Statutory Construction - Agpalo (Outline)

8/12/2019 Statutory Construction - Agpalo (Outline)

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CHAPTER ONE: Statutes

IN GENERAL

Laws, generally

• A whole body or system of law

• Rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory bylegitimate power of the state

• Includes RA, PD, EO (president in the e of legislati!e power", Presidential issuances (ordinance power"#urisprudence, ordinances passed by sanggunians of localgo!ernment units$

%tatutes, generally

• An act of legislature (Philippine &ommission, Phil$

Legislature, 'atasang Pambansa, &ongress"

• PDs of )arcos during the period of martial law *+-&onstitution

• EO of A.uino re!olutionary period /reedom &onstitution

Public 0 affects the public at large

• general 0 applies to the whole state and operatesthroughout the state ali1e upon all people or all ofa class$

• %pecial 0 relates to particular person or things of a

class or to a particular community, indi!idual orthing$

• Local Law 0 operation is confined to a specific place or locality (e$g municipal ordinance"

Pri!ate 0 applies only to a specific person or sub2ect$

Permanent and temporary statutes

• Permanent 3 one whose operation is not limited in duration

but continues until repealed$

• 4emporary 3 duration is for a limited period of time fied inthe statute itself or whose life ceases upon the happening ofan e!ent$

o E$g$ statute answering to an emergency

Other classes of statutes• Prospecti!e or retroacti!e 0 accdg$ to application

• Declaratory, curati!e, mandatory, directory, substanti!e,remedial, penal 0 accdg$ to operation

• According to form

o Affirmati!e

o 5egati!e

)anner of referring to statutes

• Public Acts 0 Phil &ommission and Phil Legislature *+6*3*+-7

• &ommonwealth Acts 0 *+-83 *+98

• Republic Acts 0 &ongress *+983 *+:, *+; <

• 'atas Pambansa 0 'atasang Pambansa

• Identification of laws 0 serial number and=or title

ENACTMENT OF STATUTES

Legislati!e power, generally

• Power to ma1e, alter and repeal laws

• >ested in congress 0 *+; &onstitution

• President 0 *+- ? /reedom (PD and EO respecti!ely"

• %angguniang barangay, bayan, panglungsod, panlalawigan 0

only within respecti!e 2urisdiction 0 ordinances

• Administrati!e or eecuti!e officer

• Delegated power

• Issue rules and regulations to implement a specificlaw

&ongress legislati!e power

• 4he determination of the legislati!e policy and itformulation and promulgation as a defined and binding ruleof conduct$

• Legislati!e power 3 plenary ecept only to such limitationsas are found in the constitution

Procedural re.uirements, generally

• Pro!ided in the constitution (for 'ills, RA"

• Pro!ided by congress 0 enactment of laws

Rules of both houses of congress (pro!ided also by the&onstitution"

Passage of bill

• Proposed legislati!e measure introduced by a member ocongress for enactment into law

• %hall embrace only one sub2ect which shall be epressed inthe title

• %inged by authors

• /ile with the %ecretary of the @ouse

• 'ills may originate from either lower or upper @ouse

• Eclusi!e to lower house

Appropriation

Re!enue= tariff bills

'ills authoriing increase of public debt

'ills of local application

Pri!ate bills

• After - readings, appro!al of either house (see Art 8 %ec :8

(*""

• %ecretary reports the bill for first reading

• /irst reading 0 reading the number and title, referral to theappropriate committee for study and recommendation

• &ommittee 0 hold public hearings and submit

report and recommendation for calendar for second

reading• %econd reading 0 bill is read in full (with amendment

proposed by the committee" 0 unless copies are distributedand such reading is dispensed with

o 'ill will be sub2ect to debates, motions and

amendmentso 'ill will be !oted on

o A bill appro!ed shall be included in the calendar o

bills for -rd reading

• 4hird reading 0 bill appro!ed on :nd reading will be

submitted for final !ote by yeas and nays,

• 'ill appro!ed on the -rd reading will be transmitted to the

BOther @ouseC for concurrence (same process as the firs

passage"o If the BOther @ouseC appro!es without amendmen

it is passed to the President

o If the BOther @ouseC introduces amendments, and

disagreement arises, differences will be settled bythe &onference &ommittees of both houses

o Report and recommendation of the : &onference

&ommittees will ha!e to be appro!ed by bothhouses in order to be considered pass

• Presidento Appro!es and signs

o >etoes (within -6 days after receipt"

o Inaction



• If the President !etoes 0 send bac1 to the @ouse where itoriginated with recommendation

o :=- of all members appro!es, it will be sent to the

other house for appro!alo :=- of the other house appro!es 0 it shall become a

law

o If president did not act on the bill with in -6 days

after receipt, bill becomes a law

• %ummary - ways of how a bill becomes a law$

President signs

inaction of president with in -6 days after receipt !etoed bill is repassed by congress by :=- !otes of all its

members, each house !oting separately$

Appropriations and re!enue bills

• %ame as procedure for the enactment of ordinary bills

• Only difference is that they can only originate from the

Lower @ouse but the %enate may propose= concur with theamendments

• Limitations of passage (as per &onstitution" Art 8 %ec$ : (:"

o congress may not increase the appropriation

recommended by the President o particular appropriation limited

o procedure for &ongress is the same to all other

department= agencies (procedure for appro!ingappropriations "o special appropriations 0 national treasurer= re!enue

proposalo no transfer of appropriations authority to

augmento discretionary funds 0 for public purposes

o general appropriations bills 0 when re3enacted

o President my !eto any particular item=s in an

appropriation re!enue, or tariff bill$

Authentication of bills

• 'efore passed to the President

• Indispensable

• 'y signing of %pea1er and %enate President

•

Fnimpeachability of legislati!e 2ournals

• #ournal of proceedings

• &onclusi!e with respect to other matters that are re.uired bythe &onstitution

• Disputable with respect to all other matters

• 'y reason of public policy, authenticity of laws should rest

upon public memorials of the most permanent character

• %hould be public

Enrolled bill

• 'ills passed by congress authenticated by the %pea1er andthe %enate President and appro!ed by the President

• Importing absolute !erity and is binding on the courtso It carries on its face a solemn assurance that it was

passed by the assembly by the legislati!e andeecuti!e departments$

• &ourts cannot go behind the enrolled act to disco!er whatreally happened

o If only for respect to the legislati!e and eecuti!e

departments

• 4hus, if there has been any mista1e in the printing of the bill

before it was certified by the officer of the assembly andappro!ed by the &hief Eecuti!e, the remedy is by

amendment by enacting a curati!e legislation not by 2udicialdecree$

• Enrolled bill and legislati!e 2ournals 3 &onclusi!e upon thecourts

• If there is discrepancy between enrolled bill and 2ournalenrolled bill pre!ails$

Githdrawal of authentication, effect of

• %pea1er and %enate President may withdraw if there idiscrepancy between the tet of the bill as deliberated and

the enrolled bill$

• Effecto

5ullifies the bill as enrolledo Losses absolute !erity

o &ourts may consult 2ournals

PARTS OF STATUTES

4itle of statute

• )andatory law 3 E!ery bill passed by &ongress shal

embrace only one sub2ect which shall be epressed in thetitle thereof (Art 8, %ec :8 (*" *+; &onstitution"

• : limitations upon legislation

o 4o refrain from conglomeration, under one statute

of heterogeneous sub2ectso 4itle of the bill should be couched in a language

sufficient to notify the legislators and the publicand those concerned of the import of the singlesub2ect$

Purposes of re.uirement (on * sub2ect"

• Principal purpose to apprise the legislators of the ob2ect

nature, and scope of the pro!ision of the bill and to pre!enthe enactment into law of matters which ha!e not recei!edthe notice, action and study of the legislators$

o 4o prohibit duplicity in legislation

• In sum of the purposeo 4o pre!ent hodgepodge= log3rolling legislation

o 4o pre!ent surprise or fraud upon the legislature

o 4o fairly apprise the people, through publication o

the sub2ects of the legislationo Fsed as a guide in ascertaining legislati!e intent

when the language of the act does not clearlyepress its purposeH may clarify doubt o

ambiguity$

@ow re.uirement construed

• Liberally construed

• If there is doubt, it should be resol!ed against the doubt andin fa!or of the constitutionality of the statute

Ghen there is compliance with re.uirement

• &omprehensi!e enough 3 Include general ob2ect

• If all parts of the law are related, and are germane to the

sub2ect matter epressed in the title• 4itle is !alid where it indicates in broad but clear terms, the

nature, scope and conse.uences of the law and its operations

• 4itle should not be a catalogue or inde of the bill

• Principles apply to titles of amendatory acts$

o Enough if it states Ban act to amend a specific

statuteC

• 5eed not state the precise nature of the amendatoryact$

• F% Legislators ha!e titles ending with the words Band foother purposesC ( F% is not sub2ect to the sam&onstitutional restriction as that embodied in the Philippine

&onstitution"



Ghen re.uirement not applicable

• Apply only to bills which may thereafter be enacted into law

• Does not apply to laws in force and eisting at the time the*+-7 &onstitution too1 effect$

• 5o application to municipal or city ordinances$

Effect of insufficiency of title

• %tatute is null and !oid

• Ghere, the sub2ect matter of a statute is not sufficientlyepressed in its title, only so much of the sub2ect matter as is

not epressed therein is !oid, lea!ing the rest in force, unlessthe in!alid pro!isions are inseparable from the others, in

which case the nullity the former !itiates the latter

Enacting clause

• Gritten immediately after the title

• %tates the authority by which the act is enacted

• * 3 Phil &ommission 0 B 'y authority of the President of theF%, be it enacted by the F% Philippine &ommissionC

• : 3 Philippine Legislature3 B by authority of the F%, be it

enacted by the Philippine LegislatureC

• - 3 Ghen : became bicameral B'e it enacted by the%enate and @ouse of Representati!es of the Philippines in

legislature assembled and by authority of the sameC

• 9 3 &ommonwealth3 B'e it enacted by the 5ationalAssembly of the Philippines

• 7 0 when 9 became bicameral Bbe it enacted by the %enateand @ouse of Representati!es in congress assembledC 0 same*+983*+:=*+;3present$

• 8 0 'atasang Pambansa B'e it enacted by the 'atasangPambansa in session assembledC

• 0 PD B 5OG 4@ERE/ORE, I JJJJJJ President of thePhilippines, by the powers !ested in me by the &onstitutiondo hereby decree as followsC

• ; 0 EO B5ow, therefore, I, JJJJ hereby orderC

Preamble

• Defined 0 prefatory statement or eplanation or a finding offacts, reciting the purpose, reason, or occasion for ma1ing

the law to which it is prefiedC

• /ound after enacting clause and before the body of the law$

• Fsually not used by legislations because content of the preamble is written in the eplanatory note$

• 'ut PDs and EOs ha!e preambles$

Pur!iew of statute

• that part which tells what the law is about

• body of statute should embrace only one sub2ect should onlyone sub2ect matter, e!en there pro!isions should be alliedand germane to the sub2ect and purpose of the bill$

• %tatue is usually di!ided into section$ w=c contains a single

proposition$• Parts

o short title

o policy section

o definition section

o administrati!e section

o sections prescribing standards of conduct

o sections imposing sanctions for !iolation of its

pro!isionso transitory pro!ision

o separability clause

o effecti!ity clause

%eparability clause

• it states that if any pro!ision of the act is declared in!alid

the remainder shall not be affected thereby$

• It is not controlling and the courts may in!alidate the wholestatute where what is left, after the !oid part, is not complete

and wor1able

• Presumption 0 statute is effecti!e as a whole

• its effect to create in the place of such presumption theopposite of separability$

PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES, RULES AND ORDINANCES

Presidential issuances

• are those which the president issues in the eercise o

ordinance power$

• i$e$ EO, AO (administrati!e orders", proclamations, )O(memorandum orders", )& (memorandum circulars", andgeneral or special orders$

• @a!e force and effect of laws$

• EOo acts of the President pro!iding for rules of a

general or permanent character in the

implementation or eecution of constitutionalstatutory powers$

o do not ha!e the force and effect of laws enacted by

congresso different from EO issued by the President in the e

of her legislati!e power during the re!olutionPresidential decree under the freedom constitution

• AOo acts of the President which relate to particula

aspects of go!ernmental operations in pursuance ofhis duties as administrati!e head

• Proclamationso acts of the President fiing a date or declaring a

statute or condition of public moment or interest

upon the eistence of which the operation of aspecific law or regulation is made to depend

• )O

o acts of the President on matters of administrati!edetails or of subordinate or temporary intereswhich only concern a particular officer or office ofgo!ernment

• )&o acts of the president on matters relating to interna

administration which the President desires to bringto the attention of all or some of the departmentsagencies, bureaus, or offices of the go!ernment

for information of compliance

• Keneral or %pecific Order o Acts and commands of the President in his

capacity as &ommander3in3&hief of the A/P

%upreme &ourt circularsH rules and regulations• %ee Art ;, %ec$ 7(7" *+; &onstitution

• %ee Art$ 8, %ec$ -6 *+; &onstitution

• It has been held that a law which pro!ides that a decision o

a .uasi32udicial body be appealable directly to the %&, ienacted without the ad!ice and concurrence of the %&ineffecti!e

o Remedy or applicable procedure 0 go to &A

• Rules of &ourt 0 product of the rule3ma1ing power of the %&o Power to repeal procedural rules

o 5o power to promulgate rules substanti!e in nature

(unli1e the legislati!e department"

• %ubstanti!e rules 0 if it affects or ta1es away !ested rightsright to appeal



• Procedural rules 0 means of implementing eisting rightHwhere to file an appeal for transferring the !enue

• Rules and regulations issued by the administrati!e oreecuti!e officers in accordance with and authoried by law,ha!e the force and effect of law

o Re.uisites for !alidity

Rules should be germane to the ob2ectsand purposes of the law

Regulations be not in contradiction with, but conform to, the standards that the

law prescribes 4he be for the sole purpose of carrying

into effect the general pro!isions of thelaw

o Law cannot be restricted or etended

o Law pre!ails o!er regulations, if there are

discrepancies

• Rule3ma1ing power of public administrati!e agency is a

delegated legislati!e power 0 if it enlarges or restricts suchstatute is in!alid

• Re.uisites for delegating a statute by legislati!e branch to

another branch of go!ernment to fill in details, eecution,enforcement, or administration of law$ the law must be

o &omplete in itself

o /i a standard which may be epress or implied

Eample of BstandardC 0 simplicity and

dignityH public interestH public welfareHinterest of law and orderH 2ustice ande.uity and substantial merit of the caseHade.uate and efficient instruction

• Eampleo &hange of Band=orC to BorC 0 in!alid

o &hange of BmayC(permissi!e" to BshallC

(mandatory" 0 in!alid (Krego ! &O)ELE& pp ::"

Administrati!e rule and interpretation distinguished

• Rule 0 Bma1esC new law with the force and effect of a !alidlawH binding on the courts e!en if they are not in agreement

with the policy stated therein or with its innate wisdom

• Interpretation 0 merely ad!isory for it is the courts thatfinally determine what the law means

• Administrati!e construction is not necessarily binding uponthe courtsH it may be set aside by 2udicial department (if thereis an error of law, or abuse of power or lac1 of 2urisdiction or

KAD 0 gra!e abuse of discretion"

'arangay ordinance

• %angguniang barangay 0 smallest legislati!e bodyH may passan ordinance by ma2ority of all its membersH sub2ect tore!iew by %angguniang bayan= panglungsod

• %angguniang bayan= panglungsod 0 ta1e action on theordinance within -6 days from submissionH if theres

inaction, it is presumed to be consistent with the municipal

or city ordinanceH if inconsistency is found, it will remand tothe %angguniang barangay)unicipal ordinance

• Lodged in the %angguniang bayan

• )a2ority of the .uorum !oting, ordinance is passed

• Ordinance sent to )ayor within *6 days for appro!al or!etoH if theres mayors inaction, ordinance is presumedappro!edH if !etoed and o!erridden by :=- of all members,

ordinance is appro!ed

• Appro!ed ordinance is passed to %angguniang panlalawiganfor re!iew

o Githin -6 days may in!alidate in whole or in part

and its action is finalH if theres inaction within -6days, it is deemed !alid

&ity ordinance

• >ested in %angguniang panglungsod

• )a2ority of the .uorum !oting, ordinance is passed

• %ubmitted to )ayor within *6 dayso Appro!e

o >eto 0 :=- of all members 0 appro!ed

o Inaction 0 deemed appro!ed

• If city or component city 0 submit to %angguniang panlalawigan for re!iew which shall ta1e action within -6

days, otherwise, it will be deemed !alid

Pro!incial ordinance

• %angguniang panlalawigan 0 ma2ority of .uorum !oting passage of ordinance

• /orwarded to the Ko!ernor who within *7 days from receipshall

o Appro!e

o >eto 0 :=- of all members 0 appro!ed

o Inaction 0 deemed appro!ed

VALIDITY

Presumption of constitutionality

• E!ery statute is presumed !alido Lies on how a law is enacted

o Due respect to the legislati!e who passed and

eecuti!e who appro!ed

o Responsibility of upholding the constitution rest

not on the courts alone but on the legislati!e andeecuti!e branches as well

• &ourts cannot in.uire into the wisdom or propriety of laws

• 4o declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of the law

to the constitution must be clear and une.ui!ocal

• All reasonable doubts should be resol!ed in fa!or of theconstitutionality of lawH to doubt is to sustain

• /inal arbiter of unconstitutionality of law is the %upreme

&ourt E5 'A5& (ma2ority who too1 part and !oted thereon"

• 5onetheless, trial courts ha!e 2urisdiction to initially decidethe issue of constitutionality of a law in appropriate cases

Re.uisites for eercise of 2udicial power

• 4he eistence of an appropriate case

• Interest personal and substantial by the party raising theconstitutional .uestion

• Plea that the function be eercised at the earliest opportunity

• 5ecessity that the constitutional .uestion be passed upon inorder to decide the case

Appropriate case

• 'ona fide case 0 one which raises a 2usticiable contro!ersy

• #udicial power is limited only to real, actual, earnest, and

!ital contro!ersy

• &ontro!ersy is 2usticiable when it refers to matter which iappropriate for court re!iewH pertains to issues which are

inherently susceptible of being decided on groundrecognied by law

• &ourts cannot rule on Bpolitical .uestionsC 0 .uestions which

are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom (!legality" of a particular act or measure being assailed

o Bseparation of powersC

o @owe!er, &onstitution epands the concept o

2udicial re!iew 0 2udicial power includes the dutyof the courts of 2ustice to settle actual contro!ersiein!ol!ing rights which are legally demandable andenforceable and to determine whether or not there

has been KAD amounting to lac1 or ecess o



2urisdiction on the branch or the part of any branch= instrumentality of the Ko!ernment

%tanding to sue

• Legal standing or locus standi 0 personal= substantial interestin the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain

direct in2ury as a result of go!ernmental act that is beingchallenged

• BinterestC 0 an interest in issue affected by the decree

• &itien 0 ac.uires standing only if he can establish that hehas suffered some actual or threatened concrete in2ury as aresult of the allegedly illegal conduct of the go!ernment

o E$g$ tapayer 0 when it is shown that public funds

ha!e been illegally disbursed

• )ember of the %enate or of the @ouse has legal standing to.uestion the !alidity of the Presidential !eto or a condition

imposed on an item in an appropriations bills

• %& may, in its discretion, ta1e cogniance of a suit whichdoes not satisfy the re.uirement of legal standing

o E$g$ calling by the President for the deployment of

the Philippine )arines to 2oin the P5P in !isibility patrols around the metro

Ghen to raise constitutionality

• at the earliest possible opportunity 0 i$e$ in the pleading

• it may be raised in a motion for reconsideration = new trial inthe lower courtH or

• in criminal cases 0 at any stage of the proceedings or onappeal

• in ci!il cases, where it appears clearly that a determination of

the .uestion is necessary to a decision, and in cases where itin!ol!es the 2urisdiction of the court below

5ecessity of deciding constitutionality

• where the constitutional .uestion is of paramount public

interest and time is of the essence in the resolution of such.uestion, adherence to the strict procedural standard may be

relaed and the court, in its discretion, may s.uarely decidethe case

• where the .uestion of !alidity, though apparently has become moot, has become of paramount interest and there isundeniable necessity for a ruling, strong reasons of public

policy may demand that its constitutionality be resol!ed

4est of constitutionality

• is what the &onstitution pro!ides in relation to what canor may be done under the statute, and not by what it has been

done under it$o If not within the legislati!e power to enact

o If !ague 0 unconstitutional in : respects

>iolates due process

Lea!es law enforcers unbridleddiscretion in carrying out its pro!isions

o Ghere theres a change of circumstances 0 i$e$

emergency laws

• Ordinances (test of !alidity are"o It must not contra!ene the &onstitution or any

statuteo It must not be unfair or oppressi!e

o It must not be partial or discriminatory

o It must not prohibit but may regulate trade

o It must be general and consistent with public

policyo It must not be unreasonable

Effects of unconstitutionality

• It confers no rights

• Imposes no duties

• Affords no protection

• &reates no office

• In general, inoperati!e as if it had ne!er been passed

• : !iews

o Orthodo !iew 0 unconstitutional act is not a law

decision affect ALLo )odern !iew 0 less stringentH the court in passing

upon the .uestion of unconstitutionality does notannul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflicwith the &onstitutionH decisions affects partieO5LM and no 2udgment against the statuteopinion of court may operate as a precedentH i

does not repeal, supersede, re!o1e, or annul thestatute

In!alidity due to change of conditions

• Emergency laws

• It is deemed !alid at the time of its enactment as an eercise

of police power

• It becomes in!alid only because the change of conditionsma1es its continued operation !iolati!e of the &onstitution

and accordingly, the declaration of its nullity should onlyaffect the parties in!ol!ed in the case and its effects applied

prospecti!ely

Partial in!alidity

• Keneral rule that where part of a statute is !oid as repugnanto the &onstitution, while another part is !alid, the !alid

portion, if separable from the in!alid, may stand and beenforced

• Eception 0 that when parts of a statute are so mutually

dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations

inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warranta belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, thenullity of one part will !itiate the rest 0 such as in the case ofTatad v Sec of Department of Energy and Antonio v

COMELEC

EFFECT AND OPERATION

Ghen laws ta1e effect

• Art : && 3 B laws to be effecti!e must be published eitherin the Official Kaette or in a newspaper of genera

circulation in the countryCo 4he effecti!ity pro!ision refers to all statutes

including those local and pri!ate, unless there arespecial laws pro!iding a different effecti!itymechanism for particular statutes

• %ec *; &hapter 7 'oo1 * of Administrati!e &ode

• Effecti!ity of laws

o

default rule 0 *73day periodo must be published either in the OK or newspape

of general circulation in the countryH publicationmust be full

• 4he clause Bunless it is otherwise pro!idedC 0 solely refers to

the *73day period and not to the re.uirement of publication

Ghen Presidential issuances, rules and regulations ta1e effect

• 4he Presidents ordinance power includes the authority toissue EO, AO, Proclamations, )O, )& and general o

specific orders

• Re.uirement of publication applies ecept if it is merelyinterpretati!e or internal in nature not concerning the public

• : types



o 4hose whose purpose is to enforce or implement

eisting law pursuant to a !alid delegation or to fill

in the details of a statuteH re.uires publicationo 4hose which are merely interpretati!e in nature or

internalH does not re.uire publication

• Re.uirements of filing (*+; Administrati!e &ode"

o E!ery agency shall file with the FP Law &enter -

certified copies of e!ery rule adopted by it$ Rulesin force on the date of effecti!ity of this &odewhich are not filed within - months from that date

shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanctionagainst any party= persons

Ghen local ordinance ta1es effect

• Fnless otherwise stated, the same shall ta1e effect *6 daysfrom the date a copy is posted in a bulletin board at theentrance of the pro!incial capitol or city, municipality or

barangay hall, A5D in at least : other conspicuous places inthe local go!ernment unit concerned

• 4he secretary to the %angguinian concerned shall cause the

posting not later than 7 days after appro!alH tet will bedisseminated in English or 4agalogH the secretary to the

%angguinian concerned shall record such fact in a boo1 1eptfor that purpose, stating the dates of appro!al and posting

• Kist of ordinance with penal sanctions shall be published in anewspaper of general circulation within the respecti!e

pro!ince concernedH if 5O newspaper of general circulationin the pro!ince, PO%4I5K shall be made in allmunicipalities and cities of the pro!ince where the

%anggunian of origin is situated

• /or highly urbanied and independent component cities,main features of the ordinance, in addition to the posting

re.uirement shall be published once in a local newspaper$ Inthe absence of local newspaper, in any newspaper of generalcirculation

o @ighly urbanied city 0 minimum population of

:66,666 and with latest annual income of at least

76) Php

%tatutes continue in force until repealed

• Permanent= indefinite 0 law once established continues untilchanged by competent legislati!e power$ It is not changed

by the change of so!ereignty, ecept that of political nature

• 4emporary 0 in force only for a limited period, and theyterminate upon epiration of the term stated or uponoccurrence of certain e!entsH no repealing statute is needed

4erritorial and personal effect of statutes

• All people within the 2urisdiction of the Philippines

)anner of computing time

• %ee Art$ *- &&

• Ghere a statute re.uires the doing of an act within a

specified number of days, such as ten days from notice, itmeans ten calendar days and 5O4 ten wor1ing days

• E$g$ * year from Oct$ 9, *+98 is Oct$ 9, *+9

• If last day falls on a %unday or holiday, the act can still bedone the following day

• Principle of Beclude the first, include the lastC DOE% 5O4

APPLM to the computation of the period of prescription of acrime, in which rule, is that if the last day in the period of

prescription of a felony falls on a %unday or legal holiday,the information concerning said felony cannot be filed on the

net wor1ing day, as the offense has by then already prescribed

CHAPTER TWO: Construt!on an" Inter#retat!on

NATURE AND PURPOSE

&onstruction defined

• &onstruction is the art or process of disco!ering andepounding the meaning and intention of the authors of thelaw, where that intention rendered doubtfully reason o

ambiguity in its language or of the fact that the gi!en case isnot eplicitly pro!ided for in the law$

• &onstruction is drawing of warranted conclusions beyond

direct epression of the tet epressions which are in spirithough not within the tet$

• ine!itably, there enters into the construction of statutes

the play of #FDI&IAL #FDK)E54 within the limits of therele!ant legislati!e materials

• it in!ol!es the EER&I%E O/ &@OI&E 'M 4@E#FDI&IARM

&onstruction and interpretation distinguished

• 4hey are so ali1e in practical results and so are usedinterchangeablyH synonymous$

&onstruction Interpretation3 process of drawing warrantedconclusions not alwaysincluded in direct epressions,or determining the application

of words to facts in litigation

3 art of finding the truemeaning and sense of any formof words

Rules of construction, generally

• Rules of statutory construction are tools used to ascertainlegislati!e intent$

• 5O4 rules of law but mere aioms of eperience

• In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to 1now therules of statutory construction, in case of doubt, be construed

in accordance with the settled principles of interpretation$

• Legislature sometimes adopts rules of statutory constructionas part of the pro!isions of the statute 3 see eamples page

9+376

• Legislature also defines to ascertain the meaning of !ague broad words= terms

Purpose of ob2ect of construction

• 4he purpose is to ascertain and gi!e effect to the intent of thelaw$

• 4he ob2ect of all 2udicial interpretation of a statute is todetermine legislati!e intent, either epressly or impliedly, bythe language usedH to determine the meaning and will of thelaw ma1ing body and disco!er its true interpretations of law$

Legislati!e intent, generally

• is the essence of the law

• Intent is the spirit which gi!es life to legislati!e enactment$ Imust be enforced when ascertained, although it may not beconsistent with the strict letter of the statute$ It has been held

howe!er, that that the ascertainment of legislati!e intendepend more on a determination of the purpose and ob2ect othe law$

• Intent is sometimes e.uated with the word Bspirit$C

• Ghile the terms purpose, meaning, intent, and spirit areoftentimes interchangeably used by the courts, not entirely

synonymous

Legislati!e purpose



• A legislati!e purpose is the reason why a particular statutewas enacted by legislature$

• Legislation Bis an acti!e instrument and go!ernment which,for the purpose of interpretation means that laws ha!e endsto be achie!edC

Legislati!e meaning

• Legislati!e meaning is what the law, by its language, means$

• Ghat it comprehendsH

• Ghat it co!ers or embracesH

• Ghat its limits or confines are$• Intent and )eaning 0 synonymous

• If there is ambiguity in the language used in a statute, its

purpose may indicate the meaning of the language and leadto what the legislati!e intent is

Kraphical illustration 0

Federation of Free Farmers v CA.

• RA 5o$ ;6+ %ec$ * 0 BIn absence of a written milling

agreements between the ma2ority of the planters and themillers, the unrefined sugar as well as all by3products shall

be di!ided between themC

• RA ;6+ %ec$ + 0 B4he proceeds of any increase in participation granted by the planters under this act and abo!e

their present share shall be di!ided between the planter andhis laborer in the proportion of 86N laborer and 96N

planterC

• 4o gi!e literal import in interpreting the two section willdefeat the purpose of the Act

• 4he purpose

o &ontinuous production of sugar

o 4o grant the laborers a share in the increased

participation of planters in the sugar produce

• 4he legislati!e intent is, thus to ma1e the act operati!eirrespecti!e of whether there eists a milling agreement

between central and the sugar planters$

)atters in.uired into in construing a statute

• BIt is not enough to ascertain the intention of the statuteH it isalso necessary to see whether the intention or meaning has

been epressed in such a way as to gi!e it legal effect or!alidityC

• 4hus 4he ob2ect of in.uiry is not only to 1now what the

legislature used sufficiently epresses that meaning$ 4helegal act is made up of : elements

o internal 0 intention

o eternal3 epression

• /ailure of the latter may defeat the former

Ghere legislati!e intent is ascertained

•

4he primary source of legislati!e intent is the statute itself$• If the statute as a whole fails to indicate the legislati!e intent

because of ambiguity, the court may loo1 beyond the statutesuch as

o Legislati!e history 0 what was in the legislati!e

mind at the time the statute was enactedH what thecircumstances wereH what e!il was meant to be

redressedo Purpose of the statute 0 the reason or cause which

induced the enactment of the law, the mischief to

be suppressed, and the policy which dictated its passage

o when all these means fail, loo1 into the effect of

the law$

If the -rd means (effect of the law" is firs

used, it will be 2udicial legislation

POWER TO CONSTRUE

&onstruction is a 2udicial function

• It is the court that has the final word as to what the lawmeans$

• It construes laws as it decide cases based on fact and the lawin!ol!ed

• Laws are interpreted in the contet of a peculiar factuasituation of each case

• &ircumstances of time, place, e!ent, person and particularly

attendant circumstances and actions before, during and aftethe operati!e fact ha!e ta1en their totality so that 2ustice can

be rationally and fairly dispensed$

• )oot and academic 0o Purpose has become stale

o 5o practical relief can be granted

o Relief has no practical effect

• Keneral rule (on mootness" 0 dismiss the caseo Eception

If capable of repetition, yet e!adingre!iew

Public interest re.uires its resolution Rendering decision on the merits would

be of practical !alue

Legislati!e cannot o!errule 2udicial construction

• It cannot preclude the courts from gi!ing the statute differeninterpretation

• Legislati!e 0 enact laws

• Eecuti!e3 to eecute laws

• #udicial3 interpretation and application

• If the legislature may declare what a law means 0 it wil

cause confusionit will be !iolati!e of the fundamenta principles of the constitution of separation powers$

• Legislati!e construction is called resolution or declaratory

act

Endencia v David

• Eplains why legislati!e cannot o!errule %upreme &ourtdecision

Perfecto v. Meer

• Art$ ; %ec$ + *+-7 &onstitution 0 %&s interpretation Bshal

recei!e such compensation as may be fied by law, whichshall not be diminished during their continuance in officeC 0

eempt from income ta

• Legislati!e passed RA 7+6 %ec$ *- 0 Bno salary whene!erecei!ed by any public officer of the Republic shall be

considered eempt from the income ta, payment of which ishereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensationfied by the &onstitution or by lawC

• %ource of confusion

• >iolati!e of principle on separation of powers

• RA 7+6 %ec *- 0 unconstitutional

• Art ; %ec$ + *+-7 0 repealed by Art$ *7 %ec$ 8 *+-&onstitution 0 Bno salary or any form of emolument of any

public officer or employee, including constitutional officersshall be eempt from payment of income taC

• 4hus, 2udiciary is not eempt from payment of ta anymore

Ghen 2udicial interpretation may be set aside



• BInterpretations may be set aside$C 4he interpretation of astatute or a constitutional pro!ision by the courts is not so

sacrosanct as to be beyond modification or nullification$

• 4he %upreme &ourt itself may, in an appropriate case changeor o!errule its pre!ious construction$

• 4he rule that the %upreme &ourt has the final word in theinterpretation or construction of a stature merely means thatthe legislature cannot, by law or resolution, modify or annul

the 2udicial construction without modifying or repealing the!ery statute which has been the sub2ect of construction$ Itcan, and it has done so, by amending or repealing the statute,the conse.uence of which is that the pre!ious 2udicial

construction of the statute is modified or set asideaccordingly$

Ghen court may construe statute

• B4he court may construe or interpret a statute under the

condition that 4@ERE I% DOF'4 OR A)'IKFI4MC

• Ambiguity 0 a condition of admitting : or more meanings$%usceptible of more than one interpretation$

• Only when the law is ambiguous or doubtful of meaningmay the court interpret or construe its intent$

&ourt may not construe where statute is clear

• A statute that is clear and unambiguous is not susceptible of

interpretations$• /irst and fundamental duty of court 0 to apply the law

• &onstruction 0 !ery last function which the court should

eercise

• Law is clear 0 no room for interpretation, only room forapplication

• &ourts cannot enlarge or limit the law if it is clear and free

from ambiguity (e!en if law is harsh or onerous

• A meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflectedin the !ery language of the statute cannot be placed therein

by construction

Manikan v. Tanodbayan

• %ec$ PD **83A 0 Bsole police authorityC of EPA

officials may not be construed as an eception to, orlimitation on, the authority of the 4anodbayan to in!estigatecomplaints for !iolation of the anti3graft law committed by

the EPA officials

• EPAs power 0 not eclusi!eH BsoleC refers to policeauthority not emplyed to describe other power

Lapid v. CA

• Issue whether or not the decision of the Ombudsman

imposing a penalty of suspension of one year without pay isimmediately eecutory

• Administrati!e &ode and LK& 0 not suppletory to

Ombudsman Act

• 4hese three laws are related or deal with public officers, butare totally different statutes

• An administrati!e agency tas1ed to implement a statute maynot construe it by epanding its meaning where its pro!isionsare clear and unambiguous

Land ank v. CA

• DAR interpreted BdepositsC to include trust accountsC

• %& held that BdepositsC is limited only to cash and L'P bonds

Libanan v. !"ET

• Issue whether ballots not signed at the bac1 by the chairmanof the 'oard of Election Inspectors ('EI" are spurious, since

it !iolated %ec$ :9 RA *88

• @eld not spuriousH only renders the 'EI accountable

Rulings of %upreme &ourt part of legal system

• Art$ ; && 0 B#udicial decisions applying or interpreting thelaws or the &onstitution shall form part of the legal system o

the PhilippinesC

• Legis interpretato #egis vim obtinet 0 authoritati!

interpretation of the %& of a statute ac.uires the force of law by becoming a part thereof as of the date of its enactment since the courts interpretation merely establishes thcontemporaneous legislati!e intent that the statute thu

construed intends to effectuate

• Stare decisis et non $%ieta novere & when the %& has once

laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state ofacts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future

casese where the facts are substantially the sameo /or stability and certainty

• %upreme &ourt becomes, to the etent applicable, the criteriathat must control the actuations not only of those called uponto abide thereby but also of those duty3bound to enforceobedience thereto$

• %& rulings are binding on inferior courts

#udicial rulings ha!e no retroacti!e effect

• Le prospicit not respicit 3 the law loo1s forward, no

bac1ward

• Rationale Retroacti!e application of a law usually di!esrights that ha!e already become !ested or impairs he

obligations of contract and hence is unconstitutional$

Peo !$ #abinal

• Peo ! )acarandang 0 peace officer eempted from issuanceof license of firearms 0 included a secret agent hired by ago!ernor

• Peo$ !$ )apa 0 abandoned doctrine of )acarandang in *+8

• 4he present case, #abinal was arraigned while the)acarandang Doctrine was still pre!ailing, howe!er, the

decision was promulgated when the )apa doctrine was in place

• 4he &ourt held that #abinal is ac.uitted using stare decisis

doctrine and retroacti!ity doctrineCo. v. CA

• On 'P ::, &o is ac.uitted in relying on the &ircular issued

ue doctrine, which con!icted ue under 'P ::, was nogi!en retroacti!e application

"oa v. Co##ector of C%stoms

• Fsed 2us soli (place of birth"

• %& fa!ored 2us sanguinis (by blood"

• @owe!er, the abandonment of the principle of 2us soli did

not di!est the citienship of those who, by !irtue of the principle before its re2ection, became of were declaredcitiens of the Philippines

en'onan v. CA

• Issue when to count the 73year period to repurchase landgranted &A *9*

• )onge ! Angeles (*+7" and 4upas ! Damaso (*+;9" 0 fromthe date of con!eyance or foreclosure sale

• 'elisario !$ IA& (*+;;" 0 from the period after the epirationof the *3year period of repurchase

• 4he %& held that the doctrine that should apply is that which

was enunciated in )onge and 4upas because the transactionin!ol!ed too1 place prior to 'elisario and not that which wa



laid down in the latter case which should be applied prospecti!ely

&ourt may issue guidelines in construing statute

• In construing a statute, the enforcement of which may treadon sensiti!e areas of constitutional rights, the court may

issue guidelines in applying the statute, not to enlarge orrestrict it but to clearly delineate what the law is$

Peo. v. Ferrer

• Ghat acts that may be considered liable under the Anti3

%ub!ersion Act

Mora#es v. Enri#e

• Rights of a person under custodial in!estigation

"P v. CA( Mo#ina

• Kuidelines for ascertaining psychological incapacity of anerring spouse in a !oid marriage under Art$ -8 /&

LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO CONSTRUE

&ourts may not enlarge nor restrict statutes

• &ourts are not authoried to insert into the law what they

thin1 should be in it or to supply what they the legislaturewould ha!e supplied if its intention had been called to theomission$

• 4hey should not by construction, re!ise e!en the mostarbitrary or unfair action of the legislature, nor rewrite thelaw to conform to what they thin1 should be the law$

• 5either should the courts construe statutes which are

perfectly !ague for it !iolates due processo /ailure to accord persons fair notice of the conduct

to a!oid

o Lea!e law enforcers unbridled discretion in

carrying out its pro!isions

• : leading stars on 2udicial constructiono Kood faith

o

commonsense• an utterly !ague act on its face cannot be clarified by either a

sa!ing clause or by construction

&ourts not to be influenced by .uestions of wisdom

• &ourts do not sit to resol!e the merit of conflicting theories

• &ourts do not pass upon .uestion of wisdom, 2ustice or

epediency of legislation, for its not within their pro!ince tosuper!ise legislation and 1eep it within the bounds of

common sense$

• 4he court merely interpret regardless of whether or not theywise or salutary$

CHAPTER THREE: A!"s to Construt!on

IN GENERAL

Kenerally

• Ghere the meaning of a statue is ambiguous, the court iswarranted in a!ailing itself of all illegitimate aids toconstruction in order that it can ascertain the true intent of

the statute$

• 4he aids to construction are those found in the printed page

of the statute itselfH 1now as the intrinsic aids, and thoseetraneous facts and circumstances outside the printed page,called e)trinsic aids$

4itle

• It is used as an aid, in case of doubt in its language to itsconstruction and to ascertaining legislati!e will$

• If the meaning of the statute is obscure, courts may resort tothe title to clear the obscurity$

• 4he title may indicate the legislati!e intent to etend orestrict the scope of law, and a statute couched in a languageof doubtful import will be constructed to conform to thelegislati!e intent as disclosed in its title$

• Resorted as an aid where there is doubt as to the meaning ofthe law or as to the intention of the legislature in enacting it

and not otherwise$• %er!e as a guide to ascertaining legislati!e intent carrie

more weight in this 2urisdiction because of the constitutionare.uirement that Be!ery bill shall embrace only one sub2ect

who shall be epressed in the title thereof$

• 4he constitutional in2unction ma1es the title an indispensable part of a statute$

ag%io v. Marcos

• 4he .uestion raised is when to count the 96 yr period to file a petition for reopening of cadastral proceedings (to settle andad2udicate the titles to the !arious lots embraced in th

sur!ey" as authoried by RA +-* co!ering the lands thaha!e been or about to be declared land of public domain, by!irtue of 2udicial proceedings instituted w=in the 96 years

net preceding the appro!al of this act$• 4he .uestion is as1ed if the proceeding be reopened

originally instituted in court April *:, *+*: or 5o!ember :7*+::, the counted date form which the decision therein

rendered became final$ Petition was filed on #uly :7, *+8*

• 4itle of the Law BAn Act to authorie the filing in the propecourt under certain conditions of certain claims of title to

parcels of land that ha!e been declared public land, by !irtueof the appro!al of this act$C

• 4here was an apparent inconsistency between the title and body of the law$

• It ruled that the starting date to count the period is the datethe final decision was rendered$

• It recites that it authories court proceedings of claims to

parcels of land declared public by !irtue of 2udicial decisionrendered within forty years net preceding the appro!al othis act$

• 4hat title written in capital letters by &ongress itselfH such1ind of title then is not to be classed with words or titles used

by compilers of statues because it is the legislature spea1ing$

• Gords by !irtue of 2udicial decisions rendered in the title othe law stand in e.ual importance to the phrase in %ections *thereof by !irtue of 2udicial proceedings instituted$

