Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! - Sicherheitspolitik

Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 05. 2010

Stalemate Meets Structural Reform!

The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact

of the Lisbon Treaty

von Karsten Pötschke

WiSi-Papers

Texte des Bundesverbandes für Sicherheitspolitik an Hochschulen

WISSENSCHAFT & SICHERHEIT


The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty


A. Introduction

After1 the Cold War the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU)

shaped Europe‟s strategic landscape. During the

last 20 years both organizations have changed their

character tremendously. Having lost its main raison

d´être since the Soviet threat had vanished, NATO

is still in the process of defining its new mission.

Besides maintaining collective defense as its core

function, it is trying to find new uses for its

capabilities. Simultaneously, the European

Communities (EC) have been transformed with the

Treaty of Maastricht (1992) into the European

Union. In order to promote political integration the

EU is successively equipped with powers and

instruments to deal with foreign policy matters. As

part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy

(CFSP) the European Union has only recently

begun starting with the EU Summit of Cologne

(1999) to develop an European Security and

Defense Policy (ESDP) as integral part.2 The

European Union strives for the capability to conduct

a broad range of military and civilian operations.

Unfortunately, the parallel development of NATO

and EU has created some friction since

responsibility is not clearly divided among the

organizations.3 In response the EU and NATO

announced a formal “Strategic Partnership” in 2002

almost 10 years after the start of the parallel

1 The author holds a bachelor degree in

International Relations from Dresden University of

Technology. He is currently a LLM (Adv.) candidate in

Public International Law at Leiden University. The

author wishes to thank Professor Frans A.M. Alting von

Geusau and Nicholas Procopenko for their

encouragement and perceptive comments. All errors are

the author’s own. 2 For a good overview of the development of ESDP see Keukeleire, From Taboo to Spearhead 3 Twenty-one countries belong to NATO and the

EU. The six non-NATO members of the European Union

are Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and

Sweden; the seven non-EU members of NATO are

Albania, Canada, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, Turkey and

the USA.

development to resolve tensions between the

organizations.4

The objective of the paper is twofold. It strives to

analyze the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the

NATO-EU Strategic Partnership. Therefore, it will

need to review the current state of the partnership

beforehand to identify existing deficits of and risks to

the relationship. By focusing afterwards on selected

revised European Union treaty provisions, the article

will be able to analyze whether existing problems

are mended, ignored, or aggravated. Thereafter, it

will briefly discuss the possible impact of the

development trend of the EU-NATO partnership on

international law. The final conclusion will contain an

outlook of the future development of NATO-EU

relations and, building upon prior findings, some

policy advice.

B. NATO – EU Strategic Partnership before

Lisbon

The following chapter will focus on the description of

the strategic partnership between EU and NATO

before the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty.

Before looking at the links which have been

established between the organizations and how

these organizations cooperated in the field, the

chapter will first briefly address the question why

NATO and EU are doomed to cooperate. Finally, the

persistent problems in the relationship between

NATO and EU will be reviewed.

1. Reasons for a Strategic Partnership

There are several reasons why NATO and EU need

to cooperate thoroughly. The most important ones

are: First, as can be seen comparing the current

NATO strategy as developed at the 1999

Washington Summit5 and the EU strategy with

respect to CFSP and ESDP6, it is apparent that both

4 EU-NATO, EU-NATO declaration on ESDP 5 NATO, Washington Strategic Concept 1999 6 EU, Report on the Implementation of the

European Security Strategy, 1-9




organizations have partially overlapping missions

and geographical foci. Both organizations aim to

bolster European defense and crisis management

capacities. In addition, besides having a clear focus

on Europe, both organizations conduct crisis

management operations worldwide. It is important

to note that the EU as an actor who is perceived as

more independent than NATO can be active in

regions where NATO engagement is politically

impossible. The EU missions to Georgia after the

Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, in the Middle

East and in the Ukraine can stand as an example.

Hence, one organization can stabilize regions which

are also of strategic interest to the other.7

Second, the organizations need to coordinate since

they partially build upon the same resource pool. As

some countries‟ militaries have to fulfill roles within

NATO and the ESDP, they have earmarked their

resources for use within both frameworks. Hence,

two problems arise: Availability and interoperability.

Availability is not only an issue when resources are

double hatted and are already used within an EU or

NATO operation yet are needed by the other

organization for its own mission, but also when they

are single hatted since then the other organization

has no access to these resources at all.

Interoperability is important to ensure that national

resources can be used in both NATO and EU roles

and that resources of countries, not being a joint

member of NATO and EU, can be applied

effectively in operations where NATO and EU are

jointly engaged.8

Third, both organizations lack certain capacities that

the other organization can offer. Many of today‟s

7 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44 (highlighting

added) 8 Here different training standards and equipment

have proved to be a problem, since NATO rules of

engagement differ from EU rules. See CRS, NATO and

EU, 7 and 20

crises call for a comprehensive approach combining

military and civilian efforts.9 Undoubtedly, the EU is

more proficient than NATO in topics like civilian

reconstruction or the promotion of the rule of law,

but it is still lacking necessary assets to conduct

high intensity combat operation.10

The reality is that

“EU capabilities have become the necessary

complement to NATO‟s military forces in nearly all of

the Alliance‟s current operations.”11

Fourth, both organizations suffer from similar

capacity shortfalls. Joint capacity building is likely to

benefit both organizations and moderate costs for

the member states. The importance of cooperation

to address joint capability shortfalls is highlighted by

the fact that the 2009 EU Report on ESDP

dedicates one third of its section on NATO-EU

relations to the work of the joint EU-NATO

Capability Group.12

Fifth, the number of operations where NATO and

EU Assets are deployed jointly is rising; recent

examples are Afghanistan and the fight against

piracy (Operation Ocean Shield (NATO) and

Atalanta (EU)).13

Sixth, as Shea points out, in an ever more multi-

polar world, where power shifts towards Asia, the

pressure of North America and Europe increases

since both have a common value base resulting in

similar policies.14

9 The Counter Insurgency (COIN) strategy in

Afghanistan is a perfect example of this complex

interplay. See PA Consulting Group, Dynamic Planning

for COIN in Afghanistan; NATO, Afghanistan Report

2009; and US Army, COIN Field Manual 10 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 99; Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 32 11 Shea quote a high ranking NATO official, see

Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44 12 EU, ESDP Report 2009, 34; EU, Development

of European Military Capabilities, 6 13 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44 14 Ibid., 45




To sum up, NATO and the ESDP of the European

Union are realities which cannot be denied by the

other organization. For practical reasons they are

required to cooperate as long as both of them exist.

