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STATE OF CALIFORNIAr/|A/c^
BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
INQUIRY CONCERNING JUDGE BRUCE CLAYTON MILLS,
NO. 201.
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTERS: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
By Notice of Formal Proceedings filed October 13, 2017, the Commission on Judicial Performance (the Commission) charged Contra Costa County Superior Court Judge Bruce Clayton Mills with two counts of willful misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, and improper action within the meaning of article VI, section 18 of the California Constitution. The Chief Justice of California appointed the undersigned, Justice Victoria G.Chaney, Presiding Special Master, Justice Jennifer R.S. Detjen, Special Master, and Judge Paul A. Bacigalupo, Special Master, to hear and take evidence. On January 17 and 18, 2018, we conducted an evidentiary hearing in San Francisco, California. We now submit this final report containing findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with rule 129 of the Rules of the Commission on Judicial Performance.
As set forth below, we find Judge Mills’s conduct constitutes violations of the Code of Judicial Ethics that rise to the level of willful misconduct.
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BACKGROUND
Judge Bruce Clayton Mills was a deputy district attorney
in Contra Costa County for eight years before he was sworn in as
a Contra Costa County Municipal Court judge in 1995. He was
elevated to the superior court in 1998. (Ex. 23.) Prior to the
events at issue in this matter, the Commission has disciplined
Judge Mills five times during his 23 years on the bench. In 2001,
the Commission issued a Notice of Intended Private
Admonishment to Judge Mills based on conduct that ―fostered an
appearance that the judge was attempting to coerce or intimidate
[a] defendant into pleading guilty to the charge against him.‖
(Ex. 23.) In 2006, the Commission publicly admonished Judge
Mills for improper ex parte communications, embroilment, and
for ―a pattern of making comments that are discourteous,
sarcastic, demeaning and belittling to those appearing before
him.‖ (Ex. 24.) The Commission issued Judge Mills an advisory
letter in 2008 for ―[c]onditioning [a] defendant‘s release on
posting bail for the improper purpose of collecting restitution.‖
(Ex. 25.) In 2011, the Commission issued Judge Mills another
advisory letter for ―enabling [his] minor son to bypass the
ordinary application process for going on a ‗ride along‘ ‖ to
accompany a police officer executing a warrant Judge Mills
signed. (Ex. 26.) Finally, in 2013, the Commission publicly
admonished Judge Mills for communicating with a courtroom
clerk and a pro tem judge in another department ―through
channels not available to the public‖ about a case involving his
son. (Ex. 27.)
We recite the background associated with this inquiry
chronologically.
3
A. PEOPLE V. JEFFERS (COUNT TWO)
On March 23, 2016, Ryan Smith (Smith), defendant‘s
counsel in People v. Jeffers, Contra Costa County Superior Court
No. 01-171912-9, left Judge Mills and deputy district attorney
William Moser (Moser) in the courtroom as the jury retired to the
jury room to begin deliberations. (Exs. 20, 22; RT 106-107.)1 As
Moser prepared to leave the courtroom, he and Judge Mills had a
conversation. Moser recalls that Judge Mills asked him,
specifically in the context of the Jeffers trial, ―do you want to
know what I would have done?‖ and talked to him about an
argument that might have ―defeat[ed] the defense theory.‖ (RT
107-108.) Judge Mills recalls the conversation as a ―war story‖
about a similar case he had when he was a deputy district
attorney. (Ex. 22.)
Moser reported the conversation to his supervisor, Nancy
Georgiou (Georgiou). (Ex. 21.) On March 24, 2016—the day after
the conversation—Georgiou called Smith to disclose the
conversation; she also disclosed the conversation to Judge John
Kennedy, the supervising judge of the Contra Costa County
criminal courts. (Ex. 21.) Judge Steve Austin, Contra Costa
County‘s Presiding Judge, also learned of the communication on
March 24. (RT 90.)
On March 29, 2016, Judge Austin met with Judge Mills to
discuss the Mills-Moser conversation. (RT 90-91.) Judge Austin
told Judge Mills that the matter was ―potentially serious,‖ told
him that Judge Austin might have to report that communication
to the Commission, and gave Judge Mills a copy of the
Commission‘s Public Admonishment of Judge Stuart Scott. (RT
1 Citations to the reporter‘s transcript are to the January
17, 2018 reporter‘s transcript.
4
96.) (See In the Matter of Judge Stuart Scott, Decision and Order
Imposing Public Admonishment (Feb. 17, 2016)
<https://cjp.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/40/2016/08/Scott_02-
17-16.pdf> [as of Feb. 28, 2018].)
On April 1, 2016, Judge Kennedy had a court reporter
transcribe a disclosure of the communication; both Georgiou and
Smith were present and acknowledged the disclosure. (Ex. 21.)
Georgiou and Smith then appeared in Judge Mills‘s courtroom,
where he disclosed on the record his characterization of his
conversation with Moser and recused himself from any further
involvement in the case. (Ex. 22.) As it turned out, the Jeffers
jury had deadlocked, resulting in a mistrial. (Ex. 20.)
On April 18, 2016, Judge Mills and Judge Austin spoke
again. Judge Austin told Judge Mills that he had received an
ethics opinion about the communication and was still trying to
decide ―what [his] next step was going to be.‖ (RT 97.) Judge
Mills, through his attorney, James Murphy, self-reported the
communication to the Commission on April 21, 2016. (Ex. 1.)
B. EVILSIZOR V. SWEENEY (COUNT ONE)
On August 12, 2016, Judge Mills presided over a hearing on
an order to show cause regarding contempt stemming from
Joseph Sweeney‘s (Sweeney) violation of a protective order
entered in divorce proceedings between Sweeney and Keri
Evilsizor (Evilsizor). (Exs. 6, A.) After determining Sweeney had
violated the protective order, Judge Mills asked Evilsizor‘s
attorney, Michelene Insalaco (Insalaco), to advise the court
regarding jail time. (Ex. A.) Insalaco requested Judge Mills
impose the ―maximum combined sentence‖ for Sweeney, which
Judge Mills believed to be 25 days in jail. (Ex. A.) In response,
Judge Mills advised Insalaco:
5
―THE COURT: Well, keep in mind, he‘s also going to get
good time[] credits. You don‘t do criminal. But he‘s also going to
get one day good time for each day that he serves, probably. So
out of 25, he‘ll serve 12 or 13?
―THE BAILIFF: Yes.
―THE COURT: So the reality is he‘ll only serve half of it to
begin with.‖ (Ex. A.)
