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Stalingrad Virtual Staff Ride (VSR) Walkbook
Stands 8-15
VOLUME I
Stand List
1. BARBAROSSA Overview (JUN 1941-MAY 1942).
2. Case BLUE (BLAU) and the Advance to Stalingrad (JUN 1942-AUG 1942).
3. Isolation of the City (20 AUG-2 SEP 1942).
4. The Fight for the Suburbs (3 SEP-12 SEP).
5. First Assaults on the City (13 SEP-14 SEP 1942).
6. Committing the Soviet 13th Guards Rifle Division (15 SEP-18 SEP 1942).
7. The Fight for the South and Center Continues (19 SEP-26 SEP 1942).
VOLUME II
Stand List
8. Fighting for the Workers’ Villages and Mamaev Kurgan (27 SEP-2 OCT 1942).
9. Battle for Orlovka, Final Fight for the Workers’ Villages (1-13 OCT 1942).
10. Tractor Factory and Spartanovka-Rynok (14 OCT-17 OCT 1942).
11. Barrikady Factory, Phase I (16 OCT-18 OCT 1942).
12. The Lulls, Barrikady Factory Phase II, and Red October Factory (19 OCT-11 NOV 1942)
13. Operation HUBERTUS and Liudnikov’s Island (12-18 NOV 1942).
14. Operation URANUS (19-30 NOV 1942).
15. The Final Acts (30 NOV 1942-2 FEB 1943).
Integration Session.
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I. Administrative notes:
Yellow highlighted text refers to terrain movements on the virtual terrain.
Blue highlights refer to visual aids to be displayed from the PowerPoint visual aids package.
Text in gray highlights in the description part of each stand is meant to show the most important
material that is being presented. Text that is not in gray highlights is optional and/or background
material that the instructor will probably not present to the students in order to keep the time of
the staff ride within reason.
II. Scaling (or tailoring) the Stalingrad VSR.
A. The battle of Stalingrad was a massive event that included larger campaigns such as
Case BLUE and Operation URANUS, and involved hundreds of thousands of soldiers in a 5
month struggle. The complete Stalingrad VSR reflects this enormity.
B. If instructors were to present all of the material in the instructor notes and visuals—
even focusing only on the gray highlighted materials—the VSR would take more than eight
hours and would have to be executed in two days to avoid participant burn-out.
C. However, the Stalingrad VSR is scalable. It should be tailored to fit the audience and
thus reduced in scope and time (a six hour ride, three in the morning and three in the afternoon,
is a good goal). Below are some general suggestions for scaling the field phase of your staff ride
(note that at the beginning of each volume of the instructor notes is more specific guidelines for
trimming down portions of the ride to fit the unit needs).
1. If you are a higher level unit looking to examine more operational (and even
strategic) implications and insights of Stalingrad, you will want to keep most of the first two and
last two stands’ material in the ride (BARBAROSSA, Case BLUE, Operation URANUS, and
Final Acts). This will entail cutting significant portions of the other stands, which focus on
tactics. You may want to focus on only three to five of the key terrain areas of the city for
detailed descriptions and virtual movements, instead of the dozen or so that are in the notes.
2. If you are a mid to lower level unit looking for some insights at all levels, you
can maybe cut BARBAROSSA altogether and minimize Case BLUE, Operation URANUS, and
Final Acts (you will want to even cut some of the gray highlighted parts). Also scale back on
Stand 3, Isolation of the City; Stand 4, Fight for the Suburbs, and Stand 13, Operation
HUBERTUS and Ludnikov’s Island. You can then focus on maybe six to eight key terrain areas
of the city for detailed descriptions and virtual movements.
3. If you are only interested in the tactical aspects of the battle, eliminate stands 1,
2, 3, 4, 14, and 15. Instead, using a few of the visual aids provided, give a 15-20 minute
overview of the entire campaign. Then pick one, two, or three stands (depending on time) and do
those stands as written, like case studies of certain actions.
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D. General recommendations for all stands to save time.
1. Delete or shorten “Description (Strategic)” and “Description (Operational)”
sections at the beginning of stands with a tactical focus.
2. After the first orientation of the entire city (Stand 5), you can shorten
subsequent orientations, and do not go to the ground (just do from an aerial view.
3. Delete or shorten virtual movements as needed; especially if you have already
been in the same area. However, remember that the terrain is one of the most important parts of
the staff ride.
4. Delete or shorten vignettes.
5. Try not to name every single subordinate unit in an operation if possible. For
example, you can say something like “all three of the 71st Divisions’ regiments made gains…”
instead of naming each individual regiment.
E. Recommended deletions or shortening for specific stands in Volume II.
1. Stand 8, Fighting for the Workers’ Villages and Mamaev Kurgan. “Description
(Tactical).”
a. Shorten terrain description (Section I.A.1.).
b. Shorten or delete Chuikov’s counterattack plan (Section I.B.2.).
c. Begin virtual movement for the stand at Hill 107.5 (Section I.D.4.b.).
d. Delete 95th Rifle Division attack on Mamaev Kurgan (Section I.D.6.).
2. Stand 9, Battle for Orlovka, Final Fight for the Workers’ Villages. “Description
(Tactical).”
a. Delete Orlovka terrain description (Section II.B.).
b. Describe the reduction of the Orlovka Salient from the visuals provided;
conduct no virtual movements (Section II, Reduction of the Orlovka Salient).
c. Shorten description of Section II.G. (Outcome of the Fight for the
Orlovka Salient).
d. Delete Spartanovka-Rynok (Section III.L.5.).
3. Stand 10, Tractor Factory and Spartanovka-Rynok. “Description (Tactical).”
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a. German Plan (Section I. B.) Focus on Group Jäneke’s mission as the
main effort.
b. Soviet Strength and Dispositions. (Section I.C.) Condense description to
general Soviet defense rather than details of each division/brigade.
c. Focus details on the 14th Panzer Division as the main effort during the
attack on Tractor Factory fighting. Provide general actions of other divisions in Group Jäneke.
d. XIV Panzer Corps Attack on Spartanovka and Rynok 15-17 October
(Section III). Brief entirely off the visuals provided; use no virtual movements.
4. Stand 11, Barrikady Factory, Phase I. “Description (Tactical).”
a. Focus details on the 14th Panzer Division as the main effort of Group
Jäneke during the attack on the Barrikady Factory fighting. Provide general actions of other
divisions.
b. Spartanovka and Rynok on 18 October (Section II.D.) delete.
5. The Lulls, Barrikady Factory Phase II, and Red October Factory.
a. “Description (Operational).”
i. Reorganization of Soviet Forces in the Stalingrad Area (Section
I). Provide very brief description of the reorganization.
ii. Don Front. Rokossovsky’s Fourth Kotluban Counterstoke
(Offensive) 19-26 October (Section IV). Provide very brief description of the counteroffensive
and result.
iii. Southwestern Front/Army Group B (Section VI). Provide very
brief description of Dumitrescu’s concerns.
b. “Description (Tactical).”
i. Martenovskii Shop (Section I.E.2.a.) delete virtual movement
into building; shorten description.
ii. Spartanovka–Rynok (Section I.E.2.d.) delete.
6. Stand 13, Operation HUBERTUS and Liudnikov’s Island. “Description
(Tactical).” Cover this stand using visuals only and providing only a virtual bird’s eye view of
the Barrikady Factory complex.
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Stand 8
Fighting for the Workers’ Villages and Mamaev Kurgan
26 September-2 October 1942
Visuals for this stand.
8-1: The Workers’ Villages
8-2: Orientation, North Stalingrad
8-3: Front Reorganization, 28 September 1942
8-4: Second Kotluban Offensive, 18 September-2 October 1942
8-5: Situation, 26 September 1942
8-6: German Attack Plan, 27 September 1942
8-7: Chuikov’s Attack Plan, 27 September 1942
8-8: Situation at Nightfall, 27 September 1942
8-9: German Attack Plan, 28 September 1942
8-10: Situation at Nightfall, 28 September 1942
8-11: Mamaev Kurgan, 95th RD Attack, 29 September
Virtual Movement Directions:
Start with the terrain in an overview of the northern half of Stalingrad that generally replicates
the “The Workers’ Villages” visual now showing.
Orientation.
Visual: The Workers’ Villages
Starting with an overview of the northern areas of Stalingrad, point out the various Worker’s
Villages. Explain that “upper” and “lower” refer to the distances from the Volga River.
Next, point out the following key terrain features (Virtual Movement Directions: you can have
the computer operator zoom down lower to get a closer look at any or all of these features as you
point them out).
Visual: Orientation, North Stalingrad
I. Mamaev Kurgan-Tennis Racket.
–Dolgii Ravine
–Mamaev Kurgan
–Flying School
–Uniform Factory
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–Locomotive Repair Shops
–Meat Combine
–Lazur Chemical Factory
–Bannyi Ravine
II. Between Mamaev Kurgan and the Brick Factory.
–the Steppe
–Balkas/ravines
–Gorodishche
–Orlovka
–Central Landing Stage.
–Red October Factory
–Skul’pturnyi Park.
–Barrikady Factory
–The southern Sports Stadium.
–The “Schnellhefter” (also called the “six-sided block”)
–The Silikat Factory.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator return to an overview of the northern
half of Stalingrad that generally replicates the “Orientation, North Stalingrad” visual now
showing.
Description (Strategic).
I. Strategic Planning and Diplomacy.
A. Allied. No major developments.
B. Axis. On 30 SEP, Hitler spoke to the nation and boasted that Stalingrad will be taken.
II. Europe.
A. North Africa and Mediterranean.
1. There were no major engagements in North Africa as Montgomery continued
to accumulate forces and supplies for his upcoming offensive.
2. Rommel could only wait for the British attack at El Alamein. He did not
receive reinforcements, nor could he send any that might help in Russia.
B. North Atlantic, Arctic Convoys, and Strategic Bombing.
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1. During this time frame, U-boats made no attacks on Allied convoys. Supplies
for Operation TORCH and other efforts continued to flow to Britain.
2. In the Baltic, despite the moderate success of Convoy PQ 18, for Allied
shipping and escort vessels for TORCH and other activities, the United States and Britain
suspended supply convoys from Iceland to the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1942.
a. The suspension of the convoys caused ill feeling among the Soviet
leadership, although the actual reduction in supplies was minimal (supplies getting through in the
Baltic were always smaller than other routes such as Iran).
b. The U.S. and Britain decided to sail single ships independently until
convoys could resume. This also had minimal effect
3. Allied strategic bombing continued during this time frame with a series of
smaller raids in both day and night bombing.
III. Pacific.
A. On 28 SEP, the Japanese continued their retreat on the Kokoda Trail in New Guinea.
B. Skirmishing continued on Guadalcanal, but the Americans clearly had the upper hand.
Description (Operational).
I. General.
Visual: Front Reorganization, 28 September 1942
A. On 26 September, Stalin approved Vasilevsky’s and Zhukov’s conceptual plan for
the Operation URANUS counteroffensive (to be discussed in more detail later).
B. On 28 September, the Stavka reorganized Soviet forces in the Stalingrad region. The
changes were as follows:
1. Stalingrad Front. The Southeastern Front, commanded by Colonel General
Andrei I. Eremenko was redesignated as the new Stalingrad Front. Its front now stretched from
Rynok in the north to the Sarpa Lakes region southeast of Stalingrad.
2. The Don Front. The former Stalingrad Front was redesignated as the new Don
Front and Lieutenant General Konstantin K. Rokossovksy was designated as the commander. It
assumed control of the lines positioned north and northwest of Stalingrad.
II. Leningrad.
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A. The Germans had encircled part of Soviet 8th (the 6th Guards Rifle Corps) and 2nd
Shock Armies near Gaitolovo, and the Germans continued their efforts to reduce the pocket from
the end of Sep to early OCT.
B. Also during this time the German 28th Light Infantry and the 12th Panzer divisions
defeated the attempts of the Leningrad Front to expand their bridgeheads.
III. Caucasus.
A. German fight for El'khotovo and El'khotovo Pass.
1. Pausing briefly early on 26 September, 13th Panzer Division made extensive
preparations to assault the Soviet forces at El'khotovo and the adjacent El'khotovo Pass.
2. Both the town and pass were heavily fortified and surrounded by rugged
forested terrain reinforced with bunkers and other field fortifications. The most formidable of
these defenses were on Mount Seko and Hill 703, which flanked the pass to the southeast.
3. Defending the region was Koroteev's 9th Army.
4. The new 13th Panzer Division commander (Colonel Crisolli took command
when Herr was killed by a mine) decided to launch his assault through the forests east of
El'khotovo to seize the two key terrain features and then envelop the pass and town from the
southeast.
5. The battle began on 26 SEP, and lasted for eight days as the German advance
slowed to a crawl.
a. The initial assaults by 13th Panzer Division's 66th Grenadier Regiment
seized the high ground southeast of the pass but could advance no farther.
b. After another assault on the pass on 28 SEP, over the next two days
93rd Grenadier Regiment' made progress through the Soviet defense in depth south of
I'llarionovka.
c. Following another pause to regroup and a day's delay due to heavy fog,
on 3 OCT, 66th Grenadier Regiment finally penetrated into the northeastern section of the town
and captured it. However, after this exhausting fight, which reduced its strength to 80 tanks, 13th
Panzer Division could not advance further.
B. While 13th Panzer was fighting in the El'khotovo Pass, Kleist formulated new plans.
1. He ordered the SS "Viking" Motorized Division, to join LII Corps' 370th
Infantry Division in an attack east on 13th Panzer's left flank.
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2. On 22 SEP, he directed Steiner's SS panzer-grenadiers to advance east and
penetrate the Soviets' positions blocking access through the passes across the Terek Mountains
around the village of Sagopshin.
3. Then, they were to exploit either east toward Grozny or south toward
Ordzhonikidze, a key junction on the Georgian Military Road, the only significant route in the
region.
4. At the same time, Recknagel's 111th Infantry Division, supported by part of
Nordland and Germania Regiments from SS "Viking," was to capture Malgobek. Beyond
Malgobek and Sagopshin lay Ordzhonikidze.
5. From there, the Germans could turn northeast and capture Grozny, the refinery
center of the Caucasus oil region.
6. On the Soviet side, Koroteev, had already ordered his 52nd Tank and 59th Rifle
Brigades, along with other supporting units to launch a counterattack against a perceived weak
spot in 111th Infantry Division's defenses in the Alkhan-Churt valley.
7. As a result, Steiner’s forces ran into the heavy concentration of Soviet forces.
This precipitated an intense fight that lasted more than a week before the assault by "Viking" was
halted by the Soviet resistance.
8. During this fighting, a Finnish SS battalion seized Hill 711, overlooking the
town of Sagopshin, on 28 SEP but could go no farther.
9. As a result of this fighting, SS "Viking" and 111th Infantry Divisions captured
Malgobek but failed to seize either Sagopshin or the passes through the Terek Mountains.
10 On 3 OCT, Kleist asked Hitler through the OKH "to be informed when and in
what strength the army can expect to get reinforcements to continue the advance to Makhachkala
via Ordzhonikidze and Grozny." (Glantz, II, 558).
11. After delaying a week, Hitler informed Kleist on 10 October that he might
receive one or two mobile divisions later in the month.
C. After Kleist's seizure of El'khotovo and Malgobek, Maslennikov, commander of the
Trans-Caucasus Front's Northern Group of Forces, reported to his front commander, Tiulenev,
that without rest and reinforcements his forces were not capable of further offensive action and
needed to go over to the defense.
D. Besides thwarting Kleist's advance toward Ordzhonikidze and Grozny, Maslennikov's
defense of the Terek River line also severely hindered Army Group A’s effort to resume
offensive operations at Novorossiisk and toward Tuapse.
IV. Don Front. Second Kotluban Offensive.
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Visual: Second Kotluban Offensive, 18 September-2 October 1942) The Second Kotluban
offensive began on 18 September and was still ongoing at this time. The offensive would
sputtered out by 2 October.
Description (Tactical).
I. Strength, Dispositions, and Plans at Mamaev Kurgan and in the Factory Workers Villages.
Visual: Situation, 26 September 1942
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator maintain the overview of the
northern half of Stalingrad that generally replicates the “Situation, 26 September 1942”
visual now showing.
A. German Situation, Strength, Dispositions, and Plans.
1. Terrain.
a. The Steppe and Balkas. The terrain in the area between Gorodishche
and the Dolgii Ravine where most of LTG Walter von Seydlitz’s LI Corps was situated was
composed of the eastern reaches of the steppe. Here, however, the steppe began gently to
undulate with gentle slopes and valleys as it approached the Volga River. The area was crosscut
by several deep “balkas” or ravines generally running west to east toward the river. The ravines
were deep but generally passable by infantry and vehicles. The latter, however, had to cross at
one of any number of roads and trails. The ravines were generally dry except in cases of heavy
rains. Since the ravines ran east and west, they were to prove of only moderate value to the
Soviet defenders but could be, and were, used by the Germans as covered avenues of approach.
b. As a unit approached the city, it would encounter large patches of
small trees in the areas just to the west of the Workers’ Villages. The “forests” west of the city
were composed not of large hardwoods or tall pines and firs, but short, scrubby trees not unlike
the Mesquite tree woods of west Texas. Within these patches of trees, the Soviet defenders had
constructed a series of fighting positions and trenches to oppose a German attack from that
direction.
c. Workers’ Villages. Once through the Mesquite trees, an attacking
force would next encounter the “upper” Workers’ Villages for the three major factory complexes
(Tractor, Barrikady, and Red October). These villages generally consisted of small wooden huts
densely packed along dirt streets. The huts were generally small with perhaps a kitchen, small
sitting area, and a bedroom or two. Each was heated by a brick (manufactured at the large Brick
Factory nearby) hearth and chimney. As the Germans attacked, these villages would be largely
consumed by fire from artillery and aerial strikes, leaving only an eerie landscape of ash and
standing chimneys through which to attack. As the attacker approached the actual factory
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district, he would begin to encounter much larger concrete, brick, and steel structures. These
were apartment complexes, hospitals, stores, and business buildings. The opposition in these
areas would generally harden due to better materials to build defensive positions, thus better
protection for the defenders.
2. German Dispositions Mamaev Kurgan to Gorodishche, North to South.
a. XIV Panzer Corps (not shown). LTG Hans Hube’s XIV Panzer Corps
was manning a sector in the vicinity of the developing Orlovka Salient over to Spartanovka-
Rynok. From there the corps’ line briefly followed the Volga River, then bent back to the
northwest past Kotluban. More on the XIV Panzer Corps’ individual divisions later.
b. LI Corps. Seydlitz’s LI Corps was spread out between Gorodischche
and the Dolgii Ravine. At this point the corps consisted of (north to south):
i. 389th Infantry Division. LTG Erwin Jänecke’s 389th Infantry
Division was in positions east and southeast of Gorodishche and southwest of Orlovka,
supporting, in part, the XIV Panzer Corps’ initial efforts to reduce the Orlovka Salient. The
efforts so far were not effective. The division was in good shape with its six battalions rated as: 1
medium strong; 3 average, and 2 weak.
ii. 24th Panzer Division. On the 389th’s right, LTG Arno von
Lenski’s 24th Panzer Division was preparing to advance from the steppe south and southwest of
Gorodishche in an easterly direction toward the central factory district. Technically part of the
XLVIII Panzer Corps, the division was now under tactical control of the LI Corps for the next
phase of the battle for Stalingrad. The division was in relatively good shape in terms of tanks and
troops. Its four infantry battalions were rated as: 2 medium strong and 2 average. The division
possessed about 40 operational tanks.
.
iii. 295th Infantry Division. To the right of the 24th Panzer
Division, MG Rolf Wuthmann’s 295th Infantry Division manned a sector covering the area
northwest of Mamaev Kurgan southeast to the railroads leading into the Tennis Racket. Some of
its units were positioned in the area between the Krutoi and Dolgii Ravines where it linked with
the 71st Infantry Division on its right. The division was in fair shape with its seven battalions
rated as: 2 average, 4 weak and 1 exhausted.
iv. 100th Jäger Division. LTG Werner Sanne’s 100th Jäger
Division was just arriving west of Stalingrad from the Don River region and was attached to the
LI Corps. Composed of largely Austrian personnel and some Silesians, it was a fresh division,
but only possessed two regiments. It would soon be reinforced with the 369th Croatian Regiment
to make up the difference. The division began moving into positions between the 24th Panzer
Division and 295th Infantry Division in the sector facing Mamaev Kurgan on 25 September. The
relief would be complete before the next major German attack on 27 September.
a. XLVIII Panzer Corps. The XLVIII Panzer Corps remained in positions
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holding the southern part of the city. Paulus frequently syphoned off forces from this corps to
help Hube’s XIV Panzer Corps in reducing the Orlovka Salient and later to reinforce efforts in
the factory districts.
i. 94th Infantry Division (not shown). The XLVIII Panzer
Corps unit designated to help Hube at Orlovka was the 94th Infantry Division. This division was
preparing to move from central Stalingrad north to the Orlovka Salient. The division was in good
shape with all seven of its infantry battalions rated as: medium strong.
Visual: German Attack Plan, 27 September 1942
3. Paulus’ Attack Plan. By 26 September, Paulus concluded that the fight for
Southern and central Stalingrad was largely over. There were a few pockets of resistance
remaining, most notably the slender position held by the 13th GRD along the Volga south of the
Krutoi Ravine, but Paulus felt that those positions were not worth the casualties needed to reduce
them. He now focused his attention on the northern factory districts which were the assigned task
of Seydlitz’ LI Corps, now the Sixth Army’s main effort, and the Orlovka Salient, which was
XIV Panzer Corps’ (Hube’s) responsibility.
a. Organization and First Shock Group. For the main attack, Paulus
organized the LI Corps into two “Shock Groups.” The first (which was the corps’ main effort),
was composed of the 389th Infantry, 24th Panzer, and 100th Jäger Divisions. They would
advance generally northeastward toward the factory district.
i. The 389th would head almost due east with the Metchetka
River on its left, cross the Vishnevaia Ravine and seize the Upper Barrikady Village.
ii. The 24th Panzer, the main effort of the main effort, would
attack northeasterly across the steppe, through the brush country, cross the railroad, and capture
Hill 107.5 and the Dom Commune as its initial objective.
iii. The 100th Jäger Division’s mission was to clear Mamaev
Kurgan of Soviet defenders, capture a small uniform factory, and attack into the western sections
of the Lower Red October Workers Village.
b. Second Shock Group. The smaller second Shock Group consisted of
the 295th Infantry Division and the 194th Grenadier Regiment on loan from the 71st Infantry
Division. The 295th was to attack eastward to clear the southern base of Mamaev Kurgan,
advance along the Dolgii Ravine to the Volga, and turn north to clear the Tennis Racket and
attack into the southeastern sections of the Lower Red October Workers Village.
c. XIV Panzer Corps. To the north, Hube’s corps was to attack to reduce
the Orlovka Salient which had slowly developed after his corps initially reached Rynok on 23
August. Because Hube was busy fending off the Don Front’s Second Kotluban Offensive, Hube
could commit only sparse resources to the salient. Paulus had promised him the 94th Infantry
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Division to assist in that effort and it was now gradually handing over its positions in central
Stalingrad to other divisions.
4. Once the LI Corps objectives for this attack were taken, ideally Seydlitz’s
command would be in position to begin the final attacks to seize the three major factory
complexes: the 389th to seize the Tractor Factory; the 24th Panzer to take the Barrikady; and the
100th Jäger to capture the Red October Factory.
B. Soviet Situation, Strength, Dispositions, and Plans.
Visual: Situation, 26 September 1942
1. The 62nd Army’s Defenses in the North.
a. As of 26 September, the 62nd Army had three rifle divisions, a tank
corps, and an NKVD regiment north of the Dolgii Ravine and south of the Orlovka Salient.
These units were in hasty or prepared defenses and all were preparing to conduct a counterattack
for which they had received a warning order from Chuikov. From north to south these consisted
of:
i. 23rd Tank Corps (MG A. F. Popov). The 23rd Tank Corps (41
tanks) was employed in a covering force role forward of the rifle divisions. It was composed of:
1. 6th Guards Tank Brigade in the north south of the
Metchetka River. 21 tanks.
2. 189th Tank Brigade east of Aleksandrovka. 9 tanks.
3. 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade north side of the north
branch of the Vishnevaia Ravine.
4. 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade located north and south of
the north branch of the Vishnevaia Ravine.
5. 269th NKVD Regiment (attached) was located between
the Vishnevaia Ravine and Mamaev Kurgan.
6. 137th Tank Brigade located west of Mamaev Kurgan.
11 tanks.
ii. 112th RD (COL Ivan E. Ermolkin). Located in hasty defenses
behind the 23rd Tank Corps was the 112th RD positioned to defend the Barrikady and Red
October Workers’ Villages in the north. The division had been rapidly moved from the vicinity
of the Krutoi Ravine to its new location in anticipation of the German attack.
iii. 95th RD (COL Vasilii A. Gorishnyi). The 95th RD was
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located in the vicinity of Mamaev Kurgan (where it had just moved from the Dolgii Ravine area)
and was responsible for holding that position.
iv. 284th RD (COL Nicholai F. Batiuk). The 284th Rifle Division,
composed largely of Siberian personnel, had taken over the entire Dolgii Ravine defense and was
responsible for defending the Tennis Racket area. It was reinforced with one regiment (685th
RR) from the 193rd RD, most of which was still on the east side of the Volga.
Visual: Chuikov’s Counterttack Plan, 27 September 1942
2. Chuikov’s Counterattack Plan.
a. Chuikov’s intelligence sources made him aware of Paulus’ impending
attack. Thus he decided to conduct a preemptive counterattack to throw the German effort off
balance. He issued the counterattack order on the evening of 26 September. It consisted of the
following missions:
i. 23rd Tank Corps. The 23rd TC, specifically the 269th NKVD
Regiment and the 137th TB, was to attack the forward defenses of the 24th Panzer Division in
the vicinity of the Rzhevskaia Station on the rail line.
ii. 95th RD. The 95th RD was to attack to take the southern arm of
Dolgii Ravine.
iii. 284th RD. The 284th was to attack south to take the Krutoi Ravine.
b. When Chuikov issued his counterattack order, he was not aware that the
100th Jäger Division was at that moment assuming positions between the 24th Panzer and the
295th Divisions. This action of course would shorten the German division lines making them
more densely packed in preparation for Paulus’ own attack the same day.
Visual: Situation at Nightfall, 27 September 1942
C. Chuikov’s Failed Counterattack.
1. The artillery preparation for the Soviet counterattack began at 0500 on the
morning of the 27th.
2. After an hour’s bombardment against the German positions, the Soviet
counterattack began at 0600. The various attacking columns slowly moved forward against
unexpectedly heavy German defensive fires, but made some progress. This lasted until about
0800 when events took a turn for the worse.
3. At 0800, the usual aerial attack preceding a German ground attack arrived
over the battlefield. Within a short period of time, JU-87 Stuka dive bombers had totally
disrupted the attacking forces of the 95th RD and the 23rd TC. Ju-88s utterly destroyed a key
strongpoint on Mamaev Kurgan and Chuikov’s own headquarters bunker came under attack.
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4. German preparatory artillery fire smothered the 137th Tank Brigade west of
the looming high ground.
5. A soldier from the 24th Panzer Division described the scene:
The attack area was enveloped in a murky haze of gunpowder, wafting dust, and
choking smoke, the flashes of explosions illuminating the fog. To the ground troops ready to push
off, it looked like a storm cloud with cracking thunder and flashing lightning. (Glantz,
Armageddon in Stalingrad, p. 248).
6. The Soviet attack faltered then rapidly fell back after suffering heavy losses as
the Germans’ own attack began.
D. Initial German Assault on the Workers’ Villages-27 September.
1. The German Attack. After over two hours of artillery and aerial
bombardment, the German attack began at 1030.
a. 389th Infantry Division. In the north, the 389th Infantry Division pushed
eastward after quickly crossing the railroad. Entering what appeared to be sage brush and
Mesquite trees, the division advanced between the Metchetka River and the northern bank of the
Vishnevaia Ravine. Supported by some tanks of the 24th Panzer Division and a number of
assault guns, the division methodically ground down the 6th Guards Tank, 189th Tank, and
elements of the 38th and 9th Motorized Rifle Brigades. By 1200, the defenses of those units were
shattered and in headlong retreat toward the workers’ villages to the east. By nightfall, the
division’s 544th Regiment had pushed to the bridge at the crossing of the upper Vishnevaia
Ravine and the other two regiments were approaching the ravine farther north.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator move to the ground near the western
part of Dolgii Ravine, just south of the ravine. Face north. You will be following the route of
Kampfgruppe Edelsheim of the 24th Panzer Division.
b. 24th Panzer Division. For this attack, Lenski kept his division organized into
three kampfgruppes: Kampfgruppe Winterfeld (which was based on the 24th Panzer Regiment)
on the left, Kampfgruppe Edelsheim (based on the 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment) in the
center, and Kampfgruppe Hellerman (based on the 21st Panzer Grenadier Regiment) on the right.
i. Kampfgruppe Winterfeld. After repulsing the attack of the
269th NKVD Regiment and part of the 9th MRB, KG Winterfeld crossed the railroad, and after a
sharp fight with T-34s and elements of the 112th RD, captured western areas of the Upper Red
October Worker’s Village. It eventually attacked into the Dom Commune and controlled most of
that area by nightfall. It was now positioned to advance into the Lower Red October Worker’s
Village.
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Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator move north through the Dolgii
Ravine and on to the western slope of Mamaev Kurgan. Have the operator move north while
facing east so participants can see the rear of the hill. Stop due west of the hill and cover the
information below, including the vignette.
ii. Kampfgruppe Edelsheim. KG Edelsheim crushed the initial assaults
of the 137th TB and then attacked through the Mesquite trees on the west slope of Mamaev
Kurgan. There, the panzer grenadiers encountered Soviet infantrymen defending in the woods.
The “nightmarish” terrain “provided excellent camouflage for the Russians.” One soldier
recalled the experience:
To our right was the rear slope of the menacing Mamayev Kurgan, its bald crown boiling
and seething as shell after shell ripped up the ground sending clods of earth, bits of
wood, and smoke high into the air. This was the unpleasant site to their right as the men
plunged into the bushes and pushed toward the shooting range. Encounters came at close
range. A burst of fire from the bushes, a man would be hit and then crumple to the
ground, his comrades also diving to the ground and opening fire on the suspected area.
Grenades were thrown and the bushes stormed, usually ending in the death of the
Russians. (Glantz, Armageddon in Stalingrad, p. 250).
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator face north and continue movement
north, across the airfield and the railroad, then move to Ovrashnaya (the Upper Red October
Worker’s Village).
The mounted force passed rapidly through the woods, crossed the railroad, and passed through
the area of open ground between the Upper and Lower Red October Worker’s Villages. By
1110, the kampfgruppe had captured Hill 107.5 and was also poised to advance into the Lower
Red October Worker’s Village. KG Edelsheim’s impressive advance, however, opened a large
gap between it and KG Hellerman to its right.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator move to the vicinity of Hill 107.5 to
see that area. Next, elevate and point out Dom Commune, KG Winterfeld’s objective for the day
and its current location. Then look south back toward KG Hellerman’s route to discuss that
movement.
Lenski was forced to commit the understrength 276th Infantry Regiment (attached from the 94th
Division) to try and fill the gap between KG Edelsheim and KG Hellerman, but the regiment was
too small to adequately fill the void. Lenski then requested Seydlitz to have the 100th Jäger
Division shift left (northwest) to help fill the void.
iii. Kampfgruppe Hellerman. Over on the right, KG Hellerman
also attacked across the gentle western slope of Mamaev Kurgan and entered the sage brush and
Mesquite trees.
17
iv. The kampfgruppe pushed over the slope, through the grounds of
the Stalingrad Flying School and a military rifle range, and was approaching the railroad and the
military uniform factory just beyond by nightfall. There it held up and prepared for further
advances for the next day.
Virtual Movement Directions: Point out approximate location of the Uniform factory.
KG Hellerman’s left was approximate 2 km south of KG Edelsheim at this point.
c. 100th Jäger Division.
Virtual Movement Directions: Still looking south toward Mamaev Kurgan, point out the
approximate location of the 100th Jäger Division’s fighting on the hill that day.
On and around Mamaev Kurgan, the assault regiments of the 100th Jäger Division ran into
resistance that was far more organized and resolute that that faced by its neighbors to the left.
The jägers spent much of the day in close quarters and brutal fighting against regiments of the
95th RD on Mamaev Kurgan. By nightfall the jägers had secured most of the large hill complex,
including the peak, except for the north and northeastern slopes. A few small pockets of
resistance in the ravines on the south side held out through the night.
d. 295th Infantry Division. Even the weak 295th Infantry Division made
some positive headway on this attack. Its regiments were able to push northeastward up the shaft
of the Tennis Racket and come parallel to the jäger units on Mamaev Kurgan by the end of the
day. It failed, however, to cut off the 284th RD from the strip of land held by the 13th GRD
farther south. The mouth of the Dolgii Ravine was still in Soviet hands.
2. Chuikov’s Situation and Actions.
a. Chuikov’s losses on 27 September were very high. He understood that the
battle was a very close run thing. That evening he remarked that, “One more battle like that and
we’ll be in the Volga.” By nightfall, damage to the 62nd Army included:
i. The virtual destruction of the 112th RD’s 524th Regiment in the
north.
ii. The severe mauling of the 23rd TC which now possessed a total of
20 tanks. The 27th and 189th TBs consisted of only 2 tanks each.
iii. Only small “remnants” remained of the 9th MRB, 137th TB, and
269th NKVD Regiment.
iv. Only 400 men remained in the entire 95th RD.
