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1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
_____________________________________________________________
STATE OF IOWA, )
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) S.CT. NO. 15-1830
)
MAURICE D. ANGEL, )
Defendant-Appellee. )
_____________________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT
FOR SCOTT COUNTY
HONORABLE MARLITA A. GREVE, JUDGE
____________________________________________________________
APPELLEE’S BRIEF AND ARGUMENT
_____________________________________________________________
SHARON D. HALLSTOOS [email protected] HALLSTOOS LAW OFFICE 3110 SPRING VALLEY ROAD Dubuque, Iowa 52001 563-582-6200 (Home Office/Fax)
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE FINAL BRIEF
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2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the 8TH day of JUNE, 2016, the undersigned certifies that
a true copy of the foregoing instrument was served upon Defendant-
Appellee-Angel by placing one copy thereof in the United States
mail, proper postage attached, addressed to Maurice D. Angel, 713
11th Avenue, Rock Island, IL 61201.
HALLSTOOS LAW OFFICE
_____________/S/__________________
Sharon D. Hallstoos
Attorney at Law
Hallstoos Law Office
3110 Spring Valley Road
Dubuque, IA 52001
(563) 582-6300
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
Certificate of Service…………………………………………………………..2 Table of Authorities……………………………………………………………4 Statement of the Issues Presented for Review…………………………..6 Routing Statement…………………………………………………………….7 Statement of the Case…………………………………………………………8 Argument……………………………………………………………………….15 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………..29 Request for Non-oral Argument…………………………………………..30 Attorney's Cost Certificate………………………………………………….30 Certificate of Compliance…………………………………………………..31
4
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: PAGE
Henry v. State, 626 S.E.2d 511 (Ga. 2006………………………….7,26
People v. Vera, 913 NE2d 86 (Ill. App. 2009)………………………….25
State v. Barnett, 220 S.E.2d 730 (GA)………………………………..6,26
State v. Beckett, 532 NW2d 751 (Iowa 1995)…………………6,9,10,28
State v. Colon, 644 A.2d 877 (Conn. 1994……………………………..25
State v. Easter, 241 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1976)……………….6,11,20,22
State v. Harris, 436 N.W.2d 364 (Iowa 1989)……………………….6,21
State v. Iowa District Court, 472 N.W.2d 621(1owa 1991)……….6,29
State v. Liesche, 228 N.W. 2d 44 (Iowa 1975)………6,11,16,17,21,22
State v. Myers, 570 N.W.2d 70 (Iowa 1997)………………………….6,18
State v. Paschal, 300 N.W.2d 115 (Iowa1981)…………………..6,23,24
State v. Seiler, 342 N.W.2d 264 (Iowa 1983)………..…………..6,11,20
State v. Swaim, 412 N.W.2d 568 (Iowa 1987)……………………..10,14
Wenck v. State, 320 N.W.2d 567 (Iowa 1982)…………………………...9
5
Statutes:
Iowa Code § 808.3……………………..7,8,10,11,13,15,16,17,19,23,24
Iowa Code § 808.4 (2015)…………………………………..6,7,8,10,27,29
6
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
WHETHER THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS INVALID BECAUSE IT
WAS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH IOWA CODE §§ 808.3 AND 808.4
Authorities
State v. Barnett, 220 S.E.2d 730, 732 (GA 1975)
State v. Beckett, 532 NW2d 751 (Iowa 1995)
State v. Bishop, 387 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Iowa 1986)
State v. Easter, 241 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1976)
State v. Godbersen, 493 NW2d 852, 854-55 (Iowa 1992)
State v. Harris, 436 N.W.2d 364 (Iowa 1989)
State v. Iowa District Court, 472 N.W.2d 621(1owa 1991)
State v. Liesche, 228 N.W. 2d 44 (Iowa 1975)
State v. Myers, 570 N.W.2d 71, 73 (Iowa 1997)
State v. Paschal, 300 N.W.2d 115 (Iowa 1981)
State v. Seiler, 342 N.W.2d 264 (Iowa 1983)
