The 16th Sustainment Brigade: Supporting the DrawdownThe Commander’s Emergency Response ProgramSustaining the Army’s First Advise and Assist Brigade

WWW.ALU.ARMY.MIL/ALOG

MAY–JUNE 2010 FORMERLY ARMY LOGISTICIAN

Stability Operationsin Iraq

Approvedforpublicrelease;distributionisunlimited.PB700-10-03Headquarters,DepartmentoftheArmy

AParadigmShiftatNTC:CSSBsThatThink“InsidetheBox” —MajorJohnM.Ruths

SustainmentintheArmy’sFirstAdviseandAssistBrigade —LieutenantColonelDavidWilson

TheCommander’sEmergencyResponseProgram: SynergisticResultsThroughTraining—MajorMarkW.Lee

MDMPforSustainmentUnits—MajorDanielMisigoy

The 16Th SuSTainmenT Brigade in iraq

The16thSustainmentBrigadeinIraq:Supporting theDrawdown—ColonelMartinB.Pitts andLieutenantColonelRobertS.Mott

FuelSupportatContingencyOperatingBaseSpeicher —LieutenantColonelVincentC.Nwafor, SergeantFirstClassThomasE.Harrell,Jr., andStaffSergeantPaulaMiller

SharetheRoad:ConvoyEscort —MajorKrisA.Kough,CAARNG, andCaptainCurtisA.GollerIII,CAARNG

LandWarNet:IsYourITWorkforceReady? —ChiefWarrantOfficer(W–3)DannieWalters

PayingAgents:TheGood,theBad,andtheUgly —MajorBillKeltner

LogisticsSupportinanAustereEnvironment: TheMissiontoSinjar—CaptainJackA.Tyer,TNARNG

ResourcingandTrainingaLevelIIILogisticsTraining andAdvisoryTeam—LieutenantColonelCarlosE.Lopez

PB700–10–03VOLUME42ISSUE3MAY–JUNE2010www.alu.army.mil/alog

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Cover:SincetheU.S.-Iraqsecurityagreementtookeffecton1January2009,U.S.andcoalitionforcesinIraqhavetransitionedtostabilityoperations.ThisenvironmentischaracterizedbyadrawdowninU.S.trooplevels,partnershipswithIraqiunitsforbothtrainingandjointoperations,andsupportofhumanitarianreliefandreconstructionefforts.Thearticlesbeginningonpages7and10andtheseriesofarticlesprofilingthe16thSustainmentBrigadebeginningonpage18 examinethesustainmentofstabilityoperationsinIraq.Inthecoverphoto,ajointU.S.andIraqiconvoylinesupbeforeleavingthestagingareaatContingencyOperatingBaseSpeichertodeliverIraqitextbookstoschoolsaroundSalahadDinprovince.(Photo by SSG Raul Elliott)

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TheHumanResourcesOperationsBranch —CaptainRodenA.Carrido

BuildingtheLocalEconomyatQ-West —StaffSergeantPatriciaMcCarthy,WAARNG

TacticalGroundReportingImprovesOperationalPicture —CaptainSpencerBrown

UnitContractingProblemsDuringOverseasTrainingExercises —MajorWilliamT.Cundy

TrainingWithIndustry—LieutenantColonelMarshallN.Ramsey

ATRADOCBestPractice:AVirtualWaytoKeep TrainingCurrent—DonaldD.Copley,Jr.

DeployedArmyBands—ChiefWarrantOfficer(W–5)JohnS.Fraser

TheGlobalizationofMilitaryLogistics —MajorChristineM.Schverak

JOYCE E. MORROWAdministrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

1006203

BOARD OF DIRECTORSChairman

Major General James E. ChambersCommander

ArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommand

MembersLieutenant General Mitchell H. Stevenson

DeputyChiefofStaff,G-4DepartmentoftheArmy

Lieutenant General William N. PhillipsPrincipalMilitaryDeputy

totheAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnology

Lieutenant General James H. PillsburyDeputyCommandingGeneral

ArmyMaterielCommand

Lieutenant General Edgar E. Stanton IIIMilitaryDeputyforBudget

AssistantSecretaryoftheArmyFinancialManagementandComptroller

Lieutenant General Eric B. SchoomakerTheSurgeonGeneral

Ex OfficioBrigadier General Jesse R. Cross

TheQuartermasterGeneral

Brigadier General Lynn A. CollyarChiefofOrdnance

Brigadier General Brian R. LayerChiefofTransportation

Brigadier General Mark A. McAlisterCommander

ArmySoldierSupportInstitute

Brigadier General Joseph L. BassCommandingGeneral

ArmyExpeditionaryContractingCommand

Major General James K. GilmanCommandingGeneral

ArmyMedicalResearchandMaterielCommand

ARMY LOGISTICS UNIVERSITYColonel Shelley A. Richardson

President

Barbara G. MroczkowskiVicePresident

STAFFRobert D. Paulus,Editor

Kari J. Chenault,AssociateEditorApril K. Morgan,AssistantEditor

Julianne E. Cochran,AssistantEditorLouanne E. Birkner,AdministrativeAssistant

GraphicsartsandlayoutbyRCW Communication Design, Inc.

Thismediumisapprovedfortheofficialdissem-inationofmaterialdesignedtokeepindividualswithintheArmyknowledgeableofcurrentandemergingdevelopmentswithintheirareasofexpertiseforthepurposeofenhancingtheirpro-fessionaldevelopment.

ByOrderoftheSecretaryoftheArmy:

GEORGEW.CASEY,JRGeneral,UnitedStatesArmy

ChiefofStaff

Official:

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Army Sustainment(ISSN0004–2528)isabimonthlyprofessionalbulletinpublishedbytheArmyLogisticsUniversity,2401QuartersRoad,FortLee,Virginia23801–1705.Periodicalspost-ageispaidatPetersburg,VA23804–9998,andatadditionalmailingoffices.

Mission:Army SustainmentistheDepart-mentoftheArmy’sofficialprofessionalbulletinonsustainment.Itsmissionistopublishtimely,authoritativeinformationonArmyandDefensesustainmentplans,programs,policies,opera-tions,procedures,anddoctrineforthebenefitofallsustainmentpersonnel.Itspurposeistoprovideaforumfortheexchangeofinformationandexpressionoforiginal,creative,innovativethoughtonsustainmentfunctions.

Disclaimer:Articlesexpressopinionsofauthors,nottheDepartmentofDefenseoranyofitsagencies,anddonotchangeorsupersede

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LINES OF COMMUNICATION

SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS

HEADLINES

WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT

COMMENTARY

FOCUS

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS

HEADLINES

WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT

COMMENTARY

FOCUS

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2 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

AParadigmShiftatNTC:CSSBsThatThink“InsidetheBox”

by Major john M. ruths

ortCarson’s68thCombatSustainmentSupportBattalion(CSSB)completedaNationalTrainingCenter(NTC)rotationatFortIrwin,California,inJune2009 insupportofthe4thInfantryBrigadeCombatTeam(IBCT),1stInfantryDivision.The4thIBCT’sNTCrotationwasfocusedonOperationIraqiFreedom(OIF),andalthoughthe68thCSSBwasdeployingtoAfghanistanlaterintheyear,itfollowedtheOIFscenariowithoutanyproblems.

Duringmissionpreparation,the68thCSSB’slead-ersdiscoveredthatnoCSSBhadpreviouslycompletedarotation“inthebox,”meaning,locatedamongthemaneuverunitsinthemiddleofthefight.Instead,allCSSBshadoccupiedandoperatedoutofapartofFortIrwinthatisoftenreferredtoasthe“dustbowl,”which

isnownamedLogisticsSupportArea(LSA)Warrior.Gettingoutofthedustbowlandinsidetheboxisthesubjectofthisarticle.

TrainingatNTC“Thiswasgoingtobeourcapstonetrainingevent,”

saidLieutenantColonelThomasRivard,the68thCSSB’scommander.“Theeffortweputintoittoplan,prepare,execute,andassesswastremendous.Ourtrainingobjectiveswerebold,andthetrainingpayoffwasirreplaceable.It’smycontentionthatwecreatedthiseffectbydoingsomethingwhichhadnotoccurredbefore—fightingtotrainasa‘competitive’unit.”

Inthiscase,theterm“competitive”meansbeinglocatedforwardofthelightline,requiredtousemultiple

FThe 60th Ordnance Company trains at the combat outpost live-fire range.

MAY–jUNE 2010 3

integratedlaserengagementsystemgear,andbeingexposedtothevari-oustheater-replicatedbattleeffectsfoundatNTC—justlikeanyunitinthe4thIBCT.

Trainingatacombattrainingcenter(CTC)likeNTCisakeyele-mentofthetrainingguidancefromthe68thCSSB’shigherheadquar-ters,the43dSustainmentBrigade.Thattrainingguidanceinstructsunitsto“fighttotrain”ataCTCbeforedeployment.TheCSSBtookthisguidancefurtherbyapplyingittoallofitsformations,regardlessofdeploymentorders.

TheobjectivesofaCTCrota-tionforasustainmentcompanyorbattalionaretoexecutesituationaltrainingexercisesandfull-spectrumoperationstodeveloplethalsmallunitsthatcaneffectivelyshoot,move,communicate,andfightinlogisticsconvoysandalsotoimprovesmall-unitcommand,con-trol,communications,computers,andintelligenceprocesses.

Attheendoftherotation,theunitheadquartersreceivesfeedbackabouthowwelltheunitperformsthefollowingfunctions:command-ingandcontrollingtheirsubordi-nateformations,leveragingArmyBattleCommandSystemsandothertechnologies,conductingstaffpro-cessesandbattledrills,andexecutingthesixrequiredfunctionsofatacticaloperationscenter(TOC).

TrainingInsidetheBoxBecauseLSAWarriorislocatedonthemainportion

ofFortIrwin,unitsthereareimmunetotheopposingforceandthecounterinsurgencyenvironmentofthemaintrainingarea.Notonlydoesthisenvironmentlackaninteractiveenemy,significantdistractersexistthatdonotexistinthebox,includingtheusualvarietyofinstallationrestaurants,shopping,andentertainmentvenues.(Clearly,itcanbedifficulttofocusontrain-ingwithaStarbucksandpostexchangenearby.)AtLSAWarrior,thebattlestaffalsolacksthesituationalawarenessthatunitshavewhileinthebox.

“Asthebattalioncommander,”saidRivard,“Iwantedourrotationtohavethesamefeelasadeploy-ment,andbeinginthemaneuverboxalongwiththeIBCTwesupporteddidjustthat—andevenmore.Withourimmersionintotheenvironment,Iwasbetterabletoincorporatethefourelementsof

battlecommand,whicharetovisualize,understand,describe,anddirect.”

Theunitbenefitedfromapartnershipwiththe4thIBCTaswellasitssupportunit,the701stBrigadeSupportBattalion(BSB).Infact,thestaffcoordinationthatoccurredlaterallyandverticallywasanunintendedbenefitforeveryone.

CommandersofCSSBsthathadpreviouslyrotatedthroughNTChadsetuponLSAWarrior,justbehindtheechelons-above-brigade(EAB)buildinglocatedadjacenttotherotationalunitbivouacarea.Therea-sonsbehindthiscourseofactionincludedaccesstotheEABcommunicationsarchitecture,proximitytotheEABpersonnelandtheirbriefings,andsimplicityofcommandandcontrol.

AtNTC,EABpersonnelprovidethelogisticsassetsthatarenotresidentwiththeBSBsaswellasthesus-tainmentpushesthataBSBcouldexpectintheater.TheEABisexpertlyposturedtoprovidemostclassesofsupply,water,andtrashremovalforrotatingunits,andtheydosowithcontractorsoperatingmilitary

Soldiers from the 60th Ordnance Company handle ammunition at Forward Operating Base Reno.

4 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

vehicles.WhenaCSSBispartofanNTCrotation,itcanexpecttocommandandcontroltheEABassetsandassumealogisticssupportmissiononageneralsupportbasis.Whereyouchoosetoconductyourcom-mandandcontroldeterminesthetrainingpayoff.

Howthe68thCSSBTrainedatNTCBrigadierGeneralRobertB.Abrams,thecommand-

inggeneralofNTC,hasseveralaxiomsthatheprovidestocommanders.Threeofthoseaxiomscometomind.First,traineverydaylikeyourlifedependsonit.Sec-ond,getbettereveryday;bereadyforthefirstdayofanactualdeploymentbythetimeyourunitreachestrainingday14.Andthird,beconfidentinyourself,yourunit,andyourleaderstodeployandsucceedinthefirst30daysincountry.InternalizingAbram’sguidanceremindsusthatCSSBs“fighttotrain”inthebox.

Normally,theBCTheadquarters,BSB,andbrigadespecialtroopsbattalionoccupyNTC’slargestforwardoperatingbase(FOB),whichisFOBKing.FOBKing

isalsowhereaCSSBheadquartersbelongs.IfnotatFOBKing,thentheCSSBheadquartersshouldoccupyFOBSantaFe(usuallynotactivated),butonlyifanothertacticalforceoccupiesthisareaoriftheheadquarterscanbringitsownCisco-powerednetwork(CPN)forcommunications.

ForceprotectionisnotsomuchtheissueasisaccesstoaCPNorjointnetworknode,whichallowstheunittoseethedigitalcommonoperationalpicture.Tomaximizetraining,unitstendtobelenientaboutcertainaspectsofphysicalsecurity.Basically,thismeansthatunitsmanonlytheentrycontrolpointandassumeaguardforceontheperimeter.

Thetrainingobjectiveslistedinthe68thCSSB’sletterofintent,aswellthoseoftheCSSB’ssubordinate60thOrdnanceCompany,describedwhatitwantedfortherotation.TheCSSBaskedtoreceivetraininginthefollowingareas:❏ Convoylivefire.❏ Commandandcontrolwithdigitalsystems.

A 68th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion convoy security element prepares to leave Forward Operating Base King on an escort mission.

MAY–jUNE 2010 5

❏ CommandandcontrolofEABlogisticsconvoysusingconvoysecuritydetachmentelements.

❏ Establishmentofalogisticssupportarea.❏ Planninganddirectingsustainmentoperations.❏ Reactingtoimprovisedexplosivedevices.❏ Rulesofengagement.❏ Escalationofforcemeasures.

TheCSSBalsoaddedvarioustacticalammunitiontasksforthe60thOrdnanceCompany.Thebattalioncommander’sletterofintentconvincedseniortrainersthattheCSSBbelongedatFOBKingandnotatLSAWarriorandledthemtoapprovetheparadigmshift.

TheCSSB’sbattalionchaplainworkedwithsevenotherunitchaplainsandprovidedbattlefieldministryatthemedicalfacilityandmortuaryaffairscollectionpointlocatedattheFOBandtendedtothespiritualneedsofthenotionalcasualties.ThebattalionS–2syn-chronizedtheCSSB’sintelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissanceeffortswiththoseofthe4thIBCTS–2andfocusedonpatternanalysisandgeographicintel-ligenceanalysis,includingworkingwiththechangedetectionoverlaysprovidedbytheunmannedaerialvehicleassets.TheserelationshipsprovedfruitfulandtaughttheCSSBtheimportanceofestablishingrela-tionshipswithsupportedunitsintheater.

Augmentingthe68thCSSB’sCapabilitiesDeployingtoNTCwithonlyaheadquarterscreatesa

challengingtrainingenvironmentforanybattalion,and

suchasmallforceprovideslittlebenefittotherota-tionalBCT.ByaddingassetsreferredtoasIBUs(ittybittyunits)totheArmyForceGenerationprocess,aCSSBheadquarterscanpossesscapabilitiesthataremoreinlinewithtraditionalplanning,preparing,executing,andassessing,whicharepartofSoldier,leader,staff,andcollectivetasks.

Wheneverpossible,CSSBsshouldbringhome-sta-tionunitswiththemtoNTC,andifnoneareavailable,theCSSBshouldrequestthemfromotherlocations.Fewwouldarguethateverylogisticsunitintheconti-nentalUnitedStatesshouldrotatethroughaCTConceeachyear,whethertheyhaveadeploymentscheduledornot.Bydoingso,commandersprovideacapstonetrainingexercisetoaunitthatwouldnototherwisehaveanannualtrainingfocus.

UsingenablerslikeIBUscreatesaverticalcommandandcontrolstructurethatallowstheCSSBheadquarterstoobserveitssystems,collectobjectivefeedback,andthenmakeadjustmentstofuturetrainingbasedonthisfeedback.Inthisway,theobjectiveofthetrainingrota-tionistoexercisethebattalionasalearningorganiza-tionandnotmerelyaunitthatoccupiesasiteatNTCtoexecuteroutinelogisticssupport.

AnexampleofeffectivelyintegratinganIBUwastheadditionofthe60thOrdnanceCompany,whichprovidedthe4thIBCTandthe701stBSBwithammunitioncapabilitywhileprovidingarealistictrainingopportunityforthesmallerunit.The60th

During its National Training Center rotation, the 68th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion’s tactical operations center was located at Forward Operating Base King.

6 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

OrdnanceCompany’scommanderandfirstsergeantestablishedanumberofbattle-focusedtrainingopportunitiesfortheirmilitaryoccupationalspecialty89B(ammunitionspecialist)and89A(ammunitionstockcontrolandaccountingspecialist)SoldiersattheFortIrwinammunitionsupplypoint(ASP),theBCT’sfieldASP,andtheammunitiontransferandholdingpointatFOBReno.

Atalllocations,the60thOrdnanceCompanyexpertlyreceived,stored,andissuedliveammunitionforthe4thIBCT’slive-fireevents.Inadditiontohan-dling4tonsofammunitionatFOBReno,theadditionofSoldiersandleadersalleviateda3-monthbacklogatFortIrwin’sASP.

Addingonlythe60thOrdnanceCompanywasnotwithoutitschallenges.The68thCSSBwaswithoutasolutionforconductingconvoyoperationsintheIBCT’sbattlespaceduringfull-spectrumoperations.InJanuary,4monthsbeforetherotation,theCSSBmadethedecisiontoobtain24guntrucksandusethemasaconvoysecuritydetachment.

AfterdrawingtheM1151uparmoredhigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehiclesfromtheFortCarsonArmyfieldsupportbattalion,aguntrucktrainingmis-sionwasassignedtotheCSSB’s360thTransportationCompany,whichwasthendesignatedtodeploywiththeCSSB.Withtheadditionoftwoplatoonleadersandpla-toonsergeants,thebattalionwasthenposturedtoinde-pendentlyconductconvoyoperationsfromEABorfromwithintheIBCT,thuscreatingamultiechelontrainingopportunityfortheSoldiersandthebattalionstaff.

Withoutadoubt,thedecisiontoincludeaconvoysecuritydetachmentenablerprovidedthecapabilitytooperatemoreindependently,anditalsoprovidedavaluableenablertothe4thIBCT.

ImprovingProcessesDuringTrainingBeingtotallyimmersedintraining,the68thCSSB

staffwasfreetoimproveprocessesandvalidatebattle

drills.Afteramere14daysinthetrainingenvironment,thebattlestaffwasabletovalidatemostofitsbattledrillsandreacttomanysituations.

InadditiontodevelopingandrefiningTOCbattledrillsatFOBKing,theCSSB’sbattlestaffreworkeditstacticalstand-ingoperatingprocedures,createdsmartcards,refinedthecontentandlayoutofroutinebriefs,anddevelopedaworkablebattlerhythmfortherotation.Manyexperiencedleaderswouldagreethatworkingthesebattlestaffprocessesiseasierduringatrain-

ingdeploymentthanduringgarrisonoperationsandhavingthescenariotodrivetheseprocessesaddsvigorandrealism.

AnotheradvantageofpositioningtheCSSB’sheadquartersatFOBKingwasthatthestaffcouldvisualizethebattlefieldthroughcommunicationsequipmentbyusingtheprimary,alternate,contingen-cy,emergency,andrepository(PACE–R)taxonomy.(Seechartabove.)AboutPACE–R,LieutenantColo-nelRivardsaid,“Thisvisualizationwasinvaluabletomeasacommander,andIwasabletotranslatetheconcepttothestaffintermsofinformationmanage-ment,knowledgemanagement,andultimately,situ-ationalunderstanding.”

Havingtheopportunitytoexercisethefourcom-ponentsofbattlecommandandthesixfunctionsofaTOCusingthesesystemswasessentialtotheCSSB’slearning—anditwasatrainingobjectivethatwouldnothavebeenachievablewhilepositionedatLSAWarrior.The43dSustainmentBrigadecom-mander,ColonelEdDaly,whoprovidescommandandcontroltothe68thCSSBwhenatFortCarson,isknowntosay,“Arewetrainingthingsright...andarewealsotrainingtherightthings?”NeverbeforehadthebattalionexercisedthisnumberofArmyBattleCommandSystems,battledrills,andstafftrainingevents.

NTCofferssuperbtraining,butitismenu-driven;commandersdecidewhattrainingtheirunitsneed.CSSBcommandersshoulddeploytoNTCwithanimmersionmindsetthatallowscommandersatalllev-elstostresssystemsearly.Itisyourrotation,andthemenuisdiverse.

Major john M. ruths is the s–3 for the 68th CoMbat sus-tainMent support battalion. he holds an M.b.a. degree with a ConCentration in logistiCs ManageMent froM tui university and is a graduate of the CoMbined logistiCs Captains Career Course.

Command and Control Intelligence Sustainment

P - Primary Field Manual Tactical Ground Reporting System

Battle Command Sustainment Support System

A - Alternate Command Post of the Future (Ventrillo)

Distributed Common Ground System-Army

Voice Over Internet Protocol

C - Contingency Blue Force Tracker Command Post of the Future

Secret Internet Protocol Router Network

E - Emergency Movement Tracking System

Secret Internet Protocol Router Network

Field Manual

R - Repository Command Post of the Future

Tactical Ground Reporting System

Battle Command Sustainment Support System

The 68th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion identified these decision- making tools using the PACE–R taxonomy.

MAY–jUNE 2010 7

T he4thBrigadeCombatTeam(BCT),1st ArmoredDivision,embarkeduponitsmission readinessexercise(MRX)attheNationalTrainingCenter(NTC)atFortIrwin,California,inJanuary2009fullypreparedtoexecutecounterinsurgencyoperations.ButwhileatNTC,thebrigadereceivedwordthatitwouldinsteadbedeployingastheproofofprinciplefortheadviseandassistbrigade(AAB)mission.

TheAABMissionTheAABisanaturalevolutionoftheroleofthe

BCTinastabilityoperationsenvironment.U.S.SoldiersnowadviseandassistIraqiSecurityForces(ISF),whichincludetheIraqiArmy(IA),IraqiNationalPolice,andDepartmentofBorderEnforcement.InadditiontotheAABmission,the4thBCTwouldalsobeenablingcivilcapacityeffortsoftheU.S.DepartmentofStateprovin-cialreconstructionteamsinthesouthernIraqiprovincesofDhiQar,Maysan,andMuthana.

Thisboldshiftinmissiondrewallleaderstolooktothisunifiedactionwithakeeneyewhileensuringthatitwasnestedacrossalloperations.FieldManual(FM)3–0,Operations,definesunifiedactionas“thesynchro-nization,coordination,and/orintegrationoftheactivitiesofgovernmentalandnongovernmentalentitieswithmili-taryoperationstoachieveunityofeffort.”

Tofacilitatethenewmission,thebrigadereceivedadditionalpersonnelwhowerethenembeddedwiththeISFonIraqibases.Militarytransitionteams(MiTTs),borderenforcementtransitionteams,portofentryteams,policetrainingteams,andstabilitytrainingteamsround-edoutthebrigadepersonnel,andthebrigadealignedwithsupportedIraqiunitstoaccomplishtheadviseandassistmission.

TrainingatNTCThe4thBCTsawthechangeinmissionasanoppor-

tunitytoexecuteanontraditionaltrainingregimenthatwouldsettheconditionsforsuccessasitassumedtheadviseandassistmission.Thecommandersawtheimplicationsofthemissionandknewthatallentitieshadtoworktogethereffectivelytoachievethecam-paignendstate.

WhileatNTC,thebrigadestaffwasgivenclearguid-ancebyitscommander,ColonelPeterNewell,toworkthroughtwolinesofeffort:first,tobuildcivilcapacityacrossthelinesofgovernance,essentialservices,eco-nomicdevelopment,andruleoflawsecurity;andsec-ond,toadvise,assist,andenabletheISF.

The4thBCT’sbrigadesupportbattalion(BSB),the121stBSB,receivedthisnewfocusfortheBCT’smissionandsawsustainmentcrossingalllinesof

effort.ThisallowedtheBSBtostickwiththefundamentalsofrequirementsdeterminationforoperationsandcapabilitiesreviewsforthesustainmentmission.AsstatedinFM4–0,Sustainment,“Successfulsustainmentenablesfreedomofactionbyincreasingthenumberandqualityofoptionsavailabletothecommander.”

Theunfamiliarelementofthebattalion’sMRXwasthepartner-shipwiththeISF.Asthestaffworkedthroughtheconcept,it

SustainmentintheArmy’sFirstAdviseandAssistBrigade

by Lieutenant CoLoneL DaviD WiLson

Partnership and Tactical Overwatch

Advises Iraqi Army units on—

•Sustainment at the division, brigade, and battalion levels.

•Mission planning, preparation, execution, and assessment.

•Sustainment procedures.

•Employment of logistics enablers.

•Field workshops, headquarters support companies, motorized transportation regiments.

• Fights together with an Iraqi Army unit.

• Assists with missionpreparation.