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Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator go to an overhead view similar to the
next visual.
Visual: German Attack Plan, 28 September 1942
b. Reinforcements. That night, Chuikov moved the remaining two regiments
(883rd and 895th RRs) of Smekhotvorov’s 193rd RD across the Volga to reinforce the 112th RD
positions in the Red October Lower Village. That move, when complete, would allow the 112th
RD to contract farther north to shorten and thicken its lines.
c. Creates a Reserve. Chuikov ordered most of Popov’s 23rd TC to withdraw
into a reserve position west of the Red October Factory once the 193rd RD was in position. The
6th Guards TB remained in position defending the Triangle Woods. Once consolidated Popov
was ordered to move the remnants of the 137th TB to defensive positions at the Bannyi Ravine
and the 38th MRB to defensive positions at Zaraiskaia Street in the Red October Lower Village.
d. Chuikov Orders a Counterattack on Mamaev Kurgan. Additionally,
Chuikov ordered Gorishnyi’s 95th RD, despite its severely weakened state, to counterattack
Mamaev Kurgan the following morning. To increase the 95th’s chances, he also directed his
artillery commander to “shell Mamaev Kurgan non-stop throughout the night with artillery and
mortars so as to prevent the enemy from consolidating his position on the hill.” (Glantz,
Armageddon in Stalingrad, 258).
3. 28 September, The Assaults Continue. The 95th RD’s counterattack never took
place since Seydlitz ordered the LI Corps to continue to press the attack. Operations took place
throughout the night of 27-28 September, especially on Mamaev Kurgan where the jägers strove
to wipe out the remaining 95th RD defenders on the hill cut off during the previous day’s attack.
a. Objectives for the Day.
i. 389th Infantry Division. The 389th Division’s objective for the day
was to clear the rest of the Vishnevaia Ravine and Triangle Wood, and seize the western reaches
of the Upper Barrikady Worker’s Village. Jänecke would then begin to shift his division north
across the Metchetka River to assist the XIV Corps in the reduction of the Orlovka Salient.
ii. 24th Panzer Division. Lenski’s 24th Panzer Division’s mission was
to continue the attack northeast towards the Silikat Factory to clear the northwestern section of
the Lower Red October Workers Village and the open area between the Upper and Lower
Barrikady Worker’s Villages.
iii. 100th Jäger Division. In addition to continuing the fight on
Mamaev Kurgan, Sanne’s jäger division was ordered to shift left (northwest) to close the gap
with the 24th Panzer Division, which it did during the night. The 54th Jäger Regiment, which
shifted north of the Bannyi Ravine, was to attack into the western portions of the Lower Red
19
October Workers Village to help secure the 24th Panzer Division’s right flank. The 100th
Division was further assigned the tasks of clearing the northern slope of Mamaev Kurgan and
seizing the Uniform Factory and Meat Combine.
iv. At the south end of the line, the 295th Infantry Division was tasked
to attack east and penetrate to the banks of the Volga to cut off and destroy elements of the 284th
RD and 13th GRD.
v. 94th Infantry Division. The 94th Infantry Division continued its
planned movement north to support the XIV Panzer Corps’ efforts to reduce the Orlovka Salient.
Visual: Situation at Nightfall, 28 September 1942
a. The Main Assault. The next phase of the LI Corps assault began in
earnest beginning at dawn. The attack was accompanied, as usual, with the support of the
Luftwaffe which, this time, concentrated much of its effort on the Volga Boat Flotilla. During the
day German planes succeeded in sinking five of the six operational ferries, significantly reducing
Chuikov’s ability to get reinforcements and supplies, at least for the moment. Chuikov’s own
headquarters was struck once again by a near miss.
i. 389th Infantry Division. In accordance with its mission, the 389th
Division pushed east to clear the Vishnevaia Ravine and the steppe to the north. Engaging and
defeating the remnants of the 6th GTB and 524th RR (112th RD) it cleared the Triangle Wood.
By nightfall, the 544th Regiment advanced into the areas north of the Upper Barrikady Workers’
Village, while the rest of the division began to shift north across the Mechetka River as planned.
ii. 24th Panzer Division.
a. At 0615, German air strikes began against Soviet defenses
in front of the 24th Panzer.
b. Division recon parties went forward initially to find and test
Soviet defenses, mostly remnants of the 23rd TC.
c. The recon was followed by the main kampfgruppes which
began cutting their way through weak resistance.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator go to the Dom Commune and hover
above it facing south toward Hill 107.5. After pointing out the hill, pan left toward the
“Narrows” to show the route and objective of KG Edelsheim.
d. By 1200, KG Edelsheim had reached the “Narrows,” a ravine
defended by elements of the 38th MRB located due west of the Barrikady Factory.
e. Once KG Edelsheim reached the Narrows, KG Winterfeld, on
20
the left, then advanced from the Dom Commune and attacked northeast through a large open area
toward the Upper Barrikady Worker’s Village.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator go to ground at the Dom Commune
and face northeast toward the Upper Barrikady Worker’s Village. Follow KG Winterfeld’s route
across the open ground toward the Upper Barrikady Village and move to the vicinity of the open
area between the upper and lower villages. Do not move all the way through.
KG Winterfeld’s attack route was described as a “coverless steppe pockmarked with shell craters
and lines of Russian trenches.” (Glantz, 261). The kampfgruppe objective was to seize and clear
the narrow open area between the Upper and Lower Barrikady Worker’s Villages (this was
considered vital since the route allowed the division easier lateral movement through open area
for the eventual attack on the Barrikady Factory rather than movement through the constricted
terrain of the built-up areas, also allowing bypass of the heavily defended “Narrows”). KG
Winterfeld successfully seized the area.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator move through the Upper Barrikady
Worker’s Village to a point just short of the Silikat Factory.
f. By nightfall, KG Winterfeld had went on to capture portions of
the Lower Barrikady Workers’ Village and had elements just short of the Sillikat Factory at the
north end of the Upper Barrikady Village.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator move back to Mamaev Kurgan.
Point out key locations as described below.
iii. 100th Jäger Division. The gap between the 24th Panzer and 100th
Jäger Divisions was not adequately covered with the insertion of the 276th Regiment into the
line there. The gap increased again once the 24th Panzer started its attack that morning since the
dismounted jägers, despite moving to close the distance, could not keep up with the mounted
armored troops and they ran into stiffer resistance as well.
a. Sanne’s division jumped off at dawn, the 54th Jägers were able
to clear most of the north side of Mamaev Kurgan and reach the railroad. There, they ran into
more remnants of the 95th RD reinforced with the remnants of the 269th NKVD Regiment and
the 137th TB.
b. Just on the other side of the railroad, the 95th RD had
developed the uniform factory into a strongpoint bristling with machineguns and the 54th Jägers’
advance stalled there for the rest of the day, although the 227th Jägers on the left were
able to capture the head of the Bannyi Ravine a little farther north
c. With the capture of the head of the Bannyi Ravine, Sanne
21
began to shift more of the 100th Division to the left (north) to close the gap with the 24th Panzer
Division. By dark, the 295th Infantry Division had assumed control of the whole Mamaev
Kurgan Sector from the 100th Division.
d. Meanwhile, on the 100th Division’s right, the 369th Croatian
Regiment (attached to the division) made several attempts, in cooperation with elements of the
295th Infantry Division, to capture the Meat Combine in the Tennis Racket. All attempts were
unsuccessful.
iv. 295th Infantry Division. The 295th’s attacks to reach the Volga all
failed and made no significant gains. The 295th, already in a weakened state, now had control of
a much larger sector, including Mamaev Kurgan.
4. 62nd Army’s Situation Night of 28-29 September.
a. Over the past two weeks, Chuikov’s 62nd Army had taken a tremendous
beating and had lost about two thirds of the city. It now held a strip of land about 10 kilometers
long and which was nowhere, except the Orlovka Salient, more than two kilometers wide. In the
13th GRD and 284th RD sectors, units held strips of land only a few hundred yards from the
banks of the Volga.
b. Still, in the day’s fighting, Chuikov believed he noted a change in
the German attacks. “They were losing their punch,” he noted. “[The attacks] were
uncoordinated and not as rapid and well-organized as they had been. Enemy battalions,
supported by tanks, were thrown into battle at different points and not very confidently.” (Glantz,
Armageddon in Stalingrad, 264).
c. Nevertheless, the cost to Chuikov’s forces was high that day. The 23rd TC
had lost 626 men, the 284th RD over 300. The 95th RD now had “only a few men left.”
d. Chuikov’s biggest concern were the losses to his transport fleet. Not only
was he unable to receive more than a trickle of reinforcements and resupply, but many of his
wounded were dying or were wounded again by German air attacks as they waited to be moved
back across the river. The battle was reaching a crisis point.
e. That night the 62nd Army commander issued detailed orders to his
commanders. Anticipating the tough battle to come within the confines of the city itself, he
concluded the orders with the following statements:
I expect the commanders of all units to act with all possible haste in carrying out
engineering work to strengthen their positions, in constructing anti-tank and anti-infantry
obstacles along the forward edge and in depth, and in adapting buildings for the defense
in the event of street fighting.
22
Use all available resources for constructing obstacles, right up to dismantling buildings,
railroads, tram lines, while enlisting the services of the civilian population through the
local authorities . . . .
Explain to all personnel that the army is fighting on its last line of defenses; there can be
no further retreat. It is the duty of every soldier and commander to defend his trench, his
position—NOT A STEP BACK! The enemy MUST BE DESTROYED AT WHATEVER
COST!
Shoot soldiers and commanders who willfully abandon their foxholes and positions on
the spot as enemies of THE FATHERLAND. (Glantz, 271)
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer return Mamaev Kurgan and provide an
approximate view of the next visual.
Visual: Mamaev Kurgan, 95th RD Attack, 29 September 1942
5. Fighting on Mamaev Kurgan 29 September.
a. Fortunately for Chuikov, the attacks made by Seydlitz’s LI Corps units on
the 29th were not aggressive and advances in the workers’ villages made little progress.
b. Thus, the key event on the 29th was the counterattack of the 95th RD on
Mamaev Kurgan.
c. What made this attack notable was the fact that the Soviet 8th
Air Army made numerous bombing and gun runs against the Germans’ positions on the top of
the hill. For once, it was the Germans who were on the receiving end of a massive air attack.
Combined with heavy artillery fire, the Soviet preparations softened the German defenders.
d. Bolstered by a regiment from the 284th RD, the severely weakened 95th
RD launched an attack aimed at the top of the hill. Though the Russians successfully retook the
water cisterns located near the summit, they were unable to quite get to the top. In fact the
incessant heavy artillery fire pounding the top of the hill by both sides made it impossible for
either side to hold that piece of high ground and it became a no man’s land.
e. Counterattacks by the 295th Infantry Division on the 30th failed to
retake any of the lost ground.
6. Soviet Reinforcements 29 September -2 October.
a. The fighting on 29 September signaled a kind of turning point in the battle
for Stalingrad. Not only did the increasingly stronger Soviet Air Force begin to flex its muscles
in daylight, Chuikov (or more likely Eremenko) was soon able to locate and move to the city
additional transport vessels which reopened the spigot of reinforcements for the beleaguered
62nd Army.
23
b. Between 26 and 30 September, the Stalingrad Front had lost 16,174 men,
the vast majority of which were from the 62nd Army.
c. Beginning the night of 29 September, Chukov began to receive a steady
flow of reinforcements starting with the freshly reconstituted 42nd and 92nd RBs and
replacement packets for the depleted 95th RD. He also received the entire 39th RD on the night
of 29-30 September.
d. In addition, over the next 3 days, the 62nd Army would receive the 308th
RD and 37th GRD as well.
7. The Schwerpunkt Shifts to Orlovka.
a. After the fighting died down in the Worker’s Villages on 29 September,
Paulus began to shift his attention to the Orlovka Salient.
Analysis (Strategic and Operational).
1. Was it operationally necessary for the Sixth Army to totally eliminate the 62nd Army in the
northern half of Stalingrad?
2. Operationally/strategically, what are the advantages and disadvantages of not completely
taking the rest of the city?
Analysis (Tactical).
1. What is your assessment so far of Paulus’ initial plan to capture the northern half of
Stalingrad?
2. What are the tactical challenges for commanders and staffs of suddenly transitioning from
tactical operations in the open steppe to those of fighting block by block in the small wooden
worker’s villages?
3. What are the tactical challenges for soldiers of suddenly transitioning from tactical operations
in the open steppe to those of fighting block by block in the small wooden worker’s villages?
4. How would you assess Chuikov’s leadership and efforts to “inspire” his troops?
24
Stand 9
The Battle for Orlovka and Final Fight for the Workers Villages
1-13 October 1942
Visuals for this stand.
9-1: The Orlovka Salient, Orientation
9-2: Attack on the Workers Villages, Orientation
9-3: Third Kotluban Offensive, 9-11 October 1942
9-4: Attack on the Workers Villages, German Overview, 1 October 1942
9-5: Sixth Army Plan to Seize the Factory District
9-6: Attack on the Workers Villages, Soviet Overview, 1 October 1942
9-7: The Orlovka Salient, Situation, 28 September 1942
9-8: The Orlovka Salient, Initial German Attack, 29 September 1942
9-9: The Orlovka Salient, German Attack, 1 October 1942
9-10: The Orlovka Salient, German Attack, 2 October 1942
9-11: The Orlovka Salient, Situation, 3 October 1942
9-12: The Orlovka Salient, German Attack, 4 October 1942
9-13: The Orlovka Salient, Situation, 5-6 October 1942
9-14: The Orlovka Salient, Situation, 7 October 1942
9-15: Attack on the Workers Villages, Attack Plan for 3 October 1942
9-16: Attack on the Workers Villages, Chuikov’s Counterattack, 1-2 October 1942
9-17: Attack on the Workers Villages, Situation, Midnight, 3 October 1942
9-18: Attack on the Workers Villages, German Attacks, 4 October 1942
9-19: Attack on the Workers Villages, Situation, 4-5 October 1942
9-20: Attack on the Workers Villages, German Attacks, 5-7 October 1942
9-21: Stalingrad, The Lull, 8-13 October 1942, German Unit Moves
9-22: Stalingrad, German Front Reorganization, 1-10 October 1942
9-23: Stalingrad, The Lull, 8-13 October 1942, Soviet Unit Moves
9-24: Stalingrad, Spartanovka-Rynok Situation, 13 October 1942
9-25: Stalingrad, The Lull, 8-13 October 1942, Soviet Attacks
Virtual Movement Directions: Start with the terrain in the overhead view of the northern half of
Stalingrad.
Orientation.
Visuals:
The Orlovka Salient, Orientation
Attack on the Workers’ Villages, Orientation
Starting in the north, point out the following key terrain features
25
Virtual Movement Directions: you can have the computer operator zoom down lower to get a
closer look at any or all of these features as you point them out.
Visual: The Orlovka Salient, Orientation
I. Orlovka Sector.
–Orlovka
–Orlovka Cemetery
–Orlovka River
–Orlovka Railroad Spur
–Northern Landing Stage
–The Mechetka River
–The Orlovka River
–Metchetka River Railroad Bridge (west of the Upper Tractor Factory Workers Village).
Visual: Attack on the Workers’ Villages, Orientation.
II. Between the Mechetka River and the Bread Factory.
–Upper Tractor Factory Workers Village.
–Lower Tractor Factory Workers Village.
–The northern Sports Stadium.
–The Bread Factory.
III. Between the Bread Factory and the “Tennis Racket.”
–The southern Sports Stadium.
–The “Schnellhefter” (the “six-sided block”)
–The Silikat Factory.
–Upper Barrikady Factory Workers Village.
–Lower Barrikady Factory Workers Village.
–The “Narrows.”
–Skul’pturnyi Park.
–Red October Factory Workers Village.
–The “Tennis Racket.”
–Central Landing Stage.
–62nd Army headquarters bunker (at Barrikady Reservoir).
Description (Strategic).
I. Strategic Planning and Diplomacy.
A. Allied. On 6 October, the Allies agree on a strategy whereby Americans will bomb in
the daytime and the RAF at night.
26
B. Axis. (No major developments)
II. Europe.
A. North Africa and Mediterranean (No major developments).
B. North Atlantic, Arctic Convoys, and Strategic Bombing (No major developments).
III. Pacific.
A. On 11 October the battle of Cape Esperance takes place on the northwest coast of
Guadalcanal. The US Navy intercepts and defeats a Japanese fleet on its way to reinforce troops
on the island. With the help of radar they sink one cruiser and several Japanese destroyers.
B. On 13 October the Japanese navy conducts a heavy bombardment of Henderson Field,
Guadalcanal.
Description (Operational).
I. General.
A. On 5 October, orders came down from the Stavka directing that the independent
detachments of armed workers were now formally under Red Army control. As a result, the
remaining workers in the factory districts were drafted into front line units or evacuated
depending on whether they were specialists or not.
C. On 9 October, the Supreme Soviet removed political commissars from the
command team of Soviet military units and returned sole command powers to the military
commanders. Commissars were assigned propaganda, education, and information responsibilities
only.
II. Leningrad. (No major developments)
III. Caucasus. On 6 October, the German III.Panzer Korps captured Malgobek on the Terek
River in the Caucasus in southern Russia. Far to the west, German troops also captured
Novorossiysk.
IV. Don Front. Third Kotluban Offensive.
Visual: Third Kotluban Offensive, 9-11 October 1942
27
Note: Location of the Orlovka Salient. The salient was just eliminated by the time of the Third
Kotluban Offensive but it is shown in this slide to inform the participants where it was in relation
to this operation.
A. Due to the heavy casualties in the Second Kotluban Offensive, Stavka sent
reinforcements to the Don Front which received seven new rifle divisions as well as support
units needed for a third Kotluban offensive.
B. The Third Offensive began on 9 October immediately following assaults launched by
Eremenko's Stalingrad Front southeast of the city. The lack of time to rebuild and reorganize the
shattered 1st Guards and 24th Armies between the end of the Second Kotluban Offensive and the
Third, however, meant that that those commands were too exhausted and disorganized to
accomplish anything of significance.
C. The Soviet offensive ran out of steam in just two days on 11 October. The attacks
accomplished little other than to give Paulus additional concerns over Sixth Army's flanks at the
same time Hitler was pressuring him to finish off Chuikov's 62nd Army.
Description (Tactical).
I. Strength, Dispositions, and Plans in the Factory Districts.
Visual: Attack on the Workers’ Villages, German Overview 1 October 1942
A. German Situation, Strength, Dispositions, and Plans.
1. German Dispositions in the Factory Districts, North to South.
a. XIV Panzer Corps. The XIV Panzer Corps faced the Orlovka Salient
and the Don Front to the north. (More details on this command below).
b. LI Corps. The LI Corps at this point consisted of:
i. 94th Infantry Division. Most of the division was now deployed
facing the Orlovka Salient. One regiment (the 276th) was still attached to the 24th Panzer
Division south of the Metchetka River.
ii. 389th Infantry Division. Most of the division was now
deployed facing the Orlovka Salient. One regiment (the 544th) was also attached to the 24th
Panzer Division.
iii. 24th Panzer Division. The 24th Panzer was occupying
positions in the Upper and Lower Barrikady Factory Workers’ Villages and extended west from
there.
iv. 100th Jäger Division. The 100th Jäger Division was occupying
28
positions in the Lower Barrikady and Red October Workers’ Villages north of Mamaev Kurgan.
v. 295th Infantry Division. The 295th Division was still
occupying its positions on Mamaev Kurgan and east toward the handle of the Tennis Racket.
Visual: Sixth Army Plan to Seize the Factory District)
2. The Plan. Having largely completed the capture of the southern half of
Stalingrad, Paulus’ mission called for him to finish capturing the northern half of the city as well.
His general plan to accomplish this was as follows:
a. Complete the capture of the workers’ residential districts to include
Rynok and Spartanovka.
b. Capture the Tractor Factory.
c. Turn south and capture the Barrikady Factory and Red October
Factories concurrently.
d. Destroy the 62nd Army.
3. The Obstacle. Before he could seriously contemplate attacking the Tractor
Factory, however, Paulus felt he needed to eliminate the Orlovka Salient. Once that was
achieved he would also then have additional troops to take on the factory defenses.
B. Soviet Situation, Strength, Dispositions, and Plans.
Visual: Attack on the Workers’ Villages, Soviet Overview 1 October 1942
1. Soviet Dispositions in the Factory Districts, North to South. On 1 October,
Chuikov’s defenses in the north were as follows:
a. Group Andriusenko (not shown). Defending the Orlovka Salient. (More
details on this command below).
b. Group Gorokhov (not shown). Defending Rynok-Spartanovka. (More
details on this command below).
c. 6th Guards Tank Brigade (6th GTB). By 29 September, the 23rd Tank
Corps had been so depleted, all remaining forces were consolidated under the 6th GTB and the
Tank Corps Headquarters was evacuated to the east side of the Volga the following day. The 6th
GTB was deployed interspersed with the 112th RD between the Metchetka River and the Silikat
Factory. The brigade possessed only 9 T-34 and 4 T-70 operational tanks, and 8 other non-
operational tanks.
d. 112th Rifle Division (112th RD). Deployed between the Mechetka
29
River and the Silikat Factory; defending the approaches to the Tractor Factory Workers’
Villages.
e. 42nd Rifle Brigade. After being withdrawn from the city center on 25
September and reconstituted, the 42nd RB returned to the Central Landing Stage on the night of
29 September. It was placed to defend the Silikat Factory and vicinity.
f. 92nd Naval Infantry Brigade (also referred to as the 92nd Rifle
Brigade). Also withdrawn on 24 September and reconstituted, the 92nd RB returned to the
Central Landing Stage the night of 29 September. It was positioned to defend a portion of the
Upper Barrikady Factory Workers’ Village and forward of the Schnellhefter Block.
g. 308th Rifle Division (308th RD). The 308th RD (4,000 men) arrived
at the Central Landing Stage the night of 30 September. It was deployed between the Lower
Barrikady Factory Workers’ Village and Skul’pturnyi Park; defending the approaches to the
Barrikady Factory.
c. 193rd Rifle Division (193rd RD). Deployed between the Lower
Barrikady Factory Workers’ Village and the northern reaches of the Red October Factory
Workers’ Village; defending the area between the Red October and Barrikady Factories.
d. 39th Guards Rifle Division (39th GRD). The 39th GRD (3,500 men)
arrived at the Central Landing Stage the night of 30 September-1 October. It was positioned to
defend the approaches to the Red October Factory.
e. 95th Rifle Division (95th RD). The 95th RD was freshly reinforced
and still deployed in the vicinity of the Tennis Racket defending the area between the Red
October Factory and Mamaev Kurgan, including the Lazur Chemical Factory.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator elevate/descend to a level that
provides the participants a view similar to that of the next slide.
II. Reduction of the Orlovka Salient.
A. Situation, The Orlovka Salient.
Visual: Orlovka Salient, Situation 28 September 1942
Note: You are going back in time slightly to 28 September.
1. During the time the Sixth Army was fighting in southern Stalingrad and began
to push his forces northeastward to capture the factory districts in the north, a salient developed
between Seydlitz’s LI Corps in Sixth Army’s center and Hube’s XIV Panzer Corps to the north.
2. The salient consisted of major Soviet strongpoints centered on some low
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hills, ravines, and the village of Orlovka, about 3 kilometers northwest of Stalingrad. In the
north, the Soviet positions stretched from west of Orlovka, along a line north of the Orlovka
River, to the villages of Spartanovka-Rynok in the north. To the south, the lines extended
southeast to the Upper Barrikady Workers Village.
3. Paulus needed to reduce the salient in order to improve communications with,
and better protect, Hube’s XIV Panzer Corps.
4. The position also posed a flanking threat to any German units attacking into
the Tractor Factory District.
5. Paulus also needed to reduce the mileage of front his was army was holding so
that he could use some of the formations employed there to help reduce Stalingrad itself. With
the number of casualties he was sustaining, Paulus would need every man he could get to finish
the job.
6. Those challenges, combined with the Don Front’s frequent offensives in the
Kotluban area against Paulus’ left flank, provided him with an irritating, if not intolerable,
situation. The salient had to be removed.
A. Terrain.
1. The terrain in the vicinity of Orlovka was very open with few trees. The few
hills in the area were very low and gave the defenders only the slightest advantage in terms of
height.
2. Other than the village, the only other cover and concealment available was
provided by three ravines: the Orlovka River ravine to the south; another ravine which lay to the
immediate south and west of Orlovka itself; and the third which ran toward the northeast on the
immediate east side of the village.
3. The ravines had been thoroughly prepared as defensive positions by the Soviet
defenders.
C. Soviet Strength, Dispositions, and Plans.
1. The Orlovka Salient was defended by Group Andriusenko, commanded by
Col. K.M. Andriusenko who also commanded the 115th Rifle (or Special) Brigade. The 115th
was a “Special Brigade” meaning it was formed largely from workers and other volunteers and
had few trained soldiers in its ranks. This roughly division-size, ad hoc group consisted of:
–2nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (1,100 men)
–115th Rifle Brigade (3,600 men)
–282nd NKVD Regiment (from the 10th NKVD Division) (1,080 men) attached.
–Total: 5,800 troops
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2. In addition, two battalions from Group Gorokhov (defending Spatanovka-
Rynok) and were in support of Group Andriusenko, but not under Andriusenko’s direct control:
–1st Battalion, 124th Rifle (or Special) Brigade (about 1,000 men)
–1st Battalion, 149th Rifle (or Special) Brigade (about 1,000 men)
3. Andriusenko could also call on 50 pieces of 76mm artillery to support his
defense, and about 20 tanks.
D. German Strength, Dispositions, and Plans.
1. The task of reducing the Orlovka Salient went to Hube’s XIV Panzer Corps.
The corps at point consisted of:
a. 3rd Motorized Division. (The 3rd Motorized Division was not
involved with the Orlovka operation; it was in the line defending against the Don Front
northwest of Stalingrad.
b. 16th Panzer Division. Most of the 16th Panzer Division was in
positions to the east facing Spartanovka and Rynok. Only 1 infantry and 1 pioneer battalion
would participate in the attacks on the salient, at least initially. Those two units were in positions
along the north face of the salient.
c. 60th Motorized Division. Only the division’s 160th Motorcycle
Battalion would participate in the initial assaults on the salient which held positions on the west
and northwest lines of the salient. The remainder of the division was in positions to the north and
northwest of Orlovka also facing the Don Front.
2. Two additional divisions were tasked to assist Hube with the reduction of the
salient:
a. 94th Infantry Division (minus) (detached from the XLVIII Panzer
Corps) Arrived in positions west of Orlovka on 27-28 September. The division’s 276th Regiment
was still attached to the 24th Panzer Division.
b. 389th Infantry Division (minus) (detached from the LI Corps) was
now in positions along the southwest face of the salient. The 544th Regiment remained south of
the Metchetka River protecting the 24th Panzer Division’s left flank.
Visual: Orlovka Salient, Initial German Attack, 29 September 1942
E. The Plan. The plan for the initial German attack on the salient called for:
1. 16th Panzer Division: The 2nd Battalion, 79th Panzer Grenadiers and the
651st Pioneer Battalion to attack the north face of the salient down the road into Orlovka itself.
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2. 60th Motorized Division: The 160th Motorcycle Battalion would attack into
the 115th Rifle Brigade.
3. 94th Infantry Division: 1 kampgruppe from each of the 267th and 274th
Infantry Regiments would attack the southwestern defenses of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Brigade.
4. 389th Infantry Division: 1 kampgruppe from each of the 545th and 546th
Infantry Regiments would attack the defenses of the 2nd Battalion, 115th Rifle Brigade.
5. The intent was to pinch off the 115th Rifle and 2nd Motorized Rifle
Brigades and encircle them for eventual destruction, thereby eliminating the salient.
F. The Attack.
1. On 28 September, Fliegerkorps VIII began an intensive bombing of the
Orlovka defenses. The Luftwaffe was also joined by the available artillery of the XIV Panzer
Corps.
2. 29 September.
a. To begin the operation, all four divisions sent out small reconnaissance
in force detachments to feel out Soviet defenses on the morning darkness of the 29th.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator descend to a point northeast of
Orlovka and move south along the dirt road toward the village. Stop movement just as you enter
Orlovka.
b. The RIFs were later followed by the main attacks. The 2-79 Panzer
Grenadier attack was able to reach the village of Orlovka and gain a foothold there. To the east,
however, the 651st Pioneers were repulsed by the 282nd NVKD.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator elevate above Orlovka still facing
south and pan to the left (east) toward the 651st Pioneer attack sector. Next pan right (northwest)
toward the 160th Motorcycle Battalion attack sector.
c. The 160th Motorcycle Battalion successfully pushed the 115th RB
back toward the village.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator pan to the left (southwest) toward
the cemetery and the 94th Division attack sector.
d. The two 94th Division kampgruppes also forced the 2nd MRB back
toward the village but was unable to make contact with the 16th Panzer elements.
e. To the south, the 389th Division’s kampgruppes, however, made little
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headway.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator pan to the left more (southeast)
Orlovka River.
3. 30 September.
Visual: Orlovka Salient, German Attack, 1 October 1942
a. On 30 September, Hube’s troops made only minor attacks against the
tip of the salient.
b. Andriusenko took advantage of the lull on 30 September to reposition
most of the 2nd MRB and 115 RB south of the village thereby reducing the number of troops in
the threatened pocket.
.
c. Only two Soviet battalions, about 500 men, remained in position
northwest of Orlovka.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator descend to Orlovka and move south
through the village to the cemetery/railroad station.
4. 1 October. Hube resumed the attack on the morning of 1 October. By the end
of the day:
a. The 16th Panzer Division troops captured most of Orlovka proper.
b. One of the 94th Division kampfgruppes captured the cemetery 300
meters west of the village.
c. The remnants of the two Soviet battalions northwest of the village
were encircled.
d. With this reverse, Group Andriusenko formed a new defense line
south of Orlovka.
5. 2 October.
Visual: Orlovka Salient, German Attack, 2 October 1942
a. On 2 October, the elements of the 16th Panzer, 60th Motorized, and
94th Infantry Divisions press the attack and Orlovka is entirely taken.
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b. Farther south, the 389th’s 545th and 546th kampgruppes attack with
20 tanks and assault guns into the 1st Battalion, 124th RB and forced it back to near the railroad.
Visual: Orlovka Salient, Situation, 3 October 1942
c. With the progress being made against the salient, and with the Don
Front’s latest Kotluban Offensive at an end, additional troops from XIV Panzer Corps units
could be moved south to help with the reduction of the salient. Paulus decided to shift the 389th
Division a short distance south back across the Metchetka River to support an upcoming attack
on the Tractor Factory. The division’s support elements were moving south even as the
division’s kampgruppes were making their final attacks against the Orlovka Salient. The
kampgruppes moved that night.
d. Paulus concurrently moved the 94th Division farther south to take over
the 389th’s old sector as well.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator “fly” the 94th Division’s route
southeast to its new jump off position northwest of the Upper Tractor factory Worker’s Village.
Descend to the ground and face northeast toward the Orlovka River.
6. 3 October. As short lull ensued as Hube issued orders for a two-pronged attack
on 4 October by the 16th Panzer and 94th Infantry Divisions to cut off the base of the salient and
encircle the remaining elements of the 2nd MRB and 115th RB.
7. 4 October.
Visual: Orlovka Salient, German Attack, 4 October 1942
a. At 1200, 94th Infantry Division attacked toward the Orlovka River
northeastward against the 1st Battalion, 124th RB.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator follow the 94th Division’s attack
route northeast to the Orlovka River. At the river, stop and elevate slightly to view the 16th
Panzer Division’s attack route coming in from the north.
b. At 1600, the 16th Panzer Division attacked southwestward against the
282nd NKVD Regiment toward the Orlovka River.
c. By nightfall, the two columns met at the river as planned and cut off
most of Group Andriusenko. Group Andriusenko now consisted of two main pockets of
resistance surrounded by the XIV Panzer Corps.
Visual: Orlovka Salient, Situation, 5-6 October 1942
35
8. 5 October. A lull ensues, but with minor German probing attacks in all
sectors.
9. 6 October. Both groups of surrounded Group Andriusenko elements attempted
breakouts on 6 October.
a. The northern Soviet group attempted a break out and was quickly
wiped out.
b. The rest of Group Andriusenko attempted a break out down the river.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator follow the Group Andriusenko break
out route down the river. Halt near the junction of the Orlovka and Metchetka Rivers.
1. This breakout group was closer to the main line, less than 1
kilometer.
.
2. The attempt received heavy support from artillery and rockets.
3. Still, only 220 men made it out of the roughly 6,500 originally
defending the salient.
Visual: Orlovka Salient, Situation, 7 October 1942
10. 7 October. After the second breakout attempt, the Germans finally erased the
Orlovka salient.
G. Outcome of the Fight for the Orlovka Salient.
1. German Results:
a. Better communications with Hube’s XIV Panzer Corps.
b. Shortened the lines for XIV Panzer Corps
c. Mostly eliminated the threat to XIV Panzer Corps’s rear areas.
d. Eliminated the threat of attack into LI Corps left flank.
attacks.
e. Paulus discovered that concerns over future attacks from the Don
Front, however, now prevented him from moving all but small numbers of forces from that flank
to help with the reduction of the city.