• 4he court ruled that eamining Act no$ :;9 in detail wasintended to apply to public lands only for the title of the act

always indicati!e of legislati!e intent$

• 5o bill shall embrace more than one sub2ect, which sub2ecshall be epressed in the title of the bill, the words and fo

other purposes when found in the title ha!e been held to be

without force or effect whatsoe!er and ha!e been altogetherdiscarded in construing the Act$

Ebar#e v. S%ca#dito

• 4he issue is raised whether Eecuti!e order no$ :89 entitledB Outlining the procedure by which complaints charging

go!ernment officials and employees with commission oirregularities should be guidedC applies to criminal actionsto the end that no preliminary in!estigation thereof can beunderta1en or information file in court unless there i

pre!ious compliance with the eecuti!e order$

• EO only applies to administrati!e and not to criminacomplaints$

• 4he !ery title spea1s of commission of irregularities$



Ghen resort to title not authoried

• 4he tet of the statute is clear and free from doubt, it isimproper to resort to its title to ma1e it obscure$

• 4he title may be resorted to in order to remo!e, but not to

create doubt$

Preamble

• It is a part of the statute written immediately after its title,which states the purpose, reason for the enactment of thelaw$

• Fsually epress in whereas clauses$

• Kenerally omitted in statutes passed by

• Phil$ &ommission

• Phil$ Legislature

• 5ational Assembly

• &ongress of the Phil

• 'atasang Pambansa

• 4hese legislati!e bodies used the eplanatory note to eplainthe reasons for the enactment of statutes$

• Etensi!ely used if Presidential decrees issued by the

President in the eercise of his legislati!e power$

• Ghen the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither epand nor restrict its operation, much

less pre!ail o!er its tet$ 5or can be used as basis for gi!inga statute a meaning$

• Ghen the statute is ambiguous, the preamble can be resorted

to clarify the ambiguity$

• Preamble is the 1ey of the statute, to open the minds of thelawma1ers as to the purpose is achie!ed, the mischief to be

remedied, and the ob2ect to be accomplished, by the pro!isions of the legislature$

• )ay decide the proper construction to be gi!en to the statute$

• )ay restrict to what otherwise appears to be a broad scope of

law$

• It may epress the legislati!e intent to ma1e the law applyretroacti!ely in which case the law has to be gi!en

retroacti!e effect$

Illustration of rule

Peop#e v. P%risima

• A person was charged w= !iolation of PD + which penalies,among others, the carrying outside of ones residence any

bladed, blunt or pointed weapon not used as a necessary toolor implement for li!elihood, with imprisonment ranging

from fi!e to ten years$

• uestion rose whether the carrying of such weapon should be in relation to sub!ersion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless

!iolence, criminality, chaos or public disorder as a necessaryelement of the crime$

• 4he mere carrying of such weapon outside ones residence is

sufficient to constitute a !iolation of the law

• Pursuant to the preamble which spelled out the e!ents thatled to the enactment of the decree the clear intent and spirit

of the decree is to re.uire the moti!ation mentioned in the preamble as in indispensable element of the crime$

• 4he se!erity of the penalty for the !iolation of the decree

suggests that it is a serious offense, which may only be 2ustified by associating the carrying out of such bladed of blunt weapon with any of the purposes stated in its preamble$

Peo v. Ec*ave'

• Issue whether a person who s.uatted on a pastoral landcould be held criminally liable for the !iolation of PD :

Bany person who, with the use of force, intimidation orthreat, or ta1ing ad!antage of the absence or tolerance of the

land owner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residentialcommercial or any other purposes$

• 4he decree was promulgated to sol!e the s.uatting problemwhich according to its preamble is still a ma2or problem inurban communities all o!er the country and because many

persons and entities found to ha!e been unlawfullyoccupying public and pri!ate lands belong to the affluenclass$

• 4he court said that crime may only be committed in urbancommunities and not in agricultural and pastural land

because the preamble of the decree shows that it waintended to apply for s.uatting in urban lands, more

particularly to illegal constructions$

&ontet of whole tet

• 4o ascertain legislati!e intent is the statute itself ta1en as awhole and in relation to one another considering the whole

contet of the statute and not from an isolated part of the pro!ision$

• 4he meaning dictated by the contet pre!ails$

• E!ery section, pro!ision, or clause of the statute must beepounded by reference to each other in order to arri!e at theeffect contemplated by the legislature$

Punctuation mar1s• %emi3 colon 0 used to indicate a separation in the relation of

the thought, what follows must ha!e a relation to the samematter it precedes it$

• &omma and semi3 colon are use for the same purpose to

di!ide sentences, but the semi 0 colon ma1es the di!ision alittle more pronounce$ 'oth are not used to introduce a new

idea$

• Punctuation mar1s are aids of low degree and can ne!ercontrol against the intelligible meaning of written words$

• An ambiguity of a statute which may be partially or whollysol!ed by a punctuation mar1 may be considered in theconstruction of a statute$

• 4he .ualifying effect of a word or phrase may be confined to

its last antecedent if the latter is separated by a comma fromthe other antecedents$

• An argument based on punctuation is not persuasi!e$

Illustrati!e eamples

F#orentino v. P+

• Bwho may be willing to accept the same for such settlementC

0 this implies discretion

• %& held only the last antecedent 0 Bany citien of thPhilippines or any association or corporation organied

under the laws of the PhilippinesC

• pursuant to which bac1pay certificate3holders cancompel go!ernment3owned ban1s to accept said certificates

for payment of their obligations subsisting at the time of the

amendatory act was appro!ed +era v. ,arcia

• Bif the charge against such subordinate or employee in!ol!edishonesty, oppression, or gra!e misconduct or neglect in the

performance of his dutyC

• BdishonestyC and BoppressionC 0 need not be committed inthe course of the performance of duty by the person charges

Peo. v. S%bido

• %ubsidiary imprisonment in case of insol!ency .ualifies both

non3payment of indemnity and non3payment of fine

&apitaliation of letters

• An aid of low degree in the construction of statute$



@eadnotes or epigraphs

• %econdary aids

• 4hey are prefied to sections, or chapters of a statute for

ready reference or classification$

• 5ot entitled too much weight, and inferences drawn therefrom are of little !alue and they can ne!er control the plain

terms of the enacting clauses, for they are not part of the law$

• 4he pro!isions of each article are controlling upon the

sub2ect thereof and operate as a general rule for settling such.uestions as are embraced therein$

• Ghen the tet of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there isneither necessity nor propriety to resort to the headings or

epigraphs of a section for interpretation of the tet, especiallywhen they are mere reference aids indicating the general

nature of the tet that follows$

Lingual tet

• Rule is that, unless pro!ided, where a statute is promulgatedin English and %panish, English shall go!ern but in case ofambiguity, %panish may be consulted to eplain the Englishtet$

• A statute is officially promulgated in %panish or in English,or in /ilipino

• BIn the interpretation of a law or administrati!e issuance promulgated in all the official languages, the English tetshall control, unless otherwise pro!ided$

Intent or spirit of law

• It is the law itself$

• &ontrolling factor, leading star and guiding light in the

application and interpretation of a statute$

• A statute must be according to its spirit or intent$

• 4he courts cannot assume an intent in no way epressed andthen construe the statute to accomplish the supposedintentionH otherwise they would pass beyond the bounds of

2udicial power to usurp legislati!e power$

Policy of law

• %hould be gi!en effect by the 2udiciary$

• One way to accomplish this mandate is to gi!e a statute ofdoubtful meaning, a construction that will promote public

policy$

Tinio v. Francis

• Policy of the law 0 to conser!e the land of the homesteader

• not be sub2ect to encumbrance= alienation from the date

of the appro!al of the application and for a term of 7 yearsfrom and after the date of the issuance of the patent or grant

o from the ORDER for the issuance of patent

o if literal interpretation is to be used, policy will be

defeated

Ca-i%at v. Mat*ay

• policy 0 against double pensions for the same ser!ices

• a law which grants retirable employees certain gratuity Binaddition to other benefits which they are entitled under

eisting lawsC &A55O4 be construed as to authorie thegrant of double gratuity

• Bother benefitsC may be

o Refund of contributions

o Payment of the money !alue of accumulated

!acation and sic1 lea!es

Purpose of law or mischief to be suppressed

• Intended to be remo!ed or suppressed and the causes which

induced the enactment of the law are important factors to beconsidered in this construction$

o Purpose or ob2ect of the law

o )ischief intended to be remo!ed

o &auses which induced the enactment of the law

• )ust be read in such a way as to gi!e effect to the purpose pro2ected in the statute$

• 4he purpose of the general rule is not determinati!e of the

proper construction to be gi!en to the eceptions$• Purpose of statute is more important than the rules o

grammar and logic in ascertaining the meaning

Dictionaries

• A statute does not define word or phrases used$

• Kenerally define words in their natural plain and ordinary

acceptance and significance$

&onse.uences of !arious constructions

• In.uired as an additional aid to interpretation$

• A construction of a statute should be re2ected that will causein2ustice and hardship, result in absurdity, defeat legislati!e

intent or spirit, preclude accomplishment of legislati!e

purpose or ob2ect, render certain words or phrases asurplusage, nullify the statute or ma1e any of its pro!isionsnugatory$

Presumptions

• 'ased on logic, eperience, and common sense, and in theabsence of compelling reasons to the contrary, doubts as tothe proper and correct construction of a statute will be

resol!ed in fa!or of that construction which is in accord withthe presumption on the matter$

o &onstitutionality of a statute

o &ompleteness

o Prospecti!e operation

o Right and 2ustice

o Effecti!e, sensible, beneficial and reasonable

operation as a wholeo Against inconsistency and implied repeal

unnecessary changes in law

impossibility

absurdity

in2ustice and hardship

incon!enience

ineffecti!eness$

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Kenerally

• A statute is susceptible of se!eral interpretations or wherethere is ambiguity in the language, there is no better mean

of ascertaining the will and intention of the legislature thanthat which is afforded by the history of the statute$

Ghat constitutes legislati!e history

• @istory of a statute refers to all its antecedents from itinception until its enactment into law$

• Its history proper co!ers the period and the steps done fromthe time the bill is introduced until it is finally passed by thelegislature$

• Ghat it includeso Presidents message if the bill is enacted in

response thereto,

o 4he eplanatory note accompanying the bill



o &ommittee reports of legislati!e in!estigations

o Public hearings on the sub2ect of the bill

o %ponsorship speech

o Debates and deliberations concerning the bill

o Amendments and changes in phraseology in which

it undergoes before final appro!al thereof$o If the statute is based from a re!ision, a prior

statute, the latters practical application and 2udicial construction,

o >arious amendments it underwent

o &ontemporary e!ents at the

Presidents message to legislature

• 4he president shall address the congress at the opening of itsregular session or appear before it at any other time$

• Fsually contains proposed legal measures$

• Indicates his thin1ing on the proposed legislation, whenenacted into law, follows his line of thin1ing on the matter$

Eplanatory note

• A short eposition of eplanation accompanying a proposed

legislation by its author or proponent$

• Ghere there is ambiguity in a statute or where a statute issusceptible of more than one interpretation, courts may resort

to the eplanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertainthe purpose or intent of the statute$

• Fsed to gi!e effect to the purpose or intent as disclosed in its

eplanatory note$

• A statute affected or changed an eisting law and theeplanatory note to the bill which has e!entually enacted intoa law states that the purpose is too simply to secure the

prompt action on a certain matter by the officer concerned

and not to change the eisting lawH the statute should beconstrued to carry out such purpose$

• It may be used as a basis for gi!ing a statute a meaning that

is inconsistent with what is epressed in the tet of thestatute$

Legislati!e debates, !iews and deliberations

• &ourts may a!ail to themsel!es the actual proceedings of thelegislati!e body to assist in determining the construction of astatute of doubtful meaning$

• 4here is doubt to what a pro!ision of a statute means, that

meaning which was put to the pro!ision during thelegislati!e deliberation or discussion on the bill may be

adopted$

• >iews epressed are as to the bills purpose, meaning oreffect are not controlling in the interpretation of the law$

• It is impossible to determine with authority what

construction was put upon an act by the members of thelegislati!e body that passed the bill$

• 4he opinions epressed by legislators in the course of

debates concerning the application of eisting laws are not

also gi!en decisi!e weight, especially where the legislatorwas not a member of the assembly that enacted the said laws$

• Ghen a statute is clear and free from ambiguity, courts willnot in.uire into the moti!es which influence the legislatureor indi!idual members, in !oting for its passageH no indeedas to the intention of the draftsman, or the legislators, so far

as it has not been epressed into the act$

Reports of commissions

• &ommissions are usually formed to compile and collate alllaws on a particular sub2ect and to prepare the draft of the

proposed code$

Prior laws from which statute is based

• &ourts are permitted to prior laws on the same sub2ect and toin!estigate the antecedents of the statute in!ol!ed$

• 4his is applicable in the interpretation of codes, re!ised orcompiled statutes, for the prior law which ha!e beencodified, compiled or re!ised will show the legislati!e

history that will clarify the intent of the law or shed light onthe meaning and scope of the codified or re!ised statute$

Peo. v. Manantan

• Issue whether or not 2ustice of peace is included

•

&ontention of )anantan, who is a 2ustice of peace, is that theomission of B2ustice of peaceC re!ealed the intention of thelegislature to eclude such from its operation

• @eld contention denied$ In holding that the word B2udgeC

includes B2ustice of peaceC, the &ourt said that Ba re!iew ofthe history of the Re!ised Election &ode will help 2ustify and

clarify the abo!e conclusionC

Director of Lands v. Abaya

• Ghen to count the *63year period, either from the date thedecision was rendered or from the date 2udicial proceedingsinstituted in cadastral cases

• @eld court resol!ed the issue by referring to 9 older lawswhich ha!e in common that counting of the period startsfrom the date of the institution of the 2udicial proceeding and

not from the date the 2udgment is rendered

Sa#aysay v. Castro

• BActually holdingC < Blastly electedC

• 4hus, a !ice mayor acting as mayor is not included in the pro!ision

&hange in phraseology by amendments

• Intents to change the meaning of the pro!ision$

• A statute has undergone se!eral amendments, each

amendment using different phraseology, the deliberateselection of language differing from that of the earlier act onthe sub2ect indicates that a change in meaning of the law was

intended and courts should so construe that statute as toreflect such change in meaning$

Commissioner of C%stoms v. CTA

• Bnational portC (new law" not the same as Bany portC (oldlaw"H otherwise, BnationalC will be a surplusage

Amendment by deletion

• Deletion of certain words or phrases in a statute indicatesthat the legislature intended to change the meaning of thestatute, for the presumption is that the legislation would not

ha!e made the deletion had the intention been not effect achange in its meaning$

• A statute containing a pro!ision prohibiting the doing of a

certain thing is amended by deleting such pro!ision$

,#oria v. CA

• Issue whether a public officer or employee, who has been pre!enti!ely suspended pending in!estigation of the

administrati!e charges against him, is entitled to his salaryand other benefits during such pre!enti!e suspension

• @eld &ourt answered in the negati!e because such pro!ision

with regard to payment of salaries during suspension wasdeleted in the new law

%enaseda v. F#avier

• Ombusman and his deputy can only pre!enti!ely suspendrespondents in administrati!e cases who are employed in his



office, and not those who are employees in other departmentor offices of the go!ernment

Eceptions to the rule (of amendment by deletion"

• An amendment of the statue indicates a change in meaningfrom that which the statute originally had applies only when

the intention is clear to change the pre!ious meaning of theold law$

• Rules dont apply when the intent is clear that the

amendment is precisely to plainly epress the construction ofthe act prior to its amendment because its language is not

sufficiently epressi!e of such construction$

• /re.uently, words do not materially affect the sense will beomitted from the statute as incorporated in the code or

re!ised statute, or that some general idea will be epressed in brief phrases$

Adopted statutes

• /oreign statutes are adopted in this country or from locallaws are patterned form parts of the legislati!e history of thelatter$

• Local statutes are patterned after or copied from those ofanother country, the decision of the courts in such countryconstruing those laws are entitled to great weight in the

interpretation of such local statutes$

Limitations of rule

• A statute which has been adopted from that of a foreigncountry should be construed in accordance with theconstruction gi!en it in the country of origin is not withoutlimitations$

Principles of common law

• Qnown as Anglo3American 2urisprudence which is no in

force in this country, sa!e only insofar as it is founded onsound principles applicable to local conditions and is not in

conflict with eisting law, ne!ertheless, many of the principles of the common law ha!e been imported into this 2urisdiction as a result of the enactment of laws andestablishment of institutions similar to those of the F%$

&onditions at time of enactment

• In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to ha!eta1en into account the eisting conditions of things at the

time of its enactment$

• In the interpretations of a statute, consider the physicalconditions of the country and the circumstances then obtain

understanding as to the intent of the legislature or as to themeaning of the statute$

@istory of the times

• A court may loo1 to the history of the times, eamining thestate of things eisting when the statute was enacted$

• A statute should not be construed in a spirit as if it were a protoplasm floating around in space$

• In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law orconstitutional pro!ision, the history of the times of which Igrew and to which it may be rationally supposed to bear

some direct relationship, the e!ils intended to be remediedand the good to be accomplished are proper sub2ects ofin.uiry$

• Law being a manifestation of social culture and progressmust be interpreted ta1ing into consideration the stage ofsuch culture and progress including all the concomitantcircumstances$

• Law is not a watertight compartment sealed or shut off fromthe contact with the drama of life which unfolds before ou

eyes$

CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION

Kenerally

• Are the constructions placed upon statutes at the time of, orafter their enactment by the eecuti!e, legislati!e or 2udicia

authorities, as well as by those who in!ol!e in the process oflegislation are 1nowledgeable of the intent and purpose of

the law$

• &ontemporary construction is strongest in law$

Eecuti!e construction, generallyH 1inds of

• Is the construction placed upon the statute by an eecuti!e oadministrati!e officer$

• 4hree types of interpretationo &onstruction by an eecuti!e or administrati!

officer directly called to implement the law$o &onstruction by the secretary of 2ustice in hi

capacity as the chief legal ad!iser of thego!ernment$

o @anded down in an ad!ersary proceeding in the

form of a ruling by an eecuti!e officer eercising

.uasi32udicial power$

Geight accorded to contemporaneous construction

• Ghere there is doubt as to the proper interpretation of astatute, the uniform construction placed upon it by theeecuti!e or administrati!e officer charged with itenforcement will be adopted if necessary to resol!e the

doubt$

• 4rue epression of the legislati!e purpose, especially if theconstruction is followed for a considerable period of time$

+est#e P*i#ippines /nc. v. CA

• Reasons for why interpretation of an administrati!e agency

is generally accorded great respecto

Emergence of multifarious needs of a moderniingsocietyo Also relates to eperience and growth o

specialied capabilities by the administrati!eagency

o 4hey ha!e the competence, epertness, eperience

and informed 2udgment, and the fact that theyfre.uently are the drafters of the law they interpret

P*i#ippine S%gar Centra# v. Co##ector of C%stoms

• Issue whether the go!ernment can legally collect duties Ba

a charge for wharfageC re.uired by a statute upon all articleeported through pri!ately3owned whar!es

• @eld the court reasoned in the affirmati!e by saying Bthelanguage of the Act could ha!e been made more specific and

certain, but in !iew of its history, its long continuouconstruction, and what has been done and accomplished byand under it, we are clearly of the opinion that thego!ernment is entitled to ha!e and recei!e the money in.uestion, e!en though the sugar was shipped from a pri!ate

wharf

Geight accorded to usage and practice

• &ommon usage and practice under the statute, or a course oconduct indicating a particular underta1ing of it, especiallywhere the usage has been ac.uiesced in by all the partiesconcerned and has etended o!er a long period of time$



• Optim%s interpres rer%m %s%s & the best interpretation of the

law is usage$

&onstruction of rules and regulations

• 4his rule3ma1ing power, authorities sustain the principle thatthe interpretation by those charged with their enforcement is

entitled to great weight by the court in the lattersconstruction of such rules and regulations$

Reasons why contemporaneous construction is gi!en much weight

• It is entitled to great weight because it comes from the particular branch of go!ernment called upon to implementthe law thus construed$

• Are presumed to ha!e familiaried themsel!es with all the

considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of thelaw, and to ha!e formed an independent, conscientious and

competent epert opinion thereon

Ghen contemporaneous construction disregarded

• Ghen there is no ambiguity in the law$

• If it is clearly erroneous, the same must be declared null and

!oid$

Erroneous contemporaneous construction does not preclude correctionnor create rightsH eceptions

• 4he doctrine of estoppel does not preclude correction of theerroneous construction by the officer himself by hissuccessor or by the court in an appropriate case$

• An erroneous contemporeaneous construction creates no!ested right on the part of those relied upon, and followed

such construction$

Legislati!e interpretation

• 4a1e form of an implied ac.uiescence to, or appro!al of, aneecuti!e or 2udicial construction of a statute$

• 4he legislature cannot limit or restrict the power granted tothe courts by the constitution$

Legislati!e appro!al

• Legislati!e is presumed to ha!e full 1nowledge of acontemporaneous or practical construction of a statute by anadministrati!e or eecuti!e officer charged with itsenforcement$

• 4he legislature may appro!e or ratify such contemporaneousconstruction$

• )ay also be showmen by the legislature appropriatingmoney for the officer designated to perform a tas1 pursuantto interpretation of a statute$

• Legislati!e ratification is e.ui!alent to a mandate$

Reenactment

• )ost common act of appro!al$

• 4he re3enactment of a statute, pre!iously gi!en acontemporaneous construction is persuasi!e indication of theadoption by the legislature of the prior construction$

• Re3enactment if accorded greater weight and respect than thecontemporaneous construction of the statute before itsratification$

%tare decisis

• #udicial interpretation of a statute and is of greater weightthan that of an eecuti!e or administrati!e officer in the

construction of other statutes of similar import$

• It is an in!aluable aid in the construction or interpretation ofstatutes of doubtful meaning$

• %tare decisis et non .uieta mo!ere 0 one should follow pas precedents and should not disturb what has been settled$

• %upreme &ourt has the constitutional duty not only ointerpreting and applying the law in accordance with priodoctrines but also of protecting society from theimpro!idence and wantonness wrought by needles

uphea!als in such interpretations and applications

• In order that it will come within the doctrine of stare decisis

must be categorically stated on an issue epressly raised bythe partiesH it must be a direct ruling, not merely an obiterdictum

• Obiter dictum 0 opinion epressed by a court upon some.uestion of law which is not necessary to the decision of the

case before itH not binding as a precedent

• 4he principle presupposes that the facts of the precedent andthe case to which it is applied are substantially the same$

• Ghere the facts are dissimilar, then the principle of staredecisis does not apply$

• 4he rule of stare decisis is not absolute$ It does not applywhen there is a conflict between the precedent and the law$

• 4he duty of the court is to forsa1e and abandon any doctrine

or rule found to be in !iolation of law in force

•

Inferior courts as well as the legislature cannot abandon a precedent enunciated by the %& ecept by way of repeal or

amendment of the law itself

CHAPTER FOUR: A"$erene to, or "e#arture %ro&, 'an(ua(e o

statute

LITERAL INTERPRETATION

Literal meaning or plain3meaning rule

• Keneral rule if statute is clear, plain and free from

ambiguity, it must be gi!en its literal meaning and appliedwithout attempted interpretation

o >erba legis

o Inde animi sermo 0 speech is the inde o

intentiono Gords employed by the legislature in a statute

correctly epress its intent or will

o >erba legis non est recedendum 0 from the words

of a statute there should be no departureo 4hus, what is not clearly pro!ided in the law

cannot be etended to those matters outside itsscope

• #udicial legislation 0 an encroachment upon legislati!e prerogati!e to define the wisdom of the law

o &ourts must administer the law as they find i

without regard to conse.uences

+ationa# Federation of Labor v. +L"C

• Employees were claiming separation pay on the basis of Art:;- Labor &ode which states that Bemployer )AM also

terminate the employment of an employeeC for reasontherein by ser!ing notice thereof and paying separation payto affected employees

• 4here was compulsory ac.uisition by the go!ernment of theemployers land (Patalon &oconut Estate" for purposes oagrarian reform which forced the employer to cease hioperation

• Issue whether or not employer is liable for separation pay

• @eld 5O, employer is not liable for separation payS

o It is a unilateral and !oluntary act by the employe

if he wants to gi!e separation pay



o 4his is gleaned from the wording B)AMC in the

statute

o B)AMC denotes that it is directory in nature and

generally permissi!e onlyo Plain3meaning rule is applicable

o Ano yun, ipapasara ng go!ernment tapos

magbabayad pa ang employer ng separation payS

Ang daya3dayaS Lugi na nga si employer, 1i1ita pasi employeeS FnfairS &annot beS 5oS 5oS

o 4o depart from the meaning epressed by the

words is to alter the statute, to legislate and notinterpret

o )aledicta est eposition .uae corrumpit tetum 0

dangerous construction which is against the tet

Dura le sed le

• Dura le sed le 0 the law may be harsh but it is still the law

• Absoluta sentential epositore non indigent 0 when thelanguage of the law is clear, no eplanation of it is re.uired

• Ghen the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation$It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, e!en ifit may be harsh or onerous

• @oc .uidem per.uam durum est, sed ital e scripta est 0 it iseceedingly hard but so the law is written

• A decent regard to the legislati!e will shoud inhibit the courtfrom engaging in 2udicial legislation to change what it thin1s

are unrealistic statutes that do not conform with ordinaryeperience or practice (respeto nalang sa ating mga

mambabatasS Ghate!erS @aha 2o1e only"

• If there is a need to change the law, amend or repeal it,remedy may be done through a legislati!e process, not by

2udicial decree

• Ghere the law is clear, appeals to 2ustice and e.uity as 2ustification to construe it differently are una!ailing 0Philippines is go!erned by &I>IL LAG or PO%I4I>ELAG, not common law

• E.uity is a!ailable only in the absence of law and not itsreplacement 0 (so, pag may law, walang e.uity e.uityS Pero

pag walang law, pwedeng mag3e.uity, getsS$$$ important

toS"• Ae.uitas nun.uam contra!enit legis 0 e.uity ne!er acts in

contra!ention of the law

DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION

%tatute must be capable of interpretation, otherwise inoperati!e

• If no 2udicial certainty can be had as to its meaning, the court

is not at liberty to supply nor to ma1e one

Santiago v. COMELEC

• In this case, the &ourt adopted a literal meaning thus,concluded that RA 8-7 is inade.uate to implement the

power of the people to amend the &onstitution (initiati!e onamendments" for the following reasons

o Does not suggest an initiati!e on amendments on

to the &onstitution because it is silent as toamendments on the &onstitution and the word

B&onstitutionC is neither germane nor rele!ant tosaid section

o Does not pro!ide for the contents of a petition for

initiati!e on the &onstitutiono Does not pro!ide for subtitles for initiati!e on the

&onstitution

o RA is incomplete and does not pro!ide a sufficient

standard

• #ustice Puno (anoS #ustice 4reeS" dissents

o Legislati!e intent is also shown by th

deliberations on the bill that became RA 8-7

(there are 9 more reasons 0 see page *-63*-*which are not so important"

• Interpretation of RA 8-7 was not in 1eeping with th

maim interpretation fienda est ut res magis !aleat .uam pereat 0 that interpretation as will gi!e the thing efficacy is

to be adopted

Ghat is within the spirit is within the law

• Dont literally construe the law if it will render imeaningless, lead to ambiguity, in2ustice or contradiction

• 4he spirit of the law controls its letter

• Ratio legis 0 interpretation according to the spirit or reasonof the law

• %pirit or intention of a statute pre!ails o!er the letter

• A law should accordingly be so construed as to be inaccordance with, and not repugnant to, the spirit of the law

• Presumption undesirable conse.uences were ne!er intended

by a legislati!e measure

Literal import must yield to intent

• >erba intentioni, non e contra, debent inser!ire 0 wordought to be more subser!ient to the intent and not the intento the words (ahhh parang intent is to woman as word is to

man 0 so man is subser!ient to woman logicalS"• Kuide in ascertaining intent 0 conscience and e.uity

• %o it is possible that a statute may be etended to cases no

within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they comewithin its spirit or intent

Limitation of rule

• &onstrue (intent o!er letter" only if there is ambiguityS

&onstruction to accomplish purpose

• PFRPO%E or REA%O5 which induced the enactment of thestatute 0 1ey to open the brain of the legislature= legislati!eintentS

• %tatutes should be construed in the light of the ob2ect to be

achie!ed and the e!il or mischief to be suppressed• As between two statutory interpretations, that which bette

ser!es the purpose of the law should pre!ail

Sarcos v. Casti##o

• 4his case eplains why legislati!e purpose to determin

legislati!e intent

• /ran1furter o Legislati!e words are not inert but deri!ed !itality

from the ob!ious purposes at which they are aimed

o Legislation 0 wor1ing instrument of go!ernmen

and not merely as a collection of English words

• 'en2amin 5atham &ardooo Legislation is more than a composition

o

It is an acti!e instrument of go!ernment whichmeans that laws ha!e ends to be achie!ed

• @olmes

o Gords are fleible

o 4he general purpose is a more important aid to the

meaning than any rule which grammar or formalogic may lay down

o &ourts are apt to err by stic1ing too closely to the

words of law where those words import a policythat goes beyond them

Soriano v. Offs*ore S*ipping and Manning Corp

• A literal interpretation is to be re2ected if it would be un2usor lead to absurd results




0ing v. !ernande'

• Issue whether or not a &hinese (parang si RA and %erge"

may be employed in a non3control position in a retailestablishment, a wholly nationalied business under RA**;6 Retail 4rade Law (btw, wala na tong law na Tto$ It has

been repealed by the Retail 4rade Liberaliation Act 0 my

thesisS"

• @eld 5oS (1asi duduraan 1a lang ng mga intsi1S #o1e onlyS"the law has to be construed with the Anti3Dummy Law 0

prohibiting an alien from inter!ening in the management,operation, administration or control thereof

• Ghen the law says you cannot employ such alien, youcannot employ an alienS 4he unscrupulous alien may resort

to flout the law or defeat its purposeS (maggulang daw mgaintsi1 ultimo tubig sa pasig ri!er, which is supposed to be

free, bottles it and then sells itS @uwatS"

• It is imperati!e that the law be interpreted in a manner thatwould sta!e off any attempt at circum!ention of thelegislati!e purpose

%stamante v. +L"C

• Issue how to compute for bac1wages to which an illegally

dismissed employee would be entitled until his actualreinstatement (ta1e note of this case$$ its a labor case 1ilitini Kolangco"

• - ways

o *st 0 before Labor &ode 0 to be deducted from the

amount of bac1wages is the earnings elsewhereduring the period of illegal dismissal

o :nd 0 Labor &ode Art$ :+ 0 the amount of

bac1wages is fied without deductions or.ualifications but limited to not more than - years

o -rd 0 amended Art$ :+ 0 full bac1wages or without

deductions from the time the laborerscompensation was withheld until his actual

reinstatement• 4he clear legislati!e intent of the amendment in RA 8*7

(Labor &ode" is to gi!e more benefits to wor1ers than was pre!iously gi!en them under the )ercury Drug rule or the *st

way

1S v. Toribio

• 4he prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for humanconsumption so long as these animals are fit for agriculturalwor1= draft purposes was a Breasonable necessary limitationCon pri!ate ownership

• Purpose or ob2ect of the law 0 to protect large cattle againsttheft and to ma1e easy reco!ery and return of such cattle totheir owners, when lost, strayed or stolen

• Issue whether the slaughter of large cattle outside themunicipal slaughterhouse without a permit by the municipal

treasurer is prohibited

• @eld ME%S Outside or inside without permit is prohibited

ocobo v. Estanis#ao

• Issue whether the &/I and a municipal court in the capital ofa pro!ince ha!e concurrent 2urisdiction o!er the crime of

libel

• RP& 0 grants 2urisdiction with &/I

• #udiciary Act grants 2urisdiction with the municipal court inthe capital of a pro!ince in offenses where the penalty is not

more than prission correctional or fine not eceeding8,666Php (penalty for libel"

• %o ano naS

,odines v. CA

• Patent Law 0 grants the patentee the eclusi!e right to ma1euse, and sell his patented machine, article or product

• Doctrine of e.ui!alents 0 when a de!ice appropriates a priorin!ention by incorporating its inno!ati!e concept, and albeiwith some modification and change, performs substantially

the same function in substantially the same way to achie!esubstantially the same result (ano ba TtoS Purosubstantially"

P#anters Association of So%t*ern +egros /nc. v. Ponferrada

• : apparently conflicting pro!isions should be construed as torealie the purpose of the law

• 4he purpose of the law is to I5&REA%E the wor1er

benefits

• 'enefits under RA 8+;: shall be I5 ADDI4IO5 to the benefits under RA ;6+ and PD 8:*

• B%ubstitutedC cannot be gi!en literal interpretation

Ghen reason of law ceases, law itself ceases

• 4he reason which induced the legislature to enact a law is theheart of the law

• &essante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa le 0 when the reason o

the law ceases, the law itself ceases• Ratio legis est anima 0 reason of the law is its soul

Peo v. A#m%ete

• Agricultural 4enancy Act is repealed by the Agricultura

Land Reform &ode

• Agricultural 4enancy Act 0 punishes prereaping o prethreshing of palay on a date other than that pre!iously se

without the mutual consent of the landlord and tenanto %hare tenancy relationship

• Agricultural Land Reform &ode 0 abolished share tenancyrelationship, thus does not punish prereaping or prethreshing

of palay on a date other than that pre!iously set without themutual consent of the landlord and tenant anymore

o Leasehold system

Commendador v. De 2i##a

• Issue whether PD -+, which withdrew the right to peremptorily challenge members of a military tribunal, had been rendered inoperati!e by PD :697 proclaiming the

termination of a state of martial law

• @eld ME%S 4he termination of the martial law and thdissolution of military tribunals created thereunder, the

reason for the eistence of PD -+ ceased automatically andthe decree itself ceased

2as$%e' v. ,iap

• Ghere the mischief sought to be remedied by a statute has

already been remo!ed in a gi!en situation, the statute may nolonger apply in such case

• 4he law bans aliens from ac.uiring and owning lands, the

purpose is to preser!e the nations lands for futuregenerations of /ilipinos

• A sale of land in fa!or of an alien, in !iolation of the said

law, no longer be .uestioned after the alien becomes a/ilipino citien

%upplying legislati!e omission

• if it is clearly ascertainable from the &O54E4S

• )ay supply legislati!e omission to ma1e the statute conformto ob!ious intent of the legislature or to pre!ent the act from

being absurd

• 5ote differentiate from 2udicial legislation



&orrecting clerical errors

• As long as the meaning intended is apparent on the face ofthe whole enactment and no specific pro!ision is abrogated

• 4his is not 2udicial legislation

Illustration rule

"%fino Lope' 3 Sons /nc. v. CTA

• &ourt change the phrase Bcollector of customsC toBcommissioner of customsC to correct an ob!ious mista1e in

law

• %ec 0 Bcommissioner of customsC 0 grants the &4A 2urisdiction to re!iew decisions of the &ommissioner of

&ustoms

• %ec ** 0 Bcollector of customsC 0 refers to the decision of the&ollector of &ustoms that may be appealed to the ta court

• B&ommissionerC pre!ails 0 &ommissioner of &ustoms has

super!ision and control o!er &ollectors of &ustoms and thedecisions of the latter are re!iewable by the &ommissioner of&ustoms

Lamp v. P*ipps

• BOrdinary &OFR4% of lawC to BOrdinary &OFR%E of lawC

Farinas v. arba

• Issue who is the appointing power to fill a !acancy created by the sanggunian member who did not belong to any

political party, under the pro!ision of the Local Ko!ernment&ode

• Blocal chief eecuti!eC 0 a misnomer

• It should be Bauthorities concernedC

• 'ecause the President is not a Blocal chief eecuti!eC but

under %ec$ 76 of the Local Ko!ernment &ode, the BPresident,Ko!ernor, )ayor ha!e the eecuti!e power to appoint in

order to fill !acancies in local councils or to suspend localofficials

ualification of rule (of correcting clerical errors"• Only those which are clearly clerical errors or ob!ious

mista1es, omissions, and misprintsH otherwise, is to rewritethe law and in!ade the domain of the legislature, it is 2udicial

legislation in the guise of interpretation

&onstruction to a!oid absurdity

• Reason it is always presumed that the legislature intendedeceptions to its language which would a!oid conse.uencesof this character

• 4hus, statutes may be etended to co!er cases not within theliteral meaning of the terms if their eact and literal import

would lead to absurd or mischie!ous results

• Interpretation talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut e!iteturincon!eniens et absurdum 0 where there is ambiguity, such

interpretation as will a!oid incon!enience and absurdity is to be adopted

• &ourts test the law by its results 0 if law appears to be

arbitrary, courts are not bound to apply it in sla!ishdisobedience to its language

• &ourts should construe a statute to effectuate, and not to

defeat, its pro!isionsH nor render compliance with its pro!isions impossible to perform

Peo v. D%$%e

• %urplusageSSS

• %ec$ : of Act 5o$ --:8 0 prescription of offenses

o Prescription shall begin to run from

4he day of the commission of the!iolation

/rom the time of disco!ery A5Dinstitution of 2udicial proceedings forin!estigation and punishment

• 'ut the pre!ailing rule is that prescripti!e period is tolledupon the institution of 2udicial proceedings 0 an act of grace

by the %tate

• &ourt held that the phrase Binstitution of 2udicial proceedingfor its in!estigation and punishmentC may be eithe

disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded bythe word BuntilC

O#iveros v. 2i##a#%'

• Issue whether or not the suspension order against an electi!eofficial following an information for !iolation of the Anti3

Kraft law filed against him, applies not only to the currenterm of office but also to another term if the accused run foreelection and won

• %ec *- of the Anti3Kraft Law 0 suspension unless ac.uittedreinstatedS

• @eld only refers to the current term of the suspended officer

(and not to a future un1nown and uncertain new term unlesssupplemented by a new suspension order in the e!ent oreelection" for if his term shall ha!e epired at the time of

ac.uittal, he would ob!iously be no longer entitled toreinstatementH otherwise it will lead to absurdities

Peo v. 4% !ai

• Issue when does a crime punishable by arresto meno prescribe

• %tate says *6 years as pro!ided for in Art +6 RP&

o Art$ :8 (correctional offenses" 0 ma fine o

:66Php 0 correctional penalty 0 prescribes in *6years (Art$ +6"

• &ourt held that this is not rightSSSS It is wrongS

o Art$ + (light offenses" 0 not more than :66Php 0

light felonies 0 : monthso *Php ma1es a difference of + years and *6 months

(huwatS"o Arresto mayor (correctional penalty" prescribes in

7 yearso Less gra!e 0 prescribe e!en shorter

o Also, prescripti!e period cannot be ascertained no

until the court decides which of the alternati!

penalties should be imposed 0 imprisonment ba orfine lang yun lang poS

Peo v. "eyes

• Dangerous Drugs Act

• RA 87+o U :66 grams 0 ma penalty is reclusion perpetua

o V :66 grams 0 min penalty is reclusion

perpetua• &ourt ruled that

o U :66 grams 0 penalty ranging from prision

correctional to reclusion temporal

*-93*++grams 0 reclusion temporal

883*-- 0 prison mayor

Less than 88 grams 0 prision correcional

• %tat&on 0 duty of the court to harmonie conflicting pro!isions to gi!e effect to the whole lawH to effectuate theintention of legislature

Ma#on'o v. 5amora



• &ontention the &ity &ounsel of &aloocan cannot !alidly pass an ordinance appropriating a supplemental budget for

the purpose of epropriating a certain parcel of land, withoutfirst adopting or updating its house rules of procedure withinthe first +6 days following the election of its members, asre.uired by %ecs$ 76 and 7: of the LK&

• &ourt said this is absurdSSSS &ontention is re2ectedSo Adoption or updating of house rules would

necessarily entail wor1 local councils handswere tied and could not act on any other matter if

we hold the absurd contentionSo %o much incon!enienceS %hioS And this could not

ha!e been intended by the law

&onstruction to a!oid in2ustice

• Presumption 0 legislature did not intend to wor1 a hardshipor an oppressi!e result, a possible abuse of authority or act ofoppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose

hardship on the other

• Ea est accipienda interpretation .uae !itio caret 0 thatinterpretation is to be adopted which is free from e!il or

in2ustice

Amatan v. A%-ero

• Rodrigo Fmpad was charged with homicide

• Pursuant to some pro!ision in criminal procedure, he enteredinto a plea bargaining agreement, which the 2udge appro!ed

of, downgrading the offense charge of homicide to attemptedhomicide to which Fmpad pleaded guilty thereto$

• @elloS 5amatay na nga tapos attempted langS

)ababaliw a1o sayo, 2udge, whoe!er you areSSS

• /iat 2usticia, ruat coelum 0 let the right be done, though thehea!ens fall (ano dawS"

• %tated differently, when a pro!ision of the law is silent or

ambiguougs, 2udges ought to in!o1e a solution responsi!e tothe !ehement urge of conscience (ahhh ano daw ulitS"

Peo v. P%risima

• It was contended that PD +(-" 0 is a malum prohibitumH thus

intent to use such prohibited weapons is immaterial byreason of public policy

• &ourt said that use the preamble to construe such act whether penalied or not

• )oreo!er the court said that legislature did not intendin2ustice, absurdity and contradiction

• &ourt ga!e an eample

o %o if I borrowed a bolo then I return this to my

lender, then in the course or my 2ourney Imcaught, Im penalied under the Decree for 73*6years imprisonmentS (ang labo namanS"

1rs%a v. CA

• Issue whether or not the isolated use, at one instance, of aname other than a persons true name to secure a copy of a

document from a go!ernment agency, constitutes !iolationof &A *9: 0 Anti3alias Law

