Status of Efforts: Caucasus and Central Asia

Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism

Status of Efforts: Caucasus & Central Asia

April 2011

The Fund for Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, 501(c)(3) non-profit research and educational organization that

works to prevent violent conflict and promote sustainable security. We promote sustainable security through

research, training and education, engagement of civil society, building bridges across diverse sectors, and

developing innovative technologies and tools for policy makers. A leader in the conflict assessment and early

warning field, the Fund for Peace focuses on the problems of weak and failing states. Our objective is to create

practical tools and approaches for conflict mitigation that are useful to decision-makers.

Copyright © 2011 The Fund for Peace.

All rights reserved.

This program description is proprietary to The Fund for Peace.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written consent from The Fund for Peace.

The Fund for Peace Transnational Threats

Threat Convergence Status of Efforts Briefing Number 3

Series Editor

Patricia Taft

Report Written by

Jonas Vaicikonis

The Fund for Peace Publication FFP : TTCVR1107 (Version 11E)

Circulation: PUBLIC

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2 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org

Introduction & Contents

WMD Nonproliferation Activities 4

Export Control Laws & Projects in Place 5

Counterterrorism Initiatives 7

Antiterrorism Instruments 12

Anti-Money Laundering and

Finance Initiatives 14

U.S. Multilateral Initiatives 16

References 17

About The Fund for Peace 18


Caucasus & Central Asia

Overview

The Fund for Peace is an

independent, nonpartisan, 501(c)(3) non-

profit research and educational organization

that works to prevent violent conflict and

promote sustainable security.

We promote sustainable security through

research, training and education, engagement

of civil society, building bridges across

diverse sectors, and developing innovative

technologies and tools for policy makers.

A leader in the conflict assessment and early

warning field, the Fund for Peace focuses on

the problems of weak and failing states. Our

objective is to create practical tools and

approaches for conflict mitigation that are

useful to decision-makers.

The Fund for Peace offers a wide range of

initiatives focused on our central objective:

to promote sustainable security and the

ability of a state to solve its own problems

peacefully without an external military or

administrative presence. Our programs fall

into three primary thematic areas:

• Conflict Early Warning and Assessment;

• Transnational Threats; and

• Sustainable Development, Sustainable

Security.

After three years of project work, in January

2009, The Fund for Peace established its

program on Threat Convergence to explore

the linkages among the three biggest threats

to global security: fragile states, the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

(WMD), and terrorism. The program aims to:

• raise the profile of the challenges in

vulnerable, fragile and ungoverned regions

on the nonproliferation agenda;

• explore how these regions may serve as

enabling environments for nuclear

terrorism;

• promote more coherent and strategic

policy approaches to nuclear terrorism and

illicit nuclear trafficking; and

• become a hub for threat convergence-

related analysis.

The program encourages innovative and

fresh approaches to the issue by convening

experts, performing extensive field research

in some of the world’s most difficult

environments, and by partnering with

international and regional organizations to

explore how the threat of catastrophic

terrorism emanating from weak and failing

states can be prevented.

About Threat Convergence


WMD Nonproliferation Activities


Armenia

Azer.

Georgia

Kazak.

Kyrgyz.

Mongolia

Tajikistan

Turkmen.

Uzbek.

UNSCR 1540 Reports submitted 9 Nov 04 Add. 1

28 Oct 04 Add. 1

24 Oct 04 10 Dec 04 7 Dec 05

21 Dec 04 18 Feb 06

3 Jun 05 12 Jan 05 9 Jan 06

14 Oct 04 27 Jun 06

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (not yet entered into force)

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

Chemical Weapons Convention (1993)

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

Biological Toxin Weapons Convention (1972)

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

International Atomic Energy Agency

CSA/AP CSA/AP CSA/AP CSA/AP CSA/AP CSA/AP CSA/AP CSA/AP CSA/AP

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980)

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

- State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

Joint Convention on the Safety of State Partyent Fuel Management and on the safety of Radioactive Waste Management (1997)

- - - Signatory State Party

- State Party

- State Party

Convention on Nuclear Safety (1994)

State Party

- - Signatory - - - - -

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005)

- Signatory - Signatory Signatory State Party

Signatory State Party

State Party

Abbreviations: AP: Additional Protocol in Force CSA: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in Force



Export Control Laws and Projects in Place

Armenia The Armenian Parliament adopted a law on the export control of dual-use items and technologies and their transit

across the territory of the Armenia on 24 September 2003. An inter-departmental Commission for the export control

of dual-use items and technologies enforces export controls and regulates the transit of dual-use items across the

territory of Armenia. Any support to non-state actors involved in WMD proliferation is prohibited under Armenian law.