36
f. Similar concerns over Soviet attacks against the Fourth Panzer Army
to the south also prevented reinforcement from that quarter.
g. Therefore, additional attacks against the workers villages had to wait
until the 389th Infantry Division could be pulled away from the Orlovka salient.
h. The fighting in the salient also caused a several-day postponement of
the 24th Panzer Division’s attack against the Tractor Factory and its villages.
2. Soviet Results:
a. During the fighting in and around the Orlovka salient, Group
Andriusenko was almost wiped out which severely weakened Chuikov’s northern flank.
b. The distractions of the salient and the concurrent Kotluban Offensive,
however, helped enable Chuikov to cross the 37th and 39th Guards Divisions, and the 308th
Rifle Division over the Volga and reinforce the Stalingrad garrison during the lessened fighting
in the city. Since the bulk of German airpower was shifted to the salient also helped to enable the
crossings.
c. The fighting in the salient also precluded the shifting of additional
troops from the XIV Panzer Corps to help with the fighting in Stalingrad.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator return to the overhead view of the
northern half of Stalingrad.
III. The Final Battles for the Workers’ Villages.
A. Situation.
1. At the same time Hube’s XIV Panzer Corps was reducing the Orlovka salient,
the LI Corps was also continuing to conduct minor attacks to capture the residential districts of
the three major industrial complexes (the Tractor, Barrikady, and Red October Factories) in the
northern half of Stalingrad. These areas needed to be cleared of Soviet defenders before the final
offensive to capture the three factories and advance to the Volga River could begin.
2. Though he had lost most of the southern half of Stalingrad, Chuikov was
determined not to lose the northern half of the city. How much of the rest that he could hold on
to remained to be seen, but his mission was clear: retain what he could, or die in the attempt.
3. The one thing that Chuikov had going for him that Paulus lacked was that the
Stavka was prepared to reinforce him in a timely manner with fresh reserves. Of course, “timely
manner” generally meant, “just in time” and not a moment before.
4. The Stavka also needed every soldier, gun, and tank it could scrape together
37
for several major counteroffensives that were being planned at that very moment for execution
within the next six weeks. So while Chuikov would get fresh men, he would only receive enough
to keep Hitler focused on the city, while the Stavka planned to achieve a much bigger objective.
B. German Plans.
Note: You are going back in time slightly to 30 September.
1. The task of capturing the rest of the workers’ villages, as well as for the factory
battles to come, was assigned to Seydlitz’ LI Corps.
2. After the LI Corps had advanced up the west side of the city to reach the
Upper Barrikady Village on 30 September, Paulus realized that he had to provide Seydlitz with
additional troops if he wanted the LI Corps strong enough to finish taking the workers’ villages
and still have enough combat power to take the factories themselves. His initial option was to
pull the 389th Infantry Division from the Orlovka Salient. Southward movement for parts of the
division started 1 October and continued even as the division’s kampfgruppes attacked on 2
October. Amazingly, the division’s combat troops were then moved into position in time to
attack in the Tractor Factory villages by the morning of the 3rd.
3. A brief lull set in at the factory areas as Paulus waited for the repositioning of
the 94th and 389th Infantry Divisions. It would take some time to move the 389th Infantry
Division into position on the 24th Panzer Division’s left flank where the 389th’s 544th Regiment
was already posted.
4. In the meantime, Paulus developed his plan for the next attack. The attack
plan as finalized called for the following moving parts:
Visual: Attack on the Workers Villages, Attack Plan for 3 October 1942
a. In the north, the newly repositioned 389th Division would be
reinforced with 17 assault guns from the 244th Assault Gun Battalion and attack along the south
bank of the Mechetka River toward the west end of the Upper Tractor Factory Workers’ Village.
It would protect the 24th Panzer Division’s left flank.
b. In the south, the 100th Jäger Division, reinforced with 7 assault guns
from the 245th Assault Gun Battalion, would conduct fixing attacks in the Red October and
Barrikady districts while also protecting the 24th Panzer’s right flank.
c. The main effort, the 24th Panzer Division, would conduct a two-
pronged attack directly towards the south end of the Upper Tractor Factory Workers’ Village.
1. Kampgruppe Winterfeld would aim to seize the Silikat
Factory en route to the primary objective.
2. Kampgruppe Edelstein would likewise capture the
38
Schnellhefter Block and the stadium in stride. The attached 276th Infantry Regiment (94th
Division) was to attack toward Skul’pturnyi Park and protect the 24th Panzer’s right flank.
5. The attack was scheduled for 3 October.
C. Chuikov’s Counterattack Misfires.
Visual: Attack on the Workers Villages, Chuikov’s Counterattack 1-2 October 1942
1. During the lull on 1-2 October, Chuikov was able to cross much needed
reinforcements. These included the 39th GRD, which was placed to defend the Red October
Factory and the 308th RD which was placed to defend the Barrikady.
1. Detecting the slowing pace in the Sixth Army’s efforts in the factory district
and with fresh troops coming available, Chuikov decided to use the lull as an opportunity to
conduct a counterattack. The purpose of the counterattack was to recapture the “Narrows” and
the Upper Barrikady Village areas. The attacks would also facilitate and cover the positioning of
the 308th RD as it came into the line.
2. The initial attacks were conducted as a reconnaissance in force on 1 October
by the weakened 112th RD and a regiment (685th RR) of the 193rd RD on 1 October. These
offensive probes were designed to detect weaknesses in the German line in anticipation for the
major attack on 2 October and to take advantage of any opportunities that might arise. The
reconnaissance efforts, however, failed to achieve anything useful.
3. Chuikov tried again with a full blown attack on 2 October by sending in the
42nd Brigade, the 92nd Brigade, and a fresh regiment of the 308th RD. Once again, the attacks
failed to dent the German line and only resulted in additional Soviet casualties.
4. During the heavy fighting on the 2nd, the Luftwaffe almost decapitated the
62nd Army. Conducting random aerial raids against available targets, a German bombs struck
Chuikov’s command bunker next to the Barrikady factories oil tanks. The bombs not only set the
oil tanks on fire, they knocked out Chuikov’s communications with Eremenko and the burning
oil flow forced the evacuation of the bunker making it untenable. Chuikov and his command
team survived the attack, but were now forced to find a new location from which to command
the army.
D. The German Attack of 3 October.
Visual: Attack on the Workers Villages, Attack Plan for 3 October 1942
1. 24th Panzer Division.
a. The 24th Panzer Division jumped off at 1400. In some tough fighting,
39
Kampfgruppe Winterfeld advanced through the Upper Barrikady Workers’ Village which was
described as “dozens of chimneys, piles of ash, charred wood, and shattered masonry.” (Glantz,
Armageddon in Stalingrad, 318).
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator descend to the southern section of
the Upper Barrikady Workers’ Village. Advance on the ground to the Silikat Factory, then
continue on to the worker’s houses just short of the Schnellhefter Block. Have the computer
operator elevate slightly to get a view of the Schnellhefter Block and the southern stadium.
The kampfgruppe moved through the village and attacked the Silikat Factory itself and captured
it after bitter fighting. It then pushed on to the Schnellhefter Block which it failed to capture. It
did, however, essentially surround a large portion of the 308th Division’s 339th RR defending
the block.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator pan right to the south towards
Skul’pturnyi Park.
b. Similarly, Kampfgruppe Edelstein, on KG Winterfeld’s right, attacked
by “creeping through destroyed huts, buildings and gardens, up to the western edge of
Skul’pturnyi Park.” (Glantz, Armageddon in Stalingrad, 318). With both the 276th Regiment and
Kampfgruppe Edelstein meeting fierce resistance by the 308th RD there, parts of the
kampfgruppe continued to move northeast where it was able to seize a small part of the stadium
complex east of the Schnellhefter Block.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator pan back to the left to the north
towards the Upper Tractor Factory Village.
3. 389th Infantry Division. The 3 October attack began with an assault by the
389th Infantry Division, now with 20 assault guns in support, pushing through a series of gullies,
ravines, and shattered orchards south of the Mechetka River. Opposing the advance were the
remnants of the 6th GTB and elements of the 112th RD. By noon, the forward elements of the
389th had advanced to the ravines just west of the Upper Tractor Factory Village and had driven
the Soviet defenders into the western and southern reaches of the village itself.
4. 100th Jäger Division. In the south, the regiments of the 100th Jäger Division
advanced against stiff resistance in the Lower Barrikady and Red October Village districts and
measured their gains in single buildings and tens of yards at best.
5. The battle lasted into the darkness as the Germans consolidated their gains.
One German tanker described the eeriness of the fighting that night near the Schnellhefter Block:
The battlefield around the destroyed workers huts and hollows was illuminated by
burning buildings, the flickering flames causing shadows to move and dance, making it
impossible to determine if Russian tank-killers were sneaking up with Molotov cocktails.
Engagements would flare up with frightening speed; someone would notice a movement
40
in the shadows, a flare would be fired, climbing a hundred meters into the dark sky with a
trail like a rocket, bursting into a brilliant white star which then fell gracefully
earthward, brilliantly illuminating everything within a circle of several hundred meters.
(Glantz, Armageddon in Stalingrad, 324).
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator return to the overhead view of the
northern half of Stalingrad.
E. German Situation, Midnight 3 October.
Visual: Attack on the Workers Villages, Situation, Midnight 3 October 1942
1. By midnight on 3 October, the 389th Division and 24th Panzer Division were
poised to advance into the Tractor Factory district the next day. The latter division was now up to
36 tanks due to exceptional repair efforts on the part of its crews and maintenance personnel, but
its panzer grenadier regiments were now down to less than 1,000 men. Nevertheless, the 24th
Panzer Division would remain the LI Corps’ main effort.
2. Seydlitz ordered the attack continued the following day with the following
objectives:
a. The 389th Division would continue its push east into the Upper
Tractor Factory Village.
b. The 24th Panzer Division was to continue its drive directly toward the
Tractor Factory itself. Bread Factory No. 1 was the intermediate objective.
c. The 100th Jäger Division would continue its push through the southern
workers villages toward the Volga River in attempts to reach the Barrikady and Red October
factories.
F. Soviet Situation, Midnight 3 October.
1. The arrival of the 308th RD on 2 October had been timely, but by the end of
the day on 3 October, that division had already taken tremendous casualties. Much, if not most,
of the 339th RR was cut off in the Schnellhefter Block.
2. Moreover, the other units in the north, the 112th RD, 6th GTB, and the 42nd
and 92nd RBs were in much worse shape. The regiments in the 112 RD were down to about 100
men each and the 92nd Brigade hovered at 50 men.
3. If Chuikov wanted to prevent a complete German breakthrough, he needed
41
more troops and quickly. Thus, he requested that Eremenko release the 37th GRD to him.
Eremenko agreed and the division began crossing the Volga on the night of the 3rd.
6. By dawn of 4 October, all three 37th GRD regiments were across and
Chuikov’s staff was guiding them into position between the 308th RD and the 112th RD. The
Guard Division would now take up the defense of the approaches to the Tractor Factory. Its
arrival was just in time.
G. The Attack Continues, 4 October.
Visual: Attack on the Workers Villages, German Attacks, 4 October 1942
1. Preliminary Preparations. At first light of 4 October, the Luftwaffe and LI
Corps artillery began softening up the day’s objectives. Most of the bombing effort focused on
the Schnellhefter Block and Soviet defenses in the Skul’pturnyi Park area both of which caused
significant additional casualties for the 308th RD.
2. 389th Infantry Division. To the north, the 389th Infantry Division continued
its drive into the Upper Tractor Factory Village. Its regiments were able to gain almost a third of
the blocks in the village against the severely depleted 112th RD before running into the fresh
troops of the 109th GRR of the 37th GRD. The 389th was halted at that point.
3. 94th Infantry Division. Two regiments of the 94th Infantry Division attempted
to attack across the Mechetka River and support the 389th’s efforts, but both attacks were
repulsed.
4. 24th Panzer Division Attack. The prep continued until 0910 when
Kampfgruppes Edelstein and Winterfeld jumped off to take their objectives. For some reason,
despite the German bombing and artillery prep, the attack seemed to catch the Soviets by
surprise.
a. Kampfgruppe Winterfeld. KG Winterfeld’s initial efforts were focused
on the reduction of the remaining 308th RD defenders in the Schnellhefter Block. After very
tough building to building and room to room combat, the remnants of the 339th RR were either
wiped out or, for a few, were forced to retreat. From there, the kampfgruppe was able to advance
a short way into the Lower Tractor Factory Village before it ran into stiff resistance from the
newly arrived 37th GRD.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator descend to the worker’s village west
of the Schnellhefter Block. Move east through the Schnellhefter and past the southern stadium.
Halt in the open area near the Zitomersk Ravine. Pan right to view the Brick Factory towards the
southeast.
b. Kampfgruppe Edelstein. On the right, KG Edelstein was able to capture
the rest of the southern stadium and its surrounding complex as well. Between the two
kampfgruppes, the 24th Panzer tankers destroyed nine Soviet tanks, destroying more than half of
42
what remained of the 6th GTB. KG Edelstein then attempted to drive southeast toward the Brick
Factory and almost reached the railroad. By this time, however, it too was running into elements
of the 37th GRD. The kampfgruppe was forced to stop and actually withdraw a short distance
back toward the stadium.
5. 100th Jäger Division Attack. To the south, the 100th Jäger Division’s attacks
continued to make some, but very little, progress.
H. Soviet Moves.
1. As the 37th GRD came into the area, its units were fed piecemeal into the battle
by regiments. Even so, the timely arrival of the division was able to stabilize what might have
otherwise been a disaster for Chuikov.
2. As the division came into the line between the 112th and 308th RDs, Chuikov
pulled back the remnants of the 6th GTB and the 42nd RB to the vicinity of the Bread Factory.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator return to the overhead view of the
northern half of Stalingrad.
I. German Situation, Midnight 4 October.
Visual: Attack on the Workers Villages, Situation, 4-5 October 1942
1. On the evening of 4 October, Lenski informed Seydlitz that with the losses
incurred on 4 October, the 24th Panzer Division could no longer engage in offensive operations.
Three of its four panzer grenadier battalions were now rated as “exhausted” and the fourth as
“weak.” The division now had at most 580 infantrymen, less than a single battalion, to conduct
operations. It just did not have the combat strength for effective attacks, especially now that the
fresh 37th GRD was opposing it. Seydlitz agreed and passed the news on to Paulus.
2. Paulus was acutely aware of the dwindling strength of his command and had
been doing all he could to acquire reinforcements. Neither Weichs at Army Group B or the OKH
could offer any new reinforcements, at least in a timely manner. For the time being, Paulus was
stuck with what he had to continue the effort to take the city. That evening, he ordered Seydlitz
to have the LI Corps go over to the defense, but ordered that the 389th continue its offensive
efforts in the Tractor Factory Village for the next day’s attack. That division’s goal was to
remove the salient created by the 112th RD and 109th GRR (37th GRD) to the north of the
division and straighten out the German lines.
3. To help the weakened forces on all fronts in the factory district, Paulus
arranged for a massive aerial bombing of key Soviet positions.
J. Soviet Situation, Midnight 4 October.
43
1. The remnants of the 6th GTB and the 42nd RB were attached to the now beat-
up 308th RD and put into the line on the 308th RD’s right. The remnants of the 92nd RB in
Skul’pturnyi Park were attached to the 308th RD as well.
2. Due to the heavy casualties suffered by the 6th GTB on 4 October, Chuikov
again requested reinforcements from Eremenko in the way of the 84th Tank Brigade to replace
his tank losses. Eremenko approved the release of the brigade but the brigade could not begin to
cross late until the following day.
2. The bombing attack on his command bunker, accurate German mortar fire, and
the obvious German push toward the Tractor Factory complex prompted Chuikov to move his
headquarters northward to new location on the night of 4-5 October. The new site, the old 10th
NKVD Division command bunker, was much nearer the Tractor Factory, just south of the Brick
Factory on the west bank of the Volga.
K. The Attack Continues, 5-7 October.
Visual: Attack on the Workers Villages, German Attacks, 5-7 October 1942.)
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator move to a more close up view of the
Upper Tractor Factory Village and the Metchetka River crossing sites in the 94th Division area
of operations.
1. 5 October.
a. Over the next three days, the Sixth Army would remain largely
dormant with the exception of the 389th Division and a few small local attacks and
reconnaissance efforts.
b. 389th Infantry Division. In accordance with Paulus’ directive, the
389th Division’s 5 October attack was very limited in scope. Continuing its push into the village
it gained about 400 meters and captured most of the southern areas of the Upper Village area.
c. On the night of 5-6 October, the 20 light tanks (T-70s) of the 84th TB
were ferried across the Volga. The brigade’s heavy and medium tanks (5 KV-1s and 24 T-34s)
had to remain on the east bank for the moment since there were no large barges available to ferry
those vehicles across.
2. 6 October. The 389th Division attacks in the Upper Tractor Factory Village
were placed on hold for 6 October due to the need for the division to concentrate its remaining
infantrymen near the next jump off point there. Even so, there was still heavy artillery and aerial
bombardments by both sides during the day.
3. 7 October.
a. The pause on 6 October led Eremenko to believe that the Germans had
44
either culminated or were about to renew their assaults the following day. Either way, the front
commander ordered Chuikov to launch a strong counterattack on 7 October to retake the Lower
Village area.
b. Instead, Chuikov’s counterattack was once again pre-empted by the
Germans’ own attack. At 1120, the 389th Division, supported by 10 tanks from the 24th Panzer
and 10 assault guns from the 245th Assault Gun Battalion, launched its next drive into the Upper
Tractor Factory Village.
c. The 389th’s attack clearly demonstrated that the Sixth Army’s ability
to take the rest of the city was in trouble. Though the division gained several blocks in the
western part of the upper village and gained a foothold in the southern reaches of the Upper
Village, the depleted 112th RD aided by a regiment of the 37th GRD was able to retain about 60
percent of the village itself. In short, the 389th failed to straighten the LI Corps’ line.
d. Farther north, a supporting effort by the 94th Infantry Division once
again came to naught. In their second attempt to cross the Mechetka River west of the railway
bridge, two reinforced battalions were driven back by Soviet defenders. One of the battalions
was essentially stopped in its tracks when it was about to jump off. At 1800, a massive and
accurate Katyusha rocket attack landed among the assembled troops and caused massive
casualties.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator return to the overhead view of the
northern half of Stalingrad.
L. The German Lull and Soviet Countermoves.
Visual: Attack on the Workers Villages, The Lull, 8-13 October 1942
1. Paulus orders a complete lull. All offensive operations, save small localized
attacks, ceased on 8 October. Paulus made this decision despite Hitler’s increasing demands that
he finish the job. By close of day on 7 October, Paulus clearly understood that it was not possible
for him to capture the city until addition combat forces could be brought to bear, but that would
take some time. It would take almost a week as events transpired.
2. The Search for Reinforcements. Between Weichs and Paulus and their
respective staffs, Army Group B and Sixth Army were able to come up with a plan to reinforce
the Sixth Army at Stalingrad. The plan, not surprisingly, included risks. The plan called for:
a. Permanent reassignment of the depleted 94th Infantry Division from the
LI Corps to Hube’s XIV Panzer Corps. That division was given to Hube to assist him with the
reduction of Rynok-Spartanovka.
b. Movement of the 14th Panzer Division from the XLVIII Panzer Corps
south of the city to be attached to the LI Corps. The 14th Panzer Division took over the 24th
45
Panzer Division’s sector on 11 October and the 24th Panzer took over the Barrikady Factory
sector.
c. Movement of the relatively fresh 305th Infantry Division from the VIII
Corps northwest of the city to be attached to the LI Corps. The 305th was put into the line to the
right of the 389th Division by 12 October and the 389th took over the 94th Infantry Division’s
front. The 94th was loaned to Hube’s XIV Panzer Corps for the final reduction of Spartanovka
and Rynok.
d. Movement of the relatively fresh 79th Infantry Division from the
XVII Corps northwest of the city to replace the LI Corps’ worn-out 71st Infantry Division
further south around the Mamaev Kurgan – Tennis Racket sector.
e. By the time these moves were made, the Sixth Army strength in
Stalingrad proper stood at about 70,000 combat troops, 2,300 guns and mortars, and 300 tanks
and assault guns.
3. The Risk. Movement of these divisions required an adjustment the Sixth
Army’s and perhaps more importantly, Army Group B’s lines.
Visual: Front Reorganizations, 1-22 October 1942
a. Third Romanian Army. The major change was turning over
the entire sector encompassing the Serafimovich and Kletskaia bridgeheads over the Don River
(which were held by the Soviets) to GEN Petre Dumitrescu’s Third Romanian Army. Almost as
soon as Dumitrescu assumed control of that front, he wisely began to request German troops to
help him reduce the two bridgeheads. Given the poor defensive terrain he was assigned, and the
lack of modern anti-tank weapons, Dumitrescu needed the Don as an anti-tank obstacle. He
would make the request several times, but each time Hitler personally responded, “no.”
b. Fourth Panzer Army. In addition, the Fourth Panzer Army holding the
Sixth Army’s immediate southern shoulder now consisted of only the exhausted IV Corps, the
VI Romanian Corps, and the 29th Motorized Division which was held on a string as the Army
Group B reserve. The XLVIII Panzer Corps now consisted of a headquarters and some corps
support troops only. All its divisions were now fighting in Stalingrad under other corps.
Visual: Stalingrad, The Lull, 8-13 October 1942, Soviet Unit Moves
4. Chuikov’s Moves. In addition to asking for more reinforcements, Chuikov was
compelled to make a couple of adjustments of his own. These included:
a. Movement began on 8 October by the 95th RD from the Tennis Racket
to assume a sector between the 308th RD and the 84th TB. The 95th RD was in position by 9
October and on arrival the remnants of the 42nd RB were consolidated with the division.
b. The 284th RD kept its own sector in the Tennis Racket area
46
as well as took over the areas on and around Mamaev Kurgan from the 95th RD.
Visual: Situation Spartanovka-Rynok, 13 October 1942
5. Spartnovka-Rynok.
a. In the Spartanovka sector, the remnants of the 2nd MRB and the 115th
RB which had survived the Orlovka Salient were repositioned to cover the northern approaches
to the Tractor Factory district along the Metchetka River and placed under Gorokhov. They were
reinforced on the south side of the Metchetka with one battalion each of the 124th and 149th
RBs.
d. The 282nd NKVD Regiment was withdrawn for reconstitution on the
west side of the Volga.
e. On 11 October Chuikov positioned the 45th RD on islands in the
Volga River to oppose any amphibious crossings the German might be anticipating (there were
none).
M. Soviet Actions During the Lull.
1. As with all “lulls” during the fighting at Stalingrad, an absence of major attacks
did not mean a complete absence of action. In addition to the various unit moves described
above, there were several key actions during the six day period between German attacks:
a. On 11 October, for example, there were several minor German attacks
in the 95th RD and 37th GRD sectors. In response, Chuikov decided to conduct a major
counterattack the following day to recapture the stadium complex.
b. In short, the Soviet counterattack failed. A regiment of the 37th GRD,
supported by tanks of the 84th Tank Brigade, conducted an attack towards the stadium from the
northeast while a regiment from the 308th RD attacked from the southeast. Both attempts were
handily repulsed by the just arrived 14th Panzer Division.
f. On 12 October, a regiment from 95th RD launched another attack
against the stadium area and advanced about 200 meters before being halted. The next day, the
14th Panzer Division retook the ground.
N. Conclusions.
1. During the period 1-13 October the Sixth Army was able to make significant
gains in the fight for Stalingrad:
a. The Sixth Army and Fourth Panzer Army were able once again to fend
off large Soviet counterattacks on the flanks conducted by the Don and Stalingrad Fronts.
47
b. The XIV Panzer Corps eliminated the Orlovka Salient.
c. The LI Corps solidified its grasp on most of the various factory
workers’ villages as it now prepared to assault the factory complexes themselves.
2. The casualties sustained in these operations, however, caused Paulus some
problems as well:
a. By 8 October, he was forced to delay for six days any further major
attacks to take the city due to insufficient numbers of infantrymen.
b. He had to shuffle divisions around to bring in more troops, which in
turn weakened his flanks.
c. The delay also allowed Chuikov some breathing space to reinforce and
reset his own forces as well.
3. The challenge now was to determine which side, the Germans or the Soviets,
could best weather the meat grinder and survive the battle of attrition.
Analysis (Strategic and Operational).
1. Is capturing Stalingrad worth the risk of using allied forces the way the Romanians were now
going to be employed?
2. What do you see as the advantages and disadvantages of the Don Front offensives in the
Kotluban region thus far?
Analysis (Tactical).
1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of operating in this type of terrain (large concrete
and steel buildings and more open terrain versus wooden worker’s huts in very close terrain)?
2. Critique the Sixth Army’s plan. Is it necessary to clear the worker’s villages? Was there any
advantages or disadvantages in clearing the city north to south?
3. Why are the Germans now concerned about their flanks?
4. How important is ‘straightening the lines’ in urban operations?
5. At what point does a unit become ‘combat ineffective?’ How does one measure “combat
ineffectiveness?”
48
6. How useful is the MDMP process in these types of operations?
7. When is a city considered “captured?”
49
Stand 10
Tractor Factory and Spartanovka-Rynok
13-17 October 1942
Visuals for this stand.
10-1: Orientation, North Stalingrad, 13 October 1942
10-2: German Situation (Organization & Strength), Tractor Factory, 13 October 1942
10-3: Attack on the Tractor Factory, German Attack Plan, 14 October 1942
10-4: Soviet Situation (Organization & Strength), Tractor Factory, 13 October 1942
10-5: Soviet Situation, Tractor Factory, 13 October 1942
10-6: Attack on the Tractor Factory, The Attack, 0500-1200, 14 October 1942
10-7: Attack on the Tractor Factory, The Attack, 1200-1800, 14 October 1942
10-8: Attack on the Tractor Factory, The Attack, 1800-0600, 14-15 October 1942
10-9: Attack on the Tractor Factory, The Attack, 0600-2400, 15 October 1942
10-10: Orientation, Spartanovka-Rynok, 14 October 1942
10-11: XIV Panzer Corps Attack, Spartanovka-Rynok, 15 October 1942
10-12: XIV Panzer Corps Attack, Spartanovka-Rynok, 16-17 October 1942
Virtual Movement Directions: Start with the terrain in the overhead view of the northern half of
Stalingrad.
.
Orientation.
Visual: Orientation, North Stalingrad, 13 October 1942
Starting in the north, point out the following key terrain features (Directions: you can have the
computer operator zoom down lower to get a closer look at any or all of these features as you
point them out).
I. North of the Mechetka River.
–Rynok
–Spartanovka
–The Mokrata-Mechetka (& Orlovka) River.
II. Between the Mechetka River and the Brick Factory.
–Metchetka River Railroad Bridge (northeast).
–Upper Tractor Factory Workers Village.
–The North Sports Stadium.
–Lower Tractor Factory Workers Village.
-Zitomirsk Ravine.
50
–The Tractor Factory.
–Hall No. 2
–Hall No. 10
–Tractor Factory Fuel Storage Tanks.
–Zaitsevskii Island.
–The Brick Factory.
–The “Schnellhefter” (the “six-sided block”)
–The Barrikady Factory.
Description (Strategic).
I. Strategic Planning and Diplomacy.
A. Allied. On 18 October, General Mark Clark secretly landed in Algeria to confer with
Vichy officials and Resistance groups in preparation for impending Allied invasion.
B. Axis. On 14 October 1942, Hitler ordered a halt to all further offensives in the Soviet
Union for the rest of the year and directs his field commanders there to hold in place until 1943.
The order does not apply to the Sixth Army at Stalingrad.
II. Europe.
A. North Africa and Mediterranean. On 15 Oct, Alfred Jodl suggested to Adolf Hitler
to order Vichy France to strengthen its defenses in North Africa as intelligence indicated a
possible Allied attack. Hitler rejected the suggestion because he thought the Italians would object
to any moves that strengthened France.
B. North Atlantic, Arctic Convoys, and Strategic Bombing (No major developments).
III. Pacific. (No major developments).
Description (Operational).
I. Don and Stalingrad Fronts.
A. Fourth Kotluban Offensive. On or about 14 October, Stalin ordered Rokossovsky’s yet
another thrust by the Don Front in the Kotluban Area to link up with Chuikov’s 62nd Army in
the Spartanovka area.
B. Stalin also directed Eremenko and his 64th Army to conduct a spoiling attack in the
south from Beketovka to threaten the Sixth Army from that direction and hopefully divert forces
from Chuikov’s front.
51
C. Neither of these efforts would take place before the renewal of offensive action by the
Sixth Army on 14 October.
II. Leningrad (No major developments).
III. Caucasus. On 14 October, Army Groups A’s offensive in the Caucasus was suspended with
the exception of 17th Army's attacks near Tuapse on the coast of the Black Sea.
Description (Tactical).
I. Strength, Dispositions, and Plans in the Tractor Factory Area.
Visual: German Situation (Organization & Strength), Tractor Factory, 13 October 1942
A. German Strength and Dispositions.
1. Total German combat strength in the Factory District was about 40,000
troops, 83 tanks and 41 assault guns (these were daily averages during this period). Seydlitz’ LI
Corps initially consisted of 3 infantry divisions and one panzer division. Unlike the Soviet
divisions, the Sixth Army’s divisions could expect few replacements anytime soon. So, for the
next phase of the attack on Stalingrad, Paulus provided Seydlitz with two additional divisions:
the 305th Infantry Division and the 14th Panzer Division, both of which were in better shape
than the corps’ other divisions currently assigned.
a. Each infantry division now possessed an average of between 1,700 and
4,000 “bayonets” compared to a little over 8,100 infantrymen when at full strength (roughly 40
to 50 percent strength).
b. The 24th Panzer Division, smaller than its infantry counterparts even
at full strength, averaged about 600 men for each of its two panzer grenadier regiments and only
about 20 to 30 operational tanks, depending on the day and how many tanks the mechanics were
able to return to operable status. The 14th Panzer Division was in better shape, but it was to be
the main effort for the upcoming operation and would be ground down rather quickly, as had
been the 24th.
2. Hube’s XIV Panzer Corps consisted of one infantry division, two motorized
divisions, and one panzer division.
a. The two divisions charged with the reduction of Spartanovka and
Rynok (94th Infantry Division and 16th Panzer Division) were comparable in strength to those in
the LI Corps.
b. The 3rd and 60th Motorized Divisions were unavailable to help due to
their requirements of defending against the attacks of the Don Front along the Kotluban line.
52
B. German Plan.
Visual: Attack on the Tractor Factory, German Attack Plan, 14 October 1942
1. XIV Panzer Corps (not shown). Hube’s corps was to attack and destroy
remaining Soviet forces in Spartanovka and Rynok.
a. The corps was also to protect the LI Corps’ left flank and to defend a
portion of the line facing the Don Front to the north.
b. Only portions of the 16th Panzer and 94th Infantry Divisions would be
focused on the Spartanovka – Rynok mission.
c. Hube’s attack would begin one day later on 15 October (more to
follow on these attacks later).
Note corps boundary along Mechetka River.
2. LI Corps. Seydlitz’s LI Corps, the Sixth Army main effort, was to attack and
destroy remaining Soviet forces in the Tractor Factory district to include the area of the Brick
Factory just to the south thereby seizing the Volga River bank in that area.
a. 389th Infantry Division. On the corps left, the 389th Infantry
Division would attack through the Upper Tractor Factory Worker’s Village and clear the
southern bank of the Mokraia-Metchetka River at the north end of Stalingrad proper. Where
possible, it would cooperate with the XIV Panzer Corps operations north of the River.
b. Group Jäneke. Seydlitz’s main effort, Group Jäneke, newly
organized from elements of the 305th and 389th Infantry Divisions, about 70 tanks from the
14th and 24th Panzer Divisions, and 31 assault guns from the 244th and 245th Assault Gun
Battalions, would be the corps’ main effort.
i. Group Jäneke would attack northeastward through the Lower
Tractor Factory Worker’s Village toward the factory, and to the Metcheka and Volga Rivers.
i. The spearhead of Group Jäneke, the 14th Panzer Division,
would attack in the center through the southern reaches of the Lower Factory Worker’s Village
and into the central areas of the Tractor Factory itself.
c. 305th Infantry Division. The 305th Infantry Division (-) would attack
on the right of the panzer division through Bread Factory No. 2 into the southern area of the
Tractor Factory and to the Brick Factory.
d. 24th Panzer Division. Farther south, a kampfgruppe from the
53
24th Panzer Division would conduct an attack to seize the area south of the southern sports
stadium which would then be used as a support position for the follow-on attack of the Barrikady
Factory.
e. On the corps far right, Seydlitz’s’ 295th Infantry and 100th Jäger
Divisions would remain on the defensive south of the main attack but were to conduct probing
attacks to fix the Soviet forces in their front to prevent reinforcement of the Tractor Factory area,
and gain ground where opportunities arose.
C. Soviet Strength and Dispositions.
Visual: Soviet Situation (Organization & Strength), Tractor Factory, 13 October 1942
1. 62nd Army strength on 13 October was about 20,000 troops.
f. The situation for Chuikov’s 62nd Army was, if anything, worse
than what the Germans faced. His four divisions in the Tractor and Barrikady Factory areas
averaged in strength only about 3,000 bayonets.
g. He possessed total of about 8,000 more men manning the four rifle
Brigades and other units in and near Spartanovka and Rynok to the north.
h. He also had two new tank brigades, the 1st Special Tank Brigade and
the 84th Tank Brigade. The former was a new unit rapidly assembled and manned by civilian
volunteers and workers for the Tractor Factory and equipped with the tanks assembled and
repaired there. It operated under the operational control of the 84th TB. The brigades together
possessed a total of 40 tanks.
i. The 62nd Army’s defensive depth was now down to only between 200
and 1400 meters from the front line back to the Volga River.
