Stillwell's Command Problems

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ForewordAlthough this is the second of a series covering the China-Burma-India

Theater of Operations during World War II, it is a story in itself and one fullof drama. The previous volume, Stilwell's Mission to China, recounts the earlyefforts of the United States to improve the combat efficiency of the ChineseArmy. This second volume presents the problems of a commander, his staff,and histroops in a position so irregular and complex as to be unprecedented inU.S. Army history, and outlines the background of their position in Alliedpolicy, military and political. Their position was determined by an arrangementamong allies, one accepted with reservations by the War Department. There isa saying: "There is but one thing more difficult than fighting a war withAlliesthis is to fight a warwithoutthem."

A history of the Allied effort in China and Burma, to be complete, must bewritten in three dimensions, American-British-Chinese. The present volumeis based on a thorough study of the American records and a wealth of informa-tion inGeneral Stilwell's papers not previously explored. The full story of thewar on the Asiatic mainland cannot be written until British studies are furtheradvanced and the records and the views of the Chinese, of which only a super-ficial knowledge is now obtainable, have been disclosed and compared withthose of their Western allies. Nevertheless, it seems desirable to tell the Amer-ican story now. It is needed to round out the history of our Army's global effortand to do justice to the Americans, high an d low, who made their contributionto victory in avast an d difficult but at thetime little-known theater.


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TheAuthorsFrom 1946to 1953 the authors formed the CBI Section of the staffengagedin writing thehistoryof the U.S. Army inWorld War II.CharlesF.Romanusreceived thedegreeof Master of Arts in Historyat theUniversity of Illinois in 1937, and pursued his work for the doctorate atLouisiana StateUniversity,wherehe was ateachingfellow in history.EnteringtheArmyin 1943he wascom missioned in March 1945and became ahistoricalofficer in the headquartersof the ChinaTheater.He is now ahistorian in theHistorical Section of the Office of the Quartermaster General, and is a captainin the USAR.Riley Sunderland graduated from the University of Chicago in 1937. InApril 1942he was called to active duty as asecondlieutenant in the Field Artil-lery,and fromJuly 1945 to May1946was in theHistorical Section, Headquar-ters, India-Burma Theater, in New Delhi. He is now a senior operationsresearch analyst fo r Technical Operations, Incorporated, of Arlington,Massachusetts.


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Preface"When,in October1943,Lt.Gen.JosephW. Stilwelldecided there waslittlemorehepersonallycoulddo to improve the combat efficiency of the ChineseArmy, and decided to concentrate his efforts on the India-Burma scene, ineffect his decision marked achange from the role of a staff officer, advising

withoutthepowerto c o m m a n d ,to thatof acomm ander,giving orders.AsCommandingGeneral,United States Army Forces, China, Burm a and IndiaTheaterofOperations, asactingDeputySupreme Allied Commander,South-east Asia, asCommanding General,ChineseArmy in India, and asCommand-ing General, Northern Combat Area Command, Stilwell was charged withmanyduties. He wasresponsiblefor the activeconduct of acampaign innorthBurma,and for its immediatelogistical support;for theexecutionof anumberofprojects agreedto by the President, thePrimeMinister ofGreatBritain, andthe Generalissimoof China to aid China; for the executionofprojects orderedby the U.S.Joint Chiefs of Staff to reinforce U.S.operations in the Pacific, andfo r theirlogistical support;and ,asdeputy commander,fo rplayingan appro-priateroleinSoutheast AsiaCommand shouldnecessitydemand.This multi-tudeofroles, these often conflicting missionsand requirements,meant tha tStilwell faced avariety ofcommandproblems. Thisvolume relates his effortsto solve them.

The narrative,likethat in the first volumeof the subseries,Stilwell'sMissionto China, iswritten at the level of the theater commander's headquarters orcommandpost.Under this inherent l imitat ion, it offers acontribution to an


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their missionwriting a history of the U.S. Army theater of operations inChina, Burma, and India. It alsoreflects the nature of thedocum entary sourceswhich the U.S.Army was able to open forthem.The events of1943-44in China,Burma,andIndia,great though they were,were but thepreludetoothers. Lookingbackon 1943and1944,thosewho hadseen the latereventssaw the preludethrough the glass of their own experi-ences, and interpreted the actions andmotives of the men of 1943 and 1944accordingly. But the men whose words an d acts are recorded in thesepageswerenobetter at foretelling the future than men have everbeen. Sometimesaware of wha t the future mighthold, theywere nonethelesspreoccupied with

th eproblemsof the day, rather than thoseof nextyear.Standing on their sideof the veil of the future, they sawthrough it dimlyas men always se ethroughit, not as men see the recentpast. It is the historian'stask to recreate the scenethey saw, and let the reader judgethem, as inevitably he will judge them,bytheunderstandingof his own day.The volumehasmany references to disagreementsbetween allies. Inevit-ably, the account of the disagreements takes up more space than the finalagreement,though it is the latterw hich is themoreimportant.The differencesand disagreementsare of interest to the student because theydidhappen,andbecause they are an inevitablepart of coalition war. But they should not bemagnified out ofproportion.

The authors are greatly indebted to many participants in the eventsdescribedwho werewilling to offer comment and criticism on severaldrafts ofthemanuscript:Lt.Col. Charles E.Beach,Maj.Gen. Haydon L.Boatner,Brig.Gen. FredericW. Boye,Brig. Gen. Waldemar F. Breidster,Col. Rothwell H.Brown,Col.HarryA. Buckley,Brig.Gen. Robert M. Cannon,Maj. Gen.Gil-bertX. Cheves, Lt.Col.GeorgeL.Converse, Maj.Gen. WilliamE. R.Coveil,Maj. Gen. Howard C .Davidson,Col.Joseph K . Dickey, Brig. Gen. FrankDorn,Lt.Col. Trevor N. Dupuy,Col.Ernest F. Easterbrook, Maj. Gen.VernonEvans, Brig.Gen.Benjamin G. Ferris, Lt.Col.John B.George,Capt.Shy S.Greenspan, Maj. Gen.Thomas G. Hearn,Col. FrancisHill, Col. Charles N.Hunter ,Maj. Gen. PatrickJ. Hurley,Lt. Col.GeorgeT. Lau ghlin, Brig.Gen.Malcolm F.Lindsey,Col.Robert C. Lutz,Col.John E.McCammon, Lt.Col.GeorgeA.McGee,Jr.,Col. EdwardJ. McNally ,Lt.Col. HarryL.Mayfield,


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cuss the historyof theChina-Burma-Indiatheaters with GeneralBoatner, Lt.Col.Dwight E.Brewer,Lt .Col.Charles F.Byars,Colonel Converse,Maj. Gen.WilliamM. Creasy,Mr.John P.Davies,Jr., GeneralDorn,ColonelDupuy,Colonel Easterbrook,General Evans, Maj. Gen. Francis W . Festing (British36th Division), Colonel George, General Hearn, Col. Thomas J. Heavey,ColonelHill,General Hurley, General Lindsey,GeneralGeorgeC.Marshall,GeneralMerrill,Colonel Peers, General Roberts,Colonel Rockis,Col. RobertF.Seedlock,Colonel Spaht,Col.JosephW. Stilwell,Jr.,ColonelStodter, Col.Thomas F.Taylor, Captain Tilly, General Wessels, General Wedemeyer,andColonel Wood.They are of coursenot responsiblefor any errors of fact or in-terpretation in thepagesfollowing.Agreat dealofassistancehasbeenreceived from otherhistorians. Maj.Gen.S. W. Kirby,C.B.,C.M.G.,O.B.E.,M.C.,and BrigadierM. R.Roberts,D.S.O.,of the Cabinet Office Historical Section, commented on adraft of the manu-script at very considerable length. Col. Allison R . Hartman and the staff offormerJapanese officers of the Historical Section, Far East C o m m a n d , pre-sented the autho rs with interpretationsand corrections from th eJapanesepointof view. Dr. Henry LeeBowen of the Air Forcehistoriansgave generously ofhistimean dexperienceincommenting on ChapterIII.

Within th e Office, Chiefof Military History, the authorsweregreatly aidedby Mr.JosephBykofsky, Transportation Section,himself aveteranof theNorthBurma Campaign. Stilwell's Command Problems like its predecessor, Stilwell'sMission to China,reflects much of the industrious research, judgment, and nar-rative skill of Mrs.Jacqueline Perry Griffin, research assistant. The section ofChapterII entitled "SEACTriesToSalvage BurmaOperations"was writtenbyMrs.Griffin, whosespecialfield was the operationso f Southeast Asia Com-mand.Only Mrs. Griffin's departure inOctober 1950kept her direct contribu-tion to thetext from beingalarger one.Mrs. Dorothy Campbell Liles prepared the manuscript of Chapters Ithrough VI in first draft, and prepared Part Two for circulationamong partic-ipants in thecampaign. Her successor,Miss Mildred Bucan,prepared th e finaldraft of the manuscript forpublication.Their quick perceptions,sound com-mon sense,and stenographicskill permitted theauthors to concentrateontheirproper tasksof research and writing.