Although Judge Mills was initially determined to sentence
Sweeney on August 12 and attempted to remand Sweeney to
custody, Judge Mills eventually continued sentencing to August
16 after determining, based on a ―form on the clerk‘s computer,‖
that Sweeney was entitled to a 72-hour stay before sentencing.
(Ex. A.) At the sentencing hearing, Judge Mills adopted
Insalaco‘s proposed factual findings and sentenced Sweeney: ―On
each count there‘s a $1,000 fine. I think it would be appropriate
to order the fine be paid by a specific date, so I‘ll order 180 days
to pay the fine and five days on each count, to run consecutive, for
a total of 25 days. And then attorneys‘ fees, as indicated, in the
amount of $19,080, costs of $930, for a total of $20,010 in costs
and fees. [¶] That is the order. Defendant‘s remanded into the
custody of the sheriff‘s department.‖ (Ex. C.) Judge Mills signed
an order outlining the sentence and provided a copy to Evilsizor‘s
counsel, who later served the order on James Morrison
(Morrison), Sweeney‘s lawyer; the order was silent regarding
good time credits. (Exs. 11, 15; RT 52, 183-184.)
The sheriff‘s department returned the order to Judge
Mills‘s courtroom through the Judge‘s bailiff, Deputy Joe
Harrison, questioning whether the sentence included good time
credits. (RT 163-165, 176.) After consulting with Judge Mills,
his clerk, Lori Bogdan (Bogdan), handwrote on the order ―no good
6
time credits to be given‖ and Judge Mills initialed the notation.
Bogdan sent the form—with the new notation—back to the jail,
but never served it on the parties. (RT 163-164, 169.)
Sweeney‘s mother contacted Morrison on August 25, 2016,
concerned about her son‘s release date. (RT 53.) Morrison then
investigated and learned of the revised order when he received a
copy from the jail. (RT 53-54, 56.) That day, Morrison wrote a
letter to Judge Mills—copied to Insalaco—requesting that Judge
Mills ―correct‖ the order and notify the sheriff. (Ex. 15, RT 58-
59.) Insalaco‘s office responded by letter the same day urging
Judge Mills to leave his ―no good time credits‖ order intact. (Ex.
J, RT 189-190.)
Upon receiving the parties‘ letters, Judge Mills consulted
with Judge Kennedy, who Judge Mills said ―concurred in the
opinion‖ that Sweeney was not entitled to ―good time credits in
connection with the civil contempt citation.‖ (Ex. 5.) According
to Judge Mills, however, ―both judges, who were aware of Mr.
Sweeney‘s past litigation history of filing appeals, motions, as
well as complaints against the Commission . . . and others,
decided to avoid a ‗constitutional crisis‘ and afford [Sweeney] the
credit entitlements which he may not have actually been entitled
to receive.‖ (Ex. 5.) On August 25, 2016, Judge Mills issued an
order that Sweeney ―having been ordered to serve 25 days county
jail is entitled to receive good time credits.‖ (Ex. 16.)
C. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. PREHEARING
Judge Mills self-reported the Jeffers communication to the
Commission on April 21, 2016. (Ex. 1.) The Commission wrote to
Judge Mills on October 28, 2016, to inform him it had ordered a
preliminary investigation regarding that communication. (Ex. 2.)
7
Judge Mills responded to the Commission on December 13, 2016.
(Ex. 3.)
On January 30, 2017, the Commission wrote to Judge Mills
informing him it had ordered a supplemental preliminary
investigation regarding the Evilsizor v. Sweeney orders. (Ex. 4.)
Judge Mills responded through counsel on March 16, 2017. (Ex.
5.)
The Commission filed a Notice of Formal Proceedings on
October 13, 2017, charging Judge Mills in two counts with willful
misconduct, prejudicial conduct, and improper action under
article VI, section 18 of the California Constitution. Judge Mills
noted in his Answer to the Notice of Formal Proceedings, filed on
October 30, 2017, that on October 19, 2017, he had ―demanded
that Inquiry No. 201 be dismissed on the ground that the entire
Commission, including its Executive Director and staff, had
conflicts of interest and was disqualified . . . .‖ On November 13,
2017, the Commission denied Judge Mills‘s disqualification
demand and on December 20, 2017, the Supreme Court denied
Judge Mills‘s writ petition stemming from his disqualification
demand (case No. S245704). On December 1, the Chief Justice
appointed us ―to hear and take evidence‖ in the above-entitled
matter ―and report thereon to the Commission.‖
On December 27, 2017, the parties filed their prehearing
briefs, followed on December 28 by their proposed exhibit and
witness lists. On January 4, 2018, the parties filed and served
objections to proposed exhibits.
We conducted a prehearing conference on January 10, 2018
in advance of the evidentiary hearing set for January 17.
Following the prehearing conference, the parties served offers of
proof and time estimates for their proposed witnesses. Judge
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Mills also served an amended witness list and an amended
proposed exhibit list, to which the Examiners filed objections.
We issued tentative rulings on the parties‘ objections on
January 12, 2018. On January 16, Judge Mills served notice that
he would be arguing certain of our tentative rulings, and filed
and served a motion in limine to exclude evidence of prior
discipline.
2. EVIDENTIARY HEARING
At the outset of the January 17, 2018 hearing, we heard
argument regarding proposed exhibits and Judge Mills‘s motion
in limine. For those exhibits on which the parties did not argue,
we adopted our written tentative rulings. Based on the parties‘
argument, we overruled objections to exhibits 18, 19, 23, 24, 25,
26, and 27. (RT 13, 19.) We also denied Judge Mills‘s motion in
limine, which would have excluded exhibits 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27.
Exhibits M and P were excluded per our tentative rulings, and we
excluded exhibits Q and R based on the parties‘ argument at the
hearing.2 (RT 20.) We admitted all other exhibits, including the
Examiners‘ exhibits 1 through 12 and 14 through 27, and
Respondent‘s exhibits A through L, N, O, S, and T.3 (RT 69.)
We heard testimony in the matter on January 17, 2018,
and closing argument on January 18.
After the Examiners rested, Judge Mills moved to dismiss
the inquiry because Judge Mills argued there was ―no clear and
convincing evidence whatsoever‖ to support the Commission‘s
2 We have detailed the parties‘ objections to exhibits and
our rulings in appendix A.
3 The Examiners withdrew their proposed exhibit 13 before
the hearing.
9
charges against Judge Mills. (RT 144.) We denied the motion,
finding we lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the charges under article
VI, section 18 of the California Constitution and the Rules of the
Commission on Judicial Performance, rule 125(b). Consistent
with the findings of fact and conclusions of law below, however,
we would have denied the motion had we reached the merits.