STATUTES
Iowa Code § 808.3……………………..7,8,10,11,13,15,16,17,19,23,24
Iowa Code § 808.4 (2015)……………………………………..7,8,10,27,29
7
ROUTING STATEMENT
This case should be retained by the Iowa Supreme Court
because one of the issues raised involves a substantial issue of first
impression in Iowa and deals with whether the warrant was in
‘substantial compliance’ with Iowa Code §§ 808.3 and 808.4. Iowa
R. App. P. 6.903(2)(d) and 6.1101(2)(c).
The case involves the following 2 issues: (1) Whether pursuant
to Iowa Code 808.3 whether the district court erred in sustaining the
defendant’s motion to suppress in finding the search warrant invalid
because the application for the search warrant was not signed by
Deputy Furlong; And
(2) Pursuant to Iowa Code Section 808.4 the district court erred
in sustaining the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress the evidence seized
through the issuance of a search warrant where the magistrate did
not make a finding of probable cause prior to issuing the search
warrant.
8
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State appeals the district court’s ruling grant of the
Defendants’ Motions to Suppress evidence seized pursuant to a
search warrant executed on May 18, 2015.
Course of Proceedings
Defendant-Appellee, Maurice Angel, agrees with the State’s
recitation of the course of proceedings.
Facts: Defendant-Appellee, Angel, agrees that the State’s
recitation of facts are sufficient in regards to the issues raised on
appeal.
STATE’S ARGUMENT
THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS INVALID BECAUSE IT DID MEET
THE REQUIREMENTS OF IOWA CODE SECTIONS 808.3 AND
808.4 (2015).
A. Error Preservation.
9
Angel agrees that the State preserved error by filing a
resistance and brief in opposition to the Defendants’ motion
to suppress and that the State offered a witness for the
contested hearing, obtained a ruling on the contested issue
and filed an application seeking discretionary review of the
district court’s ruling.
B. Standard of Review.
The court reviews legal challenges regarding the statutory
sufficiency of the warrant is for correction of errors at law.
State v. Day, 528 N.W.2d 100, 102 (Iowa 1995); State v.
Beckett, 532 N.W.2d 751, 753 (Iowa 1995). The appellate
courts may affirm the district court’s ruling on any grounds,
including grounds that are different from those relied on by
the trial court. Wenck v. State, 320 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Iowa
1982). The appellate court is limited in its review to a
consideration of only that information, reduced to writing,
which was actually presented to the magistrate at the time
application for the warrant was made. State v. Seager, 341
N.W.2d 420, 426 (Iowa 1983).
10
c. Discussion.
In State v. Bishop, 387 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Iowa 1986), the
appellate court recognized its duty to give deference to the
magistrate's finding. Id. at 558. Due to the preference for
warrants, doubts are resolved in favor of their validity. Id.
The Court held that the reviewing court has the obligation
“to insist that the issuing magistrate’s function be
performed in a neutral, detached manner and not merely
serving as a rubber stamp for the police.” State v. Beckett,
532 N.W.2d 751, 753 (Iowa 1995) (quoting State v. Swaim,
412 N.W.2d 568, 571 (Iowa 1987).
In the instant case, the Court did not err when it granted
the Defendants’ Motion to Suppress because the search
warrant was not in substantial compliance with Iowa Code
§§ 808.3 and 808.4. (2015) for the following reasons: (1)
The application was unsigned and therefore was not
supported by oath or affirmation and (2) The
11
magistrate/judge did not complete the endorsement
indicating its probable cause findings prior to issuing the
search warrant.
The district court correctly held that Furlong’s unsigned
and unsworn Application for the Search Warrant could not
be later supplemented by his oral testimony because it was
limited in considering only the “four corners of the warrant”
documents, citing State v. Seiler, 342 N.W.2d 264 (Iowa
1983) and State v. Easter, 242 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1976).
(Ruling, p. 3) (App. 138).
In State v. Liesche, 228 N.W.2d 44, 48 (Iowa 1975), the
Court declared that it would limit challenges to the search
warrant to the “four corners” of the warrant documents
presented to the magistrate at the time he/she issued the
warrant. Id.
