Robert E.Quinn

I soon realized that many, who tread this path before, started with Scheins work on thesubject. That comforted me a little bit, as I found a personal assurance in being a part of

the (OD) herd, at least in my first steps of exploration that would eventually lead me in

many directions.

There was another story unfolding for me in parallel.

In January 2010, I enrolled into an Internship Program on Organization Development, an

offering by Sumedhas, the Academy for Human Context, and an institution dedicated tofostering of human processes. My main aim of joining the internship program was to

connect to the theoretical knowledge and frameworks on the subject of organization

and its development as defined and practiced in the field of OD as well as gather

personal insights from a practice field that the program offered. As I write this report, I

have entered into the next phase of the internship program, in which, amongst other

criterias, I am expected to do a book review exercise as per the programs design.

Given the connect between (a) my desire to understand the organization culture

phenomena and (b) the stated criteria of book review in my Sumedhas OD Internship, Ihave chosen to do a review of the bookStrategic Pragmatismby Edgar Schein.

Why Strategic Pragmatism?

In this book I found a right mix ofthe theoretical frameworks developed by Schein to

understand organization culture, as well as an analysis of the internal structure and

functioning of a real life organization from a culture standpoint.

The primary objective of this book review exercise that I have undertaken is to help me

as an OD practitioner, understand the phenomena of Organization Culture, and its

various manifestations in the life of an organization. Scheins seminal work in this areaboth in terms of his theoretical constructs drawn from his decades of experience in social

psychology, and his project work to diagnose and document the culture at Singapores

EDB, has been an important learning milestone for me. In this report I will primarilyreview and relate my understanding of what Schein has presented in his book, StrategicPragmatism, while also taking help from other sources which I shall quote specifically.

The narrative will largely be in the first person and will include, dispersed throughout this

report my thoughts, reflections, dilemmas, inner dialogues and the resultant meaning

making around Organization Culture and my experiences with this project.
http://www.sumedhas.org/http://www.sumedhas.org/http://www.sumedhas.org/


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2.0About Strategic PragmatismFollowing is an extract from the inside front-and-back cover of the book, providing a

brief overview about it. The book was published by MIT Press in 1997 and is based on

the work carried out by Schein under an invitation from Singapores EDB.

Strategic Pragmatism:The Culture of Singapores Economic Development Board

Per capita income in Singapore has gone from $500 to more than $20,000 ina little over twenty five years. Edgar Schein, a social psychologist with a longand celebrated research interest in organizational studies, examines thecultural history of the key institution that spawned this economic miracle.

Through interviews and full access to Singapores Economic DevelopmentBoard (EDB), Schein shows how economic development was successfullypromoted. He delves into the individual relationships and the overallstructure that contributed to EDBs effectiveness in propelling Singapore,one of Asias little dragons, into the modern era. In his foreword, LesterThurow, locates Scheins organizational and case-specific account within alarger economic and comparative framework.

Over a period of two years Schein studied how the EDB was created, thekind of leadership it provided, the management structure it used, and how itinfluenced other organizations within the Singapore government. Schein satin on EDB meetings and extensively interviewed current and formermembers of the board, Singapores leaders who created the organization, andbusiness people who have dealt with the EDB. His book intertwines theperspectives of the boards members and its investor clients in an analysisthat uses both organization and cross-cultural study.

Although there are currently studies of comparable Japanese and Koreanorganizations, this is the first detailed analysis of the internal structure andfunctioning of the economic development body of Singapore, a key player inthe Asian and world markets.

The MIT Press

Cambridge, Massachusetts1997


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3.0Organization CultureMy Early UnderstandingsI remember in my Class VIII, our Science teacher gave us a mantra W2HW2! It standsfor 5 basic questions that will help you, she said then, in pursuit of knowledge. Never

forget to askWhat, Why, How, When & Where, and you shall know things, her words

of wisdom, which are deeply etched in my conscience.

I took recourse to these very basic questions in my first steps to understand Organization

Culture and ended up writing a few questions,

1. What is organization culture?2. Why does it exist?3. What purpose does it serve?4. How does it get created?5. What are the implications of its presence in an organization context?6. When does it manifest?7.

Where does it show up in the everyday lives of an organization?8. How can it be diagnosed?

9. Why would anyone want to diagnose it?10.And more ..

It was all interplay of the 5 words starting with 2 alphabets W & H!

To top it, was the gospel truth that I have experienced in and with organizations as a part

of my work lifeIdont know,thats how things are done around here!

I found my initial solace in Edgar Scheins bookOrganization Culture and Leadership,

in which he provides the following generic definition ofCulture,

The culture of a group can be defined as a pattern of shared basic assumptions that waslearned by the group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal

integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be

taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those

problems.

Thats quite a complex definition, were my first words to myself when I first read it. Tounderstand this sentence, I took help of another mantra taught by our Professor in

Taxation & Law during my management education, who simplified a monster called The

Indian Contracts Act, 1872. He told us first not fear the long sentences and break it word-

by-word, relate, re-relate each word with the other and create a meaning. Unknowingly,one then got introduced to the technique of combining deductive and inductive logic for

right understanding.

But Schein also gave a frame having multiple categories through which I could

comprehend the Culture phenomena. This would include,


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1. Observed behavioral regularities when people interact: the language they use, thecustoms and traditions that evolve, and the rituals they employ in a wide varietyof situations.

2. Group norms: the implicit standards and values that evolve in working groups.3. Espoused values: the articulated, publicly announced principles and values that

the group claims to be trying to achieve.4. Formal philosophy: the broad policies and ideological principles that guide agroups actions towards its stakeholders.

5. Rules of the game: the implicit, unwritten rules for getting along in theorganization, the ropes a newcomer must learn.

6. Climate: the feeling that is conveyed in a group by the way in which members ofthe organization interact with each other, with customers or other outsiders.

7. Embedded skills: the special competencies displayed by the group members inaccomplishing certain tasks.

8. Habits of thinking, mental models, and linguistic paradigms: the shared cognitiveframes that guide the perceptions, thoughts, and language used by the members of

a group.9. Shared meanings: the emergent understandings created by the group members asthey interact with each other.

10. Root metaphors or integrating symbols: the ways in which groups evolve tocharacterize themselves, which may or may not be appreciated consciously but

become embodied in buildings, office layouts, and other material artifacts of thegroup.

11.Formal ritual and celebrations: the way in which a group celebrates key eventsthat reflect important values or important passages by members, such as

completion of important projects or milestones.

Whilst, cognitively I could understand the frame with the above category definitions, I

got its real meaning when I realized the presence of all of the above in the various

narratives on Singapores EDB in Strategic Pragmatism, which I shall explore in thisreview.

Furthermore, in a limited manner, I am now able to indulge in sense making of some ofmy client organizations through these lenses. Needless to mention, there is always an Ahafeeling, though as a fleeting experience, every time I am able to decipher the implicit

phenomena of culture when I see through these lenses.

Let me now draw a few references from Kim S. Cameron & Robert E. Quinns book

Diagnosing and Changing Organization Culture, which I referred to earlier. Unlike

Schein, who specifically focused on group behavior when defining culture, Cameron &Quinn focus more on such behaviors as seen in an organization change context.

Cameron & Quinn say, and I quote, the reason organization culture was ignored as an

important factor in accounting for organizational performance is that it encompasses the

taken-for-granted values, underlying assumptions, expectations, collective memories, and

definitions present in an organization. It represents how things are around here. It


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reflects the prevailing ideology that people carry in-their-heads. It conveys a sense of

identity to employees, provide unwritten and often unspoken guidelines for how to get

along in the organization, and it enhances the stability of the social system that they

experience.

I noticed that Cameron & Quinns basic definition of culture does not deviate much fromScheins constructs.