DISCUSSION
A. LEGAL STANDARDS
The Commission has charged Judge Mills with (a) willful
misconduct in office, (b) conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute (prejudicial
conduct), and (c) improper action, as those terms are used in
article VI, section 18, subdivision (d) of the California
Constitution.
1. WILLFUL MISCONDUCT
―To commit willful misconduct in office, a judge must (1)
engage in conduct that is unjudicial and (2) committed in bad
faith, (3) while acting in a judicial capacity.‖ (Broadman v.
Commission on Judicial Performance (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1079,
1091 (Broadman).) ―A judge acts in bad faith only by (1)
performing a judicial act for a corrupt purpose (which is any
purpose other than the faithful discharge of judicial duties), or (2)
performing a judicial act with knowledge that the act is beyond
the judge‘s lawful judicial power, or (3) performing a judicial act
that exceeds the judge‘s lawful power with a conscious disregard
for the limits of the judge‘s authority.‖ (Id. at p. 1092.)
2. PREJUDICIAL CONDUCT
―Prejudicial conduct is distinguishable from willful
misconduct in that a judge‘s acts may constitute prejudicial
conduct even if not committed in a judicial capacity, or if
10
committed in a judicial capacity, not committed in bad faith.
Prejudicial conduct is ‗either ―conduct which a judge undertakes
in good faith but which nevertheless would appear to an objective
observer to be not only unjudicial conduct but conduct prejudicial
to public esteem for the judicial office‖ . . . or ―willful misconduct
out of office, i.e., unjudicial conduct committed in bad faith by a
judge not then acting in a judicial capacity‖ ‘ ‖ (Broadman,
supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 1092-1093.)
3. IMPROPER ACTION
―The least serious type of judicial misconduct is improper
action. It is conduct that violates the California Code of Judicial
Ethics, but that does not rise to the level of prejudicial
misconduct. [Citation.] Improper action thus includes unjudicial
conduct that an objective observer aware of the circumstances
would not necessarily deem to have an adverse effect on the
reputation of the judiciary.‖ (Inquiry Concerning Freedman
(2007) 49 Cal.4th CJP Supp. 223, 232.)
4. STANDARD OF PROOF
―The [C]ommission has the burden of proving the charges
against Judge [Mills] by clear and convincing evidence.
[Citations.] ‗Evidence of a charge is clear and convincing so long
as there is a ―high probability‖ that the charge is true.
[Citations.] The evidence need not establish the fact beyond a
reasonable doubt.‘ ‖ (Inquiry Concerning Velasquez (2007) 49
Cal.4th CJP Supp. 175, 184.)
B. COUNT ONE – EVILSIZOR V. SWEENEY
1. AUGUST 16, 2016 ORDERS
a. Findings of Fact – August 16, 2016 Orders
The operative facts regarding Judge Mills‘s ex parte
communication with the sheriff‘s department on August 16, 2016
11
regarding Joseph Sweeney‘s contempt sentence are largely
undisputed, rather the parties primarily disagree about the effect
of those facts.
The Examiners and Judge Mills agree that on August 12,
Judge Mills presided over a hearing on an order to show cause
regarding contempt alleging that Sweeney had violated a
Domestic Violence Prevention Act restraining order issued by
another judge. (Exs. 5, 6.) At the sentencing hearing on August
16, Judge Mills sentenced Sweeney to 25 days in jail. (Ex. 11.)
The Examiners and Judge Mills also agree that two versions of
the sentencing order resulted from the hearing, one without and
one with the words ―no good time credits to be given‖
handwritten on the second page. (Exs. 11, 12.) Finally, there is
no dispute that one of those versions—the one without ―no good
time credits to be given‖—found its way to the parties, but Judge
Mills did not instruct that the revised order be served on the
parties. (Exs. 5, 15; RT 52, 169.)
The Examiners and Judge Mills disagree about whether
the version of the order containing the notation ―no good time
credits to be given‖ constituted a clarification or a modification of
the original order. We find that the notation modified, rather
than clarified, the order.4
Although Judge Mills did not testify at the evidentiary
hearing, we find that many of the statements submitted to the
Commission on his behalf, which bind Judge Mills pursuant to
the Rules of the Commission on Judicial Performance, rule 106
4 Each of our findings is by clear and convincing evidence.
12
and Evidence Code section 1222, lack indicia of credibility.5 As
discussed below, Judge Mills‘s statements evidence a story that
changed incompatibly over time. Nevertheless, Judge Mills‘s
statements convince us the notation was a modification rather
than a clarification.
There is no dispute that the order Judge Mills initially
issued and sent to the jail with Sweeney is silent about the
availability of good time credits. To support his clarification
argument, Judge Mills now contends that the order‘s silence is
equivalent to an order that Sweeney was to be afforded no good
5 Rules of the Commission on Judicial Performance, rule
106 provides: ―A judge may be represented by counsel in all
commission proceedings. The written communications of counsel
shall be deemed to be the written communications of the judge.
Counsel has the authority to bind the judge as to all matters
except a stipulation as to discipline.
―Any paper filed with the commission and any written
statement made to the commission or to its staff must be signed
by the judge or the judge‘s counsel. A stipulation as to discipline
must be signed by the judge. The signing of any document or
statement warrants that the signer has personal knowledge of
the matter contained in the document or statement or has
investigated the matter and has a good faith belief in the
accuracy of the representations contained in the document or
statement.
―This rule applies to the filing of responses to staff inquiry
letters and preliminary investigation letters under rules 110 and
111, to the filing of answers in formal proceedings under rule 119,
and to all other filings with the commission and the masters and
all other correspondence with the commission.‖
13
time credits. We are aware of no evidence supporting that
contention.6
But Judge Mills argued in his initial response to the
Commission (dated March 16, 2017) that ―in any misdemeanor
sentencing the protocol is not to set forth on the sentencing order
whether good time credits are available or not . . . . Those credits
are usually available, so it is the sheriff‘s department at jail that
determines the amount of good time that would be allotted . . . .‖
(Ex. 5, italics added.) Judge Mills‘s admission is bolstered by his
statement that “[t]he sentencing minute order accompanying Mr.
Sweeney to the jail is silent on the issue [of good time credits], as
are all sentencing orders. After his incarceration, the Sheriff‘s
Department made an inquiry to Judge Mills‘s clerk Lori Bog[d]an
seeking a clarification whether the sentencing minute order
included good time credits. Ms. Bog[d]an then presented the
issue to Judge Mills. Judge Mills reviewed Penal Code Section
4019 to determine whether the contempt citation giving rise to jail
time was covered by the statute allowing good time credits, or not.