Armenia adopted a dual-use control list in 2007 and has since harmonized the Armenian list with the EU dual-use

control list. The Criminal Code of Armenia, adopted in 2003, criminalizes actions prohibited by WMD nonproliferation

treaties, including the development, production, acquisition, transfer, smuggling and sale of weapons of mass

destruction or relevant components, technologies and devices. Additionally, the Criminal Code prohibits the

smuggling of weapons, narcotics, radioactive and explosive materials.

Azerbaijan Azerbaijan’s export control law came into force on 26 October 2004. The law stipulates that conventional, nuclear,

chemical and biological weapons, materials, devices, technologies and any services thereto pertaining, as well as dual

-use goods are subject to export control. It remains unclear whether the government of Azerbaijan has compiled a

comprehensive list of controlled items. For more information, please see the Azerbaijani Law on Export Control (in

Russian).1 Azerbaijan has received extensive technical assistance from the United States to develop a robust export

control system. In 2007, the U.S. funded training of Azeri border guards and customs officials on dual-use commodity

identification, international export control, border security and interdiction techniques. The U.S. government also

assisted Azeri authorities in the implementation of the export control law by funding training, software development

for tighter control and regulation implementation. In January 2005, a DOE/NNSA team traveled to Baku to conduct a

workshop on nuclear commodity identification, commodities subject to export control, and Azeri legislation in the

field of export control. In February 2004, U.S. government agencies sponsored workshops on transit controls for

freight forwarders, maritime nuclear commodity identification, and export control legislation standards. Despite

progress made, the U.S. Department of State notes that Azeri export control legislation “still lacks comprehensive

controls on transit and transshipments”, and export licensing for dual-use items has yet to be fully implemented.

Additionally, law enforcement officials and freight forwarders receive inadequate training in the sphere of trade

controls. Corruption and insufficient resources increase vulnerability, and sensitive cargo often goes unchecked. The

Azeri government has not made sufficient progress in investigating and prosecuting those found to be in violation of

export controls. For more information, please see the State Department’s Country Assessments and Performance

Measures for Azerbaijan, 2006.2

Georgia Georgia’s Law on the Export Control of Weapons, Military Equipment and Dual-Use Items was adopted on 28 April

1998. The law stipulated that conventional, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, materials, devices and

technologies are subject to export controls, and that an export license can only be obtained for the export of nuclear

material if the recipient country provides guarantees that the materials will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes

and will be subject to all IAEA safeguards. By 2002, the Georgian government had compiled a list of 26 groups of dual

-use items subject to export control. This list includes controlled items from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

control lists. In January 2003, the Export Control law was amended to specify the licensing authorities for weapons

and dual-use goods. The United States has provided technical and training assistance to Georgia in the development

of an export control system. In April 2005, the DOE organized a series of export control workshops in Tbilisi and along

the Georgian-Azerbaijani border. In September 2004, a NNSA team conducted a series of training courses on nuclear

commodity identification for Georgian customs and border patrol officials. In April 2004, DOE specialists held an end-

use/end-user workshop in Tbilisi for Georgian government officials, which covered export control standards, export

license reviews, and proliferation methods. For more information, please see the NTI page on Export Control

Developments in Georgia.3


Kazakhstan Kazakhstan participates in two export control regimes, the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Kazakhstan has been praised for taking the lead in strengthening export controls among Central Asian states and has

a number of nonproliferation export control laws. It has had an automated export control system since 2000. It is

continuing to address questions of rapid turnover in its export control office and of the office’s under-resourcing.