• Provides mobile training teams that conduct focused sustainment training.

• Provides command and control of logistics training and advisory teams.

• Acts as the Iraqi Army link to coalition enablers.

Adviser Element(Military Transition Team)

Partner Unit(Brigade Support Battalion)

Through their logistics training and advisory teams, brigade support bat-talions are responsible for assisting their Iraqi partner units. Military transition teams are responsible for advising those Iraqi units.

8 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

soughtassistancefromNTC’sGoldminerobserver-controllerteam.TheGoldminerteamwasabletopro-videtheBSBwithinstantfeedbackfromthePhoenixAcademyatCampTaji,Iraq.ThebattalionlearnedthatMulti-NationalSecurityTransitionCommand-Iraqwascreatinglogisticsmaintenanceadvisoryteams(LMATs)toworkinconjunctionwiththeMiTTstobuildtheISF’slogisticscapacitythroughtraining.ThisnewinformationpromptedtheBSBtoanalyzehowitcouldbecomeanenablerofthisvitalmissionofthesustainmentwarfightingfunction.

AcriticalstepintheprocesswasdeterminingwhatthetrainingrequirementswouldbeandiftheISFhadanyprocessresemblingamission-essentialtasklist.Therewereseveralunknowns,suchasthetypesoflogisticsunitstheISFhad,thestatusoftheironhandequipment,theironhandpersonnelstatus,andtheorga-nizationoftheirlogisticsunits.WithoutanswerstothesequestionsinitiallyduringtheMRX,theBSBfocuseditstrainingonpartnership,negotiation,andbilateralengage-ments.ThisallowedtheBSBstafftopreparethecom-manderforkey-leaderengagementsandtoworkthroughtheBATNA[bestalternativetoanegotiatedagreement]andZOPA[zoneofpossibleagreement]tobeachievedbytheengagements.

TheroleplayersatNTCwhoassistedinthetrainingwerefromtheMulti-NationalDivision-SouthregionofIraq.TheyservedtheBSBwellbypressingfortrainingoftheirforces,whichdidnothaveadequateequipment,funding,andresources.OneoftheBSB’smanylessonslearnedwasthatU.S.unitsmustlettheISFdrivethetrainingprioritiesandmustcoachthemthroughbuildingcapacityacrossallsustainmentandcombathealthsup-portfunctions.

DeployingasanAABFollowingtheNTCrotation,the4thBCTattended

thepredeploymentsitesurvey(PDSS)andgained

furtherknowledgeoftheLMATrequirementsthatwerebeingdevelopedaswellastheMulti-NationalCorps-Iraqrequirementforunitpartnershipintheater.ThisrequirementstatedthatBSBsweretopartnerwithIraqimotorizedtransportationregiments(MTRs)andforwardsupportcompaniesweretopartnerwithheadquartersandsupplycompaniesofIraqiArmybrigades.

AfterthePDSS,theBCTstudiedtheinformationreceivedduringitsvisitwiththe4thBCT,1stCavalryDivision,whichtransferredauthoritytothe4thBCT,1stArmoredDivision,andtooktimetodevelopitsstrategyfortrainingandpartnership.Thestrategyfollowedacrawl-walk-runmodel,andthebrigadelookedatdevel-opingthetrainingandpartnershipalongthreelines:trainthejundees(IAprivates),trainthetrainer,andfocusonjointoperations.

ThroughfactfindingandthePDSS,the121stBSBrealizedthatU.S.militarylogisticsisnotthesameasISFlogistics.Thisallowedthebattaliontofocusonimprov-ingtheISFlogisticsposturebygettingISFsustainmentunitstoworkefficientlyusingtheircurrentsystemandnottheU.S.system.TheISF’slackofconfidenceintheirsystemwasimmediatelyobvious.TheBSBdecidedtoapproachISFtrainingwiththecommander’smodelforsupportoftheAAB,theTAPE[train,advise,partner,andenable]model.(Seefigurebelow.)

The121stBSB’slogisticianshadtobreaknewgroundindetermininghowtodeliverinstructionthatwouldbuildlogisticscapacityfortheISF.Thiseffortstartedwithanassessmentofwhatthepreviouspartnerunithadestablished.The27thBSB,4thBCT,1stCav-alryDivision,hadmadegreatstridesinembracingtheembeddedlogisticsMiTTaspartoftheirteamandhaddevelopedatrainingplanthatwouldsetguidelinesfortheMiTTtofollowintheirengagementwiththeMTR.

MuchofwhatwasbeingdeliveredfocusedontheindividualtrainingofIraqisoldiers.Thisservedasagoodfoundationandlaidthegroundworkforthe121stBSBtotrain,advise,partner,andenable.

TheBSB’sapproachwastobuildontheactionsalreadyinplaceasittransitionedandmovedfromtrain-ingindividualIraqijundeestothetrain-the-trainermode.Thetrain-the-trainermodegavetheIraqipartnersthecapabilitytodelivertheinstructionthemselves,withcoalitionforcesprovidingadviceonthedeliveryoftheinstructionoradjustmentsnecessarytomovetheinstruc-tiontoahigherlevel.

TheMTRcommanderusedtheBSB’sfeedbacktodevelophistrainingprioritiesforsubsequentengage-ments.Inessence,thisallowedtheISFtopickthetrain-ingthattheyweremostinterestedinreceiving,basedontheprioritiesoftheMTRcommander.

Abigpartinmovingtothetrain-the-trainermode

Train

Advise

Partner

Enable

Identify issues and trends

Reinforceand facilitate

Coach, teach,and mentor

The TAPE Model

Enabling Iraqi partner units consists of three tasks: train-ing, advising, and partnering.

MAY–jUNE 2010 9

wastheestablishmentofthe121stBSBlogisticstrainingandadvisoryteam(LTAT).TheLTATwasmadeupofseniornoncommissionedofficers(formerdrillsergeants,instructors,andlinguists)andaunitcommanderprovid-ingoversighttofocusthetrainingeffortsandidentifyanyfuturekey-leaderengagementsbetweentheISFandBSBcommanders.

AfteramonthoftrainingwiththeISF,theBSBcouldtellthattheMiTTwastheenhancerandtheBSB(throughtheLTAT)wastheenabler.TheMiTTreliedontheBSB’strainingcapabilitiestoassisttheMTRcommanderinachievinghistraininggoalswhilethetrain-the-trainereffortsandthepushforpartnershipstartedtogainground.

JointLogisticsConvoysSuccessinthispartnershipwasevidentwhenthe

MTRcommanderprovidedISFsoldiersandassetstopartnerwiththeBSB’ssustainmentreplenishmentopera-tions.TheMTRcommandersawthepartnershipasanopportunitytoimprovehisownconvoyoperations.

Throughgoodfaiththatdevelopedfromtherelation-ship,theMTRbeganrunningjointlogisticsconvoyswiththeBSB.Thiseffortwasexecutedincrementallyandstartedwiththetrainingofgroundandconvoycom-mandersformovingcommoditieswithinthecoalitionforceandISFlogisticsformation.

Thecommandersreceivedinstructionsontroop-leadingprocedures,tacticalconvoyoperations(basedonthe121stBSB’sConvoyLeader’sGuide),escalationofforce,andsharingtheroad(amethodthatpreventssustainmentmovementsfromimpedingthehighwaysthatbelongtotheIraqipeople).Thistrainingculminatedwithconvoyleadercertificationforthegroundandcon-voycommandersandmovedtothestage-setterphaseofexecutingalogisticsconvoy.

ThejointlogisticsconvoyprocessfortheISFandcoalitionforceswasbasedona96-hourtimelinedevel-opedbythe121stBSB.Theconceptofoperationsdevelopedatthebrigadelogisticscommandpostbythesupportoperationssection(futureoperations)andthemissionsupportorderdevelopedbytheBSBS–3sec-tion(currentoperations)settheconditionsfortheISFtoreceivetheinformationneededtocoordinatethejointoperation.

TheconceptofoperationsalsoallowedtheMiTTtotracktheIAheadquarters’planningoncetheyreceivedthemission.Thegroundandconvoycommandersattendedthesustainmentsynchronizationmeetingatthebrigadelogisticscommandpostandensuredthatthecommoditiestobemovedwereontrackastheybeganprecombatchecksandinspectionsforthemissionset,whichoftenincludedKBRlogisticsassetswithintheconvoy.ThisallowedtheISFtoseethecriticalsynchro-nizationandcoordinationthatoccursbeforeany121stBSBconvoy.

ThetimeleadinguptothejointIAandcoalitionforcelogisticsconvoywascoinedthe“twominutedrill”orthe“NASCARpitdrill”bytheBSBcommanderbecauseoftheintensityoftheoperations.Atthistime,theBSBwouldquicklycheckthevehiclesformaintenanceneedsorhaveaqualitycontrolteaminspectvehiclesintheBSBmotorpool.Criticalstaffsections,suchastheS–1,wouldverifymanifestsforthetacticalconvoysystem,andtheelectronicwarfareofficerwouldensurethatallcounterremote-controlledimprovisedexplosivedeviceelectronicwarfaresystemswereinworkingorderpriortodeparture.

Alsoduringthistime,thecoalitionforceandIAcon-voymemberswouldshareamealandattendtheBSBS–2’sjointthreatbriefthatcenteredonroute-focusedintelligencepreparationofthebattlefieldandtheconvoycommander’sconvoymissionbrief.Followingallbrief-ingsandthefinalprecombatchecksandinspections,thecoalitionforce,ISF,andKBRconvoymemberswouldconductajointgroundrehearsaltopracticeactionsdur-ingmovement,actionsoncontact,actionsatdestination,andpreparationsforreturn.Therehearsalswerecomplet-edwithBSBinterpretersembeddedintheISFandcoali-tionforceformations(astheywouldbewhenmounted)sothattheBSBcouldensurethattheIAfullyunderstoodthemissiontobeconductedaswellasthetactics,tech-niques,andproceduresforconvoyoperations.

After-actionreviewsfromallstagesofthepartner-shipwereprovidedtotheMTRcommanderandtheIAdivisionMiTTsothattheISFcouldsettheprioritiesforfuturetraining.ThereviewsalsoprovidedtheMiTTwithagoodassessmentofwheretheISFpartnerwasonthescalefortheoperationalreadinessassessment—aunitstatusreport—providedtotheIraqiMinistryofDefenseeverymonth.

ThissustainmentmissioninsupportoftheAABallowed121stBSBlogisticianstoworkwithIraqipart-nerstobuildtheircapabilitiesforsustainmentwhilesupportingthe4thBCTinabattlespacethesizeofSouthCarolina.Buildingtheconceptofsupportthroughsus-tainmenttargetingmeetingssynchronizedsustainmentacrosstheBCTandallowedtheBSBtoincorporatecon-tractors,ISFlogisticians,andtheBSB’sorganicsustain-mentplatformsintoitsreplenishmentoperations.

SynchronizingsustainmentwhilepartneringwiththeISFallowedcoalitionforcestomodeltheexactbehaviortheISFwantstoemulate.ThosecapabilitieswillendurelongaftertheBSB’smissioniscomplete.Logisticsisthemusclethatenablesthefisttostrike!

lieutenant Colonel david wilson is the CoMMander of the 121st brigade support battalion, 4th brigade CoMbat teaM, 1st arMored division. he is a graduate of the Citadel, the Military College of south Carolina, and holds a Master’s degree in general adMinistra-tion froM Central MiChigan university.

10 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

TheCommander’sEmergencyResponseProgram:SynergisticResultsThroughTraining

TheCommander’sEmergencyResponseProgram(CERP)allowsfieldcommandersinIraqandAfghanistantofundprojectsdesignedtowinheartsandminds,huntenemies,andencour-agethegrowthoflocalinstitutionsinwartime.CERPprovidesU.S.GovernmentappropriationsdirectlytotacticalunitsforthepurposeofmeetingtheemergencyneedsoflocalIraqiandAfghancivilians.

However,CERP’sverynoveltyandimportancecanpresentchallengesinitsimplementationbecausetheundisciplinedoruncoordinateduseofCERPfundscouldresultinCongressabruptlyendingthem.Suchafateisworthavoidingbecausetheprogram’searlysuccessdemonstratesthatrelativelysmallamountsofmoneyspentlocallyandintelligentlybycommanderscanyieldenormousbenefits.

OriginsofCERPCERPbeganasanefforttoprovidecommandersin

IraqwithastabilizationtooltobenefittheIraqipeo-ple.Initialresourcesforthateffortcamefromstock-pilesofill-gottenBa’athistPartycashleftbehindbySaddamHussein’sregime.Thiscash,alongwithotherregimeassetsrecoveredintheweeksandmonthsthatfollowedtheoverthrowofSaddamHussein,providedasourceoffundingforprojectsthatrespondedtotheemergencyneedsoftheIraqipeople.

IncontrasttothedevioushandlingofthesefundsbyseniorBa’athists,theAmericanmanagementoftherecoveredassetswastransparent,well-documented,andsubjecttolaw.Fieldcommandersandseniorpolicy-makersensuredthatseizure,control,anddispositionofformerregimepropertycompliedwithinternationallawonarmedconflictandoccupation.Inparticular,theU.S.CentralCommand(CENTCOM)publicizedthat,

inseizingthefunds,coalitionforcesweretakingpos-sessionofandsafeguardingmovablepropertyoftheStateofIraqratherthanthepersonalpropertyofIraqicitizens.Evidencethatmanyoftheassetshadbeenobtainedfromcriminalskimmingofprofitsfromoilsales(inviolationofUnitedNationssanctions)causedcoalitionleaderstorejectthenotionthatindividualseniorBa’athistsweretherightfulowners.

ThelackoffunctioningIraqicivilinstitutionsfol-lowingSaddamHussein’soverthrowresultedinamassofemergencyneeds.Clearingstreetsofdestroyedvehicles,bulldozingmountainsofgarbage,distributingrations,repairingdamagedroofs,wells,andsewers,rehabilitatingbroken-downjailsandpolicestations,andtendingtoavarietyofurgentmedicalneedsbecamethebusi-nessofU.S.Soldiers.Thesereliefandreconstructionactivitieswereundertakenwhenthepaceofcontinuingcombatoperationsagainsthostileelementspermit-tedor,insomecases,whengravecollateraldamagedemandedaquickU.S.response.

CERPTodayThepurposeofCERPremains

unchanged:toenablecommand-erstosuccessfullyrespondtourgenthumanitarianreliefandreconstructionrequirementswithintheirareasofresponsibil-itybycarryingoutprogramsthatimmediatelyassistthelocalpop-ulation.Theseprogramsinclude

by Major Mark W. Lee

Judicious spending by commanders can yield significant results in meeting the humanitarian needs of local populations and gaining their trust and cooperation.

Iraqi workers wet down dirt so they can mix cement to be used in constructing the Basra Talent School and the Al Jameat and Al Quibla markets in Basra, Iraq. The projects were financed

through the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. (Photo by SSG Chrissy Best)

MAY–jUNE 2010 11

makingcondolencepaymentsaftercombatoperations,dispersingfundsfornecessaryrepairsresultingfromcombat,purchasingorrepairingcriticalinfrastructureequipment,andperforminglarge-scaleciviccleanupsthatemployasmanylocalinhabitantsaspossible.

CERPhasalsobecomeavitalcapabilityinthecom-mander’stoolboxforstabilityoperations.CERPhasprogressedtobecomeabroadermeansfortacticalcom-manderstoconductthenumerousstabilityoperationstasksrelatedtodevelopmentthattraditionallyhavebeenperformedbyU.S.,foreign,andlocalprofessionalcivil-ianpersonneloragencies.Thesetasksincludeestab-lishingcivilsecurityandcontrol,promotingeconomicdevelopment,andrestoringanddevelopingessentialservices,governance,andinfrastructure.

WhiletheU.S.Armyisuniquelytrained,manned,andequippedtooperateinunstableregions,itlacksthedevelopmentexpertiseandcapacityofitscivilianpartnersinconductingthesetasks.Butciviliandiplo-maticanddevelopmentagenciesareoftenchallengedtoundertakesuchtasksinunstableareaswiththeirtra-ditionaldeliverysystems.

Giventhesechallenges,DepartmentofDefense(DOD)policy,outlinedinDODDirective3000.05,MilitarySupportforStability,Security,Transition,andReconstruction(SSTR)Operations, directsthatU.S.militaryforcesbepreparedtoperformalltasksneededtoestablishormaintainorderwhencivilianscannotdoso.CERPisonetooltheU.S.Governmenthasprovid-edtomilitarycommanderstomeettheserequirementsandothertheater-specificstrategicobjectives.

Examplesoftheater-levelobjectivesforCERPinclude—❏ Ensuringthaturgenthumanitarianreliefand

reconstructionrequirementsaremetforthelocalpopulation.

❏ Improvingthecapacityoflocalgovernmentsbypart-neringwithprovincialgovernmentagenciesinidenti-fying,prioritizing,selecting,anddevelopingprojects.

❏ Ensuringthatlarger,strategicprojectsandservicesareconnectedtotheenduserinlocalcommunities.

❏ Creatingmomentumandconditionsforeconomicrecoveryanddevelopment.

❏ Empoweringmajorsubordinatecommandandtacticalcommanders,incoordinationwithlocalofficialsandotherU.S.Governmentagencies,todevelopandapproveCERPprojectsconsistentwiththeater-specificguidance,theirrespectivefundingapprovalauthority,andbudgetavailability.

SignificanceofCERPHavingbeenacclaimedforitseffectivecontribu-

tionstostabilizationeffortsinIraq,CERPhasbecomebothanimportantdevelopmentinlawandapotentiallytransforminginfluenceonmodernU.S.militaryopera-tions.ThesignificanceofCERPisthat,byauthorizingandfundingaprogramfordiscretionaryhumanitarianprojectsbybrigadeanddivisioncommanders,Con-gresshasrecognizedtheneedfornewtoolstoconductmajorstabilityoperations.

AuthoritytouseacertainamountofoperationandmaintenancefundsisessentialtoensuringthatCERPremainseffectivedespiteoverlappingrulesandpoliciesthatplacesimilarauthorityelsewhere.Con-gressionalacknowledgmentoftheneedfornewtoolsisessentialbecausetheConstitution,whileitvestsauthorityoverforeignaffairsandnationaldefenseinthePresident,vestsseparate,broadauthorityoverthepurseinCongress.

Sincethemilitary’sconventionalroleofpreparingforandfightingtheNation’swarscontinuestodefinedefensebudgetsandfundingmechanisms,noncon-ventionalmilitaryoperationsbringintohighestreliefthiscongressionalpowertoinfluenceforeignaffairsandnationaldefensethroughtheappropriationsprocess.

AstheSupremeCourthasmadeclear,the“estab-lishedruleisthattheexpenditureofpublicfundsisproperonlywhenauthorizedbyCongress,notthatpublicfundsmaybeexpendedunlessprohibitedbyCongress.”Thisrule—surelyasoundandproperonetosafeguardthepeople’streasureinaconstitutionaldemocracy—requiresnospecialsupplementduringpeacetimetrainingandexercises.However,duringamilitaryoverseascontingencyoperation,theabsenceofcongressionalauthorityforcommanderstodecideontheirowninitiativetoquicklyspendsmallamountsofGovernmentfundsonurgenthumanitarianprojects

12 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

canspelldefeatinthestruggletopersuadelocalpopulationstoviewU.S.intentionsasfriendlyandenduring.ByprovidingasourceoffundingforCERP,Congresshasfurnishedsuchauthority.

CERP’sFutureThereisbroadagreementamongmilitaryleadersthat

CERP’simpactwillcontinuetobeprofound.TheChair-manoftheJointChiefsofStaffhasdescribedCERPasoneofthemosteffectivemeanswehaveinOperationEnduringFreedomofpersuadingordinaryAfghanisthatwearetheretohelpthemandtheirfamilies.

Theeffectivenessoftheprogramintheneartermwillrequirethosewithoversightresponsibility,bothwithinDODandinCongress,towithstandtheten-dencytoburdenCERPwithpurpose-basedfiscalprohibitions.Suchaprohibitionwouldbeanypolicy

statementorexpressionofcongressionalintentstating,forexample,thattopayarewardorpurchaseapolice-man’suniformorbuildadamisanimproperpurposeforappropriatedCERPfundsasamatteroffiscallaw.

Whilecontrolsonexpenditureofpublicfundsarenecessaryandappropriate,CERP’spositiveimpactwillcontinuetostemfromcommanders’abilitytomakejudgmentcallsquicklyabouthowbesttobenefitlocalpopulations.Commanderswillmakethesejudgmentcallsbasedpartlyoninformationthat,amongU.S.orga-nizations,onlythemilitarywillreceive,thankstonor-malpatrollingbySoldiersinaffectedcommunities.

Overthelongerterm,CERPshouldbemadepartoforganicauthorizinglegislationandcodifiedintitle10oftheU.S.Code.CommanderswhocancountonlegalauthorityandcongressionalfundingforCERPduringadeploymentwillmakeCERParoutinepartoftheirtrainingprogram.Combattrainingcenterandinstitutionalprecommandcoursepersonnelshouldlike-wiseestablishastabletrainingprogram,collectlessonslearned,andincorporatethoselessonsintoleaderdevel-opmentprograms.Proactivetrainingandleaderdevel-opmentwillprovidethebestcontrolwhilemaximizingcoordinatedanddisciplineduseofCERPwithoutimposingtheheavyhandoftheAnti-DeficiencyAct.

Whilenosystemofcontrolcaneliminateeveryill-chosenproject,divisionandbrigadecommanderswilldemonstrate,astheyhavedonetimeandagain,thatthebestsystemisonethatencouragestheinitia-tiveofleadersandreliesontheirgoodjudgment.Theunorthodoxoperationsweundertaketodayhavechal-lengedourGovernmenttoprovidenewmechanismswithinthelawnolessthantheyhavechallengedourArmedForcestoemploynewtechnologies,weapons,organization,andtactics.CERPpromisestobeonepartofananswertothesechallengesandisnosmallchangeinsoldiering.

Commander’s Emergency Response Program or (CERP) funds are a relatively small piece of the war-related budgets . . . But because they can be dispensed quickly and applied directly to local needs, they have had a tremendous impact—far beyond the dollar value—on the abil-ity of our troops to succeed in Iraq and Afghanistan. By building trust and confidence in coali-tion forces, these CERP projects increase the flow of intelligence to commanders in the field and help turn local Iraqis and Afghans against insurgents and terrorists.

—Secretary of Defense Robert M. GatesTestimony to Senate Committee on Appropriations

February 2007

Students gather at the official reopening cer emony for Agam High School in Afghanis tan’s Nangarhar province. The school was rehabilitated by a Marine Corps unit with $25,000 in Commander’s Emergency Re sponse Program funds. (Photo by CPT Dan Huvane, USMC)

MAY–jUNE 2010 13

ImprovingCERPTrainingCENTCOMcommanderGeneralDavidH.Petraeus,

ina23September2009memoaddressedtotheChiefofStaffoftheArmyandtheCommandantoftheMarineCorps,identifiedaneedtoestablishaCERPpre-deploymenttrainingprogram.Thebasisofthememowas“recentGAO[GovernmentAccountabilityOffice]andAAA[ArmyAuditAgency]findings[that]characterize[d]CERPtrainingasinadequate”andfoundthat“thereisnotrainingprogramatanyleveldesignedtohelpadequatelypreparethewarfighterontheproperexecutionofCERPpriortoarrivalintheater.”

InresponsetothePetraeusmemo,Headquarters,DepartmentoftheArmy,publishedExecutionOrder048–10:Pre-DeploymentTrainingforContractingOfficers,whichcitestrainingrequirementsforcon-tingencycontracting,operationalcontractsupport,andCERPfunctionalcomponents.TheArmyTrain-ingandDoctrineCommandwasdesignatedtodeliverCERPfunctionaltrainingnolaterthan30March2010,andtheU.S.ArmyFinancialManagementSchool(USAFMS)wasdesignatedastheleadforpre-deploy-mentinstitutionalCERPtraining.

Respondingproactively,TerryHancock,aUSAFMStrainingdeveloper,immediatelydeployedtobothIraqandAfghanistantoconductinterviews,observepro-cedures,andgatherdocumentationtoformulateaneffectivetrainingstrategyinsupportofthisinitiative.Basedonthecontactsshemade,aswellastheurgentneedforthistraining,theaterfinancialmanagementwarriorsassistedinformulatingandreviewingtrainingmaterialstoensurethattheywererealistic,relevant,andreflectiveofcurrentCERPexecution.

TheUSAFMSissimultaneouslyaddressingthedistributedlearning(dL)trainingrequirementintwophases.Thefirstphase,scheduledtobeavailablenolaterthan30March2010,isaweb-based,16-hourdLCERPcoursethatprovidesaprogramoverviewandinstructiononroles,responsibilities,andprocessesaswellasscenario-basedpracticalexercisesthatrequirestudentstoworkthroughthreedifferentprojectsfrombeginningtoendstate.AllCERPparticipantswillcompletethe16-hourdLcourseandreceiveacoursecompletioncertificate.

Thesecondphaseisamultifunctional,multitrack,40-hour,module-baseddLCERPcoursethataddresseseachstakeholder.Eachparticipantwillcompleteaspe-cifictrackthatcorrespondstohisparticularfunctionalarea(forexample,commander,resourcemanager,orpurchasingofficer).Thiscoursewillbetheprimarypre-deploymentinstitutionalCERPtrainingfordep-loyingindividualsandwillincorporatetactics,tech-niques,andproceduresfromU.S.Forces-IraqandU.S.Forces-Afghanistan.