The next part will explain how the organizations

have structured their cooperation.

2. Conceptual and Institutional Links

The European Union is linked via various

instruments and forums with NATO. The foundation

for formal cooperation was created with the

announcement of a “Strategic Partnership” in 2002

in the joint “EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP”15

. The

cornerstone of this partnership is the Berlin Plus

Agreement of 2003 which gives the European Union

“assured access” to NATO planning abilities and

“presumed access”16

to NATO operational

capabilities for EU-led missions. Furthermore, both

organization confirmed and have constantly

reassured each other that their relationship ought to

be mutually reinforcing and that they respect their

decision making autonomy. Additionally, it was

underlined that the development of ESDP takes

place within the framework of NATO and that NATO

should remain the main organization for the

provision of collective security in Europe.17

Before

the Lisbon Treaty, it seemed that NATO

distinguished itself from the EU via its mandate of

collective self defense which contrasts the EU‟s

more general humanitarian tasks.18

NATO and the EU slowly established institutional

links parallel to the conceptual links. The formal

15 EU-NATO, Declaration on ESDP 16 The agreement reads that NATO will with

“strong likelihood” decide that some listed assets and capabilities will be made available to the EU. See EU-

NATO, Berlin Plus Agreement; see also CRS, FAQ EU,

6; CRS, NATO and EU, 16 17 See for example EU, ESDP Report 2009, 34

and NATO, Straßbourg/Kehl; Duke, Future of EU-

NATO Relations, 28 18 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 30

development commenced with informal “breakfast

meetings”19

between the NATO Secretary-General

de Hoop Scheffer and the High Representative for

CFSP Solana, a former NATO Secretary-General

himself. As the ESDP developed more permanent

structures in 2001, expanded institutionalized

cooperation became viable. Currently, meetings

between the Foreign Ministers of NATO and EU or

the EU‟s Political and Security Committee (PSC)

and NATO‟s North Atlantic Council are common

practice20

. Furthermore, EU and NATO have

established ad hoc working groups addressing

issues such as managing capability goals, the

implementation of the Berlin Plus Agreement, the

exchange of classified information, or the facilitation

of geographical dialog.21

In addition, mission

working groups have been established to coordinate

efforts where NATO personnel are deployed

alongside EU personnel.22

Moreover, the EU has

established a small planning cell at the Supreme

Headquarter Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in

2006 which is reciprocal to the NATO permanent

liaison team to EU Military Staff (EUMS) (since

2005).23

However, it appears that the informal staff

to staff contacts are most important to smooth the

day to day cooperation.24

Moreover, the simple fact

that the majority of member states belongs to both

organizations or is associated at least via programs

like the NATO‟s Partnership for Peace (PfP)

guarantees an exchange of information.25

Looking at the development of the institutionalized

cooperation between the NATO and EU, one is

19 Ibid., 33 20 See NATO, List of Ministerial Dinners. 21 See for example Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 96 for the cooperation for the Berlin Plus mission Althea to

Bosnia-Herzegovina 22 CRS, NATO and EU, 16 23 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 33 24 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44 25 See EU, ESDP Report 2009, 34-35 for current

cooperation




likely to conclude that a healthy relationship

between both of them exists. However, as will be

shown below, this perception is misguiding.

3. Relationship of Field Operations

NATO and EU have conducted a broad range of

missions after the end of the Cold War. The

relationship pattern between them is and ever was

diverse. Both organizations conducted missions

which were totally independent from the other

organization.26

Many of the EU‟s independent

missions, however, made use of the Berlin Plus

Agreement since critical assets such as air transport

capacity were and are missing in the Union‟s

arsenal. The first such independent mission was

CONCORDIA in Macedonia. It seems that the Berlin

Plus Agreement is working quite effectively when

applied.27

The European Union‟s first autonomous

military mission outside the Berlin Plus agreement

was ARTEMIS to the DRC contributing to the

stabilization of the security conditions and the

improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia

in 2003.28

Some of the independent missions

conducted by the EU have in fact been taken over

from NATO; an example is the EU mission

(EUFOR) Althea which replaced NATO‟s in Bosnia-

Herzegovina.

In some instances EU and NATO missions run

parallel. Ideally they are complementary like in

Afghanistan. While ISAF focuses on the

development of the Afghan National Army, EUPOL

provides assistance to the Afghan National Police.

Furthermore, the European Union provides

significant funding, personal and material for non-

26 For NATO see Frantzen, NATO and peace

support operations 1991-1999 27 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44; EU, ESDP

Report 2009, 34 28 EU, Council Decision 2003/432/CFSP; for

NATO missions see: NATO, NATO operations and

missions

military activities in Afghanistan even within the

framework of NATO‟s Provision Reconstruction

Teams (PRT). Shea, the Director of Policy at NATO,

concludes that “it is difficult to envisage a major

NATO operation these days in which the EU would

not also be present in a significant complementary

role.”29

However, it seems that some operations are

rather competitive than complementary, which is

especially problematic if shared resources are used.

For instance, NATO and EU were competing to

provide air lift capacities for the African Union‟s

mission in Darfur.30

Also, at the Horn of Africa the

EU mission ATALANTA operates parallel to the

NATO‟s Ocean shield with essentially the same

mandate – prevent piracy.

4. Deficits and Risks

Whereas part 1 identified the opportunities created

by cooperation, this part turns to the other side of

the coin looking at the deficits of and the risks for

the strategic partnership.

The relationship between NATO and EU might look

healthy, but it is in fact crippled for various reasons.

At core of the “stalemate”31

is the fluidity in which

both organizations operate and their overlapping

membership. On the one hand, fluidity refers to the

ever changing operating environment of ESDP and

NATO. They need to deal with issues ranging from

classical national defense, over delivery of

humanitarian aid and out of area crisis management

to “new” threats like terrorism and organized crime.

On the other hand, fluidity refers to the

organizations themselves. NATO and the EU are

involved in a transformation process developing

their structures and strategies. Having three

29 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44 30 CRS, NATO and EU, 20; Duke, Future of EU-

NATO Relations, 32 31 This is the term used by former NATO

Secretary-General Japp de Hoop Scheffer, see de Hoop

Scheffer, Transatlantic Leadership for a New Era




variables (environment, NATO, ESDP), which are

highly volatile and whose future value is hard to

predict, it seems to be almost impossible to define a

stable and efficient relationship among the EU and

NATO.