• @eld 5OS (isang beses lang naman eh$$ hehehe 2o1e langS"

o 4he purpose of the Anti3alias Law is to pre!ent

confusion and fraud in business transactionso %uch isolated use of a different name is not

prohibited by the lawH otherwise, in2ustice,absurdity and contradiction will result

&onstruction to a!oid danger to public interest

Co 0im C*am v. 2a#de' Tan 0e*

• %a &onsti Tto ahS La lang hehe (yihee, %ergeS"

• BprocessesC in the proclamation that Ball laws regulationsand processesC of the so3called RP during the #apanese

occupation of the country Bare null and !oid and withoutlegal effectC )AM 5O4 be construed to embrace #FDI&IALPRO&E%%E% as this would lead to great incon!enience and

public hardship and public interest would be endangered

o &riminals freed

o >ested right, impaired

&onstruction in fa!or of right and 2ustice

• Art$ *6 && In case of doubt in the interpretation oapplication of laws, it is presumed that the law3ma1ing body

intended right and 2ustice to pre!ail

• Art$ + && 4he fact that a statute is silent, obscure, orinsufficient with respect to a .uestion before the court wil

not 2ustify the latter from declining to render 2udgmenthereon

• In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is percei!ed to tipthe scales which the court belie!es will best promote the

public welfare is its probable operation as a general rule or

principle

Sa#vacion v. SP

• Kreg 'artelli raped his alleged niece *6 times and detainedher in his apartment for 9 days

• &ourt ga!e a fa!orable 2udgment of more than *)Php

• '%P re2ected the writ of attachment alleging %ec **- of the&entral 'an1 &ircular 5o$ +86 (applicable to transienforeigners"

• Issue whether the dollar ban1 deposit in a Philippine ban1 oa foreign tourist can be attached to satisfy the moral damageawarded in fa!or of the latters *:3year3old rape !ictim

• '%P did not honor the writ of attachment pursuant to

RA89:8 %ec ; 0 Bforeign currency deposits shall be eempfrom attachment, garnishment, or any other order or proces

of any court, legislati!e body, go!ernment agency or anyadministrati!e body whatsoe!erC

• &ourt held that A5O 'AS 5a3rape na nga ayaw pangmagbayad ng moral damages dahil lang sa isang silly lawS

(hehe$$ 2o1e lang$$ Im so bored na ehS"o &ourt applied the principles of right and 2ustice to

pre!ail o!er the strict and literal words of thestatute

o 4he purpose of RA 89:8 to eempt such asset

from attachment at the time the said law waenacted, the countrys economy was in a shambles'ut in the present time it is still in shambles$$$ hehe

2o1e lang but in the present time, the country ha

reco!ered economically$ 5o reason why suchassets cannot be attached especially if it wouldsatisfy a 2udgment to award moral damages to a*:3year3old rape !ictimS

%urplusage and superfluity disregarded

• Ghere a word, phrase or clause in a statute is de!oid of

meaning in relation to the contet or intent of the statute, owhere it suggests a meaning that nullifies the statute o

renders it without sense, the word, phrase or clause may bere2ected as surplusage and entirely ignored

• %urplusagium non noceat 0 surplusage does not !itiate a

statute

• Ftile per inutile non !itiatur 0 nor is the useful !itated by thenon3useful

Demafi#es v. COMELEC

• Issue whether a pre3proclamation election case has become

moot because the proclaimed winner had immediately ta1en



his oath pursuant to %ec : RA 9;6 which pro!ides that theBfirst mayor, !ice3mayor and councilors of the municipalityof %ebaste shall be elected in the net general elections for

local officials and shall ha!e .ualifiedC

• It was contended that Bshall ha!e .ualifiedC beginsimmediately after their proclamationS

• &ourt held that this is wrongSo 4he said phrase is a 2argon and does not warrant

the respondents reading that the term of office ofthe first municipal officials of %ebaste begins

immediately after their proclamationo 4he Qing in TAlice in Gonderland if there is no

meaning in it, that sa!es a world of trouble, you

1now, as we need not try to find any

o Apply the general rule when such term begin 0 the

term of municipal officials shall begin on the *st

day of #anuary following their election

Redundant words may be re2ected

• %elf3eplanatory, ano buS

Obscure or missing word or false description may not precludeconstruction

• /alsa demonstration non nocet, cum de corpore constat 0

false description does not preclude construction nor !itiate

the meaning of the statute which is otherwise clear

Eemption from rigid application of law

• Ibi .uid generaliter conceditur 0 e!ery rule is not without aneception

• Inest haec eception, si non ali.uid sit contras 2us bas.ue 0where anything is granted generally, this eception isimplied

• &ompelling reasons may 2ustify reading an eception to arule e!en where the latter does not pro!ide anyH otherwisethe rigor of the law would become the highest in2ustice 0summum 2us, summa in2uria

Law does not re.uire the impossible

• 5emo tenetur ad impossible 0 the law obliges no one to perform an impossibility

• Impossibilium nulla obligation est 0 no obligation to do animpossible thing

• Impossible compliance !ersus %ubstantial compliance (as

re.uired by law"

Lim co C*%i v Posadas

• Publication in the Official Kaette wee1ly, for three timesand consecuti!ely, to ac.uire 2urisdiction o!er naturaliationcase

• It was an impossibility to fulfill such re.uirement as the OKwas not, at the time, published wee1ly

• 4hus, &ourt held that compliance with the other :

re.uirements would be deemed sufficient to ac.uire 2urisdiction o!er the naturaliation case

Akbayan v. COMELEC

• 4his case is about the statutory grant of stand3by power tothe &O)ELE& as pro!ided for in %ec$ :; RA ;9-8

• Petitioners were as1ing the respondent to eercise such power so as to accommodate potential !oters who were not

able to register for the upcoming election

• &O)ELE& denied the petition alleging the impossibility oflate registration to accommodate potential !oters

• &ourt ruled that the pro!ision must be gi!en suchinterpretation that is in accordance with logic, commonsense, reasonableness and practicality

• Ghere time constraint and the surrounding circumstancesma1e it impossible or the &O)ELE& to conduct specia

registration of !oters, the &O)ELE& cannot be faulted forefusing to do so, for the law does not re.uire the impossibleto be doneH there is no obligation to ho the impossible thing

• &O)ELE&s decision is sustained

5umber and gender of words

• Ghen the contet of a statute so indicates, words in plurainclude the singular, and !ice !ersa$

•

A plural word in a statute may thus apply to a singula person or thing, 2ust as a singular word may embrace two omore persons or things

• Art$ ++8 && 0 (law on succession" such article also applie

to a situation where there is only one child becauseBchildrenC includes BchildC

• Election &ode 0 BcandidateC comprehends BsomecandidatesC or Ball candidatesC

• On gender 0 the masculine, but not the feminine, includes algenders, unless the contet in which the word is used in thestatute indicates otherwise

IMPLICATIONS

Doctrine of necessary implication

• %o3called gaps in the law de!elop as the law is enforced• %tat&on rule to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary

implication

• Doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a

part thereof as that which is epressed

• E necessitate legis 0 from the necessity of the law

• E!ery statutory grant of power, right or pri!ilege is deemedto include all incidental power, right or pri!ilege

• In eo .uod plus sit, simper inest et minus 0 greater includes

the lesser

• 5ecessity 0o includes such inferences as may be logically be

drawn from the purpose or ob2ect of the statute

from what the legislature must be presumed to

ha!e intended, and from the necessity of ma1ingthe statute effecti!e and operati!e

o ecludes what is merely plausible, beneficial, o

desirable

• must be consistent with the &onstitution or to eisting laws

• an implication which is !iolati!e of the law is un2ustified o

unwarranted

C*%a v. Civi# Service Commission

• Issue whether a coterminous employee, or one whoseappointment is co3eistent with the duration of a go!ernmen

pro2ect, who has been employed as such for more than :years, is entitled to early retirement benefits under %ec : RA

88;-

•

&ourt held that ME%, &hua is entitledSo A coterminous employee is no different from a

casual or temporary employee, and by necessary

implication, the inclusion of the latter in the clasof go!ernment employees entitled to the benefits

of the law necessarily implies that the formeshould also be entitled to such benefits

o Grong application of the maim Bepresio

uniusest eclusion alteriusC

Remedy implied from a right

• Fbi 2us, ibi remedium 3 where there is a right, there is aremedy for !iolation thereof

• Right 3V Obligation 3V Remedy



• 4he fact that the statute is silent as to the remedy does not preclude him from !indicating his right, for such remedy is

implied from such right

• Once a right is established, the way must be cleared for itsenforcement, and technicalities in procedure, 2udicial as well

as administrati!e, must gi!e way

• Ghere there is Bwrong,C (depri!ation or !iolation of a right"there is a remedy

• If theres no right, principle does not apply

at%ngbaka# v +ationa# Deve#opment Co• Petitioner was suspended and remo!ed from office which

pro!ed to be illegal and !iolati!e not only of theAdministrati!e &ode but of the &onstitution itself

• &ourt ruled that to remedy the e!il and wrong committed,

there should be reinstatement and payment of bac1wages,among other things

• @owe!er, there was a legal problem as to his reinstatement,

for when he was suspended and e!entually dismissed,somebody was appointed to his position

• Issue whether remedy is denied petitioner

• @eld position was ne!er B!acantC$ %ince there is no!acancy, the present incumbent cannot be appointed

permanently$ 4he incumbent is only holding a temporary

position$ )oreo!er, the incumbents being made to lea!e the

post to gi!e way to the employees superior right may beconsidered as remo!al for cause

Krant of 2urisdiction

• &onferred only by the &onstitution or by statute

• &annot be conferred by the Rules of &ourt

• &annot be implied from the language of a statute, in theabsence of clear legislati!e intent to that effect

Pimente# v. COMELEC

• &O)ELE& has appellate 2urisdiction o!er election casesfiled with and decided by the R4& in!ol!ing municipalelecti!e officials DOE% 5O4 I)PLM the grant of authority

upon the &O)ELE& to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition

or mandamus concerning said election cases

Peo v. Pa#ana

• %tatute grants a special court 2urisdiction o!er criminal casesin!ol!ing offenders under *8 at the time of the filing of theaction, a subse.uent statute defining a youthful offender as

one who is o!er + but below :* years of age may not be soconstrued as to confer by implication upon said special courtthe authority to try cases in!ol!ing offenders *8 but below:* years of age

Ghat may be implied from grant of 2urisdiction

• 4he grant of 2urisdiction to try actions carries with it all

necessary and incidental powers to employ all writs, processes and other means essential to ma1e its 2urisdiction

effecti!e• Ghere a court has 2urisdiction o!er the main cause of action,

it can grant reliefs incidental thereto, e!en if they would

otherwise be outside its 2urisdictiono E$g$ forcible entry and detainer is cogniable in

)4& )4& can order payment of rentals e!en

though the amount eceeds the 2urisdictionalamount cogniable by them, the same merely

incidental to the principal action

• %tatutes conferring 2urisdiction to an administrati!e agencymust be liberally construed to enable the agency to discharge

its assigned duties in accordance with the legislati!e purpose

o E$g$ the power granted the 5@A to hear and decide

claims in!ol!ing refund and any other claims filed

, include attorneys fees and other damages

Krant of power includes incidental power

• Ghere a general power is conferred or duty en2oined, e!ery particular power necessary for the eercise of one or the

performance of the other is also conferred

• 4he incidental powers are those which are necessarilyincluded in, and are therefore of lesser degree than the power

grantedo Eamples

Power to establish an office includeauthority to abolish it, unless

Garrant issued shall be made upon probable cause determined by the 2udge implies the grant of power to the

2udge to conduct preliminaryin!estigations

Power to appro!e a license includes by

implication the power to re!o1e it

• Power to re!o1e is limited bythe authority to grant license

from which it is deri!ed

Power to deport includes the power to

arrest undesirable aliens aftein!estigation

Power to appoint !ested in the Presidenincludes the power to ma1e temporary

appointments , unless

Power to appropriate money include power to withdraw unepended money

already appropriated

Etc see page **3*:

Krant of power ecludes greater power

• 4he principle that the grant of power includes all incidenta powers necessary to ma1e the eercise thereof effecti!eimplies the eclusion of those which are greater than that

conferredo Power of super!ision DOE% 5O4 I5&LFDE

power to suspend or remo!alo Power to reorganie DOE% 5O4 I5&LFDE the

authority to depri!e the courts certain 2urisdiction

and to transfer it to a .uasi32udicial tribunalo Power to regulate business DOE% 5O4 I5&LFDE

power to prohibit

Ghat is implied should not be against the law

• Power to appoint includes power to suspend or remo!e 0o &onstitutional restriction of &I>IL %ER>I&E

E)PLOMEE%, that it must be a cause pro!ided for by law precludes such implication (unless the

appointment was made outside the ci!il ser!icelaw

• Power to appoint a public officer by the President includes

power to remo!eo Pro!ided that such remo!al is made with 2ust cause

o Ecept is such statute pro!ides that term of office

to be at the pleasure of the appointing officer

power to appoint carries with it power to remo!eanytime

• Power to in!estigate officials DOE% 5O4 I5&LFDE the

power to delegate the authority to ta1e testimony owitnesses whose appearance may be re.uired by the

compulsory process of subpoena$ 5or does such power to



in!estigate include the power to delegate the authority toadminister oath

Authority to charge against public funds may not be implied

• It is well3settled that unless a statute epressly so authories,no claim against public funds may be allowed

o %tatute grants lea!e pri!ileges to APPOI54I>E

officials, this cannot be construed to includeELE&4I>E officials

o BemployerC to pay *-th month pay, does not imply

that it includes Bgo!ernment

Illegality of act implied from prohibition

• In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis 3 where a

statute prohibits the doing of an act, the act done in !iolationthereof is by implication null and !oid

• Prohibited act cannot ser!e as foundation of a cause of actionfor relief

• E dolo malo non oritur actio 0 no man can be allowed tofound a claim upon his own wrongdoing or ine.uity

• 5ullus coomodum capere potest de in2uria sua propria 0 no

man should be allowed to ta1e ad!antage of his own wrong

• Public policy re.uires that parties to an act prohibited bystatute be left where they are, to ma1e the statute effecti!e

and to accomplish its ob2ecto Party to an illegal contract cannot come to court of

law and as1 that his illegal ob2ect be carried outo A citien who sold his land to an alien in !iolation

of the constitutional restriction cannot annul thesame and reco!er the land, for both seller and

buyer are guilty of ha!ing !iolated the &onstitution

4wo (:" Eceptions to the rule

• Pari delicto doctrine will not apply when its enforcement or

application will !iolate an a!owed %un"a&enta' #o'!) or

#u*'! !nterest

De#os Santos v. "oman Cat*o#ic C*%rc*

• @omestead Law 0 to gi!e and preser!e in the homesteaderand his family a piece of land for his house and culti!ation

• 4he law prohibits the alienation of a homestead within 7years following the issuance of the patent and pro!ides that

any contract of a con!eyance in contra!ention thereof shall be null and !oid

• 4he seller or his heirs, although in pari delicto, may reco!er

the land sub2ect of such illegal sale

arsobia v. C%enco

• Another eception is that when the transat!on !s not !''e(a'

#er se *ut &ere') #ro$!*!te" and the prohibition by law isdesigned for protection of one party, the court may grant

relief in fa!or of the latter

Ghat cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly

• uando ali.uid prohibetur e directo, prohibetur et perobli.uum 0 what cannot, by law, be done directly cannot be

done indirectly

Peo v. Concepcion

• Ghere a corporation is forbidden from doing an act, the prohibition etends to the board of directors and to each

director separately and indi!idually

• Ghere the board of directors is prohibited from grantingloans to its director, a loan to a partnership of which the wifeof a director is a partner falls within the prohibition

Peop#es ank and Tr%st Co. v. P+

• Ghere a statute prohibits the payment of the principa

obligation during a fied period, the interest thereon duringthe eistence of the restriction is not demandable

Cr%' v. Tant%ico

• Law eempts retirement benefits of a public officer oemployee from attachment, garnishment etc

• Earlier law authories the go!ernment to withhold an amoundue such officer or employee to pay his indebtedness to thego!ernment %@OFLD 5O4 'E &O5%4RFED to withholdso much of his retirement benefits as this amount to

attachment garnishment etc$

Tant%ico 6r. v Domingo

• Law eempts retirement benefits of a public officer oemployee from attachment, garnishment etc

• Ko!ernment cannot withhold payment of retirement benefitsof a public officer until his accountabilities with thgo!ernment shall ha!e been cleared, as such action is doing

indirectly what the go!ernment is prohibited from doingdirectly

4here should be no penalty from compliance with law

• A person who complies with what a statute re.uires cannot

by implication, be penalied thereby

• /or Bsimple logic and fairness and reason canno

countenance an eaction or a penalty for an act faithfully

done in compliance with the lawC

CHAPTER FIVE: Inter#retat!on o% +or"s an" #$rases

IN GENERAL

Kenerally

• A word or phrase used in a statute may ha!e an ordinarygeneric, restricted, technical, legal, commercial or tradingmeaning

• )ay be defined in the statute 0 if this is done, use suchdefinition because this is what the legislature intended

• 4as1o ascertain intent from statute

o ascertain intent from etraneous ? rele!an

circumstance

o construe word or phrase to effectuate such intent

• Keneral rule in interpreting the meaning and scope of a termused in the law

o Re!iew of the G@OLE law in!ol!ed as well as the

I54E5D)E54 of law (not of an isolated part or a

particular pro!ision alone"

%tatutory definition

• Ghen statute defines words ? phrase3 legislati!e definitioncontrols the meaning of statutory word, irrespecti!e of anyother meaning word ha!e in ordinary usual sense$

• Ghere a statute defines a word or phrase, the word or phraseshould not by construction, be gi!en a different meaning$

• Legislature restricted meaning as it adopted specific

definition, thus, this should be used



• 4erm or phrase specifically defined in particular law,definition must be adopted$

• 5o usurpation of court function in interpreting but it merelylegislates what should form part of the law itself

2ictorias Mi##ing Co. v. Socia# Sec%rity Commission 7compensation8RA **8*, %ec$ ;(f"V

• 9compensation: to inc#%de a## ren%merations e)cept

bon%ses a##o;ances 3 overtime pay

• Definition was amended deleted BeceptionsC

•

Legislati!e Intent the amendment shows legislati!e intentthat bonuses ? o!ertime pay now included in employees

renumeration$

• Principle by !irtue of epress substantial change in phraseology, whate!er prior 2udicial or eecuti!e

construction should gi!e way to mandate of new law$

Peo. v. 2envia-e 7 C*iropractic<

• Issue Ghether person who practiced chiropractic withoutha!ing been duly licensed, may be criminally liable for!iolation of medical law$

• @eld 4hough term Bpractice of medicine,C chiropractic mayin ordinary sense fall within its meaningH statutorily defined 3includes manipulations employed in chiropracticH thus, onewho practices chiropractic without license is criminally

liable$

C*ang 4%ng Fa v. ,ian'on7 a#ien<

• Issue whether alien who comes into country as temporary

!isitor is an BimmigrantC

• @eld while BimmigrantC in ordinary definition3 Ban alienwho comes to the Philippines for permanent residenceCH 4he

Immigration Act ma1es own definition of term, which isBany alien departing from any place outside the Philippinesdestined for the Philippines, other than a non3immigrant$

• (so 1elangan part siya nung Bother than a non3immigrantC$"

3V yep yep, %ergeS 'ut more importantly, the definitionemphasies an immigrant, who is an alien, who comes to the

Philippines either to reside 4E)PORARILM orPER)A5E54LM 0 no distinction

• definition of terms gi!en weight in construction

• terms ? phrases, being part ? parcel of whole statute, gi!en

effect in their E54IR4M, as harmonious, coordinated, andintegrated unit

• words ? phrases construed in light of contet of G@OLEstatute$

ualification of rule

• %tatutory definition of word or term controlling only as usedin the ActH

• not conclusi!e as to the meaning of same word or term in

other statutes• Especially to transactions that too1 place prior to enactment

of act$

• %tatutory definition controlling statutory words does not

apply wheno application creates incongruities

o destroy its ma2or purposes

o becomes illogical as result of change in its factual

basis$

Ernest v. CA 7 RA 9*88 ? EO +66, +6*V

• Bsugarcane planterC is defined as a planter3owner of

sugarcane plantation w=in particular sugar mill district, who

has been allocated eport and=or domestic ? reser!e sugar.uotas$

• %tatutory definition ecludes emergency, non3.uota, nondistrict and accommodation planters, they ha!ing no sugar.uota$ @owe!er, in *+77, .uota system abolished

• Gith change in situation, illogical to continue adhering to pre!ious definition that had lost their legal effect$

Amadora v. CA

• @owe!er, where statute remains unchanged, interpreted

according to its clear and original mandateH until legislatureta1ing into account changes sub2ected to be regulated, seefit to enact necessary amendment$

Gords construed in their ordinary sense

• Keneral rule In the absence of legislati!e intent, words and

phrases should be gi!en their plain, ordinary, and commonusage meaning$

• %hould be read and considered in their natural, ordinary

commonly accepted, and most ob!ious significationaccording to good and appro!ed usage and without resultingto forced or subtle construction$

Centra# A'%carera Don Pedro v. Centra# ank

• A statute Beempts certain importations from ta and foreign

echange, which are actually used in the manufacture or preparation of local products, forming part thereof$C

• B/orming part thereofC not to mean that the imported products ha!e to be mied mechanically, chemically

materially into the local product ? lose its identity$

• )eans that the imported article is needed to accomplish thelocally manufactured product for eport$

C/" v. Mani#a %siness Lodge =>?

• BbusinessC (if un.ualified" in ta statute plain and ordinary

meaning to embrace acti!ity or affair where profit is the purpose ? li!elihood is the moti!e$

• In this case, a fraternal social club selling li.uor at it

clubhouse in a limited scale only to its members, without

intention to obtain profit• 5ot engaged in business$

P*iippine# Association of ,overnment "etirees v. ,S/S

7 9present va#%e:<

• %tatute Bfor those who are at least 87 yrs of age, lump sum

payment of present !alue of annuity for the first 7 years, andfuture annuity to be paid monthly$ Provided *o;ever thathere shall be no discount from annuity for the first 7 yrs$ ofthose who are 87 yrs or o!er, on the day the law too1 effect$C

• >ocabularyo lump sum 3 amount of money gi!en in single

paymento annuity 3 amount of money paid to somebody

yearly or at some other regular inter!al• %hould there be discount from the present !alue of hi

annuity

• 5O$ Fsed in ordinary sense as said law grants to the retiredemployee substantial sum for his sustenance considering hi

age$ Any doubt in this law should be ruled in his fa!or$

Mat%g%ina /ntegrated @ood Prod%cts /nc. v. CA

• Ghether transferee of a forest concession is liable foobligations arising from transferors illegal encroachmen

into another forest concessionaire, which was committed prior to the transfer

• %ec$ 8* of PD 67 Bthe transferee shall assume all the

obligations of the transferor$C



• &ourt held that the transferee is 5O4 liable and eplainedBObligationsC construed to mean obligations incurred by

transferor in the ordinary course of business$ 5ot those as aresult of transgressions of the law, as these are personalobligations of transferor$

• Principle &onstrue using ordinary meaning ? a!oidabsurdity$

M%stang L%mber /nc. v CA

• %tatute %ec$ 8; PD 67 3 penalies the cutting, gathering ?or collecting timber or other forest products without a

license$

• Is BlumberC included in BtimberC

• Re!ersing *st ruling, %& says lumber is included in timber$

• B4he Re!ised /orestry &ode contains no definition of timber

or lumber$ 4imber is included in definition of forestry

prod%cts par (." %ec$-$ Lumber 3 same definitions asBprocessing plantsC

• Processing plant is any mechanical set3up, machine or

combination of machine used for processing of logs ? other

forest raw materials into #%mber !eneer, plywood etc p$*;-$

• %imply means, #%mber is a processed log or forest raw

material$ 4he &ode uses lumber in ordinary common usage$

In *++- ed$ of Gebsters International Dictionary, #%mber isdefined as timber or logs after being prepared for the mar1et$

4herefore, lumber is a processed log or timber$ %ec 8; of PD67 ma1es no distinction between raw ? processed timber$

Keneral words construed generally

• ,enera#ia verba s%nt genera#iter inte##igenda what is

generally spo1en shall be generally understoodH general

words shall be understood in a general sense$

• ,enera#e dict%m genera#iter est interpretand%m a general

statement is understood in a general sense

• In case word in statute has both restricted and general

meaning, KE5ERAL must pre!ailH Fnless nature of thesub2ect matter ? contet in which it is employed clearly

indicates that the limited sense is intended$

•Keneral words should not be gi!en a restrictedmeaning when no restriction is indicated$

• Rationale if the legislature intended to limit themeaning of a word, it would ha!e been easy for it toha!e done so$

Application of rule

,atc*a#ian v. COMELEC

• BforeignerC3 in Election &ode, prohibiting any foreignerfrom contributing campaign funds includes 2uridical person

•

BpersonC3 comprehends pri!ate 2uridical person• BpersonC3 in penal statute, must be a Bperson in law,C an

artificial or natural person

2argas v. "i##aro'a

• B2udgeC without any modifying word or phrase

accompanying it is to be construed in generic sense tocomprehend all 1inds of 2udgesH inferior courts or 2ustices of

%&$

C 3 C Commercia# Corp v. +A@ASA

• Bgo!ernmentC 3 without .ualification should be understoodin implied or generic sense including KO&&s$

Centra# ank v. CA

• B5ational Ko!ernmentC 3 refers only to central go!ernment

consisting of eecuti!e, legislati!e and 2udiciary, as well aconstitutional bodies ( as distinguished from loca

go!ernment ? other go!ernmental entities" 2ers%s<

• 94he Ko!ernment of the Republic of the PhilippinesC or

BPhilippine Ko!ernmentC 0 including central go!ernments awell as local go!ernment ? KO&&s$

"ep%b#ic F#o%r Mi##s v. Commissioner of C%stoms• Bproduct of the PhilippinesC 0 any product produced in the

country, e$g$ bran (ipa" ? pollard (dara1" produced fromwheat imported into the country are Bproducts of the

PhilippinesC

Keneric term includes things that arise thereafter

• Progressi!e interpretation 3 A word of general signification

employed in a statute, in absence of legislati!e intent, tocomprehend not only peculiar conditions obtaining at it

time of enactment but those that may normally arise after itsappro!al as well

• Progressi!e interpretation etends to the application o

statute to all sub2ects or conditions within its general purpose

or scope that come into eistence subse.uent from it passage

• Rationale to 1eep statute from becoming ephemeral (short3li!ed" and transitory (not permanent or lasting"$

• %tatutes framed in general terms apply to new cases andsub2ects that arise$

• Keneral rule in %tat&on Legislati!e enactments in generacomprehensi!e operation, apply to persons, sub2ects and

businesses within their general pur!iew and scope cominginto eistence subse.uent to their passage$

,eotina v. CA

• Barticles of prohibited importationC 3 used in 4ariff and

&ustoms &ode embrace not only those declared prohibited atime of adoption, but also goods and articles sub2ect oacti!ities underta1en in subse.uent laws$

,atc*a#ian v. COMELEC

• Bany electionC 3 not only the election pro!ided by law at thatime, but also to future elections including election o

delegates to &onstitutional &on!ention

Gords with commercial or trade meaning

•Gords or phrases common among merchants and tradersac.uire commercial meanings$

•Ghen any of words used in statute, should be gi!en such trade ocommercial meaning as has been generally understoodamong merchants$

•Fsed in the following tariff laws, laws of commerce, laws for

the go!ernment of the importer$•4he law to be applicable to his class, should be construed as

uni!ersally understood by importer or trader$

Asiatic Petro#e%m Co. v. C/"

• 5o ta shall be collected on articles which, before its ta1ing

effect, shall ha!e been Bdisposed of C

•Lay parting away w= something

•)erchant to sell (this must be used"

San Mig%e# Corp. v. M%nicipa# Co%nci# of Manda%e

•Bgross !alue of moneyC



•)erchant Bgross selling priceC which is the total amount ofmoney or its e.ui!alent which purchaser pays to the !endor

to recei!e the goods$

Gords with technical or legal meaning

•Keneral rule words that ha!e, or ha!e been used in, a technicalsense or those that ha!e been 2udicially construed to ha!e acertain meaning should be interpreted according to the sensein which they ha!e been PRE>IOF%LM used, although the

sense may !ary from the strict or literal meaning of thewords

•Presumption language used in a statute, which has a technical or

well31nown meaning, is used in that sense by the legislature

Mani#a !era#d P%b#is*ing Co. v. "amos

•%ec *9 of Rule 7+ of Rules of &ourt which prescribes the stepsto be ta1en when property attached is claimed by a person

other than the defendant or his agent

• %tatute Bnothing herein contained shall pre!ent such third

person from !indicating his claim to the property by any proper action.C

• Issue Bproper actionC limits the -rd partys remedy to

inter!ene in the action in which the writ of attachment isissued

•@eld BactionC has ac.uired a well3defined meaning as anBordinary suit in a court of 2ustice by which one party

prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of aright or pre!ent redress or wrong

Ghile

•%ec : Rule : of Rules of &ourtH B&ommencement of ActionC

•%tatute B&i!il action may be commenced by filing a complaintwith the proper courtC

•Gord commencement 3 indicates the origination of entire proceeding

• It was appropriate to use proper action (in * st statute" than

inter!ention, since asserted right of -rd party claimantnecessarily flows out of pending suitH if the word

Tinter!ention is used, it becomes strange$

Ma#anyaon v. Lising

• %ec$ *- of Anti3Kraft Law

• %tatute B if a public officer is ac.uitted, he shall be entitled

to reinstatement and to his salaries and benefits which hefailed to recei!e during the suspensionC

• Issue Gill a public officer whose case has been dismissed

not Bac.uittedC be entitled to benefits in %ec$ *-

• @eld 5o$ Ac.uittal B#ega# meaning finding of not guilty

based on the merit$

• Dismissal does not amount to ac.uittal ecept when, thedismissal comes after the prosecution has presented all its

e!idence and is based on insufficiency of such e!idence$

"%ra v. Lopena

•Probation law 3 Dis.ualified from probation those Bwho ha!e been pre!iously con!icted by final 2udgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than * month ? a fineof no less than Php :66$C

•Issue Bpre!iously con!ictedC

•@eld it refers to date of con!iction, not date of commission of

crimeH thus a person con!icted on same date of se!eraloffenses committed in different dates is not dis.ualified$

@ow identical terms in the statute construed

• Keneral rule a word or phrase repeatedly used in a statutewill bear the same meaning throughout the statuteH unless a

different intention is clearly epressed$

• Rationale word used in statute in a gi!en sense presumed to be used in same sense throughout the law$ 4hough rigid and

peremptory, this is applicable where in the statute the wordappear so near each other physically, particularly where the wordhas a technical meaning and that meaning has been defined inthe statute$

De #a Pa' v. Co%rt of Agrarian "e#ations UBRicelandCV

• share tenancy 3 a!erage produce per hectare for the -

agricultural years net preceding the current har!est

• leasehold 3 according to normal a!erage har!est of the - preceding yrs

• BMearC3 agricultural year not calendar year

• BAgricultural yearC 3 represents * cropH if in * calendar yr :crops are raised thats : agricultural years$

0rivenko v. "egister of Deeds

• %tatute In %ec$* , Art$ III of *+-7 &onstitution 3 Bpublic

agricultural lands shall not be alienatedC ecept in fa!or of/ilipinos, %A)E as %ec$ 7 Bno pri!ate agricultural land shal

be transferred or assigned$C

• both ha!e same meaning being based on same policy onationaliation and ha!ing same sub2ect$

)eaning of word .ualified by purpose of statute

• Purpose may indicate whether to gi!e word, phrase

ordinary, technical, commercial restricted or epansi!emeaning$

• In construing, court adopts interpretation that accords bes

with the manifest purpose of statuteH e!en disregard technicaor legal meaning in fa!or of construction which wileffectuate intent or purpose$

Gord or phrase construed in relation to other pro!isions

• Keneral rule word, phrase, pro!ision, should not beconstrued in isolation but must be interpreted in relation toother pro!isions of the law$

• 4his is a >ARIA4IO5 of the rule that, statute should beconstrued as a whole, and each of its pro!ision must be gi!eneffect$

C#a%dio v. COMELEC

• %tatute (LK&" B5o recall shall ta1e place within * yr from

the date of the officials assumption of office or * yeaimmediately preceding a regular electionC

• Issue Does the *st limitation embraces the entire recal

proceedings (e$g$ preparatory recall assemblies" or only the

recall election

• @eld the &ourt construed BrecallC in relation to %ec$8+which states that, Bthe power of recall shall be eercised

by the registered !oters of an LKF to which the locaelecti!e official belongs$C

• @ence, not apply to all recall proceedings since power !ested

in electorate is power to elect an official to office and no power to initiate recall proceedings$

• Gord or pro!ision should not be construed in isolation form but should be interpreted in relation to other pro!isions of astatute, or other statutes dealing on same sub2ect in order toeffectuate what has been intended$



,arcia v. COMELEC

• @istory of statuteo In the &onstitution, it re.uires that legislature shall

pro!ide a system of initiati!e and referendum

whereby people can directly appro!e or re2ect anyact or law or part thereof passed by &ongress or

local legislati!e body$

o Local Ko!t$ &ode, a later law, defines #oca#

initiative as Bprocess whereby registered !oters of

an LKF may directly propose, enact, or amend anyordinance$C

It is claimed by respondents that since

resolution is not included in thisdefinition, then the same cannot be

sub2ect of an initiati!e$

• Issue whether a local resolution of a municipal council can be sub2ect to an initiati!e and referendum

• @eld Ge re2ect respondents narrow and literal reading of

abo!e pro!ision for it will collide with the &onstitution andwill sub!ert the intent of the lawma1ers in enacting the

pro!isions of the Local Ko!ernment &ode (LK&" of *++* oninitiati!e ? referendum

• 4he subse.uent enactment of the LK& did not change the

scope of its co!erage$ In %ec$ *:9 of the same code$ It states(b" /nitiative s*a## e)tend on#y to s%b-ects or matters ;*ic*are ;it*in t*e #ega# po;ers of t*e Sangg%nians to enact.:

• 4his pro!ision clearly does not limit the application of local

initiati!e to ordinances, but to all Bsub2ects or matters whichare within the legal powers of the Sangg%nians to enact,which undoubtedly includes resolutions$C

,e#ano v. C.A.

• In &orporation Law, authories a dissol!ed corporation to

continue as a body corporate for - yrs$ for the purpose ofdefending and prosecuting suits by or against it, and duringsaid period to con!ey all its properties to a BtrusteeC for

benefits of its members, stoc1holders, creditors and other

interested persons, the transfer of the properties to the trustee being for the protection of its creditors and stoc1holders$

• Gord BtrusteeC 3 not to be understood in legal or technical

sense, but in KE5ERAL concept which would include alawyer to whom was entrusted the prosecution of the cases

for reco!ery of sums of money against corporations debtors$

"ep%b#ic v. As%ncion

• Issue Ghether the Sandiganbayan is a regular court within

the meaning of R$A$ 8+7

• %tatute RA 8+7 which ma1es criminal actions in!ol!ing

members of the P5P come Bwithin the eclusi!e 2urisdictionof the reg%#ar co%rts.

• Fsed Bregular courtsC ? Bci!il courtsC interchangeably

• &ourt martial 3 not courts within the Philippine #udicial%ystemH they pertain to the eecuti!e department and simplyinstrumentalities of the eecuti!e power$

• Regular courts 3 those within the 2udicial department of the

go!ernment namely the %& and lower courts which includesthe Sandiganbayan.

• @eld &ourts considered the purpose of the law which is toremo!e from the court martial, the 2urisdiction o!er criminalcases in!ol!ing members of the P5P and to !est it in thecourts within the 2udicial system$

Mo#ina v. "afferty

• Issue Ghether BAgricultural productsC includes

domesticated animals and fish grown in ponds$

• %tatute Phrase used in ta statute which eempts such products from payment of taes, purpose is to encourage the

de!elopment of such resources$

• @eld phrase not only includes !egetable substances but alsodomestic and domesticated animals, animal products, and

fish or bangus grown in ponds$ &ourt ga!e epansi!meaning to promote ob2ect of law$

M%no' 3 Co. v. !ord

• Issue B&onsumptionC limited or broad meaning

•

%tatute word is used in statute which pro!ides that Beceptas herein specifically eempted, there shall be paid by eachmerchant and manufacturer a ta at the rate of *=- of *N on

gross !alue of money in all goods, wares and merchandisesold, bartered, or echanged for domestic consumption$

• @eld &onsidering the purpose of the law, which is to ta al

merchants ecept those epressly eempted, it is reasonableand fair to conclude that legislature used in commercial useand not in limited sense of total destruction of thing sold$

Mottom%# v. de #a Pa'

• Issue Ghether the word BcourtC refers to the &ourt ofAppeals or the trial court

• %tatute RA 7-9- Effect of Appea# Appeal shall not stay the

award, order, ruling, decision or 2udgment unless the office

or body rendering the same or t*e co%rt , on motion, aftehearing ? on such terms as it may deem 2ust should pro!ideotherwise$

• @eld It refers to the 4RIAL &OFR4$ If the ad!erse partyintends to appeal from a decision of the %E& and pendingappeal desires to stay the eecution of the decision, then themotion must be filed with and be heard by the %E& before

the ad!erse party perfects its appeal to the &ourt of Appeals$

• Purpose of the law the need for immediacy of eecution odecisions arri!ed at by said bodies was imperati!e$

)eaning of term dictated by contet

• 4he contet in which the word or term is employed may

dictate a different sense

• 2erba accipienda s%nt sec%nd%m materiam a word is to beunderstood in the contet in which it is used$

Peop#e v. C*ave'

• %tatute /amily home etra2udicially formed shall be eempfrom eecution, forced sale or attachment, ecept for Bnon

payment of debtsC

• Gord BdebtsC 0 means obligations in general$

0rivenko v. "egister of Deeds

• %tatute lands were classified into timber, mineral andagricultural

• Gord BagriculturalC 0 used in broad sense to include allands that are neither timber, nor mineral, such being the

contet in which the term is used$

Sant%#an v. E)ec%tive. Secretary.

• %tatute A riparian owner of the property ad2oining foreshore

lands, marshy lands or lands co!ered with water borderingupon shores of ban1s of na!igable la1es shall ha!e

preference to apply for such lands ad2oining his property$

• /act Riparian 3 one who owns land situated on the ban1s ori!er$

• @eld Fsed in a more broader sense referring to a propertyha!ing a water frontage, when it mentioned Bforeshorlands,C Bmarshy lands,C or Blands co!ered with water$C

Peo. v. Ferrer



• Bcase ;*ere conte)t may #imit t*e meaning

• Gord BO!erthrowC

• %tatute Anti3%ub!ersion Act B1nowingly ? willfully and byo!ert acts$C

• Re2ects the metaphorical BpeacefulC sense ? limits itsmeaning to Bo!erthrowC by force or !iolence$

Peo. v. +a'ario

•

%tatute )unicipal ta ordinance pro!ides Bany owner ormanager of fishpondsC shall pay an annual ta of a fied

amount per hectare and it appears that the owner of thefishponds is the go!ernment which leased them to a pri!ate

person who operates them

• Gord BOwnerC 0 does not include go!ernment as theancient principle that go!ernment is immune from taes$

Ghere the law does not distinguish

• 1bi #e) non disting%it nec nos disting%ere debem%s where

the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish$

• &orollary principle Keneral words or phrases in a statuteshould ordinarily be accorded their natural and generalsignificance

•

Keneral term or phrase should not be reduced into parts andone part distinguished from the other to 2ustify its eclusionfrom operation$

• &orollary principle where the law does not ma1e anyeception, courts may not ecept something therefrom,unless there a compelling reason to 2ustify it$

• Application when legislature laid down a rule for one class,no difference to other class$

Presumption that the legislature made no .ualification in the

general use of a term$

"ob#es v. 5amba#es C*romite Co.

• %tatute grants a person against whom the possession of BanylandC is unlawfully withheld the right to bring an action for

unlawful detainer$

• @eld any land not eclusi!e to pri!ate or not eclusi!ely to publicH hence, includes all 1inds of land$

Director of Lands v. ,on'a#es

• %tatute authories the director of lands to file petitions for

cancellation of patents co!ering public lands on the groundtherein pro!ided$

• @eld not distinguished whether lands belong to national or

local go!ernment

SSS v. City of aco#od

• Issue eempts the payment of realty taes to Bpropertiesowned by RPC

• @eld no distinction between properties held in so!ereign,

go!ernmental, or political capacity and those possessed in proprietary or patrimonial character$

2e#asco v. Lope'

• %tatute certain BformalitiesC be followed in order that act

may be considered !alid$

• @eld no distinction between essential or non3essentialformalities

Co#gatePa#mo#ive P*i#s v. ,imene'

• %tatute does not distinguish between Bstabilier and fla!orsC

used in the preparation of food and those used in themanufacture of toothpaste or dental cream

O#iva v. Lamadrid

• %tatute allows the redemption or repurchase of a homestead property w=in 7 years from its con!eyance

• @eld Bcon!eyanceC not distinguished 3 !oluntary o

in!oluntary$

Escos%ra v. San Mig%e# re;ery /nc.