Theintentistomakethecourseavailablewithnoaccessrestrictions(otherthanacommonaccess

card)viatheWorldWideWebortheSoldierSup-portInstituteenterpriseBlackboarddomainorbyCD–ROMforthosewithlimitedornoconnectiv-ity.Theendstateistodevelopindividualswhoaretrainedthroughrealistic,relevant,immersive,andengagingdistributedlearning,functionallydrivenbyassignment,andwhocanultimatelyachievetacticalcommanders’desiredstrategiceffects.

InadditiontotheeffortsoftheUSAFMS,theArmyForcesCommandisintheprocessofdevelopingmobiletrainingteamsthatwillconductscenario-based,predeploymenttrainingforpayingagents,purchasingofficers,projectmanagers,andunitsandcommandersduringrotationsattheNationalTrainingCenter,JointReadinessTrainingCenter,BattleCommandTrainingProgram,andJointMultinationalReadinessCenter.

ThechallengethatCERPpresentstocommandersistomanageprojectsinasynchronizedanddiscip-linedmanner.CoordinatingCERPprojectswiththeeffortsofallindividuals,teams,andunitsthatarepursuingthesameobjective(insidethebrigadeaswellasoutside)willyieldmaximumeffectsperdollarspent.Focusingexpendituresontheurgenthumanita-rianneedsofthecivilianpopulaceratherthanoninfrastructureandsecurityforceinvestmentswillyieldvictories,bothshortandlongterm,intheintricateworkingsofheartsandminds.

Major Mark w. lee is a CoMptroller and re sourCe Manager instruCtor at the arMy fi nanCial ManageMent sChool at fort jaCkson, south Carolina. he previously served as dep uty g−8 and regional CoMMand east re sourCe Manager in afghanistan. he holds a b.s. degree in MatheMatiCs, an M.b.a. degree with a ConCentra-tion in publiC adMinistration, and M.ed., j.d., and ph.d. degrees. he is Cur rently attending the air CoMMand and staff College.

An Army captain helps a local child in Afghanistan use a new hand water pump provided by the Com mander’s Emergency Response Program.

14 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ustainmentcommandersandstaffsfearthe militarydecisionmakingprocess(MDMP) becausetheytypicallydonotunderstandit.Forsomeofficers,theironlyexposuretotheMDMPisattheschoolhousewhentheyattendtheCombinedLogisticsCaptainsCareerCourse,CombinedArmsandServicesStaffSchool,andIntermediateLevelEducation.Likewise,noncommissionedofficers(NCOs)maybeexposedtotheMDMPonlyduringtheBattleStaffNCOCourse.OtherofficersandNCOsmayhavebeenexposedtotheMDMPbyworkingwithamaneuverbattalionorbrigadestaff.Theseexperienc-esoftenleadofficersandNCOstobelievethatMDMPisunfeasibleorirrelevantinnonmaneuverunitsorunitsthatarenotassignedanareaofoperations(AO).

Thepurposeofthisarticleistoidentifythediffer-encesbetweenanMDMPforland-owningunitsandforunitswithoutanassignedAO.Thesedifferencesshouldshapetheunitheadquarters’battlerhythmandexecutionofanMDMP.AcommanderandstaffwhoarewellversedindoctrineunderstandtheoperationalframeworkoftheirmissionsandtheMDMPandwillbeabletomakebetteruseoftheirtimeandresourcestoplan,prepare,andexecuteamission.

DefiningMDMPFieldManual(FM)5–0,ArmyPlanningandOrders

Production,definestheMDMPasfollows:

Themilitary decision making processisaplanningmodelthatestablishesproceduresforanalyzingamission,developing,analyzing,andcomparingcoursesofactionagainstcriteriaofsuccessandeachother,selectingtheoptimumcourseofaction,andproducingaplanororder.

TheMDMPisnothingmorethantheproblem-solvingprocess—thescientificmethodappliedtomilitaryproblems.Itisamodelformakingdecisionsbasedonalargeamountofinformation.Fundamental-ly,everypersonconductsthisprocessinhismindformuchsmallertasks.Weidentifyaproblem,considertheinformationathand,considerouroptions,andmakeourdecisionbasedonwhatweknowandwhatweassumewillhappen.

HowamaneuverunitconductsitsMDMPisclearlydifferentfromhowotherheadquartersconducttheirMDMPs.Thegreatestdifferenceisspecifiedtasks.Maneuverunitswillreceivemorespecifiedtasksandpurposesthroughoutanoperationthanotherunits.Thesespecifiedtasksareclearlyposi-tionedthroughouttheoperationandareusuallyaddressedinthecommander’sintent.Bycontrast,asustainmentunitwilltypicallyreceiveonespecifiedtask:to“providesustainmentto”thesupportedunit.Thistaskneverchanges.Atmost,thesustainmentunitmaybetaskedtoconductmissionsinadditiontosustainment,suchasbasedefenseanddetaineeopera-tions.However,nofurtherguidanceisprovidedonthesustainmentmission.

Typically,theconceptofsupportdevelopedbytheG/S–4andthesupportoperationsofficer(SPO)duringthehigherheadquarters’MDMPbecomestheconceptofoperationsforthesustainmentunit.Therefore,partofthesustainmentunit’sMDMPiscompletedbeforehigherheadquartersissuesanorder.Thisshouldleadasustainmentunittodevelopadirectedcourseofaction(COA)andwargameonlythatoneCOA.

AlthoughSunTzuteachesusto“seetheenemy,seetheterrain,andseeourselves,”thesustainmentstaffmustalsoseethesupportedunit.Thisisakeycomplexitythatsustainmentstaffsshouldrecognize.Theymustalsotakeintoaccountfriendlyactionsaswellasenemyactions.Staffsmustunderstandthecomposition,disposition,andschemeofmaneuverforthesupportedunitandfortheirownunits.Ifthesustainmentstaffcannotseethemselvesandthesup-portedunit,theconceptofsupportissubjecttoshort-fallsandpossiblefailure.

Sustainmentofamajoroperationisusuallydividedintobefore,during,andafterphases.The“before”phasetypicallystartswiththefirstwarningorder(WARNO)orevena“bepreparedto”taskfromthepreviousoperationandendsbeforethecurrentopera-tionbegins(unitscrossingthelineofdeparture).Thisrequiressustainmentunitstoexecutetasksastheplanisbeingdevelopedinordertosettheconditionsfortheoperation.

S

MDMPforSustainmentUnitsby Major DanieL Misigoy

Many members of sustainment units are often uncomfortable with the military decision making process (MDMP) and do not understand its importance to the successful completion of their jobs. This article offers some suggestions to help sustainers make the MDMP work for them.

MAY–jUNE 2010 15

KeystoSuccessAformalanddeliberateMDMPhas128steps.A

staffandcommanderwhoareknowledgeableandpro-ficientintheMDMPcanidentifywhichstepstomod-ify,expand,oromit.AnMDMPisveryrelevantandnecessaryforsustainmentunits.However,becauseofthefactorsdiscussedintheprevioussection,sustain-mentunitsmustmodifyhowtheyconductanMDMP.Threewaysthatasustainmentunitstaffcanmaximizeitstimeandeffortstoyieldaflexible,integratedplanarecollaborativeplanningwithhigherheadquarters,detailedandupdatedrunningestimates,andadetailedwargamingsession.

Collaborative planning.Sustainmentunitsmustconductcollaborativeplanningwiththeirsupportedunits.CollaborativeplanningisdefinedinFM5–0as“thereal-timeinteractionamongcommandersandstaffsattwoormoreechelonsdevelopingplansforasingleoperation.”ThetraditionalwaysustainmentunitsexecutethistaskisbyhavingtheSPOparticipateinthesupportedunit’sMDMP.Othermethodsaretousealiaisonofficer(LNO)orforthehigherheadquar-ters’G/S–4toprovidethelinkbetweenthesustain-mentunitandthesupportedunit.Themethodselectedshouldbeplannedoutandbepartoftheunit’sstand-ingoperatingprocedures.

ThesustainmentunitstaffmustprovidetheLNOorG/S–4withitscommander’sintent,updatedrun-ningestimates,andtheCOAstheyaredeveloping.TheLNOorG/S–4mustprovidethesustainmentunitstaffwithrunningestimatesfromthehigherheadquar-ters,COAsdeveloped,theschemeofmaneuverfromthechosenCOA,andanoperationalsynchronizationmatrixwithallwarfightingfunctions.Sharingthisinformationshouldbearegularpartofbothstaffs’battlerhythmstoensurethattherightinformationisavailablefortheappropriatestaff.

Detailed and updated running estimates.Develop-ingandmaintainingtherightrunningestimatesiscru-cialtocollaborativeplanningandproperlymanagingtime.AlthoughFM5–0presentsagenericformatforarunningestimatethatmirrorsastaffstudy,therun-ningestimateshouldbeinaformatthatbestconveysinformationthatcanbequicklyanalyzedforrapiddecisionmaking.Thisformatmaybecharts,tables,orspreadsheets,dependingontheinformation.Runningestimatesthatthesustainmentunitstaffshouldmain-tainandupdatearethe—❏ Intelligenceestimate,whichshouldmirrorthe

higherheadquarters’S–2estimate.❏ Supportedunitandsustainmentunitcombatpower

andmaintenanceposture.❏ Supportedunitsupplystatusforallclassesof

supply.❏ Sustainmentunitsupplystatusofdirectsupport

stocks.

❏ Supportedunitandsustainmentunitpersonnelstatus.

❏ Estimatedrequirementsforallclassesofsupplyneededforthesupportedunittoexecutethemission.

❏ Casualtyestimatefortheoperationappliedintimeandspace.Theserunningestimateswillfeedinformation

directlytotheSPOandG/S–4astheydeveloptheconceptofsupportduringthehigherheadquarters’MDMP.Detailedrunningestimatesthatareconstantlyupdatedwillfeedthemissionanalysisprocess.Thiswillallowthestafftofocusontheanalysisandpro-videthecommanderwithaclearervisualizationoftheoperationwithoutspendingtimecollectingdataaftertheyreceivethemission.

Wargaming.COAanalysis,orwargaming,isessen-tialtosynchronizingtheplanandidentifyingcriticaltasks,branches,andsequels.FM5–0states—

Wargamingstimulatesideas,highlightscriticaltasks,andprovidesinsightsthatmightnototh-erwisebediscovered.ItisacriticalstepintheMDMPandshouldbeallocatedmoretimethananyotherstep.

Ironically,sustainmentunitsoftenspendtheleastamountoftimeonwargaming.Theresultofthisisaplanthatisunclear,uncoordinated,andunsynchro-nized.Asthisplanisissueddowntothecompanylevel,crucialdetailsaremissing,whichleadstopoorsituationalawarenessandnocleartaskandpurposeatthesquadandplatoonlevels.Thefollowingvignettehighlightsseveralproblems.

The brigade is planning for two battalion task forc-es to conduct a coordinated attack on the enemy, who is occupying the three western towns in the brigade AO. The brigade support battalion (BSB) is tasked with sustaining the brigade and with being prepared to support consequence management. The BSB staff decides to execute this task by pushing a convoy with fuel, ammunition, construction materials, and medi-cal supplies to the closest forward operating base and conducting a follow-on mission to move to the objec-tive. The planning is conducted using a Microsoft Pow-erPoint slide from the brigade’s concept of operations story board for the operation. Once the task organi-zation is finalized, the BSB cuts a fragmentary order directing A Company to plan and execute a convoy and other companies to provide assets.

Sincethestaffdidnotwargame,itwasunclearwhattheconvoy’staskandpurposewere.Theywereessentiallytoldtogotoanotherforwardoperatingbaseandwait.Butwhatweretheywaitingfor?Nodecisionpoints,conditionchecks,ortriggerswereeveridenti-fied.Informationandinstructionsforcoordinationandlinkupwithotherunitswerenotprovided.Theseare

16 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

allissuesthatshouldbeidentifiedduringthewargame.Theconsequencesofanunsynchronizedplanrangefromashortfallinsupporttofratricide.Itisimpor-tantthatkeydetailsbeidentifiedduringtheplanningprocessandprovidedtosubordinatecommanderstoensuremissionsuccess.

ExecutinganMDMPMissionAnalysisThesustainmentunitstaffcanstartitsMDMPwhen

itreceivesthefirstWARNOfromitshigherorsup-portedheadquarters.Insomecases,thesustainmentstaffcanbeginearlier.Thisrequiresusingcommand,control,communications,andcomputersystemstoprovideacommonoperationalpictureoffutureopera-tionsandtoallowLNOstogainandpassrelevantinformation.

TheexecutiveofficeralertsthestafftogathertheirtoolsandpreparetheplanstentfortheMDMPatadesignatedtime.StaffsectionsupdatetheirestimatesbeforetheMDMPstarts.TheS–3postsintheplanstentanygraphics,theoperationaltimeline,andtheinitialcommander’sintentfromthehigherheadquarters.

Oncethestaffgathers,theyconductaninitialassessmentbasedoninformationfromtheLNO,thehigherheadquarters’WARNO,andtheirrunningesti-mates.Thestaffidentifiesanyinitialsustainmenttasksthatneedtobeaccomplishedbeforetheoperationandobtainsthesustainmentcommander’sinitialguidance.ThestaffproducesaWARNOforitssubordinateunits.Therunningestimatesareupdatedandexpandedbythesustainmentstaffandarepasseduptothehigher

Combined Arms and Services Staff School students use the military decision making process to wargame a particular, hypothetical stability operations scenario. For many sustainment Soldiers, this type of classroom MDMP exercise is their only MDMP experience. (Photo by MAJ Christopher LeCron)

MAY–jUNE 2010 17

headquarters’G/S–4andLNO,ensuringthatthestaffsshareacommonoperationalpictureandthatthecon-ceptofsupportdevelopedisfeasible,suitable,andacceptable.

Missionanalysislaststhelongestofanystepandwillbeconductedtwoorthreetimes.ThesustainmentstaffcontinuesdoingmissionanalysisuntilthehigherheadquartershascompleteditswargameandissuedWARNO3.However,thisdoesnotmeanthestaffstaysintheplanstentthroughout.Asthehigherheadquar-terscompletesanMDMPstep,thestaffreceivesaWARNOandinformationfromtheLNO.Thethreecyclesofmissionanalysisforthesustainmentstaffare:❏ Missionanalysisbrief(WARNO2).❏ COAdevelopment.❏ Wargaming(WARNO3).

MissionAnalysisBriefAsthestaffexecutesthecyclesofmissionanalysis,

theyupdatetheirrunningestimates,identifyingspecifiedandimpliedtasks,criticalfactsandassumptions,con-straints,requiredversusavailableassets,andinformationrequirements.Attheendofeachcycle,theyinformallybriefthecommander,issueafragmentaryordertosub-ordinateswithimmediatetasks,andprovideupdatedrunningestimatestotheLNOandG/S–4.Attheendofmissionanalysis,thestaffprovidesaformalbriefingtothecommanderandthesubordinateunitcommanders.Subordinatecommandersareincludedinordertofacili-tateparallelplanningandsotheycanreceivethecom-mander’sintentwhenthestaffreceivesit.

COADevelopmentCOAdevelopmentforthesustainmentstaffbegins

whenthehigherheadquarterscompletesitswargameandissuesWARNO3.ThesustainmentstaffconductsafocusedCOAdevelopmentsincetheframeworkfortheCOAwasalreadydevelopedbytheG/S–4duringhigherheadquarters’MDMP.Theconceptofopera-tionsforthesustainmentunitisbasedontheconceptofsupportdevelopedbytheG/S–4.ThismakesCOAdevelopmentforthesustainmentstaffarelativelyeasyprocess.Thesustainmentstaffstillneedstodevelopspecifiedtasks,assignthemtosubordinateheadquar-ters,anddevelopaCOAstatementandsketch.TheendstateisaCOAbrieftothecommanderandsubordinatecommandersforapproval.

WargamingOncethecommanderhasapprovedtheCOA,

thestaffmustconductadetailedCOAanalysis,orwargame.ThisisarguablythemostimportantMDMPstep.Wargamingallowsthestafftosynchronizetheplanbothinternallyandexternally.Externalsynchro-nizationiscrucialsincetheirsubordinateunitswilloperateinanotherunit’sAOandwilllikelytraverse

multipleunits’AOs.AccordingtoFM5–0,COAanal-ysisenablesthestaffto—❏ Furthervisualizethebattle.❏ Determineconditionsandresourcesrequiredfor

success.❏ Identifythecoordinationneededtoproduce

synchronizedresults.Inadditiontotheprocessforwargamingdescribed

inFM5–0,thestafftakesstepstotailorthewargametotheirrequirements.First,thestaffobtainsthehigherheadquarters’operationalsynchronizationmatrixandrecordofitswargame.Thecriticaleventswargamedbythesustainmentstaffarenestedwiththecriticaleventsoftheirhigherheadquarters.Insomecases,thesecriti-caleventsmayneedtobedividedintotwocriticaleventsforthesustainmentstaff.

Thehigherheadquarters’synchronizationmatrixalsotellsthestaffwhatadjacentunitsandenablersareexpectedtodooverspaceandtime.Thisshouldbeincorporatedintothewargamebyexpandingthecyclesforeachcriticalevent.Onecycleincludes—❏ Actionbythemaneuverunitandenablers.❏ Actionbythesustainmentunit.❏ Reaction(enemyactiononthesustainmentunitpri-

marilyandotherunitsasneeded).❏ Counteractionbythemaneuverunitandenablers.❏ Counteractionbythesustainmentunit.

Asthestaffcompleteseachcycle,itvisualizesthebattleinordertoidentifyadditionalimpliedtasks,decisionpoints,andrequiredcoordination.ThestaffcompletesitsoperationalsynchronizationmatrixandupdatesthesustainmentsynchronizationmatrixfortheG/S–4.Theresultofthewargameisasuitable,feasi-ble,andcompleteconceptoftheoperationsthatidenti-fiesrequiredcoordinationandrehearsalswithadjacentunitsandisreadytobepublishedinanoperationorderforsubordinates.

TheMDMPisaninvaluabletoolforanystaff.Sustainmentunitscanusethetechniquesdescribedinthisarticletostreamlineandfocustheirplanningandrapidlyprocessinformation.Theprocessusesalinearplanningtimelinedrivenbyhigherheadquar-ters’MDMPs.Thenextstepforthesustainmentstaffistonesttheirplanningprocessintheirhigherhead-quarters’targetingcycle.BymaximizingtheuseofanLNO,maintainingdetailedrunningestimates,andexecutingadetailedwargame,thestaffwillbeabletobettermanagetimeandinformation,whichwillleadtogreaterproductivity.

Major daniel Misigoy is a fellow at the u.s. agenCy for international developMent. he holds a baChelor’s degree froM boston university and a Master’s degree froM the national defense intelligenCe College and is a graduate of the arMy CoM-Mand and general staff College.

18 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

sthesurgeofU.S.forcesinIraqthathadbegun in2007waswindingdownduringthelatter halfof2008,the“KnightWarriors”oftheBam-berg,Germany-based16thSustainmentBrigadebeganassumingresponsibilityforsustainmentoperationsinMulti-NationalDivision-Northfromtheircounterpartsofthe3dSustainmentBrigade.Theseoperationswerecon-ductedatContingencyOperatingBase(COB)QayyarahWest(Q-West)andotherforwardoperatingbasesstretch-ingfromtheIraq-TurkeyborderatHaburGatetoJointBaseBalad(formerlyLogisticsSupportAreaAnaconda).

AlthoughthesurgeprovedtobeaclearsuccessinBaghdadandAlAnbarProvince,thecitiesofMosulandKirkukremainedhotspotsforenemyactivity.ProvidingsustainmenttocoalitionforcesinandaroundMosulandKirkukrequiredwell-trained,disciplined,andtacticallypatientleadersandconvoyescortteamsatalllevels.

SharetheRoadTheendofthesurgebroughtwithitmajorchanges

inhowsustainmentforcesaccomplishedtheirmissions.Oneofthesechangeswasthe“SharetheRoad”con-ceptforexecutingconvoys,whichwasintroducedatthistimebyMulti-NationalCorps-Iraq(MNC–I).(Seerelatedarticleonpage23.)ThisinitiativewasanefforttobringasenseofnormaloperationsbacktotheroadsofIraq.Coalitionforcesconvoyswereinstructednotto“owntheroad,”whichmeantthattheyhadtoceasesomeoftheconvoypracticestheyhadusedinthepast,suchasdrivingdownthecenteroftheroadandmakingoncomingtrafficmovetothesideoftheroadandstop.

Othertactics,techniques,andproceduresthatcoali-tionforcesconvoyshadimplementedovertheyearsandceasedduringthedrawdownincludedsettinguphastytrafficcontrolpointswheneverconvoyshadtoturnontoadifferentroute,operatingconvoysina“bubble”bynotallowingciviliantrafficwithin500feetofacoalitionforcesconvoy,andhanging“StayBack;DeadlyForceAuthorized”signsonguntrucks.

UndertheSharetheRoadinitiative,thesignswereremoved,civilianvehicleswereallowedtominglewithcoalitionforcesconvoys,andconvoysbeganoperatingpredominantlyatnighttoavoidaddingtocongestedciviliantraffic.The16thSustainmentBri-gadesuccessfullyimplementedSharetheRoadacross

thebrigade’sfootprint,exceptwithinMosul,wherethepersistentenemythreatrequiredstrictermeasurestomaintainconvoysecurity.

LogisticsTrainingandAdvisoryTeamsItwasaroundthissametimethatMNC–Ibegana

renewedefforttoassisttheIraqiSecurityForces(ISF)intrainingtheirlogisticsunits.U.S.Armydivisionsandthe3dExpeditionarySustainmentCommand(ESC)directedtheformationoflogisticstrainingandadvisoryteams(LTATs).TheLTATsbeganadeliberatetrainingprocessforIraqimaintenancecompaniesattheorgani-zational,division,locationcommand,anddepotlevels.

The16thSustainmentBrigadewasdirectedtoimmediatelystanduptwoLTATs,oneatK–1(Kirkuk)andoneatAlKasik,withanon-ordermis-siontostanduptwomore.AlthoughMNC–IhadarecommendedLTATstructuremodel,thecompositionofthe16thSustainmentBrigade’sLTATsfocusedonsubject-matterexpertsandtrainers;theLTATsthere-forehadmorewarrantofficersandnoncommissionedofficersthancommissionedofficers.AsanexampleoftheLTATs’success,bytheendofthebrigade’sdeployment,theIraqirepairmaintenancecompany(RMC)atK–1hadreceivedanawardfromtheIraqiArmyDirectorofElectricalandMechanicalEngineer-ingforbeingthetopRMCinIraq.

CombatPatrolsVersusConvoysWhilethe16thSustainmentBrigadewasinthe

processofimplementingSharetheRoadandstand-ingupLTATs,theU.S.andIraqiGovernmentssignedthenewbilateralsecurityagreement.TheagreementrequiredcombatpatrolstobepartneredwithISFatalltimes.Beforethesecurityagreement,sustainmentconvoyshadbeencalled“combatlogisticspatrols,”or“CLPs,”forseveralyears.Soifa“CLP”wasaformofcombatpatrol,thenithadtohaveanIraqiescort,eventhoughthesecurityagreementstipulatedthatlogisticsconvoyswerenotrequiredtohaveISFescorts.

Subsequently,on1January2009,the16thSustain-mentBrigadestoppedusingtheterm“CLP”andsub-stituted“convoy”inordertoensurethatsustainmentconvoyswereoperatingwithinthetermsofthesecurityagreement.Thischangeprovedtobequitechalleng-

The16thSustainmentBrigadeinIraq:SupportingtheDrawdown

by CoLoneL Martin b. Pitts anD Lieutenant CoLoneL robert s. Mott

The “Knight Warriors” faced the challenge of supporting operations in the transition from the surge to the drawdown.

A

MAY–jUNE 2010 19

ingbecause“CLP”hadawarriorconnotationand“convoy”seemedtoindicateagarrisonmentality.Eventually,theESCwouldpublishapolicyletteronusingtheterm“convoy”inplaceof“CLP”todem-onstratethatthechangeinterminol-ogyhadgeneral-officercommandemphasis.

IncreasedIraqiResponsibilityThe16thSustainmentBrigade

hadapproximately6monthsbeforethenextstepinimplementingthesecurityagreementcameintoeffecttogetusedtotherenewedemphasisonreturningIraqtonormalcondi-tionsandworkingthroughIraqiSecurityForces.ThatstepcalledforallcoalitionforcestobeoutofIraqicitiesby30June2009.ThisnewbenchmarkontheroadtofullIraqisovereigntybroughtevengreaterchallengestothetaskofcoordinatingthemovementofconvoysthroughthecityofMosul.

ISFandtheNinewaOperationsCommandfeltempoweredandconfidentthattheycouldridthecityofMosulofviolentextremistswithminimalassistancefromcoalitionforces.Consequently,toremainconsistentwiththemessageoftheirinformationoperationscam-paign—thatcoalitionforceswerenotoperatingwithinthecity—theISFonlyallowedcoalitionforcessustain-mentconvoysadaily4-hourwindowtomovethroughthecitylimitsofMosul.The4-hourmovementwindowcausedthe16thSustainmentBrigadetoincreaseitscoor-dinationeffortswithlocalbattlespaceowners.