Kazakhstan, partnering with the U.S. and U.K., recently moved 100 tons of highly radioactive material from a Soviet-

era reactor to a secure storage site. This project was widely praised internationally as a successful multi-state

partnership to reduce the risk of terrorist acquisition of dangerous material. Kazakhstan is a state party to the Central

Asia Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty.

Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan participates in two export control regimes, the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It has

requested assistance from other UN member states in fulfilling its obligations under UNSCR 1540. It has asked for

“methodological, financial, and technical assistance.” Kyrgyzstan has a number of national trade and export control

laws and is a state party to the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty.

Mongolia Mongolia does not participate in any multilateral export regimes. It has, however, declared that Mongolia is a nuclear

weapon free zone and the UN has certified this declaration. Legislation, such as the Law on Protection Against Toxic

Chemicals (1995) and the Law on Combating Terrorism (2004), enables Mongolia to fight WMD proliferation.

Mongolian export control laws prohibit the transfer of weapons or weapons components into or through its territory,

although they do not specifically mention WMD.

Tajikistan Tajikistan does not participate in any multilateral export control regimes, though it has a number of national trade and

export control laws which address the problem of WMD use and transport. Tajikistan is a state party to 14 treaties that

address terrorism and nonproliferation. It is a well-known transit hub for drugs and other illicit goods, and it has not

been able to secure its borders to stem this tide. Tajikistan is a member of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free

Zone Treaty.

Turkmenistan Turkmenistan does not participate in any multilateral export control regimes, though it has a number of national trade

and export control laws. Turkmenistan is a state party to the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty.

Uzbekistan Uzbekistan does not participate in any multilateral export control regimes. It has requested assistance in fulfilling its

obligations under UNSCR 1540, especially in training its border security personnel. It has a number of national trade

and export control laws. Uzbekistan is a state party to the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty.

Export Control Laws and Projects in Place


Counterterrorism Initiatives


Pursuant to U.N. Security Council

Resolutions 1373 and 1624 CTC Cooperation

UNSCR 1373 Reports

submitted

UNSCR 1624 Reports

submitted UNODC Terrorism Prevention Branch activities

Armenia CTC assistance received 2001-2007

1) S/2002/162 2) S/2003/146 3) S/2003/1044 4) S/2005/366 5) S/2006/1028

S/2006/1028 • Participated in a workshop on the Implementation of the Universal Instruments against Terrorism. Organized in cooperation with the CIS Executive Committee and co-funded by the OSCE (Minsk, Belarus, January 2008).

• Participated in a workshop for legal experts of CSTO Member States on the criminal law aspects of the implementation of the Universal counter-terrorism Instruments, (Moscow, Russia, October 2007).

• Participated in the second subregional expert workshop on International Cooperation on Counter- Terrorism, Corruption and the Fight against Transna-tional Organized Crime (Antalya, Turkey, February 2007).

• Participated in a workshop on the legislative implementation of universal instruments against terrorism and regional experiences in promoting international cooperation against terrorism for the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Moscow, Russia, November 2005)

• Participated in a workshop for Central Asia and the Caucasus on international cooperation against terrorism and transnational organized crime, organized in cooperation with the Government of Turkey (Antalya, Turkey, February 2004)

Azerbaijan CTC assistance received 1998-2006

1) S/2001/1325 2) S/2002/1022 3) S/2003/1085 4) S/2004/964 5) S/2006/802




UNSCR 1373 & 1624*




UNSCR 1373 Reports

submitted

UNSCR 1624 Reports


Georgia CTC assistance received 2002-2005

1) S/2002/3 & Add.1 2) S/2002/1185

- • Participated in the second subregional expert workshop on International Cooperation on Counter- Terrorism, Corruption and the Fight against Transna-tional Organized Crime (Antalya, Turkey, February 2007).


• Participated in a workshop for Central Asia and the Caucasus on international cooperation against terrorism and transnational organized crime, organized in cooperation with the Government of Turkey (Antalya, Turkey, February 2004)

Kazakhstan CTC assistance received 2004-2008

S/2001/1307 S/2002/1087 S/2003/862 S/2004/658 Add 1. S/2005/287


• Participated in the Regional Workshop for Central Asia and Afghanistan on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Organized in cooperation with the OSCE (Tashkent, Uzbekistan, April 2007).