On a less abstract level the threats facing the

relationship are: Firstly, the purpose and mission of

NATO are not clearly defined. The strategic

concepts of Rome (1991) and Washington (1999)

are merely interim measures. Since the end of the

Cold War, which rendered collective security less

important, it is constantly looking for a new raison

d´être. While it is looking for a purpose, NATO does

not want the EU to occupy any possible roles it

might want to fulfill itself. This leads to rivalry. The

internal deadlock about strategic future, due to

deadlocked negotiations between the USA and

Europe as well as the Europeans response to fulfill

their vision via ESDP, hinders effective cooperation

between NATO and EU.

Secondly, impacted by either the lack of their own

strategic concepts or their ambiguity, NATO and EU

have not gone past their mutual recognition as

strategic actors in the European security structure.

Despite the limited substantial cooperation32

a

common comprehensive strategy is missing. Thus,

no clear cut burden sharing exists (e.g. NATO

focuses on collective security and robust peace

enforcement, while the EU focuses on policing and

peace keeping and building). The manner in which

NATO and EU cooperate led some to conclude that

the “strategic benefits to Europe‟s security have

resulted more from a happy convergence of the

independent actions of both NATO and the EU than

from a deliberately coordinated policy of these two

32 On issues like: defense policy, crisis

management, capability building for expeditionary

missions, stabilization and reconstruction operations and

security sector reform.

institutions.”33

Furthermore, the absence of a

common strategy and henceforth priority setting

hampers the effective development of capabilities

and creates the controversy about deployment of

commonly used resources.

Thirdly, there is a constant fear of competition for

especially more mobile, high readiness resources

and the fear of independent, uncoordinated action

by one organization.34

This fear is not quite

unfounded. The examples of the USA‟s coalition of

the willing or the competition in support of the AU‟s

Darfur mission are telling. Another stunning example

of lacking coordination is the fight against piracy. At

the Horn of Africa are currently ships from multiple

NATO/EU countries deployed in various missions.

These ships are active under national command, as

part of the NATO Operation Ocean Shield, the EU

Operation ATALANTA, or the US led CTF 151.35

Fourthly, one major reason for the deadlock of EU-

NATO cooperation relates to Turkey. Not only has

the Turkish blockade “reduced to a farce the regular

official meetings between the PSC and the NAC[,]”36

which makes strategic cooperation impossible, but

also everyday cooperation between established

liaison cells is hampered.37

To justify this blockade,

Turkey claims that it cannot pass NATO intelligence

to EU, since non-PfP countries Malta and Cyprus

could benefit.38

Before looking into the reasons for

Turkeys obstruction of coordination of EU-NATO

relations, it needs to be pointed out that Turkey

exerts quite some influence over NATO and EU.

Besides the fact that Turkey can effectively veto any

33 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44 34 CRS, NATO and EU, 7; McNamara, CFSP

threatens transatlantic security, 2 35 Wiegold, Wie ernüchternd ist die Piratenbilianz

& Order of Battle (Revised) 36 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 96 37 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 34 38 Ibid., 29; Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 96-97




NATO decision due to the consensus requirement39

,

Turkey‟s geographic location as bridge between

Europe, the Middle East and Asia is of strategic

importance. Furthermore, excluding Russia, it

commands by far the biggest European military,40

hence it has a great potential to support peace

keeping operations. Turkey has already done so in

support of several ESDP mission.41

Turkey‟s behavior derives from various reasons.

Turkey is not interested in seeing a separate

European Security Identity evolve at the decline of

NATO. Additionally, it has virtually no weight in

ESDP as compared to its active role in the Western

European Union before. Ankara is also upset with

the EU because of the slow progress in its

accession negotiations. Furthermore, the historical

conflict between Greece, Cyprus and Turkey over

Northern Cyprus has recently reached new heights.

Additionally, Cyprus is reciprocally blocking Turkish

participation in EU security activities like the EDA. It

is mainly the political disagreement between Turkey

and Cyprus that has “essentially held the entire

ESDP-NATO relationship hostage for years.”42

The deadlock is hampering everything from

strategic debate, over every day exchange of

sensitive information up to the set up of new

missions or the management of existing missions.

For instance, Turkey‟s refusal to let Cyprus

participate in a police training mission in Southern

Kosovo complicates this mission.43

Strategic

cooperation on questions like Afghanistan or Darfur

is impossible. The existing informal channels are

39 NATO, Consensus-Decision Making 40 In fact, it has with 514.000 troops twice as much as Germany (215.000). Russia excluded. For

military comparison see Globalfirepower, Turkey

Military Strength and Globalfirepower, Germany

Military Strength 41 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 98 42 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 96-97 43 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 39

not a viable alternative to formal debates and

decisions. Moreover, Turkey also weakened the EU

Battlegroup concept by withdrawing its promised

contribution. Furthermore, the future application of

the Berlin Plus Agreement is also unclear due to

possible Turkish delays. ALTHEA might be its last

mission.44

Fifthly, the current institutional links are weak and

deficient, especially for cooperation on strategic

matters. The Berlin Plus Agreement might have

worked well in the two instances where it was

applied; however, it is too cumbersome and

politically complex to be suitable for some of the

EU‟s envisioned fast crisis response scenarios.

Additionally, it does not explicitly allow strategic

debate. Furthermore, it forces the EU to adapt to

NATO structures.45

Therefore, some like Howorth

conclude that “an entirely new set of arrangements

therefore needs negotiating.” 46

It is highly unlikely

that this is going to happen any time soon especially

because of the Turkish blockade.47

Moreover,

outside Berlin Plus, the capacity to conclude

agreements quickly between NATO and EU to

arrange for joint deployment was hampered48

by the

lack of international legal personality of the

European Union.49

Sixthly, recently the base for the development ESDP

within the framework of NATO known as the three

Ds (no decoupling, no discrimination, no

duplication), a term coined by Madeleine Albright in

1998, is being questioned.50

ESDP challenges all

44 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 97; see also Duke,

Future of EU-NATO Relations, 33; CRS, FAQ EU, 6;

CRS, NATO and EU, 17 45 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 34 46 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 97 47 In fact, Ankara already delayed the conclusion

of the Berlin Plus Agreement by two years, see Howorth,

NATO and ESDP, 97 48 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 45 49 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 30 50 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 100




three D‟s by its very design. Duplication is

inevitable. For example, after in 2002 the

compromise to add a small operational planning cell

to EUMS could prevent the establishment of a

separate EU Military Headquarter,51

the 2008 EU

strategic review based on operational experience

concluded that the EU still needed its own military

planning capacity.52

The fear of decoupling is

evident, considering the negative reactions of some

NATO countries because the EU did not consult

NATO before starting its latest autonomous mission

to Congo, even though EU did not request the use

of NATO.53

Yet, on the other hand not only the

Europeans are striving for more independence

through ESDP, but also the USA has recently

detached itself from the NATO framework when it

engaged in “coalitions of the willing”. The reason for

the decoupling process is the growing division

between European and Americans about the

strategic security interest of each region. This

transatlantic divide is best seen in the struggle to

find a new security strategy for NATO.