HumanResourcesandFinanceDespitethefluxintheoperatingenvironment,the

deploymentaffordedthe16thSustainmentBrigadeagreatopportunitytosynchronizehumanresourcesandfinancialmanagementfunctionsamongthebrigade,thesupportoperationsoffice(SPO),andthespecialtroopsbattalion(STB).Followingsustainmentbrigadedoctrine,thesefunctionswereeffectivelymanagedbytheSPOandcommandedandcontrolledbytheSTB.Thisrelationshipshouldbethetemplateforbothcom-batdeploymentsandgarrisonoperations.

The16thSustainmentBrigadeSPOwasabletobuildandmonitornumerousconvoysthatrelocatedexcessequipmentfromnorthernIraqtosouthernIraqforeven-tualshipmentoutofthetheater.Thebrigade’seffortstoclearthecentralreceivingandshippingpointyardsofexcessequipmentinnorthernIraqwilleventuallyleadtoaseamlessandefficientredeploymentofSoldiersandequipmentfromtheJointIraqiOperationalArea.That,inturn,willallowthenewadviseandassistbrigadesto

focusonISFtrainingandtransitionandnotjustonret-rogradelogistics.

Duringits15-monthrotationinIraq,the16thSus-tainmentBrigadeplayedanintegralroleinlayingthefoundationfortheresponsibledrawdownofforcesoverthenext2½years.WiththebrigadeactingasthemayoroftheHaburGateborder-crossingsite,thebri-gade’splannerswereinapositiontoprovidedetailedinformationoninfrastructureandotherdatarequire-mentsforstrategiclogisticsplanningefforts.AstheseniormissioncommandofCOBQ-West,thebrigadealsowasabletoprovidevaluableinformationontheinfrastructureandoperationalintricaciesoftheCOB;thisinformationwillsupporttheCOB’s(planned)futureexpandedresponsibilitiesascoalitionforcesshifttoapostureofstrategicoverwatch.

Colonel Martin b. pitts was the CoMMander of the 16th sus-tainMent brigade during its deployMent to operation iraqi freedoM 08–10. he was previously the u.s. arMy europe deputy g–4 in heidelberg, gerMany. he holds Master’s degrees in publiC adMin-istration and strategiC studies. he is a graduate of the arMy CoM-Mand and general staff College and the arMy war College.

lieutenant Colonel robert s. Mott was the s–3 offiCer in Charge for the 16th sustainMent brigade during its deployMent to operation iraqi freedoM 08–10. he was previously the exeCu-tive offiCer for the 16th speCial troops battalion at baMberg, gerMany. he holds a baChelor’s degree in international relations froM ohio university and is a graduate of the arMy CoMMand and general staff College and the CoMbined logistiCs offiCers advanCed Course.

The commander of the 16th Sustainment Brigade and a local Iraqi community leader discuss the security situation in the community and at Contingency Operating Base Q-West in the village of Jaddilah Soflih, Iraq. (Photo by SFC Adam V. Shaw, 16th Sustainment Brigade PAO)

20 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

FuelSupportatContingencyOperatingBaseSpeicher

by Lieutenant CoLoneL vinCent C. nWafor, sergeant first CLass thoMas e. harreLL, jr., anD staff sergeant PauLa MiLLer

oldiersatContingencyOperatingBase(COB)SpeicherinIraqandacrossMulti-NationalDivision-North(MND–N)receivedthefuelsupporttheyneededduringOperationIraqiFreedom08–10thankstothepositiveleadershipandconcertedeffortsofthe16thSustainmentBrigade’s391stCom-batSustainmentSupportBattalion(CSSB)andthe3dExpeditionarySustainmentCommand(ESC).

ConvoysfromCOBSpeicherprovidedfood,water,ammunition,andotherclassesofsupplytoArmyunitsthroughouttheregion.Fuelforthoseconvoysandforotheroperationswasavailablewhenandwhereitwasneeded.TheSoldiersfromthe391stCSSBensuredcontinuityinfueloperationsatSpeicherbyusingasynchronizedfuelsupportnetwork,skillfulmain-tenanceofconsumptionfactors,andoptimumonsitefuelstoragecapacity.

SynchronizedFuelSupportThesupporttoCOBSpeicherwaspossiblebecause

ofthe3dESC’ssynchronizedfuelsupportnetwork.The3dESCwasresponsibleformanagingallstrategicfuelsourcescomingintotheIraqitheaterofoperations.AmongthesesourceswasthenortherngroundlineofcommunicationcomingfromHaburGateattheIraq-Turkeyborder;thislineprimarilysupportedCOBSpeicher.TheESCalsowasresponsiblefortheaterfuelstockageatdirectsupportandgeneralsupportfuelsites.The3dESCinfluenceddailyfueloperationsbypublish-ing96-hourfueldistributionrequests,whichdictatedeachfuelsite’sfuel“push”or“pull”supplyoperations.

Asanessentiallinkinthefuelsupportnetwork,the16thSustainmentBrigade,asubordinateelementofthe3dESC,wasresponsibleforthefuelflowfromHaburGatetodirectsupportandgeneralsupportfuelsitesforMND–N.Thebrigaderesuppliedthosefuelsitesbasedonthedailypetroleumreportsprovidedbysubordinatebattalions.

Soldiersfromthe391stCSSBwereresponsibleforfueloperationsatCOBSpeicher.Byworkingtogether,theunitsofthe3dESCfuelsupportnetworkensuredresponsivefuelflowandthebestfuelstockage.

ConsumptionFactorsandStorageCapacityFuelflowedfromHaburGatetotheCOBSpeicher

fuelfarmdaily.Nomiddlemanwasinvolvedinthe

throughput.Foreignnationalfueltankersescortedbythebrigade’sconvoyprotectionvehiclesdeliveredthefuel.Theidealturnaroundtimeforthesefueltankerswas72hours.Thestatusofthefueltankerswasbriefedatthebattalion,brigade,andESClevels.Thesebriefingsdem-onstratedcommandinterestinfuelsupplyoperationsandconstitutedoneofthereasonsthatfuelsupportatCOBSpeicherwasreadilyavailableandresponsive.

AccuratemaintenanceofconsumptionfactorsandoptimumonsitefuelstoragecapacitywerecriticaltoachievingsuccessfulfuelsupporttoCOBSpeicher.The3dESCusedaquarterlyconsumptionfactor;basedontheconsumptionfactor,Speicher’sfuelfarmstockageobjectivewassetat7daysofsupply.The391stCSSB’sexperienceshowedthatmaintaining7daysofsupplyofferednobuilt-inbuffertoaccommo-dateanydisruptionsintheresupplylineorotherexigencies,suchasbadweather,whichwerepartandparceloftheoperationalenvironment.Theriskwasmitigatedbymakingstoragecapacitymanytimesgreaterthanthestockageobjective,whichallowedactualfuelstockagetobewellabove7daysofsupply.Speicherbenefitedfromthefuelstockpileconcept.

The391stCSSB’sconstantcoordinationwithallpar-tiesinvolvedwasimportanttosuccessfulfuelsupport.Thebattalion’scollaborativeeffortswithdivisionele-mentsfosteredanticipatorysupport.TheCSSB“leanedforward”anddeliveredbulkfueltothebrigadesupportbattalion’ssatellitelocationsandprovideddedicatedfuelsupporttotheaviationsupportbattalion.TheCSSB’scoordinationwiththeMarinestoprovideretailfuelsup-porttotheirgroundassaultconvoyspassingthroughthebasewasparticularlysatisfying.

TheCSSB’sverticalcoordinationwiththe16thSustainmentBrigadeandthe3dESCwaspivotalinhelpingthefuelfarmtoprovideandreceivebackupresupplytoandfromtheJointBaseBaladgeneralsup-portfuelsite.DuringOperationIraqiFreedom08–10,theCSSB’sfuelteamdidwhatitdidbest:itcoordi-natedwithhigherheadquartersandsupportingunitstoprovidefuelwhenandwherecustomerswantedit.

TheFuelFarmCOBSpeicherfueloperationsfeaturedafuelfarm

andaretailfuelpoint,bothoperatedbycontractors.KBR’sCorpsLogisticsSupportServicesconducted

S

MAY–jUNE 2010 21

thefueloperations,andKBR’sTheaterTransportationMissiondistributedthefuel.Thefuelfarmandretailpointeachhaditsownworkforceofahandfulofexpa-triatesoverseeingsubcontractors.Thesecontractoremployeesreceivedfueltankers,downloadedthefuel,processedreceipts,madeissues,accountedforthefuel,andmaintainedthefacilities.

Day-to-dayfuelfacilityoperationsrestedonthebacksofthesubcontractorworkers.TheCOBSpeicherfuelfarmandretailfuelfacilitiesworkedlikeaSwissclock;theywereunderonemanager,thecommandclimatewasamiableandconducivetoseamlessopera-tions,andcross-talksbetweenthefuelfarmworkersandretailoperatorswereregular.

Retailfuelreplenishmentwasalsoprovidedonaregularbasis.Abouthalfoftheretailfuelissueddailywenttoonpostmobilerefueling(toppingoffgenera-torsandmaterials-handlingequipment).Theotherhalfwasissuedinsupportofmotortransportinandaroundthebaseandtoconvoyspassingthrough.Althoughtheretailfueldailyconsumptionratiowasaboutthesameastheretailfuelstoragecapacity,thefacilityneverran

outoffuel.Theretailfuelpointhadlocal-haultankersonstandbyandmadereplenishmentrunsasneeded;thispracticeprovidedanothersafetyvalvethatensuredsuccessinfuelsupportoperations.

Itshouldbementionedthatfueloperationsbecamecapitalizedunderthe391stCSSB’sleadership.Capi-talizationmeantthatthebulkfuelinventorywastransferredfromArmytoDefenseEnergySupportCenter(DESC)ownership.Asacapitalizedsite,bulkfuelissuedtonon-Armyunitswaschargedtothemilitaryserviceoftherespectiveuser.Beforethecapitalization,thecostofbulkfuelissueswasabsorbedbytheArmy.

ThefuelfarmoperatedunderstringentDESCrules.Thefuelfarmemployeescapturedallthebulkfueltransactions(receiptandissue)withrelatedtempera-tureconversionreadingsandenteredtheresultingdataintotheweb-basedFuelsAutomatedSystemEnter-priseServer.TheFuelsAutomatedSystemEnterpriseServerisanautomatedinformationsystemdesignedtosupportDESCandtheservicesinperformingtheirresponsibilitiesinfuelmanagementanddistribution.

391st CSSB Coordinates , sync hronizes , and manages COB Speic her fuel suppor t operations.

3d ExpeditionarySustainment CommandManages all s trategic fuel

sources into ITO. Manages theater fuel s tockage. Generates 96-hour

DS/G S fuel distribution request.

16th Sustainment BrigadeManages fuel resupply

from strategic source to DS s ites at MND–N. R esupplies or

redistributes fuel among its subordinate battalions .

Bulk Fuel F arm SupportRetail fuel point resupply.

BSB satellite locations push.ASB pull. JBB pull.

Retail Fuel Point Support COB Speicher tenant customers.

Convoy support center.

BSB and ASBProvide fuel

requirements to 391st CSSB.

COB Speicher Fuel Support Model

L egendAS B = Aviation support battalionB S B = Brigade support battalionC OB = Contingency operating base C S S B = Combat sustainment support battalion DS = Direct supportG S = General supportIT O = Iraqi theater of operationsJ B B = Joint Base Balad MND−N= Multi-National Division-North

The COB Speicher fuel support model shows the co operative management that was the basis for suc cessful fuel operations.

22 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

Inputtingthedatafromfuelinventorystrappingchartswasasignificantpartofthedailytasks.[AccordingtoDODM4140.25,DODManagementofBulkPetroleumProducts,NaturalGas,andCoal,tank“strappingisthetermcommonlyappliedtotheprocedureformeasuringtankstoprovidethedimensionsnecessaryforcomputingcapacitytablesthatwillreflectthequantityofproductinatankatanygivendepth/level.”]TheCOBSpiecherfuelfarmcanproudlysaythatitmettheDESCstandardsduringOperationIraqiFreedom08–10.

ContractManagementStructureBecausethe391stCSSBhadtaskingauthorityover

thecontractors,thebattalionwasultimatelyaccount-ableforallfuelsupportoperationsatCOBSpeicher.Thebattalionpersonnelwhowereactivelyimmersedintheday-to-dayfueloperationsincludedtherespon-sibleofficer(RO),thecommoditymanager,andthecontractingofficer’srepresentative(COR).

TheRO,aqualifiedseniorpetroleumsupplyspecialist,providedoversightofCOBSpeicher’scapitalizedfuel-farmDefenseWorkingCapitalFundaccount.TheROacceptedaccountabilityandassumedrelatedpecuniaryliability.TheROdeter-minedandverifiedwhodrewfuelandensuredthatthefuelfacilitymaintainedanaudittrailforallfueltransactionsinaccordancewithDESCpetroleummanagementpoliciesandprocedures.TheRO’sgoalwastokeepthefuelfarm’sinventoryintoler-anceattheendofeachmonth,andthatgoalwasachieved.[Toleranceistheacceptablelevelofdevia-tionfromastandard.]

Thecommoditymanager,apetroleumsupplyser-geant,managedthedailyfunctionsoffuelsupportoperations.Thosefunctionsincluded—❏ Acknowledgingreceiptsoffuelresupplyandsend-

ingconfirmationreceiptstoDESC-Europetoallowthefuelsuppliertobepaid.

❏ Monitoringbulkpetroleumequipmentreadiness.❏ Providingtechnicalassistanceandguidancetocon-

tractoremployees.❏ Conductingonsiteinspectionsandaudits.❏ Analyzingfuelreports.❏ Projectingcurrentandfuturemissionrequirements

basedontheconsumptionfactorandstockageobjective.

❏ Transmittingthedatatothe16thSustainmentBri-gade,whichallowedthebrigadetomaketimelyandinformeddecisionsthatkeptthefuelfarmsuffi-cientlyresupplied.

ThecommoditymanagerservedastheCOR.Inthatcapacity,thesergeantensuredcontractorcompliancewiththeperformanceworkstatement.WhiletheCORmonitoredcontractorperformancedaily,formalfeed-backtothecontractorwasprovidedthroughmonthlyauditandprogramevaluationbriefs.

The391stCSSB’srelationshipwiththecontractorswasoneofmutualinterest:bothwerededicatedtoprovidingsuccessfulfuelsupport.Frankly,theCOBSpeicherfuelsupportmodelwasaproductofpositiveleadership—allelementsworkingwithacommongoaltogetthecustomersthefueltheywanted.

Thebattalion’ssuccesscontradictsafamousstate-mentfromGeneralNormanH.Schwarzkopf,thecom-manderofOperationsDesertShieldandDesertStormfrom1990to1991:“Youlearnfarmorefromnegativeleadershipthanfrompositiveleadership,becauseyoulearnhownottodoit.And,therefore,youlearnhowtodoit.”ThepositiveleadershipandunityofeffortseenintheCOBSpeicherfuelsupportmodelprovidedaninvaluablelearningexperienceonhowtomanageanddistributefueltoabase.

IfthefamousWorldWarIIGermancommanderFieldMarshalErwinRommel,knownasthe“DesertFox,”hadhadaccesstoafuelsupportnetwork,thechronicfuelshortagesthatplaguedtheGermansinNorthAfricamightnothavehappenedand“militarysupplyfailures”mightnothavebecomepartofourhistoricallexicon.PoorcommunicationbetweenRom-melandhislogisticsstaffhasbeencitedasafactorintheGermans’logisticsproblems.

IntheCOBSpeicherfuelsupportmodel,asynchronizedfuelsupportnetworkwasinplace,openlinesofcommunicationflourishedbetweenthesupportedandsupportingunits,mutualinter-estensuredsuccessfulsupportbetweenmilitaryandcivilians,andcustomersgotfuelwhenandwheretheyneededit.

lieutenant Colonel vinCent C. nwafor is the logistiCs operations Chief of standing joint forCe headquarters, u.s. afriCa CoM Mand. he Co-authored this artiCle when he was the support operations offiCer of the 391st CoMbat sustainMent support battalion in iraq. he holds a b.s. degree in aCCounting froM southern uni-versity at new orleans and an M.b.a. degree froM southeastern louisi ana university. he is a graduate of the arMy CoMMand and general staff College, the arMy logistiCs exeCutive developMent Course, and the arMy petroleuM offiCers Course.

sergeant first Class thoMas e. harrell, jr., was the petro-leuM supply operations re sponsible offiCer for the 391st CoMbat sus tainMent support battalion during the dep loyMent to iraq. he holds a baChelor’s degree in business adMinistration froM Central texas College. he is a graduate of the arMy water treatMent, petroleuM laboratory speCialist, and petroleuM logistiCs supply and serviCe Courses.

staff sergeant paula Miller served as a pe troleuM supply nonCoMMissioned offiCer for the 391st CoMbat sustainMent support bat talion in support of operation iraqi freedoM. she has CoMpleted the advanCed nonCoM Missioned offiCer aCadeMy petroleuM and water Course and the online defense distri bution ManageMent Course.

MAY–jUNE 2010 23

SharetheRoad:ConvoyEscort

ForthefirstfewyearsofOperationIraqiFreedom,theheightenedsecuritypostureontheroadsofIraqledcoalitionforcestoadoptaggressiveconvoytactics,techniques,andprocedures(TTP).Coalitionforces“owned”theroads.Simplyput,convoysdidnotsharetheroadswithIraqis.

Astacticalsituationsdictated,patrolorconvoycommandersinstructedtheirunitstodriveagainsttheflow—crossintooncomingtrafficanddriveagainsttraffic—ortodriveovermedians.Unitsmaintained“bubbles,”preventingciviliantrafficfromintermin-glingwithcoalitionforces.Civilianvehiclesenteringaconvoy’sbubblewereconsideredhostile.Anothertypicalcoalitionpracticewasspeedingorforcingmilitaryvehiclesthroughtraffic.ThesewerecommonpracticesthroughoutmostoftheIraqtheaterofoper-ationsuntiltheendof2008.Unfortunately,injuryanddeathofciviliansresultedfromtheaggressivenatureofthesepracticesthatwereintendedtoprotectcoalitionforces.

DecliningattacksledMulti-NationalCorps-Iraq(MNC–I)leaderstobelievethatitwastimetolowertheoverallsecuritypostureoftheirforcesontheroadsthroughoutthetheater.On1October2008,MNC–Iinstitutedthe“SharetheRoad”initiative,whichwasstartedjustbeforethesecurityagreementbetweentheUnitedStatesandIraqtookeffecton1January2009.CoalitionandIraqiforcesexpectthisinitiativetoresultinareturntonormalcy.Onthemainandalternatesup-plyroutes,SharetheRoadresultsingreatercivilianfreedomofmovementandasmallercoalitionforcefootprint.ThisinitiativeisbelievedtobeintegraltotheultimategoalofsuccessfullygivingcontrolofIraqbacktotheIraqipeople.

SharetheRoadRulesTosuccessfullyreturntheroadstotheIraqis,coali-

tionforceshavetochangetheirTTP.SharetheRoadisoneofthemethodsusedtomakethatchange.Someoftherulesofthisinitiativeinclude—❏ Travelintherightlanewhenfeasibleandallow

civiliantraffictopassfromthefrontandrear.

❏ Trafficmayinterminglewithaconvoyinthepro-cessofpassingbutshouldnotbeallowedtolingerinoralongsidetheconvoy.Itmustshowaprogres-siveattempttoexitormoveforward.

❏ Convoyswillnotpreventthenaturalflowoftrafficorforcetraffictostopunlessspecificcircumstancesorsafetyconcernsdictatedoingso.

❏ Convoyswillnotclearpathsthatarenotintendedfornormaltrafficflowunlessanemergencysitua-tionexistsorthemissionrequires.

❏ Considerallvehiclesfriendlyuntilprovenotherwise.❏ Continuoussituationalawarenessandvigilanceis

necessarybecauseofsomeIraqis’erraticdrivingpractices.Soldiersmustmakemeasureddecisionsandexecutetacticalpatiencewhenconsideringescalationofforce.

❏ Coalitionforcesmaynothave“StayBack”signsontheirvehicles,includingthe“Danger:StayBack100Meters”andallsimilarsigns.

❏ Unitsarepermittedtohavesignsthatstate“WhenSignaled,ProceedandPassWithCaution.”

❏ Convoyscanflowwithtrafficandareexpectedtoobeyalltrafficrulesunlessanemergencydictatesotherwise.

Underthisnewphilosophy,civilianvehiclescantravelwithconvoysandareconsideredfriendlyuntildeterminedotherwise.Thischangerequiresatotalshiftinthinkingonthepartofcoalitionforces,muchmoresothanonthepartoftheIraqipeople.However,theseguidelinesdonottakeawayaSoldier’sinher-entrighttoself-defense.Ifapotentialthreatexists,escalationofforceproceduresshouldbeinitiatedtodeterminehostileintentoraction.

ProblemsWithSharingtheRoadSharetheRoadistherightsteptotakeinorderfor

Iraqisocietytomoveforward.ItshowstheIraqisthatwecareabouttheirwell-beingandwantthemtotakeresponsibilityforthesecurityandsafetyoftheirroadsandcountry.AlthoughSharetheRoadisthewayfor-ward,thisinitiativecannotbeappliedtoallcoalitionforcemissions.

ConvoysecuritycompaniesescortingmilitaryandcivilianconvoysinaSharetheRoadenvironmentencountermanycomplexchallenges.Thesechallengesfallintwobasicareas:coalitionforcesecurityandIraqiciviliansafety.Forexample,atypicalcombatpatrol(4to5vehicles)caneasilysharetheroadwhilemaintainingpositivecommandandcontrolofitsele-ments.However,alogisticsconvoyescortingmilitary

by Major kris a. kough, Caarng, anD CaPtain Curtis a. goLLer iii, Caarng

Share the Road is the right step to take in order for Iraqi society to move

forward.

24 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

vehicles,KBRelements,orthird-countrynationals(upto50trucks)isextremelydifficulttoexecutesafelywhilesharingtheroad.

Withsmaller,nonlogisticsconvoys,onecanmain-taincommandandcontrolvisuallyandwithradiocommunicationswhileciviliantrafficmovesthrough-outtheelement.Thispatrolmayonlyspanacoupleofhundredmeters.Becauseofthesizeoftheunit,vehiclecommandershavebettersituationalawareness,makingreactiontimeshorter.

However,thesituationchangesdrasticallywhenthenumberofvehiclesintheconvoyincreasesgreatly(aswithlogisticsconvoys).Convoysecuritycompaniesescortlogisticsconvoysofupto50vehiclesthatfre-quentlyspanadistanceofmorethan5kilometers.Thiscreatesmanysecurityandcommandandcontrolprob-lems.Withonly6guntrucks,itisdifficulttosecurealargeconvoyof40to50trucks.Whenaconvoyisstretchedout,guntrucksmorethanlikelywillnothaveaviewoftheotherguntrucks,thusmakingoverlappingsecurityfortheconvoydifficult.Thesecurityelementhaspositivecontrolatthefrontandrearoftheconvoy,whereattacksaremostlikelytooccur,butcivilianvehiclesmayentertheconvoyatanytimefromthesideswithoutthesecurityelement’sknowledge.

SecurityRisksIraq’sroadsarenotinthebestcondition.Manyare

unstablefrompotholes,erosion,improvisedexplosivedevice(IED)detonations,andfrequentdigging(whichis

anindicatoroffutureIEDemplace-ment).Theshouldersoftheroadsarealsoverydangerousbecauseoferosionortamperinganddigging.UnderSharetheRoad,convoysaredirectedtostaytothesideoftheroadsociviliansmaypass.Unfortu-nately,thesideoftheroadiswheremostIEDattacksoccur.

Anothersecurityproblemforconvoysisproperexecutionofescalationofforce.WiththeSharetheRoadinitiative,weeliminatetheexistingsafestandoffdistancebetweencoalitionforceandcivil-ianvehicles,thuseliminatingthedistanceandtimeaSoldierhastodistinguishbetweenaninnocentbystanderandanindividualwithhostileintentoroneinitiatingahostileact.Wespendmanyhourstrainingonescalationofforceand

therulesofengagement,yetwehavereducedthetimehehastomakelifeordeathdecisions.

Vehiclesarepermittedtoapproachtheconvoysandpasswhendirected,movinginandoutoftheconvoyattheirleisure.Onceavehiclehasenteredtheconvoy,guntrucksmaynotbeabletoseethisvehiclebecauseoftheirplacementwithintheconvoy.Theoretically,avehiclecouldhideintheconvoyandtravelwithit.DuringourdeploymenttoIraqin2008and2009,weencounteredvehiclesemployingthistactic.Surprisingly,wealsofoundthatciviliantrucksenteredourconvoysinordertotravelundertheprotectionofourguntrucks.

Erraticdrivinghabitsofcivilianscanalsocreatesecurityproblemssincegunnersoncoalitionforce

vehiclesmaynotbeabletodistinguishbetweenaggressivedrivingwhileattemptingtopassandhostileintentortheinitiationofahostileact.

CivilianSafetyInadditiontothesafetyofcoalitionforcesandthe

securityrisksweacceptwhileexecutingthisinitiative,wemustexamineSharetheRoadbylookingatthe

A convoy travels along Main Supply Route Tampa in Iraq. Note the condition of the road and the shoulder of the road.

Most logistics convoys travel at night where

the highways are not lit, and drivers are always

fearful of being attacked at any moment.

MAY–jUNE 2010 25

risktociviliansafety.TheroadsthatcoalitionforcesandIraqisshareareinpoorconditionandindesper-ateneedofrepair.Theyareverynarrow,whichmakesthemdifficultforwidetruckstonavigate.