• Participated in the second sub-regional expert workshop on International Cooperation on Counter- Terrorism, Corruption and the Fight against Transna-tional Organized Crime (Antalya, Turkey, February 2007).

• Participated in a workshop on the legislative implementation of universal instruments against terrorism and regional experiences in promoting international cooperation against terrorism for the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Moscow, Russia, November 2005).

• Participated in a regional workshop on the legislative implementation of universal instruments against terrorism for Central Asian and neighboring countries (Tashkent, Uzbekistan, April 2005).

• Participated in a workshop for Central Asia and the Caucasus on international cooperation against terrorism and transnational organized crime, organized in cooperation with the Government of Turkey (Antalya, Turkey, February 2004).





UNSCR 1373 Reports

submitted

UNSCR 1624 Reports


Kyrgyzstan CTC assistance received 2004-2007

S/2002/204 S/2003/776 S/2004/660 Add. 1 S/2006/350

S/2010/328 • Participated in a workshop for legal experts of CSTO Member States on the criminal law aspects of the implementation of the Universal counter-terrorism Instruments, (Moscow, Russia, October 2007).






Mongolia CTC assistance received 2005

S/2001/1135 S/2002/1152 S/2005/455

- • Participated in a regional workshop on the legislative implementation of universal instruments against terrorism for Central Asian and neighboring countries (Tashkent, Uzbekistan, April 2005).





UNSCR 1373 Reports

submitted

UNSCR 1624 Reports


Tajikistan CTC assistance received 2004-2008

S/2002/358 S/2003/147 S/2004/992 S/2006/86


• Participated in a workshop for legal experts of CSTO Member States on the criminal law aspects of the implementation of the Universal counter-terrorism Instruments, (Moscow, Russia, October 2007).










UNSCR 1373 Reports

submitted

UNSCR 1624 Reports


Turkmenistan CTC assistance received 2004-2007

S/2002/580 S/2003/129 S/2003/868 S/2005/213 Add. 1 S/2009/498

See: S/2009/498 • Participated in the second subregional expert workshop on International Cooperation on Counter- Terrorism, Corruption and the Fight against Transna-tional Organized Crime (Antalya, Turkey, February 2007).




Uzbekistan CTC assistance received 2004-2007

S/2002/4 S/2002/974 S/2003/833 S/2005/347 S/2006/837

See: S/2006/837 • Participated in a workshop for legal experts of CSTO Member States on the criminal law aspects of the implementation of the Universal counter-terrorism Instruments, (Moscow, Russia, October 2007).







Antiterrorism Instruments


Armenia

Azer.

Georgia

Kazak.

Kyrgyz.

Mongolia

Tajikistan

Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft (1963)

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970)

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971)

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973)

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979)

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980)

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

- State Party

State Party

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1988)

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988)

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

- State Party

State Party

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988)

State Party

State Party

- State Party

- State Party

-

Convention on the Marking of Plas-tic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (1991)

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997)

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

Turkmen.

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

Uzbek.

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

Antiterrorism Instruments


Armenia

Azer.

Georgia

Kazak.

Kyrgyz.

Mongolia

Tajikistan

Turkmen.

Uzbek.

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005)

- - - State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

- - - Signatory State Party

State Party

Signatory State Party

State Party

Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation

- - - - - - - State Party

-

Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of fixed platforms located on the continental shelf

- - - - - - - - -



Anti-Money Laundering and Finance Initiatives

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing

Implementation of FATF 40+9 recommendations

Armenia State Party Until 2004, Armenia had no mechanisms for AML/CTF, according to the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. In 2004, Armenia established an AML/CTF framework and opened an FIU in 2005. Armenia was identified by the US Department of the Treasury in the 2007 National Money Laundering Strategy as a country with shell companies implicated in SARs filed between 1996 and 2004.