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soon learned that the witnesses to and participants in these events differedamongthemselves as witnesses alwaysdo. The autho rs are not aware thatthereexists in the D e p a r tme n t of Defense any th ing t ha t may be called an officialpointofview toward theeventsdescribedbelow.Thepointofviewherepre-sented isthat of the undersigned. Responsibility for it, and for anyerrors th ereader maydiscover, is solely theirs.Washington, D. C.18June1954 CHARLESF.ROMANUSRILEYSUNDERLAND


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ContentsPARTONE

Plans and Preparations for theNorth BurmaCampaign:October-December 1943Chapter Page

I. THELASTPREPARATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Combined Chiefs Order a North Burma Campaign . . . . . . . . . 9Improving theLines of Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11The B-29 Project Approved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5Chennault's Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Chennault's Proposals f o r 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2Building a n East China Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6The Allied Command Structure in North Burma . . . . . . . . . 28The Chinese Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2T h e American Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4T h e KachinRangers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36T h e Battleground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7Planning the North Burma Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39T h e Campaign Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8II. SEXTANT: THE WATERSHED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Drafting SEAC's Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9The United States Prepares for theSEXTANT Conference . . . . . 52The Chinese Prepare fo rSEXTANT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6Presenting CHAMPION a t Cairo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 9Trying T oReachAgreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3Over theWatershed: TheChanged Attitude Toward China . . . . . 67Stilwell'sSearchfo rGuidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1

SEAC TriesToSalvageBurmaOperations . . . . . . . . . . . . 75A Changing U.S. Attitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2


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PARTTWOThe North BurmaCampaign:December 1943-August 1944

Chapter PageIV . BREAKINGTH E STALEMATE INNORTH BURMA . . . . . . 119The ChiangsVisit Their Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 2Yupbang G a. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 4The Opponents Shape Their Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 9Enveloping th eJapanese Left Flank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 1The Capture of Taihpa G a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134Clearing the Taro Plain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136The Allies Reorganiefor theNext Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . 138Logistical Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 9Planning ToForceaDecision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 2U.S. Infantry for theSecondPhase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 46T h e Operation Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 8GALAHAD's Fight at Walawbum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151T he Big SqueezePlay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 9V . T H E BURMACAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE . . . . . . . . . 16 0T he SEXTANT Decisions Challenged . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160The Japanese Create More Command Problems . . . . . . . . . . 165Mountbattenand Stilwell Meet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169The Chiefs of Staff Reject CULVERIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171The Japanese Attack Forces Hump Diversions . . . . . . . . . . 172Inkangahtang:AnAttempt T hat Failed . . . . . . . . . . . . 175TheJapanese Delaythe 1s tBattalion,507th . . . . . . . . . . . 183

Delay at Jambu Bum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185The Siege o f Nhpum G a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 88Air Supply Problem at Imphal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191The Chindits GoBack toBurma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196T h e Question o fMyitkyina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 0Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 3

V I. T H E DRIVE F O RMYITKYINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 04The QUARTERBACK Calls an EN D RUN . . . . . . . . . . 20 4The22dDivisionan d the Drive on Kamaing . . . . . . . . . . . 207The 38thDivision: TheGeneralissimoandStilwell . . . . . . . . 211TurningTanaka's Flank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213


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Chapter PageVII. LOGISTICS A N D ADMINISTRATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 7T h e HeadquartersReorganied. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 7S O S Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 9

Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 0Clearing th e Port o f Calcutta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 3Railway Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 5Military Railway ServiceBeginsI ts Work . . . . . . . . . . . . 266Changes i n Operating Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 7Operations Under Military Railway Service . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 9Physical Improvements on theRailway . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 1A British A p p r a i s a l. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 2Attempts To UseIndian River Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . 273PipelinesinIndia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274Supply Problems in India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276N ew Agreements o n Local Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 77Housekeeping Problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280Chinese Lend-Lease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281Medical Problemsin theRear Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284Logistical Problems inChina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 3

PARTTHREECommand Problems inChinaTheater

VIII. DECISIONST O ATTACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 7"Money Is theRoot of Al l OurTrouble" . . . . . . . . . . . . 297AmericanMilitary ObserversinNorthChina . . . . . . . . . . . 302SEAC andStilwell Obtain Pressure onChiang . . . . . . . . . . 304The Generalissimo Warns o fTrouble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 6The President Demands Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 9TheChineseDecideToCrosstheSalween . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312Chennault Renews H i s Warnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 4Operation ICHIGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316East China' s Defenders on the EveofICHIGO . . . . . . . . . . 320Initial Reactions t oICHIGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 2The EastChinaArmy Written O ff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 7


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Chapter PageX . FACING T H E COMMANDPROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361Stilwell's Mission Laid Aside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362Stilwell Called toChina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364Chennault Given 10,000 Tons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 7TheJapanese DriveRolls on in East China . . . . . . . . . . . 371Vice-President Wallace Suggests Stilwell's Recall . . . . . . . . 374Stilwell Nominated for Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379The Generalissimo Agrees " in Principle" . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 4The Ledo Road Project Reduced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387Slow Progress Across the Salween . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389TheBattleforSungShan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 4Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 8

XI. THE CHINA CRISIS O F 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399The Defense o f Heng-yang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 9Japanese Successes a n dChinese.Po litics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 1The East China Crisis Grows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 5T heHurley-Nelson Mission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 3Washington Plans To En dStilwell'sLend-LeasePowers . . . . . . 418T h e Talks Begin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 2American Proposals,12-13September1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . 426Stilwelland theQuestiono f theCommunists' Role . . . . . . . . . 430Crisisin theEast,Crisisin theWest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433" I D o No t Seekt h eJob" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3 6T h e President Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 2

XII. TH E E ND OF C BI THEATER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443T h e Note Delivered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 3T h eG eneralissimo'sWrath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 7Deadlock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 1E n d o f th eDeadlock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 6TheGeneralissimo Placesth eBlame. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 60Waitingf o rt h eDecision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 4The PresidentEndsC B I Theater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 8Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 1BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 3GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8 1


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Charts o Page1. Stilwellin the CBIChainofC o m m an d :December 1943-June 1944 ... 62. Organizat ion of U.S. Forces, Ch i na , Burma and Ind ia : November1943-April 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 . Chih H u i P u . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 04 . Japanese Organizat ion a n d Disposi t ions:November 1943 . . . . . . . 4 35. Tonnage Shipped From India to China b y A i r : 1944 . . . . . . . . . 11 26 . Schematic Order of Bat t le of the Chinese Expedit ionary Force . . . . 33 37. Tonnag e Forwarded by USAF SOS CBIAdv ance Section toNorth Burma;J a nua r y 1944-May 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 08. Organization of the China Expeditionary Army: 15 Sep tem ber 1944 . . 406

Tables1. TonnagesShipped to BurmaOverBurma-SiamR a i l way :November1943-August 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 42. AverageDailyTraffic at Terminals ofPrincipal BranchLineso fJapanese-Operated Railways in Burma:January 1943-August 1945 . . . . . 9 63. Tonnage Delivered to Nor thern Combat Area Command by Air : Apri l1943-March 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 54. Strength ofU.S. A r my Forces in theChina-Burma-IndiaTheater:Janu-ary-September 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 85. Fourteenth Air Force Aircraf t Inventory by Type of A i rc ra f t : March1943-December 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 0

Maps1. India-ChinaCom munications System,October 1943-October 1944 ....... 112.The Battleground.................................................................................. 373. ALBACOREPlan,8August 1943 .............................................................. 404. Entering the HukawngValley,October 1943........................................ 445.Disposition of Forces, 1December 1943................................................ 1206.Operations inNorthern Hukawng Valley, Janua ry 1944........................ 1327. Advance to Walawbum, 23February-4 March 1944............................... 1448. Fight atWalawbum, 4-8 March 1944 .................................................... 151
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IllustrationsPageThe Kweilin Infantry TrainingCenter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7

A Squad of Kachin Rangers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7Cairo Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 0Chiang Kai-shek at Ramgarh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7Bombing of Bridges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3Kickers Prepare toDropSupplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98Packing Supplies for Airdrop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 3Parachute-Covered Foxhole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 9Attack on YupbangGa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126Japanese Fifteenth Army Commander a n d Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 9GeneralStilwellandGeneralSun. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135Drainage Culverts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 0PipelineCrossing aStream . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141GeneralStilwella n dGeneral Merrill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 9A Chinese Cook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157Troops ofMerrill's Marauders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177DamagedM3A3Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186Troopsof the Chinese 22dDivision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209A British Antiaircraft Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227JapaneseDefensivePositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232Allied Casualties at MyitkyinaAirfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 4JapaneseTrenches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 6Artilleryin Action at Myitkyina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246General Stilwell a n dColonelHunter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 9The KingGeorge DockArea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263RailroadOperations i n India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 8Supplies in Open Storagein India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282Bridges Across theYellow River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324Gen. WeiLi-huang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334A n American Liaison Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 7American Engineers on the Burma Road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339ChineseTroopsCrosstheSalween . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342FootbridgeAcrosstheSalween . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344Air-SupplyDrops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 47Chinese2d Army Artillerymen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 3T h e Sung ShanMountainArea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 8Evacuationof Kweilin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373Vice-President Wallace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 5


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PART ONEPLANS AND PREPARATIONS

FOR THE NORTH BURMA CAMPAIGNOCTOBER-DECEMBER 1943


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CHAPTER I

The Last PreparationsLt. Gen.Joseph W. Stilwell's concern with command problems in China,Burma, and India can be traced to the A R C A D I A Conference in Washington,

December 1941,when Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt proposed to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek thatChina's leader become Supreme Commander of a United Nations "ChinaTheater."The Generalissimoagreedand, in replying,asked that ahigh-rankingU.S.Armyofficer be sent to China to be chief of staff of the Allied staff that theGeneralissimo proposedtoorganizeto help himcommand ChinaTheater. TheUnited States nominated Stilwell,and the Chineseagreed.Thisthen was thebasiccommandstructure ofChinaTheater,which wasgeographically synony-mous with China. The Generalissimo was Supreme Commander; all UnitedNations forces in ChinaTheater wereunderhim,whilehe in turn wasanswer-able to himself alone, in no way subject to anyother officer or agency of theUnited Nations.Gen. Ho Ying-chin wasChiefof Staff of the Chinese Armywhile General Stilwellwas the Generalissimo's joint (Allied) chiefof staff forChina Theater. The Chinesewere not willing to let Stilwell have a staff tohelp him carry out his duties as joint chief of staff to the Generalissimo, soStilwell tried to perform them himself with the aid of an interpreter and astenographer. And since Stilwell took this course, hisAm erican subordinateswereoften not awareof hisplansforChinaTheater.