Visual: Soviet Situation, Tractor Factory, 13 October 1942
2. 62nd Army Order of Battle of Battle and in the north half of Stalingrad now
consisted of (north to south):
Group Gorokhov - Colonel Sergey F. Gorokhov
124th Rifle Brigade – COL Sergey F. Gorokhov
149th Rifle Brigade – COL Vasily Bolvinov
115th Rifle Brigade – COL Korney M. Andriusenko
2nd Motorized Rifle Brigade – COL Vasily P. Osipov
112th Rifle Division - COL Ivan E. Ermolkin, Defend the Upper TFWV
37th Guards Rifle Division - MG Victor G. Zholudev, Defend the Lower TFWV
54
and Zhitomirsk Ravine.
84th Tank Brigade - COL Daniil N. Bely, Defend vicinity of the Bread Factory.
95th Rifle Division - COL Vasily Gorishny, Defend vicinity southeast of the Sports
Stadium between the Tractor Factory and the Barrikady Factory.
308th Rifle Division - COL Leonty N. Gurtiev, Defend vicinity of the Barrikady
Factory and Skul’pturnyi Park.
42nd Rifle Brigade - COL Mayvey S. Batrakov, Remnants consolidated
with the remnants of the 339th RR and operated under the operational control of the 308th Rifle
Division.
92nd Naval Infantry Brigade - LTC Tarasov, Defend vicinity of
Skul’pturnyi Park and also operated under the operational control of the 308th Rifle Division
193rd Rifle Division (not shown) - MG Fedor Smekhotvorov, Defend the area
between the Barrikady and Red October Factories.
39th Guards Rifle Division (not shown) - MG Stepan S. Guriev-Defend vicinity
of Red October Factory.
The Soviet divisions’ supporting artillery units in this sector were concentrated on
Zaitsevskii Island and on the east bank of the Volga River.
4. Soviet Plan.
a. Chuikov’s mission remained to defend in place and inflict maximum
punishment on the Sixth Army and to conduct counterattacks at every reasonable opportunity.
b. The 62nd Army defense was largely designed to hold the landing stages
on the Volga River to allow for reinforcements to be ferried over the river to Stalingrad and
make the Germans fight for every foot of ground gained.
II. Attack on the Tractor Factory 14-15 October.
Visual: Attack on the Tractor Factory, The Attack, 0500-1200, 14 October 1942
A. The German Attack, 14 October.
1. Preparation and Softening.
a. On 14 October, at about 0500, the LI Corps unleashed a massive artillery
bombardment of the Stalingrad defenses in its front.
55
b. As the light of dawn broke, Stuka airstrikes and high altitude bombing
sorties from Colonel-General Wolfram von Richthofen’s Luftflotte IV began pounding the
positions of the 62nd Army as well. Throughout the day, 1,250 aircraft delivered their ordnance
into the Soviet defenses in the factory district, further rubbling the northern sector of the city.
2. The Attack 0730-1200.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator descend to the ground north of the
Schnellhefter Block area of the Upper Tractor Factory Worker’s Village. Move east through the
large apartment buildings until reaching the rise overlooking the center of the Tractor Factory.
a. 14th Panzer Division Attack. At 0730, the LI Corps began its attack toward
the Tractor Factory as Paulus watched the advance from his forward OP near Gorodishche.
i. Two panzer kampfgruppes composed of about 30 tanks each from the
36th Panzer Regiment and tanks attached from the 24th Panzer Division, accompanied by
infantry from the 103rd and 108th Panzer Grenadier Regiments, headed for their objective at the
center of the Tractor Factory. Within two hours, the advance penetrated the center of the
defenses of the 37th Guards Rifle Division.
ii. The 14th Panzer pushed much of the 37th GRD northward into the
Lower Tractor Factory Village where the Soviets also ran into the troops of the 389th Division.
Some elements of the 37th GRD were pushed eastward into the defenses of the Tractor Factory
itself. The division’s 118th GRR was pushed southeast toward the Volga.
iii. By noon, the tank and infantry kampfgruppes from the 14th Panzer
Division had split the 37th Guards RD in two. The panzer division had elements fighting in the
southern end of the Tractor Factory complex and some elements had advanced up to the huge
buildings in the center part of the complex.
b. 389th Infantry Division.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator ascend enough to pan left (northwest
to north) to view the 389th Division’s attack route through the Upper and Lower villages.
i. In the north, the regiments of the 389th Infantry Division fought their
way through the Upper Tractor Factory Village and into the western sectors of the Lower
Village.
ii. The 389th either destroyed or pushed the units of the 112th RD back
toward the factory and northeast toward the Mechetka River throughout the morning’s fighting.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator pan right (south towards the Brick
Factory) to view the 305th Division’s attack route up to the railroad line).
56
c. 305th Infantry Division.
i. To the south of the main effort, two regiments (577th and 578th Infantry
Regiments) of the 305th Infantry Division demolished the defenses of the 95th RD’s 90th RR
and battled their way eastward against the 117th GRR (the only regiment of the 39th GRD in this
sector).
ii. By late morning, the division had forced the 84th Tank Brigade to
retreat to a line along the railroad.
3. The Attack 1200-1800.
Visual: Attack on the Tractor Factory, The Attack, 1200-1800, 14 October 1942
a. 14th Panzer Division.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator descend to the rise and continue
movement along the road to your front that leads through the gap in the wall and into the Tractor
Factory complex. Halt inside the wall and pan northeast toward Halls 2 and 10.
i. By early afternoon, the tank and infantry kampfgruppes from the 14th
Panzer Division and elements of the 389th Division had forced some of the remnants of the 37th
Guards RD into the far ends of the Tractor factory complex north and south. The panzer division
had elements fighting in the southern end of the complex and some units had advanced almost up
to the huge buildings in the center part of the complex.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator proceed northeast toward Halls 2 and
10. Turn right on the road that leads between the two halls. Halt next to Hall 10.
iii. By dark, elements of the 14th Panzer Division were fighting in the
vicinity of Halls 2 and 10.
b. 305th Infantry Division.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator ascend above Hall 10 enough to pan
right (southwest toward the Brick Factory) to view the 305th Division’s attack route through the
southern areas of the Tractor Factory.
i. To the south of the 14th Panzer Division, the 305th Division (-) had
advanced to a line generally along the railroad by 1500 but also had elements fighting in the
southern areas of the Tractor factory complex.
ii. To the north of the 14th Panzer Division, the 305th Division’s 576th
Regiment helped to annihilate the 112th RD’s 416th RR in the open area between the lower and
upper villages.
57
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator pan left back to the 389th Division’s
sector to the north and the north end of the Tractor Factory.
c. 389th Infantry Division.
i. That afternoon, the 389th Division was making good progress in the
Lower Village and approaching the Tractor Factory Complex.
ii. The 389th division had severely mauled the 112th RD and
the right flank of the 37th GRD as it pushed through the Upper and Lower Tractor Factory
Villages.
iii. In the eastern section of the upper village, the division had surrounded
remnants of the 109th GRR and the 114th RR.
iii. In the central part of the upper village, it surrounded
remnants of the 109th GRR and the 524th RR.
iv. By dark, elements of the division were fighting their way into the
northwestern corner of the Tractor Factory.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator pan right (southwest) back towards
the Barrikady Factory in the far distance.
a. 24th Panzer Division.
i. Farthest south, by 1800 the weakened 24th Panzer Division had cut off
and surrounded much of the 117th GRR in an apartment complex south of the Schnellhefter
Block.
ii. It had not yet cleared its assigned objective, the next apartment
building complex to the south.
B. Soviet Situation.
1. As dark closed in, the situation on the Soviet side was far different.
a. During the day, Chuikov’s headquarters was once again struck by a
German bomb and this time 30 members of the army staff were killed or wounded. The drive of
the 305th Infantry Division had been so deep that the army headquarters’ guard company was
forced to conduct counterattacks to keep the Germans away from Chuikov’s command bunker.
By midnight, the 62nd Army was in a shambles.
58
b. 112th Rifle Division. Already weak, the 112th RD was now down to
less than 1,000 men. The 416th Regiment was gone; much of the 524th RR was surrounded with
a few men of the 109th GRR in the vicinity of the north stadium. The division’s 385th RR was
pushed back to the vicinity of the Mechetka River bridge and some buildings to the south of the
bridge and constituted that division’s primary position by the following morning.
c. 37th Guards Rifle Division. The once robust 37th GRD was
overpowered by the 14th Panzer Division’s attack. Its losses were catastrophic. The few men that
the division commander could pull together were concentrated in the north near the Metchetka
River. The division’s 109th GRR suffered 80% losses in killed, wounded, and missing.
Remnants of the regiment were in the vicinity of the northern stadium and surrounded; others
had retreated to the Tractor Factory’s main halls. The 114th GRR was largely destroyed with
most either killed or captured. The 118th GRR had been scattered by the German attack with
some of those moving into the Tractor Factory itself. By morning only 20 men along with 40
more from the division’s training battalion were under the regimental commander’s control.
These had been pushed back to a position just northwest of the 62nd Army HQ near the Volga.
d. 84th Tank Brigade. The 84th Tank Brigade also suffered high
casualties, but not as much as other units. By midnight, the brigade’s 20 or so surviving tanks
were pushed back to the vicinity of the 118th RR near the 62nd Army HQ.
e. 117th Guards Rifle Regiment, 39th Guards Rifle Division. The 117th
GRR was almost destroyed by the 24th Panzer Division and its remnants were encircled south of
the Schnellhefter Block (the rest of the 39th GRD, the division’s 112th GRR and 120th GRR,
were in a position near the Red October Factory and not involved in the Tractor Factory fight).
The rest of the regiment would be destroyed or captured during the night.
a. 95th Rifle Division. The 95th RD was not as heavily engaged as the
units to its north, but its 90th RR was hit hard by the 305th Infantry Division’s attack and was
now down to only 11 men who were consolidated with the 161st RR. The 161st RR was pushed
back to the vicinity of the Zhitomirsk Ravine and the railroad.
C. The Attack Continues, 15 October.
Visual: Attack on the Tractor Factory, 1800-0600, 14-15 October 1942.
1. By midnight, the Germans held three sides of the Tractor Factory and were
Involved in heavy fighting in the vicinity of Halls 2 and 10.
2. Fighting continued throughout the dark morning hours of the 15th,
particularly in the south near the 62nd Army’s headquarters bunker and around the Tractor
Factory itself. By dawn, the situation was (north to south):
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator pan left back to the 389th Division’s
sector to the north and the north end of the Tractor Factory.
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a. 389th Infantry Division. The three regiments of the 389th Infantry
Division were spread out along the Mechetka River line with the 546th Infantry Regiment in the
very northern reaches of the factory complex and stretching toward the Northern Landing Stage.
As the 546th Regiment reached the Volga River bank during the night, it began clearing the area
between the factory and the river toward the south.
b. 14th Panzer Division.
i. During the night, units of the 14th Panzer Division had captured the
majority of the Tractor Factory although small pockets of fierce resistance remained behind their
front line particularly in Hall 2 and Hall 10 in the center.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator pan right back to Tractor Factory’s
fuel storage tanks and then pan left (northward) along the bank of the Volga River toward the
Northern landing Stage.
ii. The 103rd Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 14th Panzer Division,
fought its way to the Volga near the oil tanks east of the Tractor Factory. From there, the
regiment continued clearing die hard Soviet defenders from the bluffs toward the north and
south.
c. 305th Infantry Division.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator pan right back to Tractor Factory’s
fuel storage tanks and along the bank of the Volga River toward the Brick and Barrikady
Factories.
i. In the early morning darkness, units of the 305th Division’s 577th
and 578th Infantry Regiments had also reached the Volga south of the fuel depot and began
clearing the banks of the river.
d. The four regiments which had reached the Volga during the night
succeeded in clearing about two kilometers of the river’s west bank which completely isolated
the 62nd Army from Group Gorokhov to the north. The 62nd Army was now split in two.
Visual: Attack on the Tractor Factory, 0600-Midnight, 15 October 1942
d. By dawn, the two regiments of the 305th Infantry Division and tanks
from the 14th Panzer were preparing to advance toward the Barrikady Factory to the south.
i. Elements of the 305th Division put pressure on the defenses in the
vicinity of the Brick Factory and advanced to within 300 yards from Chuikov’s headquarters
bunker.
ii. Meanwhile, the 14th Panzer Division moved into position on the
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right for the next phase of the attack which would be on the Barrikady Factory.
e. Most of the fighting during daylight of the 15th centered on reducing
pockets of surrounded resistance on the factory villages and in the Tractor Factory itself. Before
dark, the Germans were also able to place the Northern Landing Stage near the mouth of the
Metchetka River under direct fire as well.
f. By nightfall of 15 October, the LI Corps (and XIV Panzer Corps
which had that same day attacked Spartanovka-Rynok to the north) had suffered a combined
total of about 1,000 casualties of all types and the loss of 33 tanks and assault guns. 19 of the
tanks were from the 14th Panzer Division alone.
2. Soviet Situation.
a. In contrast, during the two days of fighting, Chuikov’s 62nd Army had
suffered close to 10,000 casualties and the loss of 20 tanks and 4 assault guns. Many of these
losses, if not most, resulted from the incessant German airstrikes and artillery fire.
b. The Soviets managed to transport 3,500 wounded men to the east
side of the Volga on the night of 15 October which was a record high for the four-month battle.
c. To help offset the 62nd Army’s staggering losses, Eremenko released
the fresh 138th Rifle Division to Chuikov that day. However, the Soviet’s transport flotilla was
able to move only one regiment, the 650th RR, across to the west side of the Volga on the night
of the 15th.
III. XIV Panzer Corps Attack on Spartanovka and Rynok 15-17 October
Visual: Orientation, Spartanovka-Rynok, 14 October 1942
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator provide an overview of Spartanovka
and Rynok that simulates the slide.
A. Situation and Mission for XIV Panzer Corps.
1. During the LI Corps attack on the Tractor Factory on 14 October, Hube’s XIV
Panzer Corps to the north of Stalingrad was held back in order to conduct a reconnaissance and
determine details of Group Gorokhov’s defenses north of the Metchetka River. Hube was not
scheduled to conduct his own assault until the following day. For the attack on 15 October,
Paulus assigned the XIV Panzer Corps the mission to destroy all enemy forces north of the
Mechetka River and seize the villages of Spartanovka and Rynok.
2. The Soviet defensive area north of the Metchetka River consisted of five key
locations:
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a. The first was what the Germans referred to as the “Grossen Pilz” (or
Large Mushroom), due to its mushroom-like silhouette on the horizon. It was located on a hill
west of Rynok. It was a large, well-prepared Soviet defense position consisting of a series of
trenches, bunkers, dugouts, and foxholes.
b. The next was the “Kleinen Pilz” (or Little Mushroom), located on a low
rise northwest of Spartanovka. Constructed similar to the Grossen Pilz, it was also a strong
position, but not as large as its nearby neighbor.
c. The village of Spartanovka itself which was composed largely of small but
closely packed wooden houses situated on broad avenues which provided good fields of fire for
defending troops. Gorokhov had his men strongpoint the village with a series of bunkers and
other defensive positions. Much of the village had been burned or otherwise destroyed by the
frequent German air attacks and artillery concentrations.
d. The fourth location, the village of Rynok, resembled Spartanovka in basic
Construction and condition, but was only about half the size.
e. The northern landing stage was located at the mouth of the Mechetka
River at its junction with the Volga. It was where all Soviet reinforcements, ammunition, and
supplies were landed for Group Gorokhov.
3. Hube assigned his 16th Panzer Division the mission to take Rynok and
destroy the Soviet forces there, then assist with the reduction of the larger village of
Spartanovka. For the assault, the division formed three battalion “kampfgruppes” or battle groups
each supported by about ten tanks and/or assault guns:
a. Kampfgruppe Strehlke, a tank-heavy force, was tasked to attack
Rynok itself.
b. 2nd Battalion, 64th Panzer Grenadier Regiment kampfgruppe was
tasked to assault the “Grossen Pilz.”
c. 2nd Battalion, 79th Panzer Grenadier Regiment kampfgruppe tasked to
assault the “Kleinen Pilz.”
4. Hube directed the 94th Infantry Division, on the right and in the west,
to be prepared to attack with one regiment, the 267th Infantry, to the east to assist in the capture
of Spartanovka and destruction Soviet forces there.
B. Situation and Mission for Group Gorokhov.
1. Defending this area was Group Gorokhov, named after its commander,
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Colonel Sergei F. Gorokhov, who also commanded the 124th Rifle Brigade. Under Gorokhov’s
command were four “brigades,” though two of these units were brigades in name only since they
were severely understrength due to the earlier fighting in Orlovka. The brigades consisted of:
a. 124th Rifle Brigade responsible for the defense of part of Spartanovka,
Rynok, and the “Big Mushroom.” This brigade had been reduced in strength by one battalion
which had been sent south to support the 62nd Army’s efforts across the Mechetka River into
northern Stalingrad. During the attacks on 14-15 October the 1st Battalion was severely reduced
due to casualties.
b. 149th Rifle Brigade responsible for the defense of Spartanovka and the
“Little Mushroom.” Like the 124th, the brigade was short its own 1st Battalion which had been
sent south of the Mechetka River into northern Stalingrad, and also badly mauled, and its
remnants were still in position near the Upper Tractor Factory Workers Village.
c. The remnants of Andriusenko’s 115th Rifle Brigade were responsible for
the defense of the area near the western bridge and village on the north side of the Mechetka
River. It was still severely understrength on 15 October mostly due to the fighting in the Orlovka
Salient. Its units were positioned north of the river on the night of 14-15 October.
d. 2nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, like the 115th Rifle Brigade, had been
moved north of the Mechetka River on the night of 14-15 October to defend the area near the
western bridge and village on the north side of the Mechetka River. It too was very much
reduced in strength from earlier fighting in the Orlovka Salient.
e. The 124th and 149th Brigades had been in the Spartanovka-Rynok area
since early September preparing the two key defensive positions (“Kleinen Pilz” and the
“Grossen Pilz”) which dominated the approaches to the two towns, as well as defenses in the
villages themselves.
C. Attack on 15 October.
Visual: XIV Panzer Corps Attack, 15 October 1942
1. The 16th Panzer Division attack in the north began at 0420 on the morning of
15 October after a short 3-minute artillery barrage. Initially, all three kampfgruppes, collectively
referred to as Gruppe Krumpen for the commander of the 64th Panzer Grenadiers, Colonel Paul-
Heinz Krumpen, who commanded the assault, were initially able to make good progress.
2. To the west, the 2nd Battalion, 79th Panzer Grenadiers reached the crest
of the Kleinen Pilz, bypassed part of it, and even advanced beyond it. Some elements reached the
railroad by about 0500. However, once on the high ground, the battalion began to receive heavy
fire into its flank from flak guns on the Grossen Pilz. The assault group held for a time, but then
began to retreat from the determined resistance.
3. In the center, 2nd Battalion, 64th Panzer Grenadiers were able to break into
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part of the strong defenses on the Grossen Pilz. Most of that kampfgruppe’s assault guns veered
off to the right (west) flank of the position, but 3 of the guns were inexplicably left behind, thus
reducing the battalion’s combat power. The assault troops made some headway through the
trenches and bunkers on the hill until the lead company commander was killed. That event
seemed to cause the rest of the group to lose heart and they began to retreat.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator descend to the road on the north side
of Rynok. Move south into and through the village along the road. Halt at the southern edge.
4. Kampfgruppe Strehlke attacked directly into the town of Rynok. It advanced
through the town toward the southern edge but faced stiff resistance the whole way. On its
approach to the south side the assault group ran into a strong string of Russian fortified positions
on the edge of town and its advanced elements halted there. Eventually, the group was driven
back to the north edge of town where it held for a time, then retreated back to its start line in the
afternoon, just as had the other two kampfgruppes.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator ascend to provide an overview of
Spartanovka and Rynok that simulates the slide.
5. Elements of the 94th Infantry Division only conducted feints and
demonstrations to draw Gorokhov’s attention, but made no concerted attacks.
6. By the end of the day, the initial attacks had failed to capture either town.
Nevertheless, the German assaults had succeeded in inflicting many more casualties on Group
Gorokhov than the Germans themselves had received, even though the Russians were defending.
Gorokhov’s units were now far more reduced and weak than before.
7. That afternoon, Hube ordered MG Georg Pfeiffer, commander of the 94th
Infantry Division, to hurry the shift of the 267th and 274th Infantry Regiments northward to a
position where they could join in the resumed offensive on Spartanovka the next day, 16
October.
C. Attack on 16 October.
Visual: XIV Panzer Corps Attack, 16-17 October 1942
1. The XIV Panzer Corps attack on 16 October was to support the general
assault of Seydlitz’s LI Corps against the Barrikady Factory by fixing Group Gorokhov as well
as destroying what remained of the Soviet defenses in the area north of the river. Thus, Hube’s
mission was essentially the same as on the 15th, however, his efforts were now to include at least
one regiment, the 267th, and perhaps the 274th Regiment as well, from the 94th Division.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator descend to the area just to the
northwest of the Grossen Pilz (northwest of Rynok). Move southeast through the defenses. Turn
south and move a short ways toward the ravine between the two villages then halt with
Spartanovka in view.
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2. The initial attack on the 16th did not begin until about noon when the 64th
Panzer Grenadiers fought their way onto the Grossen Pilz. After about four hours of bitter
fighting from position to position, the grenadiers captured the hill killing about 200 Russians and
capturing another 50. As events turned out, however, this was to be the only major combat action
of the day in the north.
3. During the day, the kampfgruppe from the 79th Panzer Grenadiers shifted to
their right (south) to link up with the 267th Infantry Regiment (94th Infantry Division) for the
assault on Spartanovka but that event took place too late in the day for a coordinated and joint
attack to go forward. To the south of the Metchetka River, however, the LI’s Corps’ 389th
Division succeeded in clearing the rest of the south bank of the river, thus completing the
isolation of Group Gorokhov from the 62nd Army.
4. Given the heavy casualties of Group Gorokhov and the additional regiments
of the 94th Division moving into position, the situation now looked much improved for Hube’s
ability to finally destroy the remaining resistance in the northern pocket. However, that evening
Paulus ordered the 94th’s 274th Infantry Regiment to move south of the Mokraia-Metchetka
River to support Seydlitz’s attacks on the Barrikady Factory. Only the 267th Regiment would
now be available for the attack on the 17th.
D. Attack on 17 October
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator move to the area of the 267th
infantry. Move southeast until reaching the outer fringe of Spartanovka. Halt a short ways into
the village.
1. The 16th Panzer Division’s renewed attacks on Rynok and Spartanovka began
at dawn on 17 October. Gruppe Krumpen, with about 20 tanks and reinforced by about 150
troops from the worn-down 1st Battalion, 64th Panzer Grenadiers, succeeded in seizing and
reducing the remaining resistance on the two “mushrooms.” After Gruppe Krumpen mopped up
on the two hills, the 1st Battalion, 64th Panzer Grenadiers shifted southeastward and linked with
the 267th Infantry Regiment to attack into the western sections of Spartanovka. By 1530, this
assault had succeeded in gaining a foothold in the western sections of the village.
2. That evening, Gorokhov was down to about 2,000 men and some of his units
were completely out of ammunition. Losing heart, Gorokhov requested Chuikov to order the
remnants of his units to the west side of the Volga. Chuikov responded by ordering his
operations officer into the pocket to bolster Gorokhov’s resolve and sending urgent requests to
Eremenko for men and bullets. Despite its commander’s bleak outlook, Group Gorokhov had
held through three days of intense combat. The next couple of days would determine whether
Group Gorokhov could continue to hold.
Analysis (Strategic and Operational).
65
1. What is the operational importance of Spartanovka-Rynok, if any? Was that effort worth the
resources expended?
Analysis (Tactical).
1. What are the some of the challenges posed by “industrial terrain” (i.e., factory complexes,
storage facilities, fuel depots, etc.)?
2. How does urban operations affect logistics? What supplies need to be increased? Reduced?
3. How does urban operations affect logistics in other ways?
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Stand 11
Barrikady Factory Phase I
16-18 October
Visuals for this stand.
11-1: Attack on the Barrikady Factory, Situation, 15 October 1942
11-2: Attack on the Barrikady Factory, Attack, 16 October 1942
11-3: Attack on the Barrikady Factory, Attack 0800, 17 October 1942
11-4: Attack on the Barrikady Factory, Situation 2100, 17 October 1942
11-5: Attack on the Barrikady Factory, Plan for 18 October 1942
11-6: Attack on the Barrikady Factory, Situation, Dark, 18 October 1942
Virtual Movement Directions: Start with the terrain in the overhead view (to match the visual) at
the northern end of the Sixth Army sector.
Orientation.
Visual: Attack on the Barrikady Factory, Situation, 15 October 1942
Starting in the north, point out the following key terrain features (Directions: you can have the
computer operator zoom down lower to get a closer look at any or all of these features as you
point them out).
Between the Brick Factory and the Red October Factory.
–Brick Factory
–Interim 62nd Army headquarters bunker
–Skul’pturnyi Park
–The “Narrows”
–Barrikady Factory
–Barrikady Factory Fuel Storage Tanks
–Bread Factory
–Central Landing Stage
Description (Strategic).
I. Strategic Planning and Diplomacy.
A. Allied. On 18 October, General Mark Clark secretly lands in Algeria to confer with
Vichy officials and Resistance groups in preparation for impending Allied invasion.
B. Axis (No major developments).
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II. Europe.
A. North Africa and Mediterranean (No major developments).
B. North Atlantic, Arctic Convoys, and Strategic Bombing (No major developments).
III. Pacific. (No major developments).
Description (Operational).
I. Don Front. Rokossovsky hastily prepared the Don Front for yet another Kotluban Offensive
which would begin on 20 October (discussed in Stand 12).
II. Leningrad (No major developments).
III. Caucasus. On 18 October, Army Group A’s 17th Army’s attack against Tuapse and
Novorossiisk near the Baltic Sea was stopped by the Soviets.
Description (Tactical).
I. Strength, Dispositions, and Plans in the area of the Barrikady and Red October
Factories.
Visual: Attack on the Barrikady Factory, Situation, 15 October 1942
A. German Strength, Dispositions, and Plans.
1. On the evening of 15 October, Paulus ordered Seydlitz to regroup his forces
and reorient south to attack the Barrikady Factory the next day. As Seydlitz turned his immediate
attention to the two southern factories the LI Corps situation was as follows:
a. 389th Infantry Division. The 389th Infantry Division, in the Tractor
Factory area, would remain there to mop up any remaining resistance and hold the Metchetka
River line to help fix Group Gorokhov.
b. Group Jäneke. The main effort, Group Jäneke (now consisting only of
the 14th Panzer and 305th Infantry Divisions) would reorient to the southwest and make the
attack on the Barrikady Factory on the 16th.
i. The 305th Division's 576th and 578th Regiments would
attack southward with the Volga on the division’s left.
ii. The 14th Panzer Division (-) would attack in the center, to the
68
right of the 305th.
ii. A kampfgruppe composed of the 305th's 577th Regiment and
the 14th Panzer’s 64th Motorcycle Battalion would make the assault between the 14th Panzer’s
right and the 24th Panzer Division’s left.
iii. The 14th Panzer Division’s 108th Panzer Grenadier
Regiment was held in reserve.
c. 24th Panzer and 100th Jäger Divisions. Supporting the main effort
on the corps right, the 24th Panzer Division and 100th Jäger Division would fix Chuikov’s forces
defending in the Barrikady and Red October areas.
d. In all, the attack would be made by almost 10,000 assault troops
supported by about 70 available tanks from the two panzer divisions and 18 assault guns from
the 244th and 245th Assault Gun Battalions.
B. Soviet Strength, Dispositions, and Plans.
1. Facing this next onslaught Chuikov possessed about 6,000 men in the less
than 3 divisions or so in the Barrikady Factory area that would meet the next attack.
a. On the far right next to the Volga River, were the remnants of the 37th
GRD’s 118th GRR positioned in the Brick Factory.
b. To the 118th's left was the 84th Tank Brigade with about 20
remaining tanks (it was able to bring a few of its KV-1 heavy, and T-34 medium tanks over the
Volga during the fighting around the Tractor Factory). Each tank was carefully sited and situated
in camouflaged, hull down positions for maximum affect.
c. The 84th was flanked on its left by the remnants of the 90th RR and
the 95th RD’s 161st and 241st Regiments facing in a generally westerly direction toward the
24th Panzer Division. In a second line behind the 95th RD and on its right was the newly arrived
650th RR from the 138th RD.
d. On the left flank of the 95th RD, the 308th RD faced the rest of the
24th Panzer Division across the relatively open areas of Skul’pturnyi Park.
e. Chuikov’s plan for this area was unchanged: bitterly defend the
Barrikady and Red October Factories; conduct counterattacks were feasible.
II. Attacks on the Barrikady Factory, Phase I, 16-18 October.
Visual: Attack on the Barrikady Factory, Attack, 16 October 1942
A. 16 October.
69
1. At 0800 on 16 October, the second major LI Corps offensive in the Barrikady
Factory district began with a heavy artillery barrage and air attacks from Stuka dive bombers
against the Soviet positions.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator descend to the road leading from the
Tractor Factory to the northern corner of the Barrikady Factory along the main railroad. Move
along the road until reaching the 84th Tank Brigade defense line marked by a large boulder on
the right.
2. 14th Panzer Division.
a. Although the German artillery and dive bombers devastated some
Russian positions, the positions of the 84th Tank Brigade survived with almost no casualties.
When the main tank attack from the 14th Panzer Division pushed down the main highway and
the railroad from the Tractor Factory toward the Barrikady, the German columns ran into the
well-placed tanks of the 84th Brigade dug-in along Tramvainaia and Skul’pturnaya Streets.
Firing from distances of only 100 to 200 yards, the Russian gunners could hardly miss. Within a
short period of time, 10 panzers were knocked out and the remaining German tanks wisely pulled
back.
b. Accordingly, the German infantry halted to hold its gains when
artillery and Katushya rockets began hammering their lines causing further confusion and
casualties. This action devolved into an hours long fight as German commanders struggled to get
their tanks back into advantageous positions and while the infantry hunkered down under a
terrific indirect fire.
c. At about 1600, the 14th Panzer Division renewed its tank attack and
by that time many of the Soviet tanks had been knocked out by German tank and anti-tank fire,
artillery, or air attack. Only four of the 20 Russian tanks survived the action allowing the German
attack to successfully advance into the areas at the north end of the Barrikady Factory in the late
afternoon. The day’s attacks were costly and the 14th Panzer Division ultimately lost 17 of its
own tanks.
3. 305th Division.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator turn left and head southeast to the
northern end of the Barrikady Factory.
a. To the 14th Panzer’s left, the 305th Division pushed southward near
the 62nd Army’s command bunker and also reached the north end of the Barrikady by late
afternoon.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator turn right and head southwest. Halt
at the east-west road that runs through the middle of the Barrikady Factory.
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Visual: Attack on the Barrikady Factory, Attack, 0800, 17 October 1942
b. By nightfall, almost half of the Barrikady Factory was in Seydlitz’s
hands. There remained a thin sliver of ground along the Volga River between the Brick Factory
and the Barrikady’s north end which remained in the hands of the 118th GRR.
4. 24th Panzer Division.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator ascend and pan right (northwest)
toward Skul’pturnyi Park.
a. On 14th Panzer Division’s right, kampgruppes of the 24th Panzer
Division made little progress against the 95th RD defenders in the Skul’pturnyi Park area. As the
14th Panzer pushed southwestward, a bulge developed in the line at the park.
b. That night, the rest of the 138th Rifle Division was due to be carried
across the Volga River. Chuikov sent orders to the division commander, COL Ivan I. Liudnikov,
at 2350 to move into positions to bolster the 95th Division northeast of Skul’pturnyi Park. As the
fighting continued that night, however, those very positions fell into the hands of the 24th Panzer
Division even before the 138th Division completed its crossing.
B. 17 October
1. Soviet Situation.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator provide an overview of the
Barrikady Factory area that simulates the slide.
a. Chuikov’s Request. By midnight on 16 October, Chuikov’s
situation was fairly desperate. Most of his troops were now pushed back to the vicinity of the
Barrikady Factory itself although most positions in the Skul’pturnyi Park area still held.
i. In response to this, Chuikov requested that he be allowed to
move his headquarters to the east bank of the Volga. The Stavka denied the request and in
response, that headquarters ordered Eremenko, the Stalingrad Front commander, to go see
Chuikov personally and make an assessment.
ii. That evening, Eremenko and his deputy crossed the Volga and
arrived at Chuikov’s command bunker after midnight. The front commander found the situation
as grave as had been reported. Chuikov’s primary request to Eremenko in this meeting was for
more troops. The Stalingrad Front commander promised he would send everything he could to
include more ammunition.
iii. When he departed just before dawn, Eremenko recommended
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to Chuikov to move his bunker south once again to get further away from the front line. Chuikov
instead decided to keep his headquarters there for the time being, but it would not stay for long.
b. By 0500 on the morning of 17 October, the remaining two
regiments of Liudnikov’s 138th Rifle Division were finally ferried across the Volga. With its
initial designated positions to the northeast of the Skul’pturnyi Park area already in German
hands, Chuikov instead rushed Liudnikov’s 138th into positions in the Barrikady Factory to
defend that complex and pulled the severely depleted 95th RD out of the line altogether.
c. By dawn the Soviet defenses now looked like this:
i. The 37th GRD was by now almost completely destroyed.