Judge Mills concluded, based on his analysis of the statute, that
the contempt citation at issue was not reduced by the good time
6 Judge Mills‘s clerk, Lori Bogdan, testified that she
recalled argument regarding sentencing credits and that Judge
Mills had stated no good time credits were to be given. (RT 166-
167.) She later said that she could not remember how the
question resolved. (RT 174-176.) The reporter‘s transcripts of
the August 12 and 16, 2016 hearings do not support Bogdan‘s
initial assertion that Judge Mills ruled on the issue. (Exs. A, B,
C.) Consequently, while we make no general finding regarding
Bogdan‘s credibility, we find that her memory that Judge Mills
issued a ruling regarding good time credits to be faulty, and
therefore not credible.
14
provisions of the Penal Code, so he had his clerk clarify the
minute order, which had been returned to court by the deputy
sheriffs at jail, that good time credits were not available. Judge
Mills‘[s] Clerk then returned the order, as clarified[,] to the jail.‖
(Ex. 5, italics added.)
We find the sequence of events Judge Mills outlined in his
March 16, 2017 letter to be mostly credible. Judge Mills‘s
description of the events following Sweeney‘s remand to county
jail is a statement against Judge Mills‘s own interest, but
consistent with his sua sponte explanation to Insalaco on the
record on August 12, 2016 about how much time Sweeney would
spend in jail: ―keep in mind, [Sweeney]‘s also going to get good
time[] credits. You don‘t do criminal. But he‘s also going to get
one day good time for each day that he serves, probably.‖ (Ex. A.)
Judge Mills was a deputy district attorney for eight years
before going onto the Contra Costa County Municipal Court in
1995. He was elevated to the Superior Court in 1998. (Ex. 23.)
Judge Mills emphasized his criminal law experience and
expertise on the record: ―I‘ve been applying [Penal Code section]
654 in thousands of cases over 21 years,‖ he said. And ―I dealt
with [it] for many years before taking the bench.‖ (Ex. C.) He
told the parties that he had done ―certainly over a hundred, I
would think, easily‖ order to show cause hearings before the
Evilsizor v. Sweeney hearing. (Ex. A.)
All of those circumstances lead us to find that Judge Mills
knew he was modifying the sentencing order when he initialed
the ―no good time credits to be given‖ notation.7
7 A clarification of an order, as Bogdan testified, includes
circumstances like illegible handwriting or a written order a
judge forgot to sign. (RT 170.) In this case, however, the new
15
b. Conclusions of Law – August 16, 2016
Orders
California Code of Judicial Ethics, canon 3B(7) provides in
pertinent part: ―A judge shall accord to every person who has a
legal interest in a proceeding, or that person‘s lawyer, the full
right to be heard according to law. . . . A judge shall not initiate,
permit, or consider ex parte communications, that is, any
communications to or from the judge outside the presence of the
parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding, and shall
make reasonable efforts to avoid such communications, except as
follows: [¶] (a) . . . [¶] A judge may consult with court
personnel or others authorized by law, as long as the
communication relates to that person‘s duty to aid the judge in
carrying out the judge‘s adjudicative responsibilities. [¶] . . . For
purposes of Canon 3B(7)(a), ‗court personnel‘ includes bailiffs,
court reporters, court externs, research attorneys, courtroom
clerks, and other employees of the court, but does not include . . .
employees of other governmental entities . . . .‖ (Cal. Code Jud.
Ethics, canon 3B(7).)
Judge Mills‘s modified August 16, 2016 order, which he
transmitted to the sheriff‘s department through Bogdan, is a
communication from the judge outside the presence of the parties
and concerning a pending proceeding. The sheriff‘s department is
not ―court personnel.‖ Judge Mills‘s communication, therefore,
violates the Code of Judicial Ethics, canon 3B(7).8
handwritten notation affected the extent of the sentence by 12-
plus days and significantly impacted Sweeney‘s liberty interest.
8 That the communications went through Bogdan is
irrelevant. ―The fact that an ex parte communication is indirect
does not make it permissible. No improper ex parte
16
We further conclude that Judge Mills‘s failure to set the
matter for hearing upon determining that the credits issue
remained undecided was an independent violation of Code of
Judicial Ethics, canon 3B(7), which provides: ―A judge shall
accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or
that person‘s lawyer, the full right to be heard according to law.‖
―To commit willful misconduct in office, a judge must (1)
engage in conduct that is unjudicial and (2) committed in bad
faith, (3) while acting in a judicial capacity.‖ (Broadman, supra,
18 Cal.4th at p. 1091.) ―[I]n order to determine whether a judge‘s
conduct is ‗unjudicial,‘ we measure that conduct with reference to
the [Code of Judicial Ethics].‖ (Dodds v. Commission on Judicial
Performance (1995) 12 Cal.4th 163, 172.) Because it violated
canon 3B(7), Judge Mills‘s conduct was ―unjudicial.‖
Additionally, based on our findings of fact regarding Judge
Mills‘s experience and prior discipline, detailed below as factors
in aggravation, and his admissions in this matter, we conclude
Judge Mills modified his order without a hearing, an act that
exceeded Judge Mills‘s lawful power and significantly impacted
Sweeney‘s liberty interests, and did so with at least a conscious
disregard for the limits of his authority. We conclude, therefore,
that Judge Mills‘s violations of canon 3B(7) constitute willful
misconduct. (See Broadman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1092.)
2. AUGUST 25, 2016 ORDER
a. Findings of Fact – August 25, 2016 Order
In its Notice of Formal Proceedings, the Commission
alleged that Judge Mills issued the August 25, 2016 order
communications may be sent or received via court staff.‖
(Rothman et al., Cal. Judicial Conduct Handbook (4th ed. 2017) §
5.7, p. 271.)
17
granting Sweeney good time credits ―even though [Judge Mills]
did not necessarily believe that [Sweeney] was entitled to‖ the
credits.
The only evidence we have regarding Judge Mills‘s state of
mind when he issued the August 25, 2016 order is contained in
his written statements to the Commission.9 As with his
statements regarding his conduct on August 16, 2016, Judge
Mills‘s story has evolved to suit his defense.
On March 16, 2017, Judge Mills claimed: ―When Judge
Mills found out that Mr. Sweeney‘s lawyer was claiming good
time entitlements pursuant to statute, he conferred with Judge
John Kennedy, the supervising criminal law judge in Contra
Costa County. Judge Kennedy concurred in the opinion that
Penal Code § 4019 did not provide good time credits in connection
with the civil contempt citation adjudicated against Mr. Sweeney.