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STILWELL'SCOMMAND PROBLEMSgovernors.Ofmatriel,theChinesesaidthey had about1,000,000rifles, 83,000machineguns,and 7,800 trenchmortars. Artillerywas so widely dispersed thatno division hadenough,but therewereabout 1,330cannon in China of diversecalibers andorigins.Units werefarbelow streng th;soldierswereunpaid,poorlyfed, and poorly clad; the diseasesthataccompany malnutrit ion and insanitarycamps were ramp ant. The Chinesehad not succeeded in creating a services ofsupply;consequently,troop movementsweremadeonlywith themost extremedifficulty, for trucks and motor fuel were almost nonexistent in China andtherewas no organization forkeepingup a steady flow ofrations totroops onth emarch. In his memorandums and staffstudies Stilwell always described theChinese Army as"immobile."After theJapaneseoccupied Burma in May1942anddestroyed the last lineofcom municationsbetween China and her Allies,Stilwell faced aproblem thatrequiredamultiplesolutionif he was to carryout hisordersfrom Gen.GeorgeC. M arshall,Chiefof Staff, U.S. Army,"to supportChina."

The solution that Stilwell proposed to the Chinese, British, and U.S.Governmentsin M ay andJune 1942w as to form within theChineseArmy anelite force of full-strength, well-fed, competently led andwell-trained divisions,thegapsinwhoseequipmentwould bemadegoodbylend-leaseaid. Tobringartillery, small arms ammuni t ion , shells, trucks, and spare parts into China,Stilwell proposed to retakeallBurma andreopen theline of communicationsfrom Rangoon toKunming.Oncethishadbeendone,and apowerful ChineseArmy,supported by an adequate line of communications, had been created,thenStilwell (andM arshall) believed the timewouldbe athandfor apowerfulair offensive againstJapan that would dealpunishing blows to theJapanesehomeland itself. While theseproposals werebeing considered by the severalgovernments, Stilwell in July 1942 organized the U.S. air force and servicetroops in China, Burma, and India into an American theater of operations,"U.S. Army Forcesin China, Burma andIndia."

From May1942toOctober 1943 Stilwell,withearnestsupport from GeneralMarshall and Secretary of War Henry L.Stimson,urgedhisproposals on theGeneralissimo. In Washington, Marshall and Stimson sought to enlist the


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THE LAST PREPARATIONS 5ingprogramin Yunnanwasbegun in March1943.The nucleusof an Americanliaison staffwas set up for the Yunnan divisions,orY-Forceas they came to becalled.But everystepof the wayStilwell and his subordinates had tocopewithwhat they believed to be apathy and indifference on the part of the Chinese.Aftera briefperiod in the fall of 1942,when it appeared that the Generalis-simomight be actively interested in reforming amajorportion of the ChineseArmy and joining in an offensive to retakeBurma, he statedthat operations inBurma in March 1943 could not beunder takenand invited at tention to whatmightbedone in China by asmall,effective air force.The commander of the Fourteenth U.S.Air Force in China, Maj.Gen.Claire L.Chen nau lt, believedthatStilwell, byconcentrat ingon reform of theChineseArmy andreopeningof the groun d linesof com munications to China,was compromising agreat oppor tuni ty to deal heavy and immediateblowsagainst theJapanese byair.Chafing at the restrictions placed on him by thesmall amount of supplies then being flown into China from India, GeneralChennau lt inOctober 1942finally put his case directly before the President. Hetold Roosevelt that with 105 fighters, 35 medium bombers, and 12 heavybombers,hecould open the way for the defeat ofJapan.By March 1943Roose-veltgaveunm is takable indication that he supported Chennault rather thanStilwell.At theTRIDENTConference inWashingtonduringMay1943,thedivergenttrends inU.S.policy finally cameinto theopen. The GeneralissimoasSupremeCommander ,China Theater,asked the Presidentto giveChennaul tthe logis-tical support that officer said would suffice. The President agreed, an d Chen-naultreceived first priorityon supplies flown into China.The War Departmentadvised againstgiving first priori ty to Chennaul t , because it feared that if theJapanese wereprovoked byChennault 'sairoffensive theywould sweepover theeastChinabases from whichthe FourteenthAirForceoperated.The Generalis-simo,however,gaveR oosevelthis personalassurancethat theexistingChineseforces could defend the eastChina airfields.The second major development at the TRIDENT Conference was that th eCombined Chiefs of Staff decided not to attempt the reconquest of allBurma


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6 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMSCHART 1STILWELL IN THE CBI CHAIN OFCOMMAND:

DECEMBER 1943-JUNE 1944

American authority was the creation of Southeast Asia Command (SEAC)underViceAdm. LordLouisM ountbatten asSupreme A llied Comm anderwithStilwell actingas hisdeputy.An ambitiousprogramofengineeringprojectswasbegun.WhenM ountbat ten visited China inOctober 1943 topresent his newcommand to the Generalissimo, the latterrequested that Stilwell berecalled.ThoughStilwell and the Generalissimowerenot ongood terms, though thelatter usuallyignored Stilwellboth personally and officially, this request cameimmediately after avery briefperiod in which theGeneralissimohadshownarenewed interest in Stilwell's proposals forreform of the Chinese Army,andtherefore it surprised an d angered Stilwell.


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8 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMSsuperiors,possibly fearing th ediplomaticconsequencesif the Chinese learnedthat the U.S. Government no longerattached importance to improving thecombatefficiency of the Chinese Army,never formally altered that as his pri-marymission. Instead, they tacitlyacquiesced in hisconclusionthat therewaslittle more he personally could do in China to carry it out, andgave him awhole seriesof added taskswhich,as the ArmyChiefofStafflater admitted toStilwell, added up to what Marshallcalled a"paramountm iss ion"onethatinterferedwith, andboreno relation to, his existingprimarymission.

Viewedas awhole,the wargave the United Na tions groundsforconfidence,thoughmuch hard andbitter fighting la yahead. In the Pacific, American andAustralian forces were battering through the outerJapanese defenses and by2 November 1943 were halfway up the ladder of the Solomon Islands. Oncethe islandbarrier of the Southwest Pacificwasbroken, Allied taskforcescouldrange more freely among th eJapanese island positions. In New Guinea, th eAlliedadvance wasalmost ready to turn thebarrierrepresented by New BritainIsland. But New Britain was many, many miles from Tokyo, and at times itmay have seemed that the twenty-threemonthssince7December 1941 haddone little to bring the Alliescloser toJapan. The most imm ediately hopefulaugury lay in that nightand d ay the dockyardcrews at PearlH arbor wereput-tingoil andwater,shells andfuel,intospanking-newaircraft carriers,destroyers,and cruisers, on landingcraft and transports; that Infantry and Marineofficerswere intentlystudyingmapsof the central Pacific. Occupationof keypoints intheGilbert Islands,Operation GALVANIC,wasimminent.In the Mediterranean, Benito Mussolini, the creator of fascism, had beenignominiously deposed on 25July 1943, and alittlemore than amonth laterItalysurrendered to the Allies.Apowerful Allied force thenlandedat Salerno(9 September). Eight days latersouthern Italy was firmly inAllied hands.In Russia, theG ermans wereretreating. In the summer of 1941 and againin that of 1942 the Germans had scored flashyvictories withoutbeing able tostrike a decisiveblow.On 5July 1943, theyopened their annualsummer offen-sive on the central front in Russia. In ten days the offensive had been haltedand the Red Army seized an initiative it never thereafter lost. ByNovember


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TH E LAST PREPARATIONS 9Of the three enemy s ta tesGermany, I taly, and Japan only Italy had as

ye t been invaded, and Germany andJapan still sheltered behind their outerdefenses. In the caseof Germany,th e bombers were flying over th e defenses,but in the caseo fJapan, systematicbombingof theJapanesehomelandwas asyetonly aproject for the future. China'sgeographic position,China'sassumedresources in manpower,might still play agreat,perhaps a decisive, role in theforthcoming attacks onJapan. How theseChinese resourcescould bebroughtto bear and theextentof British and American dependenceon them for victoryin th e Pacific wereamong th e major problems requiring solution in October1943.

Combined Chiefs OrderaNorth BurmaCampaignStilwell beganconcentrating on his commandproblemsabout 23October

1943, when he and hisim med iate superior fo roperations in Burma, AdmiralLord LouisM ountbatten,arrived in India after conferenceswith th e Generalis-simoin Chungking.1 Stilwell's first taskwas to aidM ountbatten in the prepara-tionof aplan foroperations in Burma tocarryout thedirectivesof theTRIDENTandQUADRANT (Quebec,August 1943) Conferences.2 With the lifting of themonsoon rainsin Burma, th ecampaign seasonw as at hand,and the timehadcome to break the blockade of China in the w ay prescribed by the CombinedChiefs of Staff:

1. to carry out operations for the capture of Upper Burma in order to improve the airrouteand establishoverlandcomm unications with China. Targetdate:mid-February,1944.2. to contin ue to build up and increase the air routes and air supplies of China, and thedevelopmentof air facilities withaview to:a. KeepingChina in the war.b. Intensifying operations against theJapanese.c. Maintainingincreased U.S. an d ChineseAirForces in China.d. EquippingChinese ground forces.3The Myitkyina (pronounced myi-che-na)-Mogaungareaofnorth Burmaacquired great importance because of this directive. In the first place, it sgeo-graphicposition at the southern tip of theh u m pof mountainsoverwhich th e


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10 STILWELL'SCOMMAND PROBLEMSconsumption and cut the payload. The airroute itself w as narrow, and itssaturation with transports sometime in the near future waspredicted. "WithMyi tky ina in Allied possession the transports would be able to use amuchwider,lower airroute.4Secondly,sincefall 1942theU.S. engineershadbeen building aroad southfrom Ledo,Assam,which wasintended to crossnorth Burma andultimatelylink with the old Burma Road. The Hukawng and Mogaungvalleys, downwhich th eLedo Roadwasbeing constructed, enterth eIrrawaddyvalley,whichis themosthabitablepart ofnorth an dcentral Burma,withina fewmilesof theMyitkyina-Mogaung area.Both towns are on the rail and road net ofprewarBurma, sowhen the Ledo Road reached them theengineering problemwouldbecomeone of improving existingfacilitiesrather than constructing new onesinthevirgin wilderness. Therefore, takingtheMyitkyina-Mogaungareawasthe prerequisiteto completing theLedo Road and openingaground line ofcommunications,with an all-weather road and agasoline pipeline, to China.