IraqiSecurityForcecheckpointsalongthemainroadschanneltrafficintofewerlaneseverycoupleofmiles.Manythird-countrynationaldriverscomefromallovertheMiddleEastandTurkey.Thismeansthatthosedrivershavedifferentlevelsofdriver’straining,vehiclemaintenancerequirements,andlicensingpro-cedures.Somedrivershavelittleornoexperiencedriv-ingbigrigs.

Mostlogisticsconvoystravelatnightwherethehighwaysarenotlit,anddriversarealwaysfearfulofbeingattackedatanymoment.DuringourmissioninIraq,weencounteredmanythird-countrynationalaccidentscausedbydriversfallingasleepatthewheel,faultybrakes,andmiscellaneousmaintenancebreak-downs.Manyoftheseincidentscouldhavebeencata-strophicifcivilianshadbeeninterminglingwiththelogisticsconvoys.

Theerraticdrivingbehaviorofsomecivilians,combinedwiththatofthethird-countrynationaltruckdrivers,increasesthenumberofaccidents.Thesecond-andthird-ordereffectsofthisinclude—❏ Slowerconvoytimesasthesecurityelementsofthe

convoysrespondtoaccidents.❏ Reducedavailabilityofquickreactionforcesthat

mustrespondtocivilianaccidents.❏ Increaseddemandsforrecoveryassetsbecauseof

increasedIEDdetonations.❏ Increaseddemandforairandgroundmedicalevacu-

ationbecauseofaccidentsandIEDdetonations.Attemptingtopassa50-vehicleconvoyisnotawise

decisionineitherIraqortheUnitedStates.Finally,whenconsideringtheconditionsoftheroadsandthedrivinghabitsandtrainingofthird-country-nationaldriversandcivilians,thesafestdecisionistoavoidlargeconvoysandtrucksatallcosts.

MitigatingSecurityandSafetyConcernsConvoysecuritycompanieshaveattemptedto

mitigatethechallengesofSharetheRoadbyimplement-ingvariousTTP.TheyhavebeeninstructedtoinstallredstrobelightsonleadandtrailvehiclestoprovideIraqiswithasignaltopass.Trafficintegrateswithconvoysinsomeinstances,suchasmaintenanceandemergencyhaltsandsmallerconvoys.Whenconvoysarehaltedonthesideoftheroadandvehiclesarenotseenasa

threat,theyarewavedbythelastguntruck.Informa-tionispassedtotheforwardguntrucksothatitcanmonitorcivilianvehiclespassingthehaltedconvoy.

Ontheotherhand,whenconvoysarehaltedforpossibleoractualIEDs,trafficishaltedinbothlanes.ThisisnottoimpedetheIraqis’righttousetheroadsbuttoensuretheirsafetyuntilthesituationisdealtwithappropriately.

Whenacivilianvehiclewantstopassasmallercon-voyandthedriverdoesnotappeartobethreatening,itisallowedtopass.Theconvoymonitorsitsmovementandensuresthatitcontinuestomoveuntilitclearsthefrontoftheconvoy.Civilianvehiclesarenotallowedtomeanderwithintheconvoys.ThisTTPtendstoworkwithsmallerconvoys,wherecommandandcontrolandsecuritycanmaintain“eyeson”thepassingvehicle.

Althoughdifficultattimes,convoysecuritycompa-niescontinuetoimprovetheirTTPtomeetthespiritoftheSharetheRoadpolicy.

Afterconductingover1,200missionsandtravel-ingalmostamillionmiles,ourtaskforcedidnothaveasingleaccidentinvolvingIraqicivilians.Itaccomplishedthisremarkablegoalwhilemaintain-inganappropriatesecuritypostureandrespectingtheIraqipeople’srighttohavesafefreedomofmove-mentontheirroads.SharetheRoadisthewayahead,anditworksforsmallerpatrols.However,toomanyuncontrollablevariablesmakeitadauntingtaskfora50-vehiclelogisticsconvoy.

Major kris a. kough, Caarng, is the exeCutive offiCer for the 1st battalion, 185th arMor regiMent (1–185th arMor) of the California arMy national guard. he was the battalion operations offiCer and perforMed a battalion seCurity forCe Mis-sion during operation iraqi freedoM 08–10. he holds a b.a. degree in history froM texas a&M university and a M.s. degree in eduCation adMinistration froM California state university, ful-lerton. he is a graduate of the arMor offiCer basiC and advanCed Courses, the CoMbined arMs and serviCes staff sChool, and the arMy CoMMand and general staff College.

Captain Curtis a. goller iii, Caarng, was the CoMMander of C CoMpany, 1–185th arMor, and was ConduCting Convoy seCurity operations in Multi-national division-north, iraq, when he wrote this artiCle. he holds a b.s. degree in business adMinis tration froM California polyteChniC state university at san luis obispo. he is a graduate of the arMor offiCer basiC and Captains Career Courses.

After conducting over 1,200 missions and travel ing almost a million miles, our task force did not have a single

accident involving Iraqi civilians.

26 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

LandWarNet:IsYourITWorkforceReady?

by Chief Warrant offiCer (W–3) Dannie WaLters

hensomeoneinyourunitinadvertently erasestheentirebattalionoperationsdatabase, wouldyouprefertorequestrestorationofthedatabasefromtheDepartmentofDefense(DOD)enterprisehelpdesk,whichisoperatedbyaDODemployeeorcontractormilesaway,orfromyourownresidentinformationtechnology(IT)personnel?Mostwouldprefersomeoneonsite.SohowcanyourunitcontinuetomaintainaneffectiveITworkforce?Thisarticleexploreschangesinthenetwork,identifiessomeofthechallengesunitsarefacing,andofferssomesug-gestionsonhowtoprepareyourITworkforce.

LandWarNetistheArmy’spartoftheDODITinfrastructurethatenablesoperationalforcesto“reachback”forinformationintheformofhigh-definitionintelligenceproducts,voice,video,andfigures.SinceLandWarNet’sinceptioninFebruary2004,itsgrowthhasspiraled,tacklingonemilestoneatatime.

Onecrucialmilestonewastopreparetheworkforceresponsiblefortheinnerworkingsoftheoperation.AsspecifiedinDODDirective(DODD)8570.1,Informa-tionAssuranceTraining,Certification,andWorkforceManagementDirective,DODdeviseda5-yearplantoupgradeitsworkforce“withtheknowledge,skillsandtoolstoeffectivelyprevent,deter,andrespondtothreatsagainstDODinformation,informationsys-tems,andinformationinfrastructures.”Inshort,DODrequiresitsITworkforcetohaveandsustaincommer-cialITindustrystandardcertifications.

Sohowdoesthatapplytoyourunit?WithLand-WarNet,aunitneedsmorethananappointmentlet-ter,familiarizationtraining,andon-the-jobtrainingtohaveaccessprivileges.Today,youhavetomeetallthenewrequirementsspecifiedinDODD8570.1ifyouwanttohaveaneffectiveITworkforcethatcanmeetyourunit’sITdemands.Otherwise,yourunitmustrelyheavilyonoutsidesourcestomeetitscommunicationandautomationneeds.

MoreITProductsWhathaschangedintheArmy’snetwork?One

immediatechangeisthatcomputers,collaborativesuites(suchasAdobeNetMeetingandMicrosoftBreeze),andArmyBattleCommandSystem(ABCS)equipmentareavailableinallunitsfromthebrigadetothecompanylevel.

LandWarNetdeliversservicesdirectlytothewar-fighters.Becauseofthisincreasedcapability,thenumberofITproductstomanagehasincreasedexpo-nentially.Fromtheperspectiveofthoseontheground,theamountofnewproductsandservicesseemsover-whelming.DuringmytourinOperationIraqiFreedom(OIF)08–10withthe16thSustainmentBrigade,atleasttwodozenprogramswereintroducedtoeithertheArmyorbrigade-andbattalion-levelunits.

ModularityisoneofthereasonsfortheincreaseinthenumberofITproductsatthebrigadeandbattalionlevels.Tokeepupwithallthechangesthatmodularitypresents,aunitshoulddocumentthem.Aseasyasthatsounds,manyunitsgothroughthetoilofresearchandotherbureaucraticstepstofixaproblemorinstallaservicebutfailtodocumenttheirsolutions.Duringourtour,wecouldhavesavedalotoftimeifwehadusedaspreadsheetofportnumbersandotherspecificationstohelpusdescribethenewsystemstothenetworkadministratorresponsibleforconfiguringthefirewall.

AnotherreasonfortheincreaseinITproductsistheArmy’sefforttoprocurecommercialoff-the-shelfequipmentthatappliestheconceptof“everythingoverInternetprotocol(EOIP).”Thisconcepthasbroughtanavalancheofnewproducts,suchasvoiceoverIPtelephones,videooverIP,videoteleconference(VTC)suitesoverIP,andevenradiooverIPproducts.Toitscredit,theArmyhaschosen,aspartofitsstrategicgoals,toreplacemanyoftheoldproprietarysystemswithcomparableEOIPequipmentthatiseasiertoinstallandmanageandcomplementsanemergingbroadband-data-capableworld.

EOIPequipmentpresentsafewchallengestobri-gadesandbattalions.Unitsusedtohavetotalcontrolovermostofthesystemsmentionedabove.Mostelec-tronicsnowhaveIPaddresses.Inthepast,equipmentlikeVTCsuites,securetelephoneequipment(STE),andconferencecallingequipmentjustneededanactivetelephonelinetooperate.Today,LandWarNetpro-videsthesameservicesbutwithasubtleprice:aunitdoesnothavetotalcontrolovertheproduct.TheunitcannotrelocateitsVTCsuitetotheconferenceroomdownstairsormoveasecuretelephonetoanotherareawithoutcallingthenetworkservicecenter(NSC)tomakethenecessarychangestoallowthistohappen.Incontrast,STEcouldbemovedwiththeapprovaloftheunit’ssecuritymanager.

W

MAY–jUNE 2010 27

Anotherbigchangeisthataunitdoesnotownitsportionofthenetwork.Thisincludesitsorganicsig-nalassets.Gonearethedayswhenaunitcouldbringitsownequipment,setitupaccordingtoitsstandingoperatingprocedures,andthencontractforservicestoalocalstrategicentrypoint(STEP)ortunnelthroughanotherInternetserviceprovider(ISP)foraccesstothelargernetwork.LandWarNet’sgoalisto“developandmaintainasecure,seamless,interdependentLand-WarNetnetworkbyleadingdevelopmentandenforc-ingtheuseofintegratedenterprisearchitecture.”Thisisadifficultconceptforunitstoaccept,butjustliketheequipment,Soldiersmustalsoevolve.Unitsmustmovetheirfocusfromowningtheequipmenttounder-standingthattheyarepartofalargernetworkwiththesharedriskandvulnerabilitiesassociatedwiththedigitalworld.

EnterpriseArchitectureIdeployedtoIraqinsupportofOIF08–10with

the16thSpecialTroopsBattalion,16thSustainmentBrigade.Itwasmysecondtimedeployingtothisregion,andthewaywemanagedthenetworkwasattimesextremelydifferentfromthefirsttime.Aswesataroundthetableforourfirstcontingencyoperatingbase(COB)S–6meeting,thefirstthingInoticedwasthatthiswasnotanall-Armynetwork.Beingaproductofthemobilesubscriberequipment(MSE)days,IwasusedtofieldingourownArmy-drivennetwork.Thistime,wesharedthenetworkwithDODciviliansandservicemembersfromotherbranchesandthisentitycalledthe“enterprise.”

Althoughtheenterprisewasnotaperson,wetalkedaboutitalotasweallcametogripswiththerealityofthenewenterprisearchitecture.Theissueofwhodidwhat—ownership—alsofrequentlyenteredourconver-sations.Tofigureoutownership,mostpeopleneedareferencepoint:theArmydoesitthisway,ortheAirForcethisway.Sowhichwayisright?TheframersoftheLandWarNetconceptanticipatedthissituationandoptedforacentralizedapproachthroughtheNSCs.Asmostunitsthathavedeployedarefindingout,theyarenotinchargeofthenetworkoreventheirpartofthenetwork,althoughtheycannegotiatemanyoftheterms.

SoWhatDoSignalSoldiersDo?Iwouldbelessthantruthfulinsayingthatwehad

alotofITworktododuringourOIF08–10deploy-ment.TheNSCdidmostoftheworkforus.Wespentourtimetryingtoavoidduplicationofeffort.ThiswasfrustratingtoalotofthesignalSoldiers,butitwasanunfortunatesideeffectofchange.Weareundoubt-edlyheadingintherightdirectiondespitethedrasticdeclineinITworkattheunitlevel.

Managersonthegroundshouldestablishmemo-randumsofagreementtosharetheworkandgivethetrainedpoolsofSoldierstheopportunitytoparticipateandexcelingroupprojects.

Agoodtimetosharetheworkloadiswhenthereisasurgeinpersonnelandextralaborisneededtopreparecomputers,improvethewiringofabuild-ing,orinstallcommunicationsequipmentinanewbuilding.Inadeployedlocation,manyjobscouldbeassignedtosignalSoldierstokeepthemproficientintheirskills.UnitsshouldcommunicatewhatresourcestheyhaveandofferthemtotheirNSC.Byseekingsolutionsjointlyandsharingthework,anorganiza-tionanditsNSCcancreateaworkingrelationshipthatcanultimatelybenefitsignalSoldiersandtheircustomers.

OurbrigadeS–6section(especiallythenoncommis-sionedofficers),incoordinationwithourCOBNSC,didagreatjobofrewiring,documenting,andinstall-ingnewservicestobuildingsontheCOB.Noonetoldthemtodoit;theydidittoprovideservicestothewarfighter.ImprovementswereseenallovertheCOB,andlessonslearnedwereusedtohelpdesigntheinter-nalinfrastructureofnewbuildings.

ObtainingCertificationAsDODspecifies,andasSoldiersofunitsthathave

returnedfromthewarzonehavefoundout,nooneisexemptfromtheITworkforcerequirements.Allper-sonnelwhosupporttheglobalinformationgridmustmeetthecertificationrequirements.

ThegoodnewsisthattheArmyandDODhavemanyresourcesforsupportingSoldiercertificationefforts.Duringourdeployment,wefoundthattryingtogetcertifiedistimeconsumingandchallenging.BothourSoldiersandtrainingmanagerswerebusyprepar-ingthemselvesthroughvariousmethods.SomeSol-diersenrolledinITprogramsofferedbycollegesanduniversities.Othersusedself-studymethodstopreparefortheircertifications.Duringthedeployment,myunitpurchasedITstudykits,startedatestingcenter,andformedstudygroupstohelpthosewhowantedassis-tancewiththeirself-studyefforts.

StartingatestcenterwaseasierthanIthought,althoughonoccasionwehadtocallthetechnicalassis-tancedeskforhelp.Fortunately,theywerehelpfulandpatientenoughtoassistusinestablishingourauthorized

By seeking solutions jointly and sharing the work, an organization and its

NSC can create a working relationship that can

ultimately benefit signal Soldiers and their customers.

28 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

testcenter.Eventually,wegotourtestcenterupandrunning.Mostofthepersonnelwhousedthefacil-ityappreciatedhavingatestcenterontheCOB.ThealternativewouldhavebeentotraveltoanotherCOB,whichinsomecaseswouldhaveremovedpersonnelfromtheirprimaryjobsforseveraldaysorevenweeks.Atthebeginning,aboutsixindividualstookthetestand50percentpassed.Althoughthiswasnotbad,weimmediatelystartedtofindwaystoimprovethepassrate,suchasestablishingstudygroups.

Duringourtour,wehosted4studygroups,whichamountedtoabout40studentswhowouldcometoourafterworkclasses3daysaweek.WecalledthesestudygroupsinsteadofinstructionalclassesbecausewedidnothavecertifiedinstructorstoteachComputingTech-nologyIndustryAssociation(CompTIA)Network+,CompTIASecurity+,orotherclasses.Thepercentageofthosepassingthecertificationtestimprovedslightlybutnotenough.

WeorderedtrainingmaterialsfromCarnegieMel-lonUniversity,whichprovidesDODD8570.1training.AlthoughtheirclassesaredeliveredviatheWeb,inourbandwidth-challengedenvironmentthecoursesoftentookalongtimetodownload,whichwasdis-tractingforstudents.WecontactedCarnegieMellonUniversity,andtheyprovideduswiththesamecoursecontentonaDVD.Withtheirpermission,wedupli-catedtheDVDformorethan124personnel.

ManyofourSoldiersthoughttheDVDswereagreatsourceofinformationthatgavethema“handsonapproach”whenparticipatingindemonstrationsandlabs(alsoincludedontheDVD).Mostappreci-atedhavinganactualinstructorgivingthemalectureonthesubjectinsteadofjustreadingitoutofastudykit.WiththeDVDs,wereceivedthepreparatorycoursesonComputerTechnologyIndustryAssocia-tion(CompTIA)Network+,CompTIASecurity+,CiscoCertifiedNetworkAssociate,andevenCerti-fiedInformationSystemSecurityProfessional.IfstudentspurchasedthesamecomparableinstructionalDVDsinthecommercialmarket,theywouldpaymorethan$5,000.

MakingtheITWorkforceSuccessfulHowcanaunitpostureitsITworkforcetosuc-

ceedinaccordancewithDOD8570.1–M,InformationAssuranceWorkforceImprovementProgram?ThankstotheinputIreceivedfromotherwarrantofficersandotherITprofessionals,Iofferthesesuggestions:❏ SurveyyourITinfrastructure,addthetraining

requiredtomanageyourITassets(suchasbootcampsandofficialcourseware),andrememberthatthisisanannualrequirement.

❏ KeepupwiththeeffortsoftheSignalCenterandtheArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand,andadjustyourtrainingplansaccordingly.

❏ FindtheDODD8570.1trainingbeingofferedinyourregion.Ifyoudonotknowwheretoask,thentryyourservicingNSCforhelp.

❏ BecomefamiliarwithDODandArmyInformationAssurancebestpracticesandincorporatethemintoyourtrainingplansandSOPs.

❏ AppointatrainingmanagerforyourITworkforce.❏ Yourtrainingmanagershouldregisterallofhis

workforcethroughtheArmyTrainingandCertifica-tionwebsite.

❏ Counselthemembersofyourworkforceonthetrainingrequirementsfortheirdutyposition,setadeadlinetogetthetrainingcompleted,andholdthemaccountable.

❏ RequestfreevouchersfromyourunitortrainingNCOforyourSoldiersandDODcivilians.

❏ NotifyyourdirectreportingunitorArmycom-mandofyourITworkforceposture,andworkoutastreamlinedagreementformanagingyourownsubunit.(Remembertopresentyourproposalasawin-winsituation,andensurethatyouworktogeth-erasoneteamtooperate,maintain,andprotectthenetwork.)

❏ EstablishaworkingrelationshipwithagoodITcertificationtrainingprogram.(Youmaybeabletoworkwithotherunits,piggybackontheirtraining,andlearnfromtheirchallenges.)

❏ LocateatestcenternearbysothatyoucanarrangeforyourSoldierstotestwhentheyareready.

❏ RecruitlocaltalentfromyourITworkforceorfromReserveComponentSoldierswhomaybequalifiedtoprovidesuchtrainingintheircivilianjobs.

❏ InvestinITself-studycertificationkits,whichwillnotonlyserveasready-referencematerialforyourITpersonnelbutwillalsoprovidematerialforthosewhohavethedesiretostudyontheirown.

LieutenantGeneralJeffreyA.Sorenson,theDepart-mentoftheArmyG–6,hasobserved,“BecausetheArmyismovingtoamodular,expeditionaryforce,LandWarNetmustfollowsuitandbecomemorestreamlinedthroughanenterprisestructure.TheArmyplanstoachievethatgoalwiththeuseofthenetworkservicecenters,whichfederatenetworksandcreatesaseamlessnetworkwhereveraSoldieris.”Whilethesechangesbringgreatadvantages,theycanleavesustain-mentunitsfeelingthattheyhavelostalevelofcontrolovertheircommunications.ThesolutionistotraintheITworkforcetooperateinthenewenvironment.

Chief warrant offiCer (w–3) dannie walters was a net-work ManageMent teChniCian for bravo CoMpany, 16th speCial troops battalion, 16th sustainMent brigade, during operation iraqi freedoM 08–10. he holds a baChelor’s degree froM the university of MiaMi and possesses CoMptia network+ and CCna CertifiCations.

MAY–jUNE 2010 29

hereisanoldsaying,“Afoolandhismoney aresoonparted.”Afterrecentnewsreportsof illegalactivitiesbysomeunscrupulousArmypayingagents(PAs)inIraq,perhapsanewadageisathand:“Adummyandhisdinararesoondamned.”AsthefinancialcostofOperationIraqiFreedomapproachesthecostoftheVietnamWar,billionsofdollarshavebeenentrustedtoPAs.

Thefinancialmanagementsupportoperationssec-tion(FMSPO)ofthe16thSustainmentBrigadewasresponsiblefortheoperationaloversightofaround300PAsinnorthernIraqwhilethebrigadewasdeployedfromJuly2008throughOctober2009.ThosePAswerefundedover$125millioninfiscalyear2009topayforprocurementandservicesdeemedvitaltosupportthewareffort.

PAsintheNewsItwouldappearthatthepresshasliftedaninfested

carpettorevealmaladroitembezzlerswhoarescram-blingoutlikecockroaches.Accordingtothepress,therehasbeena“waveofprosecutionsemergingfromthetangledandexpensivereconstructioninIraqandAfghanistan,”asKimMurphyreportsintheLos Angeles Timesarticle,“SomeU.S.troopstemptedbyreconstructioncash”(12April2009).

Murphygoesontosay,“TheJusticeDepartmenthassecuredmorethanthreedozenbribery-relatedconvic-tionsintheawardingofreconstructioncontracts;atleast25theftprobesareunderway.”ThearticledescribeshowanArmycaptaininIraqmanagedtoskimalmost$700,000incashfromreconstructionprojectsandpay-mentstoaprivateIraqisecurityforceknownastheSonsofIraq.Thecaptainis“accusedofpackingcashintoboxesandmailingthemtohisfamily’shome.”All

thewhile,hisleadersbelievedhewasmakinggreatcon-tributionstothewareffort.

Notallthenewsisbad.Inhis5June2008storyentitled,“MountainBrook,Alabamaofficerisplanner,paymasterinIraq,”TomGordonofThe Birmingham Newspostedapositivestoryaboutalieutenant,anotherPAinIraq,whousedmoneytoimproveavillage’seco-nomicstructureanditsattitudetowardthecoalition.However,thissamelieutenantwasinvestigatedafterheincurredamajorlossoffunds.SoarePAsheroeswhoaccomplishamissionthatisvitaltosuccessinIraq?Oraretheyactuallyabunchofscoundrelsrobbingusblind?Thetruthisnotalwayscutanddried.

RolesandResponsibilitiesofaPALetusstartourjourneyfortruthbytakingalookat

PAdutiesaccordingtotheproceduresinMulti-NationalCorps-Iraq’sstandingoperatingprocedure,MoneyasaWeaponSystem,andFieldManual1–06,FinancialManagementOperations.PAsareappointedbyafield-gradeofficerintheirchainofcommand.Theyrepresentfinancialmanagementcompany(FMCo)commanders,whodisbursecashtothemthroughthecompany’sdis-bursingagentstopayforcrucialwartimerequirements.TheservicingFMCotrainsPAsonallrequirementsfordrawingandsafeguardingfundsandclearingaccounts.

Beforedrawingfunds,PAsmustsignstatementsacknowledgingthattheyunderstandtheirdutiesandacceptpecuniaryliabilityforthosefundsiftheyhavealoss.PAsarenotauthorizedtodelegatetheirrespon-sibilities.APAmustalsofollowtheinstructionsofeithertheprojectpurchasingofficer(PPO)orfieldorderingofficer(FOO)whorepresentsthecontractingoffice,directsthePAtodrawfunds,andapprovesallpurchases.

PayingAgents:TheGood,theBad,andtheUgly

T

by Major biLL keLtner

Paying agents in Iraq have recently been scrutinized for mishandling Department of Defense funds. This article recounts some of those cases and provides lessons learned from the 16th Sustainment Brigade’s investigations into major losses of funds.

Critical support missions can be halted by PA losses. These losses equate not only to lost funding for the Army

but also to lost man-hours as investigating officers must be summoned to conduct a month-long investigation.

30 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

PAsmustnotcommingleanyfunds,publicorprivate.And,veryimportantly,PAsmustsecurefundsasspecifiedinchapter3oftheDepartmentofDefenseFinancialManagementRegulation(DOD-FMR),Volume5.ThismeansthatifthefundsarenotinthePA’sphysicalpossession,theymustbesecuredinanapprovedsafetowhichonlythePAhasthecombination.

CriticalsupportmissionscanbehaltedbyPAlosses.TheselossesequatenotonlytolostfundingfortheArmybutalsotolostman-hoursasinvestigatingofficersmustbesummonedtoconductamonth-longinvestigation.

InvestigationsofMajorLossesofFundsThe16thSustainmentBrigade’sFMSPOoversaw

fiveinvestigationsintocircumstancesinvolvingmajorlossesoffunds.(Amajorlossisalossof$750ormore.)Mostoftheseinvestigationsdeterminedthatthelosseswerecausedbycarelessness.Theinvestigationsalsosometimesrevealeddeeperproblemsoffraud,waste,andabuse.