In conclusion, the problems the NATO-EU

partnership is facing are intrinsically linked to the

problems NATO and the EU face by themselves:

The divide between the their member states about

the proposed role for the organization in the future,

the fear of each organization and member states to

be sidelined in important decisions as well as very

tight military budgets and limited military capabilities

threaten security cooperation among the two

organizations. Furthermore, the assumption that

NATO is the senior partner in the relationship, who

51 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 33-34;

CRS, NATO and EU, 16 52 EU, Report on the Implementation of the

European Security Strategy, 9 53 CRS, NATO and EU, 20

dictates is the terms of the development of ESDP

and the strategic partnership, is under siege.54

5. Interim Conclusion

As has been shown, it is in the interest of North

America and Europe that the EU and NATO

cooperate thoroughly and avoid competition and

rivalry. Crises like in Somalia or Afghanistan call for

long term engagement of NATO and EU.55

The

potential for synergies and greater coherence

exists.56

Yet, the formal relationship between them

is still unsatisfactory or even dysfunctional. Their

relationship is dominated by “political and functional

confusion.” 57

Lately, it seems that “neither entity is

at all interested in a formal division of labour.”58

Cooperation under the Berlin Plus Agreement,

except for existing missions, is steadily declining.59

This is even more surprising as the agreement

offers a partial raison d’être for NATO after the Cold

War, which, henceforth, should be interested in its

implementation. The various deficits identified are

the cause and catalyst for the diminishing scope of

cooperation between NATO and the EU. The Lisbon

Treaty impacts on both will be discussed next.

C. Possible Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on

the NATO-EU Strategic Partnership

Subsequently, selected provisions of the Treaty on

the European Union (TEU) and of the Treaty on the

Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as

revised by the Lisbon Treaty, which are relevant for

the NATO-EU Strategic Partnership, will be

examined. The focus will be on those prominent

provisions which either differ from the Nice Treaty or

54 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 98; CRS, NATO

and EU, 23 55 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 45 56 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 96 57 Ibid., 96 58 Ibid., 99 59 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 29




will likely have an impact on the Strategic

Partnership.

1. General

Prior to any in depth analysis of the Lisbon Treaty, it

is important to note that the Lisbon Treaty

resembles most of the provisions which already

were contained in the European Constitution; in

total over 90 percent of the structure of the

constitutional treaty have been preserved, and even

more in case of CFSP.60

However, despite that the

provisions on CFSP and ESDP proved to be the

“most uncontroversial” in the negotiation and

ratification process of the treaty,61

significant

academic debate62

about their quality and the

impact on transatlantic relations exists: For

instance, Sally McNamara perceives the Lisbon

Treaty as the “most significant boost to date” of

CSFP that effectively “remov[es] foreign policy form

the intergovernmental sphere and mak[es] it a

supranational EU competence” and that “the Lisbon

treaty represents a major threat to the NATO

alliance.63

Contrary, the International Security

Information Service concludes that many provisions

of the treaty “do not challenge the essential inter-

governmental nature of foreign and security policy

decision making.”64

Undoubtedly, this second

interpretation appears after all more convincing.

First, it might be true that in direct comparison with

the Nice Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty represents a

significant restructuring of CFSP and ESDP;

60 With respect to CFSP only three relevant

changes occurred: First, the ECJs jurisdiction is more

limited with respect to CFSP (Art. 24 TEU); a separate

data protection clause has been introduced, and the

principle of implied powers does explicitly not apply to

CFSP (Art. 352 TFEU); Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 2-5; CRS, FAQ EU, 3 61 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 104 62 A very good summary can be found at Wessels/

Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 3-5 63 McNamara, CFSP threatens transatlantic

security, 1, 10 64 ISIS, Impact of Lisbon, 1

however, keeping that the organic development of

ESDP occurred mainly outside the treaty structure,

the Lisbon Treaty merely “brings the ESDP and all

its development since the Cologne European

Council in 1999 within the Treaty framework.”65

Secondly, despite the formal abolition of the EU‟s

pillar structure, it seems to continue to exist at least

implicitly. For instance, all major substantial

decisions require unanimity66

, only implementation

decisions in non CFSP matters are subject to

qualified majority voting. Yet, in case of vital interest

even implementation decisions can be referred to

the European Council for a decision by unanimity.67

Additionally, Article 31 TEU prohibits any kind of

legislative act. Moreover, Article 24 TEU stresses

that the procedures of CFSP must be strictly

observed, and Article 352 TFEU underlines the

prohibition of the use of implied powers. Therefore,

it can be concluded CFSP and CSDP essentially

remain an intergovernmental matter.68

If it however

represents a threat to NATO and the partnership is

a different matter, which will be discussed below.

65 DGExPo, Lisbon and its implications for CFSP,

3 66 Constructive abstention is allowed (Art. 31 (1)

3rd sentence TEU); see also Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 23 67 Art. 31 TEU in the Nice Treaty the threshold for

referral was lower: Only “important” interests must have

been in stake for a referral. See also Wessels/ Bopp,

Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 24-25 68 So concludes also Wessels/ Bopp, Intuitional

Architecture after Lisbon, 10-11




2. EU Objectives and Missions

a) Objective of CFSP and Extended Petersberg

Tasks

As ESDP, now formally CSDP, is an “integral part”

of the Unions CFSP,69

it ought to contribute to the

Union objectives as set out in the Preamble, Article

3 (5) and Article 21 TEU.

In comparison to Nice several differences can be

identified in the Union‟s objectives which can have

an impact on the conceptual relationship between

NATO and EU. Article 3 contains an expanded list

of common values which characterize the EU

internally and that it seeks to promote externally. It

is important to note that the EU has added the

“protection of its citizens” as a new aim. Article 3

and 21, which combines several Nice Treaty

articles, underlines the Union‟s character as a

“civilian power”70

willing to export its values and

promote worldwide development.71

The Lisbon Treaty also updates the ESDP mission

task list.72

Compared to the old TEU this Petersberg

Task73

list seems quite extensive.74

However, if

compared to the latest mission list as set out in the

Head Line Goal 2010 (2004) the task extension

seems less dramatic.75

Yet, it can be seen as

reaffirming of the EU‟s strategic development.