The purposeof theprojectedground lineof communicationstoChinawasnot to supply theChinese armiesor sustain the Chineseeconomy; aroad anda pipelinecannot support300 divisions incombato r sustain the life of severalhundred millionsofpeople.Atwo-w ay, all-weatherroad to China, whichwasthencontemplated, would,theArmy ServiceForces believed in the fall of1943,permit th e ultimate delivery of 65,000 tons amonth to Kunming. Vehicles,artillery, and small armsammunitionfromthis tonnage would enableStilwellto fill thegaps in theequipment of suchChinesedivisions as theGeneralissimomightpermit him to train andbringto full strength.sOncerevitalized,thesedivisions might, if theGeneralissimo concurred,seize aport on the Chinesecoastandsecureairfields from whichJapancouldbe systematically and heavilybombed.Normally, planning precedes logistical preparation, and logisticalprepara-tion, fighting. One of the noteworthy aspectsof theNorth BurmaCam paignof 1943-44 is that th e logistical preparations, th e planning, and the fightingproceeded simultaneously.The troops moved forward before thecommandersagreed on their plans, and thelogistical preparations were months in being


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TH E LAST PREPARATIONS 11Improving the Linesof Communications

The QUADRANTConference, held atQuebecin August1943,resulted in anambitious list of engineering projects fo r India and Burma to increase themovementof supplies from Calcutta to China (Map 1)1. An increase in theamountof aircargo being flown to China by the AirTransport Command (ATC) to 20,000tonsamonthbymid-19442. A road from India to China (theLedo Road) with an initial (January1945) capacity of30,000tonspermonth

3. Agasolinepipelinefrom Assam via Fort Hertz in northernmost BurmatoKunming4. A thin-walled 6-inchpipelinefrom Calcutta to Assam Provinceto supplythe AirTransportCommand airfields there5. A thin-walled 6-inchpipelineto China6. An American-operated barge line on the Brahmaputra River to bringsupplies forward from thegreat portofCalcutta to the Allied basesin Assam

7. Improvementof the Bengalan d Assam Rai lway6Basic to this program was the realization that many of the difficultieshobbling th e Allied effort in Asia sprang from th e fact that th e line of com-munications from Calcutta to the airfields andstorage depotsofAssamcouldnot bring supplies forward in sufficient quantity to support amajor effort inthe air and another on the ground. To General Headquarters (India), whichwas responsible for logistical support of the British and India forces on theborder ofBurma,Lt.Gen.WilliamJ. Slim,commanding theFourteenth Army,wroteon 30October1943:

The supplysituationasregards certaincommodities in the Army areais so seriousthatI consider itwill affect activeoperations andshould, therefore,bebrought to the attention ofth e Commander-in-chief [Gen.Sir Claude J. E. Auchinleck] and the General OfficerCommanding-in-Chief 11Army Group[Gen. SirGeorgeGiffard]. . . . Ingeneral terms,instead ofholding atonnageof65,000 tons which is the target for the supplydepot in thearea,onlysome 47,000 tonswereheldon 26 Oct 43,therebygivinganover-all[Slim'sitalics]deficiency of27%. . . .Taking up the supply situation area by area, General Slim noted that in theArakan district of Burma there was no hay for animal transport or clarified
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12 STILWELL'SCOMMAND PROBLEMSMountbatten waskeenly awareof the intimateconnectionbetween the Assamlineof communications and theprospectsof victoryand placedimprovementof the Bengalan dAssam Railway veryhigh on hisagenda.8Vital though it was, th e Bengal and Assam Railway was but part of theAssamlineofcom munications.The major factors lessening the efficiency of thelineofcomm unications were (1) thecongestedportofCalcutta,through whichsupplies for Assam and China entered India; (2) the inefficient rail lines andbarge lineswhich moved them forward; (3) the civilianagencies of the Gov-ernment of India which controlled the flow ofgoods an d personnel over thelineof comm unications. Inpoint oftime,th erailwaywasconsidered first, butultimately eachof the threefactors abovehad to be appropriately handled, andgasolinepipelines constructed,before asatisfactory solutioncould be reached.As adepressing backdrop to the war effort in Bengal, famine racked thatgreatprovince,in wh ich lay the all-important harborofC alcutta.T he ricecropof 1943 had failed tomeet the demands on it; the little skiffs andluggers thatplied the intricateBengalw aterwaysinpeacetimehadbeendestroyed byBritishauthority in 1942 forfear of aJapanese invasion, and theJapaneseoccupationofBurma had effectively cut off amajor sourceof Indianrice. Before the famineended, more than 1,000,000 Bengalis died. The famine held full and horriblesway in the fall of 1943; it was a heavy added burden on the already strainedprovincial and central authorit ies,whose reactions to the needs of waralongIndia's eastern frontier must be judged against the emergent needs of Indiaherself.On 23 October when Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell visited India, theAmerican supply expert volunteered to provideU.S.railwaytroops to assumesome of the burdens of operating the Bengal and Assam Railway. His offerbegan adiscussion between interestedagencies of theGovernmentof India andSEAC. As a result of the initial exchanges th e director of transportation ofGeneralH eadquarters ( India) and thegeneralmanager of the railwaymade arapid survey of the problems that would be created if Americans helped tooperate key sections of the line. Their report agreed to U.S. assistance. TheGovernmentof India wasguided accordingly,accepting it on 6November,an d


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THE LAST PREPARATIONS 13Battalion, and the 721st, 725th , 726th, 745th, and 748th Railway OperatingBattalions. Eachbattalionwas less its maintenanceof way company, for the useof Indian labor was contemplated. Col.John A. Appleton, former generalmanager of the New York zone of the Pennsylvania Railroad,arrived in Indiaon 16 November as amember of the Appleton-Inglis RailwayMission. Hewas known to be the War Department'schoicefor thepost of director of theproposed Military Railway Service.10Therefore, as of mid-November 1943it was agreed by all concerned thatAmerican troops would assist in operatingcertain key sections of the Bengaland Assam Railway. Exact definition of the sections and the conditions ofoperationwerebeingnegotiated, and thetroopmovementwasunderway.A factor in these negotiations was the report submitted byCol.Paul F.You nt, of theTransportation Corps. Sent bySom ervell from Iran,wherehe hadsucceeded inincreasing theamountoftonnagecarriedby the Iranian rail systemto 500percent aboveprewar standards, Yount madearapid reconnaissanceoftheBengalandAssam Railway. His report of 10November stronglysuggestedthat more efficient and more vigorous operating methods, rather than th etedious processesofrebuildingth e railway,wouldbringa sharpandimm ediateincrease in thetonnagecarried.11 The greatestdeficiency, hebelieved,wa s lackof an aggressive, adequate supervisory staff between management and actualoperatingpersonnel.Mid-Novembersa wmajor personnel changesamong the menguiding th elogisticeffort. General Wheeler,chosen byAdmiral Mountbat ten to"push"improvements in the transportation system,became principal administrat iveofficer of SEAC on 15November. Lt.Gen.SirWilfred Lindsell,offered for thesamepostbyGen.SirAlan Brooke,Chiefof the ImperialGeneral Staff, becameinstead principal administrative officer fo rGen.Si rClaudeJ. E. Auc hinleck'sIndia Command. General Wheeler was succeeded in command of the SOS,CBI, byMaj.Gen.William E. R. Covell.12

At the extreme northeastern end of the vital railway line, construction ofth e Ledo Road wasresumed as the end of the rains and thegradual dryingofthegroundpermitted work to begin.The849thand1883d Engineer Aviation


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14 STILWELL'SCOMMAND PROBLEMSmaster Regiment, the 209th Combat Engineer Battalion, and the 1905thEngineer Aviation Battalion.

From the end of October to the end of November, the lead bulldozeradvanced over twenty-two miles, to mile82.35 from Ledo. To speed construc-tion, three bulldozers left the village of Nawngyang on 28 August to maketheir wayover a trail, once used by the refugees fleeing Burma in 1942, to thevillage of Namlip Sakan, which lay on the trace of the Ledo Road. Progresswas extremelydifficult, but the dozer crewsbrought their machinesthroughth emonsoon rains to theirgoal on 5October 1943. FromNamlipSakan theybegan cutting trail in both directions, back toward Ledo an d forward intoBurma. With dry weather from late October, actual road construction, asdistinguished from clearing the way, madegood progress. Anticipating thatth eroadwouldsoonbethrough the mou ntainbarrierinto th eHukawngValley,Colonel Pick sent nineteen men ahead to thevillageof Shingbwiyang(mile103from Ledo on the southern end of the Patkai Range) to establish a supplydepotfor the first truckconvoy. AtShingbwiyangPick's little supplydetach-mentw asaboutone third of the way to Myitkyina.1 3Surveyingthe engineeringprojectson 1November,the SOSchiefengineertoldGeneral Somervell that betterprogresswould bemadewith theLedo Roadonce the men and machinery on requisition were deployed south of Shing-bwiyang, but he warned, "Over-optimism on road construction, if moreevidenceisneeded than that furnished atLedo,and on roadcapacity,wouldnotbe indulged in if the true lessons of the Alcan and Pan American Highwaysweregenerallyknown."1 4 Somervellbelieved that the LedoRoadwould reachPao-shan, China, by 1November 1944, an estimatewhich was, of course, anengineering one since no one could foresee jus t when theJapanese would bedriven from th etrace of the LedoRoad.15In November the construction of pipelines that would ultimately stretchfrom India to China began. Shortly after the QUADRANT Conference theaterauthoritieshad decided to abandon theFort Hertz pipeline. Proponentsof thisroutehadlongargued that constructing apipelineb ythisshort routemight beenoughwhen added to theHump airlift to support the Fourteenth A irForce