In that case, the magistrate/judge did not comply with Iowa
Code Section 741.4 (now 808.3). On the Endorsement of
12
Search Warrant page, the magistrate did not write the name
and address of the person whose testimony the magistrate
relied on in issuing the warrant. Additionally, the
magistrate recounted at the Defendant’s suppression
hearing that he relied on a peace officer’s verbal comment
stating his beliefs that the Defendant possessed a gun on
his person that was used in a rape days earlier. The
magistrate could not remember if he placed the peace officer
under oath. Further, the magistrate did not comply with
the statutory requirement of completing an abstract of the
peace officer’s oral testimony. The Court expressed concern
about the magistrate’s failure to preserve a clear written
record for the Defendant in the event he/she wanted to
challenge the underlying search warrant. Id. at 46-47. The
Court held that the magistrate’s failure to comply with
statute created an “intolerable situation” in which all the
parties were at the mercy of the magistrate’s poor memory
of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a search
warrant.” Id. at 48 It further held that the magistrate’s
13
failure to keep a good, written record of the sworn testimony
or circumstances regarding the issuance of a warrant
deprived the defendant “of notice of the fact recited against
him for purposes of attacking their veracity.” Id. The Court
then clarified that the legislative intent behind 808.3 is to
require that the sufficiency of the probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant rises or falls on the written
Application/affidavit in support of the search warrant, along
with the abstracts of oral testimony. If the information is
not contained in the “four corners” of any of those
documents, then the court will not consider any extrinsic
evidence regarding the said warrant documents.
By enacting 808.3, it appears that the Iowa legislature
sought to protect the rights of the people and make the
Search Warrant process as transparent as possible.
14
d. ISSUANCE OF THE WARRANT:
“Because there is a preference for warrants, we resolve
doubtful cases in favor of their validity.” State v.
Godbersen, 493 NW2d 852, 854-55 (Iowa 1992). A search
warrant is only to be issued upon probable cause. State v.
Swaim, 412 NW2d 568, 570 (Iowa 1987). The test for
determining the existence of probable cause is “Whether a
person of reasonable prudence would believe a crime was
committed on the premises to be searched or evidence of a
crime could be located there.” Godbersen at 855. Although
we give substantial deference to the magistrate’s
determination of probable cause, the reviewing court has
the responsibility “to insist that the issuing magistrate’s
function be performed in a neutral and detached manner,
not serving merely as a rubber stamp for the police.”
Swaim, 412 at 571. Although we are mindful that warrant
documents are “normally drafted by non-lawyers in the
midst and haste of a criminal investigation,” id at 574
(citation omitted), we are compelled to “carefully balance
15
that consideration against the court’s duty to
conscientiously review the sufficiency of the affidavit to
insure that the issuing magistrate’s action is not a mere
ratification of the bare conclusions of others.” Id.
ARGUMENT #1
The district court properly granted the Defendants’ Motion to
Suppress because the Detective’s Application for Search Warrant
was not supported by sworn under oath or affirmation as required
by Iowa Code Section 808.3.
Iowa Code Section 808.3 states, in pertinent part, “A person
may make application for the issuance of a search warrant by
submitting before a magistrate a written application, supported
by the person's oath or affirmation, which includes facts,
information, and circumstances tending to establish sufficient
grounds for granting the application, and probable cause for
believing that the grounds exist. (Emphasis added). Id.
16
The Court has interpreted Iowa Code Section 808.3 to
require applications for search warrant to be in written form. State
v. Leische, 228 N.W.2d 44, 47 (1owa 1975). In Liesche the court
explained its rationale for the writing requirement is “to assure
accurate, meaningful review of the probable cause showing and to
provide notice to the Defendant of the facts recited against him for
purposes of attacking veracity.” Id. at 47-48.
In this case, Detective Furlong made a written application for
a search warrant, in the form of an affidavit, and presented it to
court. Application for Search Warrant pp. 1-4; App. 145-148. The
Application opens with the following phrase, “Being duly sworn, I,
the undersigned...” Id. at p. 1; App. 145.
Detective Furlong, however, did not sign the Application,
which is indicative that he was neither placed under sworn oath nor
affirmation regarding the information that he provided in the search
warrant application. Id. at p. 4; App. Id. The line above his typed
written name, where his signature is supposed to be placed, is
blank. Id.
17
Under Liesche, the application for search warrant serves as a
written record for the reviewing court and parties about what
information and which source led to the issuance of a search
warrant. In this case, the written record of Furlong’s Application for
Search Warrant does not show that he was placed under sworn
oath or affirmation. Id.
In the district court’s ruling it explained, “Detective Furlong’s
failure to sign the search warrant means that it [the Application]
was not supported by the person’s oath or affirmation.’” as required
by 808.3. Ruling p. 8; App. 143.