Only the division’s artillery regiment, located on the west side of the Volga, and a remnant of the
118th GRR remained. The 118th GRR was holding on to a small piece of ground near the Brick
Factory and a narrow strip along the Volga which it had firmly held against the 305th's attacks
on the 16th.
ii. To 118th's left, elements of the fresh 138th RD now held
positions forward (east, north, and west) of, and in, the Barrikady Factory.
iii. Farther south and west, on the 138th's left, the 308th RD
manned positions in and around Skul’pturnyi Park protecting the western approaches to the
southern end of the factory complex.
iv. On the 308th's left was the 193rd RD defending the Lower
Barrikady Worker’s Village where it protected the approaches to the northern reaches of the Red
October Factory. Just behind the 193rd were the remnants of the 95th RD in reserve.
v. Finally, farthest south was the 39th GRD defending the Red
October area itself.
2. 17 October Attack Plan. During the night of 16-17 October, Paulus ordered
Seydlitz to continue the attack on the Barrikady Factory to capture it and the Bread Factory to
the southwest. Seydlitz’s plan for the 17th was slightly different than the day before.
a. Group Jäneke was again the main effort. The 14th Panzer Division,
flanked by the 305th's 577th Infantry on the right and the 576th and 578th Regiments on the left,
would push southwest to capture the rest of the Barrikady Factory. The immediate objective
remained the capture of the Barrikady Factory.
c. The 24th Panzer Division, now reinforced by the 14th Panzer’s 108th
Panzer Grenadier Regiment on its right, would form the second jaw of a pincers movement to
clean out resistance in the Skul’pturnyi Park area, drive into the southern section of the
Barrikady, and capture the Bread Factory. Any Soviet units caught between them would be cut
off and destroyed.
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3. The Attack.
a. At 0800 on the 17th, the LI Corps resumed the attack. Within a
relatively short period, the tank-infantry teams of the 14th Panzer Division had driven two of the
138th RD’s regiments into the southern depths of the Barrikady Factory. By noon, the third
regiment was driven back there as well. These retrograde movements had the effect of further
exposing the 308th RD’s right flank. The Soviet moves also allowed a kampfgruppe of the 103rd
Panzer Grenadiers supported by tanks to drive another 500 yards southwest almost to the railroad
junction at the southwest corner of the factory complex.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator descend to a point just west of
Skul’pturnyi Park and northeast of the Narrows. Move south through Skul’pturnyi Park (point
out locations of the two bypassed Soviet resistance nests to the left [in the park] and right [the
Narrows]) until reaching the railroad tracks at the southwest corner of the Barrikady Factory.
Visual: Attack on the Barrikady Factory, Situation 2100, 17 October 1942
b. The 24th Panzer Division began its push by bypassing the 339th RR and
the 347th RR of the 308th RD in the vicinity of Skul’pturnyi Park and the Narrows. Neither
bypassed position was totally reduced during the day. In fact, the 339th RR in the park itself
would continue to resist until 20 October before the last man was killed or captured. By late
morning, the 308th RD had essentially been reduced to 25 percent strength due to the loss of
most of these two regiments.
c. After its retreat, the 138th RD fought stubbornly all day and all night
within the southern factory complex. Despite the best efforts of the German panzers and
grenadiers, the Soviets held their positions, although they took heavy casualties in the process.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator provide an overview of the
Barrikady Factory area that simulates the slide.
d. On the 138th's right flank, the 650th RR and the remnants of the 37th
GRD’s 118th GRR were driven back some distance which forced Chuikov to finally move his
headquarters even farther south on the night of 17-18 October.
4. The Results.
a. German Gains.
i. By dark, the LI Corps had made significant gains in the
Skul’pturnyi Park area. The 24th Panzer and 108th Panzer Grenadiers had succeeded in
capturing most of the park, but had bypassed strong pockets of resistance in the park and at “the
Narrows.” Their combined attack had reached the edges of the Bread Factory, but gained no
foothold there.
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ii. A kampfgruppe of the 14th Panzer succeeded in reaching the
southwest corner of the Barrikady and turned over that ground to the nearby 24th Panzer.
Otherwise the 14th Panzer Division made little progress within the Barrikady Factory itself.
iii. In bitter fighting, the 305th Division was able to push out all
remaining defenders from the Brick Factory but progressed no further.
iv. German losses were 576 killed, wounded, or missing. The 14th
Panzer Division lost 19 of its 33 available tanks and the 24th Panzer lost all but 3 of its 33
tanks as well. This made for a total of 48 tanks actually knocked out by Chuikov’s troops but
many of these vehicles sustained only superficial and mobility damage and would be back in
action the following day.
b. Soviets. It’s not clear what the Soviet casualties were in the fighting on
17 October, but the LI Corps reported that its units took in 963 POWs and deserters alone that
day (mostly from the 308th RD).
5. Late on the evening of 17 October, Seydlitz received orders for the
continuation of the attack on the Barrikady Factory. The bulk of the 14th Panzer Division and all
of the 305th Infantry Division were to be thrown into the attack the following day.
Visual: Attack on the Barrikady Factory, Plan for 18 October 1942
C. 18 October
1. The LI Corps Plan. The LI Corps’ primary objective for 18 October was the
capture of the ravine to the south of the Bread Factory which stretched from the railroad bridge
near the southwest corner of the Barrikady to the Volga River.
a. Group Jäneke. Group Jäneke, still the corps main effort, was ordered to
capture the ravine. This mission implied, of course, that Group Jäneke would also reduce the
remaining resistance in the Barrikady and capture both factory complexes (i.e., the Barrikady and
Bread Factory No. 2) in the process.
b. 14th Panzer Division. The heavy lifting would once again be conducted by
the 14th Panzer Division with 19 tanks and 18 assault guns supported by all three regiments of
the 305th Division.
c. 305th Infantry Division. Two regiments of the 305th Division would move
southwest to help eliminate resistance in the Barrikady and between the factory and the Volga.
d. 24th Panzer Division. The supporting effort, composed of the 24th
Panzer Division, the 276th Infantry Regiment (94th Division), and the 103rd and 108th Panzer
Grenadier Regiments (14th Panzer Division), would reduce the pockets of resistance in
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Scul’pturnyi Park and the Narrows overnight where two concentrations of Soviet troops still held
out. These two initial tasks were supposed to be completed by 0800 on 18 October.
e. Once Scul’pturnyi Park and the final section of the Narrows ravine
were in the 24th Panzer Division’s hands, that division was to shift its 21st Panzer Grenadier and
36th Panzer Regiments northeast to take over the sector of the 576th Infantry Regiment (305th
Division) so that the 576th could participate the attack against the Barrikady Factory itself.
f. In addition, Sixth Army issued orders for the 389th Infantry Division to
shift its 545th Regiment south to position itself on the 24th Panzer Division’s left flank as well
and help reduce pockets of resistance around the Brick Factory.
g. Paulus also ordered the 79th Infantry Division, commanded by
LTG Richard von Schwerin, to begin shifting its forces from its positions west of Stalingrad into
the city for a new follow-on mission.
2. The Attack.
a. Group Jäneke.
i. The initial assaults by Group Jäneke into the remaining
buildings of the Barrikady quickly encountered stubborn resistance at the factory as more troops
from the 138th Division moved into the complex. These troops were bolstered by elements of the
308th RD which also withdrew into the same area as elements of Group Jäneke pushed eastward
and southward.
ii. As the troops of the 305th Infantry Division advanced deeper
into the factory, Russian forward observers across the river watching the German advance,
directed very effective artillery fire against the small assault teams as they moved from position
to position causing heavy casualties.
iii. The fighting soon retreated into the large halls and smaller
buildings dotting the southern factory grounds and the Germans were forced to clear every
building of stubborn Soviet defenders room by room. The advance continued forward but at a
glacial pace. Moreover, the Soviets made a number of counterattacks that often retook lost
positions.
iv. As a result, by dark, the Germans had succeeded in
permanently advancing only yards into the factory complex in a few areas.
Visual: Attack on the Barrikady Factory, Situation, Dark, 18 October 1942
b. 24th Panzer Division. The 24th Panzer Division’s supporting efforts
on the German left fared little better.
i. Although its troops were able to further degrade the Soviet
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resistance nests near Skul’pturnyi Park and in the “Narrows” ravine, neither Soviet position was
totally reduced nor did the defenders show any signs of capitulation.
ii. The one minor achievement of the day was that the 24th's 21st
Panzer Grenadier and 36th Panzer Regiments, supported by the 389th Infantry Division’s 545th
Regiment were able to dislodge the final 200 or so holdouts of the 118th GRR and 650th RR and
capture the rest of the Brick Factory. Even there, the advance was no more than 200 yards in
total distance for 18 October.
iii. At 2245 that night, the 24th Panzer Division ordered the
attached 276th Infantry to break off its efforts against the Narrows and the 339th RR in
Skul’pturnyi Park and reassemble near the stadium as the division reserve.
3. Results.
a. German. By midnight, 18 October, the LI Corps had gained very little
for its efforts. In essence, the gains consisted of:
i. The Brick Factory and about 200 more yards of the Volga
Banks were under full German control.
ii. Though some gains were made in the Barrikady’s factory halls,
most were thrown back by counterattacks leaving the Germans with gains of literally a few yards
within the factory complex itself.
iii. With the 24th Panzer Division’s shift to the east along the
Volga River, the 14th Panzer’s and 305th Division’s attacks concurrently shifted them to the
west and south and they were now oriented on the Barrikady Factory from the west.
b. Soviet. By the end of the day, Chuikov’s forces still held the about half
of the Barrikady and all of the Bread Factory.
i. The 339th RR still held out in Skul’pturnyi Park and a handful
of men from the 347th held on at the Narrows.
ii. After sunset, and during the hours of darkness, Chuikov began
feeding replacements ferried over the Volga into his depleted regiments anticipating yet another
attack.
D. Spartanovka and Rynok on 18 October
1. There was also Germans attacks farther north against Spartanovka on 18
October.
2. During the hard fighting to retain the Barrikady Factory, Group Gorokhov in
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Spartanovka continued to hold its ground as well. An attack by the 94th Division’s 267th
Infantry penetrated into western part of the village, but the Russians successfully counterattacked
and drove the Germans back out.
3. Gorokhov also managed to retain control of the Northern Landing Stage
against an attack which allowed him to receive greatly needed additional reinforcements and
ammunition that night and the next.
E. The “Operational Lull” 19-22 October.
1. Heavy Rains and Supply Shortages. On the night of 18-19 October, Seylidtz
began repositioning some of his artillery assets to prepare for a major assault on the Bread
Factory and the Red October Factory several hundred yards farther south. Heavy rains that night,
however, slowed the movement of supplies across the Don River. The lack of supplies, in turn,
prevented the launch of the new attack on 19 October. In fact, the rain, along with intermittent
snow flurries, prevented any major operations for the next four days.
2. Fourth Kotluban Offensive. On 19 October, the Don and Stalingrad Fronts
launched the Fourth Kotluban “Counterstroke” (offensive) with attacks north and south of
Stalingrad to relieve pressure on Chuikov’s 62nd Army (this counteroffensive will be discussed
in more detail during Stand 12).
3. German Actions During the Lull. Over the next four days Paulus and Seydlitz
were not totally inactive, nor were their soldiers.
a. As assembled Schwerin’s relatively fresh 79th Infantry Division
arrived from outside the city, Paulus assembled it behind the LI Corps to prepare for a planned
attack on the Red October Factory.
b. Meanwhile, Seydlitz ordered his subordinate commanders to keep
up localized attacks on the Soviet defenses at the Barrikady Factory to further wear down the
Russian defenses, gain small objectives, conduct local reconnaissance, and otherwise help set
conditions for a successful attack on the Red October in a few days.
c. In short, however, very little of significance took place during 19-
22 October in the way of German advances, although moderate to heavy fighting took place
within the Barrikady Factory’s compound during the period. Perhaps the most significant action
was on the 19th itself when a small German attack succeeded on capturing a larger portion of the
factory complex’s southwestern corner despite the heavy rain.
4. On the other hand, the weather and Soviet attacks on the German flanks
provided Chuikov a four-day breathing space to reorganize and strengthen his defenses as well.
Several shattered units were pulled back across the river to be reformed during this period.
77
Analysis (Strategic and Operational).
1. How are these tactical battles in Stalingrad contributing (or not) to either sides’ operational
goals?
2. US Army doctrine calls for isolating a large city before attempting to reduce/capture it. How
feasible is this idea in light of the Sixth’s Army’s challenges to capture Stalingrad?
Analysis (Tactical).
1. What are the best methods to use in dealing with bypassed pockets of resistance in urban
terrain?
2. Evaluate the use of armor and mechanized forces by both the Germans and Soviets during the
fighting in Stalingrad.
3. Evaluate Chuikov’s request to move his headquarters east of the Volga and Stavka’s response.
4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of an army commander operating so close to the
front?
5. The Soviets used existing civilian infrastructure such as factories, hospitals, grain elevators,
and government buildings on which to build their defenses—why?
78
Stand 12
The Lulls, Barrikady Factory Phase II, and the Red October Factory
19 October-11 November
Visuals for this stand.
12-1: Attacks on the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Situation, 22 October 1942
12-2: Stalingrad, Front Reorganization, 22 October 1942
12-3: Stalingrad, Fourth Kotluban Offensive, 19-26 October 1942
12-4: Stalingrad, Soviet Build Up for URANUS, 29 October 1942
12-5: Attack on the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Plan for 23 October 1942
12-6: Attack on Red October Factory, 23 October 1942
12-7: Attack on the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Situation, 2100, 23 October 1942
12-8: Attack on the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Attack, 24 October 1942
12-9: Stalingrad, Martenovskii Shop, Attack, 25 October 1942
12-10: Attack on the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Attack, 25 October 1942
12-11: Stalingrad, XIV Panzer Corps Attack, Spartanovka-Rynok, 25 October 1942
12-12: Operations at the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Operations, 26 October-2
November 1942
Virtual Movement Directions: Start with the terrain in the overhead view (to match the visual)
over the Red October and Barrikady Factories.
Orientation.
Visual: Attacks on the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Situation 22 October 1942
Starting in the north, point out the following key terrain features (Directions: you can have the
computer operator zoom down lower to get a closer look at any or all of these features as you
point them out).
Between the Barrikady Factory and the “Tennis Racket.”
–Barrikady Factory
–“Liudnikov’s Island”
–Commissar’s House
–The Pharmacy (The “Apothecary”)
–Bread Factory
–Central Landing Stage
–Red October Factory
–Bannyi Ravine.
–Final 62nd Army headquarters bunker.
Description (Strategic).
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I. Strategic Planning and Diplomacy.
A. Allied (No major developments).
B. Axis. On 31 October, since he was confident that Stalingrad would soon fall, Adolf
Hitler, departed the Wehrwolf headquarters near Vinnytsia, Ukraine, and moved back to the
Wolfsschanze (Wolf’s Lair) headquarters in Rastenburg, Germany.
II. Europe.
C. North Africa and Mediterranean.
1. 21 October. US Major General Mark Clark, aboard British submarine HMS
Seraph began negotiations with Vichy French commanders in North Africa in preparation for
Operation TORCH.
2. 23 October. The Second Battle of El Alamein begins.
3. 31 October. The British Eighth Army makes a critical breakthrough at El
Alamein.
4. 2 November. Rommel requests permission from Hitler to fall back which was
denied on the next day.
5. 4 November. Seeing victory was now impossible, Rommel disobeyed Hitler's
orders and gave the orders for a general withdraw toward the Egyptian-Libyan border.
6. 7 November. Vichy French General Antoine Béthouart attempted a failed
coup d'etat in North Africa which alarmed French defense units.
7. 8 November. Allied forces attacked French ports of Casablanca and Oran,
and in Algeria in North Africa as Operation TORCH began.
8. 9 November. French Admiral Darlan signed an armistice with American
General Dwight Eisenhower, but some fighting would continue for two more days.
9. 11 November. The French garrison at Casablanca officially surrendered to the
Americans. Allied troops pushed all Axis troops out of Egypt.
D. North Atlantic, Arctic Convoys, and Strategic Bombing (No major developments).
III. Pacific. 26 October. US naval forces win the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands.
Description (Operational).
80
Visual: Stalingrad, Front Reorganization, 22 October 1942
I. Reorganization of Soviet Forces in the Stalingrad Area. In further preparation for
Operation URANUS, on 22 October the Stavka formed the new Southwestern Front around the
1st Guards Army’s headquarters and appointed LTG Nikolai F. Vatutin as commander. The
front’s sector extend from Ptishchevo to Kletskaia (between the Voronezh and Don Fronts) and it
consisted of the 21st, 63rd, and 5th Tank Armies.
II. Leningrad. (No major developments).
III. Caucasus.
A. On 25 October, Soviet troops launched the Nalckik-Ordzhonikidze Defensive
Operation in the Caucasus.
B. On 29 October German troops captured Nalchik and were now only 50 miles from the
oil fields in Grozny.
C. On 1 November, the III.Panzer Korps captured Alagir on the Terek River in the
Caucasus.
D. On 2 November, the 13th Panzer Division is halted by Soviet forces 5 miles outside
Ordshonikidze, Azerbaijan. This will be the farthest point to the southeast in the Caucuses
reached by elements of Army Group A.
E. On 4 November, Hitler suspends all offensive operations in the Caucasus.
IV. Don Front. Rokossovsky’s Fourth Kotluban Counterstoke (Offensive) 19-26 October.
Visual: Fourth Kotluban Offensive, 19-26 October 1942
A. During the second week of October, Stalin ordered Rokossovsky’s Don Front north of
Stalingrad to conduct the Fourth Kotluban Offensive to help relieve the pressure of the 62nd
Army. The problem was that Stalin did not give Rokossovsky adequate time to prepare.
B. The Front had recently received four fresh rifle divisions from the Stavka
reserves and possessed three more or less full-strength tank brigades (53 tanks in each brigade)
to conduct the offensive. The attack, however, was targeted against the very strong defenses of
the XIV Panzer Corps northwest of Orlovka which consisted of a panzer and two motorized
divisions.
C. Rokossovsky did not have adequate time to analyze the German defenses and
plan the attack due to Stalin’s pressure to begin the attack as quickly as possible even though the
Front was to attack into two German motorized and one panzer divisions.
D. On 19 October, the Don Front’s 24th and 66th Armies launched their attacks
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against the Sixth Army's northern flank once again in the vicinity of Kotluban. The results were
predictable. After several days of fighting, Rokossovsky's offensive failed to achieve much other
than to tie down any German troops which Paulus might have been tempted to glean for
operations in the city. By 26 October, all Soviet gains were erased and the XIV Corps returned
the front line to its original locations.
V. Stalingrad Front.
A. Meanwhile, Eremenko, the Stalingrad Front commander, launched another offensive
south of Stalingrad (which was intended to be a complimentary assault to Rokossovsky’s
Kotluban effort) with Shumilov’s 64th Army against the IV Panzer Corps in the Beketovka area
in an attempt to draw forces away from the factory district and give Chuikov some breathing
space.
B. The attack went in against the German 371st Infantry Division but, but as with the
attack farther north, failed to make any appreciable dent in the line, nor did Paulus pull any
troops away from the LI Corps. While Shumilov’s efforts failed to accomplish much, the
approaching exhaustion of Seydlitz’s divisions was actually a more important factor in
stabilizing Chuikov’s situation.
Visual: Stalingrad, Soviet Build Up for URANUS, 29 October 1942
VI. Southwestern Front/Army Group B. On 29 October, Dumitrescu, commander of the
Third Romanian Army, reported to Army Group B his concerns of a Soviet build up to his front
in the Serafimovich and Kletskaia bridgeheads and continued to request reinforcements.
Description (Tactical).
I. Strength, Dispositions, and Plans in the area of the Barrikady and Red October
Factories.
Visual: Attacks on the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Situation 22 October 1942
A. German Strength, Dispositions, and Plans.
1. Since the weather was soon slated to clear, and the distractive Soviet
counterattacks north and south of the city were culminating, Paulus scheduled the next major
German attack in the factory region for 23 October. This attack was planned to seize both the
Red October and Barrikady Factories. The final objective for both efforts was, of course, the
west bank of the Volga River.
2. 79th Infantry Division.
a. On its arrival on 18 October, Paulus turned over control of the newly
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arrived 79th Infantry Division to Seydlitz’s LI Corps for the impending operation.
b. The 79th temporarily consisted of only two regiments, the 208th and
212th Infantry. The third unit, the 226th Infantry, was employed elsewhere and would not be
available until late October.
c. Instead of replacing the 71st Infantry Division, Seydlitz now ordered
the 79th to enter line between the 14th Panzer and 100th Jäger Divisions and take over the
section of front immediately facing the Red October Factory. Scherwin’s relatively fresh division
would thus constitute the main effort for the 23 October attack. It would attack to seize the Red
October.
Visual: Attacks on the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Plan for 23 October 1942
3. To bolster the 79th Division’s chances, Seydlitz attached the 100th Division's
54th Jäger Regiment as the 79th's third regiment for the attack. He also provided Schwerin 7
tanks from the 24th Panzer Division.
4. Schwerin formed his division into three kampfgruppes:
i. 54th Jäger Regiment. The now battalion-size (due to casualties)
54th Jäger Regiment was reinforced with the seven tanks from the 24th Panzer Division to
bolster its strength. It was assigned the task of seizing Halls 1 and 2 at the north end of the Red
October.
ii. In the center, the 208th Infantry kampfgruppe, reinforced with
a few assault guns and a pioneer company, was to capture Halls 3-7.
iii. The final kampfgruppe, which was based on the 212th Infantry,
also reinforced with assault guns and elements of the division’s 179th Reconnaissance and 179th
Antitank Battalions, was given the mission to capture Halls 8-10 within the factory complex.
5. 14th Panzer Division.
a. The 14th Panzer Division was designated was to attack to seize the
Bread Factory. It also formed three kampfgruppes based on the 64th Motorcycle Battalion, and
the 103rd and 108th Panzer Grenadier Regiments. Each kampfgruppe was supported by 12 tanks.
The kampfgruppes would attack to seize one of three objectives:
i. 108th Panzer Grenadier Kampgruppe. The 108th
kampfgruppe’s mission was to capture the Bread Factory.
ii. 64th Motorcycle kampfgruppe. The 64th Motorcycle
kampfgruppe’s mission was to capture the ravine between the Bread and Barrikady Factories.
iii. 103rd Panzer Grenadier Kampgruppe. The 103rd
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kampfgruppe’s mission was to seize a large, several story building south of the Bread Factory.
b. From there, the 14th Panzer Division would push down the ravine to
the Volga to split the 62nd Army yet again and isolate the Red October from the Barrikady
Factory.
6. Supporting Attacks. The supporting attacks would be carried out by the 305th
Infantry and 24th Panzer Divisions.
a. 305th Infantry Division. The 305th Infantry Division would focus its
efforts to finally reduce the remaining portions of the Barrikady Factory itself.
b. 24th Panzer Division. The 24th Panzer Division would support the
305th’s attack by fire from the north. Due to the 24th Panzer’s very weak condition, it would
attack only if there was a development which made the move feasible, such as a collapse of the
Soviet defenses to its front.
7. In total, the Germans were able to muster about 10,000 assault troops for this
attack along with about 60-70 tanks and assault guns.
B. Soviet Strength, Dispositions, and Plans.
1. Chuikov, bolstered somewhat by replacements over the previous four days,
faced this attack with almost 5,000 men in the vicinity of the Red October defenses and about
2,500 in the Barrikady area.
2. To the far right of Chuikov’s line, the hardy fighters of the 118th GRR held on
to their positions north of the Barrikady. The regiment had been fed some reinforcements but
was still down to less than 200 men.
3. Liudnikov’s 138th RD still held its positions in the eastern halls of the
Barrikady.
4. The 308th RD had retained most of the halls and buildings in the south part of
the Barrikady and extended to the ravine just south of the factory.
5. The remnants of the 95th RD were put back into the line and manned the
Bread Factory, part of the workers’ village to the south, and the Bread Factory ravine to the east.
6. The 193rd RD held the part of the workers’ village with the 95th RD and the
northern buildings of the Red October Factory.
7. The 39th GRD held the rest of the Red October Factory.
8. No more than two or three tanks remained in the 84th Tank Brigade.
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C. 23 October Attack.
1. The German attack on 23 October began at 0100 with a series of small assault
groups attacking Soviet positions in the gullies and ravines northeast of the Barrikady Factory by
the panzer grenadiers of the 24th Panzer Division. These assaults were largely defeated by the
Soviets.
2. The main German assault began at 0700 with the usual wave of Stuka dive-
bombing attacks, followed by an hour-long artillery, mortar, and nebelwerfer bombardment. The
various kampfgruppes jumped off at 0810.
3. 305th Infantry Division.
a. In the north, the 576th and 577th kampfgruppes of the 305th Infantry
Division made essentially no headway against the regiments of the 138th RD defending the
southern halls of the Barrikady Factory despite the direct fire support from the 24th Panzer
Division and the combined indirect fire from the artillery of both divisions. In fact, a
counterattack by the 138th succeeded in retaking Hall 4 which had been captured by the
Germans in a preceding attack.
b. The 578th Infantry achieved better success by capturing a number of
halls and outbuildings in the southern half of the complex from the 308th RD.
4. 14th Panzer Division. In the center, the 14th Panzer Division also made little,
although some, progress.
a. The 64th and 108th kampfgruppes did succeed in crossing the railroad
and gaining a foothold in the Bread Factory but that is as far as they went.
b. The 103rd kampfgruppe drove several blocks south into a workers
village toward the multi-story building that was its objective. However, the failure of the 54th
Jäger Regiment to even reach its initial objective, a railroad bridge just northwest of the Red
October Factory, caused the 103rd to halt its movement due to fears of a Soviet attack into its
right flank.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator descend to a point just to the west of
the railroad bridge in the 54th Jäger Regiment’s sector. Move to the vicinity of the bridge and
point out that along this line would have been a long line of railroad cars functioning as an
obstacle across the 79th Division’s front.
5. 79th Infantry Division.
a. The 54th Jäger Regiment’s inability to move the 895th RR of the
193rd RD also posed a similar problem for the rest of the 79th Infantry Division. All three 79th
Division kampfgruppes jumped off at 0810 but the 54th immediately stalled against its
opponents defending in the area of a railroad bridge.
85
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator move southwest through the
worker’s huts along the west side of the railroad until reaching the area of the 208th Infantry
Regiment’s sector. Face southeast and move toward the Red October Factory until reaching the
east edge of the “Green Belt” overlooking the factory.
b. On the Jägers’ immediate right, the 208th kampfgruppe, and the 212th
beyond it, crossed the railroad west of the factory at about 0930 and continued their impressive
drive against relatively light opposition. Both gained access to the factory grounds by 1100 but
by then the Soviet resistance began to stiffen.
c. To complicate matters for the German attack, the Soviet defenders
were able to bring significant direct fire to bear from the Bannyi Ravine in the south into the
right flank of the 79th Division’s penetration. Forward observers high up on Mamaev Kurgan
also brought in effective indirect fires onto the attacking troops.
Visual: Attack on Red October Factory, 23 October 1942
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator continue movement southwest
through the factory, past Halls 5, 6, and 7 to the west bank of the Volga.
d. Nevertheless, the 208th was able to seize Hall 6 by 1230
and Halls 5 and 5a an hour later. Two companies of the regiment reach the banks of the Volga
east of Hall 7 at about 1615.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator ascend to provide an overview of the
factory complex (north to the top of the screen).
e. During the same timeframe the 212th battled for Halls 8a, 8, and 9
taking the latter two by 1600, but failing to seize 8a. Elements of the 212th were also able to
reach the banks of the Volga as its fighting centered on Hall 10.
f. The regimental reserve was sent in to bolster the troops at the Volga
and attempt to widen the penetration there, but eventually all the troops there were pulled back to
the vicinity of the main factory buildings because they were too few in number to hold the
position.
Visual: Attacks on the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Situation, 2100, 23 October 1942
g. By dark, the 79th Division had driven a significant wedge into the Red
October Factory but had failed to achieve a separation between the 39th GRD and the 193rd RD.
Moreover, the 54th Jäger Regiment’s position created two long flanks that the 79th Infantry and
14th Panzer Divisions found difficult to secure due to the losses sustained during the day’s
fighting. The 79th alone suffered 447 casualties that could not be replaced.
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h. In short, none of the German objectives for the day were fully
achieved.
6. Chuikov’s position meanwhile continued to remain precarious.
a. His report for the day indicated he had suffered 60 percent losses (or
4500 of about 7500 men, which ostensibly meant he now possessed only about 3,000 men
remaining west of the Volga).
b. He also reported that he had no reserves and urged Eremenko to
provide him with as much artillery and rocket support as he could for the morrow’s battle which
was sure to come.
c. Despite his losses, however, Chuikov indicated that he was still able to
man a more or less contiguous front for the moment.
D. 24 October.
1. The Plan. At 1855 on the 23rd, Paulus ordered Seydlitz to continue the attack
against the same objectives at dawn the next day. He also gave Seydlitz a “be prepared” order to
commit another battalion attached from the 100th Infantry Division to attack on the 79th
Division’s left flank northward to reduce the large salient between that division and the 14th
Panzer Division.
a. 305th Infantry Division. Oppenländer’s 305th Division would once
again attack the Barrikady. Oppenländer initially objected to making any further attacks against
the factory due to his division’s weakened state. He now possessed, at best, about 1,200 men
with which to make the effort. Seydlitz overruled him, however, and directed the 305th to jump
off as directed, if for no other reason than to protect the 14th Panzer’s left flank.
b. 14th Panzer Division. Heim’s 14th Panzer Division would
continue the attack to take the Bread Factory and southward to link up with the thrust coming
north to pinch off the salient.
c. 79th Infantry Division.
i. Schwerin directed the 79th Division’s main effort for 24 October
against the massive Hall 4 (which the Soviets referred to as the “Martenovskii Shop” and by the
Germans as the “Martinsofenhalle”). The structure was defended by the 120th GRR of the 39th
GRD and was the main Soviet defense position within the Red October Factory complex.
ii. The 79th Division’s main effort, the 208th kampfgruppe
reinforced by the 179th Pioneer Battalion, would attack from Halls 3, 6, and 7 to seize Hall 4.
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iii. The 212th kampfgruppe would conduct a defense of the rest of
the factory against a possible 39th GRD counterattack on the objective hall.
iv. Once the Martenovskii Shop fell, the 208th would conduct a
joint attack on Halls 1 and 2 with the 54th Jäger kampfgruppe to capture those structures as well.
Ostensibly, the latter assaults would help erase the salient to the north.
Visual: Attacks on the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Attack, 24 October 1942
2. The Attack.
a. 79th Infantry Division.
i. Operations for 24 October began at 0300 when the 212th
Infantry began efforts to clear out a small pocket of resistance remaining in Hall 5a, the Red
October Factory’s administrative building. By midmorning, that task was finished and the
assaults began on the Martenovskii Shop.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator descend to Hall 3. Move to the north
end of Hall 4 (Martinovskii Shop) and enter the building at that end. Move about halfway into
the hall and halt briefly. Then move out of the building to the north. Move southeast past Halls 1
and 2 and halt near the bluff along the Volga River. Face south in the direction of the Soviet
counterattack through the small collection of worker’s huts.
ii. From that point forward, the 208th Infantry struggled to take its
assigned objectives for the rest of the day. By dark, the 208th had succeeded in occupying about
half of Hall 4 and the southern ends of Halls 1 and 2. Elements of the 208th briefly penetrated
once again to the Volga, but a counterattack by the 39th GRD’s 117th RR successfully erased the
penetration.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator ascend to provide an overview of the
Red October and Barrikady Factory complexes (north to the top of the screen).
iii. To the south, the 212th finally seized Hall 8a but that was it.
That kampfgruppe spent the rest of the day fending off counterattacks from the 39th GRD.
iv. To the north, the 54th Jäger Regiment failed to make any
headway at the bridge.
b. 14th Panzer Division. The 14th Panzer Division’s efforts succeeded in
pushing slightly further into the Bread Factory and a deeper drive reached the ravine to the
southeast.
i. During the fighting at the ravine, elements of the 103rd
kampfgruppe initially overran Gurt’ev’s 308th Division headquarters. Gurt’ev was driven from
his hole and forced to defend from some rubble at the southwest corner of the Barrikady Factory
grounds with the few remaining members of his staff. Learning of Gur’ev’s predicament,
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Chuikov ordered Smekhotvorov, commander of the 193rd RD, to rescue the beleaguered general.
Smekhotvorov gathered ten men with submachine guns and personally led a successful rescue
effort to save Gurt’ev. Other troops soon forced the 103rd to withdraw and erased that unit’s
gains for the day.
ii. By dark, the 14th Panzer Division was down to only 750
assault troops remaining in its ranks. Only 40 able men were left in the ranks of the 103rd
Kampfgruppe.
c. 305th Infantry Division. In the north, as Oppenländer expected, the
305th Division’s operations in the Barrikady Factory experienced little progress as well. The one
positive event was the capture of the Main Hall and Hall 4 at about 1630 after several attacks and
counterattacks during the day.
d. Soviet Results.
i. In the fighting on 24 October, Chuikov reported 356 soldiers
killed in action. Statistically, that meant he had likely lost about three times that number in
wounded or a total of about another 1,000 men.
ii. By now the 37th GRD, 193rd RD, and 308th RD were down to
only a few hundred men between the three divisions and he declared them combat ineffective.