• %tatute grants employee Blea!es of absence with payC

• @eld Bwith payC refers to full pay and not to half or less than

full payH to all lea!es of absence and not merely to sic1 or!acation lea!es$

O#fato v. COMELEC

• %tatute ma1es &O)ELE& the sole 2udge of Ball pre proclamation contro!ersiesC

• @eld BallC 0 co!ers national, pro!incial, city or municipal

P*i#. ritis* Ass%rance Co. v. /ntermediate Ape##ate Co%rt

• %tatute A counterbond is to secure the payment of Bany 2udgment,C when eecution is returned unsatisfied

• @eld Bany 2udgmentC includes not only final and eecutory but also 2udgment pending appeal whose eecution orderedis returned unsatisfied$

"amire' v. CA• %tatute BAct to Prohibit ? Penalie Gire 4apping and Othe

related >iolations of Pri!ate &ommunications and Othe

PurposesC

• BIt shall be unlawful, not being authoried by all the partiesto any pri!ate communication or spo1en word, to tap any

wire or cable, or by using any other de!ice oarrangementC

• Issue Ghether !iolation thereof refers to the taping of a

communication ot*er t*an a participant to the

communication or e!en to the taping by a participant whodid not secure the consent of the party to the con!ersations$

• @eld Law did not distinguish whether the party sought to be

penalied ought to be party other than or different from thos

in!ol!ed in the pri!ate communication$ 4he intent is to penalie all persons unauthoried to ma1e any suchrecording, underscored by BanyC

Ligget 3 Myers Tobacco Co. v. C/"

• %tatute imposes a Bspecific taC on cigarettes containing

>irginia tobacco $ Pro!ided that of the length eceeds *millimeters or the weight per thousand eceeds *W 1ilos, theta shall be increased by *66N$

• Issue whether measuring length or weight of cigars, filtersshould be ecluded therefrom, so that ta would come underthe general pro!ision and not under the pro!iso

• @eld 5ot ha!ing distinguished between filter and non3filtercigars, court should not distinguish$

Ti% San v. "ep%b#ic

• Issue whether the con!iction of an applicant fonaturaliation for !iolation of a municipal ordinance woulddis.ualify him from ta1ing his oath as a citien$

• %tatute An applicant may be allowed to ta1e his oath as acitien after : years from the promulgation of the decisiongranting his petition for naturaliation if he can show tha

during the inter!ening period Bhe has not been con!icted ofany offense or !iolation of go!ernment rulesC

• @eld law did not ma1e any distinction between ma#a in se

and ma#a pro*ibita. &on!iction of the applicant from



!iolation of municipal ordinance is comprehended within thestatute and precludes applicant from ta1ing his oath$

Pera#ta v. CSC

• Issue whether pro!ision of RA :8:7, that go!ernmentemployees are entitled to *7 days !acation lea!es of absence

with full pay and *7 days sic1 lea!es with full pay,eclusi!es of %aturday, %undays or holidays in both cases,applies only to those who ha!e lea!e credits and not to thosewho ha!e none$

• @eld Law spea1s of granting of a right and does not

distinguish between those who ha!e accumulated and thosewho ha!e none$

Pi#ar v. COMELEC

• %tatute RA *88 pro!ides that BE!ery candidate shall,

within -6 days after the day of the election file true anditemied statement of all contributions and ependitures in

connection with the election$

• @eld Law did not distinguish between a candidate who pushed through and one who withdrew it$

• BE!ery candidateC refers to one who pursued and e!en tothose who withdrew his candidacy$

Sanciagco v. "ono

• B;*ere t*e distinction appears from t*e stat%te t*e co%rts s*o%#d make t*e distinction

• %tatute %ec *- of 'P 'lg$ 8+ which pro!ides that 9Any

person holding public appointi!e or position shall ipso facto

cease in office or position as of the time he filed hiscertificate of candidacyC

• Ko!ernors, mayors, members of !arious sangg%nians or

barangay officia#s shall upon the filing of candidacy, beconsidered on forced lea!e of absence from office

• /acts an electi!e 'arangay$ &aptain was elected President of

Association of 'arangay &ouncils and pursuant theretoappointed by the President as member of the Sangg%nian

Pan#%ngsod. @e ran for &ongress but lost$

• Issue @e then wants to resume his duties as member of sangg%iniang pan#%ngsod. @e was merely forced on lea!ewhen he ran for &ongress$

• @eld the %ecretary of Local Ko!ernment denied his re.uestH

being an appointi!e sangg%nian member, he was deemedautomatically resigned when he filed his certificate ofcandidacy$

,arvida v. Sa#es 6r.

• Issue whether petitioner who was o!er :* but below :: was

.ualified to be an electi!e %Q member

• %tatute %ec$9:9 of the LK& pro!ides that a member of the

0atip%nan ng 0abataan must not be :* yrs old$

• %ec$ 9:; as additional re.uirement pro!ides that electi!e

official of Sangg%niang 0abataan must not be more than :*yrs$ Bon the day of electionC

• @eld the distinction is apparent the member may be more

than :* years of age on election day or on the day heregisters as member of 0atip%nan ng 0abataan. 'ut theelecti!e official, must not be more than :* years of age on

the day of election$

Dis2uncti!e and con2uncti!e words

• Gord BorC is a dis2uncti!e term signifying disassociation andindependence of one thing from each other$

Peo v. Martin

• %tatute %ec$ 96 of &ommonwealth Act 8*, punishes Banyindi!idual who shall bring into or land in the Philippines or

conceals or harbors any alien not duly admitted by anyimmigration officer

• does not 2ustify gi!ing the word a dis2uncti!e meaning , since

the words Bbring intoC BlandC, BconcealsC and BharborsC being four separate acts each possessing its distincti!edifferent and disparate meaning$

C/" v. Mani#a 6ockey C#%b

• %tatute imposes amusement taes on gross receipts oBproprietor, lessee, or operator of amusement placeC

• @eld BorC implies that ta should be paid by eithe proprietor, lessee, or operator, as the case may be, single ?

not by all at the same time$

• Fse of BorC between : phrases connotes that either phrase

ser!es as .ualifying phrase$

• BorC means BandC, G@E5 4@E %PIRI4 OR &O54E4 O/4@E LAG %O GARRA54%

Trinidad v. erm%de' (e$g$ of BorC to mean BandC"

• %tatute %ec$ :, Rule **: of Rules of &ourt authoriingmunicipal 2udges to conduct Bpreliminary eamination oin!estigationC

• BorC e.ui!alent of Bthat is to sayC

SMC v. M%nicipa#ity of Manda%e (e$g$ of BorC e.ui!alent of Bthat is tosayC"

• Ordinance imposes graduated .uarterly fied ta

• Bbased on the gross !alue in money or actual mar1et !alueCof articlesH phrase Bor actual mar1et !alueC intended toeplain Bgross !alue in money$C

• BorC means successi!ely

• %tatute Art$ -99 of the Re!ised Penal &ode 3 Bthe offensesof seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasci!iousness, shal

not be prosecuted ecept upon a complaint by the offended

party or her parents, grandparents or guardian$C• Although these persons are mentioned dis2uncti!ely

pro!ision must be construed as meaning that the right toinstitute a criminal proceeding is eclusi!ely andsuccessi!ely reposed in said persons in the order mentionedno one shall proceed if there is any person pre!iously

mentioned therein with legal capacity to institute the action$

• BAndC is a con2unction pertinently defined as meaning

Btogether with,C B2oined with,C Balong with,C Badded to orlin1ed toC

o 5e!er to mean BorC

o Fsed to denote 2oinder or union

• Band=orC 3 means that effect should be gi!e to both

con2uncti!e and dis2uncti!e termo term used to a!oid construction which by use o

dis2uncti!e BorC alone will eclude th

combination of se!eral of the alternati!es or by theuse of con2uncti!e BandC will eclude the efficacyof any one of the alternati!es standing alone$

ASSOCIATED WORDS

5oscitur a sociis

• where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself o

e.ually susceptible of !arious meanings, its correcconstruction may be made clear and specific by considering



the company of words in which it is found or with which it isassociated$

• to remo!e doubt refer to the meaning of associated orcompanion words

%enaseda v. F#avier

• %tatute %ec$ *-(-", Art I of the &onstitution grantsOmbudsman power to BDirect the officer concerned to ta1eappropriate action against a public official or employee at

fault, and recommend his remo!al, suspension, demotion,fine censure or prosecution$

• BsuspensionC 0 is a penalty or puniti!e measure not

pre!enti!e

Magta-as v. Pryce Properties Corp.

• %tat %ec$ 97; of LK& authoried local go!ernment units to pre!ent or suppress BKambling ? other prohibited games of

chance$C

• BKamblingC 0 refers only to illegal gambling, li1e other prohibited games of chance, must be pre!ented or suppressed

? not to gambling authoried by specific statutes$

Carandang v. Santiago

• Issue Ghether an offended party can file a separate andindependent ci!il action for damages arising from physical

in2uries during pendency of criminal action for frustratedhomicide$

• %tatute Art$ -- of &i!il &ode Bin case of defamation, fraud,? physical in2uriesC

• @eld &ourt ruled that Bphysical in2uriesC not as one definedin RP&, but to mean bodily harm or in2ury such as physical

in2uries, frustrate homicide, or e!en death$

Co 0im C*an v. 2a#de' Tan 0e*

• Issue Ghether proceedings in ci!il cases pending in courtunder the so called Republic of the Philippines establishedduring the #apanese military occupation are affected by the

proclamation of Ken$ )cArthur issued on October :-, *+99

that Ball laws, regulations and processes of any othergo!ernment in the Philippines than that of the said&ommonwealth are null and !oid and without legal effect$C

• BProcessesC does not refer to 2udicial processes but to theeecuti!e orders of the &hairman of the PhilippineEecuti!e &ommittee, ordinances promulgated by thePresident of so3called RP, and others that are of the same

class as the laws and regulations with which the wordBprocessesC is associated$

Commissioner of C%stoms v. P*i#. Acety#ene Co.

• %tatute %ec$ 8 of RA *-+9 pro!ides that Bta pro!ided forin %ec$ * of this Act shall not be imposed against the

importation into the Philippines of machinery or rawmaterials to be used by new and necessary industry H

machinery e.uipment, spare parts, for use of industriesC• Issue Is the word BindustriesC used in ordinary, generic

sense, which means enterprises employing relati!ely large

amounts of capital and=or labor

• @eld %ince BindustriesC used in the law for the :nd time Bis

classified togetherC with the terms miners, miningindustries, planters and farmers, ob!ious legislati!e intent isto confine the meaning of the term to acti!ities that tend to

produce or create or manufacture such as those miners,

mining enterprises, planters and farmers$

• If used in ordinary sense, it becomes inconsistent andillogical

Peo. v. Santiago

• Issue Ghether defamatory statements through the mediumof an amplifier system constitutes slander or libel

• Libel committed by means of Bwriting, printinglithography, engra!ing, radio, cinematographic ehibiton$C

• It is argued that BamplifierC similar to radio

• @eld 5o$ Radio should be considered as same terms withwriting and printing whose common characteristic is the

Bpermanent means of publication$C

San Mig%e# Corp. v. +L"C

•

Issue Ghether claim of an employee against his employerfor cash reward or submitting process to eliminate defects

in .uality ? taste of %an )iguel product falls within 2urisdiction of the labor arbiter of 5LR&

• @eld 5o$ Outside of 2urisdiction$ 5ot necessary that entire

uni!erse of money claims under 2urisdiction of labor arbite but only those to *$" unfair labor practices, :$" claimconcerning terms ? conditions of employment 9$" claimsrelating to household ser!ices 7$" acti!ities prohibited to

employers ? employees$

• %tatute B2urisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the 5LR&, aslast amended by 'P 'lg$ :: including paragraph - Bal

money claims of wor1ers, including hose based onnonpayment or underpayment of wages, o!ertimcompensation, separation pay, and other benefits pro!ided

by law or appropriate agreement, ecept claims foemployees compensation, social security, medicare andmaternity benefits$C

Ebar#e v. S%ca#dito

• %tatute EO :87 outlines the procedure which complainants

charging go!ernment officials and employees withcommission of irregularities should be guided, applies to

criminal actions or complaints$

• EO :87 0 Bcomplaints against public officials and employeeshall be promptly acted upon and disposed of by the officialsor authorities concerned in accordance with pertinent lawsand regulations so that the erring officials and employees can

be soonest remo!ed or otherwise disciplines and theinnocent, eonerated or !indicated in li1e manner, and to theend also that other remedies, including court action, may be

pursued forthwith by the interested parties, afte

administrati!e remedies shall ha!e been ehaustedC

• @eld eecuti!e order does not apply to criminal actions

4he term is closely o!ershadowed by the .ualification 9After administrative remedies s*a## *ave been e)*a%sted:which suggest ci!il suits sub2ect to pre!ious administrati!eactions$

Mottom%# v. de#a Pa'

• Issue Ghether the word Tcourt in %ec 7, Art 79-9 Appea

shall not stay the award, order, ruling, decision or 2udgmenunless the officer or body rendering the same or the courton motion after hearing, and on such terms as it may deem

2ust should pro!ide otherwise$ 4he propriety of a staygranted by the officer or body rendering the award, orderruling, decision or 2udgment may be raised only by motion

in the main case,C refers to the &A or to the &ourt ofAgrarian Relations

• @eld &orrect construction made clear with reference to

%ec$ * of RA 79-9, where the court, officers or bodieswhose decision, award are appealable to the &ourt oAppeals, enumerated as follows &ourt of AgrarianRelations, %ec$ of Labor, %ocial %ecurity &ommission

etcH /rom grouping, the enumeration in %ec$ 7 means&ourt of Agrarian Relations not &A$

E2usdem generis (or the same 1ind or species"



• Keneral rule where a general word or phrase follows anenumeration of particular and specific words of the same

class or where the latter follow the former, the general wordor phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to,

persons, things or cases a1in to, resembling, or of the same1ind or class as those specifically mentioned$

• Purpose gi!e effect to both particular or general words, bytreating the particular words as indicating the class and thegeneral words as indicating all that is embraced in said

class, although not specifically named by the particularwords$

• Principle based on proposition that had the legislature

intended the general words to be used in their generic andunrestricted sense, it would ha!e not enumerated the

specific words$

• Presumption legislators addressed specifically to the particulariation

Illustration

M%t%c v. COMELEC

• %tatute Act ma1es unlawful the distribution of electoral

propaganda gadgets, pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic

goods, materials and t*e #ike:

• @eld and the li1e, does not embrace taped 2ingles for

campaign purposes

M%rp*y Morris 3 Co. v. Co##ector of C%stoms

• %tatute Dynamos, generators, eciters, and other machinery

for the generation of electricity for lighting or for powerH

• @eld phrase Bother machineryC would not include steamturbines, pumps, condensers, because not same 1ind of

machinery with dynamos, generators and eciters$

2era v. C%evas

• %tatute all condensed s1immed mil1 and all mil1 inwhate!er form shall be clearly and legibly mar1ed on its

immediate containers with words B4his mil1 is not suitablefor nourishment for infants less than * year of ageC

• @eld restricts the phrase Ball mil1 in whate!er form,Cecluded filled mil1$

,rap*i#on v. M%nicipa# Co%rt of Cigara

• %tatute the !ice3mayor shall be entitled to assume the officeof the mayor during the absence, suspension or othertemporary disability

• @eld anything which disables the mayor from eercising the power and prerogati!es of his office, since Btheir temporarydisabilityC follows the words BabsenceC and BsuspensionC

Peo. v. Maga##anes

• Ghere a law grants a court eclusi!e 2urisdiction to hear anddecide Boffenses or felonies committed by public officialsand employees in relation to their office,C the phrase BI5

RELA4IO5 4O 4@EIR O//I&EC .ualifies or restricts theoffense to one which cannot eist without the office, or the

office is a constituent element of the crime defined in thestatute or one perpetuated in the performance, though

improper or irregular, of his official functions

C% 1n-ieng Sons /nc. v. ord of Ta) Appea#s

• Issue whether losses due to the war were to be deductible

from gross income of *+97 when they were sustained, or in*+76 when Philippine Gar Damage &ommission ad!isedthat no payment would be made for said losses

• %tatute BIn the case of a corporation, all losses actuallysustained and not charged off within the taable year and no

compensated for by insurance or otherwise$C

• &ontention the assurances of responsible public official before the end of *+97 that property owners would be

compensated for their losses as a result of the war sufficed to place the losses within the phrase Bcompensated otherwiseC than by insurance

• @eld Re2ectedS BOtherwiseC in the clause 9compensated fo

by ins%rance or ot*er;ise: refers to compensation due unde

a title analogous or similar to insurance$ Inasmuch as thelatter is a contract establishing a legal obligation, it followsthat in order to be deemed Bcompensated for Totherwise,the losses sustained by a tapayer must be co!ered by a

2udicially enforceable right, springing from any of the

2uridical sources of obligations, namely, law, contract, .uasicontract, torts, or crimes,C and not mere pronouncement o

public officials

Ceb% /nstit%te of Tec*no#ogy v. Op#e

• Issue Ghether teachers hired on contract basis are entitled toser!ice incenti!e lea!e benefits as against the claim that theyare not so

• %tatute Rule > of IRR of Labor &ode B4his rule (on ser!iceincenti!e lea!es" shall apply to all employees, ecept Bfiled

personnel and other employees whose performance iunsuper!ised by the employer including those who ar

engaged on tas1 or contract basis$C

• @eld Bthose who were employed on tas1 or contract basisCshould be related with Bfield personnel,C apply the principle

clearly teachers are not field personnel and therefore entitledto ser!ice incenti!e lea!e benefits$

Cagayan 2a##ey Enterprises v. CA

• Issue whether the phrase Bother lawful be!eragesC which

gi!es protection to manufacturer with the Phil$ Patent Officeits duly stamped or mar1ed bottles used for Bsoda water

mineral or aerated waters, cider, mil1, cream or other lawfu be!erages,C includes hard li.uor

• %tatute title BAn Act to regulate the use of stamped omar1ed bottles, boes, cas1s, 1egs, barrels, ? other similarcontainers$C

• @eld 4he title clearly shows intent to gi!e protection to almar1ed bottles of all lawful be!erages regardless of nature ocontents$

+ationa# Po;er Corp. v. Angas

• Issue whether the term 2udgment, refers to any 2udgmen

directing the payment of legal interest$

• %tatute &entral 'an1 &ircular 9*8 0 Bby !irtue of theauthority granted to it under %ec$ * of Act 5umber :877, as

amended, otherwise 1nown as Fsury Law, the )onetary'oard in a resolution prescribed that the rate of interest foloan or forbearance of any money, good or credit ? the rate

allowed in 2udgment in the absence of epress contract shal be *:N per annum$

• @eld #udgments should mean only 2udgments in!ol!ingloans or forbearance money, goods or credit, these late

specific terms ha!ing restricted the meaning B2udgmentsC tothose same class or the same nature as those specifically

enumerated$

"ep%b#ic v. Migrino

• /acts retired military officer was in!estigated by the P&KKfor !iolation of Anti3Kraft Act in relation to EO * ? :authoriing the P&KK to reco!er ill3gotten wealth from theformer Presidents Bsubordinates and close associatesC



• Issue Does P&KK ha!e 2urisdiction to in!estigate suchmilitary officer for being in ser!ice during the administration

of the former President

• @eld B%ubordinatesC refers only to one who en2oys closeassociation or relation to the former President and his wifeH

term Bclose associatesC restricted the meaning ofBsubordinatesC

Limitations of e2usdem generis

• Re.uisites

o %tatute contains an enumeration of particular ?

specific words, followed by general word or phraseo Particular and specific words constitute a class or

are the same 1ind

o Enumeration of the particular ? specific words is

not ehausti!e or is not merely by eampleso 4here is no indication of legislati!e intent to gi!e

the general words or phrases a broader meaning

• Rule of e-%sdem generis is not of uni!ersal applicationH it

should use to carry out, not defeat the intent of the law$

1S v. Santo +ino

• %tatute It shall be unlawful to for any person to carry

concealed about his person any bowie, 1nife, dagger, 1ris or

other deadly weapon$ Provided prohibition shall not apply tofirearms who ha!e secured a license or who are entitled to

carry the same under the pro!isions of this Act$C

• Issue does Bthe deadly weaponC include an unlicensedre!ol!er

• @eld MesS &arrying such would be in !iolation of statute$'y the pro!iso, it manifested its intention to include in the

prohibition weapons other than armas blancas therein

specified$

Cagayan 2a##ey Enterprises /nc. v. CA & previo%s page sa 1abilang

column

"oman Cat*o#ic Arc*bis*op of Mani#a v. Socia# Sec%rity Commission

• Issue a religious institution in!o1ing e-%sdem generiwhether TemployerC be limited to underta1ing an acti!itywhich has an element of profit or gain

• %tatute Bany person, natural or 2uridical, domestic or

foreign, who carried in the Philippines any trade, business,industry$ and uses the ser!ices of another person, whounder his orders as regard the employment, ecept theKo!ernment, and any of its political subdi!isions branches or

instrumentalities and KO&&sC$

• @eld 5o$ the rule of e-%sdem generis applies only when

there is uncertainty$ 4he definition is sufficientlycomprehensi!e to include charitable institutions and charitiesnot for profitH it contained eceptions which said institutionsand entities are not included$

Epressio unius est eclusion alterius

• 4he epress mention of one person, thing or conse.uence

implies the eclusion of all others$

• Rule may be epressed in a number of ways

o E)press%m facit cessare tacit%m what is

epressed puts an end to that which is impliedwhere a statute, by its terms, is epressly limited tocertain matters, it may not, by interpretation or

construction, be etended to other matters$

o E)ceptio firmat reg%#am in casib%s non e)ceptis 3

A thing not being ecepted must be regarded ascoming within the pur!iew of the general rule

o E)pressio %ni%s est e)c#%sion a#teri%s 3 4h

epression of one or more things of a class impliesthe eclusion of all not epressed, e!en though alwould ha!e been implied had none been epressed

opposite the doctrine of necessary implication

5egati!e3opposite doctrine

• Arg%ment%m a contrario what is epressed puts an end to

what is implied$

C*%ng Fook v. @*ite• %tatute case eempts the wife of a naturalied American

from detention, for treatment in a hospital, who is afflictedwith a contagious disease$

• @eld &ourt denied petition for writ of habeas corpus (filed by the nati!e3born American citien on behalf of wifedetained in hospital", court resorted to negati!e3oppositedoctrine, stating that statute plainly relates to wife of a

naturalied citien ? cannot interpolate Bnati!e3bornCcitien$

• Analysis courts application results to in2ustice (as should

not discriminate against nati!e3born citiens", which is nointent of law, should ha!e used doctrine of necessaryimplication$

Application of e)pression %ni%s rule

• Kenerally used in construction of statutes granting powerscreating rights and remedies, restricting common rights

imposing rights ? forfeitures, as well as statutes strictlyconstrued$

Acosta v. F#or

• %tatute specifically designates the persons who may bring

actions for $%o ;arranto ecludes others from bringing such

actions$

Escribano v. Avi#a

• %tatute for libel, Bpreliminary in!estigations of criminaactions for written defamation shall be conducted by the

city fiscal of pro!ince or city or by municipal court of city ocapital of the pro!ince where such actions may be instituted

precludes all other municipal courts from conducting such preliminary in!estigations

Peo. v. Lantin

• %tatute crimes which cannot be prosecuted de oficio namely

adultery, concubinage, seduction, rape or acts olasci!iousnessH crimes such as slander can be prosecuted deoficio.

)ore short eamples on p$ ::7 Mani#a Lodge +o. =>? v. CA

Santos v. CA Ler%m v. Cr%'

Centra# arrio v. City Treas%rer of Davao

2era v. Fernande'

• %tatute All claims for money against the decedent, arisingfrom contracts, epress or implied, whether the same be due

not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral epenses andepenses for the last sic1ness of the decedent, and 2udgmen

for money against decedent, must be filled within the timelimit of the notice, otherwise barred fore!er$

• @eld 4he taes due to the go!ernment, not being mentioned

in the rule are ecluded from the operation of the rule$



Mendeni##a v. Omandia

• %tatute changed the form of go!ernment of a municipality

into a city pro!ides that the incumbent mayor, !ice3mayorand members of the municipal board shall continue in officeuntil the epiration of their terms$

• @eld all other municipal offices are abolished$

%tte v. Man%e# 1y 3 Sons /nc.

• %tatute Legislature deliberately selected a particular methodof gi!ing notice, as when a co3owner is gi!en the right oflegal redemption within -6 days from notice in writing bythe !endor in case the other co3owner sells his share is the

co3owned property,

• @eld the method of gi!ing notice must be deemed ecusi!e? a notice sent by !endee is ineffecti!e$

2i##an%eva v. City of /#oi#o

• %tatute Local Autonomy Act, local go!ernments are gi!en

broad powers to ta e!erything, ecept those which arespecifically mentioned therein$ If a sub2ect matter does not

come within the eceptions, an ordinance imposing a ta onsuch sub2ect matter is deemed to come within the broad

taing power, e)ception firmat reg%#am in casib%s none)ceptis.

Samson v. Co%rt of Appea#s

• Ghere the law pro!ides that positions in the go!ernment

belong to the competiti!e ser!ice, ecept those declared bylaw to be in the noncompetiti!e ser!ice and those which are

policy3determining, primarily confidential or highlytechnical in nature and enumerates those in the

noncompetiti!e as including %E&RE4ARIE% O/KO>ER5OR% A5D )AMOR%, the clear intent is that

assistant secretaries of go!ernors and mayors fall under thecompetiti!e ser!ice, for by ma1ing an enumeration, the

legislature is presumed to ha!e intended to eclude those not

enumerated, for otherwise it would ha!e included them inthe enumeration

Firman ,enera# /ns%rance Corp. v. CA

• 4he insurance company disclaimed liability since death

resulting from murder was impliedly ecluded in theinsurance policy as the cause of death is not accidental but

rather a deliberate and intentional act, ecluded by the !erynature of a personal accident insurance$

• @eld the principle Bepresssio unius est eclusio 3 the

mention of one thing implies the eclusion of the other thing3 not ha!ing been epressly included in the enumeration ofcircumstances that would negate liability in said insurance

policy cannot be considered by implication to discharge the

petitioner insurance company to include death resulting from

murder or assault among the prohibited ris1s lead ine!itablyto the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or eemptitself from liability for such death

• Insurance company still liable for the in2ury, disability andloss suffered by the insured$ (sobra Tto, I swearS )inurder nanga, ayaw pang bayaranS %obraS @indi daw accidental eh

di mas lalo ng 1ailangang bayaran dahil murderS %usS %usS"

Centeno v. 2i##a#onPorni##os

• Issue whether the solicitation for religious purposes, i$e$,reno!ation of church without securing permit fro Department

of %ocial %er!ices, is a !iolation of PD *789, ma1ing it acriminal offense for a person to solicit or recei!econtributions for charitable or public welfare purposes$

• @eld 5o$ &haritable and religious specifically enumeratedonly goes to show that the framers of the law in .uestion

ne!er intended to include solicitations for religious purposewithin its co!erage$

Limitations of the rule*$ It is not a rule of law, but merely a tool in statutory

construction

2. E)pressio %ni%s est e)c#%sion a#teri%s no more than

auiliary rule of interpretation to be ignored where other

circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intendedto be eclusi!e$

-$ Does not apply where enumeration is by way of eample oto remo!e doubts only$

,ome' v. 2ent%ra

• Issue whether the prescription by a physician of opium for a

patient whose physical condition did not re.uire the use osuch drug constitutes Bunprofessional conductC as to 2ustifyre!ocation of physicians license to practice

• @eld %till liableS Rule of e)pressio %ni%s not applicable

• &ourt said, I cannot be seriously contended that aside from

the fi!e eamples specified, there can be no other conduct ofa physician deemed Tunprofessional$ 5or can it becon!incingly argued that the legislature intended to wipe outall other forms of Tunprofessional conduct therefore deemed

grounds for re!ocation of licenses

9$ Does not apply when in case a statute appears upon its faceto limit the operation of its pro!ision to particular persons o

things enumerating them, but no reason eists why othe persons or things not so enumerated should not ha!e been

included and manifest in2ustice will follow by not includingthem$

7$ If it will result in incongruities or a !iolation of the e.ua protection clause of the &onstitution$

8$ If adherence thereto would cause incon!enience, hardshipand in2ury to the public interest$

Doctrine of casus omissus

• A person, ob2ect or thing omitted from an enumeration mus be held to ha!e been omitted intentionally$

• 4he maim operates only if and when the omission has beenclearly established, and in such a case what is omitted in theenumeration may not, by construction, be included therein$

• Eception where legislature did not intend to eclude the person, thing or ob2ect from the enumeration$ If suchlegislati!e intent is clearly indicated, the court may supplythe omission if to do so will carry out the clear intent of the

legislature and will not do !iolence to its language

Doctrine of last antecedent• ualifying words restrict or modify only the words o

phrases to which they are immediately associated not those

which are distantly or remotely located$

• Ad pro)im%m antecedens fiat re#atio nisi impediat%r

sententia & relati!e words refer to the nearest antecedentsunless the contet otherwise re.uires

• Rule use of a comma to separate an antecedent from the res

eerts a dominant influence in the application of the doctrineof last antecedent$




Pangi#inan v. A#vendia

• )embers of the family of the tenant includes the tenants

son, son3in3law, or grandson, e!en though they are notdependent upon him for support and li!ing separately fromhim 'E&AF%E the .ualifying phrase Bwho are dependentupon him for supportC refers solely to its last antecedent,

namely, Bsuch other person or persons, whether related to thetenant or notC

F#orentino v. P+

• Issue whether holders of bac1pay certificates can compel

go!ernment3owned ban1s to accept said certificates in payment of the holders obligations to the ban1$

• %tatute Bobligations subsisting at the time of the appro!al of

this amendatory act for which the applicant may directly be

liable to the go!ernment or to any of its branches orinstrumentalities, or to corporations owned or controlled by

the go!ernment, or to any citiens of the Philippines or toany association or corporation organied under the laws of

the Philippines, who may be wiling to accept the same forsuch settlementC

• @eld the court, in!o1ing the doctrine of last antecedent,ruled that the phrase .ualify only to its last antecedentnamely Bany citien of the Philippines or association or

corporation organied under the laws of the PhilippinesC

• 4he court held that bac1pay certificate holders can compelgo!ernment3owned ban1s to accept said certificates for

payment of their obligations with the ban1$

ualifications of the doctrine$*$ %ub2ect to the eception that where the intention of the law is

to apply the phrase to all antecedents embraced in the pro!ision, the same should be made etensi!e to the whole$

:$ Doctrine does not apply where the intention is not to .ualifythe antecedent at all$

Reddendo singular singuilis

• >ariation of the doctrine of last antecedent

• Referring each to eachH

• Referring each phrase or epression to its appropriate ob2ect,or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the word should be ta1en distributi!ely$

Peo. v Tamani

• Issue when to count the *73day period within which to

appeal a 2udgment of con!iction of criminal actionXdate of promulgation of 2udgment or date of receipt of notice of 2udgment$

• %tatute %ec$ 8, Rule *:: of the Rules of &ourt

• @eld %hould be from Tpromulgation should be referring toT2udgment, while notice refer to order$

0ing v. !ernande'

• Issue Ghether a &hinese holding a noncontrol position in a

retail establishment, comes within the prohibition againstaliens inter!ening Bin the management, operation,

administration or controlC followed by the phrase Bwhetheras an officer, employee or laborer

• @eld /ollowing the principle, the entire scope of personnel

acti!ity, including that of laborers, is co!ered by the prohibition against the employment of aliens$

Amadora v. CA

• Issue whether Art :*;6 of &i!il &ode, which states thatBlastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and tradeshall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and

students or apprentices so long as they remain in their

custodyC applies to all schools, academic as well as nonacademic

• @eld teachers pupils and studentsH heads o

establishments of arts and trades to apprentices

• Keneral rule responsibility for the tort committed by thestudent will attach to the teacher in charge of such student(where school is academic"

• Eception responsibility for the tort committed by thstudent will attach to the head, and only he, (who" shall beheld liable (in case of the establishments of arts and trades

technical or !ocational in nature"

PROVISOS, ECEPTIONS AND CLAUSES

Pro!isos, generally

• to limit the application of the enacting clause, section or pro!ision of a statute, or ecept something, or to .ualify or

restrain its generality, or eclude some possible ground ofmisinterpretation of it, as etending to cases not intended by

legislature to be brought within its pur!iew$

• Rule restrain or .ualify the generality of the enacting clauseor section which it refers$

• Purpose limit or restrict the general language or operation othe statute, not to enlarge it$

• Location commonly found at the end of a statute, o pro!ision ? introduced, as a rule, by the word BPro!idedC$

• Determined by Ghat determines whether a clause is a

pro!iso is its substance rather than its form$ If it performany of the functions of a pro!iso, then it will be regarded asuch, irrespecti!e of what word or phrase is used to introduceit$

Pro!iso may enlarge scope of law

• It is still the duty of the courts to ascertain the legislati!e

intention and it pre!ails o!er pro!iso$

• 4hus it may enlarge, than restrict

1.S. v. Santo +ino

• %tatute it shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed

about his person any bowie, 1nife, dagger, 1ris or any otherdeadly weapon Provided that this pro!ision shall not apply

to firearms in the possession of persons who ha!e secured alicense therefore or who are entitled to same unde

pro!isions of this Act$

• @eld through the Pro!iso it manifested the intention to

include in the prohibition weapons other than armas b#ancasas specified$

Pro!iso as additional legislation

• Epressed in the opening statement of a section of a statute

• Gould mean eactly the re!erse of what is necessarilyimplied when read in connection with the limitation

• Purposeo 4o limit generalities

o Eclude from the scope of the statute that which

otherwise would be within its terms

Ghat pro!iso .ualifies

• Keneral rule .ualifies or modifies only the phrase

immediately preceding itH or restrains or limits thegenerality of the clause that it immediately follows$

• Eception unless it clearly appears that the legislature

intended to ha!e a wider scope

C*inese F#o%r /mporters Assn v. Price Stabi#i'ation oard



• %tatute %ec$ *7 RA 9:8 3 Any eisting law, eecuti!e order

or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding, no go!ernmentagency ecept the Import &ontrol &ommission shall allocatethe import .uota among the !arious importers$ Provided4hat the Philippine Rehabilitation and 4rade Administration

shall ha!e eclusi!e power and authority to determine andregulate the allocation of wheat flour among importers$C

• Issue whether or not the pro!iso ecluded wheat flour from

the scope of act itself$

• @eld 5OS Pro!iso refer to the clause immediately

preceding it and can ha!e no other meaning than that thefunction of allocating the wheat flour instead of assigning toImport &ontrol &ommission was assigned to PR4A$

• If wheat flour is eempted from the pro!isions of the Act,

the pro!iso would ha!e been placed in the section containingthe repealing clause

Co##ector of /nterna# "even%e v. Ange#es

• Ghen an earlier section of statute contains pro!iso, not

embodied in later section, the pro!iso, not embodied in alater section thereof, in the absence of legislati!e intent, beconfined to .ualify only the section to which it has beenappended$

F#ores v. Miranda

• Issue Petitioner that appro!al of the Public %er!ice&ommission of the sale of public ser!ice !ehicle was notnecessary because of pro!iso in %ec$ :6 of &ommonwealthAct 5o$ *98

• %tatute It shall be unlawful for any public ser!ice !ehicle or

for the owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the pre!ious appro!al and authority of the &ommission

pre!iously had to sell, alienate its property,franchiseH Provided *o;ever that nothing herein containedshall be construed to pre!ent the transaction from beingnegotiated or completed before its appro!al or to pre!ent the

sale, alienation, or lease by any public ser!ice of any of its property in the ordinary course of businessC

• @eld

o the pro!iso means only that the sale withoutthe re.uired appro!al is still !alid and binding

between the partiesH alsoo the phrase Bin the ordinary course of business

could not ha!e been intended to include sale of!ehicle itself, but at most may refer only to such

property that may be concei!ably disposed of bythe carrier in the ordinary course of its business,li1e 2un1ed e.uipment$

Mercado Sr. v. +L"C

• @eld the pro!iso in par : of Art :;6 relates only to casualemployeesH not to pro2ect employees$

• Applying rule that pro!iso to be construed with reference to

immediately preceding part of the pro!ision which it isattached and not to other sections thereof, unless legislati!e

intent was to restrict or .ualify$

Eception to the rule

• Pro!iso construed to .ualify only the immediately preceding part of the section to which it is attachedH if no contrary

legislati!e intent is indicated$

• Ghere intent is to .ualify or restrict the phrase preceding itor the earlier pro!isions of the statute or e!en the statute

itself as a whole, then the pro!iso will be construed in thatmanner, in order that the intent of the law may be carried out

Repugnancy between pro!iso and main pro!ision

• Ghere there is a conflict between the pro!iso and the main pro!ision, that which is located in a later portion of the

statute pre!ails, unless there is legislati!e intent to thcontrary$

• Latter pro!ision, whether pro!ision or not, is gi!en

preference for it is the latest epression of the intent of thelegislation$

Eceptions, generally

• Eception consists of that which would otherwise beincluded in the pro!ision from which it is ecepted$

• It is a clause which eempts something from the operation oa statute by epress words$

• Becept,C Bunless otherwise,C and Bshall not applyC

• )ay not be introduced by words mentioned abo!e, as long a

if such remo!es something from the operation of a pro!isionof law$

• /unction to confirm the general ruleH .ualify the words or

phrases constituting the general rule$

• E)ceptio firmat reg%#am in casib%s e)ceptis A thing no

being ecepted, must be regarded as coming within the pur!iew of the general rule$

• Doubts resol!ed in fa!or of general rule

Eception and Pro!iso distinguished

Eception

• Eempts something absolutely from the operation of statute

• 4a1es out of the statute something that otherwise would be a part of the sub2ect matter of it$

• Part of the enactment itself, absolutely ecluding from its

operation some sub2ect or thing that would otherwise falwithin the scope$

Pro!iso

• Defeats its operation conditionally$

• A!oids by way of defeasance or ecuse

• If the enactment is modified by engrafting upon it a new pro!ision, by way of amendment, pro!iding conditionally fo

a new case3 this is the nature of pro!iso$

%imilar in a way since one of the functions of pro!iso is to ecepsomething from an enacting clause$

Illustration of eception

ME"ALCO v. P%b#ic 1ti#ities Emp#oyees Association

• %tatute 5o person, firm, or corporation, busines

establishment or place shall compel an employee or laborer

to wor1 on %undays? legal holidays, unless paid anadditional sum of at least :7N of his renumeration

Provided that this prohibition shall not apply to publicutilities performing public ser!ice, e$g$ supplying gas

electricity, power, water etc• Issue Is )ERAL&O liable to pay the :7N for employees

who wor1 during holidays and %undays

• @eld 5egati!e$ :nd part is an eception although introduced

by BPro!ided$C As appellant is a public utility that supplie

electricity ? pro!ides means of transportation, it is e!identhat appellant is eempt from .ualified prohibition

established in the enactment clause$

To#entino v. Secretary of Finance

• %tatute 5o bill shall be passed by either @ouse shall become

a law unless it has passed - readings on separate days, ? printed copies thereof in its final form ha!e been distributed



to its )embers - days before its passage, e)cept when thePresident certifies to the necessity of its immediateenactment to meet a public calamity or emergency$

• @eld it .ualifies only its nearest antecedent, which is thedistribution of the printed bill in its final form - days from itsfinal passage$? not the - readings on separate days$

Pendon v. Diasnes

• Issue whether a person con!icted of a crime against

property, who was granted absolute pardon by the President,is entitled to !ote

• %tatute A person shall not be .ualified to !ote Bwho has

been sentenced by final 2udgment to suffer one year or morefrom imprisonment, such disability not ha!ing been remo!ed

any plenary pardonC or Bwho has been declared by final 2udgment guilty of any crime against property$C

• *st clause3 : ecpetions 0 (a" Person penalied by less than *

yr$H and (:" Person granted an absolute pardon

• :nd clause 3 creates eception to * st but not to :nd that a person

con!icted of crime against property cannot !ote unless

theres pardon$

• @eld absolute pardon for any crime for which one year ofimprisonment or more was meted out restores the prisoner tohis political rights$

• If penalty less * yr, dis.ualification not apply, ecept whenagainst property3 needs pardon$

• 4he :nd clause creates the eception to the *st

,orospe v. CA Be)ception need not be introd%ced by 9e)cept: or9%n#ess:

• %tatute Rule : of Rules of &ourt, Bser!ice by registeredmail is complete upon actual receipt by the addresseeH but iffail to claim his mail from the post office within 7 days from

ate of first notice of the postmaster, ser!ice shall ta1e effectat the epiration of such time$C

• Issue Ghether actual receipt the date of a registered mail

after 7 day period, is the date from which to count the prescripti!e period to comply with certain re.uirements$

• @eld %er!ice is completed on the 7th

day after the *st

notice,e!en if he actually recei!ed the mail months later$

• :nd part is separated by semicolon, and begins with Tbut

which indicates eception$

%a!ing clause

• Pro!ision of law which operates to ecept from the effect ofthe law what the clause pro!ides, or sa!e something whichwould otherwise be lost$

• Fsed to sa!e something from effect of repeal of statute

• Legislature, in repealing a statute, may preser!e in the form

of a sa!ing clause, the right of the state to prosecute and punish offenses committed in !iolation of the repealed law$

• Ghere eisting procedure is altered or substituted by

another, usual to sa!e proceedings under the old law at thetime the new law ta1es effect, by means of sa!ing clause

• &onstrued in light of intent by legislature

• Ki!en strict or liberal meaning depending on nature of

statute$

CHAPTER SI: Statute Construe" as W$o'e an" !n Re'at!on to

ot$er Statutes

STATUTE CONSTRUED AS WHOLE

Kenerally

• %tatute is passed as a whole

o It should ha!e one purpose and one intent

o &onstrue its parts and section in connection with

other parts

o Ghy 4o BproduceC a harmonious whole

• 5e!ero Di!ide by process of etymological dissertation

(why 'ecause there are instances when th

intention of the legislati!e body is different fromthat of the definition in its original sense"

o %eparate the words (remember that the whole poin

of this chapter is to construe it as a whole"o %eparate contet

o 'ase definitions on leicographer (what is a

leicographer A person who studies leicography

Ghat is leicography then Analyes semanticrelationships between leicon and language 0 no

important$ 5e!er mind" 0 ang 1ulitS

• 4he whole point of this part is to construe the whole statuteand its part together (actually 1ahit ito nalang tandaanhanggang matapos 1asi ito lang yung sinasabi ng boo1"