Azerbaijan State Party Azerbaijan’s progress in developing an AML/CTF framework was considerably slower than that of Armenia and Georgia, and this framework remained at a level below international standards through 2006. Money laundering was criminalized in 2006, but there were no investigations or prosecutions underway and no FIU, according to the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. In February 2009, Azerbaijan adopted an AML/CTF law and has since made “progress (…) in addressing many of [the] concerns” expressed by MONEYVAL.

Georgia State Party Georgia’s anti-money laundering (AML) law came into effect in 2004. Soon thereafter, the Georgian Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and specialized units within Georgian law enforcement institutions helped prosecute 26 cases of money laundering. The trials ended in 15 convictions. Many casinos, long suspected of being money laundering fronts, were closed. However, according to the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, ensuring compliance with anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF) standards and legislation remained challenging due to political instability and endemic corruption, and suspicious activity reports (SARs) were rarely filed. Georgia was identified by the US Department of the Treasury in the 2007 National Money Laundering Strategy as a country with shell companies implicated in SARs filed between 1996 and 2004.

Kazakhstan State Party Kazakhstan is a member of the Eurasian Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, an FATF-style organization in Central Asia, which it joined in 2004. It passed its AML/CFT regime in 2010. A mutual evaluation of Kazakhstan’s AML/CFT legislation is being conducted from 2010-2011.

Kyrgyzstan State Party Kyrgyzstan is a member of the Eurasian Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, an FATF-style organization in Central Asia, which it joined in 2004. It passed its AML/CFT law in 2006 and then strengthened it during 2008-2009. It was found to be “partially compliant” or “non-compliant” in implementing 25 of the 40 recommendations and in 8 of the 9 special recommendations. Kyrgyzstan joined the Egmont Group in 2009 to further improve its anti-money laundering abilities. See Kyrgyzstan’s latest evaluation report.4

Mongolia State Party Mongolia is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group, an FATF-style organization in Asia, which it joined in 2004. Mongolia passed an AML/CFT law in 2006 and strengthened it in 2009. It was rated “partially compliant” or non-compliant” in 38 of the 40 recommendations, and in 9 of 9 special recommendations.

Tajikistan State Party Tajikistan is a member of the Eurasian Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, an FATF-style organization in Central Asia, which it joined in 2004. It formed a working group in 2009 to create AML/CFT legislation. Tajikistan was rated “partially compliant” or “non-compliant” in 35 of the 40 recommendations and in 9 of 9 special recommendations. See Tajikistan’s latest evaluation report.5


International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing

Implementation of FATF 40+9 recommendations

Turkmenistan State Party Turkmenistan is a member of the Eurasian Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, an FATF-style organization in Central Asia, which it joined in 2010. Its AML/CFT legislation was adopted in 2009. A mutual evaluation of Turkmenistan’s AML/CFT legislation is being conducted from 2010-2011.

Uzbekistan State Party Uzbekistan is a member of the Eurasian Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, an FATF-style organization in Central Asia, which it joined in 2005. Uzbekistan’s AML/CFT legislation came into force in 2006. Uzbekistan was rated “partially compliant” or “non-compliant” in 17 of the 40 recommendations and 5 of the 9 special recommenda-tions. Uzbekistan’s latest evaluation report can be found at http://www.eurasiangroup.org/Uzbekistan.php.

Anti-Money Laundering and Finance Initiatives


U.S. Multilateral Initiatives


Container Security

Initiative

Proliferation Security Initiative

Megaports Initiative (National Nuclear

Security Administration)

Armenia - Participant -

Azerbaijan - Participant -

Georgia - Participant -

Kazakhstan - Participant -

Kyrgyzstan - Participant -

Mongolia - Participant -

Tajikistan - Participant -

Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative

Joint action plan signed in 2008 (see NSOI Armenia fact sheet6)

-

Joint action plan signed in 2007 (see NSOI Georgia fact sheet7)

Joint action plan signed in 2006 (See NSOI Kazakhstan fact sheet8)

Joint action plan signed in 2007 (See NSOI Kyrgyzstan fact sheet9)

-

Provisionally agreed to a joint action plan in 2010. The Tajik government is now review-ing the plan.

Uzbekistan - Participant An NSOI delegation met with the Uzbek government to discuss the creation of a joint action plan in 2010.