A second issue raised within this context is whether the
issuing judge’s signature on the Application cures the flaw of
Furlong’s failure to sign the Application and validates Furlong’s
Application for Search Warrant. The issuing judge’s signature on
the application does not resuscitate the application because
Furlong is the listed applicant of the search warrant, which requires
his signature and not that of the magistrate; Henry v. State, 626
S.E. 2d 511, 512-13 (Ga. 2006) holds that a search warrant is
invalid where an Affidavit in support of an Application for a Search
18
warrant is signed by a person other than the named affiant. “It is
axiomatic that [t]he signature of the affiant is necessary to the
validity of an affidavit.’’ Id. at 513.
Although the issuing judge signed his name following the
phrases “Subscribed and sworn to before me on May 8, 2015,” it
does not rehabilitate the Application because there is no signature
on the complaint as to indicate who the issuing judge had sworn
under oath or affirmation regarding the information contained in
the information. Application for Search Warrant p.4; App.148.
Perhaps the issuing judge intended to write that he placed
Detective Furlong under sworn oath or affirmation. Id. In State v.
Myers, 570 N.W.2d 71, 73 (Iowa 1997) the court held that it was
“inappropriate and perhaps even dangerous to guess at the (issuing)
magistrate’s reasoning.” Even if he was found to have
acknowledged placing Furlong under oath or affirmation, the search
warrant is still invalid because the issuing judge also acknowledged
that he personally witnessed him sign the Application, which clearly
did not occur. Application for Search Warrant p.4; App.148.
19
The district court addressed whether the issuing magistrate’s
signature on the application alone validates the issuance of the
search warrant. It explained, “[I]f the issuing judge’s signature is all
that is required, why have a place for the person requesting the
search warrant to sign? That interpretation begs the question of
what is the purpose of having a search warrant application state in
its first line that the undersigned has sworn if the signature itself is
not important. The person’s signature requesting the search
warrant is a clear indication for a reviewing court to determine
there was a proper oath or affirmation given supporting the search
warrant application without that, the determination is missing and
simply cannot be made. Thus the search warrant is fatally flawed
because it was not supported by oath or affirmation as required.
See Iowa Code Section 808.3.” Ruling p. 6; App. 141.
Nearly five months following the execution of the search
warrant the Defendants filed Motions to Suppress the evidence.
The State resisted the motions. At the suppression hearing
Detective Furlong testified, over the Defendants’ objection. Furlong
acknowledged that he did not sign the application but that he
20
recalls being placed under sworn oath and affirmation by the
issuing judge. The district court allowed Detective Furlong to testify,
but instructed the parties that it would not make a determination
whether or not to sustain or overrule the Defendants’ objection until
after it conducted its research. Ruling p. 2-3; App. 137-138.
Later the court sustained the Defendants’ objection to
Detective Furlong’s testimony and held, “It is well settled law that
only information that was actually presented to the magistrate
when the warrant was requested may be considered when
determining the validity of that warrant.” State v. Seiler, 342
N.W.2d 264 (Iowa 1983). The search warrant cannot be
rehabilitated by later testimony. State v. Easter, 241 N.W. 2d 885
(Iowa 1976). Thus, this court must determine whether the search
warrant is valid based on the application for the search warrant
only; not on any procedures used in obtaining it. Therefore, this
court cannot and will not consider Detective Furlong’s testimony in
its determination of the motions to suppress.” Ruling p. 3; App.
138. Thus the district court concluded that it could not consider
21
any of Detective Furlong’s testimony since it was bound to consider
only the four corners of the search warrant. Id.
The state suggested that State v. Harris 436 N.W.2d 364
(1989) is similar to the instant case. In Harris, a police officer
submitted an application for a search warrant of the Defendant’s
residence. Id. at 369. The issuing judge was initially reluctant to
sign it because the officer’s application heavily relied on the
informant’s credibility. Id. The issuing judge required the officer to
bring the informant before him for sworn testimony under oath. Id.
The issuing judge asked the informant questions based on the
information contained in the officer’s application. Id. The issuing
judge was satisfied with the informant’s response and issued a
search warrant for law enforcement officers to search the
Defendant’s residence. Id. The issuing judge noted the officer’s
name on the application as a person whose testimony he relied on
in the warrant but the issuing judge did not include a written
abstract summary of the informant’s sworn testimony. Id. at 370.