However, in Cameron & Quinns work, I found a greater emphasis on culture change

than merely diagnosing current culture. In fact, they offer a well defined frameworkwhich they have called the Competing Values Framework

TM(CVF). This framework is

widely used in the industry, to diagnose and change an organizations culture to ensure itscontinued effectiveness to keep pace with the degree and rapidity of change in the

external environment. In their work, essentially Cameron & Quinn try to answer the

question What makes organizations effective? a question I find even Schein alluding to

in his work.

The basic CVF framework consists of two dimensionsone drawn vertically and the

other drawn horizontallyresulting in a two-by-two figure with four quadrants. Thevertical axis looks at an organization from the aspect of flexibility & adaptability v/s

stability & control; whereas the horizontal axis sees it from a lens of efficient internal

processes v/s competitive external positioning.

When studying the effectiveness of organizations more than two decades ago (Cameron

& Quinn say) it was noticed that some organizations were effective if they demonstrated

flexibility and adaptability, but other organizations were effective if they demonstrated

stability and control. Similarly, it was discovered that some organizations were effective

if they maintained efficient internal processes whereas others were effective if they

maintained competitive external positioning relative to customers and clients. These

differences represent the different ends of two dimensions, and these dimensionsconstitute the rudiments of the CVF. Hence the name competing values!

In one of my change management consulting assignments I successfully used the CVFto help a client group to articulate the as-is and the aspired-to- be aspects of theirgroups effectiveness and helped them define an action agenda to achieve their vision.

The exercise did create the desired results for my client and did bring into focus the roleof the groups culture in their operational effectiveness. The group got an access to a

language that could help them understand the tacit rules of behavior that they were

employing to create their everyday realities.

So, where does all this leave me with my early understandings of the meanings of

Organization Culture?


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I think I am left with three specific questions at this stage:

1. Can culture which is a subjective phenomenon be understood largely throughsubjective frames as given by Schein? Or

2. Can it also be understood through objective/instrument based frames likes theCVF?3. What gets focused on and what gets edited out when one uses these subjective orobjective frames and what are the corresponding implications?

The basic idea I now have ofCulture, as explained by Schein and Cameron & Quinn, has

helped me with a better appreciation of how creating and sustaining (explicitly and

tacitly) a suitable culture, enabled the growth and evolution of Singapores EDB and theimmense contribution it made in transforming Singapore from a third world country to a

first world in just over 30 years!

I shall explore this further with reference to Scheins study of the culture of Singapores

EDB in Strategic Pragmatism.


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4.0About Singapores EDBIn order to provide an organizational perspective on Singapores EDB, I narrate belowcertain extracts from Strategic Pragmatism:

Singapores Economic Development Board (EDB), is a quasi-governmental agency setupin 1961 by Singapores leaders to implement a plan to attract foreign investment.

Singapore was a British colony that achieved self-rule in 1958. It joined the Malaysian

Federation in 1963 and achieved full independence in 1965 when it left the federation.The EDB had been setup well before full independence on the assumption that Singapore

would need rapid economic development once it achieved self-rule and would have to get

along without the British naval bases that contributed heavily to its economy. It is widelyasserted that the EDB was a crucial element in the economic growth that Singapore

achieved and that the success of the EDB is largely a function of the culture that this

organization created.

The story of the EDB and its culture,

1. sheds light on how Singapore, in the space of 35 years, could be transformed froma fairly impoverished underdeveloped former colony into a modern city-state that

today aspires to be in the top ranks of developed countries.

2. illustrates the importance of non-economic factors in the analysis of economicdevelopment. In particular, it clarifies some of the issues between Asian andWestern concepts of organization and management in that Singapore turns out

to be a genuine East-West hybrid.

3. sheds light on why the World Bank and other organizations are urging developingcountries to look to Singapore for guidance and help on how to manage their own

development. This assistance is forthcoming through a consulting organization

that the EDB has set up, which has attracted requests for help from countries as

widely dispersed as Cambodia, Ghana, Indonesia and Oman.

When Singapore began its economic journey, it was commonly believed that one had to

be part of a large internal market to develop. Following conventional wisdom, it startedits journey with a strategy of import substitution in a much larger Malaysian Federation.

Based on experience and necessity, it shifted to an export-led strategy and commitment to

become the worlds best place for offshore manufacturing as a city-state with a verysmall market. During the course of the journey, it proved that city-states could not only

prosper but could get rich faster that those with the largest internal market. The ability to

adjust rapidly was more important than economies of scale.

Singapore took advantage of what few advantages it had. Its geographic location made it

potentially one of the worlds great seaports. But to realize that potential it had to spend

lavishly on infrastructure with a management drive that would give it the ability to loadand unload ships faster than anyone else in the world. A vision of development springing

from world class infrastructure initially developed around the seaport was later extended

to the airport and telecommunications. The worlds first electronic library may well be in


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Singapore. Singapore was both willing to copy others successes and committed to being

the worlds best take what others have done and build on it. All were a part of anoverall strategy of making Singapore a global city and a regional headquarters for

Southeast Asia.

The founding fathers of Singapore built a shared vision To develop Singapore into aGlobal City with Total Business Capabilities. Putting flesh on that vision was and is the

job of the Economic Development Board (EDB). The EDB is neither the head nor the

heart of the system, but best thought of as an energizer. The EDB has developed a uniquesystem of working with companies of Singapore (both local and foreign) that is intimate

without being intrusive. It pushes firms hard to go upscale in technology but does not

try to run them.

The EDB was created in 1961 as a statutory board by the Singapore Parliament. TheEDBs basic structure consists of a government appointed 12-member board, a chairman

who functions as the chief executive, a managing director who functions as the chief

operating officer, and a group of operating units under directors.

The EDB headquartered in Singapore also has offices in New York, San Francisco, LosAngeles, Chicago, Washington, Boston, London, Paris, Frankfurt, Milan, Stockholm,

Hong Kong, Tokyo, Osaka and Jakarta. Each office is staffed by one or more directors

and support staff.

The EDB itself has a large fund for investment in joint ventures of various sorts and for

the encouragement of clusters of industries that fit into its own long-range strategy.

Underlying these initiatives is Singapores desire to serve as the business hub ofSoutheast Asia by becoming the regional leader in information and manufacturing

technology.

The basic work of the EDB is carried out though its first-line senior officers who areassigned a technical area, the major companies worldwide operating in that area, and the

prospects for recruiting those companies to develop a project in Singapore. As projects

are developed, the proposing officers recruit from among their peers the necessaryadditional people they will need. Teams are thus formed, and officers often end up

matrixed across several divisions, reporting to several bosses simultaneously. This way

of working internally mirrors Singapores overall manner of operation, in that mostsenior civil servants or private sector executives have as many as five different jobs in

different organizations at the same time. Such multitasking reflects a scarcity of

sufficiently trained people in Singapore, but it has the benefit of creating networks and

building trust across a wide range of government units and private companies.

Decisions are made in the management structure through a process of proposal, review

and approval. If a decision is initiated at the top, such as a major shift in strategy, it iscommunicated intensively and extensively throughout the organization on paper,

electronically, in meetings and through other media needed to get the message across.

Most strategic and operational decision, however, begin down in the organization with a


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proposal from a first-line officer in an industry segment, or a director in a geographic

region, or from a working group or task force assigned to look into some particular issue.

Although the EDB has had some ups and downs during the course of its history, it is

today a high-morale organization that presents itself as confident and successful, as well

as the key element in Singapores economic scene. Even though it is acknowledged thatthe EDB is not the sole source of Singapores economic success, the EDB credits itself

for being the critical integrating element, the forward looking entrepreneurial driving

force, the basic sales and marketing arm of Singapore, and the organization that managed,through its culture, to train a cadre of Singapores leaders.