69 Art. 42 (1) TEU 70 Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after

Lisbon, 7-8 71 Articles 11(1), 131, 177, 181a TEU (Nice

version) 72 Article 43 TEU 73 The mission list was only included with the

Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 to the EU. Originally it was a task list compiled by the Western European Union in

1992. See WEU, Petersberg Declaration 74 Article 17 TEU (Nice version) only included

humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and tasks of

combat forces crisis management. 75 DGExPo, Lisbon and implications for CFSP, 5-

6

Furthermore, it is remarkable that new list contains

explicitly the task of conflict prevention and post-

conflict stabilization, besides the old tasks of

peacekeeping and peace-making, but also the task

of combating terrorism. In addition, Article 42

stresses the coherent civilian-military approach of

ESD.

In conclusion, the new aims and objective provisions

reflect the EU‟s desire to become a global actor and

crisis manager. On the one hand, the extension of

the Petersberg Tasks can lead to increased

tensions and pressure to coordinate with NATO as it

aims to be active in the same area (e.g. terrorism).

On the other hand provides the EU‟s explicit focus

on prevention and post-conflict stabilization and

civilian-military cooperation potential for a burden

sharing.76

The preamble and Article 3, in particular,

contribute to widening the transatlantic conceptual

divide as they reaffirm the European position on

issues like the respect for the United Nations system

and the preferred mode of conflict resolution.

b) Towards a Truly Common Defense Policy

The Lisbon Treaty maintains the goal of a common

defense policy. However, the language in some

parts of new Treaty is more compelling than in

previous treaties. For instance, the ESDP was

renamed to CSDP. Article 42 (2) TEU now states

that CSDP “shall include the progressive framing of

a common Union defence policy” and “this will lead

to a common defense”. The provisions promote the

doubling of capacities and open the opportunity for

decoupling from NATO strategy. The changed

provisions can especially harm the partnership if

read in conjunction with the new aim of “citizen

protection” as they encroach on NATO‟s core

function.

76 The Operation Active Endeavour in the

Mediterranean is one example, which could lead to

coordination difficulties.




c) Formal Relationship to NATO

Like previous treaties the revised TEU stresses in

Article 42 (2), directly after it confirmed the

perspective of the developing a truly common

defense policy, that the Union shall respect the

obligations of member states under the North

Atlantic Treaty and that CSDP shall be compatible

with NATO defense policy. Yet, paragraph 2 does

not state that CSDP will be developed within the

NATO policy framework. However, the newly

established provision on mutual assistance77

reaffirms that NATO will “remain[] the foundation of

[…] collective defence and the forum for its

implementation [for NATO members].” The future

will show how much these provisions are a mere lip

service to calm some NATO member states and

improve the relations to NATO. However, the

absence of such provisions would have been

certainly destructive for NATO-EU relations.

3. Institutions and Procedure

a) Longer Presidency, High Representative and

European External Action Service

The Lisbon Treaty aims to provide greater visibility,

stability and coherence in the Union‟s CFSP by

prolonging the presidency of the European Council

to two and a half years78

and the creation of the

“High Representative of the Union for Foreign

Affairs and Security Policy” (HR),79

who is

supported by the newly created European External

Action Service (EEAS).80

The HR will wield

substantial power as he will link the Council to the

Commission by combining the roles of the former

High Representative for CFSP in the Council and

the Commissioner for External Relations.81

77 Art. 42 (7) TEU 78 Article 15 (5) TEU 79 Article 18 TEU 80 Art. 27 (3) TEU 81 ISIS, Impact of Lisbon, 2

Furthermore, besides leading the Foreign Affairs

Council he or she will be the Vice President of the

Commission. The tasks of the HR, inter alia, are to

representing the Union‟s position in International

Organization, to harmonize Member States views

and to preside over the CFSP bodies.

The wish to create greater policy coherence through

new institutional structures is supplemented by

expanding the obligation of member states to

confirm with Union policy. Article 24 (3) TEU adds

to the existing commitment to refrain from any action

which is contrary to the interest of the Union or likely

to impair its effectiveness the obligation to “comply

with the Union‟s action in [CFSP]”. Hence, the

member states‟ obligation to coordinate themselves

is enhanced.82

The impact on the behavioral pattern

of member states remains to be seen.83

The major changes in institutional architecture

certainly do have an impact on NATO-EU relations.

First, they are likely to create greater policy

coherence among the European states, which

eventually will tilt the balance of power in NATO and

in the strategic partnership towards Europe as the

USA will have more difficulties countering pre-

negotiated European consensus. Secondly, as the

HR will make a difference in framing EU policy

towards NATO, its election mechanisms require

some attention. The required qualified majority could

either be achieved through a “pro integration” or “pro

NATO” coalition or from 2017 onward by all 23

smaller member states plus two big states.84

Lastly,

the new architecture has the potential to address the

82 For a detailed description of member states

obligations see Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 12 83 For a detailed explanation of institutional

changes see Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture

after Lisbon, 14-23 especially 16 84 „Big states“ are Germany, France, United

Kingdom and Italy. Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional

Architecture after Lisbon, 20




Turkey-problem as it allows member states to adopt

decisions with qualified majority if they act upon a

proposal from the HR.85

Hence, the Union could

approve actions that improve the relationship with

Turkey even against the opposition of Cyprus.

However, due to the provisions limitation in case of

“vital interests” and the exclusion of matters with

security and defense implications, it remains to be

seen to what extend the provisions can be applied.

b) EDA

The European Defense Agency (EDA) is not an

invention of Lisbon. It was established by the

Council of Ministers in 2004 “to improve the EU‟s

defense capabilities.”86

It came into being despite

the failed ratification of the Constitutional treaty. It is

the perfect example that “institutional changes

within the CFSP are also pursued without the official

procedure of treaty revisions and ratification”. 87

However, the Lisbon Treaty did not only bring EDA

within the treaty structure, but also highlighted

EDA‟s importance of the improvement of European

military capacities by the frequency and compelling

manner it referred to EDA.88

It underlines the wish

of European states to make the EU also a military

actor on the international scene.89

The EDA is critical in the attempt to encourage

more joint R&D and procurement amongst

European allies. Indisputably, the choices EDA will

make are going to be important for NATO-EU

relations.90

The European capability building can

have “beneficial effects on allied contributions to

NATO,”91

as Duke predicts, but it could also lead to

85 Art. 31 (2) TEU 86 EU, Joint Action, 2004/551/CFSP 87 Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after

Lisbon, 28 88 Mainly Art. 42 (3) and 45 TEU, see also Duke,

Future of EU-NATO Relations, 32 89 ISIS, Impact of Lisbon, 4 90 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 38 91 Ibid., 28

more decoupling and duplication. In order to benefit

the partnership the USA and Europe will have to

agree on common priorities and threats that need to

be countered. Such agreement will depend on the

outcome of NATO‟s strategic debate. Furthermore,

NATO‟s capabilities development mechanism and

EDA need to establish a formal relationship, which

is also less likely today.