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THE LASTPREPARATIONS 15was feared that unavailable heavy-walled pipe would be needed for the line;and finally, (4) aparallelroadwould be necessary to maintain theline.Insteadof the Fort Hertz pipeline,a thin-wa lled 4-inch pipelinewould bebuiltparallel to the Ledo Road. Thin-walledpipewas air transportable, and sothe linecouldbe built from bothends toward ameeting somewherein Burma.Assoon aspossiblea second linewas to be laid from India,using heavierpipewhere advisable,sothatultimately therewouldbe twopipelines from India toChina,one carryingaviationgas for the ATC and theFo urteenthAirForcean done carrying truck fuel. Construction began in November.17The 6-inch pipelines from tanker terminals in Bengal to Assam wereproperlypartof theAssam lineof communications; theirbuildingpresented nopart icular engineering problem. Construction of the line byeight engineerpetroleum distribution companies assisted by7,000Indian laborers wascon-templated. As1943 ended, final preparations werebeing made to begin th eworkinJanuary1944.18

TheB-29 Project ApprovedA new burden was added to the already overstrained China-Burma-Indialogistical structure in fall 1943,the B-29's of the XX Bomber Command. In

August 1943t he A r m y Air Forces (AAF)planners had suggested bombingJapan into submission with an enormous force of heavy bombers based inChina andsupported byswarms of transports flying from Indianbases.19Askedto comment,Maj.Gen. GeorgeE.Stratemeyer, Headquarters,U.S.A r m y AirForces, India-Burma Sector,pointedoutthat in order to support the AAFplanth eportofCalcuttawould require tremendousexpansion,com munications onagrand scalewould have to be installed,north Burmawouldhave to be clearedby 1July 1944, and avariety of other Herculean projects would have to besuccessfully completed by that early date. As a substitute plan Stratemeyer'sstaff offered TWILIGHT.20TWILIGHT assumed thatnor th Burmawouldbe free ofJapaneseby 1July1944 sothat the Ledo Roadmight speedilygo throughto China,and further


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16 STILWELL'SCOMMAND PROBLEMSExamining TWILIGHT, the Operations Division of the War Department

remarked that the concept of staging India-based bombers through Chinaoffered the onlyhopeo fbombingJapan fromChinese bases in March and April1944 withoutmajor interferencewith otheroperations in CBI andwith ahighdegreeofsecurity from a Japaneseground reaction.The Operations Divisionunderstoodthat Cheng-tuinwestChina would be theB-29 Chinabase. Con-sistent with the views it had expressed when the President was approvingChennault'splans in May 1943, the Operations Division feared that amajorJapanesereactionwould overrun the Kweilin-ChangshaFourteenthAirForcebasesin eastChinaif the B-29'swerebased there.In thelightof theforegoingfactors, theChina-IndiaSection of theTheater Group,Operations Division,and the Strategyand Policy Group,Operations Division,both recommendedthatthe B-29 projectfor CBI be pushed to completion withbasesatCheng-tuand Calcutta.21TWILIGHT'Sconception of the B-29'shadbeen that of aclub,bludgeoningJapan into submission. In November 1943 theideagrew in Washington thatthe airweapons could be used like astiletto,striking the vitalspots witha fewskilledblows.TheJapanesecoke ovens seemed to offer awonderful target.Iftheywere destroyed, surely theJapanesesteel indus trywouldbe crippled. Inthe fallof 1943 theForeign EconomicAdm inistrat ion,theCommitteeofOper-ations Analysts, and the Office ofStrategicServices (OSS) agreed inbelievingthat theJapanese steel indust ry was producing to the limit of its capacity,which th e analysts set atabout13,690,000tons annually,an accurateestimate,for 13,970,000 tonswas correct.However, theyerred inbelievingJapan'ssteelindustrywasproducingat capacity,for it wasnot,by5,138,000 tons.Shortageof rawm aterials,not shortageofplant,washobbling theJapanese.Th erefore,attacks on steel plant facilities had to destroy 5,000,000 tons capacity beforethey cutcurrentJapanese steel production.

Fourteenth Air Force attacks on Yangtze River iron-ore carriers weredirectlycuttingJapanesesteel production,but thiswas not realizedat thetime.The highlypublicized attackonJapaneseoceanshipping,forwhichsuchclaimshadbeen madeand suchhopesentertained,w as relatively minor in its effects,


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18 STILWELL'SCOMMAND PROBLEMSChennault's Operations

The autumn months of 1943found th e Fourteenth AirForce behind th eschedule set for it by the Chennaul t Plan of May1943, because th e plan hadbeen put intooperation before its logistical requirementswere on hand.Gen-eralChennault hadproposed togain airsuperiority inChina inAugust1943,then toattackJapaneseocean shipping,and in the last phaseto useB-24'sforstrategicbombingof Formosa,the Shanghai-Nanking-Hankow triangle,andJapan itself. To do this, which he thought wou ld force th eJapanese in sixmonths to begin abandoning theiroutlying Pacificholdings,he requested 150fighters,48B-25's, and 35B-24's, plusphoto reconnaissancecraft. For supply,he asked4,790tons permon th fromJuly to September, and7,129tonsmonthlythereafter. At TRIDENT,Washington, M ay1943,th ePresidentgavehim firstpriorityonHump tonnagefor alimitedtime.27Events did not go asChennault had hoped. Reinforcements wereslow inreachinghim.Humptonnage deliverieswerenot in thequantities contem-platedatTRIDENT.TheJapanesereacted vigorously,and flyingweatherwasoften bad. Chennault felt p ro found ly discouragedas his long-sought oppor-tunityseemed to beslipping from him.

Then in September1943 the picturebrightened.Hump tonnage(allcar-riers)improved from th e 5,674tonsof August to6,719 tons inSeptember androseto8,632 tonsin October.Fromthesem on th ly deliveriesthe FourteenthAir Forcereceived 3,038tons, 4,575 tons, and4,225 tons, respectively. Rein-forcements arrived for the FourteenthAirForce,and it swiftly began to changefrom the semiguerrilla force ofearlierdays to apowerfulweapon, whosesubor-dinate commands had areaassignments. Arrival of the 25 th and 26thFighterSquadrons inOctober reunited the51st Group.Chennault was then able to putfighters on astring of fields from Heng-yangto Kweilin in theHsiangvalley.Some missions were on occasionstaged through newer fields 200 miles east ofKweilin. Sixteen P-51's, battered but still flyable, joined Chennault. Becausehisair-raid net andnewlyformed radiointelligence teamswereworking betterthan ever, Chennaultfound his fighterpilots spending moreandmoretime


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THE LAST PREPARATIONS 19tons inNovember. Simultaneously, th eJapanesestirrings in northeast Burmathat preceded the enemy drive on Indiagavethe308th BombardmentGroup(H) achancetodrop bombson Burmesetargets whilei t engagedin itsroutineferrying ofsupplies.29The Fou rteenth Air Force was now just able to reach beyond China 'sbor-ders for a few blows at Japan or Formosa. Heavy bombers and long-rangefighters wereon h a n d . Staging fields near the coast were ready, and one ofthem, Suichuan, wasstocked to permit a mission or two to be flown from itagainst Kyushu or Formosa. On 31October aphotographicreconnaissance air-craft from Suichuan photographed amajorJapanese shippingconcentration inthe Sasebo-Nagasaki area. Chennault at onceasked Stilwellfor permission tostrike it, and Stilwell as promptly relayed th e question to Gen.Henry H.Arnold, Commanding General,ArmyAir Forces.30Arnold congratulated Chen-nault on hisaggressivespirit,but forbade attacks onJapan. Presumably, he didnot desire to alert th eJapanesehomedefenses by a fewsporadic attacks whenth e B-29'swerebeingprepared for asustained effort.31

Thoughgreatlydisappointed because it wasordered to avoidJapan,and byimplicat ion also ordered to omit Phase III of the Chennaul t Plan, the Four-teenth AirForce immediately settledon Shinchiku,Formosa, siteo f abomber-modification factory and acomba t training center, as an alternate target. OnThanksgiving Day,in a meticulously planned, precisely executed tacticaldemonstration that lasted twelve minutes, 8P-5A's, 12B-25's, and 8 P-38'sscored42Japaneseaircraft in one pass over the target.Exploiting th eJapaneseembarrassment,B-25's,working in pairs, employed their skip-bombingtacticsto account for several cargo ships in the Formosa Strait dur ing the next fort-night.32By November th e concentrationof aircraft strength in east Chinabroughtintosharp focus the long-neglectedline of communica t ions from Kunmingeastward to theHsiangvalley fields and beyond.Novembersaw the FourteenthAir Forcereceivetonnageat alevel (4,700 tons) that Chennault hadhoped tosee achieved sixm o n th s before. But tonnageatK u n m i n gwas just the begin-ning. The line of communications from Kunming to Chennault 's forwardfields, line ofcomm unica tions (known ELO C ) ,was


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STILWELL'SCOMMAND PROBLEMSabottleneck. Current ly operated by the Ch inesefor it will be recalled theGeneralissimowasSupremeCommander,ChinaTheater,andU.S.resourcesin China were limited to what came over the H u m p t heELOC's estimatedcapacity of1,500tons amo n th barely supported tw o fighter squadrons in eastChina from M ay1943on. Now,with three more fighter and two mediumbomber squadrons in east China, th e ELOC had to increase it scapacity, andChennault commenced tostressitsproblems.33Chennault 's attack on Formosa had been made while severalstaff officersfrom China Expeditionary Army,Lt.Gen. ShunrokuHata commanding, hadbeen visitingImperial General Headquarters topreparean dco-ordinatefutureplans.With the campaign in the Solomons and New Guinea runningagainsttheJapanese, Imperial General Headquarters had rejected aplan to destroy theGeneralissimo's govern me nt tha t General Hata hadproposed. Instead it hadtoldhisrepresentative abo ut 17October thatbeginninginDecember1943theJapanese3d,13th, 52d, 22d,35th,and36thDivisionswould be sent from Chinato face the Americans in the Pacific, and that in the springandsummerof1944fivemoreo fHata's divisionswouldassemblein theirpresentoccupationalareasto form Imperial GeneralHeadquarters' general reserve.Hata, as of 1August1943,had 620,000men,formed into 1 armored and 25infantry divisions,plus12 brigades (of five infantry battalions each). Of the 25 infantry divisions,5wereClass A,with three battalions of artillery (36 cannon) , 5wereClass B,with tw o battalionsof artillery (24cannon) , and the remaining 15 divisionshad no artillery. The projected transfers would take away4 ofHata'sClass Adivisions,1ClassBdivision,and 1ClassCdivision.Thiswould cutdeeplyintoHata'sstrength,for the replacementswould be rawtroopsthathewouldhaveto organizeand train as units. So the missionHatawas nowgivenprobablyreflected anappraisalof his current situation.He wasordered in October 1943". . . to maintain security in the occupied areas.Enemy airforces were to beattacked at all times in order to prevent their making raids on theJapanesemainland."In November, Hata's liaison officers weretold,by the Chief of theGeneralStaffamong others,that th e Allied airforce inChinawasdisturbingJapanese