UNQUOTE.

In my readings of the memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapores charismatic, autocratic,

paternalistic founding father and its Prime Minister for over three decades, I came across

a reference on EDB with a specific mention of its contribution in creating leaders for

Singapores institutions.

Lee Kuan Yew says, and I quote, From the team of EDB, I found three cabinet

ministers, S.Dhanabalan, Lee Yock Suan and Yeo Cheow Tong. Several EDB officers,

including Joe Pillay and Ngiam Tong Dow, became outstanding permanent secretaries.

In addition Pillay was chairman of Singapore Airlines where his financial and business

skills made it the most profitable airline in Asia while Ngiam became chairman of

Development Bank of Singapore.

(Those interested in Lee Kuan Yews memoirs may read From Third World to First

The Singapore Story: 1965-2000 published by Harper Collins Publishers, 2000)

In this brief overview of EDB, I see both a history of itself as well as a brief economic

and social history of Singapore as a city-state. It is difficult for me to miss the critical link

of EDBs evolution to that of Singapore as a city-state nation itself.

I can also distinctly notice the simultaneity of evolutionof EDB and its context (TheSingapore Story), both simultaneously growing by feeding on each other.


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5.0Deciphering EDBs Culture The ApproachI now turn to the way Schein undertook the long and arduous task of deciphering EDBsculture and giving it a language and a meaning. At the outset, I found this exercise

involving a set of paradoxes which is summed up in the following statements (of Schein)

I found in Strategic Pragmatism:

The deciphering of an organizations culture requires an interactive process between

the researcher and the members of the organization, because the description of the

culture must make sense to the insiders even though the analysis creates categories and

levels of abstraction that the insiders may find novel and sometimes even disturbing.

A cultural analysis is likely to uncover themes that have been held in the organizations

unconscious, not all of which are likely to be perceived as positive elements in theorganization.

From the beginning it was obvious that I was dealing with a spirited, proud, high-morale organization that believed in itself completely yet wanted to find a way to become

more conscious of its vulnerabilities and shortcomings.

The EDB leaders were both optimistic and concerned about the future, and wondered

whether the EDB could maintain its track record of success in the face of a more

turbulent world.

I had to describe the strength of this organization (the culture that its members believed

to be the source of its success), and yet identify the weaknesses in that culture and do a

critical analysis that would help the organization improve itself.

In the end, the EDB is a set of paradoxes that illustrates how oversimplifiedmuch of our

contemporary organization and management theory is.

I also noticed a boundary condition that was upfront stated by Schein whilst

undertaking this project. I found that the entire exercise of deciphering EDBs culturewas to increase the in-depth understanding of how the economic development processworked in Singapore and did not involve an exercise to develop a general model of

economic development. (Schein) The boundary condition was also evident when I found

that Schein resisted the temptation of comparing Singapores economic developmentprocess to that of other rapidly developing economies like Hong Kong. Readers would be

well aware that in the discourse of choosing the location for Southeast Asia

headquarters, the comparison between Singapore and Hong Kong has been inevitablefor several global organizations. Strategic Pragmatism, however, distances itself from

such an approach as the emphasis here is on a comprehensive analysis of a single case

(EDB) that reveals a variety of themes and variables that may or may not be found in

other organizations or that may have different meanings in different cultural contexts.(Schein)


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In my readings on the subject of Quantum Physics, I learnt the phenomena of the

Observer and the Observed and the irrefutable co-relation between the two. In thiscontext, I am often reminded of Fritjof Capras statement My conscious decisionabout how to observe an electron will determine the electrons properties to some extent.

If I ask it a particle question, it will give me a particle answer. If I ask it a wave question,

it will give me a wave answer.

(Those interested in exploring this theme are invited to read a book titled What the

Bleep Do We Know by William Antz, Betty Chasse & Mark Vincente. The book in fact

is the authors narrative on a very intriguing film by the same name that they made first.)

The observers frames of studying the observed are evident in the manner Schein

designed the approach to decipher EDBs culture. I give below the relevant extract from

Strategic Pragmatism to support this hypothesis,

My prior experience as a consultant and clinical researcher helped in conducting this

somewhat complex kind of research project. As a process consultant working inorganizations, I had learnt that one can take an objective clinical stance towards a client

system and that such stance is, in fact, the essence of both ethnography and effective

consultation. The most effective stance towards this kind of fieldwork is therefore a

combination of ethnography, participant observation, data gathering by means of

interviews and questionnaires as appropriate and occasionally more confrontational

interventions into the system to observe and analyze responses. (Schein)

Being an authority on both process consultation and organization culture, Schein is

humble enough to admit that this process is to some degree subjective and must be

acknowledged as such. In the end, this story is my own construction, and I do not claim

that I can surmount all of my biases. Such biases inevitably show up in my choice of what

to present and how to present it. (Schein)

As I finish writing this paragraph, a related yet an obvious question springs up in my

mindam I not bringing my own biases arising out of my own (tacit) frames, whilst I

do this project work of book review? I guess this is an un-escapable truth in any

comprehension exercise.

Let me now move to the steps Schein took in his two-year action research endeavor of

deciphering EDBs culture. Specifically, it involved gathering basic data through,

1. Observation of EDB meetings to get a feel for how day-to-day work was actuallydone; (here I would like to mention of an interesting acronym I learnt recentlyduring my study on Qualitative Research. The program faculty gave us an acronymOPOPOW standing for Ordinary Perceptions of Ordinary People of Ordinary Ways of the system. I guess this is what Schein did as a first step a first-handinspection of ongoing organizational life)

2. Interview of Singaporean government officials who had been instrumental increating and maintaining EDB;

3. Interviews of current members of EDB at all levels of the organization;


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4. Interviews of EDB alumni who had spent formative years in the EDB and thengone on to other careers in the industry or government;

5. Interview of business executives who had made the decision to invest inSingapore by placing their operation there;

6. Interviews of current managers who had day-to-day dealings with the EDB inmaintaining and enlarging their operations;7. Interviews of local Singaporean businessman who had dealings with the EDB;

8. Analysis of written historical accounts, current and past literature by the EDBsuch as annual reports and promotional materials of various sorts;

9. Information gleaned from miscellaneous accounts of Singapore, its history, and itscurrent mode of operation.

From a synthesis perspective, I found Schein actually telling several stories based on

various stories he heard during the process outlined above. He has put them into four

categories, which represent the four distinct parts of the Strategic Pragmatism book.

Part IThe EDBs perspective on Itselfrepresenting a historical perspective of the key leaders of the EDB through decades.

Part IIThe EDB from a Client/Investor Perspective

representing investors perception and data from European, Asian and local investors.

Part IIIThe EDB Culture from an Analytic Perspective

representing Scheins own interpretation of EDBs culture in terms of its contextual and

operational paradigms.

Part IVProblems, Issues and Lessons

representing collections of all problems, issues and criticisms of EDB.

In a section titled A Note on Research Method, Schein has upfront stated a keydilemma in his endeavor. He askswhat then permits one to be analytical and criticalin this kind of inquiry? In response, he takes help of two options available to him to

make sense of a mass of case detail (Schein)(a) taking recourse to organization theoryand cross-cultural theory and (b) the diversity of his own experience. He answers his

dilemma by taking a position, by sayingas many have pointed out, knowledge in the

social and organizational domain cannot be objectified in terms of traditional concept of

natural science. In the end, even the physicist is only telling a story, and the validity of a

given story can be judged only by its capacity to explain something that was not

understood before, by its capacity to explain something coherent, and ultimately, by its

capacity to be useful to others. (Schein).

Isnt this an example of Positive Pragmatismas elicited by Action Science and also

similar to the shared Sumedhian belief on truth as work-in-progress? I wonder.