-


Endnotes


References

• National Reports to the UN Security Council 1540 Committee: http://www.un.org/sc/1540/nationalreports.shtml

• Container Security Initiative: http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/

• FATF 40 Recommendations on Money Laundering: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/28/0,3343,en_32250379_32236930_ 33658140_1_1_1_1,00.html

• FAFT 9 Recommendations on Terrorist Financing: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/___document/9/0,3343,en_32250379_32236920_ 34032073_1_1_1_1,00.html

• FATF Proliferation Financing Report: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/14/21/41146580.pdf

• FATF Typologies Report on Proliferation Financing: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/14/21/41146580.pdf

• US Megaports Initiative: http://nnsa.energy.gov/nuclear_nonproliferation/1641.htm

• MONEYVAL: http://wwww.coe.int/moneyval

• Proliferation Security Initiative: http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm

• UN Security Council Counter-terrorism Committee: http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/

• UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Terrorism Prevention Branch: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/index.html

• International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism: http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm

• Central Asia Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty Text:

http://disarmament.un.org/treatystatus.nsf/44e6eeabc9436b78852568770078d9c0/c851f154c73c8837852572f8005597f1?OpenDocument

Useful URL Links

1. URL available at: http://disarmament2.un.org/committee1540/Datasheets/Azerbaijan%20Law%20on%20Export%20Control.doc

2. URL available at: http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/92785.htm

3. URL available at: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Georgia/export_control.html

4. URL available at: http://eurasiangroup.org/ru/news/eagkyrgyz.pdf

5. URL available at: http://eurasiangroup.org/ru/news/tajikistan.pdf

6. URL available at: http://www.nsoi-state.net/media/pdf/Armenia%20fact%20sheets.pdf

7. URL available at: http://www.nsoi-state.net/media/pdf/Georgia%20fact%20sheets.pdf

8. URL available at: http://www.nsoi-state.net/media/pdf/Kazakhstan%20fact%20sheets.pdf

9. URL available at: http://www.nsoi-state.net/media/pdf/Kyrgyz%20republic%20fact%20sheets.pdf

The Fund for Peace is an

independent, nonpartisan, 501(c)(3) non-

profit research and educational organization

that works to prevent violent conflict and

promote sustainable security.

We promote sustainable security through

research, training and education, engagement

of civil society, building bridges across

diverse sectors, and developing innovative

technologies and tools for policy makers.

A leader in the conflict assessment and early

warning field, the Fund for Peace focuses on

the problems of weak and failing states. Our

objective is to create practical tools and

approaches for conflict mitigation that are

useful to decision-makers.

The Fund for Peace offers a wide range of

initiatives focused on our central objective:

to promote sustainable security and the

ability of a state to solve its own problems

peacefully without an external military or

administrative presence. Our programs fall

into three primary thematic areas:

• Conflict Early Warning and Assessment;

• Transnational Threats; and

• Sustainable Development, Sustainable

Security.

Conflict Early Warning and Assessment

Transnational Threats

Sustainable Development, Sustainable Security

After three years of project work, in January

2009, The Fund for Peace established its

program on Threat Convergence to explore

the linkages among the three biggest threats

to global security: fragile states, the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

(WMD), and terrorism. The program aims to:

• raise the profile of the challenges in

vulnerable, fragile and ungoverned regions

on the nonproliferation agenda;

• explore how these regions may serve as

enabling environments for nuclear

terrorism;

• promote more coherent and strategic

policy approaches to nuclear terrorism and

illicit nuclear trafficking; and

• become a hub for threat convergence-

related analysis.

The program encourages innovative and

fresh approaches to the issue by convening

experts, performing extensive field research

in some of the world’s most difficult

environments, and by partnering with

international and regional organizations to

explore how the threat of catastrophic

terrorism emanating from weak and failing

states can be prevented.

About Threat Convergence

www.fundforpeace.org/tc

About

The Fund for Peace

www.fundforpeace.org

The Fund for Peace Transnational Threats

FFP : TTCVR1107

Documents

Status of Efforts: Caucasus and Central Asia