Virtually all the original soldiers in those three units were gone and only replacements remained.
iii. The 39th GRD and 138th RD which had not been in the fight
as long as the others, were faring much better with about 2,500 men each.
3. The reason for the increased numbers on the Soviet side by this time was that
Eremenko, at Chuikov’s request, was steadily feeding Chuikov packets of replacements (referred
to as “march battalions” and “march companies”) across the Volga rather than organized units.
The army commander felt he could more easily integrate these men into other units where they
were most needed and for the time being he chose to bolster the two divisions with the greatest
responsibility for defending the two factories.
E. 25 October
1. The Plan. Paulus’s orders to Seydlitz for 25 October were essentially repeat of
those for the 24th:
a. The 389th Infantry and 24th Panzer Divisions were to conduct routine
patrolling and limited assaults in their areas and provide direct and indirect fire support to the
main attacks when and where possible.
b. The 79th, 14th Panzer, and 305th Infantry Divisions were to continue
to press on for the Volga and eliminate any Soviet resistance in between.
c. Paulus also ordered Hube and the XIV Panzer Corps to finish off any
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resistance in Spartanovka and Rynok as well.
2. The Attack. As on the 24th, the LI Corps’ efforts against the three key factory
locations achieved marginal results at best.
Visual: Orientation, Martenovskii Shop, Red October Factory (Note: Direction of “North”)
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator descend to the northwest end of Hall
4 (Martenovskii Shop) and move into the building. Halt in the main part of the hall near the
furnaces and drainage trough/culvert.
a. Martenovskii Shop (Hall 4).
i. In the Red October area, the major event was Kampfgruppe
208’s assault against the Martenovskii Shop (Hall 4) while Kampfgruppe 212 initially held in
place and supported.
ii. Initially, the assault seemed to go well. The German infantry
was able to move further into the hall from the west and fought their way about halfway into the
building.
iii. Many of the troops of the 120th RR were hidden in a drainage
culvert that ran through the building, as well as in the large ovens in the rear of the building. At
an opportune time, the Soviet troops emerged from their hiding places and counterattacked and
the troops of the 208th were driven entirely from the building.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator ascend to provide an overview of the
Red October and Barrikady Factory complexes (north to the top of the screen).
Visual: Attacks on the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Attack, 25 October 1942
iv. A supporting attack from Kampfgruppe 212 from the south was
also driven back. The day’s success at Red October was limited to the recapture of all of Halls 1
and 2 to the north.
b. Bread Factory. At the Bread Factory, the motorcycle troops of
Kampfgruppe 64 succeeded in capturing a second building in that small complex but only after
several failed efforts.
c. Barrikady Factory. The attacks of the 103rd and 108th Kampfgruppes
from the 305th Division succeeded in clearing troops from the 138th RD away from the
northeast corner of the Barrikady Factory. At this point, Kampfgruppe 103 consisted of only 20
men and all its company commanders had been killed or wounded.
Visual: XIV Panzer Corps Attack, 25 October 1942
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d. Spartanovka–Rynok. The primary German success of the day came in
the XIV Panzer Corps’ sector up north.
i. The 94th Infantry Division had been reinforced with the return
of its relatively healthy 274th Regiment on 21 October which was now in a position to help with
the drive on Spartanovka on the 25th.
ii. The combined attacks by the 94th Infantry and 16th Panzer
Divisions succeeded in pushing deep into both Spartanovka and Rynok.
iii. By the end of the day, the main defensive positions held by
Group Gorokhov were backed into in the deep ravines located between the two towns.
Visual: Attacks on the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Operations, 26 October-2
November 1942
F. 26 October-2 November. Over the next 8 days, the attacks against the factories were
necessarily small affairs as each side dwindled in available manpower. A few German efforts
accomplished some small results and Chuikov was also to achieve a number of minor feats as
well.
1. For example, on 26 October, the remaining elements of the 14th Panzer
Division’s assault troops were combined in to a single kampfgruppe for an attack to complete the
seizure of the Bread Factory. In fact, the effort not only succeeded in that task, but drove all the
way through to the Volga to the east. The Soviets failed to drive them from the banks and now
the Germans could directly threaten the Central (and last) Landing Stage.
2. The following day, 27 October, the 226th Regiment finally returned to the
79th Division and took up a position facing the salient in the Soviet line.
3. On the Soviet side that same day (27 October), a counterattack scraped
together by Chuikov succeeded in pushing the panzer grenadiers away from the Landing Stage
and the Volga. This action allowed Eremenko to begin sending over the fresh 45th RD to
reinforce Chuikov’s beleaguered army. Given the tactical situation, however, it would take 3
days for the 45th to fully cross over.
4. On the 28th, the 305th Division made a small gain at the Barrikady Factory
With the 226th Regiment now back, the 79th Division captured most of the Red October as well.
The 10th Regiment of the 45th RD arrived at the Landing Stage and went into the defense there.
5. On 29 October, the 305th took almost all of the remaining rest of the
Barrikady Factory halls though the ground between the factory and the Volga River still lay in
Soviet hands.
6. By 30 October, the German offensive operations essentially ceased. The
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German weakness allowed the fresh troops of the 45th RD to counterattack at Red October and
retake most of the Martenovskii Shop (Hall 4).
7. The following day (31 October) attacks by the 39th GRD and 45th RD pushed
marginally farther into the Red October. The attack included several new T-34 tanks which
totally surprised the German defenders.
8. On 1 November, there are only probes and recons in the factory region. Up
north, however, an amphibious operation by the 300th RD at Latashanka north of Rynok was a
disaster. As the Russian division made its movement, the Germans detected the effort and sank
several boats killing, wounding, or capturing 900 men of the two Soviet battalions involved.
9. The next day (2 November), two partially reconstituted regiments of the 95th
RD arrived at the Landing Stage to further bolster Chuikov’s line. Meanwhile the remnants of
the 24th Panzer Division were pulled from the line north of the Barrikady Factory and the 389th
Infantry Division assumed those positions. The 24th Panzer was then moved to the 79th Division
sector and assumed control of Halls 8, 9, and 10 from the 212th Infantry and the 369th Croation
Infantry. The panzer division was moved to reinforce the depleted 79th Division for the
upcoming Operation HUBERTUS.
10. On 3 November another lull began, this one a week long. Both sides were
generally exhausted. Little fighting took place during the period and the front lines in the vicinity
of the two factories was relatively “quiet” for the next week.
Analysis (Strategic and Operational).
1. What is your assessment of the value of the continuing German operations in the Caucasus?
2. What is your assessment of the value of the continuing Soviet attacks in the Kotluban region?
Analysis (Tactical).
1. The Sixth Army is fast approaching its culminating point in terms of troops and other
resources. What actions can commanders take to anticipate such a point? What can they do to
avoiding reaching that stage particularly in terms of urban operations?
2. Urban warfare is high-tempo, stressful, and violent, resulting in higher casualties and higher
soldier “burn-out.” What can commanders do to minimize these effects?
3. What actions should units take to prepare for/train on in order to more readily adapt
themselves for urban operations (task organizing, enabler integration, equipping beyond MTOE
authorizations, others?)?
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4. At the individual level, what are some of the considerations leaders need to take into account
regarding the soldier’s load during urban operations?
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Stand 13
Operation HUBERTUS and Liudnikov’s Island
11-18 November
Visuals for this stand.
13-1: Stalingrad, Operations at the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Situation, 10
November 1942
13-2: Stalingrad, Operations HUBERTUS, Movement of the Pioneer Battalions
13-3: Stalingrad, Operations HUBERTUS, Personnel Strength of the Pioneer Battalions
13-4: Stalingrad, Operations at the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Plan for Operation
HUBERTUS, 11 November 1942
13-5: Operations at the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Operation HUBERTUS, Dark, 11
November 1942
13-6: Stalingrad, Attack on the Commissar’s House, 13 November 1942
13-7: Operations at the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Operation HUBERTUS, 14-18
November 1942
Virtual Movement Directions: Start with the terrain in the overhead view (to match the visual)
over the Red October and Barrikady Factories.
Orientation. Visual: Operations at the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Situation, 10
November 1942
Starting in the north, point out the following key terrain features (Directions: you can have the
computer operator zoom down lower to get a closer look at any or all of these features as you
point them out).
Between the Barrikady Factory and the “Tennis Racket.”
–Barrikady Factory
–Liudnikov’s CP
–Liudnikov’s Island
–Commissar’s House
–The Pharmacy (Apothecary)
–Red October Factory
–Central Landing Stage
Description (Strategic).
I. Strategic Planning and Diplomacy.
A. Allied (No major developments).
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B. Axis. On 11 November, Germans and Italians invade unoccupied Vichy France.
II. Europe.
A. North Africa and Mediterranean.
1. 11 November: Convoys reach Malta from Alexandria and the siege is lifted.
2. 13 November: The British Eighth Army recaptures Tobruk.
B. North Atlantic, Arctic Convoys, and Strategic Bombing (No major developments).
III. Pacific. (No major developments).
Description (Operational).
I. Overview.
A. Soviet Operational Plans and Situation, 3-11 November. This topic will be
covered in detail in Stand 14.
B. German Operational Plans and Situation, 3-11 November. This topic will be
covered in detail in Stand 14.
1. Army Group A. On November 15, elements of Army Group A reach
Ordzhonikidze in the Caucasus.
2. Army Group B. Intelligence builds of a possible Soviet offensive (URANUS)
in the Army Group B area of operations as well as in the Army Group Center AO (MARS). The
build-up of Soviet forces in and near the Serafimovich and Kletskaia bridgeheads northwest of
Stalingrad and in the Sarpa Lakes/Beketovka bridgehead region south of the city are interpreted
to be preparatory to a limited Soviet attack designed to interfere with Sixth Army supply lines.
Little action is taken to reinforce either of the two Romanian armies holding those fronts.
3. Sixth Army.
a. From 3 to 10 November, very little fighting took place in the vicinity
of the Red October and Barrikady Factories. Instead, Paulus and Seydlitz began to jockey units
to conduct the next offensive.
b. The Weather and the Frozen Volga. One thing that Paulus had in his
favor, at least temporarily, was the weather. As the weather turned colder, ice flows began to
choke the Volga making it more difficult for Chuikov to reinforce and resupply the 62nd Army.
During the lull in fighting during 3-10 November, the sounds of the ice flows grinding and
banging together on the river told Paulus that Chuikov would soon be cut off from resupply
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totally until the Volga was fully frozen (which Chuikov clearly understood as well). The freezing
of the Volga was expected to be complete by late November or early December.
c. Where to Get Assault Troops? The major challenge, however, was
where to find the troops to finish off Chuikov’s remaining forces and seize the remainder of
Stalingrad before the final freeze? By 3 November, Paulus realized that both the XIV Panzer and
LI Corps had culminated in terms of their capabilities to conduct any further major attacks. The
combat divisions in Stalingrad were too ground down to be able to mount anything larger than a
battalion attack, and that only by shifting remnants around and consolidating them. Even then,
such attacks were often fortunate to capture a single building, much less the larger areas that still
remained under Soviet control. Paulus and the staff of Army Group B scrounged around for
additional troops with which to finish off the 62nd Army.
d. Paulus and Richthofen Meet. On 1 November Paulus and Richthofen
met at the Fliegerkorps VIII advanced base at Razgulyayenka Rail Station to discuss Luftwaffe
support to the Sixth Army.
e. After the meeting, without Paulus’ knowledge, Richthofen sent a
message to an acquaintance on Hitler’s staff at the Wolf’s Lair to recommend the use of assault
pioneer battalions from more lightly engaged divisions in Army Group B to reinforce Sixth
Army’s final push to take Stalingrad.
f. The proposal was soon presented to Hitler who liked the idea and the
following day Der Führer officially approved the transfer of 5 assault pioneer battalions to
reinforce Sixth Army. These units became the basis of Operation HUBERTUS as finally
adopted.
IV. Initial Planning for Operation HUBERTUS.
A. The Initial Attack Plan. Paulus’ initial plan for Operation HUBERTUS called for the
seizure of the Lazur Chemical Factory located in the Tennis Racket.
B. The Objective: Cut 62nd Army in Half. Paulus and his staff believed that if the
chemical factory could be seized and the Volga reached at the Tennis racket, the 62nd Army
would once again be cut in half and therefore would make the small enclaves remaining in the
vicinity of the two factories irrelevant.
C. Use Assault Pioneer Battalions. After looking over several reinforcement options
with the staff of Army Group B, none of which were considered feasible, MG Georg von
Sodenstern, the Army Group B Chief of Staff suggested using pioneer battalions as assault
troops (an idea Sodenstern apparently thought originated with Hitler at the Wolf’s Lair). Paulus
agreed to the idea but knew it would take several days to assemble the battalions where they
were needed.
D. Planning for the Pioneer Battalions. The initial plan called for the 100th Jäger
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Division, which now occupied the front in the chemical factory sector, to be reinforced with the
five engineer battalions. With an additional infantry regiment attached, the 100th would
constitute the main effort. The 79th Infantry Division would conduct a supporting attack on the
left. Sixth Army issued the initial order for HUBERTUS late on 3 November. The date was set
for 10 November.
E. Hitler Intervenes. On 5 November a complication arose when Hitler took issue with
the idea that the Lazur Factory area should be the focus of the renewed offensive. After a series
of consultations back and forth between Sixth Army, Army Group B, and the OKW, Hitler
overruled his subordinate commanders on 7 November and directed that the Red October and
Barrikady Factories remain the focus of the Sixth Army’s impending efforts. Only after those
positions fell would der Führer permit an attack on the chemical factory.
Visual: Operations HUBERTUS, Movement of the Pioneer Battalions
F. Movement of the Pioneer Battalions.
1. Distance. Part of the reason for the delay in the beginning of Operation
HUBERTUS until 11 November was the distance that each pioneer battalion had to travel to get
to Stalingrad. These battalions, for the most part, belonged to divisions outside of the Sixth
Army. The farthest unit was the 336th Pioneer Battalion which was 1300 kilometers (800 miles)
away by road. The units and their locations were as follows:
a. 45th Pioneer Battalion, 604th Pioneer Regiment, Millerovo
b. 50th Pioneer Battalion, 22nd Panzer Division, Chertkovo
c. 162nd Pioneer Battalion, 62nd Infantry Division, Kazanskaia
d. 294th Pioneer Battalion, 294th Infantry Division, near Rossosh
e. 336th Pioneer Battalion, 336th Infantry Division, Nikolayevka
2. Transportation. In addition to the distance, the available transportation assets were
scarce.
a. The initial plan was to send the two farthest battalions by rail, but due to
shortages of rail cars and crowded schedules, the Luftwaffe was directed to use precious cargo
space on their already overburdened Ju-52 transport fleet to fly the units to Pitomnik Airfield
where they arrived on 6 November.
b. The other three battalions were sent by truck over the notoriously poor Russian
roads, now turning to mush under rain and snow flurries. Nevertheless, all five battalions had
arrived in Stalingrad by 9 November.
Visual: Operations HUBERTUS, Personnel Strength of the Pioneer Battalions
97
3. Strength. Though these battalions were well-trained in infantry assault tactics, they
were hardly “fresh” units. At full strength, the battalions would have numbered about 840 men,
or about 4,200 troops. On arrival, the battalions’ respective strengths were:
a. 45th Pioneer Battalion, strength 255
b. 50th Pioneer Battalion, strength 459
c. 162nd Pioneer Battalion, strength 309
d. 294th Pioneer Battalion, strength 306
e. 336th Pioneer Battalion, strength 382
4. The total strength of all five pioneer battalions was only 1,711 officers and men,
or about half the strength of a single full-strength German infantry regiment. This was the best
solution Hitler could muster with his mighty German war machine. On the shoulders of these
engineers was pinned the hope of the final downfall of Stalingrad.
Description (Tactical).
I. Strength, Dispositions, and Plans in the area of the Barrikady and Red October
Factories.
Visual: Operations at the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Plan for Operation HUBERTUS,
11 November 1942
A. German Strength, Dispositions, and Plans.
1. The new plan for Operation HUBERTUS called for the 305th Infantry
Division to be reinforced with three pioneer battalions and the 44th Sturm Kompanie (literally,
“Storm Company.” This was an ad hoc assault group formed from the elements of the 44th
Infantry Division and sent to Stalingrad at the same time as the pioneer battalions and for the
same purpose). Along with its own 305th Pioneer Battalion, the division was to attack to seize
the rest of the ground remaining between the front line at the Barrikady Factory and down to the
Volga.
2. The 389th Infantry Division, at the north end, would be reinforced with two
pioneer battalions and the 24th Sturmkompanie (formed from men of the 24th Panzer Division),
and with its own 389th Pioneer Battalion, would conduct a supporting attack to roll up the Soviet
right flank along the Volga. The effort was also intended to form a pincers movement with the
305th to pinch off and destroy Soviet forces between the two attacks.
3. Once the area around the Barrikady was eradicated of Soviet forces, the 79th
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Infantry Division, with its own 179th Pioneer Battalion, and reinforced with the 24th Panzer
Division’s 40th Pioneer Battalion, would attack to seize the rest of Red October and down to the
Volga. That attack was tentatively set to begin 15 November.
4. The tanks and kampfgruppes of the 14th and 24th Panzer Divisions, along
with the assault guns of the 244th and 245th Assault Gun Battalions, would be interspersed to
support the various attacks, primarily in the Red October area.
5. On 6 November the temperatures swiftly dropped causing a more rapid
freezing of the Volga. Chuikov anticipated that Paulus might use the degenerating weather
conditions to conduct a renewed offensive and pushed to get supplies and men over before the
next big attack. By 9 November, everything was almost ready for the German offensive to begin.
6. For the attack on the Barrikady Factory, the 305th and 389th Infantry
Divisions could muster only about 5,200 men for the attack including the reinforcing pioneer
battalions and sturm companies. The 79th Infantry Division possessed about half that strength for
the assault on Red October.
B. Soviet Strength, Dispositions, and Plans.
1. During the lull, Chuikov was in constant anticipation of the resumption of the
German attacks. He ordered his division commanders to make counterattacks when and where
possible to disrupt German plans, but few attacks were successful. The assaults primarily served
to further reduce the Soviet strength in the factory districts.
2. On 10 November, however, Chuikov, once again attempting to preempt the
imminent German Offensive, launched another spoiling attack at the Red October Factory.
Elements of the 112 GRR, 39th GRD successfully recaptured Hall 10 from the 24th Panzer
Division’s Kampgruppe Scheele. The Soviet attack itself did little to delay the German offensive,
but that building would now have to be retaken in the German attack the next day.
3. While the so–called “lull” persisted, Chuikov attempted to move replacements
over the freezing Volga as fast as possible, but the river conditions made such efforts extremely
problematic. Even though he was able to get some men over, casualties during the slackened
level of combat 1-11 November probably still exceeded the rate of replacements.
4. By the evening 10 November, Chuikov only possessed an estimated 2,400
men in the 5 divisions defending the two factory areas.
C. Operation HUBERTUS.
1. 11 November. Operation HUBERTUS began on 11 November began at 0340
with a heavy artillery and nebelwerfer counterbattery bombardment of the Soviet artillery
positions across the river. Fifteen minutes later, a series of German probing attacks began all
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across the front from the vicinity of Mamaev Kurgan to Rynok in an effort to disguise where the
main effort would fall.
Visual: Operations at the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Operation HUBERTUS, Dark,
11 November 1942
a. Attacks at Red October.
i. At Red October, Kampfgruppe Schwerin (composed of the 179th
Pioneer Battalion, 40th Pioneer Battalion, and elements of the 24th Panzer Division) attacked to
capture the Martenovskii Shop (Hall 4) and push to the Volga.
ii. The assault at the Martenovskii Shop began at 0400 and jumped off
from Hall 3. The assaults against the shop did not go well due to an undetected Soviet
reinforcement of the position. The German assault commander later surmised that the attack had
taken place just as the Soviets were preparing to make another assault of their own. After some
vicious close quarter fighting, the Germans were forced out of the hall once again.
iii. A similar effort by Kampfgruppe Scheele to retake Hall 10 captured
by the 112 GRR the previous day went significantly better. After a brief mortar barrage, the
Germans managed to sneak up on about 100 Russian defenders and surprise them. The Soviets
quickly abandoned the hall leaving it entirely to the Germans.
b. Main Attack at Barrikady.
i. Despite the efforts at the Red October, it was not long before Chuikov
determined that the big push was coming at the Barrikady Factory area. In the morning darkness,
the 305th Infantry Division kampfgruppes pushed eastward toward three main objectives: the
fuel depot (576th Grenadier Regiment objective), Houses 66 and 73 (577th Grenadier Regiment
objective), and the “Apothecary,” and “Commissar’s House” (578th Grenadier Regiment
objectives) (The Commissar’s House had, until recently, served as the headquarters of the 138th
RD).
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator descend to Hall 6e. Move generally
southeast to the ravine south of the fuel tanks. Move through the fuel tanks to the west bank of
the Volga. Turn northeast, pass through the next two small ravines and onto the high ground
along the bank there and halt next to Building 79.
ii. By 0900, the 576th Infantry Regiment, reinforced by the 294th Pioneer
Battalion, had reached the fuel depot and the Volga. The kampfgruppe then turned north and
began to clear about 300 meters along the river bluffs to link up with the 578th Infantry
Regiment.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator move to the Apothecary and face
toward the Index Finger Ravine.
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iii. The 578th Infantry Regiment, reinforced by the 50th Pioneer
Battalion, attacked in the center. The 578th captured the Apothecary well after the 576th
Regiment reached the Volga, but then continued to advance down the “Index Finger” ravine to
the Volga. On reaching the river, the regiment worked to widen the breach created by the 576th.
These breakthroughs now isolated Liudnikov’s 138th RD.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator reorient on the Commissar’s House.
iv. At the beginning of the attack, the 50th Pioneer Battalion attempted to
seize the Commissar’s House but found that position too heavily defended and difficult to enter
and were forced to retreat.
v. On the division left, the 577th Regiment supported by the 336th and
45th Pioneer Battalions attacked into the Barrikady apartment complex just east of the factory
itself. Due to the very stiff resistance encountered there, that attack made no headway
whatsoever.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator ascend to provide an overview of the
Barrikady Factory complex and the area of the breakthrough of the 546th Regiment (north to the
top of the screen).
vi. To the north, however, the kampgruppe of the 546th Regiment, 389th
Division, teamed with the 45th, 162nd, and 389th Pioneer Battalions succeeded in seizing the
largely open ground clear to the river. They too cleared the Volga’s western bank southward for
about 400 yards.
vii. The 138th RD was now cut off from the rest of the 62nd Army in an
area of about 300 by 400 meters. The encircled pocket which held the remnants of the 138th RD
would soon become known as “Liudnikov’s Island.”
2. 12 November. Though the initial attacks had succeeded once again to reach
the Volga, it failed to destroy the 138th RD and finish capturing the remaining Soviet forces in
the Red October Factory. On 12 November, the 95th RD made numerous counterattacks in the
fuel depot area in efforts to reestablish communications with the 138th RD, but the primary
result was additional casualties on both sides.
3. 13 November.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator move over and focus on the
Apothecary and Commissar’s House area from above.
a. Attack on the Commissar’s House.
h. The German attack on 13 November centered on the Commissar’s
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House. The area around the building was a superb killing zone, especially between the house and
the bank of the Volga. Major Josef A. Linden, the Sixth Army Engineer, explained why the area
was so difficult to attack:
There were isolated ruins here (in the vicinity of the Commissar’s House) that
had to be eliminated at all cost because of their flanking effect. Between these
ruins and the Volga was a flat undeveloped area that fell away with a steep drop
to the river bank. The Russians had built dug outs halfway up this cliff which were
protected by emplacements along the top edge of the cliff which could rake the
open ground in front of them with effective fire. They (the Russian defenders) also
received accurate fire support from the other bank of the Volga. An attack here
was therefore very difficult. (Glantz, Armageddon in Stalingrad, p. 663).
b. The 578th Infantry and 50th Pioneers began their assault at 0345 on the
13th. The kampfgruppe initially made multiple attempts to reach the building but were
successfully deflected by the Soviet defenders.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator descend to Building 71. Move to the
courtyard of the Commissar’s House and enter the building. Move upstairs and continue
movement to one of the western stairwells. Go to the basement.
c. Finally, at 1310, ten assault guns (of at least three were the new sIG-33B
vehicles with 150 mm guns) arrived and began to batter the second story of the building. Within
20 minutes, the German assault teams successfully entered the building via the main entrance in
a bold frontal attack. The fighting in the building became very bitter and at close quarters. The
Germans quickly charged up to the second story and it took the rest of the afternoon to fight from
there downward to root out the Russian defenders. The Pioneers blew holes in the floors and
lobbed grenades and satchel charges into the rooms below to kill and stun the Russians.
Virtual Movement Directions: Have the computer operator move out of the building and provide
an overview of the Barrikady Factory complex.
d. At one point smoke and a flame thrower was tried to flush them out, but
the defenders held in place. Communications between the German assault parties and the
regimental headquarters was lost by mid-day and it was almost dark when a runner arrived at the
Pharmacy to report to the 578th Grenadier Regiment’s commander that the building had been
taken along with two smaller outbuildings.
e. Several weak Soviet counterattacks by the 95th RD at the fuel depot that
day accomplished nothing of significance in that area. Liudnikov, from his bunker headquarters
dug in on the Volga bluffs, reported to Chuikov that evening that he was running out of food and
ammunition. Only a day’s supply remained and he had only 750 men remaining in Liudnikov’s
Island.
Visual: Operations at the Red October and Barrikady Factories, Operation HUBERTUS,
102
14-18 November 1942
4. 14 to 18 November. By now, both the Sixth and 62nd Armies were so
exhausted that over the next five days each could only conduct minor attacks and counterattacks.
Even the five newly arrived pioneer battalions were effectively ground down. Neither side made
any gains of great significance during this period:
a. 14 November: The 577th Infantry kampgruppe advanced about 100
meters east of the Commissar’s House.
b. 15 November: Only minor probes took place by both sides.
c. 16 November: Liudnikov’s 138th RD was now down to 500 men.
The Red Air Force conducted precarious resupply by air drops, but there was no significant
fighting.
d. 17 November: After a heavy artillery barrage, the 95th RD retook a
small part of the fuel depot with heavy casualties.
e. 18 November: The 578th Infantry, supported by two pioneer
battalions and a few tanks, push further into “Liudnikov’s Island” from the south near the
Transformer Hut. This attack represented the last significant advance of the Sixth Army in
Stalingrad before Operation URANUS.
Analysis (Strategic and Operational).
None.
Analysis (Tactical).
1. In retrospect, how feasible was it for the Sixth Army to capture Stalingrad? Consider the US
Army’s doctrine of encircling and isolating a city to reduce and capture it.
2. Were their other options available to reinforce Paulus?
3. What is your assessment of the idea to use engineer troops to be the main assault force in
operations like that of HUBERTUS?
4. What are the effects of and considerations for, multi-domain combat (such as subterranean and
tall building operations) in a battle such as Stalingrad?
5. How can multi-domain combat operations be conducted to mask operations and counter
traditional military advantages in equipment and firepower?
103
Stand 14
Operation URANUS
19-25 November
Visuals for this stand.
14-1: Stalingrad, Operation URANUS, Situation, 18 November 1942
14-2: Eastern Front, Operation URANUS, Concept, 19-30 November 1942
14-3: Eastern Front, Operation URANUS, The Plan, 19-30 November 1942
14-4: Eastern Front, Operation MARS, Concept, 25 November-21 December 1942
14-5: Eastern Front, Operation SATURN, Concept, November 1942
14-6: Situation Eastern Front, 18 November 1942
14-7: Stalingrad, Operation URANUS, Execution, 19-21 November 1942
14-8: Stalingrad, Operation URANUS, Execution, 21-24 November 1942
14-9: Stalingrad, Operation URANUS, Execution, 25-30 November 1942
14-10: Eastern Front, Operation SATURN, The Original Plan, 2 December 1942
Directions.
None.
Orientation.
Visual: Stalingrad, Operation URANUS, Situation, 18 November 1942
Description (Strategic).
I. Strategic Planning and Diplomacy.
A. Allied. No major developments.
B. Axis. No major developments.
II. Europe.
A. North Africa and Mediterranean.
1. 20 November: The Allies took Benghazi, Libya; the Afrika Korps continued
its retreat westward.
2. 29 November: The Allied offensive in Tunisia met with minimal success.
104
B. North Atlantic, Arctic Convoys, and Strategic Bombing. No major developments.
III. Pacific. No major developments.
Description (Operational).
I. Caucasus. No major developments.
II. Stavka Plans to Take the Offensive.
A. Development of Early Plans. Before discussing the execution of Operation
URANUS, it is useful at this point to review the genesis and development of the plan.
1. On 12 September, Zhukov returned to Moscow after visiting the fronts in the
Stalingrad area and met with Stalin and Vasilevsky. In a lull in the meeting, Stalin overhead
Zhukov and Vasilevsky discussing “another solution” to the Stalingrad problem. Stalin wanted to
know what “another solution” meant and had the two generals more fully develop their concept
and brief him the following day. This second meeting was not only the genesis of URANUS, but
also a series of major Soviet counteroffensives designed to relieve Stalingrad, but also to destroy
Army Group B in the north and trap Army Group A in the Caucasus.
Visual: Eastern Front, Operation URANUS, Concept, 19-30 November 1942
2. On 13 September Zhukov and Vasilevsky briefed Stalin on the concept to
eliminate the German Sixth Army enclave at Stalingrad. Their brief provided to Stalin their
conclusions that:
a. The Germans now had, or would soon have, insufficient forces to achieve
their strategic goals in Russia.
b. Both Army Groups A and B were overextended.
c. Army Group B had exposed and weak flanks.
d. That it would soon be possible to encircle and trap the Sixth Army at
Stalingrad.
Visual: Stalingrad, Operation URANUS, The Plan, 19 November 1942
3. Zhukov and Vasilevsky then laid out their basic concept for what would become
Operation URANUS. The plan called for:
a. Secretly assembling strong forces behind the Serafimovich and
Kletskaia bridgeheads.
105
b. Using the Serafimovich and Kletskaia bridgeheads as a springboard to
penetrate deep into the Sixth Army’s and Fourth Panzer Army’s rear areas.
c. Using Southeastern Front to do the same through the Sarpa Lakes
region.
d. The rapid penetration/destruction of the weak and less well-trained 3rd
and 4th Romanian Armies posted on the Sixth Army’s flanks to enable the encirclement of the forces
near and in Stalingrad. This was the critical piece of the plan.
e. Attacking forces had to be strong enough to prevent the breakout of
the Sixth Army to the west and efforts by Army Group B to attack east to re-establish communications
with the Sixth Army.
f. The 62nd Army in Stalingrad would continue to be fed only enough
forces to prevent the city’s fall and keep the Germans focused on the capture of the city.
4. Stalin asked, “Can we assemble enough forces to make this feasible?” Zhukov
replied, “Yes, but it will take 45 days.”
5. Stalin was not initially warm to Zhukov’s and Vasilevsky’s plan, but he soon
changed his mind. On 26 September he approved two counteroffensives which became
Operations URANUS and MARS and directed them to be undertaken. These would eventually
be followed by two additional offensives, JUPITER, and SATURN. Zhukov was designated to
take charge of MARS and JUPITER; Vasilevsky was designated to take charge of URANUS and
SATURN.
Visual: Eastern Front, Operation MARS, Concept, 25 November-21 December 1942
a. Operation MARS. MARS was designed to engage German Army Group
Center in an effort to inflict as much damage as possible. Originally scheduled to begin in late
October, MARS called for multiple, coordinated thrusts from all sides of the Rzhev salient to
destroy the Ninth German Army which held the salient. The offensive was also intended to tie
down German units and prevent them from being moved south to reinforce Army Group B. Due
to various events which caused delays, the offensive did not actually begin until 25 November,
six days after the start of URANUS.
b. Operation JUPITER. Operation JUPITER was to follow Operation MARS
and was to commence two to three weeks later in January 1943. The Western Front would attack
along the Moscow-Vyazma highway axis, link up with the victorious MARS force, and envelop
and destroy all German forces east of Smolensk. Once resistance around Vyazma was
neutralized, Soviet forces would then drive deep into the rear of Army Group Center to force its
withdrawal or destruction. The enormous failure of Operation MARS ensured JUPITER never
took place.
Visual: Eastern Front, Operation SATURN, Concept
106
c. Operation SATURN. SATURN was the follow-on operation to URANUS. It
was designed to destroy Army Group B and isolate Army Group A south of Rostov. This
operation was to be launched after it was determined what success was gained by URANUS. The
size and scope of SATURN would later be affected by the German effort to relieve Stalingrad,
known as Operation Winter Storm (WINTERGEWITTER).
d. Ultimately, the Soviet focus of these operations was not victory at Stalingrad,
but the much larger and ambitious objective of the destruction of entire German Army Groups.
Visual: Situation Eastern Front, 18 November 1942
6. Soviet reorganization. Part of the preparation for these major offensives and for
URANUS in particular, was the previously mentioned 28 September reorganization of the Soviet
Front commands in the Stalingrad region discussed earlier.