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6.0Deciphering EDBs Culture The FindingsLet me now briefly cover Scheins findings of EDBs culture through the eyes of various

leaders at EDB and as seen by its investors/clients.

6.1EDBs perspective on itself:

During my work with the organizations, I have often found the first step to understand a

particular organization is by studying itsVision, Mission, Values, Strategy & Structure.I have already covered these aspects of EDB in the earlier section About SingaporesEDB, which is an extract from Strategic Pragmatism, as commented upon by EDBs

leaders perspective of itself and as captured by Schein in his interviews with them.

I will now move on to the other important diagnostic frame to understand an organization

the study of its Climate. I will stick to Scheins definition of this term which is the

feeling that is conveyed in a group by the way in which members of the organization

interact with each other, with customers or other outsiders. (Schein)

In the most simplistic way, the principle element of EDBs climate is a can-do spirit.This mythical symbol of EDB is even embodied in a cartoon version of the work of the

EDB with the officers depicted as supermen and superwomen flying around solving

difficult problems. In one of his interviews, Schein even got an elaborate description ofthis dominant climate from one its first-line officers who said, EDB officers areexpected to be supermen. There is a thirty year tradition to be upheld and even though

the job is now harder and requires longer hours, the tradition of getting everything done,

doing it efficiently, and doing it on a lean basis and resolving all problems as they arise,

is still strong.

I clearly see here three dominant managerial competencies which seem to be must-have

at EDB problem solving, decision making and execution focus, which in turninfluences the EDBs climate as it tries to meet its challenges ofexternal adaptation and

internal integration. I found this as the foundation of integrating the head, heart and the

handupon which the edifice of EDB was built.

EDBs climate also includes paradoxes such as taking a long range orientation and at

the same time being very opportunistic and pragmatic; making errors but turning theminto benefits as quickly as possible.

When Schein started to probe how all this works, one formal EDB official who later went

on to become the president of a large firm, shared with him a set of imperatives that EDBlives by and that are taught to new members as necessary to survival and effective work

in EDB. Schein qualifies them as cultural imperatives and lists them as:

1. A brand of leadership that has a long range vision, ability to build a team and theability to draw out the best in team members.

2. Total loyalty to the mission of building the nation.


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3. 120% commitment from all.4. Absolute professionalism with clients.5. Total integrity in all dealings with clients.6. Clear rules and absence of corruption.7. Mental toughness and ability to absorb failures.8.

An internally boundaryless organization.9. Teamwork and openness of communication.

10.One-stop-service for the clients.I dont see anything new in this, I said to myself when I first read the words. Arentthese supposed to be the essential principles that members of any organization need to

follow for its success? I had even wondered. But I guess , like most Mission & Visionstatements, which I often find as mere artifacts and not embodied in the every-day

language of the organization, even these universal principles receive a mere lip -service

in most organizations. The EDB, as Schein realized, was a clear exception to this norm.

The cultural imperatives, Schein notes, are not merely statement of espoused valuesbut an operational philosophy that permeates all aspects of EDB operations.

The categories through which Schein says one can study the Culture phenomena (the

ones I have included in the earlier section titled Organization Culture My

Understanding) are highly visible in EDB. Some examples being:

- getting to know the members of this globally spread organization through jointwork on projects, operations committee meetings, Friday recreational club etc.

- attending training courses together, lot of informal networking includingtravelling together abroad on various assignments

- a small Christian group getting together informally during lunch time- getting acquainted with people from other government departments through

meetings and joint work on task forces- giving awards to publicize special accomplishments- printing an in-house publication that carries news about all employees- encouraging information rituals with regards to events such as promotions,

transfers or even departure from EDB

- annual staff day for all Singapore members of the EDB where they performsoriginal songs, skits, show video-tapes and inspirational speeches by leadersfollowed by an elaborate tea party at which employees of all levels mingle with

management and invited guests.

Schein also delves in detail about the EDBs Perspectives on Itselfthrough threeadditional frames:

1. Historical roots of the EDB culture2. Major strategic eras that represented major inflection points in EDBs history3. Key leaders who were responsible forthe founding stage, the formative growth

stage, the consolidation stage & the redefinition and renewal stage


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In these sections I found the history and evolution of EDB very closely tied to that of

Singapore itself and the various economic, social and political upheavals it had to gothrough since its separation from the Malaysian Federation.

6.1.1 Historical roots of the EDB culture:

Three people need to be mentioned at this stage who were instrumental in a way to give

birth to EDB Lee Kuan Yew, Singapores first Prime Minister; Goh Keng Swee, the

Finance Minister who chose the EDB name and provided the idea of making it a statutorybody; Hon Sui Sen, the first chairman of EDB and a top civil servant then.

Lee, Goh and Hon and their families were well acquainted with one other, havingsurvived the Japanese occupation together. Lee & Goh were close friends from student

days and received their education in the United Kingdom. Hon was appointed by Goh,

and before taking on the job he was sent to the World Bank for six months of training.

I found the above data extremely valuable. To build an organization like EDB on whichwould depend the nation building of Singapore itself, I felt, it was critical for the

founders to have high level of personal chemistry over and above a shared vision .After all, they had collectively embarked upon the journey of creating one hell-of-a-

startup, I further felt.

The appointment of Hon Sui Sen as EDBs first chairman reflects some of the attitudestoward people that came to play a major role in how the EDB culture evolved. In

describing the formation of EDB, Lee Kuan Yew said, I gave my best man to Dr. Goh to

do with whatever he needed, a philosophy of human resource management thatforeshadowed most of the selection and development policies of the future the relianceon excellent people and an assumption that they could learn whatever the job required

even if they had not been specifically trained for it. These excellent people would then

be put into whatever jobs most needed their skills and attention. (Schein)

I found a major resonance of this leadership theme in the book Leaders At All Levels

by Ram Charan, a management guru of current times and an advisor to business leadersand corporate boards. In this book Ram Charan says, and I quote, having worked closelywith many successful leaders over several decades, I conclude that leaders are different

from other people and they develop their talent through practice and self-correction.

In Strategic Pragmatism, I found several instances (which I shall note quote here, as it

would need another chapter in itself) of EDBs leaders who were different from other

people. Prime Minister Lee indeed found one in Hon Sui Sen and rightfully offered himthe task to build EDB, whereas he could have been given charge of other equally pressing

nation building agendas that were critical for Singapore of 1961.

On this theme of leaders being different people who are self-reflective and self-

corrective, I found important parallels in another book titled Start-up Nation: The Story

of Israels Economic Miracle by Dan Senor and Saul Singer. This book is an amazing


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narrative of Israels adversity-driven culture that fosters a unique combination of

innovative and entrepreneurial intensity which the authors realized was the answer to atrillion dollar question: How is it that Israel a country of 7.1 million people, only sixty

years old, surrounded by enemies, in a constant state of war since its founding, with no

natural resources produces more start-up companies than large peaceful stable nation

like Japan, China, India, Korea, Canada and the United Kingdom?

In 1961 Lee and Goh had in mind a clear strategy for the EDB and had appointed a

trustworthy and competent staff with Hon as the chairman. But in addition, they neededan experienced managing director to help it really take off. The chairman and his staff

had all the right motivations, but very little practical experience in how to promote

foreign investment. Their choice ended up with E.J.Mayer who was requested to take upthe task on a temporary basis until a local candidate could be found.

Mayer, I realized, was the connection between Singapore and Israel, two of the worlds

most technologically advanced nations, having similar situations when they were born as

independent nations.