Intent ascertained from statute as whole

• Legislati!e meaning and intent should be

etracted=ascertained from statutes as a whole (hence thetitle"

o Ghy 'ecause the law is the best epositor o

itself

• Optima Statuti Interpretatio est ipsum statutum 3 the bes

interpreter of a statute is the statute itself

o Yremember t*is story to memori'e t*e ma)im

Optima at %tatuti /rutti where interpreting as to

why when coc1roaches(IPI%" when added resultsto %F) (ipsum" a stadium (statutum"Z 0 sorry

bloc1mates, weird si cherryS

• Do not in.uire too much into the moti!es which influenced

the legislati!e body unless the moti!e is stated or disclosedin the statute themsel!es$

Aisporna v. CA• pointed out that words, clauses, phrases should not be

studied as detached=isolated epressionso &onsider e!ery part in understanding the meaning

of its part to produce a harmonious whole

o )eaning of the law is borne in mind and not to be

etracted from a single wordo )ost important E!ery part of the statute must be

interpreted with reference to the contet

Aboiti' S*ipping Corp v. City of Ceb%

• Described that if the words or phrases of statute be ta1en

indi!idually it might con!ey a meaning different form theone intended by the author$

• Interpreting words or phrases separately may limit the eten

of the application of the pro!ision

,aanan v. /ntermediate Appe##ate Co%rt

• &ase of wire tapping

• 4here is a pro!ision which states that B it shall be unlawfulfor any person, not being authoried by all the parties to any

pri!ate communication or spo1en word to tap any wire ocable or by using any other de!ice or arrangement, to

secretly o!erhear, intercept, or record such communicationor spo1en word by using such de!ice commonly 1nown as

dictagraphC

• Issue whether the phrase de!ice or arrangement includes party line and etension



• %tatcon it should not be construed in isolation$ Rather itshould be interpreted in relation to the other words (tap, to

o!erhear" thus party line or telephone etension is notincluded because the words in the pro!ision limit it to thosethat ha!e a physical interruption through a wiretap or thedeliberate installation of de!ice to o!erhear$ (Remember the

maim noscitus a sociis because in here they applied anassociation with other words in construing the intention orlimitation of the statute"

+ationa# Tobacco Administration v. COA

• Issue whether educational assistance gi!en to indi!iduals prior to the enactment of RA 87; should be continued to be

recei!ed

• @eld Mes$ Proper interpretation of section*: RA 87;depends on the combination of first and second paragraph

• /irst sentence states that Bsuch other additional

compensation not otherwise specified as may be determined

by the D') shall be deemed included in the standardiedsalary rates herein prescribed$C 4he second sentence states

Bsuch other additional compensation, whether in cash or in1ind, being recei!ed by incumbents only as of #uly *, *+;+not integrated into the standard shall continue to beauthoried$C (you can as1 cheery na lang to eplain it, ang

haba ng nasa boo1 "

• statcon do not isolate or detach the parts$ &onstruing astatute as a whole includes reconciling and harmoniingconflicting pro!isions

Purpose or contet as controlling guide

• construe whole statute and ascertain the meaning of thewords or phrases base on its contet, the nature of thesub2ect, and purpose or intention of the legislati!e body who

enacted the statute

• gi!e it a reasonable construction

• Leeway are accepted on grammatical construction, letters ofthe statutes, rhetorical framewor1 if it can pro!ide a clear

and definite purpose of the whole statute ( as long as it can produce a clear and definite statutes, it is sometimes affected

to be la on the construction of grammar"• @armonie the parts of each other and it should be consistent

with its scope and ob2ect

Ki!ing effect to statute as a whole

• Ghy construe a statute as a whole 3 'ecause it implies thatone part is as important as the other

• Ghat if the pro!ision=section is unclear by itself 3 One canma1e it clear by reading and construing it in relation to thewhole statute

• @ow do you properly and intelligently construe a pro!ision=statute 3 - ways (*" Fnderstand its meaning andscopeH (:" apply to an actual caseH (-" courts should considerthe whole act itself

• Ghy should e!ery part of the statute be gi!en effect 3

'ecause it is enacted as an integrated measure not ahodgepodge of conflicting pro!isions

• Gays on how the courts should construe a statute (according

to "ep%b#ic v. "eyes"

o Interpret the thought con!eyed by the statute as

wholeo &onstrue constituent parts together

o Ascertain legislati!e intent form whole part

o &onsider each and e!ery pro!ision in light of the

general purpose

o )a1e e!ery part effecti!e, harmonious and

sensible (adopt a construction which would gi!eeffect to e!ery part of the of the statute"

Ft res magis !aleat .uam pereat 3 theconstruction is to be sought which gi!es

effect to the whole of the statute 3 of itse!ery word$

Apparently conflicting pro!isions reconciled

• included in the rule of construing statute as a whole, is thereconciling and harmoniing conflicting pro!isions becauseit is by this that the statute will be gi!en effect as a whole$

• Ghy is it a must for courts to harmonie conflicting pro!ision 3 'ecause they are e.ually the handiwor1 of thesame legislature

"P v. CA

• Issue whether or not an appeal of cases in!ol!ing 2us

compensation should be made first by DARA' before R4&under %ec$ 7

• @eld %& said that the contention of the Republic and theLand 'an1 in the affirmati!e side has no merit becausealthough DARA' is granted a 2urisdiction o!er agrarian

reform matters, it does not ha!e 2urisdiction o!er criminacases$

Sa-onas v. CA

• Issue what period an ad!erse claim annotated at the bac1 of

a transfer certificate effecti!e• @eld In construing the law %ec$ 6 of PD *7:+ (ad!erse

claim shall be effecti!e for a period of -6 days from the dateof the registration" care should be ta1en to ma1e e!ery pareffecti!e

%pecial and general pro!isions in same statute

• special would o!errule the general

• special must be operati!eH general affect only those it applies

• ecept to general pro!ision

&onstruction as not to render pro!ision nugatory

• another conse.uence of the rule pro!ision of a statute shouldnot be construed as to nullify or render another nugatory in

the same statute• Interpretatio fienda est et res magis !aleat .uam pereat 3 a

law should be interpreted with a !iew to upholding ratherthan destroying

o Do not construe a statute wherein one portion wil

destroy the other o A!oid a construction which will render to

pro!ision inoperati!e

Reason for the rule

• because of the presumption that the legislature has enacted a

statute whose pro!isions are in harmony and consistent witheach other and that conflicting intentions is the same statute

are ne!er supported or regarded

ualification of rule• Ghat if the parts cannot be harmonied or reconciled withou

nullifying the other 3 Rule is for the court to re2ect the onewhich is least in accord with the general plan of the wholestatute

• Ghat if there is no choice 3 the latter pro!ision must !acatethe formerH last in order is fre.uently held to pre!ail unlessintent is otherwise

• Ghat if the conflict cannot be harmonied and made to standtogether 3 one must in.uire into the circumstances of their

passage

&onstruction as to gi!e life to law





• &onstrue statutes in pari materia together to attain the purpose of an epress national policy

• Ghy should they be construed together 3 'ecause of theassumption that when the legislature enacted the statutes theywere thin1ing of the prior statute$ Prior statutes relating to

the same sub2ect matter are to be compared with the new pro!isions$

• Again it is important to harmonie the statutes$ &ourts

should not render them in!alid without ta1ing the necessarysteps in reconciling them

2da de 1rbano v. ,S/S

• there were no facts gi!en in the boo1 ecept that it was in

this case that in pari materia was eplained well$ 4heeplanation are the same in the aforementioned

• Other things to consider in constructing statutes which are in pari materia

o @istory of the legislation on the sub2ect

o Ascertain the uniform purpose of the legislature

o Disco!er the policy related to the sub2ect matter

has been changed or modifiedo &onsider acts passed at prior sessions e!en those

that ha!e been repealed• Distingue tempora et concordabis 2ura 0 distinguish times

and you will harmonie laws

• In cases of two or more laws with the same sub2ect mattero uestion is usually whether the later act impliedly

repealed the prior act$

o Rule the only time a later act will be repealed or

amended is when the act itself states so (that itsupersedes all the prior acts" or when there is anirreconcilable repugnancy between the two$

o In the case of BimpliedC the doubt will be resol!ed

against the repeal or amendment and in fa!or of

the harmoniation of the laws on the sub2ect (laterwill ser!e as a modification"

Reasons why laws on same sub2ect are reconciled

• : main reasonso 4he presumption that the legislature too1 into

account prior laws when they enacted the new one$

Borbiter dict%m ni c*erry t*is c*apter keeps pointing o%t t*at t*e#egis#at%re are kno;#edgeab#e on t*e #a; b%t / ;onder *o; t*e actors

fitG /m not discriminating b%t *o; did Lito Lapid Loi E-ercito etckne; t*e prior #a;sG / *eard t*ey *ave researc*ers ;*o do it for t*em.

@*y dont ;e vote t*ose researc*ers insteadG 4%n #ang. / *ave beenreading t*e ;*o#e pres%mption t*at t*e #egis#at%re is kno;#edgeab#e.

Madaming namamatay sa aka#a. /s agpa#o sti## a#iveG*a*a*a "

o 'ecause enactments of the same legislature on the

same sub2ect are supposed to form part of one

uniform system (Ghy 'ecause later statutes aresupplementary to the earlier enactments"

If possible construe the two statuteswherein the pro!isions of both are gi!eneffect

Ghere harmoniation is impossible

• Earlier law should gi!e way to the later law because it is the

BcurrentC or later epression of the legislati!e will

Illustration of the rule (in pari materia"

Lacson v. "o$%e

• Issue the phrase unless sooner remo!ed of a statute thatstates Bthe mayor shall hold office for four years unlessooner remo!edC

• statcon the court held that the phrase should be construed inrelation to remo!al statutes$ 4hus the phrase meant thaalthough the mayor cannot be remo!ed during his term o

office, once he !iolates those that are stated in remo!astatutes$

C*in O* Foo v. Concepcion

• criminal case Article *:(*" eempting circumstance

(imbecile or insane"

• %tatcon the phrase Bshall not be permitted to lea!e without

first obtaining permission of the same courtC should bereconciled with another statute that states Bany patien

confined in a mental institution may be released by thDirector of @ealth once he is cured$ 4he Director shal

inform the 2udge that appro!ed the confinementC$ 4hese twostatutes refers to a person who was criminally charged buwas pro!en to be an imbecile or insane, thus they should beconstrued together$ 4heir construction would mean that in

order for the patient to be release there should be an appro!a

of both the court and the Director of @ealth$

0ing v. !ernae'

• %tatcon relation of RA **;6 (Retail 4rade 5ationaliationAct" to &ommonwealth Act *6; (Anti Dummy Law"

Dia#das v. Percides

• /acts a alien who operated a retail store in &ebu decided toclose his &ebu store and transfer it to Dumaguete$ R4L

(retail trade law" and 4a &ode %ec$ *++ were the statutesta1en into consideration in this case$ 4he former authories

any alien who on )ay *7, *+79 is actually engaged in retailto continue to engage therein until his !oluntary retirement

from such business, but not to establish or open additional

stores for retail business$ 4he latter pro!ides that any business for which the pri!ilege ta has been paid may beremo!ed and continued in any other place without paymenof additional ta$

• Issue whether the transfer by the alien from &ebu toDumaguete can be considered as a !oluntary retirement from

business$

• @eld 5o$ Although the trial court affirmed the .uestion, the%& ruled otherwise stating that R4& o!erloo1ed the clear

pro!ision of %ec$ *++$

C 3 C Commercia# Corp v. +ationa# @ater;orks and Se;erage A%t*ority

• /acts R$A$ +*: (:" states that in construction or repair wor1

underta1en by the Ko!ernment, Philippine made materials

and products, whene!er a!ailable shall be used inconstruction or repair wor1$

• /lag Law (&ommonwealth Act *-;" gi!es nati!e product preference in the purchase of articles by Ko!ernment

including go!ernment owned or controlled corporations$

• Issue interpretation of two statutes re.uiring that preference be made in the purchase and use of Phil$ )ade materials and

products

• @eld 4he %& relates the two statutes as in pari materia andthey should be construed to attain the same ob2ecti!e that is

to gi!e preference to locally produced materials$

Cabada v. A#%nan ///



• Issue whether or not an appeal lies from the decision ofregional appellate board (RA'" imposing disciplinary action

against a member of the P5P under %ec$ 97 of RA 8+7regarding finality of disciplinary action

• 4he court held that the BgapC in the law which is silent on

filing appeals from decisions of the RA' rendered within thereglementary period should be construed and harmoniedwith other statutes, i$e$ %ec :(*", Article I3' of the *+;&onstitution because the P5P is part, as a bureau, of the

reorganied DILK, as to form a unified system of 2urisprudence

• %tatcon if RA' fails to decide an appealed case within 86

days from receipt of the notice of appeal, the appealeddecision is deemed final and eecutory, and the aggrie!ed

party may forthwith appeal therefrom to the %ecretary ofDILK$ Li1ewise, if the RA' has decided the appeal within

863day reglementary period, its decision may still beappealed to the %ecretary of DILK

Mani#a 6ockey C#%b /nc. v. CA

• Issue who was entitled to brea1ages (*6N di!idend of

winning horse race tic1ets"

• %tatcon 4here are two statutes that should be considered$RA -6+ (amended by 88-* ?88-:" is silent on the matter but

the practice is to use brea1ages for anti boo1ie dri!e and

other sale promotions$ E$O$ ;; ? ;+ which allocated brea1ages therein specified$ 4hese two should be construedin pari materia, thus all brea1ages deri!ed from all races

should be distributed and allocated in accordance withEecuti!e Orders because no law should be !iewed inisolation$ (supplementary"

Keneral and special statutes

• Keneral statutes3 applies to all of the people of the state or toa particular class of persons in the state with e.ual force$

o Fni!ersal in application

• %pecial statutes3 relates to particular persons or things of aclass or to particular portion or section of the state only

• &onsidered as statutes in pari materia thus they should beread together and harmonied (and gi!en effect"

• Ghat if there are two acts which contain one general and one

specialo If it produces conflict, the special shall pre!ail

since the legislati!e intent is more clear thus itmust be ta1en as intended to constitute aneception$

o 4hin1 of it as one general law of the land while the

other applies only to a particular case

• Ghat if the special law is passed before the general law Itdoesnt matter because the special law will still be

considered as an eception unless epressly repealed$

So#id !omes /nc. v. Paya;a#

• /irst statute pro!ides that 5ational @ousing Authority shall

ha!e eclusi!e 2urisdiction to hear and decide casesin!ol!ing unsound real estate (P$D$ 5o$ +7+"$

• %econd statute grants R4& general 2urisdiction o!er suchcases$

• Issue Ghich one will pre!ail

• @eld 4he first statute will pre!ail because it is a special law,

as compared to the latter which is general law, thus it is aneception to the Bgeneral 2urisdictionC of the R4&

Magta-as v. Pryce Properties Corp

• /acts P$D$ 5o$ *;8+ authoried PAK&OR to centralie andregulate all games of chance$

• LK& of *++*, a later law, empowers all go!ernment units toenact ordinances to pre!ent and suppress gambling and other

games of chance$

• %tacon 4hese two should be harmonied rather thanannulling one and upholding the other$ &ourt said that the

solution to this problem is for the go!ernment units tosuppress and pre!ent all 1inds of gambling ecept those thaare allowed under the pre!ious law

Leveri'a v. /ntermediate Appe##ate Co%rt

• RA 8 empowers the general manager of the &i!iAeronautics Administration to lease real property under it

administration$

• Administrati!e &ode authories the President to eecute alease contract relating to real property belonging to th

republic

• @ow do you apply the rule 3 In this case, the prior (special"law should pre!ail

Reason for the rule

• the special law is considered an eception to the general law(as long as same sub2ect"

ualification of the rule

• 4he rule aforementioned is not absolute$

• Eceptionso If the legislature clearly intended the genera

enactment to co!er the whole sub2ect and to repeaall prior laws inconsistent therewith

o Ghen the principle is that the special law merely

establishes a general rule while the general law

creates a specific and special rule

Reference statutes

• a statute which refers to other statutes and ma1es themapplicable to the sub2ect of legislation

• used to a!oid encumbering the statute boo1s of unnecessary

repetition

• should be construed to harmonie and gi!e effect to th

adopted statute$

%upplemental statutes

• Intended to supply deficiencies in eisting statutes

• %upplemental statutes should be read with the original statuteand construed together

Reenacted statutes

• statute which reenacts a pre!ious statute or pro!ision$

• Reproducing an earlier statute with the same or substantiallythe same words$

Monte#ibano v. Ferrer

• Issue application of %ec$ - fo the &ity &harter of )anila i

!alid in the criminal complaint directly file by an offended party in the city court of 'acolod

• @eld 4he court ruled that the criminal complaint filed

directly by the offended party is in!alid and it ordered thecity court to dismiss it$

• 4he pro!isions of the &ity &harter of )anila 'acolod on the

same sub2ect are identically worded, hence they shouldrecei!e the same construction$

• RFLE two statutes with a parallel scope, purpose andterminology should each in its own field, ha!e a li1einterpretation

Adoption of contemporaneous construction



• in construing the reenacted statute, the court should ta1e intoaccount prior contemporaneous construction and gi!e due

weight and respect to it$

ualification of the rule

• rule that is aforementioned is applicable only when thestatute is capable of the construction gi!en to it and whenthat construction has become a settled rule of conduct

Adopted statutes

• a statute patterned after a statute of a foreign country$

• &ourt should ta1e into consideration how the courts of othercountry construe the law and its practices

CHAPTER SEVEN: Str!t or L!*era' Construt!on

IN GENERAL

Kenerally

• Ghether a statute is to be gi!en a strict or liberalconstruction will depend upon the following

4he nature of the statute

4he purpose to be subser!ed

4he mischief to be remedied

• Purpose to gi!e the statute the interpretation that will bestaccomplish the end desired and effectuate legislati!e intent

%trict construction, generally

• &onstruction according to the letter of the statute, whichrecognies nothing that is not epressed, ta1es the language

used in its eact meaning, and admits no e.uitableconsideration

• 5ot to mean that statutes are construed in its narrowest

meaning

• It simply means that the scope of the statute shall not beetended or enlarged by implication, intendment, ore.uitable consideration beyond the literal meaning of itsterms

• It is a close and conser!ati!e adherence to the literal ortetual interpretation

• 4he antithesis of liberal construction

Liberal construction, defined

• E.uitable construction as will enlarge the letter of a statute toaccomplish its intended purpose, carry out its intent, or

promote 2ustice

• 5ot to mean enlargement of a pro!ision which is clear,unambiguous and free from doubt

• It simply means that the words should recei!e a fair and

reasonable interpretation, so as to attain the intent, spirit and purpose of the law

Liberal construction applied, generally

• Ghere a statute is ambiguous, the literal meaning of the

words used may be re2ected if the result of adopting saidmeaning would be to defeat the purpose of the law

• 1t res magis va#eat $%am pereat & that construction is to be

sought which gi!es effect to the whole of the statute 0 itse!ery word

Liberal &onstruction #udicial Interpretation

E.uitable construction as will

enlarge the letter of a statute toaccomplish its intended

purpose, carry out its intent, or promote 2ustice

Act of the court in engrafting

upon a law something which it belie!es ought to ha!e beenembraced therein

Legitimate eercise of 2udicial

power

/orbidden by the tripartite

di!ision of powers among the -departments of go!ernment

• A statute may not be liberally construed to read into i

something which its clear and plain language re2ects

&onstruction to promote social 2ustice

• %ocial 2ustice must be ta1en into account in the interpretationand application of laws

• %ocial 2ustice mandate is addressed or meant for the three

departments the legislati!e, eecuti!e, and the 2udicial• %ocial 2ustice (included in the &onstitution" was meant to be

a !ital, articulate, compelling principle of public policy

• It should be obser!ed in the interpretation not only of futurelegislations, but also of laws already eisting on 5o!ember*7, *+-7$

• It was intended to change the spirit of our laws, present and

future$

&onstruction ta1ing into consideration general welfare or growthci!iliation

• &onstrue to attain the general welfare

• Sa#%s pop%#i est s%prema #e) & the !oice of the people is the

supreme law

• Stat%ta pro p%b#ico commodo #ate interpretant%r & statuteenacted for the public good are to be construed liberally

• 4he reason of the law is the life of the lawH the reason lies in

the soil of the common welfare

• 4he 2udge must go out in the open spaces of actuality and digdown deep into his common soil, if not, he become

subser!ient to formalism

• &onstrue in the light of the growth of ci!iliation and!arying conditions

o 4he interpretation that Bif the man is too long for

the bed, his head should be chopped off rather thanenlarge the old bed or purchase a new oneC should

5O4 be gi!en to statutes

STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED

Penal statutes, generally

• Penal statutes are those that define crimes, treat of theinature and pro!ide for their punishment

o Acts of legislature which prohibit certain acts and

establish penalties for their !iolation

• 4hose which impose punishment for an offense committedagainst the state, and which the chief eecuti!e has the

power to pardon

• A statute which decrees the forfeiture in fa!or of the state ouneplained wealth ac.uired by a public official while inoffice is criminal in nature

Penal statutes, strictly construed• Penal statutes are strictly construed against the %tate and

liberally construed in fa!or of the accusedo Penal statutes cannot be enlarged or etended by

intendment, implication, or any e.uitableconsideration

o 5o person should be brought within its terms if he

is not clearly made so by the statute

o 5o act should be pronounces criminal which is no

clearly made so

Peo v. Atop



• %ec$ ** of RA 87+, which amended Art$ --7 of the RP&,

pro!ides that the death penalty for rape may be imposed ifthe Boffender is a parent, ascendant, step3parent, guardian,relati!e by consanguinity or affinity within the -rd ci!ildegree, or the common3law spouse of the parent of the

!ictimC

• Is the common3law husband of the girls grandmotherincluded

• 5oS &ourts must not bring cases within the pro!isions of thelaw which are not clearly embraced by it$

o 5o act can be pronounced criminal which is notclearly within the terms of a statute can be brought

within them$o Any reasonable doubt must be resol!ed in fa!or of

the accused

• %trict construction but not as to nullify or destroy theob!ious purpose of the legislature

o If penal statute is !ague, it must be construed with

such strictness as to carefully %A/EKFARD theRIK@4% of the defendant and at the same time

preser!e the ob!ious intention of the legislatureo &ourts must endea!or to effect substantial 2ustice

Centeno v. 2i##a#onPorni##os

• PD *789, which punishes a person who solicits or recei!escontribution for Bcharitable or public welfare purposesC

without any permit first secured from the Department of%ocial %er!ices, DID 5O4 include Breligious purposesCC inthe acts punishable, the law &A55O4 be construed to

punish the solicitation of contributions for religious

purposes, such as repair or reno!ation of the church

Reason why penal statutes are strictly construedg

• 4he law is tender in fa!or of the rights of the indi!idualH

• 4he ob2ect is to establish a certain rule by conformity towhich man1ind would be safe, and the discretion of the courtlimited

• Purpose of strict construction is 5O4 to enable a guilty

person to escape punishment through technicality but to pro!ide a precise definition of forbidden acts

Acts ma#a in se and ma#a pro*ibita

• Keneral rule to constitute a crime, e!il intent must combinewith an act

• Act%s non facit re%m nisi mens sit rea & the act itself does not

ma1e a man guilty unless his intention were so

• Act%s me invite fact%s non est me%s act%s & an act done by

me against my will is not my act

)ala in se )ala prohibita

&riminal intent, apart from theact itself is re.uired

4he only in.uiry is, has the law been !iolated

RP& %pecial penal laws

• @owe!er, if special penal laws use such words as Bwillfully,

!oluntarily, and 1nowinglyC intent must be pro!edH thusgood faith or bad faith is essential before con!iction

Application of rule

Peo v. 4adao

• A statute which penalies a Bperson assisting a claimantC in

connection with the latters claim for !eterans benefit, doesnot penalie Bone who O//ER% to assistC

S%y v. Peop#e

• Ghere a statute penalies a store owner who sellscommodities beyond the retail ceiling price fied by law, theambiguity in the EO classifying the same commodity into :classes and fiing different ceiling prices for each class

should be resol!ed in fa!or of the accused

Peo v. Terreda

• %horter prescripti!e period is more fa!orable to the accused

Peo v. Manantan

• 4he rule that penal statutes are gi!en a strict construction isnot the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws

• Instead, the rule merely ser!es as an additional single facto

to be considered as an aid in detrmining the meaning o penal laws

Peo v. P%risima

• 4he language of the a statute which penalies the mere

carrying outside of residence of bladed weapons, i$e$, a 1nifeor bolo, not in connection with ones wor1 or occupationwith a !ery hea!y penalty ranging from 73*6 years oimprisonment, has been narrowed and strictly construed as to

include, as an additional element of the crime, the carrying o

the weapon in furtherance of rebellion, insurrection osub!ersion, such being the e!il sought to be remedied or

pre!ented by the statute as disclosed in its preamble

A'arcon v. Sandiganbayan

• Issue whether a pri!ate person can be considered a public

officer by reason if his being designated by the 'IR as adepository of distrained property, so as to ma1e the

con!ersion thereof the crime of mal!ersation

• @eld 5OS the 'IRs power authoriing a pri!ate indi!iduato act as a depository cannot include the power to appoin

him as public officer

• A pri!ate indi!idual who has in his charge any of the publicfunds or property enumerated in Art ::: RP& and commit

any of the acts defined in any of the pro!isions of &hapter 94itle of the RP&, should li1ewise be penalied with thesame penalty meted to erring public officers$ 5owhere inthis pro!ision is it epressed or implied that a pri!ate

indi!idual falling under said Art ::: is to be deemed a publicofficer

Limitation of rule

• Limitation * 0 Ghere a penal statute is capable of :interpretations, one which will operate to eempt an accusedfrom liability for !iolation thereof and another which wil

gi!e effect to the manifest intent of the statute and promoteits ob2ect, the latter interpretation should be adopted

1S v. ,o C*ico

• A law punishes the display of flags Bused duringC theinsurrection against the F% may not be so construed as toeempt from criminal liability a person who displays a

replica of said flag because said replica is not the one BusedCduring the rebellion, for to so construe it is to nullify the

statute together

• Ko &hico is liable though flags displayed were 2ust replica othe flags Bused duringC insurrection against F%

• Limitation : 0 strict construction of penal laws applies onlywhere the law is ambiguous and there is doubt as to its

meaning



Peo v. ,atc*a#ian

• A statute re.uires that an employer shall pay a minimum

wage of not less than a specified amount and punishes any person who willfully !iolates any of its pro!isions

• 4he fact that the nonpayment of the minimum wage is not

specifically declared unlawful, does not mean that anemployer who pays his employees less than the prescribedminimum wage is not criminally liable, for the nonpaymentof minimum wage is the !ery act sought to be en2oined by

the law

%tatutes in derogation of rights

• Rights are not absolute, and the state, in the eercise of police power, may enact legislations curtailing or restricting

their en2oyment

• As these statutes are in derogation of common or generalrights, they are generally strictly construed and rigidly

confined to cases clearly within their scope and purpose

• Eampleso %tatutes authoriing the epropriation of pri!ate

land or property

o Allowing the ta1ing of deposition

o /iing the ceiling of the price of commodities

o Limiting the eercise of proprietary rights by

indi!idual citienso %uspending the period of prescription of actions

• Ghen : reasonably possible constructions, one which woulddiminish or restrict fundamental right of the people and the

other if which would not do so, the latter construction must be adopted so as to allow full en2oyment of suchfundamental right

%tatutes authoriing epropriations

• Power of eminent domain is essentially legislati!e in nature

• )ay be delegated to the President, LKFs, or public utilitycompany

• Epropriation plus 2ust compensation

• A derogation of pri!ate rights, thus strict construction is

applied

• %tatutes epropriating or authoriing the epropriation of property are strictly construed against the epropriating

authority and liberally in fa!or of property owners

%tatutes granting pri!ileges

• %tatutes granting ad!antages to pri!ate persons or entitiesha!e in many instances created special pri!ileges ormonopolies for the grantees and ha!e thus been !iewed with

suspicion and strictly construed

• Privi#egia recipient #argam interpretationem vo#%ntati

consonam concedentis & pri!ileges are to be interpreted inaccordance with the will of him who grants them

• And he who fails to strictly comply with the will of the

grantor loses such pri!ileges

%t%an Sa;mi## /nc. v. ayvie; T*eater /nc

• Ghere an entity is granted a legislati!e franchise to operateelectric light and power, on condition that it should start

operation within a specified period, its failure to startoperation within the period resulted in the forfeiture of the

franchise

Legislati!e grants to local go!ernment units

• Krants of power to local go!ernment are to be construedstrictly, and doubts in the interpretation should be resol!ed in

fa!or of the national go!ernment and against the politicalsubdi!isions concerned

• Reason there is in such a grant a gratuitous donation of public money or property which results in an unfai

ad!antage to the grantee and for that reason, the grant should be narrowly restricted in fa!or of the public

%tatutory grounds for remo!al of officials

• %tatutes relating to suspension or remo!al of public officialsare strictly construed

• Reason the remedy of remo!al is a drastic one and penal innature$ In2ustice and harm to the public interest would li1elyemerge should such laws be not strictly interpreted againsthe power of suspension or remo!al

Oc*ate v. De#ing

• Krounds for remo!al 0 Bneglect of duty, oppression

corruption or other forms of maladministration in officeCo Bin officeC 0 a .ualifier of all acts$

o )ust be in relation to the official as an officer and

not as a pri!ate person

!ebron v "eyes

• Procedure for remo!al or suspension should be strictlyconstrued

• %tatute local electi!e officials are to be remo!ed osuspended, after in!estigation, by the pro!incial board

sub2ect to appeal to the President• President has no authority on his own to conduct the

in!estigation and to suspend such electi!e official

5aturaliation laws

• 5aturaliation laws are strictly construed against the

applicant and rigidly followed and enforced

• 5aturaliation is statutory than a natural right%tatutes imposing taes and customs duties

• 4a statutes must be construed strictly against thego!ernment and liberally in fa!or of the tapayer

• Power to ta in!ol!es power to destroy

• 4aing act are not to be etended by implication

• 4a statutes should be clearly, epressly, and unambiguously

imposed• Reason for strict construction taation is a destructi!e power

which interferes with the personal property rights of the people and ta1es from them a portion of their property fothe support of the go!ernment

%tatutes granting ta eemptions

• Law frowns against eemption from taation because taeare the lifeblood of the nation

• Laws granting ta eemptions are thus construed strictissim

-%ris against the tapayer and liberally in fa!or of the taing

authority

• 'urden of proof 0 on the tapayer claiming to be eempted

• 'asis for strict construction 0 to minimie the differen

treatment and foster impartiality, fairness, and e.uality otreatment among tapayers

• 4a eemptions are not fa!ored in law, nor are they presumed$

C/" v. CA

• Issue whether containers and pac1aging materials can be

credited against the millers deficiency ta

• 'IR claimed that there should be no ta credit

• @eld pro!iso should be strictly construed to apply only toraw materials and not to containers and pac1ing materialswhich are not raw materialsH hence, the miller is entitled tota credit



• Restriction in the pro!iso is limited only to sales, millersecise taes paid Ton raw materials used in the milling

process

eng%et Corporation v. Cenrtra# oard of Assessment Appea#s

• PD *+77 withdrew all ta eemptions, ecept thoseembodied in the Real Property &ode, a law which grantscertain industries real estate ta eemptions under the RealEstate &ode

• &ourts cannot epand eemptiom

Esso Standard Eastern /nc. v Acting Commissioner of C%stoms

• Ghere a statute eempts from special import ta, e.uipmentBfor use of industries,C the eemption does not etend tothose used in dispensing gasoline at retail in gasoline stations

C/" v. Mani#a 6ockey C#%b /nc.

• %tatute Bracing club holding these races shall be eemptfrom the payment of any municipal or national taC

• &annot be construed to eempt the racing club from payingincome ta on rentals paid to it for use of the race trac1s andother paraphernalia, for what the law eempts refers only to

those to be paid in connection with said races

L#adoc v. C/"

• %tatute eemption from taation charitable institutions,churches, parsonages or co!enants appurtenant thereto,

mos.ues, and non3profit cemeteries, and all lands buildings,and impro!ements actually, directly, and eclusi!ely usedfor religious or charitable purposes

• Eemption only refer to property taes and not from all1inds of taes

La Car#ota S%gar Centra# v. 6imene'

• %tatute ta pro!ided shall not be collected on foreignechange used for the payment of Bfertiliers when imported

by planters or farmers directly or through their cooperati!esC

•

4he importation of fertiliers by an entity which is neither a planter nor a farmer nor a cooperati!e of planters or farmersis not eempt from payment of the ta, e!en though said

entity merely acted as agent of planter or farmer as a sort ofaccommodation without ma1ing any profit from the

transaction, for the law uses the word BdirectlyC whichmeans without anyone inter!ening in the importation and the

phrase Bthrough their cooperati!esC as the only eemption

C/" v. P*i#. Acety#ene Co.

• %ee page -67

• Power of taation if a high prerogati!e of so!ereignty, itsrelin.uishment is ne!er presumed and any reduction ordiminution thereof with respect to its mode or its rate must

be strictly construed

P*i#. Te#egrap* and Te#ep*one Corp. v. COA

• On Bmost fa!ored treatment clauseC

• : franchisee are not competitors

• 4he first franchisee is will not en2oy a reduced rate of ta ongross receipts


• %trict construction does not apply in the case of ta

eemptions in fa!or of the go!ernment itself or its agencies

• Pro!isions granting eemptions to go!ernment agencies may be construed liberally in fa!or of non3ta liability of such

agencies

• 4he epress eemption should not be construed with thesame degree of strictness that applies to eemptions contrary

to policy of the state, since as to such property eemption isthe rule and the taation is the eemption

• E$g$ ta eemption in fa!or of 5APO&OR 0 whether direc

or indirect taes, eempted

%tatutes concerning the so!ereign

• Restricti!e statutes which impose burdens on the publictreasury or which diminish rights and interests are strictlyconstrued$

• Fnless so specified, the go!ernment does not fall within theterms of any legislation

A##iance of ,overnment @orkers v. Minister of Labor and Emp#oymen

• PD ;7* 0 re.uires BemployersC to pay a *- th month pay to

their employees

• BemployersC does not embrace the RP, the law not ha!ing

epressly included it within its scope

%tatutes authoriing suits against the go!ernment

• Art$ >I, %ec$ -, *+; &onstitution 0 B4he %tate may not besued without its consentC

o Keneral rule so!ereign is eempt from suit

o

Eception in the form of statute, state may gi!e itsconsent to be sued

%tatute is to be strictly construed andwai!er from immunity from suit will no

be lightly inferred

• +%##%m temp%s occ%rrit regi & there can be no legal right a

against the authority that ma1es the law on which the righdepends

• Reason for non3suability 0 not to sub2ect the state toincon!enience and loss of go!ernmental efficiency

Mobi# P*i#. E)p#oration /nc. v. C%stoms Arrastre Services

• 4he law authoriing the 'ureau of &ustoms to lease arrastreoperations, a proprietary function necessarily incident to its

go!ernmental function, may 5O4 be construed to mean thathe state has consented to be sued, when it underta1es to

conduct arrastre ser!ices itself, for damage to cargo

• %tate3immunity may not be circum!ented by directing the

action against the officer of the state instead of the state itselfo 4he states immunity may be !alidly in!o1ed

against the action A% LO5K A% I4 &A5 'E

%@OG5 that the suit really affects the propertyrights, or interests of the state and not merely those

of the officer nominally made party defendant

• E!en if the state consents, law should 5O4 be interpreted toauthorie garnishment of public funds to satisfy a 2udgmen

against go!ernment propertyo Reason

Public policy forbids it

Disbursement of public funds must beco!ered by a corresponding

appropriation as re.uired by law

/unctions and ser!ice cannot be allowedto be paralyed or disrupted by the

di!ersion of public funds from theilegitimate and specific ob2ects, a

appropriated by law

%tatutes prescribing formalities of the will



• %trictly construed, which means, wills must be eecuted inaccordance with the statutory re.uirements, otherwise, it is

entirely !oid

• 4he court is see1ing to ascertain and apply the intent of thelegislators and not that of the testator, and the latters

intention is fre.uently defeated by the non3obser!ance ofwhat the statute re.uires

Eceptions and pro!isos

• %hould be strictly but reasonably construed

•

All doubts should be resol!ed in fa!or of the general pro!ision rather than the eceptionso @owe!er, always loo1 at the intent of legislators if

it will accord reason and 2ustice not to apply therule that Ban epress eception ecludes all othersC

• 4he rule on eecution pending appeal must be strictlyconstrued being an eception to the general rule

• %ituations which allows eceptions to the re.uirement of

warrant of arrest or search warrant must be strictlyconstruedH to do so would infringe upon personal liberty and

set bac1 a basic right

• A preference is an eception to the general rule

• A pro!iso should be interpreted strictly with the legislati!eintent

o %hould be strictly construed

o Only those epressly eempted by the pro!iso

should be freed from the operation of the statute

STATUTES LI-ERALLY CONSTRUED

Keneral social legislation

• Keneral welfare legislationso 4o implement the social 2ustice and protection3to3

labor pro!isions of the &onstitution

o &onstrued liberally

o Resol!e any doubt in fa!or of the persons whom

the law intended to benefito Includes the following 0 labor laws, tenancy laws,

land reform laws, and social security laws

Tamayo v. Mani#a !ote#

• Law grants employees the benefits of holiday pay ecept

those therein enumerated

• %tatcon 0 all employees, whether monthly paid or not, whoare not among those ecepted are entitled to the holiday pay

• Labor laws construed 0 the wor1ingmans welfare should bethe primordial and paramount consideration

o Article 9 5ew Labor &ode 0 Ball doubts in the

implementation and interpretation of the pro!isionsof the Labor &ode including its implementing rulesand regulations shall be resol!ed in fa!or of laborC

• Liberal construction applies only if statute is !ague,

otherwise, apply the law as it is stated

Keneral welfare clause

• : brancheso One branch attaches to the main trun1 of municipal

authority 0 relates to such ordinances andregulations as may be necessary to carry into effect

and discharge the powers and duties conferredupon local legislati!e bodies by law

o Other branch is much more independent of the

specific functions enumerated by law 0 authoriessuch ordinances as shall seem necessary and

proper to pro!ide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, impro!e the morals, peace,

good order of the LKF and the inhabitantsthereof, and for the protection of the propertytherein

• &onstrued in fa!or of the LKFs

• 4o gi!e more powers to local go!ernments in promoting the

economic condition, social welfare, and material progress ofthe people in the community

• &onstrued with proprietary aspects, otherwise would cripple

LKFs

• )ust be elastic and responsi!e to !arious social conditions

•

)ust follow legal progress of a democratic way of life

Krant of power to local go!ernments

• Old rule municipal corporations, being mere creatures olaw, ha!e only such powers as are epressly granted to them

and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to theeercise thereof

• 5ew rule RA ::89 BLocal Autonomy ActC

o %ec *: 0 Bimplied power of a pro!ince, a city, or a

municipality shall be liberally construed in itfa!or$ Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the

eistence of the power should be interpreted infa!or of the local go!ernment and it shall be

presumed to eistC

%tatutes granting taing power (on municipal corporations"• 'efore *+- &onstitution 0 inferences, implications, and

deductions ha!e no place in the interpretation of the taing power of a municipal corporation

• 5ew &onstitution 0 Art$ , %ec 7 *+; &onstitution 0 Beachlocal go!ernment unit shall ha!e the power to create its ownsources of re!enue and to le!y taes, fees, and chargesub2ect to such guidelines and limitations as the &ongress

may pro!ide, consistent with the basic policy of locaautonomyC

o %tatutes prescribing limitations on the taing

power of LKFs must be strictly construed againsthe national go!ernment and liberally in fa!or o

the LKFs, and any doubt as to the eistence of the

taing power will be resol!ed in fa!or of the localgo!ernment

%tatutes prescribing prescripti!e period to collect taes

• 'eneficial for both go!ernment and tapayer o 4o the go!ernment 0 ta officers are obliged to act

promptly in the ma1ing of the assessments

o 4o the tapayer 0 would ha!e a feeling of security

against unscrupulous ta agents who will alwaysfind an ecuse to inspect the boo1s of tapayers

• Laws on prescription 0 remedial measure 0 interpreted

liberally affording protection to the tapayers

%tatutes imposing penalties for nonpayment of ta• liberally construed in fa!or of go!ernment and strictly

construed against the tapayer

• intention to hasten ta payments or to punish e!asions oneglect of duty in respect thereto

• liberal construction would render penalties for delin.uentsnugatory

Election laws

• Election laws should be reasonably and liberally construed toachie!e their purpose

• Purpose 0 to effectuate and safeguard the will of theelectorate in the choice of their representati!es



• - partso Pro!isions for the conduct of elections which

election officials are re.uired to follow

o Pro!isions which candidates for office are re.uired

to performo Procedural rules which are designed to ascertain,

in case of dispute, the actual winner in the

elections

Different rules and canons or statutory construction go!ern such

pro!isions of the election law

• Part *

o Rules and regulations for the conduct of elections

'efore election 0 mandatory (part *"

After election 0 directory (part -"

o Kenerally 0 the pro!isions of a statute as to the

manner of conducting the details of an election are 5O4 mandatoryH and irregularities in conducting

an election and counting the !otes, not precedingfrom any wrongful intent and which depri!es no

legal !oter of his !otes, will not !itiate an electionor 2ustify the re2ection of the entire !otes of a

precinct

Against disenfranchisement

Remedy against election official who didnot do his duty 0 criminal action against

them

• Part :o Pro!isions which candidates for office are re.uired

to perform are mandatory

o 5on3compliance is fatal

• Part -

o Procedural rules which are designed to ascertain,

in case of dispute, the actual winner in theelections are liberally construed

o 4echnical and procedural barriers should not be

allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle inthe choice of their electi!e officials