However, both judges, who were aware of Mr. Sweeney’s past
litigation history of filing appeals, motions, as well as complaints
against the Commission on Judicial Performance and others,
decided to avoid a ‘constitutional crisis’ and afford him the credit
entitlements which he may not have actually been entitled to
receive. An ‗unreported minute order‘ was prepared specifying
that Mr. Sweeney was to receive good time credit. [¶] Mr.
Sweeney did receive the good time credit and was later released
from jail after the credits were applied. It is our understanding
that Mr. Sweeney did not serve any more jail time than he would
have served had he been given the good time credits from the
9 Neither Judge Mills nor Judge Kennedy, upon whom
Judge Mills places the onus of his August 25, 2016 order, testified
at Judge Mills‘s evidentiary hearing.
18
start of his incarceration following sentencing.‖ (Ex. 5, italics
added.)
In his prehearing brief filed and served December 27, 2017,
Judge Mills changed his factual contention: ―Judge Mills
reviewed the submissions of both parties and conferred with
Judge John Kennedy, the supervising criminal law judge in
Contra Costa County. Judge Kennedy advised that if there was
ambiguity with respect to the application of the criminal statute
to a civil contempt incarceration, he ought to allow for the credit.
Judge Mills followed Judge Kennedy‘s advice and in exercising
his discretion issued a new minute order allowing for good time
credits to be applied.‖10
The evolution of Judge Mills‘s explanation further
diminishes his credibility. The two explanations are mutually
exclusive. Either Judge Mills ―decided to avoid a ‗constitutional
crisis and afford [Sweeney] the credit entitlements which he may
not have actually been entitled to receive,‖ or he ―followed Judge
Kennedy‘s advice‖ to allow for credit in the event of ambiguity.
But he did not do both.
10 The version of Penal Code section 4019 effective on
August 12 and 16, 2016 states: ―(a) The provisions of this section
shall apply in all of the following cases: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) When a
prisoner is confined in or committed to the county jail, industrial
farm, or road camp or any city jail, industrial farm, or road camp
for a definite period of time for contempt pursuant to a
proceeding other than a criminal action or proceeding.‖ The
statute expressly applies to the August 16, 2016 sentencing
order, and we see no reasonable argument to the contrary. We do
not find credible in any way Judge Mills‘s attempt to saddle
Judge Kennedy with responsibility regarding the August 25,
2016 order.
19
We again conclude that Judge Mills‘s March 16, 2017
statement contains indicia of reliability that the statement in his
prehearing brief does not. And Judge Mills‘s earlier statement is
supported by his statement in the same March 16, 2017 letter
that on August 16, ―Judge Mills reviewed Penal Code Section
4019 to determine whether the contempt citation giving rise to
jail time was covered by the statute allowing good time credits, or
not. Judge Mills concluded, based on his analysis of the statute,
that the contempt citation was not reduced by the good time
provisions of the Penal Code . . . .‖ (Ex. 5.)
We therefore find that Judge Mills issued the August 25,
2016 order because of Sweeney‘s ―past litigation history of filing
appeals, motions, [and] complaints against the Commission on
Judicial Performance and others,‖ rather than for any lawful
purpose.
b. Conclusions of Law – August 25, 2016
Order
―A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the
judiciary.‖ (Cal. Code Jud. Ethics, canon 1.) ―A judge shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the
judge‘s activities.‖ (Cal. Code Jud. Ethics, canon 2.) ―A judge
shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in
a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.‖ (Cal. Code Jud. Ethics, canon 2A.)
―A judge shall be faithful to the law regardless of partisan
interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism, and shall maintain
professional competence in the law.‖ (Cal. Code Jud. Ethics,
canon 3B(2).) ―A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters fairly,
promptly, and efficiently. A judge shall manage the courtroom in
a manner that provides all litigants the opportunity to have their
20
matters fairly adjudicated in accordance with the law.‖ (Cal.
Code Jud. Ethics, canon 3B(8).)
Judge Mills admitted he issued the August 25, 2016 order
regarding good time credits because of Sweeney‘s litigation
history and to avoid what Judge Mills called a ―constitutional
crisis.‖ Judge Mills also admitted that he did so even though he
did not believe Sweeney was necessarily entitled to the credits.
In issuing the August 25, 2016 order even though he did not
believe Sweeney was necessarily entitled to credits under Penal
Code section 4019, Judge Mills violated canons 1, 2, 2A, 3B(2),
and 3B(8) of the Code of Judicial Ethics. Deciding an issue for
reasons unconnected to the merits displays no compliance with
the law, undermines the integrity and independence of the
judiciary, and deprives litigants the opportunity to have their
matters adjudicated in accordance with the law. Moreover,
Judge Mills‘s attempt to deflect his decision to Judge Kennedy
indicates a readiness to abdicate his own responsibility to
adjudicate the matters that come before him.
We further conclude that Judge Mills issued the August 25,
2016 order even though he contemporaneously believed it was
beyond his lawful judicial power. We conclude, therefore, that
Judge Mills‘s August 25, 2016 conduct in issuing an order even
though he believed it was not a lawful order rises to the level of
willful misconduct.
C. COUNT TWO – PEOPLE V. JEFFERS
1. Findings of Fact
Judge Mills‘s defense of his communication with Moser, the
deputy district attorney responsible for People v. Jeffers, is that
after the defense attorney left the courtroom, but still in open
court, he merely shared a ―war story‖ with Moser about the last
21
DUI case that Judge Mills prosecuted 29 years earlier. (Ex. 3.)
Moser testified repeatedly, however, both on direct examination
and on a rigorous cross-examination, that Judge Mills specifically
asked him ―do you want to know what I would have done?‖ in
connection with the just-tried People v. Jeffers case. (RT 107,
108, 116, 119, 123, 126-127, 131-132, 137.) Judge Mills then
offered Moser advice about how he should have handled a specific
part of the case. (RT 108.)
We find Moser‘s testimony credible. Moser did not recall
many details of the conversation he had with Judge Mills after
the People v. Jeffers jury retired, but he very specifically
remembered Judge Mills asking ―do you want to know what I
would have done?‖ and hearing Judge Mills describe what he
would have done. One of the primary reasons we find Moser‘s
testimony credible is that the conversation immediately struck
him as significant enough to report to his supervisor, Georgiou.
(RT 109-110.) Moser told Georgiou about the communication the
day after it happened.11 (Exs. K, 20; RT 106-108, 110.)
Georgiou‘s report of the conversation to Judge Kennedy
further supports Moser‘s testimony. Judge Kennedy explained
that he understood ―from Ms. Georgiou‘s description of the
conversation it did include suggestions of things that Mr. Moser
could have done to be more effective in his performance, such as
eliciting particular evidence and so forth.‖ (Ex. K.)