7. In addition to the renaming of the Don and Stalingrad Fronts in September,
the Southwestern Front (previously inactivated on 12 July 1942) was secretly reactivated 22
October 1942 with LTG Nicolai F. Vatutin as the commander and largely assembled behind the
Serafimovich bridgehead facing the Third Romanian Army to the northwest of the Don Front.
8. Maskirovka. The reorganization and redesignation of fronts was an aspect of the
Soviet concept of Maskirovka which used camouflage, disinformation, and deception to conceal
the timing and location of the main attack.
a. To achieve the level of surprise needed, the Soviets had to move over
1,000,000 men, 13,500 artillery pieces, and almost 900 tanks.
b. Engineers had to build and camouflage numerous bridges.
c. In some sectors, trains with troops, guns, and supplies passed every 12
minutes.
d. Movement was done at night. Troops and equipment would go into hide
positions and under camouflage during daylight hours.
e. Soviet tactical airpower was predominantly used to counter German aerial
reconnaissance efforts especially over assembly areas.
f. Soviet commands ordered radio listening silence and operated false nets
with routine but fake message traffic to reassure German intelligence.
9. Eremenko, Rokossovsky, and Vatutin were informed about URANUS in early
October. Soviet commanders below them were kept in the dark about the plan until early
November. Chuikov himself was not told until 18 November, the day before the launch of the
offensive.
107
B. Development of Operation URANUS.
Visual: Stalingrad, Operation URANUS, Situation, 18 November 1942
a. For URANUS, Vasilevsky would have 700,000 troops and 1,400 tanks to
conduct the operation.
b. Stalingrad Front. In addition to Chuikov’s 62nd Army, Eremenko was
assigned the 51st, 57th, and 64th Armies.
i. 51st Army (54,800 troops; 207 tanks): 4 rifle divisions; 1 tank
brigade; 1 mech corps, 1 cav corps
ii. 57th Army (48,400 troops; 225 tanks): 2 rifle divisions; 2 tank
brigades; 1 mech corps
iii. 64th Army (52,900 troops; 40 tanks): 5 rifle divisions; 5 special or
naval brigades; 2 tank brigades
iv. 62nd Army (31,500 troops; 23 tanks): Chuikov now had 12 rifle
divisions (mostly remnants); 1 NKVD division; 6 special or naval brigades
v. 8th Air Army
c. Don Front. Rokossovsky assumed control of the 24th, 65th, and 66th
Armies.
i. 24th Army (67,500 troops; 48 tanks): 7 rifle divisions; 1 tank brigade
ii. 65th Army (77,000 troops; 49 tanks): 9 rifle divisions; 1 tank brigade
iii. 66th Army (52,000 troops; 5 tanks): 6 rifle divisions; 1 tank brigade
iv. 16th Air Army
d. The Southwestern Front. Vatutin assumed command of the 1st Guards, 5th
Tank, and 21st Armies.
i. 1st Guards Army (74,300 troops; 163 tanks): 6 rifle divisions
ii. 5th Tank Army (105,100 troops; 350 tanks): 6 rifle divisions; 2 tank
corps; 1 cav corps
iii. 21st Army (102,100 troops; 199 tanks): 6 rifle divisions; 3 tank
108
regiments, 1 tank corps; 1 cav corps
iv. 2nd and 17th Air Armies
III. German Situation and Actions to Prepare for Soviet Counteroffensives.
A. The Dilemma of the German Generals.
1. On 12 September, the same day Zhukov met with Stalin and Vasilevsky to
begin developing Operation URANUS, Paulus met with Hitler, Colonel-General Franz Halder,
Chief of the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) (German Army High Command) and General
Maximilian von Weichs, commander of Army Group B at the Führerhauptquartier Werwolf
(Hitler’s field headquarters in the east) near Vinnitsa, Ukraine.
2. During the meeting, Paulus expressed concern about his extended left flank
which stretched back to Veronezh and which was defended by troops of the 8th Italian and 3rd
Romanian Armies. Hitler did not seem much concerned at all. He believed that the Soviets were
at the end of their rope in terms of resources. Der Führer only wanted to know when Stalingrad
would fall. Paulus offered the prediction of 10 days.
3. The 12 September meeting was indicative of the almost surreal fixation Hitler
came to have on the capture of Stalingrad. Many of Hitler’s generals sensed the predicament and
danger that the German Army faced on the Russian Front by September 1942, but Hitler’s
solution to the overextension of forces, and the Soviets’ ability to take advantage of it, was
essentially, ‘capture Stalingrad and all will be well.’
4. Twelve days later, Halder was dismissed from the OKH and retired after
disagreeing with Hitler regarding the movement of Army Group A into the Caucasus and
warning him about the danger which was developing along the over-extended flanks of the Sixth
Army and the Fourth Panzer Army.
5. Of course, a logical solution was to withdraw Army Group A from the
Caucasus to shorten and thicken the German lines. Even though Hitler seemed to have lost
interest in the need to seize the Soviet oilfields there by this time, he would not consider a
withdrawal from the region and few of his generals would dare to press him on the issue. Still,
realistically, it was a matter of available resources versus goals.
Note: Visuals showing concurrently, one on each screen.
Visual: Stalingrad, Operation URANUS, Situation, 18 November 1942
B. The German Situation—Army Group B and Sixth Army.
1. By September of 1942, von Weich’s Army Group B was covering a 400-mile
front from near Veronezh to Elista.
109
a. Army Group B consisted of about 980,000 soldiers: 580,000 German
and 400,000 allied troops.
b. The Army Group consisted of seven armies from north to south:
Second German Army (not shown on visual), Second Hungarian Army (not shown on visual),
Eighth Italian Army, Third Romanian Army, Sixth German Army, Fourth German Panzer Army,
and Fourth Romanian Army. The first two of these armies would not become key players in
Operation URANUS and so are not addressed in any significant way.
2. Eighth Italian, commanded by General Italo Garibaldi. The army consisted of
about 235,000 men in twelve divisions and four legions. While the Italians did receive 12
German Mk. IV tanks and had captured several Soviet tanks, the other few tanks that were
available still tended to be obsolete Italian models. The army held the sector from
Novotscherkassi to Veschenskaia.
3. Third Romanian Army, commanded by General Petre Dumitrescu, consisted
of 152,492 Romanian troops and 11,211 German troops organized into 4 corps and 10 divisions.
a. Dumitrescu was assigned the task of defending a 100-mile long front
between Veschenskaia to a line just east of Kletskaia, which was far beyond its capabilities. It
would normally have held a front about half that distance.
b. Dumitrescu made several requests to Army Group B to provide him
additional German troops to eliminate the two Soviet bridgeheads over the Don River at
Serafimovich and Kletskaia. His requests were denied because of the need for those troops
elsewhere.
c. Moreover, the army was situated on poor defensive terrain, especially
against a mobile opponent.
d. For anti-armor defense it was largely equipped with small, outdated
37mm AT guns would could not penetrate the T-34 or KV-1 Soviet tanks.
4. Paulus’ Sixth Army by this time consisted of about 250,000 troops organized
into 5 corps of 20 divisions (3 of which were panzer divisions and 2 motorized divisions). About
40,000 (maybe as high as 50,000) of these troops were “hiwis,” (German term: “Hilfswilliger”
meaning "voluntary helper.”) These men were Russian and Ukrainian volunteers mostly drawn
from those Soviets captured earlier in the war. Most of them, though not all, were used as labor
and construction troops. As the battle in the city wore on, particularly after URANUS, more and
more of the hiwis would pick up guns to fight.
a. The Sixth Army front stretched from near Kletskaia in the northwest to
a line south of Beketovka in the southeast.
b. The army’s 3 panzer divisions were designated as the army’s main
110
counterattack force, but by this time, all 3 were tied up in the city fighting or at Spartanovka.
Each division was able to field about 15 to 25 tanks total (on a good day). Moreover, the army
was short fuel for the tanks and its other vehicles.
c. The battle of attrition in Stalingrad had also worn down the army’s
trained infantry force to about 30 percent or less of its authorized strength.
d. The Sixth Army had no reserves.
e. The army was being supplied by single rail line through Kalach which
made the Kalach bridges over the Don River key terrain.
5. Fourth Panzer Army was commanded by General Hermann Hoth. It was
composed of about 150,000 troops.
a. The army nominally controlled one German corps, one German panzer
corps (the XLVIII) and one Romanian corps composed of seven infantry and one motorized
divisions. The army’s two panzer divisions, the 14th and 24th, had been chopped to the Sixth
Army in Stalingrad as had its IV Corps.
b. Likewise, the XLVIII Panzer Corps was now under Army Group B
control, leaving the 29th Motorized Division as Hoth’s sole mobile response force. The division
was responsible for covering a 120-mile wide response zone but its employment had to be
approved by Army Group B. The division was positioned behind the Fourth Romanian Army.
6. Fourth Romanian Army, commanded by General Constantin Constantinescu,
consisted of 75,580 men organized into 2 corps and 7 divisions.
a. The army occupied a line south of Stalingrad between a line just south
of Beketovka to Sarpa, a front covering 168 miles.
b. Most of the Romanian divisions here were in poor condition. The
strongest was at 73% of its authorized strength and the 1st Infantry Division was down to 25%.
Like its sister army to the north, it possessed almost no heavy antitank guns.
c. As at Serafimovich and Kletskaia on the Don, the Soviets facing the 6.
Fourth Romanian Army held bridgeheads across the Volga.
7. The XLVIII Panzer Corps, initially commanded by General Heinrich
Eberbach (then General Otto von Knobelsdorff after 30 November) was Army Group B’s
reserve.
a. On 16 November, OKH, finally developing some concern over the
reports of Soviet build up in the Serafimovich area, directed the strengthening of the XLVIII
Panzer Corps. As of that date, the corps consisted of the 22nd Panzer Division (which was
111
considered a ‘hard luck’ outfit), and the 1st Romanian Armored Division which was equipped
with sub-standard Czech tanks.
b. Both divisions were in assembly areas behind the Third Romanian
Army area south of Serafimovich. Not surprisingly, von Weich needed Hitler’s direct approval to
employ the corps.
8. The one bright spot in this picture was the fact that Hitler had promised three
fresh divisions from France, including the crack 6th Panzer Division, but their current location
ensured that these formations could not arrive in the theater until sometime in December.
9. German Intelligence Picture. The organization responsible for determining
what the Soviets were up to was the Fremde Heere Ost (FHO), or “Foreign Armies East.” The
unit, consisting of only 35 people, was commanded by Colonel Reinhard Gehlen. In its efforts to
determine Stalin’s next moves on the Eastern front during the September-November 1942
timeframe, Gehlen and FHO determined the following:
a. FHO successfully detected the Soviet build ups for MARS and
URANUS, but not the scale.
b. FHO predicted the attack against the Third Romanian Army’s sector,
but . . .
c. The FHO also surmised, incorrectly, that the objective of URANUS
was merely to interfere with, or cut, the Sixth Army line of communication.
d. Based on its analysis of known Soviet capabilities and order of battle,
Colonel Gehlen (and Hitler) believed that the scale of two large counteroffensives like URANUS
and MARS actually turned out to be were currently beyond the capabilities of the Soviet Army.
e. On 6 November, Gehlen submitted a report to OKH that discussed the
Soviet build up at both locations, but that the main effort would be the northern build-up against
Army Group Center (MARS) and the southern effort (URANUS) would be of secondary
importance. The MARS area is where the Germans put most of their pre-attack effort and thus
ensured the spectacular Soviet failure there, but by doing so, helped to facilitate the success of
URANUS.
IV. Operation URANUS.
A. The Preliminaries. On 11 November, the same day Paulus began Operation
HUBERTUS, Zhukov and Vasilevsky informed Stalin that URANUS would begin on 19
November with opening attacks conducted by the Southwestern and Don Fronts. The Stalingrad
Front was scheduled to begin its attack the following morning. On 17 November Zhukov
departed the Stalingrad area to head north and manage the impending MARS operation.
Visual: Stalingrad, Operation URANUS, Execution, 19-21 November 1942
112
B. Initial actions of the Southwestern and Don Fronts, 19-21 November.
1. At 0720 (Moscow time; 0520 German time), 19 November, the code word
“Siren” went out over Soviet communications systems to begin URANUS. Ten minutes later,
Soviet artillery units began an 80-minute barrage of German positions facing the three Soviet
fronts. At 0850, the units of the Southwestern and Don Fronts attacked along a 200-mile sector
north and northwest of Stalingrad.
2. Southwestern Front.
a. 1st Guards Army. Rolling forward at H-Hour, the 1st Guards
Army attacked along the boundary of the Eighth Italian Army in the north to fix and hold that
element in place.
b. 5th Tank Army. In the center, the 5th Tank Army launched from the
Serafimovich Bridgehead south to attack the left wing of the Third Romanian Army, while the
army’s Operational Group (1st and 26th Tank Corps) penetrated through the 47th Romanian
Division.
c. 21st Army. In the east, the 21st Army, Southwestern Front’s main
effort, attacked from the Kletskaia Bridgehead south to attack the right wing of the Third
Romanian Army.
d. Predictably, the lack of heavy anti-tank artillery caused the Romanian
defenses to rapidly collapse. By noon, the 21st Army’s Operational Group (4th Tank Corps and
3rd Guards Cavalry Corps) had also achieved a breakthrough and was heading for the Sixth
Army’s rear areas and toward Kalach.
e. By the end of the day, the 21st Army and 5th Tank Army together
were able to capture some 27,000 Romanian prisoners and continue their advance southwards.
f. On 20 and 21 November, the Southwestern Front continued its now
largely unchallenged movement toward Kalach and its lead elements had advanced 60 miles by
the end of the day.
3. Don Front.
a. Against the well-entrenched units of the Sixth Army, the Don Front
ran into stiff resistance during 19-21 November. As with the previous Kotluban offensives, its
efforts were largely stymied by the Germans. It was, however, able to hold the Germans in place
along its front with the exception of the movement of some of Paulus’ armor.
C. Initial reactions of Army Group B and Sixth Army in the north, 19-21 November.
1. Army Group B’s initial assessment was that the Don Front was the main effort
113
and ordered the 16th Panzer Division to pull out of the Rynok-Spartanovka area and
counterattack against the 65th Army in the vicinity of Suchanov to support the XI Corps in that
sector.
2. Despite the size of the Soviet attack and the number of tanks involved,
at first Paulus did not even bother to significantly reorient the 14th and 24th Panzer Divisions to
bolster the defenses facing either breakthrough.
3. XLVIII Panzer Corps. Army Group B quickly received permission from
Hitler to use the XLVIII Panzer Corps for a counterattack.
a. Now reorganized with the 1st Romanian Armored and 22nd Panzer
Divisions, the XLVIII Panzer Corps was initially ordered forward to attack against the Don
Front, which was thought to be the Soviet main effort.
b. The hard luck 22nd Panzer Division almost immediately ran into
problems. In their endeavors to keep the engine compartments of their tanks warm in the cold
weather, German tank crews built small fires with straw under their tanks. Field mice in the
straw scrambled up the tracks and into the engine compartments and took up residence there.
When some crews could not start their engines, they discovered that the mice had chewed
through some of the wiring harnesses. Whether this problem was the primary cause or not, about
half of the division’s tanks could not be started or soon quickly broke down, causing a delay in
the division’s movement to the threatened areas.
c. By the afternoon of 19 November, Army Group B realized that the
21st Army sector of the Southwestern Front was the real threat and redirected the XLVIII Panzer
Corps to that area. During the westward movement overnight towards Bolstoy, the 1st Romanian
Armored and 22nd Panzer Divisions became separated and each ended up confronting the
Southwestern Front’s Operational Groups in a piecemeal fashion the next day.
d. On 20 November, the 26th Tank Corps handed the Romanian 1st
Armored Division a severe defeat near Sirkovsky, after which the Soviets merely pushed past the
Romanians and continued the march toward Kalach. The 1st Armored lost 60% of its combat
strength in the fighting.
e. The 22nd Panzer Division reached Petshany (just northeast of
Sirkovsky) were it encountered the 1st Tank Corps. Rapidly overwhelmed by the superior
number of Soviet tanks, the 22nd withdrew north to Bol Donschynka. Meanwhile, the remnants
of the Romanian 1st Armored Division tried to effect a link-up with the 22nd Panzer Division at
Petshany, but was forced back by Soviet counterattacks.
f. As the XLVIII Panzer Corps counterattacks came to naught, 40,000
men of the Third Romanian Army, including all or parts of 5 infantry divisions, were encircled
by the Soviet movements. The commander of the 6th Romanian Infantry Division, Major
General Mihail Lascăr, took command and formed the "Lascăr Group” to continue resistance,
while the command post of the Third Army started a retrograde movement to Morozovsk.
114
g. To help remedy the plight of the Lascăr Group, on 21 November Hitler
ordered the 22nd Panzer Division to effect a rescue of the Romanians. The division advanced
towards Perelasovsky to once again try to join with the 1st Romanian Armored Division but was
stopped again the next day between Bol. Donschynka and Perelasovsky.
h. Meanwhile, the 1st Armored Division advanced towards Bol.
Donschynka for the link up, but ran into a Soviet force there and then headed south. After more
difficult fighting, the 1st Armored Division crossed the Chir River on the 25 November with
only 19 of the 84 tanks it started with.
i. On 21 November, Paulus received reports that the Soviets were
less than 25 miles from his headquarters at Golubinsky and he had no units between him and the
advancing Soviet column to contest the 5th Tank Army’s advance. With the approach of the 26th
Tank Corps, Paulus and the Sixth Army headquarters were forced to abandon Golubinsky and
temporarily moved to Nizhne Chirskaya, then to Gumrak Airfield on 22 November.
j. On 22 November, the attacks continued against the encircled
Lascăr Group which had been ordered to resist at any cost. The Soviets offered Lascăr the
opportunity to surrender, but he turned them down. The Group had run out of food and the troops
had only about 40 rounds left when the Soviets made their final push. That afternoon, Lascăr
transmitted his last message and the Group was overrun within the next 48 hours.
k. Farther south on 22 November, the 16th Panzer Division’s
counterattack at Suchanov was handily defeated by Soviet infantry well-concealed with snow
suits and equipped with anti-tank weapons.
D. Initial actions of the Stalingrad Front, 20-21 November.
1. On 20 November, after a tense delay due to snow and fog, the Stalingrad Front
began its attack at 1000. The situation quickly developed in a positive direction and Eremenko
soon committed his Operational Groups. But the advances in the Stalingrad Front would not go
quite as well as with those of the Southwestern Front farther north.
a. 51st Army. In the south, the 51st Army’s Operational Group (4th
Mechanized Corps and 4th Cavalry Corps) quickly breached the Romanian 1st and 18th
Divisions and proceeded into the rear of the Fourth Romanian Army. The 4th Mechanized Corps,
however, ran into a minefield later in the day in which it lost 50 of its tanks and slowed its
momentum considerably.
b. 57th Army. In the center, the 57th Army had made enough headway
that the commander, General F.I. Tolbukhin, committed his 13th Tank Corps relatively early as
well. The tank corps, however, soon ran headlong into the German 29th Motorized Division near
Nariman where the German division bloodied it in several sharp skirmishes.
c. 64th Army. Close to Stalingrad, the 64th Army also broke through the
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weak 2nd Romanian Infantry Division and created a gap between it and the Romanian 20th
Division. As with the 57th Army, however, part of the 29th Motorized Division came to the
rescue with counterattack by 55 medium tanks. The respite allowed the Romanian 20th Division
to withdraw into the Stalingrad perimeter where they would continue the fight and later
surrender.
d. The next day, Army Group B recalled the 29th Motorized Division to
cover the Chir River crossings which now gave the 13th Tank Corps more freedom of
movement.
2. On 21 November, as the 29th Motorized Division headed for the Chir, the
Stalingrad Front penetrated another 30 miles in some places. The 57th Army advanced northwest
towards Sovetsky (located only 12 miles southeast of the main objective, Kalach) in its efforts to
effect the junction the advancing forces of the Southwestern Front. By evening, the 4th
Mechanized Corps (51st Army) had driven 30 miles northeast toward Sovetsky despite the
minefield incident. The rest of the 51st Army, meanwhile, advanced southwest towards
Kotel’nikovo as its units engaged the flanks of the Fourth Panzer Army and the rear of the Sixth
Army.
E. Army Group B actions in the south, 20-21 November.
1. The Fourth Romanian Army. As with its sister army to the north,
Constantinescu’s Fourth Romanian Army suffered some serious setbacks on its first day of battle
during URANUS, although some things did go better for Constantinescu such as the 29th
Motorized Division’s actions and the 4th Mechanized Corps blundering into the Romanian’s
minefield.
2. A significant problem for Constantinescu developed when Hoth’s 4th Panzer
Army withdrew west and uncovered the Fourth Army’s left flank.
2. On 21 November, the Romanian VI Corps’ was attacked by elements of the
51st Army and its headquarters was forced to retreat. Its commander, however, was able to form
a defensive line to the southwest from remnants of his battered divisions, the 6th Motorized
Regiment, and with a few tanks and assault guns that a German liaison officer appropriated from
German 4th Panzer Army’s rear area workshop. This force offered was able to offer stiff, but
brief, resistance before being forced back south of the Aksai River 36 hours later.
3. Constantinescu, wanted to pull all his units into a perimeter around
Kotel’nikovo but was ordered by German 4th Panzer Army, to which it had been subordinated,
to hold his advanced positions to slow the 51st Army. Hitler and the OKH were in the process of
developing a counterattack and wanted all units to resist in place.
F. The Soviets Tie the Bag.
Visual: Stalingrad, Operation URANUS, Execution, 21-24 November 1942
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1. After forcing the evacuation of Golubinsky by the Sixth Army and overrunning
the town, the 26th Tank Corps (5th Tank Army) rolled on through the night towards Kalach in a
heavy snowstorm. As the lead element drove toward the town, the snow was so heavy that its
commander ordered the column to turn on its headlights so that the drivers could see the road. As
the long line of tanks approached the bridges, the defending Germans thought that the column
was their own tanks (some reports say that the Germans thought that the Russian tanks were
being driven to a nearby tank range to be used as targets). Two T-34 tanks were over the bridge
and opening fire before the confused Germans figured out what was happening, but by then it
was too late. The Soviets captured the bridges intact by 0600 on 22 November.
2. After a brief fight in Kalach, the 26th Tank Corps continued to move southeast
to effect the link up with the Stalingrad Front. The 1st Tank Corps by this time had turned
southwest toward the Chir River crossings. The rest of the 21st Army was forming a wall to the
west of Paulus’ Sixth Army.
3. Farther south, the 4th Mechanized Corps (51st Army) rolled northeast against
little resistance until it made contact with the 4th Tank Corps (21st Army) near Sovetsky at 1400
on the 22nd. The bulk of the 57th Army formed a wall to the south of the Sixth Army. The
encirclement was complete.
4. Soviet intelligence estimated that the number of troops caught in the trap was
between 85,000 and 90,000. In actuality, the Soviets had surrounded 250,000 mostly German
troops, but the catch also included Romanians and Croatians, and the Russian and Ukrainian
hiwis. Within the surrounded area was 14 infantry, 3 panzer, 3 motorized, and 2 Romanian
divisions, as well as 5 corps headquarters (IV, VIII, XI, LI, and XIV Panzer), plus support units.
G. The German Reaction.
1. Stand Your Ground. As early as 21 November, Hitler ordered the Sixth Army
to establish an "all-around defensive position" rather than allow Paulus to attempt a break out.
The next day, Hitler called Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (then commanding the Eleventh
Army in Army Group North) and directed him to form “Army Group Don” to effect the relief of
the Sixth Army. From the beginning, Manstein’s hands were tied. Though he was to be given
“command” of the Sixth Army in this new army group, Manstein could not order Paulus to break
out. Hitler demanded that the Sixth Army remain in Stalingrad and hold the ground it had gained.
2. Resupply by Air. Hitler had also decided to resupply the Sixth Army by air.
Several senior officers, including Luftwaffe generals, informed Hitler that the Germans did not
possess the capability to resupply the Sixth Army by air. The forces trapped in Stalingrad would
require at least 680 metric tons (750 short tons) of supplies per day (later reduced to 500) and the
Luftwaffe could not marshal enough planes to provide that amount. However, Field Marshal
Hermann Goring, the Chief of the Luftwaffe, assured Hitler that it could be done and so Hitler
chose to accept his word for it despite the fact that he had just transferred a large number of Ju-
52 transport planes to North Africa to support Rommel’s efforts there.
3. On 23 November Paulus sent a message to Hitler to “allow me freedom of
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movement.” The following day, Hitler responds “no.”
4. The delays inherent in forming Army Group Don and developing the German
rescue plan gave the Red Army time to strengthen its encirclement and plan the destruction of
the encircled German units. The Soviet Stavka also continued planning for SATURN, the
operation designed to cut off Army Group A in the Caucasus which was planned to start on or
about 10 December.
4. In the meantime, by 24 November, the Third Romanian Army had been forced
behind the Chir River; the Fourth Panzer Army had been pushed back behind a line running
along the southern stretch of the Chir and along the Myshkova River; and the Fourth Romanian
Army had been driven back to positions about halfway between its original line and the town of
Kotel’nikovo. The Sixth Army was now totally isolated.
Visual: Stalingrad, Operation URANUS, Execution, 25-30 November 1942
H. Operation URANUS, Final phase.
1. On 26 November, Vasilevsky issued orders to the Don and Stalingrad Fronts to
begin the destruction of the Sixth Army. Initially, Vasilevksy and the Stavka believed that the
Sixth Army would be destroyed in about a week to ten days.
2. Over the next ten days, while Hitler and the OKH struggled to put together a
viable rescue plan for Paulus, the Southwest and Stalingrad Fronts were given time to solidify
their grasp on the beleaguered Sixth Army, but Vasilevsky soon ran into problems.
3. The 1st Guards, 5th Tank, and 51st Armies continued to push the retreating
units of Army Group B away from Stalingrad. The 51st made the most impressive gains and was
finally halted as it approached Kotel’nikovo.
4. Meanwhile, the 57th, 21st, 65th, and 24th Armies continued to compress the
Sixth Army into an egg-shaped perimeter. By 30 November, the troops of the Sixth Army were
65 kilometers from their nearest would-be rescuers and squeezed into an area stretching about 30
miles east to west and 25 miles north to south, which the Germans now came to refer to as the
“Kessel” or cauldron.
5. On 2 December, the Stalingrad Front launched its initial attack against the
Kessel and the Don Front launched its own attack two days later. By 6 December neither Front
had made much progress and both had sustained heavy casualties. Vasilevsky halted the
offensive and requested reinforcements from Stavka.
5. With the reports coming in from Vasilevsky, the Stavka now realized that the
German forces in the pocket are much larger than originally supposed. In response to
Vasilevsky’s request, the Stavka provided the newly organized 5th Shock Army (5 divisions, 2
tank corps, and 1 cavalry corps) and the “elite” 2nd Guards Army (composed of the 1st and 13th
Guards Rifle Corps and 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps) to reinforce Vasilevsky.
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7. Vasilevsky’s operations against the Kessel went into a pause while
he waited for the new armies to move and get into position.
Analysis (Strategic and Operational).
1. What is your assessment of Soviet efforts to plan and conduct Operation URANUS?
2. How would you compare and contrast the strategic and/or operational vision and objectives of
Case Blue with that of Operation URANUS?
Analysis (Tactical).
1. What actions could the Germans have taken avoid the outcome of Operation URANUS?
2. In your opinion, could URANUS have been even more successful that it was?
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Stand 15
The Final Acts
26 November-2 February 1943
Visuals for this stand.
15-1: Army Group Don, 26 November 1942
15-2: Stalingrad, Operation WINTERGEWITTER, The Plan, 28 November 1942
15-3: Stalingrad, Operation WINTERGEWITTER, Execution, 12-18 December 1942
15-4: Stalingrad, Operation WINTERGEWITTER, Culmination, 19-24 December 1942
15-5: Stalingrad, Operation LITTLE SATURN, Execution, 18-20 December 1942
15-6: Stalingrad, Operation LITTLE SATURN, Execution, 21-26 December 1942
15-7: Stalingrad, Operation LITTLE SATURN, Phase II, Execution, 27-31 December 1942
15-8: Stalingrad, Operation KOLTSO, Situation, 10 January 1943
15-9: Stalingrad, Operation KOLTSO, Execution, 10-15 January 1943
15-10: Stalingrad, Operation KOLTSO, Execution, 15-17 January 1943
15-11: Stalingrad, Operation KOLTSO, Finale, 26 January 1943
Eastern Front, Operation LITTLE SATURN, 16-31 December 1942
Directions.
Start with the terrain in the overhead view at the central area of Stalingrad.
Orientation.
Visual: Operation URANUS, Execution, 25-30 November 1942
Note: No virtual views required except for the Univermag Building.
Description (Strategic).
I. Strategic Planning and Diplomacy.
A. Allied. No major developments.
B. Axis. On 14 January 1943, the German General Staff proposed conscription of the
Baltic population in an effort to replenish and build up the German Army on the Eastern Front.
II. Europe.
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A. North Africa and Mediterranean. On 17 December, Axis forces largely completed
their evacuation from the Marsa Brega and El Agheila region in Libya
B. North Atlantic, Arctic Convoys, and Strategic Bombing. No major developments.
III. Pacific. No major developments.
Description (Operational).
I. Leningrad.
A. On 12 January 1943, the Soviets launch Operation SPARK, an offensive to restore
communication and over-land supply route to Leningrad.
A. On 18 January, Operation SPARK concludes by successfully opening a corridor into
Leningrad. The Soviet government announced the end of the siege of the city, although the siege
actually continued until 27 January.
II. Caucasus.
A. On 29 November, the Transcaucasus Front launched an offensive against Army Group
A along the Terek River in the Caucasus region in southern Russia. The offensive was defeated
within days.
B. On 16 December, Army Group A ends further offensives at Tuapse.
C. On 21 December, Soviet relief forces and supplies headed for Stalingrad were
stopped at Myshkova
D. On 22 December Army Group A begins to conduct retrograde operations
northwestward back toward Rostov.
E. On December 28, German Army Group A is ordered to retreat from the Caucasus
region.
F. On 1 January, the 1st Panzer Division withdrew from Terek to prevent encirclement
by the Soviet Salsk-Rostov and Mozdok-Stavropol Offensive Operations.
G. On 3 January, Soviet troops captured Mozdok, Russia.
H. On 11 January, the Trans-Caucasian Front launched the Novorossiysk-Maikop
Offensive.
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I. On 12 January, the last of Army Group A elements withdrew from the Caucasus to
the Kuban River bridgehead.
J. On 13 January, Army Group A elements at Terek retreat to the Nagutskoye-
Alexsandrovskoye line.
K. On 21 January, Soviet troops captured Voroshilovsky and Stavropol and claim
500,000 Germans killed and 200,000 captured in the past two months of fighting.
L. On 24 January, the Trans-Caucasian Front's drive toward the Kuban bridgehead
was stopped near Krasnodar and Novorossiysk.
M. On 29 January, the Trans-Caucasian Front recaptured Maikop, only 360 kilometers
(200 miles) from Kerch Strait.
III. Operation SATURN.
A. Background. Even before the consolidation phase of Operation URANUS was
completed, on 23 November Stalin had instructed Vasilevsky to finalize the plan for an offensive
by the Southwest and Voronezh Fronts, “in the general direction of Millerovo and Rostov.” On 2
December, Stalin and the Stavka approved this plan as Operation SATURN.
Visual: Stalingrad, Operation SATURN, The Original Plan, 2 December 1942
B. Plan for Operation SATURN.
1. For SATURN, Vasilevsky would have 700,000 troops and 1,400 tanks to
conduct this ambitious operation.
2. Southwestern Front. Vatutin commanded the 1st Guards and 3rd Guards
Armies and assumed tactical control of the Voronezh Front's 6th Army (note that this is the
Soviet 6th Army).
3. Stalingrad Front. Eremenko planned to use his 5th Tank Army and the
newly assigned and powerful 2nd Guards Army for his part of the operation.
4. Operation SATURN was to take place in two phases.
a. Phase One. The Southwest Front's 1st Guards and 3rd Guards
Armies would break through the Italian Eighth Army's left flank near Boguchar and push south
to Millerovo. Farther north, the Voronezh Front's 6th Army would provide right flank protection
for the Southwest Front and drive on Voroshilovgrad. The objective was to encircle/destroy the
Italian Eighth Army and those Army Group Don elements inside the Don Bend. To form the
second arm of the envelopment, the 5th Tank and 2nd Guards Armies would break through the
German defenses at the Chir River and run along the lower Don River.
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b. Phase Two. For Phase 2, the fronts would cross the Donets River at
Kamensk-Shakhtinsk and continue south to capture Rostov. That city held the railhead through
which the supplies ran for the Fourth Panzer Army and Army Group A to the south.
5. These moves were intended to effectively:
a. Encircle and destroy the Italian Eighth Army.
b. Destroy Army Group Don’s LOCs and Commo networks west of the
Don-Chir line.
c. Force the withdrawal or destruction of Army Group Don.
d. Isolate the Fourth Panzer Army and Army Group A to the south and
capture those units’ railhead at Rostov.
e. Force permanent abandonment of the Sixth Army.
6. The date set for the beginning of SATURN was set at 10 December, but an
impending German counteroffensive would soon throw Vasilevsky’s operation off its timetable.