On appeal, the Defendant argued that the court violated the Liesche
doctrine. Id. He argued that the issuing judge should not have
22
considered the Informant’s sworn, oral testimony. Id. The court
held that the search warrant was valid and did not violate the
Liesche doctrine because the informant merely confirmed the
information he provided to the peace officer and did not provide any
new information to the magistrate that was not already contained in
the officer’s application. Id. at 371.
In the case at bar, the district court properly declined to
consider Furlong’s testimony because it is inconsistent with the
four corners of the application for search warrant. The district
court explained, “[F]or a court to allow testimony in a hearing on a
motion to suppress would be a surprise to Defendants and contrary
to law.” See State v. Easter, 241 N.W.2d 885 (1976). Furlong seeks
to fix problems that are inherent on the Application for the Search
Warrant, namely that he did not sign the warrant to verify that the
issuing judge placed him under oath or affirmation and the
ambiguity of the issuing judge’s acknowledgement that he observed
Furlong personally sign the Application, when the application
clearly does not contain his signature, and that he placed Furlong
under sworn oath or affirmation. To allow him to testify would
23
involve introducing new facts which are not clear from the warrant
application.
In this case the magistrate could have inadvertently signed
the document without placing the Deputy under oath. With the
passage of time, it is highly unlikely the magistrate would recall
placing Deputy Furlong under oath in this particular case. The
Defendant would be prejudiced if the Court sent this case back to
trial court on remand for the Magistrate to testify because even if he
did not specifically recall placing Furlong under oath in this
particular case, he would likely testify that he followed his routine
way of issuing warrants, which would be to have the peace officer
swear under oath that the information he/she provided in the
Application for search warrant is credible to the best of his
knowledge.
Even if the court considers Furlong’s testimony, the search
warrant is invalid because the written application should also show
written proof that the oath or affirmation be verified in writing. In
State v.Paschal, 300 N.W.2d 115 (Iowa 1981) the court interpreted
Iowa Code section 808.3 to require proof that the application for
24
search warrant was sworn to under oath and/or affirmation also be
in writing. Id. In Paschal, a peace officer presented a written
application for a search warrant to a judge. Id. at 116. The written
application was in the form of a sworn affidavit and the officer’s oral
testimony. The court completed the endorsement of the search
warrant and, in writing, referred to the peace officer’s oral testimony
in the endorsement as something he relied on in issuing the search
warrant. Id.
The Defendant argued that the search warrant was invalid
pursuant to Iowa Code 808.3 because the endorsement neither
included a transcript nor summary of the oral testimony contained
on the audiotape. Id. at 117. However, the reviewing court found
the search warrant valid because it is neither practical nor efficient
for the court to transcribe an oral audiotape in issuing a warrant
because it would take too much time to do so considering the
urgent need to respond to warrant requests. Id. at 119. Paschal is
distinguished from our case because the issuing judge in that case
made a written reference on the endorsement page regarding the
evidence/findings he relied on whereas in our case the issuing
25
judge made no written notations on the warrant documents, except
for his signature.
Courts located in other states have held that the affiants’
failure to sign a search warrant is a mere technicality that would
not render the warrant invalid. In People v. Vera, Appellate Court of
Illinois, 913 N.E.2d 86 (2009), The Defendant filed a Motion to
Suppress the evidence obtained from the issuance of a search
warrant because the affiant police officer’s affidavit in support of the
warrant was unsworn and unsigned. Id. In Vera the court reversed
the district court’s ruling and deferred to the credibility of the
issuing judge/magistrate over these matters held that the missing
signature was a mere technical defect that did not invalidate the
warrant. Id at 439-494.
Also, in State v. Colon, 644 A.2d 877 (Conn. 1994) several
states have held that a signature on the affidavit is not essential to
prove the validity of that affidavit. See State v. Colon, 230 Conn. 24,
644 A.2d 877, 883 (1994) ("the jurat (signature) is simply evidence
of the fact that the affidavit was duly sworn to by the affiant, and,
26
in the event of its omission, the fact that the affidavit was properly
sworn to may be proven by other evidence").
Although this issue is one of first impressions for the State of
Iowa, some courts in other states have consistently held that the
affiant’s failure to sign a search warrant is more than a mere
technical error and is a fatal flaw to the issuance of a search
warrant. In Henry v. State, 277 GA App. 302, 626 S.E.2d 511
(2006), a Defendant’s financial officer was convicted of embezzling
money from her employer. The Defendant appealed the district
court’s denial of her Motion to Suppress evidence seized as a result
of the search warrant. The Defendant claimed the search warrant
was invalid because the person named as the affiant in the Affidavit
in support of the search warrant was not the same person who
signed the said affidavit/application for search warrant. The court
explained that it is axiomatic that “[t]he signature of the affiant is
necessary to the validity of an affidavit.” State v. Barnett, 136 GA.