4. Other Instruments

a) Mutual Assistance and Mutual Solidarity

Clause

The mutual assistance clause92

and the solidarity

clause93

are important innovations. The solidarity

clause will not directly impact the NATO-EU

relationship as its application is limited to terrorist

attacks and man-made or natural disasters. It has,

however, the potential to supplement NATO efforts

in preventing and reacting towards terrorist attacks

since it includes also non-military actions.

The mutual assistance/defense clause can however

be perceived as a threat to NATO. The including

saving clause, which prohibits the treaty from

prejudging NATO‟s collective defense system, is

merely cosmetic. If the mutual assistance/defense

clause is seen in conjunction with the provisions on

establishing a common defense policy and the goal

of protection of European citizen, it is apparent that

the clause encroaches on NATO‟s core function –

collective self-defense. However, Duke concludes

that despite the provision the EU will not assume a

classical collective defense function.94

Currently, the

EU lacks the military capacity to displace NATO as

92 Article 42 (7) TEU; detailed analysis of the

article can be found at DGExPo, Lisbon and its

implications on CFSP, 8 93 Art. 222 TFEU 94 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 31; also

Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 11




foundation for Europe‟s defense. Yet, the pure

existence of the clause will put strain on the NATO-

EU relations.

b) Permanent Structured and Enhanced

Cooperation Procedure

In reaction to the existing ESDP rhetoric-resource

gap95

and the Union‟s desire to handle the extended

Petersberg Tasks, the Lisbon Treaty expands the

existing mechanism “Enhanced Cooperation”96

to

ESDP and introduces the new mechanism of

“Permanent Structured Cooperation”97

(PSCo). The

later is especially interesting for the EU-NATO

relationship. Member States “whose military

capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have

made more binding commitment to one another […]

with a view to the most demanding missions shall

establish permanent structure cooperation”. The

PSCo is established by QMV in the Council after

consultation with the HR. The details of PSCo are

laid out in detail in a specific protocol. It defines the

“higher criteria” threshold and calls upon the

participants “to take concrete measures to enhance

the availability, interoperability, flexibility and

deployability of their forces.”98

They shall cooperate

in joint procurement and development programs

and regularly review their commitments with respect

to the changing security environment and the EU‟s

missions. Furthermore, they are called upon to

develop their defense capacities in multinational

forces99

. In fact, PSCo is one of the few CFSP

provisions that clearly show the motivation of

95 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 32 96 Art. 326-334 TFEU 97 Art. 42 (6) icw 46 TEU 98 DGExPo, Lisbon and its implications for CFSP,

7 99 The Battelgroup concept is also included in the

Protocol.

member states to create more than

intergovernmental cooperation.100

The introduction of these mechanisms allows for a

Europe of two speeds; A hard core101

of particular

capable states could now go ahead with further

defense integration. The impact on NATO and the

Strategic Partnership is ambiguous. PSCo is likely

to strengthen European military capacities through

encouraged joint procurement projects and

improved interoperability. Furthermore, PSCo

provides a strong incentive for non participants to

improve their own military capacities in order to join

the PSCo. On the other hand, the risk exist that a

small group of EU nations pool their military

resources “to form an army of 60.000 to undertake

EU missions.” McNamara concludes that since no

additional troops would be enlisted, “either [forces]

who are already committed to NATO [would] be

counted twice, or, in the worst case scenario, troops

[would] be withdrawn from existing NATO

Missions.”102

Additionally, better coordinated and

capable Europeans could also aggravate the

deadlock within NATO and the NATO-EU

relationship since they are more likely to challenge

the USA‟s and NATO‟s leadership.

c) International Legal Personality

The explicit recognition of the Union‟s legal

personality is likely to strengthen the Union‟s

perception as a global actor.103

Additionally, it will

facilitate and accelerate the formal conclusion of

agreements with other international actors, including

NATO, improving the Union‟s reaction time.

100 ISIS, Impact of Lisbon, 4 101 At the beginning these are most likely the

Defense G6: Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain

and Poland. 102 McNamara, CFSP threatens transatlantic

security, 11 103 Art. 37 TEU icw Art. 47 TEU; Wessels/ Bopp,

Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 3




However, it is unlikely to resolve the political

deadlock preventing the conclusion of any kind of

agreements between NATO and EU.

d) Other

Two other innovations need mentioning. First,

Article 41 (3) provides a procedure “guaranteeing

rapid access to the Unions budget for urgent

financing of initiatives in the framework of” CFSP.

This includes the set up of a rapid start-up fund to

finance ESDP mission.104

Such a measure is likely

to increase the Unions crisis reaction time.

However, it might harm the NATO-EU relations, as

it strengthens the EU‟s crisis first responder

capacities, which impacts the debate on appropriate

roles of NATO and EU.

Second, the Lisbon treaty also institutionalizes the

practice105

to “entrust the implementation of an EU

mission” to a group of member states who are

“willing and have the necessary capacities.”106

This

procedure is similar to the delegation of UN mission

or even NATO non-Article 5 missions to certain

member states. It allows the effective

implementation of ESDP.107

This provision could

benefit NATO because it encourages capacity

development to fulfill delegated tasks. However, it

could also limit the availability of high quality

resources for NATO, as they may be already used

in EU missions.

5. Interim Conclusion

The Lisbon Treaty is not a revolutionary jump in the

development of ESDP, but it cements its progress

and hints the direction of its further development.