Mayer was then the director of the industrial planning department at the Israels ministryof commerce and industry. In his first meeting (in 1958) with Mayer, Goh said, I am amember of the Peoples Action Party and we are going to fight an election shortly, at

which my party will sweep the board. I will then have to carry some responsibility in the

government and, to prepare myself for this task, my party send me on a round-the-world

trip to get information about the best methods for industrial development. On this visit,

Goh also met J.Cahen, professor of industrial management at the Haifa Technion. Both

Mayer and Cahen subsequently became involved with EDB, the former as its firstmanaging director and the latter as an occasional consultant.

Mayer also has an impact on Lee Kuan Yew. On one of his trips to Africa (when British

were to pull out their naval bases and take 25 percent of Singapores gross nationalproduct with them) he was visited by Mayer. They spent a long evening together

discussing Singapores situation and the problems of economic development, leading to

two great insights that Lee said he has never forgotten. If you are surrounded by

neighbors who dont want or need your products (the situation both in Israel and inSingapore at that time), you mustleapfrog them economically so that they will come to

need your products. By this Mayer meant that one must skip one or more steps ineconomic development chain to get ahead of other countries that are following a more

traditional path. Singapores economic vision, achieved through EDB, on high-tech and

knowledge based industries was no doubt partially influenced by this advice.

The second insight Lee got from Mayer was, recognize that the only resource you haveis your people, their brains, and theirskills. Sort them and pick the best.

So it came to pass that Lee picked Hon as EDBs first chairman and Hon in turn pickedMayer as its first managing director and the EDB was created in 1961 with the initial

strategy to create jobs through attractive labor-intensive manufacturing companies and


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to develop a climate of collaboration between labor and management that would be

attractive to foreign investors.

Historical roots like these, I realize, are so very critical to create a formative culture for

an organization. Setting up two start-ups myself, I also realize the inevitable impact of the

values and beliefs of the founders on an organizations founding culture. After all, Ibelieve, at the start-up stage, an organization is no more than a collective mental

construct held by its founding members.

6.1.2 Major strategic eras & key leaders:

In Scheins view, the EDB culture is a product of the interaction of several factors:

1. the personalities and styles of the founders (as I have briefly alluded to above),especially the EDBs first chairman, Hon Sui Sen;

2. the mentalities and the personal styles of its initial members, especially the firstgroup of officers who were assigned to EDB;3. the strategic priorities as interpreted by the leaders and officers, and asexperienced by them in their early efforts to promote foreign investments;

4. their actual experiences of successes and failures; and5. the personality and styles of the later leaders who arrived with different strategic

priorities and mandates.

Let me now pick the last thread in the list and take the EDB story forward.

From the report EDB, Thirty Years of Economic Development, Schein quotes, There

are many ways in retrospect to categorize the various economic strategies that Singapore

employed from 1960 on. Singapores own published analyses are constructed around

major thrusts of each decade.

Some of the major themes that can be seen are,

1. Curing unemployment through import substitution (1961-65):creation of labor intensive industries to create full employment in relatively low

value-added factories that produced such items as nails, textiles, footwear, paint,

polo shirts and plastic flowers.

2. Shift to export orientation and internationalization (1965):re-orienting manufacturing for exports by attracting major global companies to

setup their manufacturing base in Singapore and export components or totalproducts from there. Successful foreign investment would include U.S.

companies such as General Electric, Hewlett-Packard, Timex, Bethlehem Steel,

GTE, Lockheed; European companies such as Phillips, Siemens, Olivetti,Beecham; Japanese companies such as Seiko, Sumitomo, Yamazaki.


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3. Shift from labor-intensive industries to training labor for capital-intensive andhigh-tech industries (1968 onwards):

becoming a precision engineering shop of Asia by upgrading its labor forcethrough joint institutes between Singapore and Germany, France and Japan.

4.

From skill based industries to knowledge based industries and services (evolvedthrough the 1970s):

shifting the focus by attracting those high-tech industries that were willing to pay

higher wages and that were less labor intensive, like computers, integratedcircuits, specialty chemical products and industrial electronic equipments.

5. Regionalization, growth triangle and development of local industries (1986-):by helping to develop industrial parks in the neighboring Indonesian islands,

Thailand and Malaysia, Singapore could help a company place its low-cost

manufacturing into one of those sites while keeping the headquarters, R&D,

distribution and marketing in Singapore.

6. Renewal to a Learning Nation (1990-):by aiming to catch-up withon a moving-target basisthe GNP per capita of theNetherlands by 2020 and of the U.S. by 2030.

Schein says, the theme of strategic pragmatism comes to mind again in that Singapore

displayed throughout this period a remarkable adaptive and learning capability without

sacrificing short-run problem solving. And throughout these periods of strategic change,

the EDB as an organization maintained a certain basic character and style, even as it

evolved under the leadership of different chairmen.

These leaders would include:

1. Hon Sui SenThe Founding Chairman2. I.F.Tang and Chan Chin BockThe Deal Makers3. Ngiam Tong Dow and P.Y.HwangThe Consolidators4. Philip YeoThe Renewer

I am not covering here the details of the major contributions these leaders made in the

history of EDB. Interested readers may explore this subject by reading Strategic

Pragmatism.

From the narrative on these leaders, I however gather the importance of the fact that at

each inflection stage of an organization, the top-leadership,be it an Executive Chairman

or the Chief Executive, is vital in terms ofVision, Capabilities and Character.

These virtues can also be signified by the word Dharma, coined by the ancient Indianknowledge system, which said that the eternal concept ofDharmic Leadership is the

basic quality required for building and sustaining institutions.


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6.2 EDB from a client/investor perspective:I have always believed, that an organizationbe it for-profit or not-for-profit, is as good

as its customers experience it to be. The Voice of Customer (VoC) after all is the proof

of the pudding. The EDB was no exception to this fact. For Schein, I realized that the

VoC became an important source of data for deciphering EDBs culture. I shall nowbriefly cover this aspect of EDB, by exploring the question, why did companies chose to

invest in Singapore?

Even though EDBs efforts to seek foreign investment were worldwide, a great deal ofthat effort was directed at U.S. companies, in part because these companies were

beginning to look offshore for manufacturing just at the time that Singapore waslaunching its strategy.

There is a valuable comment from Schein that I saw in sections of Strategic Pragmatism

relating to VoC data. I found it offering a kind of directional guidance to those

undertaking the work of culture diagnosis. Schein says, and I quote, ideally I wouldhave searched out an equivalent number of companies that did not invest in Singapore to

try to find out whether it was aspects of the EDB culture that turned them off. It not only

proved to be difficult to find such companies, but it was also the case that the successful

investors made enough critical comments to make it possible to infer where the problems

lay. This I believe is a critical pointer to organizational culture studies by looking at thedisconfirming data as well.

Rather than getting into details ofthe comments made by EDBs clients/investors, I will

restrict myself to capturing some of the key statements made by them when they wereinterviewed by Schein. The voices are from: U.S. clients Mobil Corp., DuPont Corp., Lubrizol Corp., Texas Instruments, Hewlett-Packard, Digital Equipment Corp., Apple;

European clientsShell, Thomson; Asian clientsSony, Hitachi.