App. 122, 123; 220 S.E.2d 730 (1975).
Similarly, In State v. Barnett, 220 S.E.2d 730, 732 (GA 1974)
the court held that an unsigned complaint is not valid because the
27
application was not supported by the affiant’s sworn oath or
affirmation; rather it was signed by a person other than the affiant.
Id. In Barnett, the court held, “the [attesting] officer’s signature
determines the validity of the affidavit and the search warrant, its
absence cannot be considered a mere technical irregularity.” Id.
ARGUMENT #2
Pursuant to Iowa Code 808.4, The Search warrant is invalid
because the issuing judge failed to complete and comply with the
Endorsement on the Search Warrant Application.
Pursuant to Iowa Code Section 808.4, prior to issuing a
warrant the issuing judge must make a finding of probable cause.
Iowa Code Section 808.4 mandates the magistrate to first make a
“Finding” of probable cause prior to issuing a warrant. Iowa Code
Section 808.4 provides, in pertinent part, “upon a finding of
probable cause for grounds to issue a search warrant, the
magistrate shall issue a warrant” (emphasis added).
The application indicates that Deputy Furlong was not placed
under oath or affirmation at the time he presented the magistrate
28
with the application for search warrant, as indicated by his lack of
signature on the warrant. Application for Search Warrant p. 4; App.
148.
In this case, the search warrant is fatally flawed because the
issuing judge did not make any findings under paragraph 4 and 5
which provides one sentence each along with words for the issuing
judge to circle regarding his/her findings from:
(1) The information (is /is not) found to justify probable
cause.
(2) I therefore (do/do not) issue probable cause.
Endorsement of Search Warrant Application p. 1; App. 154.
In the instant case based on the issuing judge’s failure to
make findings of probable cause the district court explained,
“because there was no finding of probable cause, the search
warrant should not have been issued.” Id. Ruling p. 8; App.143.
The court previously held that where a statute required the
court to make findings, the court has refused to infer findings from
the action or inaction of the issuing judge. State v. Beckett, 532
N.W.2d at 774 (where the magistrate failed to check the box
29
regarding the reasons he found either the informant credible and/or
the information that the informant supplied the peace officer
credible); State v. Iowa District Court, 472 N.W.2d at 624 (where the
court concluded the magistrate did not make findings in compliance
with the state with the statute).
For those above-mentioned reasons, the undersigned requests
that the Court affirm the district court’s ruling granting the
Defendant’s motion to suppress because the warrant was issued in
violation of Iowa Code Section 808.4.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons argued above, this court should affirm the
district court’s decision granting the defendants’ motions to
suppress. If the court finds that the district court’s decision should
be reversed, Defendant-Appellee Angel agrees with the State and
Defendant-Appellee McDowell that the reviewing court should
remand the case to district court for a ruling on whether probable
30
cause supported the search warrant, as district court did not reach
that issue.
NON-ORAL SUBMISSION
Counsel requests not to be heard in oral argument.
ATTORNEY'S COST CERTIFICATE
The undersigned, hereby certifies that the true cost of
producing the necessary copies of the foregoing Brief and Argument
was $4.00.
__________/S/__________
SHARON D. HALLSTOOS
Attorney at Law
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME
LIMITATIONS, TYPEFACE REQUIREMENTS AND TYPE-STYLE
REQUIREMENTS
31
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Iowa
R. App. P. 6.903(1)(g)(1) or (2) because:
[X] This brief contains 4,019 words, excluding the parts of the
brief exempted by Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(1)(g)(1) or (2)
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Iowa
R. App. P. 6.903(1)(e) and the type-style requirements of Iowa R. App.
P. 6.903(1)(f) because:
[x] This brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced
typeface using Microsoft Word 2010 in Bookman Old Style, font 14
point.
_____________/S/_________ Dated: June 8, 2016
SHARON D. HALLSTOOS
Attorney at Law Hallstoos Law Office 3110 Spring Valley Road Dubuque, Iowa 52001 563-582-6300 [email protected]