IV. Operation WINTERGEWITTER (Winter Storm).
A. Organization of Army Group Don. The pause in operations at Stalingrad ordered by
by Vasilevsky on 6 December gave Manstein’s Army Group Don a bit of a breather to finalize
his plans for the rescue of the Sixth Army. Manstein’s impending operation was about to throw
Vasilevsky’s plans for SATURN off balance as well.
1. Back on 26 November, Manstein activated the headquarters for Army Group
Don at Novocherkassk about 10 miles northeast of Rostov.
Visual: Order of Battle, Army Group Don
2. It was an army group largely in name only. On paper, its organization
consisted of:
a. Paulus’ Sixth Army (which Manstein could not direct or control, only
“rescue”).
b. General Hermann Hoth’s Fourth Panzer Army which included:
i. XLVIII Panzer Corps, which included the remnants of the 22nd
Panzer and 1st Romanian Armored Divisions and the remnants of the Fourth Romanian Army. It
also included the fresh 11th Panzer Division and the 336th Infantry and 7th Luftwaffe Field
Divisions.
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ii. LVII Panzer Corps on loan from Army Group A. This corps would
consist of 2 fresh panzer divisions from France and the 15th Luftwaffe Field Division. When
complete it would also include the veteran 17th Panzer Division from Army Group A which was
at a lower strength than the two newly arrived divisions.
iii. The Fourth Panzer Army was also to receive the 16th Motorized
Division, but it was currently tied down on rear area security missions at Elista for Army Group
A.
c. Group Hollidt, commanded by Major General Karl Hollidt (commander
of the XVII Corps) was composed of the German XVII Corps and the remnants of the Third
Romanian Army.
3. The initial mission for Army Group Don was to contain the Soviets at the Chir
River line. Once that area was stabilized, Manstein would then go rescue the Sixth Army.
Visual: Stalingrad, Operation WINTERGEWITTER, The Plan, 28 November 1942
B. Plan for Operation WINTERGEWITTER (Winter Storm).
1. As originally envisaged, Operation WINTERGEWITTER (Winter Storm), the
plan for rescuing the Sixth Army, was to consist of a two-pronged attack.
2. XLVIII Panzer Corps. On the left (west), the mission of the XLVIII Panzer
Corps was to attack toward Kalach and seize the bridges there. Ideally, the Sixth Army would
attempt a break out with part of its forces moving to meet the corps at Kalach.
3. LVII Panzer Corps. On the right (east), the mission of the LVII Panzer Corps
was to attack between the Don River and the rail line running from Kotel’nikovo toward
Stalingrad. The main portion of the Sixth Army would attack west to reach out to meet the LVII
Panzer Corps somewhere between Stalingrad and the Myshkova River and create a corridor.
4. Manstein Wants a Breakout. Initially Manstein tried to convince Paulus to
attempt a breakout from Stalingrad concurrent with WINTER STORM, but the Sixth Army
commander refused for two reasons. First was that he stated that he did not have the fuel to move
his army. He would have to abandon much of his materiel and his wounded and could only move
a short distance. He also refused because Hitler had ordered him to stay.
5. 5th Tank Army Attack on the Chir Line. One thing Manstein did not plan for
was an unexpected attack against the Chir River line by the 5th Tank Army on 30 November.
The Soviet attack’s goal was to thrust to the airfield at Tatsinskaia through which much of the
Sixth Army’s supplies were now routed. Manstein was forced to commit much of the XLVIII
Panzer Corps to support Group Hollidt and the Third Romanian Army against the 5th Tank
Army’s attack. The one bright spot for the Germans in this clash was that the 11th Panzer
Division eventually destroyed much of the 5th Tank Army’s armor and helped ensure that Group
Hollidt held the Chir line. But the Soviet attacks tied down parts of the XLVIII Panzer Corps
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which meant that Manstein’s ability to use the corps to assist the Sixth Army in a breakout was
now threatened.
6. Revised Plan for WINTER STORM. On 1 December, Manstein’s staff
finalized the plan for Winter Storm which might now consist of only a single attack, that of the
LVII Panzer Corps. To make matters worse, Manstein soon discovered that Army Group A was
refusing to release the 17th Panzer Division. That problem would eventually be resolved, but the
LVII Panzer Corps was now forced to not only begin the attack alone, but with only the fresh 6th
Panzer Division (with about 200 tanks) and the worn-down 23rd Panzer Division (which was
down to only 30 tanks). The Romanian VI Corps from the Fourth Army would be employed to
hold open and protect the panzer corps’ right flank. Whether the XLVIII Panzer Corps could join
in the Stalingrad relief effort remained to be seen.
C. Situation-Soviet 51st Army.
1. General GEN N.I. Trufanov’s 51st Army manned the sector where Manstein
was about to launch WINTERGEWITTER.
2. That army consisted of 34,000 troops but possessed only 77 tanks in the
13th Tank Corps. Its 4th Mechanized Corps had been sent north to form part of the new 5th
Shock Army.
3. Although crossed by the Myshkova and Aksai Rivers, the terrain in the 51st
Army’s sector actually favored a strong armored thrust. Additionally, the rail line from
Kotel’nikovo to Stalingrad which ran through the army’s area would be a critical part of the
effort to resupply the Sixth Army (or extract it if Manstein got his way).
Visual: Stalingrad, Operation WINTERGEWITTER, Execution, 12-18 December 1942
D. Operation WINTERGEWITTER—Execution.
1. WINTER STORM Begins. During 4-11 December, the LVIII Panzer Corps
assembled near the railway town of Kotel’nikovo to prepare for its mission. On 10 December
Army Group Don notified Paulus that the rescue operation would begin within 36 hours. On the
12th, Operation WINTERGEWITTER began with the two panzer divisions driving northeast
toward the Aksai River, the 6th Panzer attacked on the left (west) and the 23rd Panzer on the
right (east). The latter division generally paralleled the rail road as it advanced. Although the
assault lacked real surprise and any attempt to maneuver, the LVII Panzer Corps readily
penetrated the Soviet defenses on the first day.
3. The 51st Army is Surprised. Though the 51st Army had indications of the
German build-up, apparently, no one on the Soviet side expected the German offensive to begin
so soon. The German attacks quickly overran the forward lines of infantry and Soviet resistance
soon faded. The initial advance had been so quick that the 6th Panzer Division was able to
capture a number Soviet artillery pieces. On the first day, LVII Panzer Corps rapidly pushed
about 30 miles northward and soon threatened the rear of the 51st Army.
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4. The 2nd Guards Army is Released. Once he was aware of the new German
offensive, Vasilevsky wasted no time in requesting that the Stavka release the 2nd Guards Army
to his control. Stavka granted the request and the 2nd Guards Army soon began moving elements
to the southeast to bring its combat power into the effort to halt Manstein’s drive.
5. Tank Battle at Verkhne-Kumskii. On 13 December, both panzer divisions
secured crossings of the Aksai River. The next day (14 December), a major armored battle
developed around the village of Verkhne-Kumskii about 10 miles north of the Aksai. In an all-
day fight, the Soviet forces were initially able to push German forces back to near the Aksai
River by the end of the day, but the 51st Army sustained heavy casualties in men and over 100
tanks destroyed. The losses sustained by the Red Army in the vicinity of Verkhne-Kumskii
provided the LVII Panzer Corps a temporary superiority in tanks and the Germans began to push
back.
6. XLVIII Panzer Corps is Fixed at the Chir. That same day (14 December), up on
the Chir River and at the Don-Chir bridgehead, XLVIII Panzer Corps remained heavily engaged
against the Fifth Tank Army and the new Fifth Shock Army. Those armies were trying to expand
the buffer zone between the new front on the Chir and the Kessel at Stalingrad. By noon on the
14th, Manstein informed Hitler that the Soviet attacks on the Chir had removed any opportunity
of using the XLVIII Panzer Corps for breaking through to the Sixth Army via Kalach. He also
told Hitler that that without the XLVIII Panzer Corps’ thrust, LVII Panzer Corps could probably
not break through to rescue the Sixth Army.
7. Fighting Continues at at Verkhne-Kumskii. As the weight of the 2nd Guards
Army was brought to bear against the LVII Panzer Corps, the fighting around Verkhne-Kumskii
stymied the German offensive. For three days, the Soviet’s 2nd Guards Army and 51st Army and
the LVII Panzer Corps launched a series of counterattacks against each other in and near the
town. The 6th Panzer Division took heavy losses during the fighting and Manstein once again
asked for the release of the 17th Panzer Division. He also asked for the 16th Motorized Infantry
Division at Elista to reinforce LVII Panzer Corps. Hitler finally agreed to release the 17th Panzer
Division but not the 16th Division.
Visual: Stalingrad, Operation WINTERGEWITTER, Culmination, 19-24 December 1942
8. The 17th Panzer Division Arrives. On 16 December, the 17th Panzer Division
finally arrived and it soon became embroiled in the fighting around Kumskii. The LVII Panzer
Corps pushed the division up on the corps left where it took over part of the 6th Panzer
Division’s sector. After two more days of fighting around Verkhne-Kumskii, on 19 December,
the LVII Panzer Corps finally cleared the remaining Soviet resistance south of the Myshkova
River. That day, the 17th Panzer secured a crossing of the Myshkova at Nish-Kimskiy and the
6th Panzer secured another at Vesilyvka the next day. The LVII Panzer Corps was now only
about 30 miles from the Kessel.
9. Manstein Requests Hitler for Breakout. On 20 December, Manstein reiterated
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to Hitler that LVII Panzer Corps probably could not get through to the Sixth Army and certainly
could not open a permanent corridor to the pocket. Manstein told der Fuhrer that the only real
course of action was to order Paulus to break out. That, he maintained, would at least save most
of the troops and whatever equipment could still be moved out.
10. Hitler Refuses. Just in case, Manstein also sent Paulus a notice to get ready for
Operation DONNERSCHLAG (i.e., “Thunderbolt") which would signal that the Sixth Army
should begin its breakout. Paulus was to get ready but was not to start movement until ordered.
Hitler, now encouraged by LVII Panzer Corps' arrival on the Myshkova River, refused to
approve DONNERSCHLAG. Sixth Army, he insisted, was to stay put until firm contact was
established with the LVII Corps at least until a complete, orderly withdrawal could be
undertaken. In was a small concession, but Manstein knew that he was unlikely to be able to
succeed in even this revised plan. In the meantime, in the meantime, Hitler directed that enough
supplies were to be flown in, particularly of motor fuel, to give the Sixth Army thirty miles of
mobility.
11. Schmidt Gives Manstein His Assessment. The LVII Panzer Corps attacked
again the next day (21 December) but failed to get much farther beyond the two Myshkova
bridgeheads. That same day, Generalmajor Friedrich Schulz, Manstein's chief of staff, conferred
with General Schmidt, Paulus' chief of staff, by means of a newly installed high-frequency
telecommunications system. The gist of the conversation was that Schmidt did not believe that
the Sixth Army could be successfully evacuated, but that if necessary, it could begin the effort no
earlier than 24 December. Schmidt noted that he (and Paulus?) considered the evacuation as an
act of desperation to be avoided until it became absolutely necessary.
12. Manstein Reports Culmination. That day, Manstein transmitted the results of
the Schulz-Schmidt exchange to the OKH. He also reiterated that he did not believe that the LVII
Panzer Corps could now establish contact with Sixth Army or that it even had the combat power
to gain any more ground. Manstein was essentially saying that WINTERGEWITTER had
culminated.
13. WINTER STORM is Cancelled. Two days later, on December 23, Manstein
officially canceled WINTERGEWITTER and switched over to the defensive as the pressure
from the 2nd Guards Army increased. From that point on, Hitler and the OKH no longer
seriously sought to relieve the troops at Stalingrad, but only to have them to fight on for as long
possible so as to tie up and destroy Soviet forces. In short, the Sixth Army was to be sacrificed.
V. Operation SATURN—Evolution to LITTLE SATURN.
A. SATURN Not Ready. On 4 December, Stalin approved another plan designated
Operation KOLTSO ("Ring") which was designed to finish off the Sixth Army with the help of
the reinforcements sent to Vasilevsky. However, neither SATURN nor KOLTSO were yet ready
when Manstein launched Operation WINTERGEWITTER on 12 December.
B. Transfer of 2nd Guards Army. Immediately after receiving news of the German
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attack, Vasilevsky telephoned Stalin to have the 2nd Guards Army transferred to Stalingrad
Front to help blunt Manstein’s drive. Stalin agreed, but the decision now forced the Stavka to
delay the start of Operation KOLTSO and SATURN since the 2nd Guards Army would now be
committed against WINTERGEWITTER, at least temporarily.
C. SATURN becomes LITTLE SATURN. On the evening of 13 December, due
to the re-missioning of the 2nd Guards Army, Stavka also made the decision to reduce the scope
of Operation SATURN. SATURN now became LITTLE SATURN. Instead of going south on
the line Millerovo to Rostov, the Southwest Front would bear southeast inside the Don Bend.
The Stalingrad Front’s 5th Tank Army would continue to head west and the two forces would
meet near Tatsinskaia and Morozovsk. The changes in direction reduced the projected depth of
the advance by half.
D. Operation MARS. Stavka’s decision to reduce the aims of Operation SATURN may
have also been influenced by the poor showing of Soviet forces participating on Zhukov’s
Operation MARS up north. Back on 25 November, Zhukov’s West and Kalinin Fronts began the
effort to pinch off the Rzhev salient. MARS, however, quickly ran into problems and its main
effort lost more than half its tanks in trying to break through the German Ninth Army. On 7
December a successful Ninth Army counterattack succeeded in killing 15,000 Soviets and taking
another 5,000 as prisoners. On 11 December, another attack by the West Front cost the Soviets
an additional 295 tanks, after which MARS petered out.
Visual: Stalingrad, Operation LITTLE SATURN, Situation, 18-26 December 1942
E. Operation LITTLE SATURN—Execution.
1. LITTLE SATURN Begins. On 16 December, Vasilevsky finally began
Operation LITTLE SATURN. To the north, the 6th and the 1st Guards Armies rapidly broke
through the Italian Eighth Army's line east of Novaya Kalitva. The next day, the 3rd Guards
Army joined them to extend the push downstream along the river. By the third day, all three
armies had broken through the German lines.
2. Eighth Italian Army Collapses. On 20 December the Eighth Italian Army’s
right flank collapsed and the Southwest Front opened up a 100-mile-wide hole. Farther south, the
Fifth Tank Army made little progress against Manstein’s XLVIII Panzer Corps along the Chir
River.
4. Group Fretter-Pico Protects the Donets Bridges. On the same day, Manstein
created Armeeabteilung (i.e., “Group”) Fretter-Pico composed of one fresh infantry division,
elements of the 3rd Mountain Division, and remnants of a weak German corps that had been
stationed as a backstop behind the Italians. Fretter-Pico’s mission was to protect the Donets
bridges at Voroshilovgrad and Kamensk-Shakhtinsk and tie in with Army Group Don.
Visual: Stalingrad, Operation LITTLE SATURN, Situation, 21-24 December 1942
5. Tatsinskaia Airfield is Captured. From 21 to 23 December, the Southwest
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Front pushed a spearhead south through the Italian and German formations retreating from the
Chir River line. On the 24th, the 24th Tank Corps (1st Guards Army) penetrated to Tatsinskaia
temporarily capturing the main aerial resupply base for Stalingrad. The tanks of the corps drove
through snowstorms onto the airfield and roamed about for several hours, destroying a number of
German transport planes and large stockpiles of supplies. The tanks were eventually driven off
later that day by counterattacks of the XLVIII Panzer Corps. Other elements of the Southwest
Front came within artillery range of Morozovsk as well.
6. Reduction of the LVII Panzer Corps. To cover Army Group Don's left flank,
protect the air base at Morozovsk, and recapture Tatsinskaia, Manstein was forced to take the
11th Panzer Division from the LVII Panzer Corps. The appearance of the Soviet 2nd Guards
Army along the Myshkova River at about that time also meant that the Russians would soon be
going over to the offensive there as well.
7. In order to save the Tatsinskaia and Morozovsk airfields, Manstein had been
forced to reduce Fourth Panzer Army's effective strength by a third. He therefore requested that
OKH transfer a panzer corps (two divisions) and an infantry division from Army Group A to
bolster Fourth Panzer Army, and at least one infantry division from Army Group B to bolster
Army Group Don’s left flank. Though he would eventually get reinforcements they would not
arrive in time to permanently save the airfields.
8. By 24 December, the 6th, 1st Guards, and 3rd Guards Armies had reached the
Millerovo-Tatsinskaia-Morozovsk line. The Southwest Front had essentially achieved its
LITTLE SATURN objectives and most of the major fighting and movement now moved to the
south.
9. Fourth Panzer Army Retreats. On 26 December the weather turned extremely
cold (-15° F). The next day, Rumanian VII Corps (Fourth Army), on LVII Panzer Corps' east
flank, collapsed and fell into a disorganized retreat. After that, the best Hoth, commander of
Fourth Panzer Army, thought he could do was to order LVII Panzer Corps back to Kotel’nikovo
and, maybe, make another temporary stand there. But, on the afternoon of 28 December, Hoth
was forced to withdraw the LVII Panzer Corps past Kotel’nikovo all the way to the Sal River.
That opened up the right bank of the Don River almost to Rostov and exposed the right flank of
Group Hollidt and the Third Romanian Army (attached to Hollidt).
10. That same day, Manstein told Hitler that Fourth Panzer Army was no
longer capable of holding a broad front south of the Don and that he intended to have Fourth
Panzer Army face east once it was south of the Sal River to protect the rear of Army Group A.
Group Hollidt would have to be pulled back, possibly to a line slightly forward of the Donets,
more likely to the river itself.
Visual: Stalingrad, Operation LITTLE SATURN, Situation, 27-31 December 1942
11. By 29 December, the advances of the 5th Shock, 2nd Guards, and 51st Armies
(Stalingrad Front) against the LVII Panzer Corps and the Fourth Panzer Army had captured
Kotel’nikovo from where Manstein’s Operation WINTERGEWITTER began. By 31 December,
Eremenko’s Stalingrad Front had pushed all the way to the Manich River. The following day,
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with the issue of the Sixth Army’s rescue no longer in doubt, the Stalingrad Front was renamed
the Southern Front and it prepared for further offensives toward the west in the New Year.
VI. Operation KOLTSO (Ring).
Visual: Stalingrad, Operation KOLTSO, Situation, 10 January 1943
A. Background.
1. On 9 December Vasilevsky had submitted his plan for Operation KOLTSO,
the destruction of the Stalingrad Kessel, to the Stavka. The Stavka approved the plan two days
later. Of course, the advent of Manstein’s Operation WINTERGEWITTER indefinitely
postponed KOLTSO the following day.
2. KOLTSO Revived. On or about 1 January, the Stavka revived Operation
KOLTSO and scheduled it to begin on 6 January. The Stavka estimated that the operation would
last about 7 days.
3. Another Front Reorganization. For the final destruction of Paulus’ Sixth
Army, and to carry on further offensives in 1943, the Soviet Fronts were reorganized once again
on 1 January 1943. Eremenko’s Stalingrad Front was renamed the Southern Front. Concurrently,
he relinquished three of his armies to Rokossovsky's Don Front which would be the command
responsible for conducting Operation KOLTSO. Rokossovsky 's Don Front now consisted of
281,000 troops organized into seven armies and it controlled the entire perimeter of the
Stalingrad pocket.
B. Plan for Operation KOLTSO-Three Phases.
1. Operation KOLTSO was the last phase of the Battle of Stalingrad. The final
plan for KOLTSO was based on three distinct attacks designed to break up the Kessel and
recapture the city.
2. For the first attack, Don Front’s main effort, LTG Pavel I. Batov’s 65th Army,
would launch an attack against the weaker western face of the pocket to destroy the 376th, 44th,
384th, and 76th Infantry Divisions located in the northwest corner of the Kessel. The 65th Army
would then conduct a thrust south toward Karpovka Station and advance to the Rossoshka River
line. For the initial assault, the 65th Army received the largest share of artillery and rocket
batteries for the assault.
3. In the second phase, MG Ivan M. Chistyakov’s 21st Army would assume the
lead at the Rossoshka River and conduct a drive to Voroponovo Station.
4. The final phase called for an all-out attack by all armies to break-up, split, and
otherwise destroy the remaining German forces in the Kessel and make contact with Chuikov’s
62nd Army in Stalingrad.
C. German Situation.
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1. On 18 December, the Sixth Army reported a ration strength of 246,000,
including 13,000 Romanians, 19,300 Russian & Ukrainian auxiliaries, and 6,000 wounded.
However, these numbers did not reflect the army’s effective combat strength. By 21 December,
the army had only 25,000 infantry troops remaining in all divisions. Service troops were
impressed into infantry service, but these men were not especially useful in terms of increasing
combat effectiveness. Moreover, Sixth Army had lost 28,000 men, mostly infantrymen, between
22 November and 23 December due to combat deaths, disease, weather, or wounds.
2. By 1 January 1943, the Sixth Army was suffering a lingering death from
Starvation and exhaustion. Between 1 and 23 December, supplies airlifted in had averaged 90
tons a day and on only one day, 7 December, did they reach the army's daily minimum
requirement of 300 tons. In the first three weeks of January, the average was 120 tons a day, but
that amount was still far too short to meet the army’s minimum needs.
3. The Sixth Army did have some advantages. One was that the Kessel
encompassed nearly all of the built-up areas in and around Stalingrad. Consequently, the German
troops had better shelter from the cold than the vast majority of Russian troops and could obtain
wood for fuel from demolished buildings, while out on the steppes the Soviets had none.
5. The Germans also had the advantage of field fortifications that they had built
during the siege and, particularly, of the Soviet defense lines facing outward that had been
constructed by the Russians the previous summer. Between the lines, the terrain was generally
flat and treeless which provided excellent fields of fire. The ground was also cut by deep balkas
(ravines), which also favored the defense.
6. In short, though their backs were to the wall, the Germans were determined to
make the final battle for Stalingrad even more costly than Chuikov’s men did when the roles
were reversed. The difference was that the Sixth Army held out little hope that they would much
in the way of fresh reinforcements or adequate supplies.
Visual: Stalingrad, Operation KOLTSO, Execution, 10-15 January 1943
D. Execution of Operation KOLTSO.
1. Operation KOLTSO was launched on 10 January 1943 with a mass
bombardment conducted by the artillery of the seven encircling Soviet armies. The main targets
were the German defense positions outside the city. At the appointed time, the 65th, 21st and
24th Armies jumped off against the western "nose" of the pocket. The Soviet advance
immediately ran into stiff resistance and the first two days’ effort brought gains of only two or
three miles.
2. On 12 and 13 January, the Germans prevented a breakthrough by maneuvering
backward nineteen miles to the line along the Rossoshka River. On reaching the Rossoshka on
the night of the 12th, the Soviet armies completed the first phase of KOLTSO. At the river,
however, the Soviets now faced what had been the original outer ring of the Stalingrad defenses.
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3. As planned, on the 14th Rokossovsky shifted the main effort to the 21st
Army which would now head for Voroponovo Station while the 65th Army aimed for Pitomnik
Airfield. The Soviet attacks of the 14th failed to pierce the heavy line of defenses and the Soviets
were turned back with heavy losses.
Visual: Stalingrad, Operation KOLTSO, Execution, 15-17 January 1943
4. The following day, however, the 24th, 65th, 21st, 57th and 64th Armies all
concurrently attacked the Rossoshka line and the defenses began to crumble. The Soviets pushed
on and the 65th Army overran Pitomnik airfield on the 16th and the 21st Army reached
Voroponovo Station on the day after. Phase two was now complete. The area of the pocket had
been reduced by about half, but the seven days allotted to complete KOLTSO were used up.
Sixth Army, moreover, had once more managed to hold its front together. It was now, at least in
the south, occupying the inner ring of Stalingrad defenses.
5. Rokossovsky had apparently gone into the KOLTSO offensive still believing
Paulus had fewer troops than he actually possessed. Rokossovsky was now forced to pause
again, regroup, and bring up reinforcements for the next effort. During the four-day pause (17-20
January), Paulus reported (on the 20th) to OKH that he could not hold out for more than a few
days and that in some sectors the defenses were so weak that the Soviets could march through
the front "at will."
Visual: Stalingrad, Operation KOLTSO, Finale, 26 January 1943
6. The final phase of the offensive began on 20 January with a Soviet push
toward the Gumrak airfield. Two days later (22 January), the airfield was occupied by the
Soviets. The airfield’s capture meant an end to the evacuation of the German wounded and that
all further aerial resupply to the Sixth Army would have to be by parachute.
7. Also that day, the 57th Army broke through the German lines at Voroponovo
Station. The Germans were unable to close the gap since ammunition had run out on that stretch
of the front. Neither troops nor ammunition could be brought in from other sectors.
8. That night, Paulus informed Hitler that rations were exhausted and there were
12,000 wounded troops still in the Kessel. He asked for a decision regarding surrender. Hitler
answered that, “surrender is out of the question. The troops will defend themselves to the last. If
possible, the size of the fortress is to be reduced so that it can be held by the troops still capable
of fighting.”
9. Over the next ten days the Soviets desperately fought their way to the
outskirts of Stalingrad while the German line grudgingly fell back into the city itself. The
German troops took shelter in the basements of the many ruined buildings where tons of rubble
overhead provided protection against a constant rain of artillery shells. Meanwhile the Soviets
began clearing the city in bitter house to house fighting with heavy casualties.
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10. On 26 January, Chuikov’s 62nd Army retook Mamaev Kurgan and tanks of
the 21st Army linked up there to split the pocket in two.
11. In the northern pocket, the German XI Corps formed a perimeter around the
Tractor Factory. In the southern pocket, the Sixth Army headquarters and LI and VIII Corps and
XIV Panzer Corps dug in around Red Square and northwest of the main railroad station. The IV
Panzer Corps, which had been holding the south front, was destroyed on that day by a Soviet
push across the Tsaritsa River from the south.
12. By now, the Sixth Army was asking the Luftwaffe to drop only food.
Artillery ammunition was not needed because there were too few guns. On 28 January, the Sixth
Army stopped issuing rations to the wounded to preserve the strength of the remaining fighting
troops.
13. By 29 January, the south pocket was split, leaving Paulus, his staff, and a
small assortment of troops in an enclave in the south and the remnants of LI and VIII Corps in
the north. The XIV Panzer Corps ceased to exist on that day.
14. On 30 January, the LI and VIII Corps were pushed into a small area around a
former Soviet Army engineer barracks, where they surrendered the following morning.
15. By 31 January German resistance in the southern pocket was confined to
individual buildings. Sixth Army headquarters was now in the basement of the Univermag
Department Store on Red Square which itself was in a 300-yard perimeter held by the survivors
of the 194th Grenadier Regiment. That day, Soviet forces reached Paulus's headquarters. At 0615
on the morning of 31 January, the radio operator at Sixth Army headquarters in the basement of
the sent the following message:
“Russians are at the door. We are preparing to destroy the radio equipment.”
An hour later, the last transmission from Sixth Army came through:
“We are destroying the equipment.”
16. Soviet staff officers entered the building and negotiated terms with General
Schmidt. Paulus refused to meet with the Russians, so Schmidt handled the surrender, but he
surrendered only the Sixth Army staff and those troops in the immediate vicinity. Paulus refused
to give an order to Strecker’s XI Corps in the northern pocket to surrender as well, claiming he
was no longer their commander.
17. Promoted to field marshal just the day before, Paulus became the first German
officer of that rank ever to have been taken prisoner. Hitler had expected the promotion to lead
Paulus to commit suicide to prevent that eventuality. When he learned of the surrender instead,
Hitler reportedly stated, "Paulus did an about-face on the threshold of immortality."
18. The entire Soviet force at Stalingrad now concentrated on the 33,000 men of
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the XI Corps trapped in the northern pocket around the Tractor Factory. The XI Corps fought on
for another forty-eight hours. On 1 February, Hitler called on the corps to fight to the last man,
saying, "Every day, every hour that is won benefits the rest of the front decisively."
19. Early on the morning of 2 February 1943, however, Strecker was informed
that one of his own officers had gone to negotiate surrender terms with the Soviets. He then
decided to put an end to the fighting. At 0840 that morning, Strecker sent a radio message to
Germany, saying that his command had performed its duty to the last man and then he
surrendered. Organized Axis resistance in the city ended that day.
Analysis (Strategic and Operational).
1. What is your assessment of the German decision to continue resistance at Stalingrad after
Operation WINTER STORM had failed?
2. How would you compare and contrast that effort (German resistance at Stalingrad) with that of
MacArthur and Wainwright at Bataan and Corregidor?
3. Are there any other key operational or Strategic advantages to be gained from such and effort?
Analysis (Tactical).
1. What is your assessment of Manstein’s “WINTER STORM” plan?
2. Was either a breakout or relief really feasible given the Sixth Army’s situation?
3. What is your assessment of Rokossovsky’s “KOLTSO” plan?
4. How much effort should the Soviets have put into re-taking the city (why take on un-necessary
casualties, if you can simply starve them out?).
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Integration Session.
I. As discussed in the Stalingrad VSR Introduction, a Staff Ride consists of three phases.
A. The first phase is “The Preliminary Study Phase.” This phase is conducted before the
visit to the battlefield and prepares the student for the visit.
B. The second phase is “The Field Study Phase.” This phase is conducted with the
battlefield terrain (as presented through the computer) and better allows students to understand
historical events through analysis of the actual terrain.
C. The third and final phase of a Staff Ride is “The Integration Phase.” No Staff Ride is
complete without an Integration Phase, and it is a critical event in order for the students to
understand what happened, why it happened, and most importantly, what can be to be learned
from the study of the battle or campaign.
II. There are several factors that the Staff Ride leader should consider when planning for and
conducting the Integration Phase.
A. First and foremost, the leader must work with the organization which is participating
in the ride and select a time and location for the Integration Session.
B. For a VSR, the most common location for the Integration Session is the classroom
after the Field Phase is complete.
C. It is recommended that, when possible, students have some time for personal reflection
and thought before the Integration Phase.
D. In some case, the Integration Phase may be conducted the day after the Field Study
Phase ends.
III. The Instructor should organize the Integration Phase based on the unit, time available, and
training objectives.
A. It is important to keep in mind that the Integration Phase is NOT an AAR of the ride
itself (i.e., ways to improve the ride). While it is useful to seek constructive criticism in order to
continue to improve the ride, this should be done at another time, or perhaps with written AAR
comments.
B. Instead the Integration session is used for the staff ride participants to integrate their
preliminary study with the field work in order to gain insights that are relevant to their current
duties and enhance their professional development.
C. Whatever method the instructor chooses to employ to generate discussion, the most
important thing to remember is that the participants should do the majority of the talking.
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D. One method that often produces a fruitful Integration Phase is to conduct the session
in three parts, based on three broad questions. Sometimes, the leader need only present the
general question and let others carry the conversation, or the leader may have to ask more
follow-up questions to prod the discussion.
1. What aspects (ideas, opinions) of the campaign had you developed in the
Preliminary Study Phase that changed because of your study of the ground?
a. This is a crucial question because seeing the terrain is central to a staff
ride, otherwise the campaign could simply be studied in the classroom. Of course, students may
develop a wide range of answers based on their personal study and what they observed in the
field.
b. Some of the more popular aspects of the discussion of terrain for the
Stalingrad Campaign include the vast distances of the operational maneuver, the four dimensions
of an urban conflict, certain major buildings (Grain Elevator, Martinovskii, etc.), the ravines, and
others.
c. The instructor can add: Did seeing the terrain alter your opinion of any
of the leaders and their decisions?
2. What aspects of warfare have changed and what aspects have remained the
same since the Stalingrad Campaign?
a. The answers to the “changed” aspect will probably seem more obvious
to the modern military professional and often will be related to technology. This may include
changes in weapons, transportation systems, communications, cyber, drones, information
operations tools, and numerous other pieces of equipment.
b. The aspects that have “remained the same” may not seem as numerous
at first, but the students will often build on some initial answers and find a lot of good items. The
role of personalities, command relationships, the importance of logistics, the need for strong,
positive leadership, and an ability to motivate soldiers, the importance of operational maneuver,
determination, courage, and fear are just some of the items of warfare that seem to have changed
little since 1942.
c. Depending on the group, you may want to ask a few more focused
questions. For example, if you have a logistics unit as participants, you can ask what aspects of
logistics have changed and what aspects have remained the same?
3. What insights can the modern military professional gain from the Stalingrad
Campaign that are relevant today? Clearly, the participants can take this discussion into a vast
number of arenas.
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a. Once again, the type of unit participating in the Staff Ride might help to
guide the discussion. For example, a military intelligence unit might focus the commander’s
situational awareness, intelligence gathering, and the importance of reconnaissance.
b. Modern frameworks such as Warfighting Functions and the Elements of
the Operational Art can be used to help prompt the discussion.
4. The three suggested Integration Phase questions are meant to aid in sparking
discussion, not to provide hard and fast “rules” of warfare. The Instructor should always be ready
for the participants to develop their own answers, and thus be prepared to let the discussion roam
many different paths. With that in mind, below is a brief list of popular topics in the Stalingrad
Campaign. It is just a short starter for a many other possibilities.
Balancing the tactical urban fight with the larger operational goals of the campaign.
The cost in lives and time involved in urban operations.
Collateral damage (civilian casualties and property damage/destruction) considerations.
Why are urban operations resource-intensive, requiring large numbers of soldiers and
units to effectively clear and hold sections of terrain?
Combined Arms in an urban fight.
Training, doctrine and equipment needed for an urban battle.
Evaluate Chuikov’s and Paulus’ leadership in light of Mission Command.