11 The communication happened on March 23, 2016. (Ex.
20; RT 106-108.) On March 24, 2016, Georgiou contacted
defendant‘s counsel and Judge Kennedy to report the
communication. (Ex. J.)
22
We have no testimony from Judge Mills to consider. We do,
however, have his written submissions to the Commission and
the record he created when he disclosed his conversation with
Moser to defendant‘s counsel. We do not find the facts in Judge
Mills‘s statements to be necessarily inconsistent with Moser‘s
testimony.12 It is possible that Judge Mills said all of the things
he reports he said and said the things Moser recalls him saying.
For that reason, we also find Judge Mills‘s recounting of the
conversation as he explained it on the record on April 1, 2016 to
be credible.
Judge Mills reported the conversation as follows: ―After
the jury went out, and here is the disclosure I want to make, Mr.
Moser remained in court, as I am prone to do, I often work in
court through inbox matters and whatnot, . . . while I am
awaiting the jury decision. I never ever discussed anything with
Mr. Moser in chambers. Everything was out in open court. We
discussed a number of matters, including innocuous things, such
as where did he go to school, and what did he do before he came
to the DA‘s office, and those types of things.
―At one point – and this is where it may become an issue. I
made the observation in relation to the expert witness that was
presented by Mr. Smith . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . .that 29 years ago, when
I last tried a DUI case that there had been an expert at the
Contra Costa Crime Lab . . . named Grady Goldman, who
actually tracked the accuracy of the breath machine.
―And what I disclosed to Mr. Moser was that Mr. Goldman
over a protracted period of time actually monitored the limited
numbers of cases where there was actually a breath sample and a
12 As we discuss in our conclusions of law, we do not agree
with Judge Mills‘s characterization of those facts.
23
blood sample taken in the same case, and what I advised him was
that they were able to have a known blood result in a small
number of cases because sometimes you get a breath sample
taken and they take a reference blood sample, and that they
monitored in those limited number of cases where the breath
machine measured at or below the actual blood sample so that
they can tell in the real world, back in the day, whether or not
the machines were actually testing properly. [¶] . . . [¶]
―And I said, ‘But if there really is a problem with these
machines that the defense expert suggests, then in the future
someone may have to look at that because if the theory is that –
because our machines here in our county don’t have a temperature
regulator, and that causes inaccurately high results of some type
being registered, then somebody may[]be ought to take a look at
that issue.‘ [¶] . . . [¶]
―But in terms of what went on 29 years ago, and the fact
that that used to be tracked – and frankly, if you had that data,
Mr. Smith, it could potentially counter the defense that you
presented in this case, but that data, to my knowledge, hasn‘t
been monitored in 29 years, and it is not available.‖
(Ex. L, italics added.)
We find that Judge Mills‘s conversation with Moser was
related to issues raised during the Jeffers trial.
2. Conclusions of Law
―A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte
communications, that is, any communications to or from the
judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or
impending proceeding, and shall make reasonable efforts to avoid
such communications,‖ subject to exceptions that do not apply
here. (Cal. Code Jud. Ethics, canon 3B(7).)
24
Judge Mills does not dispute that he had a conversation
with Moser outside the presence of defense counsel; he disclosed
as much on the record. Judge Mills, however, characterizes the
conversation as merely a ―war story,‖ and contends that the
conversation caused neither side prejudice. We are aware of no
―war story‖ exception to the prohibition against ex parte
communications. ―An improper ex parte communication violates
canon 3B(7) even if not prejudicial.‖ (Rothman et al., Cal.
Judicial Conduct Handbook, supra, § 5.1, p. 257.)
Moreover, Judge Mills‘s April 1, 2016 on-the-record-
disclosure version of the conversation alone violates canon 3B(7).
Judge Mills acknowledged on the record on April 1, 2016 that his
conversation with Moser was ―in relation to the [defendant‘s]
expert witness.‖ (Ex. L.) That conversation, then, necessarily
concerned a pending proceeding. Indeed, at the hearing where
Judge Mills disclosed the conversation on the record, he
continued to tie the conversation to People v. Jeffers when he told
defendant‘s counsel that the data he claims to have told Moser
about ―could potentially counter the defense that you presented
in this case . . . .‖ (Ex. L.)
Judge Mills‘s conduct was obviously ―unjudicial.‖ And we
can only conclude that Judge Mills initiated the conversation
with a conscious disregard for the rules prohibiting ex parte
communications. Judge Mills has been disciplined in the past for
ex parte communication. (Ex. 24.) The leading treatise on
California judicial ethics repeatedly refers to Judge Mills‘s earlier
public admonishment in its discussion of improper ex parte
communications. (See, e.g., Rothman et al., Cal. Judicial Conduct
Handbook, supra, § 5.3, pp. 264, fn. 62, 265, fn. 65.) Judge Mills
should have been well versed about ex parte communications. If
25
he was not, we can only conclude it is because he chose not to be,
and we conclude that is conscious disregard for the limits of his
authority. Consequently, we conclude that Judge Mills‘s
violation of canon 3B(7) in the People v. Jeffers matter constituted
willful misconduct.
D. ADDITIONAL FACTORS
1. JUDGE MILLS’S CONTENTIONS ABOUT THE
COMMISSION
Although the Supreme Court denied Judge Mills‘s writ
petition regarding his motion to disqualify the Commission, he
continued to assert even in his prehearing brief that the
Commission might have some bias related to its own ―personal
emotional angst with respect to Mr. Sweeney . . .‖ and identified
Sweeney as ―one of the key leaders in initiating an audit of the
Commission and forcing the Commission into litigation with the
State.‖ Even though Judge Mills continued to assert this
connection as the basis for the Commission‘s investigation here,
no evidence was presented to us that would support such a
finding.
2. FACTORS IN AGGRAVATION
a. Dishonesty
As we noted above, Judge Mills‘s statements regarding the
Evilsizor v. Sweeney proceedings and the resulting orders
evidence a story that appears to change with the purpose of the
statement.
In March 2017, when Judge Mills‘s objective was to curtail
the Commission‘s supplemental investigation, he claimed that
good time credits ―are usually available,‖ and that ―[t]he
sentencing minute order accompanying Mr. Sweeney to the jail is
silent on the issue, as are all sentencing orders.‖ (Ex. 5.) Judge
26
Mills claimed that after the sheriff‘s department sent the order
back and asked for information, he ―reviewed Penal Code Section
4019 to determine whether the contempt citation giving rise to
jail time was covered by the statute, allowing good time credits,
or not. [He] concluded, based on his analysis of the statute, that
the contempt citation at issue was not reduced by the good time
provisions of the Penal Code . . . .‖ (Ex. 5.)