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THE LAST PREPARATIONS 21weeksbeforethe attackonFormosatheJapanese11thArmyhadbeen movingacross th eTung-tingLakearea towardChang-te. Itsostensible mission was todisrupt Chinesetroop concentrationsin the VI and IX W ar Areasand to divertChineseforces from Yunnan, but the primary objectivewas to seizerice.Undercover of bad weather, the11thArmy had completed its approach while theFourteenth Air Force wasforced to remain on theground.When the weathercleared at the end ofNovember, fighter squadrons atHeng-yangand Ling-linghadbeenonconstant calltosupporttheChinese divisionsdefendingChang-te.On 4DecemberChang-te fell, but apart from its value as a ricecenter th e townheldno further attraction for11thArmy.Oncethe VI and IX War Areas hadbeen shakenup, thellthArmywithdrew. Imperial General Headquarters had amore important mission for it andwanted th e11thto take its place in the massof maneuverTokyonowdecided to assemble.As the last shotswerebeing fired around Chang-te, the highest officers inImperial General Headquarters, the WarMinistry, and the Naval General Staffwerewatching or activelyparticipating in far-reaching map maneuvers,bear-ing the code name TORA. TORA was planned to test current hypotheses onthein tent ionsandcapab ilitiesofJapan'senemies,tosuggestastrategywithwhich to counter Amer ican plans in the Pacific,and to examine"the merits,theplanning,and the militarystrength"involved intaking KweilinandLiu-chow ineast China.When TORA endedit wasagreed to takethe east Chinaai r bases and thereby"check" Allied airattacks from China. Plans and prep-arations weresoonunder way.35The battles aroundChang-teweremost significant in the Fourteenth AirForce'sanalysisof its position in China.Operationsover Burma in 1942 con-vinced theFourteenth AirForce in Maythatairpowerhad kept th eJapanesefrom crossing the Salween. It further believed thatits later sweeps over Burmahad so disrupted theirsupply systemthat th eJapanese wereunable to preparean offensive across the Salween. However, theJapanese had not contemplatedcrossingtheSalween. In May1943th e FourteenthAirForce hadsupportedthe Chinese troopsalongthe I -changGorge.The Japanese had fallen backfrom their most advancedpositions, and Chennault had claimed a decisivevic-


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STILWELL'SCOMMAND PROBLEMSproaches to C henn ault 's fields. The seeming successof combined Sino-Amer-ican operationsbefore Chang-te moved the Chineseto permit th e FourteenthA irForce to expand its radioand intelligence net within the IX War Area.36

Chennault's Proposalsfor 1944Chennaul thad been present inOctober1943when Mountbat ten ,Stilwell,and the Generalissimo discussed the QUADRANTdecisions on breaking theblockadeof China. It appeared to him that no definite decisions had been

reachedwith respect to the Burmacampaign." Such acampaignwould, hethought, m a k eit very difficult to launch his 1944China offensive and so heagain hastened topresent hiscase to hisArmysuperiorsbefore, in hisopinion,the United Nations were firmlycommitted to the B u r m acampaign. Chen-nau l t alsoappealed to the President,tellinghim thatit hadbeen impossiblefor th e Fourteenth Air Force to launch aneffective air offensive in1943.Onlynow werehisreinforcementscoming forward.37

The Chennaultproposals ofOctober1943were basically similar to thoseof thepreviousApril,but there was one interestingaddition.38If the General-issimo wasprepared to contemplatean offensive by theChinese Army againstHankow or Canton, th e necessary tactical air support operations could bemeshed intoth eover-allplan.Whereth e Aprilproposals had ofnecessitybeenhastily drafted byChennau l ten route to the TRIDENT Conference, those ofOctober showed agood deal of careful prel iminary staff work. It was mostnotable that theline of communications to the FourteenthAir Force's fieldshad been carefully studied, and that detailedsuggestions for its improvementwere included. In April, this aspect hadbeenomitted.Foroperational purposes,C hennault divided Chinainto eastern and west-ern areas,on the l ine of the 108th meridian.Weatherphases in the two areasare markedly different and influence the timing ofoperations.FromJanuaryto June,weather isgood in the west, thengrows steadily worse in summer. Inthe east, flying weather isgood fromJuly toDecember. Therefore, fromJan-uary toJune,Chennaultproposed to flymostof hismissions in west China in


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THE LAST PREPARATIONS 23destruction ofJapanese airpower and merchan tshipping.Perhaps, in theseprovisions, Chennault was offering acompromise to Stilwell, in linewith th epromisehe made inOctober to support Stilwell's plans.To supply his1944operations, Chennaultaskedfor:

EasternArea Western AreaTons) Tons)January.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 69February.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 69March. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 0 0 69Apri l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 0 0 5 4 0 0May. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 0 0 3 4 0 0June . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6200 2700

In addi t ion , Chennaul t wanted a reserve of 20,000 tons accumulated in eastChina before hisoperations opened up in full scale, which was to be inJuly.To acquire thesesupplies,Humptonnage would haveto average 12,000tons inthe first sixmonthsof 1944,and the Fourteenth Air Force receive every poundof it. The plan stressed th e impor tanceof insuringdelivery of supplies to theeast Chinabasesand gaveacarefully worked out plan to insurethis.Improve-mentof theeastern line ofcomm unicationswas estimated to require an initial4,000tonsover th e HumpinJanuary 1944plus500 tons amonthfor the restof the year. For aircraft, C h e n n a u l t wanted by fall of 1944to have 6 fightergroups,2medium bomber groups, and 3heavybombergroups.39Chennau l t dismissed the possibility of aJapaneseground attack on his airbases:6. Previous proposalsfo r aChina AirOffensive havebeen objected to, on thegrounds that"in CHINA th eJapanesecan go anywhere and takeany objective theywant,"and can there-forecapture and destroy our airbases.This theory is not founded on fact, for the followingreasons:A. The proponents of the theory t h i n k exclusively in terms of at ime when th eJapanesedominat ion of the air wasrarely challenged by a single Chinese aircraft. In the event thatplans for aChina Air Offensive are approved, the Allied armies will haveairsupremacyontheir side.Chinesetroops haveshown that with theencouragement ofeven amodicum ofairsupport, theyare farbetter able to withstand theJapanese. It may bepresumed thatJap-anese troops,suddenly confronted with th e transfer of airsupremacy to theirenemies,will


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4 STILWELL'SCOMMAND PROBLEMSC.Establishmentof airsupremacyby a China AirOffensive will further increase theJap-anese weakness of supply.Morethan95 per cent of the suppliesof theJapaneseArmies in

China from the Y A N G T S Z E RIV ER region Southward are carried inland on small,slowcom-monly unarmed river craft. As anexperiment, t ra f f i c on the Y A N G T S Z E RIV ER has been al-most totally interrupted for aperiodof a week with a force numberingnot morethan tw oscore aircraft.With sufficient forces, adequatelysupplied, this interruption can be consist-ently maintained, on other waterways as easily as on the Y A N G T S Z E . Th e enemy has nopracticable substitu tesupply lines foroperations on anyscale.Thusis it seen that a major enemy effort, both on theground and in theair,wouldbenecessary toattempt to interrupt aChina based Air Offensive. Ships carryingpersonnel an dequipment for such an effort into C H I N Awouldbe exposed to our landbased bombardment.Andtomake suchaneffort, theJapanesewouldbeforcedto abandonessential commitmentselsewhere.40

Therewereseveralmentionsin theplanofpossibleground operationsbythe Chineseto reoccupyportionsof China. It wassuggested that in the lastsixmonthsof1944support m ight begiven to Chinesetroopsinoperationsagainstth eCanton-Hong KongandI-chang-Hankow-Nanchangareas.After remark-ing tersely that"adequateChineseground forces must ofcoursebe maintainedin the airbase areas" the plan went on to state tha t in the last half of 1944"enemygarrisons in CHINA . . . will begravelyweakened"by airattacksonJapanese supply linesin China.If the GeneralissimothoughtChinesegroundforces "available" theJapanesegarrisons in Chinamight be at tacked. If anysuchoperationswereto be undertaken, then theChineseshouldbegiven"cer-tainkeyitemsofequipmentwhich theChinese Ground Forcesnowlack."4l

No documenthasbeen found togive Stilwell'sreactions to Chennault'sOctober1943proposals.However,at thetimehesumm arizedhis impressionsof the"networth"of Chennault 's1943 efforts as "a fewJap planesknockeddown [but] JapsarestillinChina."42Appraisingtheplan for Admiral Mountbatten,Maj.Gen,AlbertC.Wede-meyer, as SEAC's deputy chief of staff, commented that it was"essentially thesame as one previouslysubm itted byGeneralChennault severalmonthsago."Wedemeyernoted th a tthe ChennaultOctober1943proposals did not allotanyHumptonnagef orequipment of the Chinesearmiesthat weretoprotecttheeast Chinaair bases. Wedemeyer believed thatC henn ault greatly under-


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THE LAST PREPARATIONS 25planandconcurrently suppliesfor the rehabilitation ofChineseinternal linesofcom municationand for the Chineseground forces." InWedemeyer's opin-ion, th e fastest way tobegin intensive airoperat ions in Chinawas to open a"land and/orsearoute"to the Chinese airfields.43

What mustbe takenas the CBITheaterdecisiononChennault'sOctober1943proposalsw as the respons e ofGeneral Stratemeyer's headquarters, ArmyAir Forces,India-BurmaSector,on 16 November 1943.Thoughheliked thecareful phasing ofChennault'splan, Stratemeyer in effect rejected it with th eremarkthat "we are not yet in aposition logistically to support thisplan at thistime [Stratemeyer's italics] from a stores or a POL [petrol, oil,lubricants]standpoint." Stratemeyer raised tw opointswhich hebelieved wou ld determ inethescope ofCh ennault 's operations in 1944. Awarethat Chennaul t ' sHumppriority expired 31October,Stratemeyer told th eFourteenth Air Force com-mander that hecouldnot have theHumptonnageshe wanted,andthat Stil-wellw ascontemplatingadivision ofHump tonnagethat would providemorefor th e ChineseArmy.Stratemeyer's second point reflected th eim plicationsofbringing th eB-29's to CBI,andpractically assigned secondpriorityin air op-erations to the Fourteenth AirForce.