Onelossof$4,580.43wasdiscoveredwhenadis-bursingagentattemptedtoclearaPA’saccount.ThePAmaintainedthathehadalreadyturnedhismoneyinseveralmonthsearliertoapreviousdisbursingagent,whohadclearedhimandthenredeployed.However,thePAkeptnocopyoftheDepartmentofDefenseForm1081,StatementofAgentOfficer’sAccount,whichwouldhaveservedasproofofhisclearingtheaccount.Itdidnothelpmattersthatthenextdisburs-ingagentwaitedover4monthstoclearthePA.Bythetimetheinvestigationwasrequested,thepreviousdis-bursingagentwasnolongerintheArmy.

Inanothersituation,$1,000waslostbecauseadis-bursingagentwhowascoveringforanotherdisbursingagentonrestandrelaxation(R&R)leavefundedthewrongPAtomakea$1,000rewardpayment.ThisPAfailedtopayattentiontotheemailedinstructionsofhisPPO,whotoldthePAnottomakethepayment.ThePAclaimedthatafterreceivingthefunds,heaskedaround,foundtheawardee,andpaidhim.Later,theotherdisbursingagentcamebackfromR&R,butnoreconciliationhadbeendone.Consequently,thisdis-bursingagentfundedthecorrectPA,whoalsopaidtheawardee,thuscreatingadualpayment.

Anotherlossof$17,498.69wasreportedandinvesti-gatedbecauseaPAwasunabletoobtainthedocumen-tationneededtoclearhisaccountduringanongoinginvestigationintothequestionablepracticesofhisFOO.TheDefenseFinanceandAccountingService(DFAS),whichisresponsibleforgatheringevidenceanddeter-miningliabilityforlosses,laterreleasedthePAfromliabilitybutheldtheFOOliableforthelostfunds.

AnothercaseinvolvedaPAlosing$9,087.87becausehecommingledfundsanddelegatedauthor-

itytootherstomakepayments.Healsodidnotfollowestablishedtimelinesrequiringhimtoclearhisaccountevery30days.Hisclearingtookplace111daysafterhedrewfunds,andhedidnotmaintainaledger.

ThelieutenantwhowasmentionedfavorablyinThe Birmingham News wasironicallyalsothesubjectofamajorlossoffundsinvestigation.HewasdoinggreatworkasaPAfundingSonsofIraq,whoareformerSunniinsurgentswhoprovidesecurityservicesandhavebeencreditedwithhelpingcalmviolenceinthecountry.How-ever,helost$14,366.96.How?Hedidnotuseasafe.

Theinvestigationrevealedthatthelostcurrencyhadbeeninanassaultpackonachairinsidehislivingquar-tersand,incredibly,thathelefthisquartersunlocked.Heclaimedthatoneoftheunit’sinterpretersmayhavestolenthemoneywhilethefundswereunsecured.Clearly,thisofficerdidnotproperlysecurethefundsentrustedtohim.

ThePAlaterproducedawitnesswhoclaimedthatthePAhadaskedhiscommand,notonce,butseveraltimesforasafe.Inlightofthiswitness’sstatement,DFAScon-cludedthattheproximatecauseofthelosswasnotthathehadleftthefundsunsecuredinhisunlockedquartersbutthathiscommanderhadnotprovidedhimasafe,asshouldhavebeendoneinaccordancewiththeDODFMR.

Asofthiswriting,itappearsthelostfundswillnotberecovered.ThePAprobablywillnothavetopaybackthelostmoney,andDFASisleaningtowardholdinghiscommandertoblame.However,whilethelegalwheelsslowlyturnedandallowednewwitnesstestimonyforthedefense,thePA’scommanderredeployed.Regardless,commandersdonotholdpecuniaryliabilityforPAfundsinanycase.

However,nothavingasafewasjustthetipoftheicebergoffinancialmismanagementbythisPA’sunit.AnotherfactdiscoveredduringtheinvestigationwasthatthePA’sunitdidnotcallthemilitarypoliceafterthemoneywasallegedlystolen.Later,thesameunitincurredamajorlossoffundsbyanotherPA.

Totopthatoff,thissecondPAclaimedhisunit’slead-ershaddirectedhimtoshiftfundsfromapprovedcon-tractstopaytheSonsofIraq,whichwasnotproperlyauthorized.TheleadersclaimedtheSonsofIraqwascrucialtothesecurityoftheirtroops,andtheinvestigatorconductingthecommander’sinquiryrecommendedthatallpartiesbeonlycounseled.

FixingtheProblemsTohelppreventlosses,the16thSustainmentBrigade

FMSPO,the101stFMCo,the469thFinancialMan-agementCenter(FMC),andthe18thFMCinitiatedprogramstohelpPAs.Forinstance,theFMSPObeganmakingstaffassistancevisitstothePAs’locations.ThesevisitsallowedtheFMSPOtosharelessonslearnedandtoseeifPAswerefollowingpropersafeguardingproceduresbysecuringfundsaccordingtotheDODFMR.Theyalsoprovidedopportunitiestofindoutifanypressure

MAY–jUNE 2010 31

wasbeingputonPAstomakeimproperpurchases.StaffassistancevisitsandinspectionswerefundamentaltoimprovingthePAs’success.

ThesiteassistancevisitsrevealedthatmanyPAswerenotstoringfundsproperly.Inoneinstance,aPAwasstoringfundsinafilingcabinet.Inanother,aPAhadseveralthousandsofdollarsinatoysafethatcouldeasilyhavebeencarriedaway.Thesediscoveriesofnon-compliancewithsafeguardingprocedurespromptedtheFMSPOtosubmitanupdatetoMoneyasaWeaponSystemtowarnunitcommandersthattheymaybesubjecttoadverseadministrativeactioniffundsarelostbecauseofnegligence.

Topreventdualpayments,the101stFMCoestablishedadatabasefordisbursingagentstouseintrackingpay-ments.Nowproceduresrequirethatnewlyassigneddis-bursingagentsmakecontactwithalltheirPAstofurtherensureaccountabilityoffunds.

The469thFMCandthe18thFMCimplementede-Commerceinitiativestoremovecashfromthebattle-fieldandbuildconfidenceinlocalfinancialinstitutions.Onesuchinitiativewasapilotprogramfortheuseoflim-iteddepositoryaccountsatIraqibankssothatPAsmaywritechecksinsteadofcarryingcash.Furtherdecreasingtheneedforcashonthebattlefield,theFMConowpro-cessescontractsthatrequiremostlyelectronictransac-tionsasthemethodofpayment.

ThePAclearingpolicywasalsochangedafteraPAwaskilledbyaroadsidebombwhiletravelingtoclearhisaccount.ThepolicynowallowsPAstoclearviaemailiftheydonothaveanycashtoturninorpickup.

TofurtherassistPAs,sustainmentbrigadecom-mandersshouldusetheirspecialtroopsbattalions(STBs)forsupportinoverseeingPAoperations.TheSTBcanbetaskedtoprovidepersonnel,equip-ment,andtransportationcoordinationtosupportarobuststaffassistancevisitprogram.ThiswouldhelptoensurethatPAsareproperlysafeguardingfunds,especiallyatlocationswheretheSTBalreadyhasadministrativecontroloverfinancialmanagementunits.TheSTBcommandercouldtasktheFMCocommandertoensurethatdisbursingagentswithintheirfinancialmanagementdetachmentstaketimetoperiodicallyvisitPAslocatedattheircontingencyoperatingbases.

Improvingfinancialmanagementonthebattlefieldevenfurther,anew,enhancedPAtrainingprogramthatincorporateslessonslearnedisunderwayinIraq.Also,the469thFMCisinchargeofplanningandexecuting

thisyear’sDiamondSaberexercise,whichistheArmy’spremierannualfinancialmanagementtrainingexercise.TheexerciseprovidesrealistictrainingforFMwarriorsofallcomponentsandwillassistintheirpreparationfordeploymenttotheatersofoperations.Thisyear,allsustainmentbrigadeFMSPOswereinvitedtoattendDiamondSaberatFortMcCoy,Wis-consin,from6to19June.

Anylossoffundscapturesourattention,andincorpo-ratinglessonslearnedintotrainingreducesthelikelihoodtheywillhappenagain.Thelossesmentionedabovearetheexception,andasbadaslossesare,thingshavenotexactlygonetopieces.Almost300PAsinnorthernIraqarecurrentlydoingagreatjobspendinghundredsofmil-lionsofdollarsintheireffortstofundcrucialmissionrequirements.Stridesarebeingtakentoassisttheunsungheroeswhorisktheirlivesindangerousterritoriesastheyprovidecriticalsupportandsecurityforourtroops.

Onedisbursingagentdescribedthetrulyoutstand-ingaccomplishmentsofthePAsworkinginhisareainthisway:

AsPAsforSonsofIraqandtheCommanders’EmergencyReliefProgram,theyassumedrespon-sibilityfornineSonsofIraqcontractsandalargeliteracyprogram.Theyeachdisbursedaround$1,000,000astheyworkedcloselywiththe[dis-bursingagent]toensurethecorrectdenominationsofIraqidinarwererequestedandonhand.Duringtheirwatch,theprogramprogressedfrompayingtheSheiksdirectlybylumpsumtoconductingpaydayactivitieswhereeachindividualSonsofIraqcontractorwaspaidbythePA.TheirworkasPAssavedlivesandimprovedthelivingconditionsintheirareaofoperations.

Perhapsthereareafewbadapplesinthebunch.Buttruthfully,theArmy’sPAsareoutstandingheroeswhosustainthewarfighterbyhelpingcommandersusemoneyasaweaponsystemandasanonlethalmeanstoachievevictoryonthebattlefield.

Major bill keltner serves as the Chief of training and operations for the 469th finanCial ManageMent Center. he was the Chief of finanCial ManageMent operations for the 16th sustainMent brigade during its 15-Month deployMent in iraq. he holds an undergradu-ate degree in english froM the university of south alabaMa and is a graduate of the adjutant general offiCer basiC and advanCed Cours-es, the planning, prograMMing, budgeting, and exeCution systeMs Course, and the CoMbined arMs and serviCes staff sChool.

The site assistance visits revealed that many PAs were not storing funds properly. In one instance, a PA was storing funds in a filing cabinet. In another, a PA had several thousands of

dollars in a toy safe that could easily have been carried away.

32 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

LogisticsSupportinanAustereEnvironment:TheMissiontoSinjar

by CaPtain jaCk a. tyer, tnarng

hemissionoftheU.S.MarineCorpsat Sahl-Sinjar(referredtoasSinjar)maywell beoneoftheunsungsuccessstoriesofOperationIraqiFreedom.Setuptopreventweap-onsfromenteringIraqfromSyria,themissionwasoriginallyintendedtobeoneofshortduration.BecauseoftheirinitialsuccessinblockingaccessfromtheSinjarMountains,theirlongpatrolrange,andtheirrapidstrikecapabilities,theMarines’missionwasquicklyextendedfrom90daysto“tobedetermined.”

The30thCombatSustainmentSupportBattal-ion(CSSB),locatedatQayyarah-West(Q-West),becameawareoftheMarine’smissioninSeptember2008.Thesupportoperationsserviceandsupportofficerinchargeimmediatelybeganworkonhisunit’sconceptofsupporttosupplementtheopera-tion,whichwastobeginthefollowingmonth.

AlreadytaskedwithaheavyoperatingtempoinageneralsupportroleforMulti-NationalDivision-NorthatQ-West,the30thCSSB,underthe16thSustainmentBrigade,supportednorthernIraq—about20,000squaremiles—withfreight,food,andfuel.TheadditionofthedirectsupportmissionfortheMarinesrequiredthe30thCSSBtoresponddirectlytotheneedsoftheunitatSinjar.Thiswasadeparturefromitsregularmethodofoperation.

ProvidingSupportThevicinityofSinjarisasdesolateasonecould

imagine.TheMarineCorpshasareputationforselectingausterelocationstosetupoperations,andtheirbasecampwasanexampleofthistendency.TheMarinessetupcampwithnopermanentbuild-ingswithintheirenclave.Infact,thebasecamp’sonlypermanentconstructionwastheairstripandtaxiway.TheexterioroftheMarinecamp’sperim-eterandalloftheprotectivebarrierswerepushedupearth,whichwouldhavebeenT-walledconcreteandHescobarriersinapermanentcamp.

TheMarinesmovedintoSinjarandsetupshopinlateOctober2008.Theirlivingandofficespacesweretents.Becauseoftheausterityoftheoperat-ingenvironment,theyhadtobringeverythingtheyneededfortheoperationfromAlAsadandTaqqa-dum,includinganexpeditionaryairfieldcontroltower.TheMarinesprovidedmaildistributionanddisbursementservicesfrom20-footcontainers.

AsanexampleoftheexpeditionaryspiritpresentatSinjar,alloftheelectricalwiringwasinstalledbyMarineelectricianjourneymenfromthe1stMarineLogisticsGroup.Theunitconstructedsanitaryfacili-tieswithplywoodand55-gallondrumscutinhalftocontainwaste.ThedisposalofsaidwasteinvolvedthejudiciousapplicationofJP8andatorch.Withnopub-licworksandnocontractorspresent,theMarinestookcareofbusiness“theold-fashionedway.”

The30thCSSB’ssustainmentconsistedoffoodandwater,fuel,andemergencyrepairparts.Withatentativeplanforsupportinplace,the30thCSSBselectedthe51stTransportationCompanytoprovidesecurityforthefirstmissionon3November2008.Escortingthe353dTransportationCompanytoSinjar,theconvoycarried98,000gallonsofJP8,2,000gallonsofbulkwater,and5daysofsupplyofbothfoodandbottledwater.

Theconceptformovementwasassimpleasitwasefficient.WithForwardOperatingBase(FOB)

T

MAY–jUNE 2010 33

SykeshalfwaybetweenQ-WestandSinjar,theSoldiersofthe30thCSSBwouldtraveltoFOBSykesandremainovernight.(ThecityofTalAfarlaybetweenQ-WestandFOBSykes.Theday-timetrafficcongestioninTalAfarhadlongbeenasourceofdelay,withdaytimetrafficcapableoflengtheninga3½-hourdrivetoasmuchas9hours.)TheywouldpushoutfromFOBSykestoSinjarearlyonthesecondday,deliverthepayload,andreturntoFOBSykesforanotherovernightbeforereturningtoQ-West.

WhiletheMarineunitwasmovingtoSinjar,the371stSustainmentBrigadeatAlAsadwasshippingashower,laundry,andclothingrepair(SLCR)teamtoSinjarviaQ-West.Inaninterbrigademovementbetweenthe371stSustainmentBrigadeandthe16thSustainmentBrigade,whichwasalsolocatedatQ-West,theSLCRunitwaspickedupatJointBaseBaladandshuttledouttoFOBSykestoawaitmovementtoSinjarwhentheMarineswerereadytoinstallit.

ThefirstconvoyleftQ-Weston3NovemberandarrivedatSinjarthenextdaywithoutincident.Withthefirstconvoysuccessfullycompleted,theMarinesandSoldiersbegantoworktogethertobuildasuc-cessfulrelationship.

CorrectingDeficienciesOneofthefirstglaringdeficiencieswasinthe

estimateforclassI(subsistence).Theoriginalesti-mateforunitgrouprations(UGRs)submittedtothe16thSustainmentBrigadebythe2dMarineExpeditionaryForcecalledformanymoreUGRsthantheMarinescoulduse.BecausetheMarineshadnofieldkitchenincampandwereconstantlyatoutpostsoronpatrol,theyusedthreetimesasmanymealsready-to-eat(MREs)asoriginallyrequest-ed,andtheUGRssatmostlyunused.Whilethe

A contract carrier resupplies bulk water for use in the laundry

and shower facilities.

Armored forklifts unload palletized water that was delivered by armored tractors.

34 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

MarinesconsumedmostlyMREsandsomeUGR–Es(express),whichareself-heatingandself-containedrationsthatfeed18troops,theSoldiersofthe30thCSSBworkedtorestoreabalanceintherationcycle.Ultimately,the30thCSSBprovidedeightcontain-ersforclassIstorageandtheMarinessetupafieldkitchenattheSinjarcamp.

Bulkfuelwasanotherinitialissueofconcerntobothparties.The30thCSSBwaspushing98,000gal-lonsofJP8andwasinitiallyinformedthatthiswasthebase’smaximumfuel-storagecapacity;however,theMarineswereactuallyabletostoremuchmore.Withtwofuel-issuepointssetup,oneforaviationandoneforgroundvehicles,theirpotentialfuelconsumptionrateswerealsogreaterthanoriginallyassessed.

Withtheirtwokeysustainmentresourcesinastateofdisarray,theMarinesandthe30thCSSBreal-izedtheyneededaliaisonofficer(LNO)inplacetoreducethechanceforanymiscommunication.LateinNovember2008,aMarinegunnerysergeantwenttoQ-WesttoactastheLNO.Immediately,theArmyandMarineunitsbegantoworktogetherbetter.

MakingDeliveriesSettinguparesupplycycleoftwodeliveriesaweek,

the30thCSSBpushedoutfromQ-WestonMondaysandFridays,deliveringtoSinjaronTuesdaysandSat-urdays.WithbottledwaterandrationscomingfromQ-West,the30thCSSBpickedupanaverageof30,000gallonsofbulkwateratFOBSykesusingKBRassetsandtransporteditwiththeresupplymission.Thispro-videdfreshwaterfortheSLCRteam,whichhadsetupbothshowersandlaundryfacilitiesforcampsupport.

SoonaftertheLNOarrived,the30thCSSBbeganshippingrationsupplementstoSinjartoaugmentfieldrations.ThiswasamilestonefortheMarinesinthefield.Theadditionofanoccasionalcoldsoda,bagofchips,andsnackcakeorhoneybunimprovedthevari-etyoftheMarines’dietconsiderably.

WiththeinitialoperationalsuccessoftheMarines’presence,theoperationatSinjarquicklyexpandedandwasextended.Originallynumbering2,100,theMarines’headcountswelledtoalmost3,300,andtheirendofmissionwentfrom“90days”to“tobedeter-mined.”Thistroopsurgeforcedthe30thCSSBtoreevaluateitssupportstrategy.

Expeditionary forces are protected by built-up earth berms.

MAY–jUNE 2010 35

Now,alreadyusingmilitaryhaulassetsfromthe353dTransportationCompany,the30thCSSBtaskedthe51stTransportationCompanyandthe497thTransportationCompanytoprovidehaulassetsandplacedaforwardlogisticselementfromthe497thTransportationCompanyonthegroundatFOBSykestoincreaseresponsivenesstothemission.

Withaself-supportingelementnowonly3hoursfromSinjar,the30thCSSBcouldshuttleitssuppliesstraighttoFOBSykesandtheforwardlogisticsele-mentcouldsendthemonwithanylast-minuteadjust-ments.Inthisway,the30thCSSBcould“push”alittleheavytoFOBSykesandhavesomeflexibilityincasetheMarines’requirementsincreased.

Havingestablishedsomesenseofcivility,despitethedesolateconditions,theMarinesnextlookedatfurtherimprovingtheirposition,includingset-tingupafieldkitchen.The30thCSSBincreaseditscapabilityfortransportingrefrigeratedfoodanddeliveredfreshfruitsandvegetablestocomplementtheupgradedrationsthattheMarinespreparedintheirfullyfunctionalfieldkitchen.

After5monthsofchallengesandsuccesses,theMarinesandthe30thCSSBhadproducedfruitfulresultsbyworkingtogether.BytheendofMarch2009,the30thCSSBhadshipped1,748,000gal-lonsofJP8,64,260casesofbottledwater,andover32,000casesofMREsandUGRstoSinjar.

Followingthiscontinuedtrackrecordofsupporttoabarren,desolatearea,theMarinesatSinjarreceivedasteadysupplyofclassesI,IIIB(bulkpetroleum,oils,andlubricants),andwhenneeded,emergencyclassIX(repairparts).

Captain jaCk a. tyer, tnarng, is the transportatin offi-Cer for the 30th CoMbat sustainMent support battalion, tennessee arMy national guard. he wrote this artiCle while deployed to operation iraqi freedoM. he holds a b.a. degree in gerMan froM the university of Mississippi and is a graduate of the assoCiate logistiCs exeCutive developMent Course, the joint logistiCs Course, the Multinational logistiCs Course, the CoMbat developMents Course, and the arMy airborne sChool. he was sCheduled to graduate froM the theater logistiCs studies prograM in May.

Although they are housed in tents, the food service and laundry and shower facilities are greatly appreciated by the Marine personnel.

36 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ResourcingandTrainingaLevelIIILogisticsTrainingandAdvisoryTeam

by Lieutenant CoLoneL CarLos e. LoPez

ustainmentbrigadesandcombatsustainment supportbattalions(CSSBs)deployingto OperationIraqiFreedommustbepreparedtoassumeavarietyofmissions.OnemissiontheseunitsmustbereadyforisapartnershipwithIraqilogisticsthird-line(levelIII)units,whichtheU.S.Armyreferstoasdirectsupportunits.Thisarticleisintendedtohelpsustainmentunitsunderstandwhatisrequiredtotrain,resource,andprepareforthelevelIIIlogisticstrainingandadvisoryteam(LTAT)mission.

SustainmentbrigadesandCSSBsprovidethenecessaryqualifiedpersonneltotrainandadvisetheIraqiArmy(IA)astheytransitiontoaself-sustaininglogisticsforce.Helpingthird-lineIAlogisticsunitstooperatemoreeffectivelyandprofessionallyremainsachallengethatrequiresfullunderstandingoflevelIIIlogisticsproceduresandpoliciesaswellasfamil-iarizationwithotherlevelsofIAlogisticsunitsandtheirpartneredcoalitionunits.Sustainmentunitper-sonnelmusthaveculturalawarenesstohelpIraqisachievethedesiredself-reliantIAlogisticsposture.

TheObjectiveofSelf-SufficiencyAsU.S.forcescontinuetoreducetheirpresence

inIraq,thepossibilityofastableIraqdependsheav-ilyontheabilityoftheIraqiSecurityForces(ISF)tobeself-reliantandcapableofsustainingtheirforceswithoutexcessivecoalitionoversight.Theobjectiveofself-sufficiencyisthemaingoalofU.S.andcoalitionlogisticspartnering.

In2005,theIraqiAssistanceGroup(IAG)wascre-atedaspartoftheMulti-NationalSecurityTransitionCommand-Iraq(MNSTC–I)toserveasacoordinat-ingagencybetweenIraqicombinedworkinggroupsandMulti-NationalCorps-Iraq.IAGhasprovidedbehind-the-scenessupporttomilitarytransitionteamsandpartneringunitsastheyhelptobuildforwardISFcapability,allowingtheIraqistoadaptandleadtheireffortsinachangingoperationalenvironment.ThistrainingandassistancepartneringbroughtearlyimprovementstotheIA’sfourlevelsoflogisticssus-tainmentanddistribution.

Despitethecoalition’ssteadyemphasis,progresstowardself-sufficiencyhasbeenastruggleforIraqipart-nerunits.Iraqilogisticiansstilllackdisciplineinadher-ingtoestablishedprocessesanddependoncoalitionforcestohelppromotesuccess.Asinglestandardized

Iraqilogisticssystemisfarfrombeingareality;whatcanbeaccomplishedeasilyinoneIAdivisioncanbeachallengeinanother.

Nowandinthenearfuture,thedeployedexpedi-tionarysustainmentcommands(ESCs)inIraqmustemphasizetheprofessionaldevelopment,training,andprogressoftherepairmaintenancecompanies(RMCs)thatoperateinthe13IAlocationcom-mands(LOCOMs),whichprovidedirectsupporttobrigade-and-belowIAunits.AnRMC’smissioncanbestbeequatedtothatofaU.S.Armydirectsup-portmaintenancefacilityorsupplysupportactivity.ThesustainmentbrigadesandCSSBstrainingtheselevelIIIunitswillbechallengedbytheanticipatedreductioninresourcesandfewerU.S.capabili-tiesinthetheater.ESCs,thesustainmentbrigades’higherheadquarters,willcontinuetopartnerandsynchronizelevelIIIcapabilitieswithotherlevelsofcoalitionlogisticspartnerunitstoensurethatastrongandself-reliantIraqisustainmentnet-workremainsrelevantandcapabletosupportISFdemands.

ThegoalofESCsandtheirsubordinatecom-mandsistoreachan“overwatch”phase(alsoknownas“partneringwithpurpose”),inwhichthird-lineLTATsassumealessactiverolewhileprovidingregularadviceandfeedbacktotheirIApartneringunits.LTATsfacilitatethisbyattend-ingreviewandanalysismeetingstoensurethatcoordinationisavailableamongalllevels.Duringtheoverwatchphase,third-lineLTATsshouldbepreparedtosupporttheRMCsifsupporttoISFisseverelyinterrupted.

AccuratelyassessingtheprogressofIraqiself-sufficiencyisachallenge.Manyreportingchannelsexistthroughthevariouschainsofcommandandthedifferentlevelsofcoalitionpartnership.OtherunitstrainingandadvisingIAunits,suchasbrigadesupportbattalions(BSBs)andmilitarytransitionteamsthatsupportlevelsIandIIoperations,reporttotheirtacti-calpartnersandIAG.

Alogisticsmilitaryadvisoryteam(LMAT)isanothertypeofpartneringunitthathelpstrainandadvisetheIALOCOMs.LMATsreportthroughMNSTC–Ichannels,andthesustainmentbrigadeLTATsreporttoESCs.Sometimestheunitsreportdif-ferentperspectivesoftheIraqis’self-sufficiency.This

S

MAY–jUNE 2010 37

couldbealleviatedbymakingtheLMATsthesolereportingauthorityformeasuringtheprogressofIraqilogisticsself-sufficiencyinIAdivisions.BSBswouldprovidecustomerinputtoLMATs,LTATswouldreporttheIraqis’directsupportcapabilities,andtheLMATswouldanalyzetheinformationandconsoli-dateitintoonereport.