Once Sweeney‘s attorney raised the issue, Judge Mills
claimed he ―conferred with Judge John Kennedy[, who] concurred
in the opinion that Penal Code § 4019 did not provide good time
credits in connection with the civil contempt citation adjudicated
against Mr. Sweeney. However, both judges, who were aware of
Mr. Sweeney‘s past litigation history of filing appeals, motions, as
well as complaints against the Commission on Judicial
Performance and others, decided to avoid a ‗constitutional crisis‘
and afford him the credit entitlements which he may not have
actually been entitled to receive.‖ (Ex. 5.)
By the time he filed his Answer to the Commission‘s Notice
of Formal Proceedings in October 2017, Judge Mills‘s story had
evolved. While he still claimed that ―in reality, Judge Mills
wasn‘t making a determination or finding on the issue‖ of good
time credits at the August 12, 2016 hearing, and still
acknowledged that he researched the issue after the sheriff‘s
department sent the order back and asked about it, the
circumstances of his August 25, 2016 order were different.
―When Judge Mills found out that Mr. Sweeney‘s lawyer was
claiming good time entitlements pursuant to the statute,‖ Judge
Mills explained, ―he conferred with Judge John Kennedy, [who]
also opined that the application of the criminal statute to a civil
contempt incarceration wasn’t clear. Following that discussion,
27
Judge Mills exercised his discretion and allowed for good time
credits to be applied in this case under Penal Code § 4019. As a
result of the judges‘ conference, an ‗unreported minute order‘ was
prepared specifying that Mr. Sweeney was to receive good time
credit.‖ (Italics added.)
In his prehearing brief, Judge Mills‘s story evolved more.
The notation ―no good time credits to be given,‖ Judge Mills
explained, was how he ―clarified the order by specifically writing
what the order already provided – no good time credits applied.‖
Judge Mills‘s August 16, 2016 research into Penal Code section
4019 was omitted from his prehearing brief. Instead, for
purposes of that brief, ―the first time any party identified Penal
Code § 4019 as being applicable to this family law case‖ was
August 25, 2016. After the parties raised the good time credits
issue on August 25, Judge Mills‘s prehearing brief says he
―reviewed the submissions of both parties and conferred with
Judge John Kennedy, [who] advised that if there was ambiguity
with respect to the application of the criminal statute to a civil
contempt incarceration, he ought to allow for the credit. Judge
Mills followed Judge Kennedy‘s advice and in exercising his
discretion issued a new minute order allowing for good time
credits to be applied.‖
By the time he filed his proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law, Judge Mills‘s claim that he had researched
Penal Code section 4019 on August 16, 2016 was, he claimed,
―simply a mistake. The hearing transcripts establish this error
and confirm that Judge Mills‘s memory was inaccurate on the
timing of his review of Penal Code 4019.‖
The evolution of Judge Mills‘s statements about his actions
on August 16, 2016, and about his consultation with Judge
28
Kennedy parallel the evolution of his defense in this matter.
Judge Mills did not make a mistake. But he did make several
misrepresentations. Moreover, we are particularly concerned
with Judge Mills‘s attempt to justify his own misconduct by
reference to his consultation with Judge Kennedy and Judge
Kennedy‘s advice.
Finally, given Judge Mills‘s explanations of his review and
Judge Kennedy‘s advice about Penal Code section 4019, we are
not convinced Judge Mills ever read section 4019. As explained
earlier, that section unambiguously applied to Sweeney‘s
sentence. Consequently, Judge Mills either never read section
4019 in the context of the Sweeney matter, or he became
embroiled in the matter and his statements represent an attempt
to justify both his August 16 and 25, 2016 orders. Under either
scenario, Judge Mills‘s candor and honesty is placed in direct
question.
Honesty is a ―minimum qualification[] which [is] expected
of every judge.‖ (Kloepfer v. Commission on Judicial Performance
(1989) 49 Cal.3d 826, 865.) ―The misconduct in this matter is
especially serious because it indicates that the judge was willing
to fabricate justifications‖ for his actions. (Ryan v. Commission
on Judicial Performance (1988) 45 Cal.3d 518, 535.) ―This is
misconduct of the worst kind, evidencing moral turpitude and
dishonesty.‖ (Ibid.)
b. Prior Discipline
Judge Mills has an extensive record of prior discipline. He
was privately admonished in 2001 for conduct that ―fostered an
appearance that the judge was attempting to coerce or intimidate
[a] defendant into pleading guilty to the charge against him.‖
(Ex. 23.)
29
The Commission issued a Decision and Order Imposing
Public Admonishment in 2006 for improper ex parte
communications, for embroilment, and for failing to be patient,
dignified, and courteous with persons with whom he was dealing
in an official capacity. (Ex. 24.) This discipline is particularly
relevant to the instant matter because of its focus on improper ex
parte communications.
The Commission issued an advisory letter in 2008 after
Judge Mills conditioned a defendant‘s release on posting bail for
the improper purpose of collecting restitution. (Ex. 25.) A second
advisory letter followed in 2011 for Judge Mills bypassing the
ordinary application process for a ―ride along‖ so his son could
accompany a police officer executing a search warrant Judge
Mills signed. (Ex. 26.)
The Commission issued a second Decision and Order
Imposing Public Admonishment in 2011 after Judge Mills sought
and received credit through improper communications with a
courtroom clerk and a pro tem judge for time his son spent in a
residential program in lieu of community service he failed to
complete in a tobacco infraction case. (Ex. 27.)
While Judge Mills has been admonished for ex parte
communications in the past, the unrelated misconduct is also
relevant because it demonstrates Judge Mills‘s inability to
conform to the Code of Judicial Ethics. (See Inquiry Concerning
McBrien (2010) 49 Cal.4th CJP Supp. 315, 343.)
c. Experience
In its 2001 private admonishment, the Commission found
in aggravation Judge Mills‘s experience on the bench and before:
―In aggravation, the commission found that Judge Mills had been
a judge for more than four years at the time of the incident and
30
previously had been a deputy district attorney for eight years.‖
(Ex. 23.) Judge Mills has now been a judge for almost 22 years.
The story he claims he told in the Jeffers matter was from 29
years before the Jeffers trial. (Ex. L.)
3. FACTORS IN MITIGATION
We find no mitigating factors. We might have considered
Judge Mills‘s decision to report himself to the Commission a
mitigating factor, but Judge Mills did so more than three weeks
after the violation and only after Judge Austin advised Judge
Mills that Judge Austin had received an ethics opinion and might
have to report Judge Mills‘s conduct to the Commission. Coupled
with Judge Mills‘s lack of candor, Judge Mills‘s lengthy delay in
reporting his conduct signals to us that he self-reported only to
claim mitigation.