One can agree with the conclusions that “it is clearly

104 The provision emulates the current informal

funding practice for missions like Athena. DGExPo,

Lisbon and its implications, 3 105 E.g. Artemis 2003 with France as lead-nation. 106 Art. 44 TEU 107 ISIS, Impact of Lisbon, 4-5

an attempt to dismantle the pillars”108

and that “the

treaty underscores the EU‟s long held ambition to

become a global power.109

Keeping in mind the deficits and risks identified in

chapter B, the question whether the Lisbon Treaty

harms or helps NATO and the Strategic Partnership

cannot be answered easily. On the one hand, for

example, the recognition of NATO as prime

collective defense mechanism is positive. On the

other hand, the affirmation of the creation of a

common defense policy combined with the

introduction of a mutual assistance clause are very

likely to harm the relationship as they fuel the

traditional 3-D fears.110

The impact of other

provisions like the ones aiming at joint defense

procurement needs to be assessed in the light of

future events. Currently, it is not possible to

conclude whether they will help the Alliance, i.e. by

creating a bigger and better resource pool available

to the Alliance, or harm it, i.e. by substituting

armament cooperation in NATO for EU cooperation

and withdrawing resources from the Alliance.

Additionally, the new Treaty stresses the European

perception on foreign and security policy, which is

likely to reinforce the transatlantic divide. The further

development of European crisis management

capacities will also impact the debate on the division

of labor between NATO and the EU. More

importantly, some core problems of the NATO-EU

relationship, like the Cyprus-Turkey deadlock, are

not or only insufficiently addressed.

Therefore, de Hoop Scheffers conclusion that

Lisbon will not unlock the institutional stalemate in

the EU Relationship is probably correct.111

The

108 Ibid., 6 109 McNamara, CFSP threatens transatlantic

security, 9 110 Ibid., 10 111 de Hoop Scheffer, Transatlantic Leadership For

A New Era




treaty, by setting a clear course towards integration,

is more likely to aggravate the existing deadlock in

NATO and the Strategic Partnership. Following the

ratchet integration model the treaty will put more

pressure on the USA and NATO to adapt to Europe

as Europe‟s position is becoming more rigid.

D. Impact on the Development of

International Law

The current development of the EU-NATO

Relationship, impacted by the Lisbon Treaty, could

have in the long run a profound impact on the

development of international law. Three distinct

modes can be identified.

The first mode is the impact via the “European

approach to security”. Firstly, by acting coherently

(e.g. actions, declarations, voting behavior in UN

General Assembly) the European states could

contribute to the formation of soft law or even

custom. The further development can impact the

legal concept of security (human security, link

between security and development), the concept of

humanitarian intervention and the use of force. The

strict adherence to UN rules is likely to strengthen

the UN system. Secondly, a proactive EU could

promote European values like the rule of law as well

as human rights worldwide.

The second mode results from the cooperation

between NATO and EU. The cooperation could

further develop the law of cooperation among

international organizations, by helping to resolve

such questions as whether an organization can be

held legally responsible for the acts of another when

it shared its assets (logistics, intelligence).

The final mode results from further EU integration.

Because the Union is striving towards future

integration in areas previously reserved for

international-governmental cooperation, it could

help to develop legal rules and regulation governing

a more supranational cooperation. Furthermore, as

EU member states limit their sovereignty by

participating in the ESDP, it seems possible that the

legal concept of sovereignty is impacted, for

example, further limiting the scope of the domain

reserve.

E. Conclusion and Advice

Unfortunately it is true that “despite overlapping

membership and interests, NATO and the European

Union have struggled to establish a cooperative and

complementary relationship.”112

The main problems

bothering NATO-EU relation stem from the

conceptual transatlantic divide, which hampers the

ongoing transformation process of NATO as well as

Turkey‟s blockade of NATO-EU cooperation. The

deadlock in NATO‟s new strategy development and

the hampered EU-NATO strategic partnership are in

harsh contrast to the progressive development of

the ESDP, which can partially be understood as a

reflex to the standstill in NATO and the partnership.

Whereas the EU seems to have found its future role

in nation building and crisis management and is

rapidly developing structures and instruments to

match its vision, NATO is still puzzling where it

belongs to the 21st century.

The Lisbon Treaty, even though not revolutionary,

underlines the EU‟s drive for more independence

and points towards the creation of an “ever closer

union” also in security and defense issues. It is

unlikely to solve the existing deadlocks, but is more

likely to contribute to the transatlantic strategic

divide.

112 CRS, FAQ EU, 6




The more the pattern of EU progressive‟s

development and its establishment as a global crisis

manager with a comprehensive civilian-military

strategy in contrast to the deadlock in NATO

transformation and EU-NATO relations persists, the

more pressure will come upon NATO to define its

strategy in response to the EU‟s concept.113

It

seems we are at a turning point of the relations

between NATO and ESDP. Until recently, NATO

limited the scope in which ESDP could develop;

henceforth, it might be the ESDP defining what

NATO‟s role in the world should be.

However, this is far from concluding that NATO will

disappear.

In the foreseeable future NATO will

remain an important organization114

for the following

reasons: First, NATO‟s, but especially the USA‟s

and Canada‟s military capacities and knowledge is

still indispensable for the EU and the UN to resolve

high intensity conflicts. Furthermore, although the

transatlantic link has lost importance, the

relationship between North America and Europe is

and will remain special. The European continent is

well aware that several conflicts (e.g. Palestine,

Iran) can only be solved with the help of the United

States.115

The complete decoupling of Europe of

North America is therefore very unlikely. With this

perspective NATO will remain the forum for

transatlantic security and defense cooperation.

Based on the analysis of the relationship of EU and

NATO and the trend shown by the Lisbon Treaty the

following advice may be derived:

113 So concludes also Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 30 114 Howorth explicitly concludes that NATO will

stay the “primary body for coordinating military, security

and defense policy among its 28 member states.”

Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 105 115 EU, Report on the Implementation of the

European Security Strategy, 11

Keeping the history of European integration

in mind, NATO, but in particular the USA,

should accept that CSDP will boost the

EU’s civilian and military capacities to

operate independently from NATO. NATO

should not perceive this as threat to its

existence, but rather accept it as reality and

seize the opportunity to build its new

strategic concept in response to the path

chosen by the European Union.

Remembering its origins and capacities

NATO should retain its character as a

military and (collective self-) defense

organization and be a forum of

transatlantic exchange.

The EU has proven itself as a valuable

crisis manager. It should continue to boost

its own civilian and military capacities to

match its ambitious vision. To preserve the

transatlantic relationship it should refrain

from becoming the second collective self-

defense organization on the continent.

Since both organizations are still evolving,

NATO and the EU should abandon their

attempts to define a common strategic

relationship.116

Rather they should in the

short and medium term improve their ad-

hoc coordination and consultation

mechanism.