SustainmentbrigadecommandersworkspecificissuestoimprovetheoverallperformanceofRMCsbypersonallyconductingkeyleaderengagementswiththird-lineIAleadership.TheRMCs’progressandcapabilityassessmentsarereportedtotheESCcommanderthroughweeklyandmonthlyreportsandscheduledperiodicLTATreviews.ThesustainmentbrigadeISFcellisresponsibleforcoordinatingactionsbetweentheESCISFcellandtheLTATs,aswellasplanningkeyleaderengagementsforthesustainmentbrigadecommander.

PreparingfortheLTATMissionDuringthepredeploymenttrainingphase,sustain-

mentbrigadeandCSSBcommanderscanpreparetheirstaffsandsubordinateunitstobetterunderstandthetaskorganizations,commandandcontrol,andsup-portrelationshipsamongcoalitionforcesandIAunits.SustainmentbrigadeandCSSBcommandersshouldalsocoordinatewiththedeployedunitsthattheywillreplaceintheatertoidentifyanyuniqueissuesinresourcingandtrainingthattheirLTATwillberesponsibleformanaging.

Beforedeploying,CSSBsshouldidentifyspecificmilitaryoccupationalspecialties(MOSs)andkeylead-ersneededfortheLTATmission.TheorganizationofeachLTATisuniqueandmustbetailoredtopartnerwithitsassignedIARMC.

Undernormalconditions,athird-lineLTATisledbyacompany-gradeofficer(oranexperiencedwar-rantofficer)andtwoexperiencednoncommissionedofficers(NCOs).DependingonthetaskorganizationoftheRMC,someLTATsareorganizedwithanaddi-tionalNCOwhoservesastheteamNCO-in-charge.SoldierswithadditionalskillsetsareroutinelysenttoanLTATtoprovidereachbackcapabilityandtosupportspecifictrainingrequirementsplannedbytheLMATsandLOCOM.

ExamplesofreachbackMOScapabilitiesthataCSSBshouldconsiderduringmissionanalysistosup-portRMCsincludetransportation,ammunition,fuel,small-armsrepair,andpowergenerationrepair.OneofficerfromtheCSSBstaffshouldbeassignedtheresponsibilitytocoordinateandsynchronizerequire-mentsamongtheLTAT,sustainmentbrigade,andESCISFcells.

TherelationshipbetweentheLTATandtheLMATmustremainstrong,synchronized,andreadytoachievetheoveralltrainingobjectivesthatsupporttheLOCOM.

LTATResponsibilitiesAthird-lineLTATisresponsiblefortrainingand

advisingRMCsinmaintenance,supply,anddistribu-tiontasks.ThesetrainingtasksareassignedbytheESCstothesustainmentbrigadesandhelptheLTATstoremainproficientintrainingandadvisingtheRMCsthatsupportIAdivisions.Thetasksarecriticalinassistingthird-lineIAlogisticianstosustainthetacticalandstrategiclevelsoftheISFlinesofoperations.

Maintenance. MaintenancetasksincluderepairtoIAvehiclepowertrains,differentials,andwiring.Maintenancetrainingmustalsoincludewelding,bodywork,andpainting.Themaintenancefocusmustbeonallrepairsthattakemorethan36man-hourstocom-plete.Jobsthatrequiremorethan72hoursareevacu-atedtolevelIV.

Supply.SupplytasksincludeclassIX(repairparts)supplyandsupportactivities.RMCsmustattainabaselineunderstandingofhowtoissue,store,receive,andprocessparts.OnceanunderstandingofclassIXpartsisachieved,trainingtaskswillexpandtootherclassesofsupply.

Distribution.DistributionincludeslevelsIandIImotorizedtransportationregiment(MTR)distribu-tioncapabilitiesandlevelIVgeneraltransporta-tionregimentdistributioncapabilities.TheRMC,withoutorganictransportation,musthaveasolidunderstandingofhowtomonitorandtracktheflowofpartsandequipmenttoandfromalllevelsoforganizations.

UnderstandingtheIraqiArmySustainmentbrigadelevelIIILTATsmustunder-

standIraqiculture,doctrine,andprocessestodevelopIAleadersandensurekeyoperationallogisticssuccess.EachRMCisuniqueandrespondsdifferentlybasedontheareaofoperations,regionalatmosphere,andperson-alityofindividualIAcommanders.EachtrainingandadvisoryteamisuniquelyorganizedtoprovidetrainingthatistailoredtosustainIAorganizationswithintheirassignedareaofoperations.TheESCcoordinatesthetrainingofallsustainmentbrigadeLTATpersonnelandtheirleadersthroughIAGchannels.

A single standardized Iraqi logistics system is far from being a reality; what can be accomplished

easily in one IA division can be a challenge in another.

38 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ThePhoenixAcademyoffersLTATsandotherpersonnelsupportingtheISFa6-daycoursethatcov-ersmanyimportanttopics,includingArabic,thehis-toryofIraq,ISForganizationsandtheirfunctions,IAlogisticspractices,andLTATpartnering.ThecoursealsoincludesanoverviewandterrainwalkoftheTajiNationalDepot.TheseandothermaintopicsaredesignedtogiveLTATsandotherISFsupportingteamsthenecessaryinstitutionalknowledgetobegintheirmissionsupporttoIAlogisticstraining.

LTATsmustunderstandtheflowofsupportusedbyIAunits.LTATsdonotfixproblemsfortheirpartnerunits,buttheyencouragethemtodiscoverbylearningwhileteachingthemtotrusttheirsystem,whichisessentialtoacquiringinstitutionalknowl-edgeandpromotinglearning.Again,thegoalofalevelIIILTATistominimizehands-onparticipationandtomovetoanoverwatchposition.LTATsshouldnottrytoconvincetheIraqistochangetheirsystem;theyshouldencouragethemtolearnthemethodschosenbytheIraqiMinistryofDefense.LTATsandothertransitionteamsshouldassistbyreinforcingtheIAmethods.

LogisticsTechnologyAlackofinteractivesoftwareprogramsforrequest-

ing,tracking,andintegratingsupplieslimitstheIA’slogisticscapabilitiesandtheirprospectsfordevelop-inganefficientlogisticsinfrastructurewithstrongnetworks.TheIAMaintenanceProgram(IAMP)isadatabaseusedtotrackrequisitionsandallowsIraqilogisticianstolocallymanagemaintenanceworkordersandrepairpartsrequests.TheIAMPisnotastand-alonesystemandlacksinteractivesoftwareforself-tutoring.TheprogramwasdevelopedinEnglish(theArabicversionisnowavailable)andisaweb-basedprogramthatusesMicrosoftSQL.

TheIAMPrequiresdatatobemanuallyenteredintotheIA101universalsupplyrequisitionform,whichisusedtorequest,track,andreceivesupplies.Oncetheinformationisrecordedandallsignaturesareobtainedontheform,theinformationistransferredintotheIAMP.Theprogramcantakealongtimetooperatesinceitrequirestheusertogoinandoutofdifferentareastogatherthedesiredinformation.

AlthoughIAcombatunitshaveimprovedtacticallyandoperationally,theirsupportcapabilitieshavenot

Iraqi Army Logistics Structure

Strategic Operational Tactical

Level IVDepot Level

Level IIILocation Command Repair

Maintenance Company Level

Level IIDivision Level

Level IUnit Level

Fourth-line maintenance and repair parts support is performed at the Taji National Depot, shipbuilding facilities, contracted aircraft-specific facilities, or other contracted facilities. These organizations are the highest level of maintenance support within the Iraqi Army logistics system and are responsible for heavy-grade maintenance support.

Third-line maintenance and repair parts support is established at each of the location commands and other locations to meet operational requirements. These organizations are responsible for medium-grade repairs, including replacement of major assemblies and modules.

Second-line maintenance and repair parts support is performed by the motor transportation regiment (MTR) maintenance company.

Field workshops will soon replace MTRs as the second line of maintenance support for divisions. MTRs will only provide first-line maintenance support for division headquarters and separate brigades. MTRs will continue to provide second-line support for all other classes of supply.

First-line maintenance and repair parts support is principally performed by maintenance platoons in the headquarters and services company at the unit and brigade levels, where light-grade repairs are conducted. Equipment operators, including vehicle drivers, are also allowed to perform limited operator maintenance on the equipment.

U.S. equivalent: Army Materiel Command

and Defense Logistics Agency

U.S. partner unit:Combat sustainment support

battalion level III logistics training and advisory team

U.S. partner unit: Brigade support battalion level II logistics training

and advisory team

U.S. partner unit: Military transition

team

MAY–jUNE 2010 39

fullymaturedintoanefficientsystemthatcansignifi-cantlyextenduninterruptedcombatoperations.Theself-relianceofIAlogisticswilltaketimeanddependsgreatlyontheinterestthatIraqishaveintheprocess.MostIraqileadersandtheirunitsdemonstratetherightskillstotakeupandembracenewsystems.

Thesystemusedtomanagelogisticsisnotstream-linedanddependsonmanyhandstomakeitworkproficientlyandethically.UsingtheIA101universalsupplyrequisitionformisastringentpaper-basedmethodthatrequiresmanydaysforonesinglerequesttomakeitthroughthebureaucraticlevelsofIAcom-mands.ThissystemrequirespatienceandaggressivemanagementskillsfromIAlogisticians.

Uptothispoint,IraqishaveshownlittlepatienceandtrustinusingtheIAMP,andnottrustingthesys-temcanleadtocounterproductivepractices.SomeIraqileadershavechosentocircumventthesystem.Forexample,itiseasierforIAlogisticianstofindarepairpartindowntownKirkuk,Iraq,thantogetthelastsignaturerequiredtocompletetheIA101formandeffectivelycoordinatetransportationtoreceivethepart.

LTATScenariosDeployingsustainmentbrigadesandCSSBsshould

startLTATtrainingathomestation.Theseunitscancontacttheoutgoingunitstogatherasmanydetailsaspossibleabouttheirupcomingmissions.Theycanusethefeedbacktoplanhowtoworkthroughcommonpracticesoranyspecificchallengestheirfuturepartnerunitmightface.ThefeedbackcanbeusedtocreatetrainingscenariosformissionrehearsalexercisesandgivesustainmentbrigadeandCSSBcommandersandstaffsthebasicunderstandingtheyneedtopreparefortheirupcomingmissions.

Thefollowingscenariosarebasedonobservationsandexperiencesgatheredby16thSustainmentBri-gadethird-lineLTATs.ThesevignettesareintendedtohelpillustratesomeofthechallengesIraqisfaceintheirquestforself-reliance.WhatmightworkforoneRMCinoneLOCOMsimplywillnotworkinanotherarea.SomeIAsoldiershavedifficultyvisualizinganationwide-armyconcept—asystemthatisintercon-nectedanddependentonoutsideinfluencestomakeitwork.AnIAsoldier’stribalbackgroundandalle-giancetohisregionalbeliefsmayaffectthewayheinterpretshowthisindistinctsystemwillprovideforhisorhisunit’swelfare.

Scenario 1. AnIAdivisioninnorthernIraqisreceivinganinadequateresupplyofrepairpartsataLOCOM.TheIAdivisiondoesnothavevalidrequisi-tionsintheIAMPsystem.Inthepast,third-lineunitswereallowedtosubmitrequestsforprescribedloadlist(PLL)stock.Lastyear,theDirectorofElectricalandMechanicalEngineering(EME)publishedanew

policythatstatedthatunitscouldnolongerrequestpartsforstockatanylevel.Thispolicychangemademostoftherequisitionsthatwerealreadyinthesys-teminvalid.

ManyoftherequestsareoldandnolongerrequiredbecausethepartswerepurchasedontheeconomybeforeIAunitsbeganreceivingparts.Somerequestsforbrakepads,forexample,havebeeninthesystemforover300days.

NoneoftherequestsintheIAMPsystemcontainvehiclechassisnumbers.Sincetheunitnameislistedbybattalion,butnotbychassisnumber,itisnearlyimpossibletoensurethatpartswillarrivewhereneed-ed.Whenthepaper-copyIA101sarescrubbedagainstwhatislistedinthesystem,theinformationdoesnotmatchupbychassisnumber,date,oritemrequested.

Recommendation. TheunitshouldcontinuetoworkwiththeMTRtoensurethatitiscorrectlysub-mittingIA101stotheLOCOM.LevelIILMATsandLTATsshouldcontinuetoprovidefeedbacktotheirIraqicounterpartstoensurethatwhentheMTRsubmitsanIA101tolevelIII,theMTRkeepscop-iesoftherequestsonfiletoensuretheyreceiveacopyoftheformthatisgeneratedwhenarequestisenteredintotheIAMPoroperationsdatabase.Oncetherequestsareinthesystem,theMTRmaintenancecompanymusttrackallopenedrequisitionsandfol-lowupwiththethird-lineRMCtogetstatusesforthosepartsrequests.

IAunitleadersmustkeeptrackofpartsrequestsbecausetheircommandersandmaintenanceofficersfromtheIAdivisionarenotrequiredtoexplainthestatusofpartsrequeststhroughhigherechelons.Thisisdirectlylinkedtomaintenancemanagement.AllinvalidrequestsintheIAMPsystemshouldbepurged.Thiswillhelpalleviatethebackloginthesystem.

ThelevelIIIRMCmanagestheavailabilityofstocksandsubmitsregularrequestsforsparepartstoEMEforfirst-andsecond-linemaintenancebyvehicletypeintheIAfleet.Thesesparepartsareneededateachmaintenanceactivitytoavoiddepletingtheirstocklevels.

Scenario 2.IAcommandersandstaffofficersdonotplaceadequateemphasisonmaintenanceman-agementwithinthedivision.Aunithasnotfollowedcorrectformatsorproperlyconductedweeklyormonthlymaintenancemeetings,despiteeffortsbyLMATandLTATmemberstogetthemtosticktoagendas.Thislackoffocusonmaintenancemanage-mentleavestheIAdivision’scommandinggeneralandhisstaffwithoutafairassessmentofmainte-nanceandclassIXissues.Subordinatecommandersandstaffofficersinthiscommandarenotbeingheldresponsibleforthemaintenanceprogramintheirunits.Thishasproventohaveanegativeimpactonthedivision’soverallreadiness.

40 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

Recommendation. TheG–4adviser,MTRmain-tenanceadviser,LMAT,andLTATmustadvisetheircounterpartsoftheconsequencesofnothavinganeffi-cientmaintenanceprogram.Leadersshouldensurethattheirmeetingshavesetformatsandfollowagendas.Thiswillhelpprioritizeinformationandhelpthecom-mandinggeneral’sstaffcoordinateactions,allowingthemtorunaneffectiveandefficientmaintenancepro-gram.TheIAcommandinggeneralmustbeprebriefedonallmaintenance-relatedissuessothatheispreparedtoasktherightquestionsduringthemeetings.

IAleadersmustconductmaintenancemeetingseverymonth,noteveryothermonth.Theyshouldalsouseweeklymaintenancemeetingstoreviewrecurringjobsandtotrackthedetailsonthosejobsthatcannotbeclosed.Unfinishedjobsmustbebriefedduringthemonthlymeetings.

Scenario 3. IApersonnelhavelittletrustintheIraqilogisticssystem.Thesystem’sprocessesarenotstreamlinedanddonotalwaysprovideresults.Itisoftenmucheasiertobuythepartsofftheshelf.

AnMTRteamrecentlystartedworkingonanIA101packettorequestthreevehiclebatteriesfromthethirdline.Ithastakenover2weekstogetalltherequireddocuments(includingtwooriginalIA101sforeachbatteryandthepaperworkforeachvehicle),signatures,andstamps.TheMTR’scommander,MTRS–4,MTRmaintenancecompanycommander,andheadquartersandservicecompanywarehouseofficerinchargeallhadtosignandstampthepacket.

Becauseitismucheasierandfastertobuypartsoffthelocaleconomy,manyIraqiofficersdosoinsteadoftryingtousetheIAsystem.Proceduresareunclearandareconstantlychanging.Everyweeklymainte-nancemeetingisspentclarifyingprocedures.

Recommendation.Everypaper-basedsystemhasitsinherentchallenges.TheIraqisystemisnotstream-lined,anditwilltakealotofefforttomakeitworkefficiently.However,theIAmustcontinuetoenforcetherulesofthesystem.Havingeffectivemaintenancemeetingseachweekcanexpediteprocessesandbuildtrustinthesystem.

Thedivisionshouldhaveamaintenancestandingoperatingprocedure(SOP)towhicheachsubordinateunitmustadhere.TheLOCOMadviserswillworkwiththeG–4torecommendthattheIAcounterpartsdeveloptheirownSOPthatprovidessufficientdetailsastowhodoeswhatateachlevel.

AsU.S.andcoalitionforcesdrawdowncapabili-tiesandstartwithdrawingfromIraq,thesupportrelationshipsandoperationaltiestheyhavebuiltmustnotbeforgottenbytheirIApartnerunits.Iraq’sfuturefightingcapabilityandabilitytoregeneratecombatpowerremainapendingtestinconfidenceintheIraqilogisticiansatalllevels.FortheIAtotransitionintoaself-reliantandcompetentarmy,itslogisticiansmustcontinuetolearn,adapt,andgainnecessarytrainingexperiencesfromlevelIIILTATsandothertransitionteamsassistingintheirprofes-sionaldevelopment.IraqilogisticiansmustlearntoimplementIAmethodsandtrustthesystemestab-lishedbytheMinistryofDefense.

OnceLTATsareresourcedandcompletelyestab-lishedinthe13LOCOMs,thesethird-linetrainerswillberesponsibleforteaching,coaching,andmentoringtheRMCsonthespecificlevelIIItasks.LevelIIILTATsmustbeawareofrolesandresponsibilitiesandremainsynchronizedwiththeLMATpartneredwitheachLOCOM.ThisknowledgeisimportantforthelevelIIILTATs,whicharenormallycolocatedwiththeLMATandaredirectlyresponsibleforprovidingtheadditionaltrainingresourcesthatdevelopthetrainingstrategiesfortheLOCOMs.Theyshouldbefamiliarwiththecapabilitiesofferedbyfirst-andsecond-linecoalitionforcesteamsthatarepartneredwithIAdivisionalunitsandtheorganizationspart-neredwithfourth-linestrategicsupportIAunits.

TheprogressreportsforIAunitsprovidedbyeachcoalitionforcespartneringteammustbemonitoredandchanneledthroughonesingleagentintheareaofopera-tions.Thiswillensurethattheinformationflowsandisvalidatedbyalllevelstosupportonedesiredobjective.

Strongpartneringandsynchronizationatalllevelswillcontinuetopavethewaytoaself-reliantandpro-fessionalIAlogisticsforce,capableofsustainingIAcombatoperations.SustainmentcommandsmustreachthepartneringwithpurposeoverwatchphasesetbytheESCandremainobservantandreadytotakeactionifaninterruptiontoIAlogisticsthreatenssupporttoISFoperations.ThisphasewillaidintransitioningpowerfromthemilitarytotheGovernmentofIraqandassistintheoverallIraqistabilityplan.

lieutenant Colonel Carlos e. lopez was the support opera-tions offiCer for the 18th CoMbat sustainMent support battalion deployed to Mosul, iraq, in support of operation iraqi freedoM 08–10.

For the IA to transition into a self-reliant and competent army, its logisticians must continue to learn, adapt,

and gain necessary training experiences from level III

LTATs and other transition teams assisting in their

professional development.

MAY–jUNE 2010 41

TheHumanResourcesOperationsBranchby CaPtain roDen a. CarriDo

venasahumanresources(HR)professional,Ididn’tknowwhatthehumanresourcesoperationsbranch(HROB)ofasustainmentbrigade’ssupportoperations(SPO)sectionwasorwhatrolethebranchplayedwithinthesustainmentcom-munity.Usually,AdjutantGeneralofficersexpecttobeassignedtoacompany-level-and-aboveunitasapersonnelclerkorS–1.IexpectedtobeassignedasabattalionorbrigadeS–1withthe16thSustainmentBrigadeatBamberg,Germany.IlearnedaftermyarrivalattheunitandbeforewedeployedtoIraqinsupportofOperationIraqiFreedom08–10thatIwasgoingtobepartofthebrigade’snewHROB.

WhatistheHROB?TheHROBisanembeddedelementofsustain-

mentbrigadeandexpeditionarysustainmentcommand(ESC)SPOs.ItisalsoamodularelementthatmeetsthenewStandardRequirementCode12(SRC12)[HumanResources]structure.

TheHROB’smissionconsistsofplanning,syn-chronizing,andmanagingthesetupandoperationofpostal,casualty,andR5(reception,replacement,rest

andrecuperation,returntoduty,andredeployment)ele-mentsinconjunctionwiththeSPO’sconceptofsupportforservicingthesustainmentbrigade’sorESC’sareaofresponsibility.TheHROBplaysavitalroleinthesus-tainmentcommunitybyprovidingtechnicalguidancetothebrigadecommanderandtheHRcompanyrespon-sibleforthecommandandcontrolofsubordinateHRelementsintheareaofoperations.(Theexecutionguid-ancefortheHRcompany,however,canonlycomefromthesustainmentbrigadecommander.)

The16thSustainmentBrigadeHROBwasthesec-ondHROBtocoverMulti-NationalDivision-North(MND–N).TheHROBconceptisnew,andthechal-lengesaremany.HRSoldierscontinuetolearnthefunctionoftheHROBasleaderscontinuetodeveloppoliciesandstandingoperatingprocedurestosolidifytheHROB’sroleasaserviceproviderwithinthesus-tainmentcommunity.

Oneofthefirstchallengesfacedbythe16thSus-tainmentBrigadeHROBwashowitwouldintroduceHROBcompetenciesintosustainmentexercisesduringfieldoperations.ThiswouldintroduceleaderstotheHROBandconvincethemofthevalueaddedbytheasset.ThiswasachievedbysynchronizingHR-relatedexerciseswithsustainmentoperations(forexample,coordinatingtransportationforpostaldelivery).Beforeandduringourdeployment,theHROBbuiltrelation-shipswithotherelementsinthesustainmentcommu-nitythatwouldprovidethesupportitwouldneedforpostal,casualty,andR5operations—theHROB’sthreeprimarycorecompetencies.

PostalOperationsChallengesAswithalllogisticsoperationsandfunctionsthat

theSPOplans,coordinates,synchronizes,monitors,andcontrols,postaloperationsprovidedeployedSol-diersemotionallifesupportandaffecttheirmorale.WhiledeployedtoIraqfor15months,ourHROBmis-sionwaspostal-heavybecauseofever-changingsupportrequirementswithinourareaofoperations.MostoftheHROB’splanningandcoordinatingeffortsfocusedon

thetimelydeliveryofmailthroughoutMND–N,anarearoughlythesizeofPennsylvania.OurplacementintheSPOallowedustorapidlycoordinatefortheexternalsustainmentresourcesneededtoexecutethismission.

Whileunitsmoveandbasepopulationsincreaseordecrease,theHROBensuresthatproperpostalsupportisprovidedtotheunitsandtheirSoldiers.Thefirstchal-lengetheHROBfacedwasareductioninthesizeofitspostalplatoons.AnareathesizeofMND–Nrequiressixplatoons,butbecauseofincreasingOperationEnduringFreedomrequirements,thebranchwasexpectedtouseonlythreeplatoonstoperformthesamemissionwithnodegradationinthequalityofsupport.

Toresolvethisissue,the16thSustainmentBrigadeworkedwiththeESC’sHROBandHRcompanytodevelopaninternalmitigationstrategyandareposturingplantosustainHRoperationsthateffectivelyclosedthecapabilitygapinpostaloperationssupportofMND–N.

E

The HROB plays a vital role in the sustainment community by providing tech nical guidance to the brigade commander

and the HR company responsible for the command and control of subordinate HR elements in the area of oper ations.

42 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

Allpostalplatoons,withtechnicalguidancefromtheHROB,allowedcoalitionunitstodispatchintertheatermailtoallpermanentpostoffices,satellites,andmobileoperationsinsupportofoutlyingunits.

PostalOperationsOversightThemainArmypostofficesaremannedbycon-

tractedcivilianpersonnelwhorunallaspectsofpostaloperations.Soldiersmonitortheoperationsascontractingofficer’srepresentatives(CORs)andtech-nicalinspectors.

HROBSoldiersprovideoversightandpostalguid-ancetotheHRcompanyinexchangeforcontractorperformancefeedback.TheHROBconsolidatesthecommentsfromtheHRcompany,providesthosecom-mentstotheLogisticsCivilAugmentationProgram’smonthlyNegativeCommentBoard,andfollowsuponissuesasneeded.

TheappointmentofaCORisthecheckinthesys-temthatholdscontractorsaccountableforthequalityoftheirwork.UnitsmustensurethatCORsareclearlyinformedabouttheirresponsibilitiesandauthoritybecauseCORsareresponsibleforassessingthecon-tractors’performance.HavinganactiveCORhelpscorrectdeficiencies,preventsdeliverydelaystotheArmypostoffices,andensuresthatmailgetstotheSoldiersontime.Evaluationsnotonlyserveasatoolformonitoringcontractorperformancebutalsodocu-menttheCOR’sperformance,providingvaluablefeed-backtotheCORandperformanceappraisalinputthatcanbeusedbytheCOR’ssupervisor.