• /or where a candidate has recei!ed popular mandate,o!erwhelmingly and clearly epressed, all possible doubtsshould be resol!ed in fa!or of the candidates eligibility, for

to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the electorate

Amnesty proclamations

• Amnesty proclamations should be liberally construed as tocarry out their purpose

• Purpose 0 to encourage to return to the fold of the law of

those who ha!e !eered from the law

• E$g$ in case of doubt as to whether certain persons comewithin the amnesty proclamation, the doubt should be

resol!ed in their fa!or and against the state

• %ame rule applies to pardon since pardon and amnesty is

synonymous

%tatutes prescribing prescriptions of crimes

• Liberally construed in fa!or of the accused

• Reason 0 time wears off proof and innocence

• %ame as amnesty and pardon

Peo v. "eyes

• Art$ +* RP& 0 Bperiod of prescription shall commence to runfrom the day the crime is disco!ered by the offended,authorities, C

• Ghen does the period of prescription start 0 day of disco!eryor registration in the Register of Deeds

• @eld /rom the time of registration

• 5otice need not be actual for prescription to runconstructi!e notice is enough

• )ore fa!orable to the accused if prescripti!e period icounted from the time of registration

Adoption statutes

• Adoption statutes are liberally construed in fa!or of the childto be adopted

• Paramount consideration 0 child and not the adopters

>eteran and pension laws• >eteran and pension laws are enacted to compensate a class

of men who suffered in the ser!ice for the hardships theyendured and the dangers they encountered in line of duty

o Epression of gratitude to and recognition of those

who rendered ser!ice to the country by etendingto them regular monetary benefit

• >eteran and pension laws are liberally construed in fa!or o

grantee

De# Mar v. P*i#. 2eterans Admin

• Ghere a statute grants pension benefits to war !eterans

ecept those who are actually recei!ing a similar pensionfrom other go!ernment funds

• %tatcon 0 Bgo!ernment fundsC refer to funds of the samego!ernment and does not preclude war !eterans recei!ingsimilar pensions from the F% Ko!ernment from en2oying the

benefits therein pro!ided

oard of Administrators 2eterans Admin v. a%tista

• >eteran pension law is silent as to the effecti!ity of pension

awards, it shall be construed to ta1e effect from the date i becomes due and 5O4 from the date the application fo pension is appro!ed, so as to grant the pensioner more benefits and to discourage inaction on the part of the official

who administer the laws

C*ave' v. Mat*ay• Ghile !eteran or pension laws are to be construed liberally

they should be so construed as to pre!ent a person from

recei!ing double pension or compensation, unless the law pro!ides otherwise

Santiago v. COA

• Eplained liberal construction or retirement laws

• Intention is to pro!ide for sustenance, and hopefully e!en

comfort when he no longer has the stamina to continueearning his li!elihood

• @e deser!es the appreciation of a grateful go!ernment at bes

concretely epressed in a generous retirement gratuitycommensurate with the !alue and length of his ser!ice

Orti' v. COMELEC • Issue whether a commissioner of &O)ELE& is deemed to

ha!e completed his term and entitled to full retiremen benefits under the law which grants him 73year lump3sum

gratuity and thereafter lifetime pension, who Bretires fromthe ser!ice after ha!ing completed his term of office,C when

his courtesy resignation submitted in response to the call ofthe President following ED%A Re!olution is accepted

• @eld MesS Entitled to gratuity

• Liberal construction

• &ourtesy resignation 0 not his own will but a mere

manifestation of submission to the will of the politicaauthority and appointing power



/n "e App#ication for ,rat%ity enefits of Associate 6%stice Efren / P#ana

• Issue whether #ustice Plana is entitled to gratuity andretirement pay when, at the time of his courtesy resignationwas accepted following ED%A Re!olution and establishmentof a re!olutionary go!ernment under the /reedom

&onstitution, he lac1ed a few months to meet the agere.uirement for retirement under the law but hadaccumulated a number of lea!e of credits which, if added tohis age at the time, would eceed the age re.uirement

• @eld yes, entitled to gratuityS Liberal construction applied

/n "e Pineda

• Eplained doctrine laid down in the pre!ious case

• 4he crediting of accumulated lea!es to ma1e up for lac1 of

re.uired age or length of ser!ice is not done discriminately

• only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was mar1ed by competence, integrity, and dedication to the public ser!ice

/n "e Martin

• Issue whether a 2ustice of the %&, who a!ailed of thedisability retirement benefits pursuant to the pro!ision thatBif the reason for the retirement be any permanent disabilitycontracted during his incumbency in office and prior to the

date of retirement he shall recei!e only a gratuity e.ui!alentto *6 years salary and allowances aforementioned with no

further annuity payable monthly during the rest of theretirees natural lifeC is entitled to a monthly lifetime pension

after the *63year period

• @eld MesS *63year lump sum payment is intended to assistthe stric1en retiree meeting his hospital and doctors bills

and epenses for his support

• 4he retirement law aims to assist the retiree in his old age,not to punish him for ha!ing sur!i!ed

Cena v. CSC

• Issue whether or not a go!ernment employee who hasreached the compulsory retirement age of 87 years, but whohas rendered less than *7 years of go!ernment ser!ice, may

be allowed to continue in the ser!ice to complete the *73yearser!ice re.uirement to enable him to retire with benefits ofan old3age pension under %ec **(b" PD **98

• @owe!er, &%& )emorandum &ircular 5o : pro!ides thatBany re.uest for etension of compulsory retirees tocomplete the *73years ser!ice re.uirement for retirementshall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career

ser!ice who are regular members of the K%I% and shall begranted for a period not eceeding * year

• @eld &%& )emorandum &ircular 5o : unconstitutionalS It

is an administrati!e regulation which should be in harmonywith the lawH liberal construction of retirement benefits

Rules of &ourt

• R& are procedural 0 to be construed liberally

• Purpose of R& 0 the proper and 2ust determination of a

litigation• Procedural laws are no other than technicalities, they are

adopted not as ends in themsel!es but as means conduci!e tothe realiation of the administration of law and 2ustice

• R& should not be interpreted to sacrifice substantial rights atthe epense of technicalities

Case v. 6%go

• Lapses in the literal obser!ance of a rule of procedure will be o!erloo1ed when they do not in!ol!e public policyH whenthey arose from an honest mista1e or unforeseen accidentH

when they ha!e not pre2udiced the ad!erse party and ha!enot depri!ed the court of its authority

• Literal stricture ha!e been relaed in fa!or of liberaconstruction

o Ghere a rigid application will result in manifes

failure or miscarriage of 2usticeo Ghere the interest of substantial 2ustice will be

ser!ed

o Ghere the resolution of the emotion is addressed

solely to the sound and 2udicious discretion of thecourt

o Ghere the in2ustice to the ad!erse party is no

commensurate with the degree of hithoughtlessness in not complying with the

prescribed procedure

• Liberal construction of R& does not mean they may beignoredH they are re.uired to be followed ecept only for the

most persuasi!e reasons

Other statutes

• &urati!e statutes 0 to cure defects in prior law or to !alidatelegal proceedings which would otherwise be !oid for want oconformity with certain legal re.uirementsH retroacti!e

• Redemption laws 0 remedial in nature 0 construed liberallyto carry out purpose, which is to enable the debtor to ha!ehis property applied to pay as many debtors liability as

possible

• %tatutes pro!iding eemptions from eecution are interpretedliberally in order to gi!e effect to their beneficial andhumane purpose

• Laws on attachment 0 liberally construed to promote their

ob2ects and assist the parties obtaining speedy 2ustice

• Garehouse receipts 0 instrument of credit 0 liberallyconstrued in fa!or of a bona fide holders of such receipts

• Probation laws 0 liberally construedo Purpose to gi!e first3hand offenders a second

chance to maintain his place in society through the process of reformation

• %tatute granting powers to an agency created by the

&onstitution should be liberally construed for thead!ancement of the purposes and ob2ecti!es for which it was

created

CHAPTER EIGHT: Man"ator) an" D!retor) Statutes

IN GENERAL

Kenerally

• )andatory and directory classification of statutes 0importance what effect should be gi!en to the mandate of astatute

)andatory and directory statutes, generally

• )andatory statute 0 commands either positi!ely thasomething be done in a particular way, or negati!ely that

something be not doneH it re.uires O'EDIE5&E, otherwise

!oid• Directory statute 0 permissi!e or discretionary in nature and

merely outlines the act to be done in such a way that noin2ury can result from ignoring it or that its purpose can be

accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed andsubstantially the same result obtainedH confer direction upon

a personH non3performance of what it prescribes will no!itiate the proceedings therein ta1en

Ghen statute is mandatory or directory

• 5o absolute test to determine whether a statute is directory o

mandatory

• /inal arbiter 0 legislati!e intent



• Legislati!e intent does not depend on the form of the statuteHmust be gi!en to the entire statute, its ob2ect, purpose,

legislati!e history, and to other related statutes

• )andatory in form but directory in nature 0 possible

• Ghether a statute is mandatory or directory depends onwhether the thing directed to be done is of the essence of thething re.uired, or is a mere matter of form, what is a matterof essence can often be determined only by 2udicial

constructiono &onsidered directory 0 compliance is a matter of

con!enienceH where the directions of a statute aregi!en merely with a !iew to the proper, orderlyand prompt conduct of businessH no substantial

rights depend on ito &onsidered mandatory 0 a pro!ision relating to the

essence of the thing to be done, that is, to mattersof substanceH interpretation shows that thelegislature intended a compliance with such

pro!ision to be essential to the !alidity of the act or proceeding, or when some antecedent and prere.uisite conditions must eist prior to theeercise of the power, or must be performed before

certain other powers can be eercised

4est to determine nature of statute

• 4est is to ascertain the conse.uences that will follow in casewhat the statute re.uires is not done or what it forbids is

performed

• Does the law gi!e a person no alternati!e choice 0 if yes,then it is mandatory

• Depends on the effects of compliance

o If substantial rights depend on it and in2ury can

result from ignoring itH intended for the protectionof the citiens and by a disregard of which theirrights are in2uriously affected 0 mandatory

o Purpose is accomplished in a manner other than

that prescribed and substantially the same results

obtained 3 directory

• %tatutes couched in mandatory form but compliance is

merely directory in natureo If strict compliance will cause hardship or in2ustice

on the part of the public who is not at faulto If it will lead to absurd, impossible, or mischie!ous

conse.uences

If an officer is re.uired to do a positi!eact but fails because such actions willlead to the aforementioned, he will only

be sub2ect to administrati!e sanction forhis failure to do what the law re.uires

Language used

• Kenerally mandatory 0 command wordso %hall or %hall noto )ust or )ust not

o Ought or Ought not

o %hould or %hould not

o &an or &annot

• Kenerally directory 0 permissi!e words

o )ay or )ay not

Fse of BshallC or BmustC

• Kenerally, BshallC and BmustC is mandatory in nature

• If a different interpretation is sought, it must rest uponsomething in the character of the legislation or in the contetwhich will 2ustify a different meaning

• 4he import of the word ultimately depends upon aconsideration of the entire pro!ision, its nature, ob2ect and

the conse.uences that would follow from construing it oneway or the other

Loyo#a ,rand 2i##a !omeo;ners BSo%t* Assn. /nc. v. CA

• BmustC construed as directory

• &orporation &ode %ec 98 reads B e!ery corporation formed

under this &ode )F%4 within one month after receipt ofofficial notice of the issuance of its certification oincorporation with the %E&, adopt a code of by3laws for itgo!ernment not inconsistent with this &odeC

• PD +6:3A which is in pari materia# with the &orporation

&ode states that the non3filing of the by3laws does not imply

the BdemiseC of the corporationH that there should be a noticeand hearing before the certificate of registration may be

cancelled by the failure to file the by3laws

• One test whether mandatory or directory compliance must be

made 0 whether non3compliance with what is re.uired wilresult in the nullity of the actH if it results in the nullity, it ismandatory

Director of Land v. CA

• Law re.uires in petitions for land registration that Bupon

receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initiahearing to be published in the OK and once in a newspapeof general circulation in the PhilippinesC

• Law epressly re.uires that the initial hearing be publishedin the OK A5D in the newspaper of general circulation 0reason OK is not as widely read of the newspaper of generacirculation

• BshallC is imperati!e= mandatory

• Githout initial hearing being published in a newspaper o

general circulation is a nullity

Fse of BmayC

• An auiliary !erb showing opportunity or possibility

• Kenerally, directory in nature

• Fsed in procedural or ad2ecti!e lawsH liberally construed• Eample %ec 8- of the corporation &ode 0 Bshares of stoc1

so issued are personal property and )AM be transferred by

deli!ery of the certificate or certificated endorsed by theowner

o BmayC is merely directory and that the transfer of

the shares may be effected in a manner differenfrom that pro!ided for in law

Ghen BshallC is construed as BmayC and !ice !ersa

• Rule BmayC should be read BshallC

o where such construction is necessary to gi!e effec

to the apparent intention of the legislatureo where a statute pro!ides for the doing os some act

which is re.uired by 2ustice r public dutyo where it !ests a public body or officer with power

and authority to ta1e such action which concernsfor the public interest or rights of indi!iduals

• Rule BshallC should be read BmayC

o Ghen so re.uired by the contet or by the

intention of the legislatureo Ghen no public benefit or pri!ate right re.uires

that it be gi!en an imperati!e meaning

Diokno v. "e*abi#itiation Finance Corp

• %ec$ : RA -69 reads Bban1s or other financial institutionsowned or controlled by the Ko!ernment %@ALL, sub2ect to



a!ailability of funds accept at a discount at not morethan :6N for *6 years of such bac1pay certificateC

• B%hallC implies discretion because of the phrase Bsub2ect toa!ailability of fundsC

,overmnent v. E# !ogar Fi#ipino

• &orporation &odes reads B%@ALL, upon such !iolation

being pro!ed, be dissol!ed by $%o ;arranto proceedingsC

• B%hallC construed as BmayC

erces Sr. v. ,%ingona• %ec$ 8; Ra *86 (LK&" pro!ides that an appeal from an

ad!erse decision against a local electi!e official to thePresident B%@ALL not pre!ent a decision from becoming

final and eecutorC

• B%hallC is not mandatory because there is room to construesaid pro!ision as gi!ing discretion to the re!iewing officials

to stay the eecution of the appealed decision

Fse of negati!e, prohibitory or eclusi!e terms

• A negati!e statute is mandatoryH epressed in negati!e wordsor in a form of an affirmati!e proposition .ualified by the

word BonlyC

• BonlyC eclusionary negation

• Prohibiti!e or negati!e words can rarely, if e!er, bediscretionary

MANDATORY STATUTES

%tatutes conferring power

• Kenerally regarded as mandatory although couched in a permissi!e form

• %hould construe as imposing absolute and positi!e dutyrather than conferring pri!ileges

• Power is gi!en for the benefit of third persons, not for the

public official

• Kranted to meet the demands of rights, and to pre!ent a

failure of 2ustice• Ki!en as a remedy to those entitled to in!o1e its aid

%tatutes granting benefits

• &onsidered mandatory

• /ailure of the person to ta1e the re.uired steps or to meet theconditions will ordinarily preclude him from a!ailing of thestatutory benefits

• 2igi#antib%s et non dormientib%s -%ra s%bveni%nt & the laws

aid the !igilant, not those who slumber on their rights

• Potior est in tempoe potior est in -%re 0 he who is first in

time is preferred in right

%tatutes prescribing 2urisdictional re.uirements

• &onsidered mandatory

• Eamples

o Re.uirement of publication

o Pro!ision in the 4a &ode to the effect that before

an action for refund of ta is filed in court, awritten claim therefore shall be presented with the

&IR within the prescribed period is mandatory andfailure to comply with such re.uirement is fatal to

the action

%tatutes prescribing time to ta1e action or to appeal

• Kenerally mandatory

• @eld as absolutely indispensable to the pre!ention oneedless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge o

business, and are necessary incident to the proper, efficientand orderly discharge of 2udicial functions

• %trict not substantial compliance

• 5ot wai!able, nor can they be the sub2ect of agreements orstipulation of litigants

"eyes v. COA

• %ec$ *; RA *86 0 process of appeal of dissatisfied

tapayer on the legality of ta ordinanceo Appeal to the %ec of #ustice within -6 days o

effecti!ity of the ta ordinanceo If %ec of #ustice decides the appeal, a period of -6

days is allowed for an aggrie!ed party to go tocourt

o If the %ec of #ustice does not act thereon, after the

lapse of 86 days, a party could already proceed to

see1 relief in court

• Purpose of mandatory compliance to pre!ent delays andenhance the speedy and orderly discharge of 2udicia

functions

• Fnless the re.uirements of law are complied with, th

decision of the lower court will become final and preclude

the appellate court from ac.uiring 2urisdiction to re!iew it

• /nterest reipiciae %t sit finis #iti%m & public interest re.uire

that by the !ery nature of things there must be an end to alegal contro!ersy

,ac*on v. Devera 6r

• Issue whether %ec 8 of the Rule on %ummary Procedure

which reads B should the defendant fail to answer thecomplaint within the period abo!e pro!ided, the &ourt, mot%

proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, %@ALL rende 2udgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the

complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein,C ismandatory or directory, such that an answer filed out of timemay be accepted

• @eld mandatoryo )ust file the answer within the reglementary

periodo Reglementary period shall be Tnon3etendible

o Otherwise, it would defeat the ob2ecti!e o

epediting the ad2udication of suits

%tatutes prescribing procedural re.uirements

• &onstrued mandatory

• Procedure relating to 2urisdictional, or of the essence of the proceedings, or is prescribed for the protection or benefit of

the party affected

• Ghere failure to comply with certain procedurare.uirements will ha!e the effect of rendering the act done in

connection therewith !oid, the statute prescribing suchre.uirements is regarded as mandatory e!en though the

language is used therein is permissi!e in nature

De Mesa v. Mencias

• %ec *, Rule - R& 0 Bafter a party dies and the claim is no

thereby etinguished, the court shall order, upon propenotice, the legal representati!e of the deceased to appear and

to be substituted $ If legal representati!e fails to appea, the court )AM order the opposing party to produce theappointment of a legal representati!e C

• Although )AM was used, pro!ision is mandatory



• Procedural re.uirement goes to the !ery 2urisdiction of thecourt, for Bunless and until a legal representati!e is for him is

duly named and within the 2urisdiction of the trial court, noad2udication in the cause could ha!e been accorded any!alidity or the binding effect upon any party, inrepresentation of the deceased, without trenching upon the

fundamental right to a day in court which is the !ery essenceof the constitutionally enshrined guarantee of due process

Election laws on conduct of election

• &onstrued as mandatory

• 'efore election 0 mandatory

• After election 0 directory, in support of the result unless of a

character to affect an obstruction to the free and intelligentcasting of the !otes, or to the ascertainment of the result, or

unless it is epressly declared by the statute that the particular act is essential to the !alidity of an election, or that

its omission shall render it !oid (whew, and habaS"

• Ghen the !oters ha!e honestly cast their ballots, the sameshould not be nullified simply because the officers appointed

under the law to direct the elections and guard the purity ofthe ballot ha!e not done their duty

• /or where a candidate has recei!ed popular mandate,

o!erwhelmingly and clearly epressed, all possible doubtsshould be resol!ed in fa!or of the candidates eligibility, for

to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the electorate

De#os "eyes v. "odrig%e'

• 4he circumstance that the coupon bearing the number of the ballot is not detached at the time the ballot is !oted, as

re.uired by law, does not 2ustify the court in re2ecting the ballot

Election laws on .ualification and dis.ualification

• 4he rule of Bbefore3mandatory and after3directoryC in

election laws only applies to procedural statutesH

• 5ot applicable to pro!isions of the election laws prescribingthe time limit to file certificate of candidacy and the

.ualifications and dis.ualifications of electi!e office 0considered mandatory e!en after election

%tatutes prescribing .ualifications for office

• Eligibility to a public office is of a continuing nature andmust eist at the commencement of the term and during theoccupancy of the office

• %tatutes prescribing the eligibility or .ualifications of persons to a public office are regarded as mandatory

• Eample in the boo1 0 lawyer32udgeH 2udge3disbarment aslawyer

%tatutes relating to assessment of taes

• Intended for the security of the citiens, or to insure thee.uality of taation, or for certainty as to the nature and

amount of each others ta 0 )A5DA4ORMo E$g$ %tatutes re.uiring the assessor to notify the

tapayer of the assessment of his property within a prescribed period

• 4hose designed merely for the information or direction ofofficers or to secure methodical and systematic modes of

proceedings 3 DIRE&4ORM

%tatutes concerning public auction sale

• &onstrued mandatory

• Procedural steps must be strictly followed

• Otherwise, !oid

DIRECTORY STATUTES

%tatutes prescribing guidance for officers

• Regulation designed to secure order, system, and dispatch in proceedings, and by a disregard of which the rights of partie

interested may not be in2uriously affected 0 directoryo Eception 0 unless accompanied by negati!e

words importing that the acts re.uired shall not bedone in any other manner or time than thadesignated

%tatutes prescribing manner of 2udicial action

• &onstrued directory

• Procedure is secondary in importance to substanti!e right

• Kenerally, non3compliance therewith is not necessary to the

!alidity of the proceedings

%tatutes re.uiring rendition of decision within prescribed period

• %ec *7(*" Art$ >III, *+; &onstitution 0 the maimum period within which a case or matter shall be decided o

resol!ed from the date of its submission shall beo :9 months 0 %&

o *: months 0 lower collegiate courts

o - months 0 all other lower courts

• %ec Art$ I3A, *+; &onstitution 0o 86 days from the date of its submission fo

resolution 0 for all &onstitutional &ommissions

• 'efore the &onstitution too1 effect 3 %tatutes re.uiringrendition of decision within prescribed period 0 Directory

o Ecept

intention to the contrary is manifest

time is of the essence of the thing to bedone

language of the statute contains negati!ewords

designation of the time was intended as alimitation of power, authority or right

• always loo1 at intent to ascertain whether to gi!e the statute

a mandatory or directory constructiono basis EPEDIE5&M 0 less in2ury results to the

general public by disregarding than enforcing thelittle of the law and that 2udges would otherwiseabstain from rendering decisions after the period to

render them had lapsed because they lac1ed 2urisdiction tot do so

H%er%bin v. CA

• %tatute appeals in election cases Bshall be decided within -months after the filing of the case in the office of the cler1 ofcourtC

• Issue whether or not &A has 2urisdiction in deciding the

election case although the re.uired period to resol!e it has

epired• @eld yes, otherwise is to defeat the administration of 2ustice

upon factors beyond the control of the partiesH would defeatthe purpose of due processH dismissal will constitute

miscarriage of 2usticeH speedy trial would be turned intodenial of 2ustice

o /ailure of 2udge to ta1e action within the said

period merely depri!es him of their right to collectheir salaries or to apply for lea!es, but does no

depri!e them of the 2urisdiction to act on the cases pending before them

&onstitutional time pro!ision directory



Marce#ino v. Cr%'

• %ec *7(*" Art$ >III, *+; &onstitution 0 the maimum

period within which a case or matter shall be decided orresol!ed from the date of its submission shall be

o :9 months 0 %&

o *: months 0 lower collegiate courts

o - months 0 all other lower courts

• %ec *7(*" Art$ >III, *+; &onstitution 0 directory

• Reasons

o %tatutory pro!isions which may be thus departed

from with impunity, without affecting the !alidityof statutory proceedings, are usually those whichrelate to the mode or time of doing that which isessential to effect the aim and purpose of the

legislature or some incident of the essential act 0thus directory

o Liberal construction 0 departure from strict

compliance would result in less in2ury to thegeneral public than would its strict application

o &ourts are not di!ested of their 2urisdiction for

failure to decide a case within the +63day periodo Only for the guidance of the 2udges manning our

courts

o /ailure to obser!e said rule constitutes a ground

for administrati!e sanction against the defaulting

2udge

A certification to this effect is re.uired

before 2udges are allowed to draw theirsalaries

CHAPTER NINE: Pros#et!.e an" Retroat!.e Statutes

IN GENERAL

Prospecti!e and retroacti!e statutes, defined

• Prospecti!e 0o operates upon facts or transactions that occur after

the statute ta1es effecto loo1s and applies to the future$

• Retroacti!e 0o Law which creates a new obligation, imposes a

new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to

a transaction already past$o A statute is not made retroacti!e because it draws

on antecedent facts for its operation, or part of the

re.uirements for its action and application is drawnfrom a time antedating its passage$

1ma#i vs. Estanis#ao

• A law may be made operati!e partly on facts that occurred

prior to the effecti!ity of such law without being retroacti!e$

• %tatute RA *83 granting increased personal eemptionsfrom income ta to be a!ailable thenceforth, that is, after said

Act became effecti!e and on or before the deadline for filingincome ta returns, with respect to compensation incomeearned or recei!ed during the calendar year prior to the datethe law too1 effect$

Castro v. Saga#es

• A retroacti!e law (in a legal sense"

o one which ta1es away or impairs !ested rights

ac.uired under eisting lawso creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty

o attaches a new disability in respect of transactions

or considerations already past

Laws operate prospecti!ely, generally

• It is a settled rule in statutory construction that statutes are to be construed as ha!ing only prospecti!e operation, unless the

intendment of the legislature is to gi!e them a retroacti!eeffect, epressly declare or necessarily implied from thelanguage used$

• 5o court will hold a statute to be retroacti!e when thelegislature has not said so$

• Art$ 9 of the &i!il &ode which pro!ides that BLaws shal

ha!e no retroacti!e effect, unless the contrary is pro!ided$C

• Le) prospicit non respicit & the law loo1s forward, no

bac1ward• Le) de f%t%re -%de) de praeterito & the law pro!ides for the

future, the 2udge for the past$

• If the law is silent as to the date of its application and that itis couched in the past tense does not necessarily imply that i

should ha!e retroacti!e effect$

,rego v. Come#ec

• A statute despite the generality of its language, must not beso construed as to o!erreach acts, e!ents, or matters which

transpired before its passage

• %tatute %ec$96 of the LK& dis.ualifying those remo!edfrom office as a result of an administrati!e case from running

for local electi!e positions cannot be applied retroacti!ely$

• @eld It cannot dis.ualify a person who was administrati!elyremo!ed from his position prior to the effecti!ity of said

&ode from running for an electi!e position$

• Rationale a law is a rule established to guide actions with no binding effect until it is enacted$

• +ova constit%tion f%t%ris formam imponere debet non

praeteretis & A new statute should affect the future, not the past$

• Prospecti!ity applies to

o %tatuteso Administrati!e rulings and circulars

o #udicial decisions

• 4he principle of prospecti!ity of statutes, original oamendatory, has been applied in many cases$ 4hese include

%yco v. P+

• %tatute RA *78 which di!ested the P5' of authority toaccept bac1 pay certificates in payment of loans

• @eld does not apply to an offer of payment made beforeeffecti!ity of the act$

Lagardo v. Masaganda

•

@eld RA :8*-, as amended by RA -6+6 O5 #une *++*granting inferior courts 2urisdiction o!er guardianship cases

could not be gi!en retroacti!e effect in the absence of asa!ing clause$

Larga v. "anada 6r.

• @eld %ec$ + ? *6 of E$O$ +6 amending %ec 9 of P$D$ *7:

could ha!e no retroacti!e application$

Peo v. H%e Po Lay

• @eld a person cannot be con!icted of !iolating &ircular :6of the &entral 'an1, when the alleged !iolation occurred

before publication of the &ircular on the Official Kaette$



a#ta'ar v. CA

• @eld It denied retroacti!e application to PD : decreeing

the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, ?PD -*8, prohibiting e2ectment of tenants from rice ? cornfarmholdings pending promulgation of rules ? regulationsimplementing PD :

+i#o v CA

• @eld remo!ed Tpersonal culti!ation as the ground for

e2ectment of a tenant cant be gi!en retroacti!e effect inabsence of statutory statement for retroacti!ity$

• Applied to administrati!e rulings ? circulars

ASC+ roadcasting v. CTA

• @eld a circular or ruling of the &IR cannot be gi!enretroacti!e effect ad!ersely to a tapayer$

Sanc*e' v. COMELEC

• @eld the holding of recall proceedings had no retroacti!e

application

"om%a#de' v. CSC

• @eld &%& )emorandum &ircular 5o$ :+ cannot be gi!enretrospecti!e effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment

an employee whose temporary appointment had epired before the &ircular was issued$

• Applied to 2udicial decisions for e!en though not laws, aree!idence of what the laws mean and is the basis of Art$; ofthe &i!il &ode wherein laws of the &onstitution shall form

part of the legal system of the Philippines$

Presumption against retroacti!ity

• Presumption is that all laws operate prospecti!ely, unless thecontrary clearly appears or is clearly, plainly and

une.ui!ocally epressed or necessarily implied$

• In case of doubt resol!ed against the retroacti!e operation oflaws

• If statute is susceptible of construction other than that of

retroacti!ity or will render it unconstitutional3 the statute will be gi!en prospecti!e effect and operation$

• Presumption is strong against substanti!e laws affecting pending actions or proceedings$ 5o substanti!e statute shall be so construed retroacti!ely as to affect pending litigations$

Gords or phrases indicating prospecti!ity

• Indicating prospecti!e operation

o A statute is to apply BhereafterC or BthereafterC

o Bfrom and after the passing of this ActC

o Bshall ha!e been madeC

o Bfrom and afterC a designated date

• B%hallC implies that the law ma1es intend the enactment to

be effecti!e only in f%t%re.

• %tatutes ha!e no retroacti!e but prospecti!e effecto BIt shall ta1e effect upon its appro!alC

o %hall ta1e effect on the date the President shall

ha!e issued a proclamation or E$O$, as pro!ided inthe statute

Retroacti!e statutes, generally

• 4he &onstitution does not prohibit the enactment of

retroacti!e statutes which do not impair the obligation ofcontract, depri!e persons of property without due process oflaw, or di!est rights which ha!e become !ested, or which are

not in the nature of e) post facto laws$

• %tatutes by nature which are retroacti!eo Remedial or curati!e statutes

o %tatutes which create new rights

o %tatute epressly pro!ides that it shall apply

retroacti!ely

o Ghere it uses words which clearly indicate it

intent

• Problem in construction is when it is applied retroacti!ely, toa!oid frontal clash with the &onstitution and sa!e the law

from being declared unconstitutional$

STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT

Penal statutes, generally

• Penal laws operate prospecti!ely$

• Art$ :* of the RP& pro!ides that Bno felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to itcommission$

• Pro!ision is recognition to the uni!ersally accepted principlethat no penal law can ha!e a retroacti!e effect, no act or

omission shall be held to be a crime, nor its author punishedecept by !irtue of a law in force at the time the act was

committed$

• +%##%m crimen sine poena n%##a poena sine #egis & there i

no crime without a penalty, there is no penalty without a law

E) post facto law

• &onstitution pro!ides that no e) post facto law shall be

enacted$ It also prohibits the retroacti!e application of penalaws which are in the nature of e) post facto laws$

• E) post facto laws are any of the following

o Law ma1es criminal an act done before the passage

of the law and which was innocent when done, and

punishes such acto Law which aggra!ates a crime, ma1es it greater

than it was, when committed

o Law which changes the punishment ? inflicts a

greater punishment than that anneed to the crimewhen committed

o Law which alters the legal rules of e!idence

authories con!iction upon less or differentestimony than the law re.uired at the time of thecommission of the offense

o Law which assumes to regulate ci!il rights and

remedies only, but in effect imposes penalty or

depri!ation of a right for something which whendone was lawful

o Law which depri!es a person accused of a crime o

some lawful protection to which he has becomeentitled, such as protection of a former con!iction

or ac.uittal, or proclamation of amnesty$

• 4est if e) post facto clause is !iolated Does the law sough

to be applied retroacti!ely ta1e from an accused any right!ital for protection of life and liberty

• %cope applies only to criminal or penal matters• It does 5O4 apply to laws concerning ci!il proceeding

generally, or which affect or regulate ci!il or pri!ate rights or political pri!ilege

A#via v. Sandiganbayan

• Law as of the date of the effecti!ity of this decree, any case

cogniable by the Sandiganbayan is not an e) post facto law because it is not a penal statute nor dilutes the right of appeaof the accused$

'ill of attainder



• &onstitution pro!ides that no bill of attainder shall beenacted$

• 'ill of attainder 0 legislati!e act which inflicts punishmentwithout 2udicial trial

• Essence substitution of a legislati!e for a 2udicialdetermination of guilt

• %er!es to implement the principle of separation of powers by

confining the legislature to rule3ma1ing ? therebyforestalling legislati!e usurpation of 2udicial functions$

• @istory 'ill of Attainder was employed to suppress

unpopular causes ? political minorities, and this is the e!ilsought to be suppressed by the &onstitution$

• @ow to spot a 'ill of Attainder

o %ingling out of a definite minority

o Imposition of a burden on it

o A legislati!e intent

o retroacti!e application to past conduct suffice to

stigmatie

• 'ill of Attainder is ob2ectionable because of its e) post facto

features$

• Accordingly, if a statute is a 'ill of Attainder, it is also an e)

post facto law$

Ghen penal laws applied retroacti!ely

• Penal laws cannot be gi!en retroacti!e effect, ecept whenthey are fa!orable to the accused$

• Art$:: of RP& Bpenal laws shall ha!e a retroacti!e effectinsofar as they fa!or the person guilty of a felony, who is nota habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 7 Art 8:

of the &ode , although at the time of the application of suchlaws a final sentence has been pronounced and the con!ict isser!ing the same$

• 4his is not an e) post facto law$

• Eception to the general rule that all laws operate

prospecti!ely$

• Rule is founded on the principle that the right of the state to punish and impose penalty is based on the principles of

2ustice$

• Favorabi#ia s%nt amp#ianda adiiosa restrigenda &

&onscience and good law 2ustify this eception$

• Eception was inspired by sentiments of humanity andaccepted by science$

• : laws affecting the liability of accused

o In force at the time of the commission of the crime

0 during the pendency of the criminal action, astatute is passed

reducing the degree of penalty

eliminating the offense itself

remo!ing subsidiary imprisonment in

case of insol!ency to pay the ci!illiability

prescription of the offense

• such statute will be appliedretroacti!ely and the trial court

before the finality of 2udgment

or the appellate court on appealfrom such 2udgment shouldta1e such statute inconsideration$

o Enacted during or after the trial of the criminal

action

Director v. Director of Prisons

• Ghen there is already a final 2udgment ? accused is ser!ing

sentence, remedy is to file petition of *abeas corp%s

alleging that his continued imprisonment is illegal pursuantto said statute ? praying that he be forthwith released$

• Eceptions to the ruleo Ghen accused is habitual delin.uent

o Ghen statute pro!ides that it shall not apply to

eisting actions or pending caseso Ghere accused disregards the later law ? in!o1es

the prior statute under which he was prosecuted$

• Keneral rule An amendatory statute rendering an illegal ac

prior to its enactment no longer illegal is gi!en retroacti!eeffect does not apply when amendatory act specifically pro!ides that it shall only apply prospecti!ely$

%tatutes substanti!e in nature

• %ubstanti!e lawo creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life

liberty or property, or the powers of agencies or

instrumentalities for administration of publiaffairs$

o that part of law which creates, defines ? regulates

rights, or which regulates rights or duties whichgi!e rise to a cause of action

o that part of law which courts are established to

administer o when applied to criminal law that which declares

which acts are crimes and prescribe the

punishment for committing themo &annot be construed retroacti!ely as it might affec

pre!ious or past rights or obligations

• %ubstanti!e rights

o One which includes those rights which one en2oys

under the legal system prior to the disturbance ofnormal relations$

• &ases with substanti!e statutes

To#entino v. A'a#te

• In the absence of a contrary intent, statutes which lays down

certain re.uirements to be complied with be fore a case can

be brought to court$

Espirit% v. Cipriano

• /reees the amount of monthly rentals for residential housesduring a fied period

Spo%ses Tirona v. A#e-o

• Law &omprehensi!e Land Reform Law grantingcomplainants tenancy rights to fishponds and pursuant to

which they filed actions to assert rights which subse.uentlyamended to eempt fishponds from co!erage of statute

• @eld Amendatory law is substanti!e in nature as it eempt

fishponds from its co!erage$

• 4est for procedural laws

o if rule really regulates procedure, the 2udicia

process for enforcing rights and duties recognied by substanti!e law ? for 2ustly administeringremedy and redress for a disregard or infraction othem

o If it operates as a means of implementing an

eisting right

• 4est for substanti!e lawso If it ta1es away a !ested right

o If rule creates a right such as right to appeal

Fabian v. Desierto



• Ghere to prosecute an appeal or transferring the !enue ofappeal is procedural

• Eampleo Decreeing that appeals from decisions of the

Ombudsman in administrati!e actions be made tothe &ourt of Appeals

o Re.uiring that appeals from decisions of the

5LR& be filed with the &ourt of Appeals

• Kenerally, procedural rules are retroacti!e and are applicableto actions pending and undermined at the time of the passage

of the procedural law, while substanti!e laws are prospecti!e

Effects on pending actions

• %tatutes affecting substanti!e rights may not be gi!enretroacti!e operation so as to go!ern pending proceedings$

/b%ran v. Labes

• Ghere court originally obtains and eercises 2urisdiction, alater statute restricting such 2urisdiction or transferring it toanother tribunal will not affect pending action, unless statute

pro!ides ? unless prohibitory words are used$

Lagardo v. Masagana

• Ghere court has no 2urisdiction o!er a certain case but

ne!ertheless decides it, from which appeal is ta1en, a statuteenacted during the pendency of the appeal !esting

2urisdiction upon such trial court o!er the sub2ect matter orsuch case may not be gi!en retroacti!e effect so as to!alidate the 2udgment of the court a $%o, in the absence of asa!ing clause$

"ep%b#ic v. Prieto

• Ghere a complaint pending in court is defecti!e because it

did not allege sufficient action, it may not be !alidated by asubse.uent law which affects substanti!e rights and not

merely procedural matters$

• Rule against the retroacti!e operation of statutes in general

applies more strongly with respect to substanti!e laws that

affect pending actions or proceedings$


• A substanti!e law will be construed as applicable to pendingactions if such is the clear intent of the law$

• 4o promote social 2ustice or in the eercise of police power,is intended to apply to pending actions

• As a rule, a case must be decided in the light of the law as it

eists at the time of the decision of the appellate court, wherethe statute changing the law is intended to be retroacti!e andto apply to pending litigations or is retroacti!e in effect

• 4his rule is true though it may result in the re!ersal of a 2udgment which as correct at the time it was rendered by the

trial court$ 4he rule is sub2ect to the limitation concerningconstitutional restrictions against impairment of !ested rights

%tatutes affecting !ested rights

• A !ested right or interest may be said to mean some right or

interest in property that has become fied or established andis no longer open to doubt or contro!ersy

• Rights are !ested when the right to en2oyment, present or prospecti!e, has become the property of some particular person or persons, as a present interest

• 4he right must be absolute, complete and unconditional,independent of a contingency

• A mere epectancy of future benefit or a contingent interestin property founded on anticipated continuance of eistinglaws does not constitute a !ested right

• Inchoate rights which ha!e not been acted on are not !ested

• A statute may not be construed and applied retroacti!ely

under the following circumstanceso if it impairs substanti!e right that has become

!estedHo as disturbing or destroying eisting right embodied

in a 2udgmentHo

creating new substanti!e right to fundamentacause of action where none eisted before andma1ing such right retroacti!eH

o by arbitrarily creating a new right or liability

already etinguished by operation of law

• Law creating a new right in fa!or of a class of persons maynot be so applied if the new right collides with or impairsany !ested right ac.uired before the establishment of the new

right nor, by the terms of which is retroacti!e, be so appliedif

o it ad!ersely affects !ested rights

o unsettles matter already done as re.uired by

eisting lawo wor1s in2ustice to those affected thereby

eng%et Conso#idated Mining Co v. Pineda• Ghile a person has no !ested right in any rule of law

entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit, nor has he a !ested right in the continued eistenceof a statute which precludes its change or repeal, nor in any

omission to legislate on a particular matter, a subse.uenstatute cannot be so applied retroacti!ely as to impair hisright that accrued under the old law$

• %tatutes must be so construed as to sustain itconstitutionality, and prospecti!e operation will be presumed

where a retroacti!e application will produce in!alidity$

Peo v. Pata#in• 4he abolition of the death penalty and its subse.uent re3

imposition$ 4hose accused of crimes prior to the re

imposition of the death penalty ha!e ac.uired !ested rightsunder the law abolishing it$

• &ourts ha!e thus gi!en statutes strict constriction to pre!en

their retroacti!e operation in order that the statutes would notimpair or interfere with !ested or eisting rights$ Accused3appellant Ts rights to be benefited by the abolition of thedeath penalty accrued or attached by !irtue of Article :: of

the Re!ised Penal &ode$ 4his benefit cannot be ta1en awayfrom them$

%tatutes affecting obligations of contract

• Any contract entered into must be in accordance with, and

not repugnant to, the applicable law at the time of eecution%uch law forms part of, and is read into, the contract e!en

without the parties epressly saying so$

• Laws eisting at the time of the eecution of contracts arethe ones applicable to such transactions and not later statutes

unless the latter pro!ide that they shall ha!e retroacti!effect$

• Later statutes will not, howe!er, be gi!en retroacti!e effect ito do so will impair the obligation of contracts, for the&onstitution prohibits the enactment of a law impairing the

obligations of contracts$

• Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changesthe intention of the parties necessarily impairs the contrac

itself



• A statute which authories any de!iation from the terms ofthe contract by postponing or accelerating the period of

performance which it prescribes, imposing conditions notepressed in the contract, or dispensing with those which arehowe!er minute or apparently immaterial in their effect uponthe contract, impairs the obligation, and such statute should

not therefore be applied retroacti!ely$

• As between two feasible interpretations of a statute, the courtshould adopt that which will a!oid the impairment of the

contract$

• If the contract is legal at it inception, it cannot be renderedillegal by a subse.uent legislation$