The President has indicated that the TWILIGHTplan will becarriedout and has cabledChiang Kai-shek togiveit hisfullest support.It is believed, therefore, that thegreatestgoodfor the War effort could be ob tained if our enti re resources were throw n in gear to supple-ment th e TWILIGHT plan (includingincreased weatherservice in China) and,inaddition,keepyour operations rate in Chinaagainst enemyshipping, defense of the air terminals andsupport of the Chinese ground forces at the highest rate possible under these logisticalrestrictions.44

StilwellinSeptemberhad wanted toreadjust Hump priorities togiveChen-nault aflat40percentofHumpdeliveries but Marshall had warned him to be-ware of the political im plicat ions of such an act .4 5 No w, a few weeks later,Stratemeyer signaled the end ofC henn ault 's prioritiesb ymerely stating thatStilwell"desires"to readjust Humpprioritieswithoutexplaining whether thiswasanorderof the thea ter commanderor had War Department sanction.46The records available reveal no protest from Chennault or attempt to haveStratemeyer overruled byhigher authority.Thereh adbeen significant changes

26 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS


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Buildingan East China ArmyNo less than Chennaul t , Stilwell had aprogram for east China,andtheircompeting claimson Hump tonnagedidmuch to explain the acr imonybe-tween the two men. LikeChenna ult's,Stilwell'sprogramwasbegun in 1942, tocarry out his War Departmentorders to imp rove thecombatefficiency of theChinese Army. Aspartof his over-all program to rebuild th e Chinese Army,Stilwell in early 1943 suggested to the Generalissimo tha t thirtyreorganizedand re-equippedChinese divisions should beplaced in east China.Stilwell re-

ceived W ar Department support for the project, and lend-lease for the thirtydivisions in eastChina (the "SecondThirty" they weresometimes called todistinguish them from the"FirstThirty"of the Thirty Division Program orthe Y-Force in Yunnan plus the Chinese Army in India). But the Chinesewaited many months , in fact until after th e QUADRANT Conference (August1943),before theywould consider the project.48On 1September, General Ho, theChineseArmy'sChiefof Staff, startled

Stilwellbyproposinga tentativelistof forty-five divisions, thinly spread fromth e Yellow River to the Indochinese border, from which a"C-Force" (latercalled ZEBRA Force) could beequipped,trained, and thenshaped intoausefulforce. Stilwellwasjubi lant , and wrote:"VICTORY That commits them to thetraining scheme. Subject to change, of course, but what astruggle that hasbeen. . . . If theJaps let us alone,we may put itover "Stilwellsaw the mis-sionsofZEBRA Force as: (1) to defend theeast China airfields; (2) todrive theJapanesefrom the Yangtzevalley; (3) toco-operatein anyAllied plans to landon the Chinacoast.49

Attempts to create th e ZEBRA Forcequickly revealed basic differences be-tween the Chineseand Am ericanapproaches to theproblem ofcreating aforcein east China. The Americans wanted to bring the chosen divisions up tostrength, weed out incompetent officers, train th e soldiers, and then issueshiningnew lend-leaseequipment.The Chinese wanted to receivethe equip-ment, then talk about training and reorganization. To Stilwell, this att i tudetoward ZEBRA Force was exactly like that the Chinese had taken towardthe Yunnan divisions or Y-Force. Nevertheless, after the Generalissimo ap-


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THE LASTPREPARATIONS 7

THE KWEILIN INFANTRY TRAINING CENTERAtthe time,Stilwellaskedthe War Department to reviewits 8July1943

program fo rChineselend-lease (asdistinct from th e 1944 supplyprogram).TheJulyprogram assigned lend-leaseto the FirstThirty, butonly 10percentofthe equipment needed by the ZEBRAForce, which token shipments weretobe used fo r instructional purposes. Stilwell wanted a firm War Depar tmentcommitment to arm the ZEBRA Force in full. Facedwith this request, the WarDepartmentstudied it in thelight of the QUADRANTdecisions, the limitationson the capacityof the Assamlineof communicationsand theHump airlift, and


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28 STILWELL'SCOMMAND PROBLEMSwhich followed acourseapproved by the Chinese,was carried on by 107U.S.officers and 71enlistedmen.Severalbuildings wereturnedover to the trainingcenter by the Chinese,and the Americanscontracted formanymore.Though infantry an dartillery training wasstressed,engineering,veterinary,medical, and signalcourses were offered. Trainingequipment, initially flownfrom Kunming,wasfurnished by theU.S.Army.The infantry course lasted sixweeks,of which the first three stressedweapons instruction andtargetpractice.The last halfof the coursewasdevoted to tactics,taking the individual officerprogressively to theregimental level. Eighty-nine interpretersgaveinvaluableaid. The student officers were placed intraining regiments,eachwith twelvecompaniesof 100studentsper company.After the first infantry classgraduated on 15December1943,GeneralArmsestimatedthatby 1 May1944,4,800infantry officers an d 2,730officers and menfrom other arms and services would havegraduated. Manifestly, this figurewoulddepend uponthecontinuedwillingness of the Chinese to send studentsto the trainingcenter,a willingness thatmightnot survive the WarDepart-ment decision tokeep equipmentforZEBRAForceat the 10percent level.52

TheAlliedCommandStructurein NorthBurmaImprovementsin theAssam lineofcommunications,thedecisiontoplacea force ofB-29'sinCBI,and a ttemp ts tostrengthen the Alliedposition ineast

China,were, as itdeveloped,bothbackground andaccompanimentto thepre-matureand u nscheduledopeningo fcombatinnorthBurma.Certainly,the lineof communications had to be renovated before the Allies could be sure ofthemselves, whilethepresenceof theB-29'saffected the courseofthingsinChina, but the principaleventin fall 1943was theopeningof theNorthBurmaCampaign.Whathad been contemplated wereroughly simultaneous attacksfrom India andChinaintoBurma but this was not to be.

The Allied forces in northBurma operatedunder avery complicated systemofcommand.North Burmawas withinSEAC's boundaries,andtherefore thechain of command began with the Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral


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THE LAST PREPARATIONS 29tions. Instead, Stilwelloffered to serve as acorpscommanderunder GeneralSlim,forwhom he had thegreatest faith and respect.Stilwell'sservice under Slim w as tocontinueuntil Stilwell's forces reachedth e Kamaingarea, at which pointhe was to regain independence of action. Itwas assumedthatwhen Stilwell's Chinese from Ledo reachedKamaing theywouldbe near ajuncturewith Chinesetroops from Yunnan Province.On join-ing, the two Chineseforceswould beunder Stilwell,who in turnwould bedirectlyunderMountbattenwithnointerveningechelonsofcommand.

Informed a fewweeks later ofStilwell's agreeing to forego rank and serveunder ajuniorheadmired,General Marshall offered aninterestingappraisalofStilwell on the eve of thelatter'sgreatest triumphs as afield commander.Mar-shallwroteMountbatten:

Youwillfind,if you getbelowthe surface, thathewantsmerelyto getthings donewith-ou t delaysandwillignoreconsiderations of his own personalprestigeor positionsolonga sdrive and imagination are being given toplans, preparationsand operations.

Frankly,Ihave found himuniformly throughlongyearsofpersonal commandrelations,irritating andintolerantof slowmotion,excessivecaution, and cut-and-dried procedure.Onth eother hand, hew ill provide tremendo us energy, courage andunlimited ingenuityandimagination to anyaggressive prop osalsoroperations. His mind is farmorealert than al -mostany of ourgeneralsand histrainingandunderstandingare on anunusuallyhighlevel.Impatience with conservatismandslowmotionis his weaknessbuta damnedgoodone inthisemergency.53Stilwell'scommand relation to the Generalissimoin north Burmawas ob-

scure. In 1942theGeneralissimo'satt itude had suggested thatStilwell wouldcommand th eChinese Army in India onlyuntiloperationsbegan. BySeptem-ber1943themostprobableChinesecommanderwas Lt.Gen.Chen Tung-kuo,commanding the New Firs t Armyheadquarters, ofwhom amemorandum inStilwell'spersonal file stated:"This officer may becapable, but he has not yetdemonstratedthe fact ... noconcernabout thebasicneedsof training,whichhedoesnot understand. He is notinterestedto learn from thebottomup. . . .As amatterof fact, there is no needwhatever forany army staff, aslongas theChih Hui Pu exists. . . ." 54 The Chinese38th,22d,and30thDivisionswere