The transatlantic divide needs to be

addressed urgently. It can only be closed by

balancing the leadership ambitions of the

EU and the US and mutual understanding of

each other‟s world perception. Bilateral

dialogue between the US and European

116 So concludes also Howorth, NATO and ESDP,

106




states as well as between the USA and

the European Union should be

improved.

The Lisbon Treaty could not remove the

Turkish blockade of the Strategic

Partnership. It can only be solved if US-

Turkish and EU-Turkish relations are

improved in a comprehensive manner also

outside defense the security realm.117

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McNamara, Sally (2009): The EU‟s Common Foreign and Security Policy – How it Threatens Transatlantic Security, in: Backgrounder No. 2250, p. 1-12 (cited as: CFSP threatens transatlantic security)

PA Consulting Group (2009): Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan; available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Components/Photo/_new/Afghanistan_Dynamic_Planning.pdf (11.02.2010)

Shea, Jamie (2009): Ten Years of the ESDP – A NATO perspective, in: European Security and Defence Policy, Issue 9, 10 year anniversary issue 1999/2009, p. 44-45

Wessels, Wolfgang/ Bopp, Franziska (2008): The Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty – Constitutional breakthrough or challenges ahead?, Research Paper 6 June 2008, available at: http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf_The_Institutional_Architecture_of_CFSP_after_the_Lisbon_Treaty.pdf (17.02.2010) (citied as: Institutional Architecture after Lisbon)

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm

http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf

http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf

http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf

http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RS21372.pdf

http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RS21372.pdf

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32342.pdf

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-42311F8E-7F89AABB/natolive/opinions_50116.htm?selectedLocale=en



http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200805/20080513ATT28796/20080513ATT28796EN.pdf



http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_150_esr37tol-mar08.pdf



http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Components/Photo/_new/Afghanistan_Dynamic_Planning.pdf



http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf_The_Institutional_Architecture_of_CFSP_after_the_Lisbon_Treaty.pdf






Wiegold, Thomas (2009): Wie ernüchternd ist die Piratenbilianz & Order of Battle (Revised), blog entry of 28.12.2009; available at: http://wiegold.focus.de/augen_geradeaus/2009/12/wie-ern%C3%BCchtern-ist-die-piratenbilanz-order-of-battle-revised.html (11.02.2010)

http://wiegold.focus.de/augen_geradeaus/2009/12/wie-ernüchtern-ist-die-piratenbilanz-order-of-battle-revised.html






G. Appendix

Extracts from the revised Treaty on European Union

118

Article 3 (5) TEU

In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Article 21 TEU

1. The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.

2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to:

(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity;

(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law;

(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders;

118 Emphasis added.

(d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;

(e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade;

(f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development;

(g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and

(h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.

3. The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development and implementation of the different areas of the Union's external action […].

Article 24

1. The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence.

The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded.

The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by Member States, in accordance with the Treaties. The specific role of the European Parliament and of the Commission in this area is defined by the Treaties. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to these provisions, with the exception […].

2. […], the Union shall conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, based on the development […] the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States' actions.




3. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's action in this area.

The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.

The Council and the High Representative shall ensure compliance with these principles.

Article 37

The Union may conclude agreements with one or more States or international organisations in areas covered by this Chapter.

Article 42 TEU

1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.

2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also

make them available to the common security and defence policy. Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to as „the European Defence Agency’) shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.

4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.

5. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests. The execution of such a task shall be governed by Article 44.

6. Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article 46. It shall not affect the provisions of Article 43.

7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.




Article 43 (1) TEU

The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

Article 44 (1) TEU

Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. […]

Article 45 (1) TEU

1. The European Defence Agency referred to in Article 42(3), subject to the authority of the Council, shall have as its task to:

(a) contribute to identifying the Member States' military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments […];

(b) promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods;

(c) propose multilateral projects […], ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes;

(d) support defence technology research, […];

(e) contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector […].

Article 46 (1) TEU

1. Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation […], which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative […].

Article 47 TEU

The Union shall have legal personality.

Article 222 (1) TEFU

1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:

(a) - prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;

- protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;

- assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack;

(b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the

request of its political authorities, in the event of a

natural or man-made disaster.




Der Bundesverband Sicherheitspolitik an Hochschulen (BSH) ist der Dachverband sicherheitspolitischer Hochschulgruppen an deutschen Universitäten. Der BSH setzt sich aus sicherheitspolitisch interessierten Studierenden, Doktoranden und Lehrkräften aller Fachrichtungen zusammen. Die Mitgliedschaft im BSH steht allen sicherheitspolitisch interessierten Personen mit akademischem oder praktischem Hintergrund offen, welche die Grundsätze und Ziele des BSR teilen. Grundsätze des BSH Der BSH steht ein für die Verteidigung der Werteordnung des Grundgesetzes. In unserer sicherheitspolitischen Arbeit bildet die Auseinandersetzung mit Bedrohungen dieser Werteordnung einen Schwerpunkt. Zudem ist uns die Aufrechterhaltung der akademischen Freiheit ein besonderes Anliegen. Die Schaffung von Erkenntnis im Wettbewerb der Ideen setzt voraus, daß alle Stimmen gehört werden. Die Arbeit des BSH Die Arbeit des BSH richtet sich an alle Studierenden und erfolgt überparteilich und überkonfessionell. Die Aktivitäten des BSH umfassen:

Sicherheitspolitische Bildungsarbeit an Hochschulen

Akademische Nachwuchsförderung im sicherheitspolitischen Bereich

Wissenschaftliche Auseinandersetzung mit sicher-heitspolitischen Fragestellungen

Weiterbildung- und Qualifikation der Mitglieder im Bereich politische Bildung und Sicherheitspolitik

Impressum Wissenschaft & Sicherheit wird herausgegeben durch die AG Wissenschaft & Sicherheit des BSH und erscheint in unregelmäßigen Abständen. Kontakt und kostenloses elektronisches Abonnement unter [email protected] sowie [email protected] Kontakt: Verband der Reservisten der Deutschen Bundeswehr e.V. - Geschäftsstelle - Zeppelinstraße 7A 53177 Bonn Tel.: 0228/2590 914 Fax: 0228/2590 919 Im Internet www.sicherheitspolitik.de ISSN: 1869-5256 (elektronische Ausgabe „WiSi Papers“) Verantwortlich für diese Ausgabe: Karsten Pötschke Redaktion: Stella Adorf, Johanna Lange, Steve Schlegel

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