The characteristics of EDB which were dominantly experienced by these clients, some of

which I feel also have a correlation to the EDB culture, are:

1. One-stop service2. Accessibility3. Efficiency and speed in solving problems4. Can-do attitude5. Deep knowledge of relevant industry and companies6. Business orientation7. Persuasive with facts8. Willingness to make special concessions when needed9. Helping in locating suppliers, contractors, construction companies10.Various incentive schemes11.Capital assistance schemes, which allow EDB equity participation in selected

industries

12.Small industry finance scheme and other tax incentive and loan schemes


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Some of the specific comments made by EDB clients/investors from which I got few

insights of the EDB culture, are:

visionary outlook that helped to lay foundation today for tomorrows business, social

and technological scenarios

the EDB board is run more like an enterprise than a statutory body

great availability and responsiveness

dedication, competence, efficiency of the team

strong tradition of accountability for results

they talk to each other; they have open channels inside and with the outside so that the

whole organization responds

there is a tight hierarchy, but communications are open

they are very smart to take little steps and learn from them rather than overreachingthemselves

very little is done without careful disciplined research and, in that process, they use

outside resources and are willing to learn from whoever has relevant knowledge

they have great respect for their leaders and that, in combination of a high sense of

discipline and a very strong work ethic derived somewhat from Confucianism, makes

them very effective

they managed to pick the best people and, through creating a fairly strong elitism,

managed to get very good people to the top

what they said, they stuck to it

once they decide to do something, they do it so fast

they are very pragmatic, especially in overlooking communism in dealing with China

whenever you went with a proposition, they always wanted to know immediately what

technology you would transfer and what training you would provide local Singaporeans

they know how to bet on companies and on individual people

when they do things, they explain the logic so that everyone has a deeper understanding

of why things are done the way they are


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6.3 EDB culture from an analytic perspectiveHere, Schein brings together the earlier two perspectives by the EDB of itself & by the

EDB clients/investors during their dealings with EDB, into a coherent picture of the EDB

organizational culture and the cultural context in which it operates.

In this section Schein states, and I quote, to fully understand an organization, one must

not only be able to make a sense of the overt behaviors of the organization that are

visible, but also be able to see the underlying pattern of shared assumptions by which the

organization operates. If one is looking for the strong casual factors that explain how any

social system works, it is those underlying tacit shared assumptions that are the strongest

casual forces and that can be thought of as the essence of the culture.

To support this view, Schein offers the following model,

At this stage, I find Schein bringing together the mass of case details that he collected

through his various interviews with EDB officials and EDB clients, into a coherent

framework which is grounded in the theoretical framework on organization culture thathe had developed independently and explained in his book Organization Culture and

Leadership. Drawing references from this work, Schein in Strategic Pragmatism

explains the levels of organizational culture phenomena using a lily-pond metaphor. Ireproduce below this narrative.

Culture is an intrinsically abstract concept that integrates and explains the shared overtand visible behavioral rituals, beliefs, and values of the group. So far I (Schein) have

attempted to describe the EDB in these overt terms but, in terms of culture, what I have

described is like the surface of the lily pond these are only the visible, palpable aspects

Artifacts

EspousedValues

Underlying

Assumptions

Visible organizational

structure and processes(hard to decipher)

Strategies, goals,

philosophies

(espoused justifications)

Unconscious, taken for granted beliefs,

perceptions, thoughts and feelings(ultimate source of values and action)

Levels of organizational culture


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of the EDB culture. Just as one cannot understand the dynamics of the lily pond without

examining the stalks, the roots, and the composition of the water and the mud under thesurface of the pond (the elements that create what is on the surface), so one cannot

understand culture without looking for the roots, the nutrients, and the principles of

growth that explain the surface phenomena one sees in the organization.

This way of thinking about the culture is shown diagrammatically in the above figure.

The most surface level of the culture, exemplified by some of the descriptive material of

EDB, can be thought of as the observable artifacts of the organization. The artifacts arevery palpable and vivid, but they are hard to decipher because of the likelihood that the

observer will project his or her own cultural assumptions onto them.

To begin to understand a culture, one must then move on to the next level of inquiry by

asking members of the organization why they do certain things, which usually elicits what

one could call the espoused values of the organization. At this level, one has the official

philosophy, the mission statement, and the various justifications that members use to

explain their behavior. There often are inconsistencies between the espoused values andwhat the overt behavior or artifacts suggest.

To resolve such inconsistencies it is necessary to go to a further level of inquiry, the level

ofshared tacit assumptions. These are the real drivers of the observed behavior and are

therefore what one can think of as the underlying essence of the culture, the hidden partof the lily pond. Such tacit assumptions often complement each other in complex subtle

ways and, if the organization has a reasonably long history, become patterned into a

system or paradigm.

In other words, to fully understand the meaning of different observed behaviors and the

espoused values, one must understand the underlying paradigm that the members of the

organization use to structure their reality. One can think of such paradigms as shared

mental models that structure how the members of an organization perceive, think about,and feel about themselves and the environment around them. Once one has finished the

components of the paradigm, one can also track the possible origins of those components

in historical and broader cultural terms.

Such shared mental models do not reveal themselves easily, precisely because they are

tacit and take for granted. To decipher a cultural paradigm at this deeper level generallyrequires the joint efforts of an outside participant observer working with one or more

insiders who are willing to try to explain observed anomalies or inconsistencies by

exploring their own assumptions. Neither one can do it alone, but their joint inquiry

efforts can bring the tacit assumptions to the surface. Once a tacit assumption has beensurfaced, it can be validated by (1) external testing of how much of the explicit behavior

of the organization it explains, and (2) internal testing of how much it makes sense to the

members of the organization itself once it is made conscious and visible.

UNQUOTE.


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One of my areas of work as an OD practitioner is Executive Coaching, where I work

with an individual client (often sponsored by the organization where s/he works) with

specific goals around improving individual effectiveness. Often, the starting point forme in such engagements is to diagnose my clientsmental models and make it visible

to him/her, test its validity, and if found valid, explore with my client what this mental

model is doing for him or her in creating their worlds.

In this endeavor I am often reminded of Richard Bandlers quote in his book, The

Structure of Magic, where he says, and I quote, Human behavior no matter how bizarreit may first appear to be makes sense when it is seen in the context of choices generated

by their own models of the world. The difficulty is not that they are making a wrong

choice, but because they do not have enough choices they dont have a richly focused

image of the world.

Whilst my work in executive coaching revolves around diagnosing and decoding

individual mental models, Schein, in the context of organization culture, I find, alludes

to the shared mental models held by the membership of the organization which I feelprovides them tacit rules of behaviorwith the help of which they create their worlds.

In the case of EDB, this kind of inquiry of making visible the shared mental models ofits members, made it apparent to Schein that two different paradigms were operating.

One paradigm consisted of a set of assumptions that Singapores leaders held abouteconomic development. The other paradigm consisted of a set of assumptions about how

EDB structures and manages itself. Summarizing his thoughts on his analytic perspective

of EDB, Schein says that the two paradigms must be viewed together as a total system

rather than individual elements. What makes the EDB work is the simultaneous and

coordinated effect of all the different shared tacit assumptions.

I will now re-produce below the way Schein has represented these two operating

paradigms at EDB:

StrategicPragmatism

StateCapitalism

Sector

Collaboration

Primacy of

People

Political

Stability

Dynamic

Civil Service

The shared tacit assumptions of EDBs cultural context


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In his analytical perspective, Schein found that EDBs contextual paradigm consisted of

six interlocking and interrelated shared tacit assumptions that reflect the mental models ofthe early leaders of Singapore and are largely taken for granted even today. Apart from

providing a cultural context within which EDB operates, these assumptions are also held

by the members of the EDB itself thus influencing the everyday operating principles at

EDB.

I shall now re-produce these assumptions as Schein has articulated them,

Shared tacit assumption Assumption details

State Capitalism Singapores leaders and the EDB assumed and took it for

granted that government could and should pay an activeentrepreneurial role in economic development, and should

therefore exercise leadership through a quasi-

governmental statutory body like the EDB.

Political stability Singapores political leaders assumed (1) that economic

development must precede political development, (2) thatlong-range successful economic development could occuronly if there was political stability, and (3) that political

stability could be achieved and maintained only by the

firm but benign government controls that steer allsegments of the society.

Sector collaboration Singapores political leaders assumed that economicdevelopment could only succeed if business, labor, and

government actively collaborated with each other in

fulfilling the common goal of building the nation.