31
CONCLUSION
On Count One, we conclude that the Examiners proved two
independent violations of the Code of Judicial Ethics, canon 3B(7)
regarding the August 16, 2016 orders and violations of canons 1,
2, 2A, 3B(2), and 3B(8) with regard to the August 25, 2016 order.
As to Count Two, we conclude that the Examiners proved a
violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics, canon 3B(7). We conclude
the Examiners proved all of these violations by clear and
convincing evidence. We further conclude that all of these
violations rise to the level of willful misconduct pursuant to
article VI, section 18 of the California Constitution.
Dated: March 13, 2018
Respectfully submitted,
/s/
Hon. Victoria G. Chaney
Presiding Special Master
/s/
Hon. Jennifer R.S. Detjen
Special Master
/s/
Hon. Paul A. Bacigalupo
Special Master
Appendix A
Ex. Description Objection Ruling
A August 12, 2016 Reporter‘s
Transcript of Proceedings,
Sweeney v. Evilsizor
B August 12, 2016 Reporter‘s
Supplemental Transcript of
Proceedings, Sweeney v.
Evilsizor
C August 16, 2016 Reporter‘s
Transcript of Proceedings,
Sweeney v. Evilsizor
D August 16, 2016 Findings
and Order Re Contempt,
Evilsizor v. Sweeney
(without credits notation)
E August 25, 2016 letter from
James Morrison to Judge
Mills
F August 25, 2016 Unreported
Minute Order, Evilsizor v.
Sweeney
G August 16, 2016 Minute
Order, Evilsizor v. Sweeney
ii
Ex. Description Objection Ruling
H August 16, 2016 Findings
and Order Re Contempt,
Evilsizor v. Sweeney (with
credits notation)
I Order to Show Cause and
Affidavit for Contempt,
Evilsizor v. Sweeney
J August 25, 2016 letter from
Staci Lambright to Judge
Mills
K April 1, 2016 Reporter‘s
Transcript, Dept. 8, People
v. Jeffers
L April 1, 2016 Reporter‘s
Transcript, Dept. 29, People
v. Jeffers
M July 2016 E-mail exchange
between Doug MacMaster
and Sonya Smith
Hearsay,
Relevance
Sustained
N Contra Costa County
Superior Court Felony
Order of
Probation/Supervision
Relevance Overruled
iii
Ex. Description Objection Ruling
O Contra Costa County
Superior Court
Misdemeanor Order of
Probation
Relevance Overruled
P William Moser‘s
Misdemeanor Trial Report,
People v. Jeffers
Hearsay,
Relevance,
Untimely
Sustained
(timeliness
objection
overruled)
Q August 12, 2016
Respondent‘s Trial Brief,
Evilsizor v. Sweeney
Hearsay,
Relevance,
Untimely
Sustained
(timeliness
objection
overruled)
R August 16, 2016
Respondent‘s Sentencing
Memorandum, People v.
Jeffers
Hearsay,
Relevance,
Untimely
Sustained
(timeliness
objection
overruled)
S Form FL-415 – Findings and
Order, Evilsizor v. Sweeney
(color, with credits notation)
Cumulative,
Untimely
Overruled
T Commission on Judicial
Performance Response to
―Why a Spotlight must be
put on the Commission on
Judicial Performance‖
Hearsay,
Relevance,
Untimely
Overruled
iv
Ex. Description Objection Ruling
1 April 21, 2016 letter from
James Murphy to the
Commission on Judicial
Performance
Hearsay Overruled
2 October 28, 2016 letter from
the Commission to Judge
Mills
Hearsay Overruled
3 December 13, 2016 letter
from James Murphy to the
Commission
Hearsay Overruled
4 January 30, 2017 letter from
the Commission to Judge
Mills
Hearsay Overruled
5 March 16, 2017 letter from
James Murphy to the
Commission
Hearsay Overruled
6 Order to Show Cause and
Affidavit for Contempt with
Exhibits A-D, Evilsizor v.
Sweeney
7 August 12, 2016 Reporter‘s
Transcript of Proceedings,
Sweeney v. Evilsizor
v
Ex. Description Objection Ruling
8 August 12, 2016 Reporter‘s
Supplemental Transcript of
Proceedings, Sweeney v.
Evilsizor
9 August 16, 2016 Reporter‘s
Transcript of Proceedings,
Evilsizor v. Sweeney
10 August 16, 2016 Minute
Order, Evilsizor v. Sweeney
11 Findings and Order re
Contempt, Evilsizor v.
Sweeney (without credits
notation)
12 Findings and Order re
Contempt, Evilsizor v.
Sweeney (with credits
notation)
13 Withdrawn
14 August 25, 2016 letter from
James Morrison to West
County Detention Center
with enclosures
vi
Ex. Description Objection Ruling
15 August 25, 2016 letter from
James Morrison to Judge
Mills with enclosures
16 August 25, 2016 Unreported
Minute Order, Evilsizor v.
Sweeney
17 Complaint – Misdemeanor,
People v. Jeffers
18 March 17 and 22, 2016
Reporter‘s Transcript of
Jury Trial, People v. Jeffers
Hearsay,
Lack of
Foundation
Overruled
19 March 23, 2016 Reporter‘s
Transcript of Jury Trial,
People v. Jeffers
Hearsay,
Lack of
Foundation
Overruled
20 Minutes, People v. Jeffers
21 April 1, 2016 Reporter‘s
Transcript, Dept. 8, People
v. Jeffers
22 April 1, 2016 Reporter‘s
Transcript, Dept. 29, People
v. Jeffers
vii
Ex. Description Objection Ruling
23 May 7, 2001 Notice of
Intended Private
Admonishment to Hon.
Bruce Clayton Mills with
enclosures
Hearsay,
Evid. Code §§
350, 352
Overruled
24 June 12, 2006 Decision and
Order Imposing Public
Admonishment, In the
Matter Concerning Judge
Bruce Clayton Mills
Hearsay,
Evid. Code §§
350, 352
Overruled
25 February 25, 2008 Advisory
Letter to Hon. Bruce C.
Mills
Hearsay,
Evid. Code §§
350, 352
Overruled
26 February 7, 2011 Advisory
Letter to Hon. Bruce C.
Mills
Hearsay,
Evid. Code §§
350, 352
Overruled
27 July 30, 2013 Decision and
Order Imposing Public
Admonishment, Inquiry
Concerning Judge Bruce
Clayton Mills, No. 192
Hearsay,
Evid. Code §§
350, 352
Overruled