• A law by the terms of which a transaction or agreement

would be illegal cannot be gi!en retroacti!e effect so as tonullify such transactions or agreement eecuted before said

law too1 effect$

1.S. Tobacco Corp. v. Lina

• 4he importation of certain goods without import licensewhich was legal under the law eisting at the time of

shipment is not rendered illegal by the fact that when thegoods arri!ed there was already another law prohibitingimportation without import license$ 4o rule otherwise in anyof these instances is to impair the obligations of contract$


Peop#e v. 5eta

• Eisting law authoriing a lawyer to charge not more than7N of the amount in!ol!ed as attorneys fees in the

prosecution of certain !eterans claim$

• /acts A lawyer entered into a contract for professionalser!ices on contingent basis and actually rendered ser!ice toits successful conclusion$ 'efore the claim was collected, astatute was enacted$

• 5ew statute Prohibiting the collection of attorneys fees forser!ices rendered in prosecuting !eterans claims$

• Issue /or collecting his fees pursuant to the contract for professional ser!ices, the lawyer was prosecuted for!iolation of the statute$

• @eld In eonerating the lawyer, the court said the statute prohibiting the collection of attorneys fees cannot be appliedretroacti!ely so as to ad!ersely affect the contract for

professional ser!ices and the fees themsel!es$

• 4he 7N fee was contingent and did not become absolute andunconditional until the !eterans claim had been collected bythe claimant when the statute was already in force did no

alter the situation$

• /or the Bdistinction between !ested and absolute rights is not

helpful and a better !iew to handle the problem is to declarethose statutes attempting to affect rights which the courtsfind to be unalterable, in!alid as arbitrary and unreasonable,

thus lac1ing in due process$C

• 4he 7N fee allowed by the old law is Bnot unreasonable$%er!ices were rendered thereunder to claimants benefits$

4he right to fees accrued upon such rendition$ Only the payment of the fee was contingent upon the appro!al of theclaimH therefore, the right was contingent$ /or a right toaccrue is one thingH enforcement thereof by actual payment

is another$ 4he subse.uent law enacted after the rendition ofthe ser!ices should not as a matter of simple 2ustice affect theagreement, which was entered into !oluntarily by the partiesas epressly directed in the pre!ious law$ 4o apply the new

law to the case of defendant3appellant s as to depri!e him ofthe agreed fee would be arbitrary and unreasonable asdestructi!e of the in!iolability of contracts, and therefore

in!alid as lac1ing in due processH to penalie him focollecting such fees, repugnant to our sense of 2ustice$C

Repealing and amendatory acts

• %tatutes which repeal earlier or prior laws operate prospecti!ely, unless the legislati!e intent to gi!e themretroacti!e effect clearly appears$

• Although a repealing state is intended to be retroacti!e, it

will not be so construed if it will impair !ested rights or theobligations of contracts, or unsettle matters that had been

legally done under the old law$

• Repealing statutes which are penal in nature are generallyapplied retroacti!ely if fa!orable to the accused, unless the

contrary appears or the accused is otherwise not entitled tothe benefits of the repealing act$

• Ghile an amendment is generally construed as becoming a part of the original act as if it had always been containedtherein , it may not be gi!en a retroacti!e effect unless it i

so pro!ided epressly or by necessary implication and no!ested right or obligations of contract are thereby impaired$

• 4he general rule on the prospecti!e operation of statutes also

applies to amendatory acts

San 6ose v. "e*abi#itation Finance Corp

• RA 96* which condoned the interest on pre3war debts from

#anuary *, *+9: to December -*, *+97 amended by RA 8*on #une *8, *+7* by !irtually reenacting the old law and

pro!iding that 9if t*e debtor *o;ever makes vo#%ntary payment of t*e entire pre;ar %npaid principa# ob#igation onor before December I? ?JK t*e interest on s%c* principaob#igation corresponding from 6an%ary ? ?J> to day of

payment are #ike;ise condoned C

• @eld a debtor who paid his pre3war obligation together withthe interests on )arch *9, *+7* or before the amendment

was appro!ed into law, is not entitled to a refund of theinterest paid from #anuary *, *+98 to )arch *9, *+7* the

date the debtor paid the obligation$• Reason

o Bma1es !oluntary paymentC 0 denotes a present o

future actH thereby not retroacti!ely

o Bunpaid principal obligationC and BcondoneC 0

imply that amendment does not co!er refund ointerests paid after its appro!al$

C/" v. La Tondena

• %tatute imposes ta on certain business acti!ities is amended

by eliminating the clause pro!iding a ta on some of suchacti!ities, and the amended act is further amended, after thelapse of length of time, by restoring the clause pre!iouslyeliminated, which re.uires that the last amendment should

not be gi!en retroacti!e effect so as to co!er the whole

period$

/mperia# v. C/"

• An amendment which imposes a ta on a certain business

which the statute prior to its amendment does not ta, maynot be applied retroacti!ely so as to re.uire payment of theta on such business for the period prior to the amendment

%yco v. P*i#ippine +ationa# ank

• Issue can 'uyco compel the P5' to accept his bac1paycertificate in payment of his indebtedness to the ban1

• April :9, *+783 RA ;+ ga!e 'uyco the right to ha!e saidcertificate applied in payment of is obligation thus at thatime he offered to pay with his bac1pay certificate$



• #une *8, *+78, RA *78 was enacted amending the charterof the P5' and pro!ided that the ban1 shall ha!e no

authority to accept bac1pay certificate in payment ofindebtedness to the ban1$

• @eld 4he &ourt fa!ored 'uyco$ All statutes are construed as

ha!ing prospecti!e operation, unless the purpose of thelegislature is to gi!e them retroacti!e effect$

• 4his principle also applies to amendments$ RA *78 does

not contain any pro!ision regarding its retroacti!e effect$ Itsimply states its effecti!ity upon appro!al$ 4he amendmenttherefore, has no retroacti!e effect, and the present caseshould be go!erned by the law at the time the offer in

.uestion was made

• 4he rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the originalact continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had

accrued prior to such amendment$

/ns%#ar ,overnment v. Frank

• Ghere a contract is entered into by the parties on the basis ofthe law then pre!ailing, the amendment of said law will not

affect the terms of said contract$

• 4he rule applies e!en if one of the contracting parties is thego!ernment

STATUTES GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT

Procedural laws

• 4he general law is that the law has no retroacti!e effect$

• Eceptions

o procedural laws

o curati!e laws, which are gi!en retroacti!e

operation

• Procedural lawso ad2ecti!e laws which prescribe rules and forms of

procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redressfor their in!asion

o they refer to rules of procedure by which courts

applying laws of all 1inds can properly administer

in2ustice

o they include rules of pleadings, practice ande!idence

o Applied to criminal law, they pro!ide or regulate

the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished$

o Remedial statutes or statutes relating to modes of

procedure3 which do not create new or ta1e away!ested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the

remedy or confirmation of the rights alreadyeisting, do not come within the legal conceptionof a retroacti!e law, or the general rule against theretroacti!e operation of statutes$

o A new statute which deals with procedure only is

presumpti!ely applicable to all actions 0 thosewhich ha!e accrued or are pending$

o %tatutes regulating the procedure of the courts will

be construed as applicable to actions pending andundetermined at the time of their passage$

• 4he retroacti!e application of procedural laws is noto !iolati!e of any right of a person who may feel that

he is ad!ersely affectedHo nor constitutionally ob2ectionable$

• "ationa#e no !ested right may attach to, nor arise from,

procedural laws$

• A person has no !ested right in any particular remedy, and alitigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his

case, whether ci!il or criminal, of any other than the eistingrules of procedure

A#day v. Cami##on

• Pro!ision 'P *:+3 Bnor record or appeal shall be re.uired tota1e an appeal$C (procedural in nature and should be appliedretroacti!ely"

• Issue Ghether an appeal from an ad!erse 2udgment should be dismissed for failure of appellant to file a record onappeal within -6 days as re.uired under the old rules$

• %uch .uestion is pending resolution at the time the 'P 'lgtoo1 effect, became academic upon effecti!ity of said law

because the law no longer re.uires the filing a of a record onappeal and its retroacti!e application remo!ed the lega

obstacle to gi!ing due course to the appeal$

Castro v. Saga#es

• A statute which transfers the 2urisdiction to try certain casesfrom a court to a .uasi32udicial tribunal is a remedial statute

that is applicable to claims that accrued before its enactmen but formulated and filed after it too1 effect$

• @eld 4he court that has 2urisdiction o!er a claim at the time

it accrued cannot !alidly try to claim where at the time theclaim is formulated and filed, the 2urisdiction to try it has

been transferred by law to a .uasi32udicial tribunal$

• "ationa#e for e!en actions pending in one court may be

!alidly be ta1en away and transferred to another and no

litigant can ac.uire a !ested right to be heard by one particular court$

• An administrati!e rule which is interpretati!e of a pre

eisting statue and not declarati!e of certain rights withobligations thereunder is gi!en retroacti!e effect as of thedate of the effecti!ity of the statute$

At#as Conso#idated Mining 3 Deve#opment Corp. v. CA

• Issue whether a trial court has been di!ested of 2urisdiction

to hear and decide a pending case in!ol!ing a miningcontro!ersy upon the promulgation of PD *:;* which !estupon the 'ureau of )ines Original and eclusi!e 2urisdictionto hear and decide mining contro!ersies$

• @eld Mes$ PD *:;* is a remedial statute$• It does not create new rights nor ta1e away rights that are

already !ested$ It only operates in furtherance of a remedy oconfirmation of rights already in eistence$

• It does not come within the legal pur!iew of a prospecti!elaw$ As such, it can be gi!en retrospecti!e application ofstatutes$

• 'eing procedural in nature, it shall apply to all action pending at the time of its enactment ecept only with respecto those cases which had already attained h character of a

final and eecutor 2udgment$

• Gere it not so, the purpose of the Decree, which is tofacilitate the immediate resolution of mining contro!ersie

by granting 2urisdiction to a body or agency more adept to

the technical compleities of mining operations, would bethwarted and rendered meaningless$

• Litigants in a mining contro!ersy cannot be permitted tochoose a forum of con!enience$

• #urisdiction is imposed by law and not by any of the parties

to such proceedings$

• /urthermore, PD *:;* is a special law and under a well3accepted principle in stat con, the special law will pre!ai

o!er a stature or law of general application$

S%bido 6r. v. Sandiganbayan

• &ourt ruled that RA +7, in further amending PD *868 as

regards the %andiganbayans 2urisdiction, mode of appealand other procedural matters, is clearly a procedural law, i.e



one which prescribes rules and forms of procedure enforcingrights or obtaining redress for their in!asion, or those whichrefer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of

all 1inds can properly administer 2ustice$

• 4he petitioners suggest that it is li1ewise curati!e orremedial statute, which cures defects and adds to the means

of enforcing eisting obligations$

• As a procedural and curati!e statute, RA +7 may !alidly be gi!en retroacti!e effect, there being no impairment of

contractual or !ested rights$

Martine' v. Peop#e

• %tatutes regulating the procedure of the courts will beconstrued as applicable to actions pending and undermined at

the time of their passage$

• Ghere at the time the action was filed, the Rules of &ourt Ba petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be

entertained by the appellate courtC

• 4he subse.uent amendment thereto deleting the sentenceimplies that the appellate court is no longer prohibited from

entertaining petitions to appear as pauper litigants, and maygrant the petition then pending action, so long as itsre.uirements are complied with$

Eceptions to the rule

• 4he rule does not apply whereo the statute itself epressly or by necessary

implication pro!ides that pending actions are

ecepted from it operation, or where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair !ested rights

o &ourts may deny the retroacti!e application of

procedural laws in the e!ent that to do so wouldnot be feasible or would wor1 in2ustice$

o 5or may procedural laws be applied retroacti!ely

to pending actions if to do so would in!ol!eintricate problems of due process or impair the

independence of the courts$

Tayag v. CA

• Issue whether an action for recognition filed by anillegitimate minor after the death of his alleged parent when

Art :;7 of the &i!il &ode was still in effect and hasremained pending Art *7 of the /amily &ode too1 effect

can still be prosecuted considering that Art *7, which isclaimed to be procedural in nature and retroacti!e in

application, does not allow filing of the action after the deathof the alleged parent$

• @eld 4he rule that a statutory change in matters of

procedure may affect pending actions and proceedings,unless the language of the act ecludes them from itsoperation, is not so per!asi!e that it may be used to !alidateor in!alidate proceedings ta1en before it goes into effect,

since procedure must be go!erned by the law regulating it atthe time the .uestion of procedure arises especially where

!ested rights maybe pre2udiced$• Accordingly, Art *7 of the /amily &ode finds no proper

application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affectad!ersely a right of pri!ate respondent and, conse.uentially,of the minor child she represents, both of which ha!e been

!ested with the filing of the complaint in court$ 4he trialcourt is, therefore, correct in applying the pro!isions of Art

:;7 of the &i!il &ode and in holding that pri!aterespondents cause of action has not yet prescribed$C

&urati!e statutes

• curati!e remedial statutes are healing acts

• they are remedial by curing defects and adding to the means

of enforcing eisting obligations

• the rule to curati!e statutes is that if the thing omitted orfailed to be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to

be remo!ed or made harmless, is something which thelegislature might ha!e dispensed with by a pre!ious statuteit may do so by a subse.uent one

• curati!e statutes are intended to supply defects, abridgesuperfluities in eisting laws, and curb certain e!ils$ 4heyare designed and intended, but has failed of epected legaconse.uence by reason of some statutory disability o

irregularity in their own action$ 4hey ma1e !alid that which before the enactment of the statute, was in!alid$

• 4heir purpose is to gi!e !alidity to acts done that would ha!e

been in!alid under eisting laws, as if eisting laws ha!e been complied with

Friva#do v. COMELEC

• (rested the definition of curati!e statutes"

• 4olentinoo those which underta1e to cure errors?

irregularities, thereby !alidating 2udicial 2udicial o

administrati!e proceedings, acts of public officersor pri!ate deeds or contracts which otherwis

would not produce their intended conse.uences byreason of some statutory disability or failure to

comply with some technical re.uirement

• Agpalo

o curati!e statutes are healing acts curing defects and

adding to the means of enforcing eistingobligations

o and are intended to supply defects abridge

superfluities in eisting laws? curb certain e!ilso by their !ery nature, curati!e statutes are

retroacti!e and reach bac1 to the past e!ents tocorrect errors or irregularities ? to render !alid ?effecti!e attempted acts which would be otherwise

ineffecti!e for the purpose the parties intended

• &urati!e statutes are forms of retroacti!e legislations which

reach bac1 on past e!ents to correct errors or irregularities ?to render !alid ? effecti!e attempted acts which would beotherwise ineffecti!e for the purpose the parties intended$

Erectors /nc. v. +L"C (hahhha for the petitioner"

• %tatute EO ***, amended Art :* of the Labor &ode towiden the wor1ers, access to the go!ernment for redress ogrie!ances by gi!ing the Regional Directors ? the LaborArbiters concurrent 2urisdiction o!er cases in!ol!ing money

claims

• Issue Amendment created a situation where the 2urisdictionof the RDs and LAs o!erlapped$

• Remedy RA 8*7further amended Art :* by delineating

their respecti!e 2urisdictions$ Fnder RA 8*7, the RD haeclusi!e 2urisdiction o!er cases in!ol!ing claims, pro!ided

o the claim is presented by an employer or person

employed in domestic or household ser!ices ohousehold help under the &ode$

o the claimant no longer being employed does not

see1 reinstatemento the aggregate money claim of the employee o

househelper doesnt eceed P7,666$

All other cases are within the eclusi!e 2urisdiction of theLabor Arbiter$

• @eld EO *** ? RA 8*7 are therefore curati!e statutes$

• A curati!e statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law orto !alidate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of publicauthorities which would otherwise be !oid for want o

conformity with certain eisting legal re.uirements



Adong v. C*eong Seng ,ee

• %tatutes intended to !alidate what otherwise !oid or in!alid

marriages, being curati!e, will be gi!en retroacti!e effect$

Santos v. D%ata

• %tatute which pro!ides that a contract shall presumed ane.uitable mortgage in any of the cases therein enumerated,and designed primarily to curtail e!ils brought about bycontracts of sale with right of repurchase, is remedial in

nature ? will be applied retroacti!ely to cases arising prior tothe effecti!ity of the statute$

•

Abad v. P*i# American ,enera# /nc.

• Ghere at the time action is filed in court the latter has no 2urisdiction o!er the sub2ect matter but a subse.uent statuteclothes it with 2urisdiction before the matter is decided$

• 4he statute is in the nature of a curati!e law with retroacti!eoperation to pending proceedings and cures the defect of lac1of 2urisdiction of the court at the commencement of theaction$

Legarda v. Masaganda

• Ghere a curati!e statute is enacted after the court has

rendered 2udgment, which 2udgment is naturally !oid as thecourt has at the time no 2urisdiction o!er the sub2ect of theaction, the enactment of the statute conferring 2urisdiction to

the court does not !alidate the !oid 2udgment for thelegislature has no power to ma1e a 2udgment rendered

without 2urisdiction of a !alid 2udgment$

Friva#do v. COMELEC

• (an eample considered curati!e ? remedial as well as onewhich creates new rights ? new remedies, generally held toe retroacti!e in nature3 PD :7, which liberalies the

procedure of repatriation"

• @eld PD :7 ? the re3ac.uisition of the /ilipino citienship by administrati!e repatriation pursuant to said decree isretroacti!e$

De Castro v. Tan

• @eld what has been gi!en retroacti!e effect in Friva#do is

not only the law itself but also Phil$ &itienship re3ac.uired pursuant to said law to the date of application forrepatriation, which meant that his lac1 of /ilipino citienship

at the time he registered as a !oter, one of the .ualification isas a go!ernor, or at the time he filed his certificate ofcandidacy for go!ernorship, one of the .ualification is as ago!ernor, was cured by the retroacti!e application of his

repatriation$

"ep%b#ic v. Atencio

• &urati!e statute one which confirms, refines and !alidate the

sale or transfer of a public land awarded to a grantee, whicha prior law prohibits its sale within a certain period ?otherwise in!alid transaction under the old law$

M%nicipa#ity of San +arciso H%e'on v. Mende'

• %tatute %ec$ 99:(d" of the Local Ko!ernment &ode of *++*, pro!ides that municipal districts organied pursuant to presidential issuances or eecuti!e orders ? which ha!e their

respecti!e sets of electi!e municipal officials holding at thetime of the effecti!ity of the code shall henceforth beconsidered as a regular municipalities

• 4his is a curati!e statute as it !alidates the creation ofmunicipalities by EO which had been held to be an in!alidusurpation of legislati!e power$

Tatad v. ,arcia 6r.

• Issue Ghere there is doubt as to whether go!ernmenagency under the then eisting law, has the authority to enteintoa negotiated contract for the construction of ago!ernment pro2ect under the build3lease3and transfe

scheme

• @eld 4he subse.uent enactment of a statute whichrecognies direct negotiation of contracts under such

arrangement is a curati!e statute$

• As all doubts and procedural lapses that might ha!e attendedthe negotiated contract ha!e been cured by the subse.uen

statute

Limitations of rule

• remedial statutes will not be gi!en retroacti!e effect if to doso would impair the obligations of contract or disturb !ested

rights

• only administrati!e or curati!e features of the statute as wilnot ad!ersely affect eisting rights will be gi!en retroacti!e

operation

• the eception to the foregoing limitations of the rule is aremedial or curati!e statute which is enacted as a police

power measure

• %tatutes of this type may be gi!en retroacti!e effect e!en

though they impair !ested rights or the obligations ocontract, if the legislati!e intent is to gi!e them retrospecti!eoperation

• "ationa#e 4he constitutional restriction against impairmen

against obligations of contract or !ested rights does no preclude the legislature from enacting statutes in the eerciseof its police power

Police power legislations

• as a rule, statutes which are enacted in the eercise of police

power to regulate certain acti!ities, are applicable not only tothose acti!ities or transactions coming into being after their

passage, but also to those already in eistence

• "ationa#e the non3impairment of the obligations of contrac

or of !ested rights must yield to the legitimate eercise of power, by the legislature, to prescribe regulations to promote

the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety andgeneral welfare of the people

• Any right ac.uired under a statute or under a contract issub2ect to the condition that it may be impaired by the statein the legitimate eercise of its police power, since the

reser!ation of the essential attributes of so!ereign power isdeemed read into e!ery statute or contract as a postulate ofthe legal order

%tatutes relating to prescription

• Keneral rule a statute relating to prescription of action being procedural in nature, applies to all actions filed after it

effecti!ity$ In other words, such a statute is botho prospecti!e in the sense that it applies to cause

that accrued and will accrue after it too1 effect, ando retroacti!e in the sense that it applies to causes tha

accrued before its passage

• @owe!er, a statute of limitations will not be gi!enretroacti!e operation to causes of action that accrued prior to

its enactment if to do so will remo!e a bar of limitationwhich has become complete or disturb eisting claim

without allowing a reasonable time to bring actions thereon

+agrampa v. +agrampa

• %tatute Art$ ***8 of the &i!il &ode Bprescription alreadyrunning before the effecti!ity of this &ode shall be go!erned



by laws pre!iously in forceH but if since the time this &odetoo1 effect the entire period herein re.uired for prescriptionshould elapse, the present &ode shall be applicable e!en

though by the former laws a longer period might bere.uired$C

• @eld 4he pro!ision is retroacti!e since it applied to a cause

that accrued prior to its effecti!ity which when filed has prescribed under the new &i!il &ode e!en though the periodof prescription prescribed under the old law has not ended atthe time the action is filed in court

• 4he fact that the legislature has indicated that the statute

relating to prescription should be gi!en retroacti!e effect willnot warrant gi!ing it if it will impair !ested rights

• %tatute of limitations prescribing a longer period to file an

action than that specified under the law may not be construedas ha!ing retroacti!e application if it will re!i!e the cause

that already prescribed under the old statute for it will impair!ested rights against whom the cause is asserted$

• %tatute which shorten the period of prescription ? re.uiresthat causes which accrued prior to its effecti!ity be

prosecuted or filed not later than a specific date may not be

construed to apply to eisting causes which pursuant to theold law under which they accrued, will not prescribe until amuch longer period than that specified in the later enactment

because the right to bring an action is founded on law which

has become !ested before the passage of the new statute oflimitations

Apparently conflicting decisions on prescription

i##ones v. C/"

• Issue whether %ec$ A of &ommon wealth Act *99,

amended by RA *++-, to the effect that Bany action toenforce an cause (i.e. non payment of ;ages or overtimecompensation under this Act shall be commenced within -

years after such cause of action accrued, otherwise it shall before!er barred$ Provided *o;ever that actions already

commenced before the effecti!e day of this Act shall not beaffected by the period herein prescribed$

•

As statute shortened the period of prescription from 8 to -yrs$ from the date the cause of action accrued, it wascontended that to gi!e retroacti!e effect would impair !estedrights since it would operate to preclude the prosecution ofclaims that accrued more than - but less than 8 yrs$

• @eld a statute of limitations is procedural in nature and no!ested right can attach thereto or arise therefrom$

• Ghen the legislature pro!ided that Bactions alreadycommenced before the effecti!ity of this Act shall not beaffected by the period herein prescribed,C it intended to applythe statute to all eisting actions filed after the effecti!ity of

the law$

• 'ecause the statute shortened the period within which to bring an action ? in order to !iolate the constitutional

mandate, claimants are in2uriously affected should ha!e a

reasonable period of * yr$ from time new statute too1 effectwithin which to sue on such claims$

Cora#es v. Emp#oyees Compensation Commission

• %ame issue on 'illones but &ourt arri!ed at a differentconclusion$

• Issue Ghether a claim for wor1mens compensation which

accrued under the old Gor1mens &ompensation Act (G&A" but filed under after )arch -*, *+7 is barred by the pro!ision of the 5ew Labor &ode which repealed the G&A$

• G&A re.uires that Bwor1mens compensation claimsaccruing prior to the effecti!ity of this &ode shall be filedwith the appropriate regional offices of the Department of

Labor not later than )arch -*, *+7, otherwise shall be barred fore!er$C

• @eld Pro!ision doesnt apply to wor1mens compensationthat accrued before Labor &ode too1 effect, e!en if claimswere not filed not later than )arch -*, *+7$

• "ationa#e prescripti!e period for claims which accrued

under G&A as amended *6 yrs$ which is Ba right found onstatuteC ? hence a !ested right, that cannot be impaired by

the retroacti!e application of the Labor &ode$

&omparison of 'illones and &orales

'illones

Ghile &ourt said that such right

to bring an action accrued underthe old law is not !ested right, itdid not say that the right is one

protected by the due process

clause of the &onstitution$

/or 'O4@ cases In sol!ing howto safeguard the right to bring

action whose prescripti!e period

to institute it has been shortened by lawKa!e the claimants whose rights

ha!e been affected, one yearfrom the date the law too1 effect

within which to sue their claims$

&orales

&ourt considered the right to

prosecute the action that accruedunder the old law as one foundedon law ? a !ested right$

&ourt construed the statute oflimitations as inapplicable to the

action that accrued before the

law too1 effect$(It is generally held that the courthas no power to read into the law

something which the law itselfdid not pro!ide epressly or

impliedly$ Cora#es case seems to be on firmer grounds$

Prescription in criminal and ci!il cases

• Keneral rule laws on prescription of actions apply as well tocrimes committed before the enactment as afterwards$ 4here

is, howe!er, a distinction between a statute of limitations incriminal actions and that of limitations in ci!il suits, aregards their construction$

• In &I>IL %FI43 statute is enacted by the legislature as animpartial arbiter, between two contending parties$ In theconstruction of such statute, there is no intendment to bemade in fa!or of either party$ 5either grants right to the

otherH there is therefore no grantor against whom no ordinary presumptions of construction are to be made$

• &RI)I5AL &A%E% the state is the grantor, surrendering by

act of grace its right to prosecute or declare that the offenseis no longer sub2ect of prosecution after the prescripti!e

period$ %uch statutes are not only liberally construed but areapplied retroacti!ely if fa!orable to the accused$

%tatutes relating to appeals

• 4he right to appeal from an ad!erse 2udgment, other than thawhich the &onstitution grants, is statutory and may berestricted or ta1en away

• A statute relating to appeals is remedial or procedural innature and applies to pending actions in which no 2udgmenhas yet been promulgated at the time the statute too1 effect$

• %uch statute, li1e other statutes, may not howe!er beconstrued retroacti!ely so as to impair !ested rights$ @encea statute which eliminates the right to appeal and considers

the 2udgment rendered in a case final and unappealabledestroys the right to appeal a decision rendered after thestatute went into effect, but 5O4 the right to prosecute anappeal that has been perfected before the passage of the law

for in the latter case, the right of the appellant to appeal has become !ested under the old law and may not therefore be

impaired$



• %tature shortening the period for ta1ing appeals is to begi!en prospecti!e effect and may not be applies to pending

proceedings in which 2udgment has already been rendered atthe time of its enactment ecept if theres clear legislati!eintent$

er#iner v. "oberts

• Ghere a statute shortened the period for ta1ing appeals formthirty days to fifteen days from notice of 2udgment, an appeal

ta1en within thirty days but beyond fifteen days from noticeof 2udgment promulgated before the statute too1 effect is

deemed seasonably perfected$

CHAPTER TEN: A&en"&ent, Re.!s!on, Co"!%!at!on an" Re#ea'

AMENDMENT

♥ Power to Amend

4he legislature has the authority to amend, sub2ect toconstitutional re.uirements, any eisting law$

Authority to amend is part of the legislati!e power to enact,alter and repeal laws$

4he %& in the eercise of its rule3ma1ing power or of its

power to interpret the law, has no authority to amend orchange the law, such authority being the eclusi!e to the

legislature$

♥ @ow amendment effected

Amendment 0 the change or modification, by deletion,

alteration, of a statute which sur!i!es in its amended form$

4he amendment of a statute is effected by the enactment ofan amendatory act modifying or altering some pro!isions of

a statute either epressly or impliedly$

Epress amendment 0 done by pro!iding in the amendatoryact that specific sections or pro!isions of a statute beamended as recited therein or as common indicated, Bto readas follows$C

♥ Amendment by implication

E!ery statute should be harmonied with other laws on thesame sub2ect, in the absence of a clear inconsistency$

Legislati!e intent to amend a prior law on the same sub2ect is

shown by a statement in the later act that any pro!ision oflaw that is inconsistent therewith is modified accordingly$

Implied Amendment3 when a part of a prior statute

embracing the same sub2ect as the later may not be enforcedwithout nullifying the pertinent pro!ision of the latter inwhich e!ent, the prior act is deemed amended or modified tothe etent of repugnancy$

H%impo v. Mendo'a

Ghere a statute which re.uires that the annual realty ta

on lands or buildings be paid on or before the specifieddate, sub2ect to penalty of a percentage of the whole

amount of ta in case of delayed payment, is amended by authoriing payment of the ta in four e.ualinstallments to become due on or before specified dates$

4he penalty pro!ision of the earlier statute is modified by implication that the penalty for late payment of aninstallment under the later law will be collected andcomputed only on the installment that became due and

unpaid, and not on the whole amount of annual ta as pro!ided in the old statute$

Legislati!e intent to change the basis is clear when the

later law allowed payment in four installments$

Peop#e v. Macatanda

A statute punishing an act which is also a crime undethe RP& pro!ides a penalty as prescribed in the said

&ode, such statute is not a special law but anamendment by implication$

♥ Ghen amendment ta1es effect

*7 days following its publication in the Official Kaette onewspaper of general circulation, unless a date is specified

therein after such publication$

♥

@ow amendment is construed, generally %tatute and amendment 0 read as a whole

Amendment act is ordinarily construed as if the origina

statute has been repealed and a new independent act in theamended form had been adopted$

Amended act is regarded as if the statute has been originallyenacted in it amended form$

Read in a connection with other sections as if all had beenenacted in the same statute$

Ghere an amendment lea!es certain portions of an ac

unchanged, such portions are continued in force, with thesame meaning and effect they ha!e before the amendment$

Ghere an amendatory act pro!ides that an eisting statute

shall be amended to read as recited in the amendatory actsuch portions of the eisting law as are retained eithe

literally or substantially

Estrada v. Caseda

Ghere a statute which pro!ides that it shall be in forcefor a period of four years after its appro!al, the four

years is to be counted from the date the original statutewas appro!ed and not from the date the amendatory act

was amended$

♥ )eaning of law changed by amendment

An amended act should be gi!en a construction differentfrom the law prior to its amendment, for its is presumed thatthe legislature would not ha!e amended it had not it no

wanted to change its meaning$

Prior to the introduction of the amendment, the statute had adifferent meaning which the amendment changed in all the

particulars touching which a material change in the languageof the later act eists$

Deliberate selection of language in the amendatory ac

different from that of the original act indicates that thlegislature intended a change in the law or in its meaning$

2ictorias Mi##ing Co. v. SSS

A statutory definition of term containing a general rule

and an eception thereto is amended by eliminating theeception, the legislati!e intent is clear that the term

should now include the eception within the scope ofthe general rule$

Parras v. Land "egistration Commissions

%ection of a statute re.uiring the eact payment o

publication fees in land registration proceedings, ecepin cases where the !alue of the land does not eceedP76,666 is amended by deleting the ecepting clause, imeans that the statute as amended now re.uire

payment of the publication fees regardless of the !alueof the land in!ol!ed

%uppression of the ecepting clause amount to th

withdrawal of the eemption allowed under the originaact$



♥ Amendment Operates Prospecti!ely

An amendment will not be construed as ha!ing a retroacti!eeffect, unless the contrary is pro!ided or the legislati!e intentto gi!e it a retroacti!e effect is necessarily implied from thelanguage used and only if no !ested right is impaired$

/mperia# v. Co##ector of /nterna# "even%e

A statute amending a ta law is silent as to whether itoperates retroacti!ely, the amendment will not begi!ing retroacti!e effect so as to sub2ect to ta pasttransactions not sub2ect to ta under the original act$

Di% v. Co%rt of Appea#s

%tatutes relating to procedure in courts are applicable to

actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage$

♥ Effect of Amendment on >ested Rights

After a statute is amended, the original act continues to be inforce with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to theamendment or to obligations that were contracted under the

prior act and such rights and obligations will continue to be

go!erned by the law before its amendment$

5ot applied retroacti!ely so as to nullify such rights$

♥ Effect of amendment on 2urisdiction

#urisdiction of a court to try cases is determined by the law

in force at the time the action is instituted$

#urisdiction remains with the court until the case is finallydecided therein$

"i##aro'a v. Arciaga

Absence of a clear legislati!e intent to the contrary, a

subse.uent statute amending a prior act with the effectof di!esting the court of 2urisdiction may not be

construed to operate but to oust 2urisdiction that hasalready attached under the prior law$

/b%raan v. Labes Ghere a court originally obtains and eercises

2urisdiction pursuant to an eisting law, such 2urisdiction will not be o!erturned and impaired by the

subse.uent amendment of the law, unless epress prohibitory words or words of similar import are used$

Applies to .uasi32udicial bodies

Erectors /nc v. +L"C

PD *8+* and *-+* !ested Labor Arbiters with originaland eclusi!e 2urisdiction o!er all cases in!ol!ing

employer3employee relations, including money claimsarising out of any law or contract in!ol!ing /ilipino

wor1ers for o!erseas employment

/acts An o!erseas wor1er filed a money claim againsthis recruiter, and while the case is pending, EO + wasenacted, which !ested POEA with original andeclusi!e 2urisdiction o!er all cases, including money

claims, arising out of law or contract in!ol!ing /ilipinowor1ers for o!erseas employment$

Issue whether the decision of the labor arbiter in fa!or

of the o!erseas wor1er was in!alid

@eld the court sustained the !alidity of the decision andruled that the labor arbiter still had the authority to

decide the cease because EO +b did not di!est thelabor arbiter his authority to hear and decide the casefiled by the o!erseas wor1er prior to its effecti!ity$

#urisdiction o!er the sub2ect matter is determined by thelaw in force at the time of the commencement of the

actionH laws should only be applied prospecti!ely unlesthe legislati!e intent to gi!e them retroacti!e effect iepressly declared or is necessarily implied from thelanguage used$

♥ Effect of nullity of prior or amendatory act

Ghere a statute which has been amended is in!alid, nothingin effect has been amended

4he amendatory act, complete by itself, will be considered asan original or independent act$

,overnment v. Agonci##o

Ghere the amendatory act is declared unconstitutionalit is as if the amendment did not eist, and the origina

statute before the attempted amend remains unaffectedand in force$

REVISION AND CODIFICATION

♥ Kenerally

Purpose to restate the eisting laws into one statute andsimply complicated pro!isions, and ma1e the laws on thesub2ect easily found$

♥ &onstruction to harmonie different pro!isions Presumption author has maintained a consisted philosophy

or position$

4he different pro!isions of a re!ised statute or code should

be read and construed together$

Rule a code enacted as a single, comprehensi!e statute, andis to be considered as such and not as a series of

disconnected articles or pro!isions$

Lic*a%co 3 Co. v. Aposto#

A irreconcilable conflict between parts of a re!isedstatute or a code, that which is best in accord with thegeneral plan or, in the absence of circumstances uponwhich to base a choice, that which is later in physica

position, being the latest epression of legislati!e willwill pre!ail$

♥ Ghat is omitted is deemed repealed

all laws and pro!isions of the old laws that are omitted in there!ised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the

statute or code pro!ides otherwise

Reason re!ision or codification is, by its !ery nature and purpose, intended to be a complete enactment on the sub2ec

and an epression of the whole law thereon, which therebyindicates intent on the part of the legislature to abrogate

those pro!isions of the old laws that are not reproduced inthe re!ised statute or code$

Possible only if the re!ised statute or code was intended to

co!er the whole sub2ect to is a complete and perfect system

in itself$

Rule a subse.uent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if

the former re!ises the whole sub2ect matter of the formerstatute$

Ghen both intent and scope clearly e!ince the idea of a

repeal, then all parts and pro!ision of the prior act that areomitted from the re!ised act are deemed repealed$

Mecano v. Commission on A%dit

&laim for reimbursement by a go!ernment official omedical and hospitaliation epenses pursuant to%ection 8++ of the Re!ised Administration &ode o

*+*, which authories the head of office to case areimbursement of payment of medical and hospita



epenses of a go!ernment official in case of sic1ness orin2ury caused by or connected directly with the

performance of his official duty$

&oA denied the claim on the ground that A& of *+;which re!ised the old A&, repealed %ec$ 8++ because itwas omitted the re!ised code$

%& ruled that the legislature did not intend, in enactingthe new &ode, to repeal %ec$ 8++ of the old code$

BAll laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this &ode are herebyrepealed or modified accordingly$C

5ew code did not epressly repeal the old as the new&ode fails to identify or designate the act to be repealed$

4wo categories of repeal by implication

Pro!isions in the two acts on the same sub2ect matter

that are in irreconcilable conflict$[ Later act to the etent of the conflict constitutes an

implied repeal of the earlier

If the later act co!ers the whole sub2ect of the earlierone and is clearly intended as a statute, it will operate torepeal the earlier law$

4here is no irreconcilable conflict between the two codes onthe matter of sic1ness benefits because the pro!ision has not

been restated in the 5ew &ode$

4he whereas clause is the intent to co!er only those aspects

of go!ernment that pertain to administration, organiationand procedure, and understandably because of the manychanges that transpired in the go!ernment structure since the

enactment of the old code$

♥ &hange in phraseology

It is a well settled rule that in the re!ision or codification of

statutes, neither an alteration in phraseology nor theadmission or addition of words in the later statute shall be

held necessarily to alter the construction of the former acts$

Gords which do not materially affect the sense will beomitted from the statute as incorporated in the re!ise statuteor code, or that some general idea will be epressed in brief

phrases$

If there has been a material change or omission, whichclearly indicates an intent to depart from the pre!iousconstruction of the old laws, then such construction as will

effectuate such intent will be adopted$

♥ &ontinuation of eisting laws$

A codification should be construed as the continuation of theeisting statutes$

4he codifiers did not intend to change the law as it formerlyeisted$

4he rearrangement of sections or parts of a statute, or the

placing of portions of what formerly was a single section inseprate sections, does not operate to change the operation,

effect of meaning of the statute, unless the changes are ofsuch nature as to manifest clearly and unmista1ably alegislati!e intent to change the former laws$

REPEAL

♥ Power to repeal

Power to repeal a law is as complete as the power to enactone$

4he legislature cannot in and of itself enact irrepealable lawsor limit its future legislati!e acts$

♥ Repeal, generally

Repeal total or partial, epress or implied

4otal repeal 0 re!o1ed completely

Partial repeal 0 lea!es the unaffected portions of the statutein force$

A particular or specific law, identified by its number of titleis repealed is an epress repeal$

All other repeals are implied repeals$

/ailure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that theintent was not to repeal any eisting law, unless an

irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy eist in theterms of the new and old laws, latter situation falls under thecategory of an implied repeal$

Repealed only by the enactment of subse.uent laws$

4he change in the condition and circumstances after the passage of a law which is necessitated the enactment of a

statute to o!ercome the difficulties brought about by suchchange does not operate to repeal the prior law, nor ma1e the

later statute so inconsistent with the prior act as to repeal it$

♥ Repeal by implication

Ghere a statute of later date clearly re!eals an intention onthe part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on thesub2ect, that intention must be gi!en effect$

4here must be a sufficient re!elation of the legislati!e intento repeal$

Intention to repeal must be clear and manifest

Keneral rule the latter act is to be construed as acontinuation not a substitute for the first act so far as the two

acts are the same, from the time of the first enactment$

4wo categories of repeals by implication

Ghere pro!isions in the two acts on the same sub2ectmatter are in an irreconcilable conflict and the later act

to the etent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeaof the earlier$

If the later act co!ers the whole sub2ect of the earlie

one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it wiloperate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act$

♥ Irreconcilable inconsistency

Implied repeal brought about by irreconcilable repugnancy between two laws ta1es place when the two statutes co!e

the same sub2ect matterH they are so clearly inconsistent andincompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciledor harmonied and both cannot be gi!en effect, once canno

be enforced without nullifying the other$

Implied repeal 0 earlier and later statutes should embrace thesame sub2ect and ha!e the same ob2ect$

In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statutemust be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the

eisting law that they cannot be made to reconcile and standtogether$

It is necessary before such repeal is deemed to eist that is be

shown that the statutes or statutory pro!isions deal with thesame sub2ect matter and that the latter be inconsistent withthe former$

the fact that the terms of an earlier and later pro!isions oflaw differ is not sufficient to create repugnance as toconstitute the later an implied repeal of the former$

Ag%-etas v. Co%rt of Appea#s

/act that %ec :; of RA *88 pertaining to can!assing by boards of can!assers is silent as to how the board ofcan!assers shall prepare the certificate of can!ass and a

to what will be its basis, w=c details are pro!ided in thesecond paragraph of %ec:-* of the Omnibus Election&ode, an earlier statute, Brespecti!e boards ocan!assers shall prepare a certificate of can!ass duly

signed and affied with the imprint of the thumb of theright hand of each member, supported by a statement ofthe !otes and recei!ed by each candidate in each polling



place and on the basis thereof shall proclaim as electedthe candidates who obtained the highest number of!otes coast in the pro!inces, city, municipality or

barangay, and failure to comply with this re.uirementshall constitute an election offenseC

Did not impliedly repeal the second paragraph of %ec

:-* of OE& and render the failure to comply with there.uirement no longer an election offense$