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THE LAST PREPARATIONS 31


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American, but the headquarters was regarded legally and diplomatically asChinese. All orders to Chineseunitsinitially went on Chih Hui Pu letterheads,validatedb y Stilwell'schopat thebottom ascommandinggeneral.When th e38thDivision moved up to theLedoareain April 1943,Chih Hui Pu split intoaforward and rear echelon. The Forward Echelon was under General Boatner,who relieved GeneralWheeler and the Services ofSupply (SOS) ofrespon-sibility for the forward area.Brig. Gen. WilliamE. Bergin tookchargeof theRearEchelon.55BeforeG eneral Boatner could play hispart in the forthcoming campaign,he had to surviveaChineseattempt in September to removeh im, and a sug-gestion that Lt. Gen. Sun Li-jen, commanding theChinese38thD ivision,havea free hand in the approaching operations.Whatever th e abstract meritofhav-ing GeneralSunoneof the few Allied commanders to emergefrom the FirstB u r m aCampaign with enhancedrepu ta t ion pract ica l ly incommandof theNorthBurma Campaign,General Sun'shintthat heshould takeover wascastin aform that made it unacceptable. Sun'sletter to Stilwelltookso dismalaview of thecampaign,referred with suchgloomyrelish to theJapanesestrengthand the difficulties of the terrain,as to suggest heapproached the fight withextreme reluctance. Stilwell could hardlyhave entrusted thecampaignto a manwho hadgoneon recordashavingvery little faithin it. But Sun had the back-ing of the Generalissimo, at least forSun'swish that Boatnergo, and the Gen-eralissimo ordered Stilwell to relieveBoatner. Stilwellreplied that the com-mander'sdeputy, Boatner, mustbe able to com mandboth the Chineseand theU.S. service troops who would be supporting thedrive. Stilwell knew of noChinese officer ableto fi l l thatrole. If the Generalissimodid, let the officer benam ed and a simple, practical test begiven to determine th e question. Theissuewas dropped and Boatnerkepthispost.56The American personnel of Chih Hui Pu wereconcurren tly 5303d Head-quarters andHeadquarters Company (Provisional)Combat Troops. They func-tionedas an American headquarters for the American service and medical unitsin the Chinese Army, which had few such units.57 As American, British, an dIndian combat and service uni ts entered north Burma, they were attached or

32 STILWELL'SCOM M AND PROBLEMS


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combatzones, with the result that SOS in theforward zonewas duplicating thework of the combat troops insupportingtheChinese.59An importantmemberof Chih Hui Pu wasCapt.C. E.Darlington,who before the war hadbeendis-trictcommissionerof the HukawngValleyfor theGovernmentof Burma.Dar-lington was completely familiar with tha t section ofnorth Burma, had theloyalty and respect of the Kachin tribesmen who inhabited it, and was an un-failing sourceof advice and information.60

The Chinese ForcesThe Chinese 38thand 22dDivisionswere commandedbyGeneral Sun andLt.Gen. Liao Yao-hsiang respectively. GeneralSun,agraduateof theVirginiaMilitary Institute,was appraised as: "Agood field soldier,courageous and de-termined. Argumentative,insis tentondoingthingshisway;but muchcon-cerned over thewell-being of hisunit . A capablecomm ander." General Liao,agraduateof St. Cyr in France, was judged: "A good field soldier, courageous

and determined. He hasfaithfully compliedwith al l training directives,and asaresult his division is now fully asgood as the 38th, which had along startahead ofhim.Acapablecom mander ."6 lWhen the 22d and 38th com pleted their training at Ramgarh, the38thnumbered946 officers and 11,388enlistedmen, and the 22d,857 officers and10,439men. (See Chart3.) With servicea nd army troops, the Chinese Armyin Indiatotaled2,626 officers and 29,667 enlistedmen. Replacements werepro-vided and the two divisions wereactually slightly larger at the end of 1943.The a rmy and servicetroops included an"excellent"antiaircraft battalion, amotor regiment whichworked in the Ledoarea,anengineer regiment whichbuilt mostof the Shingbwiyangairstrip, ananimal transportregiment, and twoporter units to carry stretchercases.62The work horse of the campaign was the infantry regiment,with 129 of-ficers and 2,642enlisted men atTableofOrganization (T/O)strength. It hadthree battalions, each with three rifle companies and one machineg un com-pany. The battal ion had 27 Bren guns, 51submachineguns, and 1860-mm.63

THE LAST PREPARATIONS 33


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portation companies (one apack transport) , a signalplatoon, aspecial serviceplatoon,andmedical andveterinarypersonnel.Therewerefourteen radios andplentyof wireequipment.64Division artillerywas on the modest sidebecauseof terrain conditionsand was attached toregimentsas the situation required.As the campaignprogressed,thedemand fo rartillery supportgrew.As aresult,byJune 1944, onebattery of155-mm. how itzers and one of 105-mm. ho witzerswere firing in general support . Support bymedium and fighter bombers wasavailable on an increasing scale. Allied air superiority in north Burma wascomplete.

Becauseof theextremely difficult nature of theterrain innorthBurma,ex-tensive reliance was necessarily placed on animal transport, such as mules,horses, and Indian ponies. Each division hadabout 1,000 animals .Forage forth e animalswas regularly suppliedbyair.65A solution to the replacement problem had been arranged in that theChineseGovernment hadpromised to supply replacements; the success ofStil-wellinholdingtheChineseto thepromisewouldhaveagreatdealto dowithth eprogress of the campaign.Stilwell's staffbelieved that much ofwhat theytookto be theundue caution ofChinese commandersin theconductof oper-ationsarosefrom the lackof afunctioning replacement system.The Americansbelieved that the Chinesecommanderwhoseforce tookcasualtiesinbattle suf-fered aproportionateloss ofpower an d influence. Consequently, the Chineseappeared reluctant to embark oncombat operations.A steady flow of replace-ments from Chinawoulddo agreatdeal to ensureaggressivenessby Sun andLiao.66To exercisecommand,Stilwelldrew on his 1942 experiences and organizedan American liaison net down to and including the Chinesebattalions. EachChinesedivision had asmall staff of U.S. advisers,includingsupply , signal,medical,motor,andveterinary officers, under acolonel,who keptin touchwithChih Hui Pu througha division radioplatoon andthreeradio teams.Chineseregiments had a liaisonofficer of fieldgrade,with radio team;eachbattalionhad amajor or senior captainwith radioteam.It speakswell forboth Americans and Chinesethatoveraperiod ofmonths

34 STILWELL'SCOMMAND PROBLEMS


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orderswas a sourceofpotential difficulty, not only interpretation in the nar-row sense but in that of conveying the spirit as well. Important clauses, intranslation from English toChinese,werealways reinforcedwithparallel con-structions, sothat one clauseat leastmight be understood.Though no worsethanwhatother Amer icans faced in theSouthwest Pacific and alittlebetterthan what th eChineseborewith cheerful fortitude, conditions in the field forthe liaisonpersonnelwerestillhard and were astrain on thoseAmericans whoborethem.Therewas lacking the senseo ffraternitywith and close support byone's ownpeople, suppliessometimes vanished,andhostile Chineseofficerscouldmakelifemostunpleasant.67

The American ForceFor theprojected Burmaoperations, the War Departmenthad atlastsup-plied someU.S. infantry troops,though originally they were not intended to

operate underStilwell'scommand ,and in number werefa rfrom th e corps ofwhich Stilwell had alwaysdreamed. On 1September 1943GeneralM arshallhaddirected shipment of about3,000 volunteers to Asia to form threelong-rangepenetration groupson themodelofthosecommandedbyBrigadierOrdeCharlesWingate.The project wasgiven th ecode nameGALAHAD.O rganiza-tion of GALAHADbegan on 5Septemberand was completeon 20September.Given thedesignation of 5307thCompositeUnit (Provisional), theunitwasformed of volunteers from the continental United States, the 33d InfantryRegiment on Trinidad, BritishWest Indies, and from theSouthwest Pacific.The War Departmentdid not think that GALAHAD couldbe restoredafteraction by receiving replacements. The War Department told theater head-quarters itsconception wasthat th e uni twas providedfor one major missionof threemonths' duration,whoseclosemight find theunitso exhausted anddepletedthatitssurvivorswould require threemonths'hospitalization andrest.Through rumor ,this idea was conveyed to GALAHADpersonnel in the some-what different form that after three months' combat duty they would berelieved.68

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Americansdid not knowjunglefighting.But GeneralMarshall'sanswer to thisandother arguments of l ike tenor was the simple statement tha t all handswouldhaveto eatsomecrowifJapanwas to bebeaten.

69It may besurmisedthat the Chief of Staffbelieved no coalition could endureif one partner alwaysprevailed.That GALAHADwasunder SEAC's operational control, rather than underCBITheater directly, caused administrativedifficulties, fo rtherewas noprior

decision as towhich headquarterswould exerciseadm inistrativeresponsibil-ities. Nor was GALAHAD even activated as a uni t unti l several months hadpassed. Initially,OPD hadorderedLt.Col. CharlesN. Hunter,as"Command-ing Officer all Casual Detachments , shipment 1688," to prepare GALAHAD'Spersonnel fo rtheir future duties.70 On 13NovemberCBITheater headquartersordered Col. Francis G. Brink to be"officer-in-charge of training, GALAHADproject."Brinkwas ordered to dealdirectlywith RearEchelonheadquartersatNew Delhi on"all matters pertaining to administration andsupply."7 1 Butthisletterdid not activatet heunitnor did it makeBrinkcommandingofficer.As best he could under those uncertain conditions, Hunter discharged thedutiesof commanding officer, whileBrink and he trained the men underWin-gate's general supervision. As it developed, circumstances permitted twomonths inwhich toweld th e GALAHADvolunteersinto ahomogeneous force.In October,theater headquarters listed ablock ofnumbers from which aunit designationmightbetaken.Finally,inlate December, Huntercut the ad-ministrative tangleby activating the 5307thRegiment (Provisional),usingoneof theblock ofnumbers supplied by CBITheater headquarters.7 2As theunit took shapein India,it comprised three battalions,the 1st, com-mand ed by Lt.Col. WilliamL.Osborne, the 2d, by Lt.Col. GeorgeA.McGee,Jr., and the 3d, by Lt. Col. Charles E. Beach. Eachbattalion wasbroken downinto tw o combat teamsof 16officers and 456enlisted men. The combat teamhad ariflecompanyofthree ri

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Stillwell's Command Problems