Dynamic civil service Singapores political leaders assumed that favorable

economic conditions for investors would be guaranteedonly if the government and civil service were competent,

incorruptible, and operated with an open and consistent set

of rules that were vigorously enforced.

Primacy of people Singapores political leaders assumed that the only

resources Singapore had was its people and their potential;it must therefore pick the best of them and develop them

to the maximum potential.

Strategic pragmatism Singapores political leaders assumed that it is possibleand essential to have a vision and master strategy for the

development of Singapore, and at the same time one must

use all of ones practical intelligence to pragmatically andinnovatively make it happen without at any point

compromising the vision.

Schein believes that the last tacit assumption on Strategic pragmatism is the critical glue

that ties together the six paradigms together. To further explain this, he states that the

EDB is able to project an image of readiness to solve whatever problem comes along,


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rapidly and efficiently. But at the same time they have a long-range agenda, a purpose, a

set of value principles that they will not violate.

Schein has represented the second operating paradigm at EDB as:

As a comment on this representation of EDBs culture, Schein states that the

operational culture of EDB is a set of paradoxes and anomalies from a Western point of

view, but its tacit assumptions are consistent with each other and enable the organization

to function effectively.

These assumptions can be best understood as:

Shared tacit assumption Assumption details

Teamwork:

Individualistic GroupismThe EDB assumed that the best kind of leadership is tobuild a team, and that the ultimate mission of the team

members is to contribute to Singapore becoming a fully

developed nation.

Boundaryless

organization

The EDB assumed that the only way it could fulfill its

function effectively was for all managers, officers, and other

relevant employees of the organization to be fully informedabout all projects at all times.

Partnership with clients The EDB assumed that it could succeed only if it fullyunderstood the needs of its clients (present and potential

investors) and collaborated with them in solving their

problems efficiently but without compromising its ownbasic goals, plans or rules (strategic pragmatism)

Learning

Organization

Teamwork:Individualistic Groupism

BoundarylessOrganization

Partnership

with clients

NonhierarchicHeirarchy

Cosmopolitan

Technocracy

The shared tacit assumptions of EDBs culture


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Cosmopolitan

technocracy

The EDB assumed that it could succeed only if it recruited:

1. the best and brightest based on scholastic performance2. officers with a cosmopolitan orientation based on

overseas education and interest in working with and inoverseas business settings

3.

officers who were technically oriented and trainedbecause the kind of businesses that were to be promotedwere usually technically based

4. officers who had high level of personal initiative to beable to work in unpredictable and unchartered businessand government arenas

5. officers and managers who were team oriented and hadhigh levels of interpersonal skill to deal with multiple

cultures, multiple hierarchical levels, and acrossorganizational boundaries of all kind

Nonhierarchical

hierarchy

The EDB implicitly assumed that officers could succeed

only if they simultaneously had two potentially opposing setof abilities:

1. a strong sense of autonomy in performing their tasks, awillingness to initiate decisions through formal

proposals up the hierarchy, a willingness to be open and

frank in revealing information up the hierarchy, a

willingness to go around the hierarchy when tasksrequire it, and the ability to work with higher levels of

management in the client organizations

2. suitable deference to superiors when appropriate(particularly in public), a willingness to seek and accept

guidance from above in revising proposals and inmaking decision, good judgment in keeping their

superiors fully informed when going around thehierarchy, and appropriate humility when being coached

and guided by superiors and when dealing with higher-

ranking managers in client companies.

Commitment to learning

and innovation

The EDB assumed that the only way it could fulfill its

vision of development was to learn from others and its ownexperience, and to continuously innovate in dealing with

whatever problems were discovered to stand in the way of

achieving the vision.

Amongst the shared tacit assumptions on the EDB culture as given in the above table, the

assumption around Nonhierarchical hierarchy has made me reflect a lot. In my workwith organizations, I hear about the dilemma concerning autonomy v/s control. I findmany organizations struggling to find an answer to this apparent paradox. Whenever my

clients seek my expert advice on this subject, I often end up in silence, something whichis contrary to what my clients expect of me.


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The shared tacit assumptions at the EDB on Nonhierarchical hierarchy seem to provide

me an answer to my dilemma on the subject. Explaining this assumption further, Scheinstates, and I quote, the best way to characterize this set of relationships is to note thatEDBers are expected to perform as one would in a boundaryless Western organization in

which hierarchy is downplayed and, at the same time, to perform as one would in an

Asian (Chinese) organization in which deference and hierarchy are dominant. What theyoung senior officer has to learn in entering this organization was how to do thathow

to develop the judgment and interpersonal skills to perform according to both set of

norms. The officer learns to use the hierarchy without the hierarchy becoming a

dominant controlling force.

Reflecting on Scheins words, I then wonder, Is this paradox of autonomy v/s control, aproblem to be solved, or a reality to be lived, day-to-day? Other than judgment and

interpersonal skills, what sort of coping mechanisms would members of such

organizations need to cultivate in order to live such an organizational life? Can these

skills be taught as a prescribed learning method or do each member of such an

organization have to figure out their everyday answers to this paradox as they solve theeveryday organizationalproblems?

The following figure depicts the combination of the culture and contextual paradigms of

EDB in a cohesive framework as deciphered by Schein, with Strategic Pragmatism &

Learning Organization forming the core,

The cultural paradigm of the EDB

State

Capitalism

Sector

Collaboration

Primacy of

People

PoliticalStability

Dynamic

Civil Service

Teamwork:

Individualistic GroupismBoundarylessOrganization

Partnership

with clientsNonhierarchic

Heirarchy

Cosmopolitan

Technocracy

Strategic

Pragmatism

Learning

Organization


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Schein summarizes his findings on the EDB culture by saying, In order to understand

why Singapore and the EDB work the way they do, one must consider all the twelve

elements shown and must treat culture as a system of interrelated parts, not isolated

elements. It is Singapores ability to put all pieces together that helps to explain the

success of their economic development thus far.


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7.0The Organization Development Process at EDBIn his book The Living Company, the author Arie De Geus, the retired Director of

Group Planning at The Royal Dutch/Shell Group, explores the question what can

explain the longevity gap between a company that survives for centuries and the average

corporation, which does not last 20 years?

He says, many companies die young because their policies and practices are based too

heavily on the thinking and language of economics. Their managers focus on producing

goods and services and forget that the organization is a community of human beings that

is in business to stay alive. In contrast, managers of living companies consider

themselves to be stewards of long-standing enterprise. Their priorities reflect their

commitment to the organizations long-term survival in an unpredictable world. Likecareful gardeners, they encourage growth and renewal without endangering the plant

they are tending. They value profits the same way most people value oxygen: as

necessary for life but not the purpose of it. They scuttle assets when necessary to make a

dramatic change in the business portfolio. And they constantly search for new ideas.These managers also focus on developing people. They create opportunities for

employees to learn from one another. Such organizations are suited for survival in a

world in which success depends on the ability to learn, to adapt, and to evolve.

In his book, The Fifth Discipline, the author Peter Senge takes De Geuss argumentfurther by defining the term The Learning Organization as, an organization whosemembers continually enhance their capacity to create their desiredfuture.

The same theme of continuous evolution through continuous learning and adaptation isexplored by Gary Hamel in his bookLeading the Revolution, where he coins a term

Resilient Organization which he defines as, organizations which continuously

innovate externally with respect to its context and innovate internally with respect to its

own past,in order to remain resilientand relevant.