Irreconcilable inconsistency between to laws embracing thesame sub2ect may also eist when the later law nullifies the

reason or purpose of the earlier act, so that the latter lawloses all meaning and function$

Smit* e## 3 Co. v. Estate of Maroni##a

A prior law is impliedly repealed by a later act where

the reason for the earlier act is beyond perad!entureremo!ed$

Repeal by implication 0 based on the cardinal rule that in thescience of 2urisprudence, two inconsistent laws on the same

sub2ect cannot co3eist in one 2urisdiction$

4here cannot be two conflicting law on the same sub2ect$Either reconciled or later repeals prior law$

Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant (a later law

repeals the prior law on the sub2ect which is repugnantthereto"

Mecano v. Commission on A%dit

Issue whether %ec$ 8++ of the Re!ised Administrati!e&ode has been repealed by the *+; Administrati!e&ode$

*+; Administration &ode pro!ides that BAll laws,decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions

thereof, inconsistent with this code are hereby repealedor modified accordingly

&ourt ruled that the new &ode did not repeal %ec 8++

[ Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistencyta1es place when two statutes co!er the same

sub2ect matter, they are so clearly inconsistent andincompatible with each other that they cannot be

reconciled or harmonied, and both cannot begi!en effect, that one law cannot be enforcedwithout nullifying the other$

[ 4he new &ode does not co!er not attempt to the

co!er the entire sub2ect matter of the old &ode$[ 4here are se!eral matters treated in the old &ode

that are not found in the new &ode$ (pro!isions onnotary publicH lea!e law, public bonding law,

military reser!ations, claims for sic1ness benefitsunder section 8++ and others"

[ &oA failed to demonstrate that the pro!isions ofthe two &odes on the matter of the sub2ect claim

are in an irreconcilable conflict$

[ 4here can no conflict because the pro!ision onsic1ness benefits of the nature being claimed by

petitioner has not been restated in old &ode$

[ 4he contention is untenable$[ 4he fact that a later enactment may relate to the

same sub2ect matter as that of an earlier statute isnot of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of

the prior act new statute may merely be cumulati!eor a continuation of the old one$

[ %econd &ategory possible only if the re!isedstatute or code was intended to co!er the wholesub2ect to be a complete and perfect system initself$

♦ Rule a subse.uent is deemed to repeal a priorlaw if the former re!ises the whole sub2ec

matter of the former statute$[ Ghen both intent and scope clearly e!ince the idea

of a repeal, then all parts and pro!isions of the prior act that are omitted from the re!ised act are

deemed repealed$[ 'efore there can be an implied repeal under thi

category, it must be the clear intent of thelegislature that later act be the substitute of the

prior act$[ Opinion - s$*++* of the %ecretary of #ustice wha

appears clear is the intent to co!er only thoseaspects of go!ernment that pertain to

administration, organiation and procedureunderstandably because of the many changes tha

transpired in the go!ernment structure since theenactment of RA&$

[ Repeals of statutes by implication are not fa!oredPresumption is against the inconsistency and

repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to 1nowthe eisting laws on the sub2ect and not to ha!eenacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes$

Ty v. Trampe

Issue whether PD +:* on real estate taes has beenrepealed impliedly by RA *86, otherwise 1now as the

Local Ko!ernment &ode of *++* on the same sub2ect$

@eld that there has been no implied repeal

&ourt it is clear that the two law are not coetensi!eand mutually inclusi!e in their scope and purpose$[ RA *86 co!ers almost all go!ernmental function

delegated to local go!ernment units all o!er the

country$[ PD +:* embraces only )etropolitan )anila Area

and is limited to the administration of financiaser!ices therein$

[ %ec$+ PD+:* re.uires that the schedule of !alueof real properties in the )etropolitan )anila Area

shall be prepared 2ointly by the city assessors state

that the schedules shall be prepared by the pro!incial, city and municipal assessors of themunicipalities within )etropolitan )anila Are

for the different classes of real property situated intheir respecti!e local go!ernment units foenactment by ordinance of the sanggunianconcerned$

!agad v. ,o'oDado#e

%ec$*+ RA 886, the Ombudsman Act grant

disciplinary authority to the Ombudsman to disciplineelecti!e and appointi!e officials, ecept thoseimpeachable officers, has been repealed, RA *86, theLocal Ko!ernment &ode, insofar as local electi!e

officials in the !arious officials therein named$

@eld both laws should be gi!en effect because there isnothing in the Local Ko!ernment &ode to indicate tha

it has repealed, whether epressly or impliedly$[ 4he two statutes on the specific matter in .uestion

are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, ato compel us to uphold one and stri1e down theother$

[ 4wo laws must be incompatible, and a clea

finding thereof must surface, before the inferenceof implied repeal may be drawn$

[ /nterpretare et concordare #eges #egib%s es

optim%s interpretandi mod%s i. e (e!ery statutemust be so construed and harmonied with other



statutes as to form uniform system of 2urisprudence$

[ the legislature should be presumed to ha!e 1nown

the eisting laws on the sub2ect and not to ha!eenacted conflicting statutes$

/nitia 6r v. CoA

implied repeal will not be decreed unless there is anirreconcilable inconsistency between two pro!isions orlaws is RA -79 in relation to PD *7+$

[ RA -79 0 in part of the Postmaster Keneral,sub2ect to the appro!al of the 'oard of Directors of

the Philippines Postal &orporation, shall ha!e the power to Bdetermine the staffing pattern and the

number of personnel, define their duties andresponsibilities, and fi their salaries and

emoluments in accordance with the appro!edcompensation structure of the &orporation$C

[ %ec$8 PD *7+ 0 B eemptions notwithstanding,agencies shall report to the President, through the

'udget &ommission, on their positionclassification and compensation plans, policies,rates and other related details following suchspecifications as may be prescribed by the

President$C

Issue whether %ec8 of PD*7+, the two laws beingreconcilable$

Ghile the Philippine Postal &orporation is allowed tofi its own personnel compensation structure through its

board of directors, the latter is re.uired to follow certain

standards in formulating said compensation system, andthe role of D') is merely to ensure that the actionta1en by the board of directors complies there.uirements of the law$

Ceb% /nstit%te of Tec*no#ogy v. Op#e

%ec$ -(a" PD 97* and %ec$ 9: of 'P :-: illustrates

repeal by implication$[ %ec -(a" pro!ides Bno increase in tuition or other

school fees or charges shall be appro!ed unless

86N of the proceed is allocated to increase insalaries or wages of the member of the faculty$C

[ 'P :-: Beach pri!ate school shall determine its

rate of tuition and other school fees or charges$4he rates or charges adopted by schools pursuantto this pro!ision shall be collectible, and theirapplication or use authoried, sub2ect to rules and

regulations promulgated by the )inistry ofEducation, &ulture and %ports$C

Issue whether %ec$ 9: of 'P :-: impliedly repealed

%ec$ -(a" of PD 97*

@eld there was implied repeal because there areirreconcilable differences between the two laws$

♥

Implied repeal by re!ision or codification Re!ised statute is in effect a legislati!e declaration thatwhate!er is embraced in the new statute shall pre!ail and

whate!er is ecluded there from shall be discarded$

)ust be intended to co!er the whole sub2ect to be a completeand perfect system in itself in order that the prior statutes or

part thereof which are not repeated in the new statute will bedeemed impliedly repealed$

Peop#e v. en%ya

Ghere a statute is re!ised or a series of legislati!e actson the same sub2ect are re!ised or consolidated into one,co!ering the entire field of sub2ect matter, all parts and

pro!isions of the former act or acts

[ that are omitted from the re!ised act are deemedrepealed$

6oa$%in v. +avarro

Ghere a new statute is intended to furnish the eclusi!erule on a certain sub2ect, it repeals by implication the

old law on the same sub2ect,

Ghere a new statute co!ers the whole sub2ect matter ofan old law and adds new pro!isions and ma1es changes

and where such law, whether it be in the form of anamendment or otherwise, is e!idently intended to be a

re!ision of the old act, it repeals the old act byimplication$

Peop#e v. A#m%ete

Re!ision of the Agricultural 4enancy Act by th

Agricultural Land Reform &ode$

%ec -+ of A4& (RA **++" Bit shall be unlawful foreither the tenant or landlord without mutual consent, toreap or thresh a portion of the crop at any time pre!iousto the date set, for its threshing$C

An action for !iolation of this penal pro!ision i pending in court, the Agricultural Land Reform &odesuperseded the Agricultural 4enancy Act, abolished

share tenancy, was not reproduced in the Agricultura

Land Reform &ode$ 4he effect of such non3reenactment is a repeal o

%ection -+$

It is a rule of legal hermeneutics that an act which purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain

operates as a repeal of anything omitted which wacontained in the old act and not included in the act as

re!ised$

A substitute statute, and e!idently intended as thsubstitute for it, operates to repeal the former statute$

T%ng C*in !%i v. "odrig%e'

Issue whether %ec$*; Rule 9* of the pre3*66 Rules o&ourt, which pro!ided the appeal in habeas corpucases to be ta1en within 9; hours from notice o

2udgment, has been replaced by the *++ Rules of &i!i

Procedure, which pro!ides in %ec$ - Rule 9* thereofthat appeal from 2udgment or final order shall be ta1enwithin *7 days from receipt thereof, in !iew of the facthat the %ec$ *; was repealed, in accordance with the

well3settled rule of statutory construction tha pro!isions of an old law that were not reproduced inthe re!ision thereof co!ering the same sub2ect aredeemed repealed and discarded

@eld %& in this case to abrogate those pro!isions of theold laws that are not reproduced in the re!ised statute o&ode$

♥ Repeal by reenactment Ghere a statute is a reenactment of the whole sub2ect in

substitution of the pre!ious laws on the matter, the latter

disappears entirely and what is omitted in the reenacted lawis deemed repealed$

Parras v. Land "egistration Commission

Ghere a law amends a specific section of a prior act by pro!iding that the same is amended so as to read afollows, which then .uotes the amended pro!ision, wha

is not included in the reenactment is deemed repealed$

4he new statute is a substitute for the original sectionand all matters in the section that are omitted in the

amendment are considered repealed$



♥ Other forms of implied repeal

4he most powerful implication of repeal is that which ariseswhen the later of two laws is epressed in the form of auni!ersal negati!e$

4here is a clear distinction between affirmati!e and negati!estatutes in regard to their repealing effects upon priorlegislation$

Affirmati!e statute does not impliedly repeal the priorlaw unless an intention to effect a repeal is manifest,

A negati!e statute repeals all conflicting pro!isionsunless the contrary intention is disclosed$

Legislati!e intent to repeal is also shown where it enacts

something in general term and afterwards it passes anotheron the same sub2ect, which though epressed in affirmati!e

language introduces special conditions or restrictions

4he subse.uent statute will usually be considered asrepealing by implication the former regarding the matter

co!ered by the subse.uent act$

4he epress repeal of a pro!ision of law from which aneecuti!e official deri!es his authority to enforce another

pro!ision of the same law operates to repeal by implicationthe latter and to depri!e the official of the authority toenforce it$

4he enactment of a statute on a sub2ect, whose purpose or

ob2ect is diametrically opposed to that of an earlier law onthe same sub2ect which thereby depri!es it of its reason for

being, operates to repeal by implication the prior law, e!en

though the pro!isions of both laws are not inconsistent$

♥ BAll laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are

hereby repealed or modified accordingly,C construed$

5ature of repealing clause

5ot epress repealing clauses because it fails to identifyor designate the act or acts that are intended to be

repealed$

A clause, which predicates the intended repeal upon thecondition that a substantial conflict must be found on

eisting and prior acts of the same sub2ect matter$

4he presumption against implied repeal and the rule onstrict construction regarding implied repeal apply e

proprio !igore$

Legislature is presumed to 1now the eisting law so thatif repeal of particular or specific law or laws is

intended, the proper step is to so epress it$

2a#de' v. T%ason

Bsuch a clause repeals nothing that would not be e.uallyrepealed without it$

Either with or without it, the real .uestion to be

determined is whether the new statute is in fundamentaland irreconcilable conflict with the prior statute on the

sub2ect$

%ignificance of the repealing clause the presence of suchgeneral repealing clause in a later statute clearly indicates the

legislati!e intent to repeal all prior inconsistent laws on thesub2ect matter whether or not the prior law is a special law$

A later general law will ordinarily not repeal a prior

special law on the same sub2ect, as the latter is generallyregarded as an eception to the former$

Gith such clause contained in the subse.uent general

law, the prior special law will be deemed repealed, asthe clause is a clear legislati!e intent to bring about thatresult$

♥ Repeal by implication not fa!ored

Presumption is against inconsistency or repugnancy andaccordingly, against implied repeal

Legislature is presumed to 1now the eisting laws on thesub2ect and not to ha!e enacted inconsistent or conflictingstatutes$

A construction which in effect will repeal a statute altogetheshould, if possible, be re2ected$

In case of doubt as to whether a later statute has impliedlyrepealed a prior law on the same sub2ect, the doubt should beresol!ed against implied repeal$

1S v. Pa#acio

Repeals by implication are not fa!ored, and will not bedecreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so

intended$

As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberationand with full 1nowledge of all eisting ones on thsub2ect

It is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statuteit was not intended to interfere with or abrogate anyformer law relating to some matter

Fnless the repugnancy between the two is not onlyirreconcilable, but also clear and con!incing, andflowing necessarily form the language used, the later acfully embraces the sub2ect matter of the earlier, o

unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond perad!enture remo!ed$

E!ery effort must be used to ma1e all acts stand and if

by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciledthe later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier$

+APOCO" v. Angas

Illustrates the application of the principle that repeal or

amendment by implication is not fa!ored$

Issue whether &entral 'an1 &ircular 9*8 has impliedlyrepealed or amended Art ::6+ of the &i!il &ode

@eld in answering the issue in the negati!e, the courruled that repeals or e!en amendments by implicationare not fa!ored if two laws can be fairly reconciled$ 4he

statutes contemplate different situations and apply todifferent transactions in!ol!ing loan or forbearance omoney, goods or credits, as well as 2udgments relatingto such load or forbearance of money, goods, or credits

the &entral 'an1 &ircular applies$

In cases re.uiring the payment of indemnities adamages, in connection with any delay in the

performance of an obligation other than those in!ol!ingloan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, Ar::6+ of the && applies

&ourts are slow to hold that one statute has repealed another by implication and they will not ma1e such ad2udication if

they can refrain from doing so, or if they can arri!e aanother result by any construction which is 2ust and

reasonable$

&ourts will not enlarge the meaning of one act in order todecide that is repeals another by implication, nor will theyadopt an interpretation leading to an ad2udication of repea

by implication unless it is ine!itable and a clear and eplici

reason thereof can be adduced$

♥ As between two laws, one passed later pre!ails

Leges posteriors priores contrarias abrogant (later statute

repeals prior ones which are not repugnant thereto$"

Applies e!en if the later act is made to ta1e effect aheadof the earlier law$



As between two acts, the one passed later and going intoeffect earlier will pre!ail o!er one passed earlier and going

into effect later$

Mani#a Trading 3 S%pp#y Co. v. P*i#. Labor 1nion

an act passed April *8th and in force April :* st was held

to pre!ail o!er an act passed April + th and in effect #uly

9th of the same year$

And an act going into effect immediately has been held

to pre!ail o!er an act passed before but going into effectlater$

Ghene!er two statutes of different dates and of contrarytenor are of e.ual theoretical application to a particular case,

the statute of later date must pre!ail, being a later epressionof legislati!e will$

P*i#ippine +ationa# ank v. Cr%'

As between the order of preference of credit set forth in

Articles ::9* to ::97 of the && and that of Article **6of the Labor &ode, gi!ing first preference to unpaidwages and other monetary claims of labor, the formermust yield to the latter, being the law of the later

enactment$

4he later law repeals an earlier one because it is the later

legislati!e will$

Presumption the lawma1ers 1new the older law andintended to change it$

In enacting the older law, the legislators could not ha!e1nown the newer one and could not ha!e intended tochange what they did not 1now$

&& laws are repealed only by subse.uent ones, not theother way around$

David v. COMELEC

%ec$ * of RA 88+ pro!ides that the term of barangay

officials who were to be elected on the second )ondayof )ay *++9 is 7 years

4he later act RA *86 %ec 9- (c" states that the term of

office of barangay officials who were to be elected alsoon the :nd )onday of )ay *++9 is - years$

4here being a clear inconsistency between the two laws,the later law fiing the term barangay officials at -years shall pre!ail$

♥ Keneral law does not repeal special law, generally

A general law on a sub2ect does not operate to repeal a prior

special law on the same sub2ect, unless it clearly appears thatthe legislature has intended by the later general act to modifyor repeal the earlier special law$

Presumption against implied repeal is stronger when of twolaws, one is special and the other general and this appliese!en though the terms of the general act are broad enough to

include the matter co!ered by the special statute$ ,enera#ia specia#ib%s non derogant & a general law does not

nullify a specific or special law

4he legislature considers and ma1es pro!ision for all thecircumstances of the particular case$

Reason why a special law pre!ails o!er a general law thelegislature considers and ma1es pro!ision for all the

circumstances of the particular case$

Keneral and special laws are read and construed together,and that repugnancy between them is reconciled by

constituting the special law as an eception to the generallaw$

Keneral law yields to the special law in the specific law inthe specific and particular sub2ect embraced in the latter$

Applies irrespecti!e of the date of passage of the special law

♥ Application of rule

Sto. Domingo v. De #os Ange#es

4he court in!ariably ruled that the special law is noimpliedly repealed and constitutes an eception to thegeneral law whene!er the legislature failed to indicate

in unmista1able terms its intent to repeal or modify the prior special act$

+APOCO" v. Arca

Issue whether %ec$ : of &om$ Act *:6 creating the 5APO&OR, a go!ernment3owned corporation, andempowering it Bto sell electric power and to fi the rateand pro!ide for the collection of the charges for any

ser!ices rendered Pro!ided, the rates of charges shalnot be sub2ect to re!ision by the Public %er!ice Act has

been repealed by RA :8 amending the Public %er!iceAct and granting the Public %er!ice &ommission the

2urisdiction to fi the rate of charges of public utilities

owned or operated by the go!ernment or go!ernmentowned corporations$

@eld a special law, li1e &om$ Act *:6, pro!iding for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by asubse.uent statute, general in its terms, li1e RA :8although the general statute are broad enough to include

the cases embraced in the special law, in the absence oa clear intent to repeal$

4here appears no such legislati!e intent to repeal or

abrogate the pro!isions of the earlier law$

4he eplanatory note to @ouse 'ill 96-6 the late became RA :8, it was eplicit that the 2urisdictionconferred upon the Republic %er!ice &ommission o!erthe public utilities operated by go!ernment3owned o

controlled corporations is to be confined to the fiing orates of such public ser!ices

4he harnessing and then distribution and sale of electric

power to the consuming public, the contingencyintended to be met by the legal pro!ision undeconsideration would not eist$

4he authority of the Public %er!ice &ommission undeRA :8 o!er the fiing of rate of charges of publicutilities owned or operated by KO&&s can only beeercised where the charter of the go!ernmen

corporation concerned does not contain any pro!ision tothe contrary$

P*i#ippine "ai#;ay Co. v. Co##ector of /nterna# "even%e

PR& was granted a legislati!e franchise to operate a

railway line pursuant to Act 5o$ *9+ %ec$ *- whichread BIn consideration of the premises and of the

operation of this concession or franchise, there shall be paid by the grantee to the Philippine Ko!ernment

annually, an amount e.ual to one3half of one percentum of the gross earnings of the grantee $C

%ec :7+ of Internal Re!enue &ode, as amended by RA

-+, pro!ides that Bthere shall be collected in respect toall eisting and future franchises, upon the grosearnings or receipts from the business co!ered by thelaw granting a franchise ta of 7N of such taes

charges, and percentages as are specified in the speciacharters of the corporation upon whom suc franchise



are conferred, whiche!er is higher, unless the pro!isionshereof preclude the imposition of a higher ta $

Issue whether %ection :7+ of the 4a &ode hasrepealed %ection *- of Act *9+, stand upon a differentfooting from general laws$

Once granted, a charter becomes a pri!ate contract andcannot be altered nor amended ecept by consent of allconcerned, unless the right to alter or repeal is epresslyreser!ed$

Reason the legislature, in passing a special charter, hasits attention directed to the special facts andcircumstances in the particular case in granting a special

charter, for it will not be considered that the legislature, by adopting a general law containing the pro!isions

repugnant to the pro!isions of the charter, and withoutany mention of its intention to amend or modify the

charter, intended to amend, repeal or modify the specialact$

4he purpose of respecting the ta rates incorporated inthe charters, as shown by the clause$

LLDA v. CA

Issue which agency of the go!ernment, LLDA or thetowns and municipalities compromising the region

should eercise 2urisdiction o!er the Laguna La1e and

its en!irons insofar as the issuance of permits forfishery pri!ileges is concerned$

4he LLDA statute specifically pro!ides that the LLDAshall ha!e eclusi!e 2urisdiction to issue permits for theuse of all surface water for any pro2ects in or affectingthe said region, including the operation of fish pens$

RA *86 the LK& of *++* grants the municipalities the

eclusi!e authority to grant fishery pri!ileges inmunicipal waters$

@eld two laws should be harmonied, and that the LLA

statute, being a special law, must be ta1en as aneception to RA *86 a general law,

,arcia v. Pasc%a#

&ler1s of courts municipal courts shall be appointed bythe municipal 2udge at the epense of the municipalityand where a later law was enacted pro!iding that

employees whose salaries are paid out of the municipalfunds shall be appointed by the municipal mayor, thelater law cannot be said to ha!e repealed the prior lawas to !est in the municipal mayor the power to appoint

municipal clec1 of court, as the subse.uent law should be construed to comprehend only subordinate officialsof the municipality and not those of the 2udiciary$

,ordon v. CA

A city charter gi!ing real estate owner a period of oneyear within which to redeem a property sold by the city

for nonpayment of realty ta from the date of such

auction sale, being a special law, pre!ails o!er a generallaw granting landowners a period of two years to ma1ethe redemption$

Sto. Domingo v. De#os Ange#es

4he &i!il %er!ice law on the procedure for thesuspension or remo!al of ci!il ser!ice employees doesnot apply with respect to the suspension or remo!al of

members of the local police force$

♥ Ghen special or general law repeals the other$

4here is always a partial repeal where the later act is aspecial law$

2a#era v. T%ason

A subse.uent general law on a sub2ect has repealed or

amended a prior special act on the same sub2ect byimplication is a .uestion of legislati!e intent$

Intent to repeal may be shown in the act itself the

eplanatory note to the bill before its passage into lawthe discussions on the floor of the legislature,

Intent to repeal the earlier special law where the later generaact pro!ides that all laws or parts thereof which areinconsistent therewith are repealed or modified accordingly

If the intention to repeal the special law is clear, then the rulethat the special law will be considered as an eception to the

general law does not applyH what applies is the rule that thespecial law is deemed impliedly repealed$

A general law cannot be construed to ha!e repealed a specia

law by mere implication admits of eception$

City ,overnment of San Pab#o v. "eyes

%ec$ * PD 77* pro!ides that any pro!ision of law orlocal ordinance to the contrary, the franchise ta

payable by all grantees of franchise to generatedistribute, and sell electric current for light, heat, and

power shall be :7 of their gross receipts$

%ec$ *- of the LK& states 5otwithstanding any

eemption granted by any law or other special law, the pro!ince may impose a ta on business en2oying afranchise at a rate not eceeding 76N of *N of the grossannul receipts$

@eld the phrase is all3encompassing and clear that thelegislature intended to withdraw all ta eemption

en2oyed by franchise holders and this intent is mademore manifest by %ec$ *+- of the &ode, when i

pro!ides that unless otherwise pro!ided in this code taeemptions or incenti!es granted to or presently

en2oyed by all persons, ecept local water districtscooperati!es, and non3stoc1 and non3profit hospitaland educational institutions, are withdrawn upon theeffecti!ity of the &ode$

,aer#an v. Cat%big

Issue whether %ec$ *: of RA *6 as amended, the &ity

&harter of Dagupan &ity, which fied the minimum age.ualification for members of the city council at :- yearshas been repealed by %ec$8 of RA ::7+

@eld there was an implied repeal of %ec$ *: of thecharter of Dagupan &ity because the legislati!e intent torepeal the charter pro!ision is clear from the fact thaDagupan &ity, unli1e some cities, is not one of those

cities epressly ecluded by the law from its operationand from the circumstance that it pro!ides that all actsor parts thereof which are inconsistent therewith arerepealed$

4he last statute is so broad in its terms and so clear and

eplicit in its words so as to show that it was intendedto co!er the whole sub2ect and therefore to displace the

prior statute$

agatsing v. "amire'

A charter of a city, which is a special law, may beimpliedly modified or superseded by a later statute, and

where a statute is controlling, it must be read into thecharter, notwithstanding any of its particular pro!isions

A subse.uent general law similarly applicable to al

cities pre!ails o!er any conflicting charter pro!ision, forthe reason that a charter must not be inconsistent withthe general laws and public policy of the state$

%tatute remains supreme in all matters not purely local$





♥ Effect of repeal of ta laws

Rule fa!oring a prospecti!e construction of statutes isapplicable to statutes which repeal ta laws$

%uch statute is not made retroacti!e, a ta assessed before the

repeal is collectible afterwards according to the law in forcewhen the assessment or le!y was made$

♥ Effect of repeal and reenactment

%imultaneous repeal and reenactment of a statute does notaffect the rights and liabilities which ha!e accrued under the

original statute, since the reenactment neutralies the repealand continues the law in force without interruption$

4he repeal of a penal law, under which a person is charged

with !iolation thereof and its simultaneous reenactment penaliing the same act done by him under the old law, will

not preclude the accuseds prosecution, nor depri!e the courtof the 2urisdiction to try and con!ict him$

Peop#e v. A#m%ete

Ghere the reenactment of the repealed law is notsimultaneous such that the continuity of the obligationand the sanction for its !iolation form the repealed law

to the reenacted law is bro1en, the repeal carries with itthe depri!ation of the court of its authority to try,con!ict, and sentence the person charged with !iolation

of the old law to its repeal$

♥ Effect of repeal of penal laws

Ghere the repeal is absolute, so that the crime no longereists, prosecution of the person charged under the old law

cannot be had and the action should be dismissed$

Ghere the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and theact which was penalied by a prior law ceases to be criminal

under the new law, the pre!ious offense is obliterated$

4hat a total repeal depri!es the courts of 2urisdiction to try,con!ict, and sentence, persons, charged with !iolations of the

old law prior to the repeal$

Repeal of a statute which pro!ides an indispensable elementin the commission of a crime as defined in the RP& li1ewise

operates to depri!e the court of the authority to decide thecase, rule rests on the same principle as that concerning theeffect of a repeal of a penal law without .ualification$

Reason the repeal of a penal law without dis.ualification isa legislati!e act of rendering legal what is pre!iously decreedas illegal, so that the person who committed it is as if hene!er committed an offence

Eception

where the repealing act reenacts the statute and

penalies the same act pre!iously penalied under therepealed law, the act committed before reenactment

continues to be a crime, and pending cases are notthereby affected$

Ghere the repealing act contains a sa!ing clause

pro!iding that pending actions shall not be affected, the

latter will continue to be prosecuted in accordance withthe old law$

♥ Distinction as to effect of repeal and epiration of law

In absolute repeal, the crime is obliterated and the stigma of

con!iction of an accused for !iolation of the penal law beforeits repeal is erased$

♥ Effect of repeal of municipal charter

4he repeal of a charter destroys all offices under it, and putsan end to the functions of the incumbents$

4he con!ersation of a municipality into a city by the passageof a charter or a statute to that effect has the effect of

abolishing all municipal offices then eisting under the oldmunicipality offices then the eisting under the oldmunicipality, sa!e those ecepted in the charter itself$

♥ Repeal or nullity of repealing law, effect of

Ghen a law which epressly repeals a prior law is itselrepealed, the law first repealed shall not thereby re!i!edunless epressly so pro!ided

Ghere a repealing statute is declared unconstitutional, it wilha!e no effect of repealing the former statute, the former oold statute continues to remain in force$

CHAPTER ELEVEN: Const!tut!ona' Construt!on

&onstitution defined

• fundamental law which sets up a form of go!ernment anddefines and delimits the powers thereof and those of it

officers, reser!ing to the people themsel!es plenaryso!ereignty

• written charter enacted and adopted by the people by which a

go!ernment for them is established

• permanent in nature thus it does not only apply to eistingconditions but also to future needs

• basically it is the fundamental laws for the go!ernance andadministration of a nation

• absolute and unalterable ecept by amendments• all other laws are epected to conform to it

Origin and history of the Philippine &onstitutions

• *+-7 &onstitution

Peop#e v. Linsangan 0 eplained as to how this &onstitution cameabout

• 4ydings3)cduffie Law3 allowed the /ilipinos to adopt a

constitutions but sub2ect to the conditions prescribed in theAct$

o Re.uired - steps

drafting and appro!al of the constitution

must be authoried

it must be certified by the President othe F%

it must be ratified by the people of the

Philippines at a plebiscite

• *+- &onstitutiono adopted in response to popular clamor to meat the

problems of the country

o )arch *8, *+8 &ongress passed Resolution 5o$:

which was amended by Resolution 5o$ 9, calling acon!ention to propose amendments to the

&onstitution

• *+; &onstitutiono after ED%A Re!olution

o also 1nown as the *+; &harter

Primary purpose of constitutional construction• primary tas1 of constitutional construction is to ascertain the

intent or purpose of the framers of the constitution aepressed in its language

• purpose of our &onstitution to protect and enhance the peoples interests

&onstitution construed as enduring for ages

• &onstitution is not merely for a few years but it also needs toendure through a long lapse of ages

• WHY/ 'ecause it go!erns the life of the people not only a

the time of its framing but far into the indefinite future

• it must be adaptable to !arious crisis of human affairs but imust also be solid permanent and substantial



• Its stability protects the rights, liberty, and property of the people (rich or poor"

• It must be construed as a dynamic process intended to standfor a great length of time to be progressi!e and not static

• Ghat it is 5O4o It should 5O4 change with emergencies or

conditionso It should 5O4 be infleible

o It should 5O4 be interpreted narrowly

• Gords employed should not be construed to yield fied and

rigid answers because its meaning is applied to meet new orchanged conditions as they arise

• &ourts should construe the constitution so that it would beconsistent with reason, 2ustice and the public interest

@ow language of constitution construed

• primary source in order to ascertain the constitution is theLA5KFAKE itself

• 4he words that are used are broad because it aims to co!er

all contingencies

• Gords must be understood in their common or ordinarymeaning ecept when technical terms are employee

o G@M 'ecause the fundamental law if essentially

a document of the people

• Do not construe the constitution in such a way that itsmeaning would change

• Ghat if the words used ha!e both general and restricted

meaning

• Rule general pre!ails o!er the restricted unless the contraryis indicated$

Ordi##o v. COMELEC

• Issue whether the sole pro!ince of Ifugao can be !alidlyconstituted in the &ordillera Autonomous Region under%ection *7, Article *6

• @eld 5o$ the 1eywords pro!inces, cities, municipalities andgeographical areas connotes that a region consists of morethan one unit$ In its ordinary sense region means two or more

pro!inces, thus Ifugao cannot be constituted the &ordillera

Autonomous Region

Marcos v. C*ief of Staff

• Issues

o the meaning or scope of the words any court in

%ection * Article * of the *+-7 &onstitutiono Gho are included under the terms inferior court in

section : Article

• @eld %ection * of Article * prohibits any members of the&ongress from appearing as counsel in any criminal case $ 4his is not limited to ci!il but also to a military court or

court martial since the latter is also a court of law and 2usticeas is any ci!il tribunal$

• Inferior courts are meant to be construed in its restricted

sense and accordingly do not include court martials ormilitary courts for they are agencies of eecuti!e characterand do not belong to the 2udicial branch unli1e the terminferior court is$

• Another RFLE words used in one part are to recei!e thesame interpretation when used in other parts unless the

contrary is applied=specified$

Lo'ada v COMELEC

• the term B'atasang Pambansa,C which means the regularnational assembly, found in many sections of the *+-

&onstitution refers to the regular, not to the interim 'atasangPambansa

• words which ha!e ac.uired a technical meaning before they

are used in the constitution must be ta1en in that sense whensuch words as thus used are construed

Aids to construction, generally

• apart from its language courts may refer to the following inconstruing the constitution

o history

o proceedings of the con!ention

o

prior laws and 2udicial decisionso contemporaneous constructions

o conse.uences of alternati!e interpret3tations

• these aids are called etraneous aids because though thei

effect is not in precise rules their influence describes the

essentials of the process (remember preamble ganito langdin yun"

Realities eisting at time of adoptionH ob2ect to be accomplished

• @istory basically helps in ma1ing one understand as to howand why certain laws were incorporated into the constitution

•

In construing constitutional law, the history must be ta1eninto consideration because there are certain considerationsrooted in the historical bac1ground of the en!ironment at the

time of its adoption (Legaspi !$ )inister of /inance"

A$%ino v. COMELEC

• Issue what does the term Bincumbent president in sec$ - oArticle * of the *+- &onstitution refer to

• @eld @istory shows that at that time the term of Presiden

)arcos was to terminate on December -6, *+-, the newconstitution was appro!ed on 5o!ember -6, *+: still duringhis incumbency and as being the only incumbent president athe time of the appro!al it 2ust means that the term

incumbent president refers to )r$ )arcos

• #ustice Antonio concurring opinion states the only rationa

way to ascertain the meaning and intent is to read itlanguage in connection with the 1nown conditions of affairout of which the occasion for its adoption had arisen and

then construe it$

/n re erm%de'

• incumbent president referred to in section 7 of Article *; othe *+; constitution refers to incumbent President A.uinoand >P Doy Laurel

Civi# Liberties 1nion v. E)ec%tive Secretary

• issue whether EO :;9, which authories a cabinet memberundersecretary and assistant secretary to hold not more than

two positions in the go!ernment and KO&&s and to recei!e

corresponding compensation therefore, !iolates %ec$ *-, Art of the *+; &onstitution

• court eamined the history of the times, the conditions underwhich the constitutional pro!isions was framed and its ob2ect

• held before the adoption of the constitutional pro!ision

Bthere was a proliferation of newly3created agenciesinstrumentalities and KO&&s created by PDs and othe

modes of presidential issuances where &abinet memberstheir deputies or assistants were designated to head or sit as

members of the board with the corresponding salariesemoluments, per diems, allowances and other prere.uisites

of office

• since the e!ident purpose of the framers of the *+;&onstitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on th



President, >ice President, members of the &abinet, theirdeputies and assistants with respect to holding multiplego!ernment offices or employment in the Ko!ernment

during their tenure, the eception to this prohibition must beread with e.ual se!erity

• on its face, the language of %ec *- Art$ is prohibitory so

that it must be understood as intended to be a positi!e andune.ui!ocal negation of the pri!ilege of holding multiplego!ernment offices or employment

Proceedings of the con!ention

• RFLE If the language of the constitutional pro!ision is plainit is not necessary to resort to etrinsic aids

• E&EP4IO5 when the intent of the framer doesnt appear

in the tet or it has more than one construction$

• Intent of a constitutional con!ention member doesntnecessarily mean it is also the peoples intent

• 4he proceedings of the con!ention are usually in.uired into because it sheds light into what the framers of theconstitution had in mind at that time$ (refers to the debates,

interpretations and opinions concerning particular pro!isions"

L%' Farms v. Secretary of DA"

• Ghether the term BagricultureC as used in the &onstitution

embraces raising li!estoc1, poultry and swine• 4ranscript of the deliberations of the &onstitutional

&ommission of *+;8 on the meaning of BagricultureC clearlyshows that it was ne!er the intention of the framers of the&onstitution to include li!estoc1 and poultry industry in the

co!erage of the constitutionally3mandated agrarian reform program of the Ko!ernment

• Agricultural lands do not include commercial industrial, and

residential lands

• @eld it is e!ident in the foregoing discussion that %ec : ofRA 887 which includes Bpri!ate agricultural lands de!otedto commercial li!estoc1, poultry and swine raisingC in thedefinition of Bcommercial farmsC is I5>ALID, to the etent

of the aforecited agro3industrial acti!ities are made to beco!ered by the agrarian reform program of the %tate

Monte-o v. COMELEC

• Ghether the &O)ELE& has the power to transfer, byresolution, one or more municipalities from onecongressional district to another district within a pro!ince,

pursuant to %ec : of the Ordinance appended to the *+;&onstitution

• 4he &ourt relied on the proceedings of the &onstitutional

&ommission on Bminor ad2ustmentsC which refers only tothe instance where a municipality which has been forgotten(ano ba Tto1inalimutan ang municipality" is included in theenumeration of the composition of the congressional district

and not to the transfer of one municipality from one districtto another, which has been considered a substanti!e or ma2or

ad2ustment

&ontemporaneous construction and writings

• may be used to resol!e but not to create ambiguities

• In construing statutes, contemporaneous construction areentitled to great weight howe!er when it comes to the

constitution it has no weight and will not be allowed tochange in any way its meaning$

• Gritings of delegates 0 has persuasi!e force but it depends

on two thingso if opinions are based on fact 1nown to them and

not established it is immaterialo on legal hermeneutics, their conclusions may not

be a shade better in the eyes of the law$

Pre!ious laws and 2udicial rulings

• framers of the constitution is presumed to be aware o pre!ailing 2udicial doctrines concerning the sub2ect oconstitutional pro!isions$ 4@F% when courts adop

principles different from prior decisions it is presumed tha

they did so to o!errule said principle

&hanges in phraseology

• 'efore a constitution is ratified it undergoes a lot of re!isionand changes in phraseology (e$ deletion of words" and these

changes may be in.uired into to ascertain the intent o purpose of the pro!ision as appro!ed

• @OGE>ER mere deletion, as negati!e guides, canno

pre!ail o!er the positi!e pro!isions nor is it determinati!e oany conclusion$

• &ertain pro!isions in our constitution (from *+-7 to the

present" are mere reenactments of prior constitutions thuthese changes may indicate an intent to modify or change themeaning of the old pro!isions$

,a#man v. Pamaran

• the phraseC no person shall be compelled in a criminacase be a witness against himselfC is changed in such a way

the words criminal cases had been deleted simply means tha

it is not limited to criminal cases only$

&onse.uences of alternati!e constructions

• conse.uences that may follow from alternati!e constructionof doubtful constitutional pro!isions constitute an importanfactor to consider in construing them$

• if a pro!ision has more than one interpretation, tha

construction which would lead to absurd, impossible omischie!ous conse.uences must be re2ected$

• e$g$ directory and mandatory interpretation Art$ ; %ec *7(*

re.uires 2udges to render decision within specific periodsfrom date of submission for decision of cases (construed asdirectory because if otherwise it will cause greater in2ury tothe public"

&onstitution construed as a whole

• pro!ision should not be construed separately from the rest it

should be interpreted as a whole and be harmonied withconflicting pro!isions so as to gi!e them all force and effect$

• sections in the constitution with a particular sub2ect should

be interpreted together to effectuate the whole purpose of the&onstitution$

To#entino v. Secretary of Finance

• >A4 Law, passage of bill

• in!ol!ed are article 8 %ec$ :9 and RA *8 (>A4 Law"

• contention of the petitioner RA *8 did not originat

eclusi!ely from the @OR as re.uired by the &onstitution because it is the result of the consolidation of two distinc

bills$

• &ourt re2ected such interpretation$ (guys alam niyo na

naman to, that it should originate from @OR but it could stil

be modified by the %enate"

)andatory or directory

• RFLE constitutional pro!isions are to be construed amandatory unless a different intention is manifested$

• Ghy 'ecause in a constitution, the so!ereign itself spea1sand is laying down rules which for the time being at least areto control ali1e the go!ernment and the go!erned$



• failure of the legislature to enact the necessary re.uired bythe constitution does not ma1e the legislature is illegal$

Prospecti!e or retroacti!e

• RFLE constitution operates prospecti!ely only unless the

words employed are clear that it applies retroacti!ely

Magtoto v. Mang%era

• %ec :6 of Article I> of the *+- &onstitution Bno personshall be compelled to be a witness against himself$ Anyconfession obtained in !iolation of this section shall beinadmissible in e!idenceC

• &ourt held that this specific portion of the mandate should be

gi!en a prospecti!e application

Co v. E#ectric Trib%na#

• %ec$ *(-" Art$ 9 of the *+; &onstitution states that those born before #anuary *, *+- of /ilipino mothers, who electPhilippine citienship upon reaching the age of ma2orityC arecitiens of the Philippines has a retroacti!e effect as shown

to the clear intent of the framers through the language used

Applicability of rules of statutory construction

• Doctrines used in Sarmiento v. Mison is a good eample in

which the %& applied a number of rules of statutory

construction$

• Issue whether or not the appointment of a &ommissioner of&ustoms is sub2ect to confirmation by the &ommission onappointments

Kenerally, constitutional pro!isions are self3eecuting

• RFLE constitutional pro!isions are self eecuting ecept

when pro!isions themsel!es epressly re.uire legislations toimplement them$

• %EL/ EE&F4I5K PRO>I%IO5%3 pro!isions which are

complete by themsel!es and becomes operati!e without theaid of supplementary legislation$

• #ust because legislation may supplement and add or prescribe

a penalty does not render such pro!ision ineffecti!e in the

absence of such legislation$• In case of Doubt &onstrue such pro!ision as self eecuting

rather than non3self eecuting$

Mani#a Prince !ote# v. ,S/S

• Issue w=n the sale at public bidding of the ma2orityownership of the )anila @otel a .ualified entity can match

the winning bid of a foreigner

• @eld resolution depends on whether the issue is selfeecuting or not$ 4he court ruled that the .ualified /ilipino

entity must be gi!en preference by granting it the option tomatch the winning bid because the pro!ision is selfeecuting$

3 4he End 3

Documents

Statutory Construction - Agpalo (Outline)