A further extension of this theme can also be found in the bookLeadership and the New

Science: Discovering Order in a Chaotic World by Maragaret Wheatley, who isrenowned her work in Cultural Anthropology and has a PhD background from Harvard

on Organizational Behavior and Change. In this book, she provides a new way of looking

at the world by combining three strands originating in natural science biology, chaostheory and quantum physics, to put forward three critical hypothesis that she believes

matter to individual and organizational growth (a) Relationships are what matters

(b) Chaos and change are the only route to transformation and (c) Life is a vast web of

interconnections where cooperation and participation are required.

In my endeavor of studying the organization culture phenomena, I realize now, that

tacitly I was also exploring the underlying themes of organizational renewal, change,resilience and relevance as elicited by De Geus, Senge, Hamel & Wheatley. When Ilooked for these aspects in the EDB story, I realized that Strategic Pragmatism offered


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me clear insights; an experience I realize as somewhat similar to Fritjof Capras thought

about the electron giving me a particle answer if I askedit a particle question.

Schein captures this as the shared tacit assumption at EDB of being a Learning

Organization with a commitment to learning and innovation into a framework as below,

The EDB model for planning the organizational development

and organizational learning program

Level # Level Name Learning focus and OD strategy

1 Self Personal MasteryIdentities & Roles

2 People Team Learning & DialogueInterpersonal relationships

3 Style & Skills Intergroup relations and Organizational culture

4 Shared Vision Mental Models & Systems Thinking

Schein notes that, the learning organization values go back to the early leaders, to LeeKuan Yews and Goh Keng Swees willingness to learn from other countries and from

various non-Singaporean advisers. Because of their orientation to training anddevelopment, EDB officers try to stay in touch with relevant management theories and

technologies.

From one of his interviews with Ms.Shirley Chen, the then director of corporate services

at EDB, Schein notes, in one of our discussions Chen volunteered that she had run

across Senges book, found it interesting and exciting, and gave it to managing director

Tan Chin Nam to read. He also found it relevant and obviously saw connections between

Self

Strategy

Style Skills

Shared vision/values

Systems Structure

People


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how the EDB tried to operate and what Senge was articulating, particularly the

importance of systems dynamics in an increasingly complex world. That year Tan Chin

Nam and Lee Kuan Yew also went to the annual Business Forum at Davos, Switzerland,

where they had an opportunity to attend talks by Peter Senge and Bill Issacs from MIT

Organizational Learning Center.

Some of the steps taken to articulate the OD & learning strategy at EDB clearly show that

though advised through external subject matter experts, the entire process was owned

and driven internally by various EDB officers under the leadership of Chen. After

deciding in their 1994 corporate meeting, organizational learning became the coretheme of EDBs growth. Teams were formed to study each of the five learning

disciplines articulated by Senge personal mastery, mental models, shared vision, teamlearning and systems thinking, and their applicability to EDBs context. From thisevolved a work plan that would cover not just the learning organization principles but the

whole organization development effort for the EDB.

From the above narrative on the organization development & learning processes at EDB,I find five key lessons for OD practitioners:

1. OD & learning agenda has to be driven by the senior most levels of managementand anchored in each and every function of the organization and not just in HR,

2. It can be a partnership model with external subject matter experts but primarilyowned and driven as a process internal to the organization,

3. The leaning agendas have to be considered as provisional truths that are alignedto the continuously changing organizational context,

4. OD is an investment directed towards resilience and growth of theorganization and its members,

5. The well being and growth of people and the communities they create within theorganization become the core purpose of the organization, where profits become a

necessity to meet this core purpose.

From Scheins articulation of the OD model at EDB, I realize that the first step to OD is

Exploration ofSelf, which is so much aligned to the shared Sumedhian belief, which is,

Identity is the starting point.

I now also carry a new perspective of OD, to quote Marcel Proust, the French Novelist,

as a voyage of discovery with fellow travelers, not to seek new lands but to see it withnew eyes, a voice deeply anchored in the sutra or verse from the Ishavasya Upanishad

13:

"Eeshaavaasym idam sarvam yat kinchana jagatyaam jagat, Tena tyaktena bhunjithaah,

Maa gridhaah kasyachit dhanam, Hiranmayena paatrena satyasya apihitam mukham,

Tat tvam Pushan apaavrinu, satyadharmaaya drishtaye. "

(It means, "Everything in this world belongs to the Lord. You enjoy it by abandoningit and not lusting after else's wealth. The face of Truth is hidden by a golden cover;O God Pushan, remove the golden cover to enable us see the Truth.")


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8.0EDB CultureA Critique & Summary NotesA review of any phenomena necessarily has to include a critique, I remember one of

my OD fraternity colleagues once mentioning to me. I guess its about balancing both

perspectivesone based on deficit thinking that focuses on whats missing and another

based on constructivist thinkingthat focuses on whats working.

With respect to EDB and its culture, this aspect is very well documented in Strategic

Pragmatism in the form of an interview that Schein had with Khoo Seok Lin, the thendirector of human resources who was also in-charge of organization development and

learning initiatives of EDB. I reproduce below this conversation, with acronyms EHS for

Edgar H Schein and KSL for Khoo Seok Lin.

EHS: What problem is the organization development program trying to solve?

KSL: I am not here to try and solve any problems. Of course there are always problems

this isnt optimal or that isnt optimal but that is not the issue. The issue is beinginnovative and talking about enhanced performance. So its not about looking back at

history, and talking about improving here or there, but to look ahead and see where

Singapore needs to be, to figure out where the EDB can contribute, and what must we

be as an organization in order to meet the challenges.

EHS:So even though you dont know that those challenges will be

KSL: We cannot foresee everything, but we do know where we want to go and we have

in place some of the strategies relatively clear cut. And one thing we know is that the

environment will be more complex and the competition will be fiercer for sure because

we already feel it now.

EHS: So when you earlier said, lets look at skill and style, for example, you are

relating that to currently known strategies?

KSL: For example in style, we said we need two things we need a style of

management where every officer, every manager, is a people empowerer. Many middle

managers still look at their job as a technical thing, and not enough in the area of

being a builder of people, motivating them and cheering them on instead. You have to

be a model, not a judge saying wrong wrong all the time.

EHS: Historically is that what they have been, technical supervisors, critics?

KSL: Not critics, but the focus at middle management level, the bulk of their focus has

been there, because, as I told you, to be promoted you had to be technically very

competent, excellent in what you are doing.

EHS: What is puzzling about this is that if I talk to the alumni of the EDB of the 1960s

and 1970s, they talk about it as an organization where they got a lot of power and


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could take initiative. So where did this middle-management technical supervision

attitude develop, because it wasnt apparently true of the early organization. Hasnt it

always been people-enhancing organization?

KSL: It is, but we are saying that there is a lot more that can be done.

EHS:Even more

KSL: Oh yes [said with great emphasis]. The moment we start thinking that we have

done all that can be done, thats the first time we start going downhill. We have to

think about how we can improve ourselves. Put it this way: there is a lot of opportunity

for bottom-up ideas to flow; thats true of EDB. But there is also a lot of opportunity for

middle managers to enthuse the younger officers. There is a lot of potential. The

moment we think EDB has it, thats when we dont have it. Thats why we do

benchmarking of EDB

EHS: [Interrupts] But you see problem cases? If you were asked, would you be able topoint to supervisors and heads who are too technical, who are not good enhancers of

people, who need this kind of training?

KSL: Of course I can [laughs]. Dont quote me [laughs]

EHS:But thats the thing that is interesting, that this has crept into the organization.

Or has it always been there?

KSL: Put it this way. The same people, if put into another organization, would probably

be among the top people. Thats the unique thing we have here, both strength of EDB

and a question. Everyone is, because of the recruitment system which is so stringent.Everyone who comes in is excellent on paper and in their interaction.

Then you are competing among excellent people, and among excellent people, you

know, if you look at the bell-shaped thing, there will always be some who are more

excellent than o

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