CasualtyOperationsCasualtyoperationsareanothercriticalHROBmis-

sion.Casualtyliaisonteams(CLTs)assignedtotheHRcompanyandlocatedwithlevelII+orIIImedicaltreat-mentfacilitiesensurethetimelyandaccuratecollectionandprocessingofcriticalcasualtyinformationsoitcanbeforwardedtothecasualtyassistancecenterforjudi-ciouscasualtynotification.TheHRcompanycommand-erandCLTplatoonleaderareresponsibleforensuringthatreportsarecompletedandsubmittedwithin3hoursofanincident.TheHROBissolelyresponsibleforsup-portingCLTplanningandforcemanagement.

CLToperationsarethemostmentallyandemo-tionallychallengingworkanHRSoldiercanendure.Inadditiontoverifyingtimelyandaccuratecasualtyreports,boththeHROBandHRcompanyassessthementalwell-beingofCLTSoldiers.CLTsnotonlyprovidecasualtyinformation;theyserveasliaisonsforaffectedcommandersandunits,provideupdatedstatusreportstoaffectedunits,andinformunitswhenaffectedSoldiersleavethetheater.CLTSoldiersmayseedisturbingwoundsorinjuriesandmightshowsignsofemotionalstresswhileonduty.TheHROBmakesrecommendationstorotateindividualSoldiersorteams

intootherHRpositionswithintheHRcompany’sothersupportelementstomaintainCLTreadiness.

R5OperationsR5operationsrequiretrackingSoldierswhoenter,

transit,anddeparttheatersofoperations.R5teamsareemplacedatmostair-passengerterminals,especiallythoseprocessinganaverageflowof600ormoreper-sonnelperday.TheprimaryresponsibilityoftheR5teamistoaccountfortheseSoldiersusingtheDep-loyedTheaterAccountabilitySystem.

TheR5missionofthe16thSustainmentBrigadeHROBdidnotchangeoverthecourseofthedep-loymentintermsofaccountingfortheinter-andintra-theatertransferofpersonnel.Areducedoper-atingtempoandautomationsystemsthatwereemplacedbypreviousR5teamsprovidedthecapabil-ityforthiscorecompetencytobecontractedtocivil-ianpersonnel.

HRandtheSpecialTroopsBattalionOfallthechallengestheHROBfacedwhilesustain-

ingandsynchronizingtheHRmission,themostper-plexingwasdeterminingtheextentofthesustainmentbrigade’sspecialtroopsbattalion’s(STB’s)involve-mentintheHRcompany’smission.UndertheSRC12modularstructure,theHRbattalionwasremoveddur-ingtransformation,leavingnoHRcommandsabovecompanylevel.Asaresult,theHRcompanywasattachedtotheSTBforadministrativecontrolandtoensureHRmissionexecution.Thelossofbattalion-levelHRplanningandoversightledtotheHROB’sestablishmentwithinthesustainmentbrigadeanditsplacementundertheSPO.

Theconfusionreallylieswiththelinesofcommu-nicationamongtheHROB,STB,andHRcompany.Withinlegacystructures,linesofcommunicationflowedfromtoptobottomandreverse(forexample,platoontocompanyandcompanytobattalion).Undermodularity,technicalguidancerequestsandotherinformationmovedirectlyfromtheHRcompanytotheHROBattheSPOandvice-versa.TheSTBisnotdirectlyinvolved.

TheSTBisresponsiblefortheadministration,sup-ply,maintenance,training,andreadinessoversightof

While units move and base populations increase

or decrease, the HROB ensures that proper postal support is provided to the units and their Soldiers.

MAY–jUNE 2010 43

HRcompanypersonnel,butnotfortechnicaloversightoftheHRmission.Naturally,onecouldmaketheargument,dependingontheirinterpretationofcur-rentdoctrine,thattheSTBshouldhaveHRperson-nelassignedtooverseetheHRcompanysinceitisasubordinatecompanyoftheSTB.(Thiswasacommonmovemadeamongthesustainmentbrigadesintheaterduringtheyearbeforethe16thSustainmentBrigade’sdeployment.)BesidestheHRmission,however,theHRcompanyoperatesjustlikeanyothercompany.

SynchronizingHRSupportThehumanresourcessustainmentcenterdetermined

thatHROBplacementinsidetheSTBwasnotcontrib-utingtotheHROB’soverallsustainmentmissionasanexternalassetwhileassignedtotheSPO.TheHROBcontainssubject-matterexpertswhoprovidethetech-nicalguidancerequiredtoassisttheHRcompanyincarryingoutitsHRsupport—afunctionthatissimilartotheonetheSPOperformsinplanning,coordinating,synchronizing,monitoring,andcontrollingotherlogis-ticsservices.

Whiledeployed,ourHROBpersonnelremainedattheSPOandprovidedtechnicalguidancethroughtheSPOtothesustainmentbrigadecommanderandtheHRcompany.WepassedalonganyinformationabouttheHRcompany’soperationalrequirementstotheSTB.

TheSTBandSPOHROBdevelopedamutuallysupportiverelationship,synchronizingbothtechnicalHRoperationsandcommandandcontroloversightofHRsupportpersonnel.Forexample,theSTBprovidedaugmenteepersonnelforataskforcecreatedtoback-fillanHRcompany;thatcompanyhaddepartedanditsreplacementsdidnotarriveuntil90daysaftertheunitleft.ThecoordinatedplanningeffortsbetweentheHROBandtheSTBensuredcontinuousHRsupporttoMND–N.ThiscombinationofHROBcommandlead-ershipandSTBpersonnelprovidedthecommandandcontrolforourHRassetsofoneR5team,fiveCLTs,andthreepostalplatoons,allofwhichweresynchro-nizedtoexecutetheHRmission.TheseeffortsresultedinnomissiondegradationandcontinualoversightofsubordinateHRunits.

PostaloperationscontinuedtobetheHROB’sgreat-estchallengethroughoutthedeployment,butwithsup-portfromtheSPOandsustainmentbrigade,assistancefromtheESC,andcooperationfromtheSTBand

HRcompany,weeffectivelyovercameourchallengesandprovidedtopnotchpostalsupporttoMND–N.GoodcommunicationbetweenallHRelementswithinMND–NwasthekeytosuccesswhilesupportingthesustainmentmissionofprovidingbasicandemotionallifesupporttoSoldiers.

Captain roden a. Carrido is the huMan resourCes operations branCh plans and operations offiCer for the 16th sustainMent brigade support operations offiCe. he holds a b.s. degree in politiCal sCienCe froM san diego state university. he is a graduate of the adjutant general offiCer basiC and advanCed Courses.

A Soldier from the postal detachment, 847th Human Resources Company, lifts a bag of mail out of a cart in preparation to sort it. The 847th, an Army Reserve unit from Fort Snelling, Minnesota, was subordinate to the 16th Sustainment Brigade during its deployment to Iraq and was one of the units helping with mail operations. (Photo by SGT Jill Fischer, 116th Public Affairs Detachment)

44 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

BuildingtheLocalEconomyatQ-Westby staff sergeant PatriCia MCCarthy, Waarng

hearrivaloftwoWashingtonArmyNationalGuardunits,the81stBrigadeSpecialTroops

Battalion(BSTB)andtheheadquartersandheadquarterscompany(HHC)ofthe181stBrigadeSupportBattalion(BSB),atContingencyOperatingBase(COB)QayyarahWest(Q-West),Iraq,broughtaboutsignificantchangesonandofftheinstallation.ThetwounitsworkeddiligentlytoimproveeconomicconditionsinthevillagesaroundQ-Westbyprovidingbasiclifesupportandemploymenttolocalresidents.

“ThepeopleofIraqareanxioustowork;educatedmenarewillingtoperformunskilledlaborinordertofeedtheirfamilies,”statedGee-GeeKitzler,theIraqiFirstInitiativeoperationscoordinatorforKBR,Inc.Byestablishinggoodrelationshipswiththelocalvillageleaders,coalitionforceswereabletodevelop

multiplestrategiesforimprovingtheeconomicstateofthelocalIraqipopulation.Theunitsmadenotewor-thyprogressbylayingthegroundworkforemployingmanylocalnationals.

NonlethalEngagementTeamOnestrategyforimprovingthelocaleconomywas

theuseofthe81stBSTBnonlethalengagement(NLE)team,whichcomprisedU.S.Soldierswhofocusedonimprovingrelationshipsbetweencoalitionforcesandlocalnationals.TheeffortsoftheNLEteamimmense-lystrengthenedtheunits’connectionstothevillagessurroundingCOBQ-West.TheNLEprogramenabledthe81stBSTBtonotifylocalleadersofopportunitiesforimprovingtheirlivingconditionsandtodeterminewhichvillageswereindireneedofemployment.TheNLEteamdecidedwhichvillagesitwouldusetostageitsoperationsandthennotifiedthelocalmuktars,orvillageleaders,abouttheemploymentopportunitiesavailableforeachvillage.

AspartoftheNLEprogram,theteambegantwomilitaryconstructionprojects:thedevelopmentofanewnorthentrycontrolpointandtheconstructionofaperimeterfencetobordertheCOB.Mostofthelabor-ersinvolvedinthesetwoprojectswerefromvillagesaroundtheinstallation.These2militaryconstructionprojectswereexpectedtorequirebetween50and100workersforayearofemployment.

Asidefrombasiclifesupportnecessities,likecleanwater,food,andshelter,thelargestneedexistingwithinthelocalcommunitieswasemployment.“Ifyoucanfixthejobsituation,youalsofixthelifesupportissues,”saidLieutenantColonelKennethGarrison,the81stBSTBcommander.

The81stBSTBNLEteamtraveledtovariouslocalvillagesseveraltimesaweektogatherunemploymentdataforthoseareas.TheBSTBdiscoveredthatveryfewpeopleweregainfullyemployedwithinthesmallervil-lages.“Inthosecases,hiringevenonepersonprovidesatremendousbenefit,”saidLieutenantColonelGarrison.

TheNLEteamwassuccessfulinprovidingjobsandimprovingthelocalpopulation’seconomicsitua-tion.CaptainDavidRaines,battlecaptainforthe81stBSTB,said,“Hiring5outof50peopleinonevillagemakesalargeimpactinthatvillage.”Employing1localnationalimprovesthelifestylesofanadditional10to20relativesinhishousehold.

T

An Iraqi vendor sells merchandise at the monthly souq at Contingency Operating Base Qayyarah West.

MAY–jUNE 2010 45

MonthlySouqsFirstLieutenantAnthonyMarion,officer-in-chargeof

theQ-WestIraqi-BasedIndustrialZone(I–BIZ)team,reported,“OnewaythatHHC181stBSBisimpact-ingfamiliesinlocalvillagesaroundCOBQ-Westandhelpingmakeachangeintheeconomyisbysponsoringmonthlysouqs.”AsouqisamarketwithintheCOBthatallowsbothIraqivendorsfromtheinstallationandexternalvendorstoselltheirmerchandisetoSoldiers.

IndependentIraqivendorMiahiHawwas,a19-year-oldmanfromthelocalvillageofJedallah,soldhisproductsatthesouqformanymonths.Miahiwasquotedsaying,“Nosouq,nowork.”Therevenueheearnedatthesouqsupportedhiswifeand17otherfamilymemberswhoresidedinhishousehold.Miahiisaprimeexampleofthesubstantialeconomiccontributionthe181stBSBHHCmadebysimplyhostingthismonthlyevent.

Equallyimportant,theHHChostedinformationalbriefingsknownasVIPluncheonsforvillageleaders.Thesemeetings,heldinconjunctionwiththemonthlysouqs,affordedthevillageleadersanopportunitytocommunicatetheirissuestomilitaryleaders.Thepri-marycoalitionattendeeswereprincipalleadersfromtheCOB,suchastheinstallationcommanderColonelMartinPittsandgarrisoncommanderLieutenantColo-nelAlanDorow.Bybringingtheseleaderstogether,issuesandconcernswereconfrontedandresolved.Moreover,theVIPluncheonwasanopportunetimeforthecoalitionforcestoadvertiseanyemploymentvacanciesthatcouldbenefittheIraqileaders’villages.

I–BIZAnothermeansofimprovingtheIraqis’economic

positionwasI–BIZ.I–BIZisatheater-wideprogramthatoffersIraqi-basedcontractorsandIraqiretailersaper-manentlocationoncoalitionbases.TheoriginalintentoftheI–BIZprogramwastoencouragethesaleofIraqicommoditiestoSoldiersanddramaticallyimprovetheeconomicstateoflocal-nationalbusinessowners.

FirstLieutenantMarionandStaffSergeantAlvinFernandez,bothstaffmembersoftheQ-WestI–BIZproject,workedextensivelywithotherreconstruc-tionelementsatQ-WesttoencouragebusinessesfromthelocalvillagestobecomemembersoftheI–BIZprogram.TheI–BIZstaffalsotriedtoinfluenceinde-pendentIraqibusinessownerswhowerecontractedbythemilitarytobecomeaffiliatesoftheprogram.“Bydoingthis,wedirectmoneyintotheIraqieconomyandhelpstabilizesecuritybyprovidingjobssoIraqiscansupporttheirfamilies,”saidFirstLieutenantMari-on.Withoutadoubt,anemployedIraqiislesslikelytoturntoinsurgentactivityformoney.

Aftertheofficialtransferofauthorityofthe181stBSBHHC,theunitplacedsignificantemphasisonIraqibusinessesinQ-West.FirstLieutenantMarionemphasized,“OurmainfocussincearrivingatQ-West

hasbeenontheIraqibusiness.”Whenthisarticlewaswritten,12IraqibusinesseswereofficiallyassociatedwiththeI–BIZprogramatQ-West.

IraqiFirstInitiativeAnotherprogramtheunitsemployedtoimprove

thelocalIraqieconomywastheIraqiFirstInitiative.Theprograminvolvesthepreferentialhiringoflocalnationalsfromcommunitiesaroundtheinstallation.ThegoaloftheIraqiFirstInitiativeistobalancesecu-rityandeconomicobjectivesbyexpandingtherecon-structionofIraq’seconomyandsupportingmilitarycounterinsurgencyefforts.

On23March2009,theQ-WestI–BIZsectionhostedajobfairattheCOBtoinformIraqisofemploymentopportunitiesavailabletothemonthebase.Withtheassistanceofvillagedignitaries,over30Iraqisattendedtheevent.Thedignitariesalsoprovidedalistthatidenti-fiedbetween100and300localnationalsforpotentialemploymentatCOBQ-West.Afterward,thegarrisoncommanderanddeputybrigadecommanderforQ-WestmetwithrepresentativesfromKBR,I–BIZ,andthebadgingofficetodiscusstheprocessofhiringlocalnationalsmentionedatthejobfair.

ThehiringprocessinvolvedacomprehensivesecuritybackgroundinterviewconductedatthebadgingofficeandaKBR-facilitatedmedicalscreening.AlthoughtheIraqiFirstInitiativeatQ-Westbeganbyemployingonly20localnationals,the181stBSBHHCcontin-uedtostrivetoincreasethenumberoflocalnation-alsemployedbyKBR.“ThereisnospecificnumberofIraqisthatQ-Westislookingtohire.ThenumbersarebasedontheneedforKBRsubcontractors,”saidLieutenantColonelDorow.KBRdoesnothavealocal-nationalhiringquota,buttheHHC’sintentwastoofferemploymenttoasmanylocalIraqisaspossible.

The81stBSTBandthe181stBSBHHCprovidedeconomicrelieftotheIraqipopulationsurroundingQ-West.Whentheyredeployed,theseunitsleftIraqamuchmorestabilizednationandhadcontributedtothePresident’soverallmissionofemployinganeffectiveexitstrategyinIraq.Theeconomicdevelopmentstheseunitsmadehelpedanationtobecomemuchmoresus-tainableinitseconomy.Astrongereconomywillhelplayafoundationforlastingpeaceandsecurity.

staff sergeant patriCia MCCarthy, waarng, served as the Multi-national forCe-iraq aCCess Control badging nonCoMMis-sioned offiCer and retention nonCoMMissioned offiCer for head-quarters and headquarters CoMpany, 181st brigade support battalion, 81st heavy brigade CoMbat teaM, whiCh was deployed in support of operation iraqi freedoM 08–10. she is Currently working toward a degree in business adMinistration and is a gradu-ate of the national guard reCruiting and retention Course and the huMan resourCes basiC nonCoMMissioned offiCer aCadeMy.

46 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

TacticalGroundReportingImprovesOperationalPicture

by CaPtain sPenCer broWn

O perationsIraqiFreedomandEnduringFree- domhaveforeverchangedhowinformation isdisseminatedandsharedonthebattlefield.Asthemilitaryconductsthewaronterrorism,theoneconstantisthatvaluableinformationisgatheredattheplatoonandsquadlevelsandpasseduptohigherechelonsformilitaryintelligenceSoldierstoanalyze.Everyday,Soldiersexitthewireonpatrolsorconvoysandengagethelocalpopulace.Indoingso,SoldiersarecollectingmoreinformationthananypieceoftechnologyintheArmy’sinventory.Havingrecognizedthis,theArmyhascoinedthephrase“everySoldierisasensor.”

TacticalGroundReportingThe“everySoldierisasensor”conceptwas

improvedbytheDefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency(DARPA)in2006withthedevelopmentofacomputer-basedprogram,theTacticalGroundReport-ing(TIGR)system,thatenablesseamlesscommunica-tionofinformationacrossthebattlefield.

TIGRisaweb-basedtoolthatoffersauniquemulti-mediaperspectiveofthebattlefieldtoSoldiersonpatrolaswellastheirhigherheadquarters.TIGRmakesiteasiertoaggregateinformationbyprovidingcompany-levelSoldierstheabilitytouploadpatroldebriefsandcreatereportsondatacollectedfrompatrols,whichare

The Tactical Ground Reporting (TIGR) system, shown in this screenshot, provides its users with a platform to consolidate report information and share that information with intelligence analysts and commanders at higher echelons. Its capability to provide near-real-time information provides patrols and convoys with an up-to-date look at their surroundings before they head out on a mission. (Photo by DARPA)

MAY–jUNE 2010 47

thenstoredinasystemthatissearchable.TIGRallowsSoldierstotailordatabasesearchesusinganumberofdifferentparameters,anditofferssearchresultsthatareexportabletoMicrosoftExcelandPowerPoint.

Aftercompletingamission,SoldiersandconvoycommandersrecordinTIGRanyobservationsandeventsthatoccurredalongtheirroutes.TIGRalsoenablesaconvoycommandertouploadpertinentpicturesorstreamingvideoinadditiontothetextreport.Forexample,ifaconvoycommandernoticesasuspiciousvehiclealongtherouteandisabletogetapicture,description,andgridlocationforthevehicle,hecanthenuploadthedataandmediatoTIGRforalltoview.

CompaniesusingTIGRcanstoredatainacommondatabase,whichenableseasieranalysis,collaboration,andinformation-sharing.Intelligence-deriveddatacanthenbedisseminatedandretrievedbyallechelons.

The16thSustainmentBrigadeExperienceTIGRwasintroducedtothe16thSustainmentBri-

gadeinSeptember2008andhasbeenexceedinglybeneficialtobothbattalion-andcompany-levelopera-tions.Innear-realtime,the16thSustainmentBrigade’sbattalionsusedTIGRtoeasilyaccessreportssubmittedbycompanies.The264thCombatSustainmentSupportBattalion(CSSB),asubordinateunitofthe16thSus-tainmentBrigade,routinelyintegratedTIGRreportingintotheirdailybattlerhythm.

Oneofthe264thCSSB’smissionswastoprovidedisabled-vehiclerecoverysupportforunitstravelingwithinMulti-NationalDivision-North.Ononeocca-sion,the264thCSSBwascalledtorecoverarouteclearancemine-resistantambush-protected(MRAP)vehiclethatwasdisabledbyanimprovisedexplosivedevice(IED).Thisrequiredthe264thCSSBtoquicklyconductanalysisoftheroutetotherecoverylocation,whichwasonaroadrarelytraveledbytheunit.

Withinminutes,thebattalionintelligenceofficer(S–2)usedTIGRtoretrievetheinitialSPOT[situa-tion,position,observation,troopsandterrain]reportfromthemaneuverunitandprovidethebattalionoperationsofficerwithanalysisonthebestroutetotaketotherecoverylocation.TheS–2printedoutmapsandsatelliteimageryfromTIGRtouseinbriefingtherecoveryconvoycommanderandhis

driversofthethreatsandenemytactics,techniques,andproceduresinthearea.Withthisinformation,theconvoycommanderwasarmedwithenhancedsitu-ationalunderstandingandawarenessandthe264thCSSBwasabletoconducttherecoverymissionwith-outfurtherincidenttotheirunit.

Battalionsnowhavetheresourcestheyneedtodevelopanaccuratecommonoperationalpicture(COP)thatcanbedisseminatedlaterallyandtohigherheadquarters.TIGRalsogivesbattalionsthetoolstooverseeeventsoccurringwithintheirsub-ordinatecompaniesandprovidethoseunitswithinstantfeedback.

Brigade-levelstaffscanviewallreportssubmittedbysubordinatebattalionsandadjacentbrigades.Inthisway,TIGRhasstreamlinedinformationdissemination,whichgreatlyenhancessituationalunderstandingandawareness.

TIGR’sStrengthsandWeaknessesOften,initialSPOTreportsreceivedatthebrigade

levelfromadjacentunitscontaingapsininformation.Toclarifyorobtainadditionalinformation,TIGRpro-videsuserswiththeabilitytocontacttheindividualwhosubmittedthereportthroughemailoritsforumfunction.TIGRenablesalluserstosubmitpostingsandreports.ThisisbothoneofTIGR’sstrengthsandoneofitslimitations—thelevelofdetailandspecific-ityofareportdependsontheindividualsubmittingit.IfacompanysubmitsaninaccurategridlocationtoTIGR,thosecoordinateswillbewidelypassedalongtobattalionandlateralunits.

TIGRisnotamandatoryreportingrequirementforunits.Asaresult,manyeventsthatmaybebeneficialtootherunitsthatuseTIGRgounreported.Thiscangivecommandersatlowerechelonsafalserepresentationofthebattlefield.(BattalionsandbrigadesareabletogetinformationfromtheCommandPostoftheFutureandDistributedCommonGroundSystem-Army.)

TIGR,whenemphasizedbybrigadeleaders,willreduceinaccuratereportingfromsubordinateunitsandprovideasolidCOPwithintheunitstructure.TIGRisapositivesteptowardclosingthetimegapbetweensenderandreceiverofcriticalreporting.TheArmy’sadoptionofthisprogramtakesadvantageofthemilitary’smosteffectiveandvaluableinformation-gatheringresource—theSoldier.BoththemodernandfuturebattlefieldsrelyheavilyonprogramslikeTIGRtoassistingatheringandprocessinginformationfromtheasymmetricalbattlefield.

Captain spenCer brown served as the assistant intelligenCe offiCer for the 16th sustainMent brigade while deployed in sup-port of operation iraqi freedoM 08–10. he is a graduate of the Military intelligenCe Captains Career Course.

After completing a mission, Soldiers and convoy

commanders record in TIGR any observations and events

that occurred along their routes.

48 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

UnitContractingProblemsDuringOverseasTrainingExercises

by Major WiLLiaM t. CunDy

heArmyconductsmultipletrainingexercisesinforeigncountrieseveryyear.Theseexercisesusuallyareexecutedincoordinationwiththearmedforcesofthehostcountries.

Contingencycontractingteams(CCTs)supportingthesemultinationalexercisestypicallyencounterprob-lemsinfiveareas:❏ Micro-purchasecapabilitiesoftorchandadvanced

echelon(ADVON)parties.❏ Deployingunits’understandingofthecontract

requirementsdefinitionandapprovalprocess.❏ Useofthemortuaryaffairsblanketpurchaseagree-

mentprocess.❏ CCTcommunicationrequirements.❏ ArmyVeterinaryCommand(VETCOM)-approvedrequirementsandproducts.

ThesefiveproblemareascanbeaddressedbeforeanexercisewithproperplanningandtheinclusionoftheCCTintheplanningprocessfromtheearliestopportunity.

Unitplannersandlogisticspersonnelneedtoensurethatthefiveproblemareasareaddressedatinitialplanningmeetingsandarerevisitedateachsubsequentplanningmilestone.Unitleadersandplannersneedtoincorporatethecontractingassetsavailabletothemintotheplanningprocess,andCCTpersonnelshouldbeincludedateveryplanningconferenceoncethemis-sionisassigned.

Unitsalsoneedtounderstandthat,inordertohaveallcontractarrangementsinplacewhentroopsarriveinthetheater,CCTsshouldbeincountryseveralweekstomonthsbeforethearrivalofunitpersonnel.Thecostsofcontractsusuallyarepaidforfromtheexercisebudget,whichisanotherreasonwhyCCTsneedtobeincludedintheplanningphases.ACCTmayneedtomakemultipletripstoensurethatallcon-tractarrangementsareset.

Micro-PurchasesbyAdvancePartiesAmicro-purchaseisaGovernmentpurchaseofsup-

pliesorservicesthatinvolveslessthan$3,000forasinglepurchase;itdoesnotrequirecompetitionandisnormallyconductedinformallyusingacreditcard.TorchandADVONpartiescommonlydonotdeploywithamicro-purchasecapability,whichcanseri-ouslyinhibittheirabilitytorespondtounanticipatedrequirementsencounteredduringtheinitialoccupation

andsetupattheexerciselocation.Lackofmicro-purchasecapabilitycanalsocauseproblemswiththeprocurementofsuppliesneededfortrackingcellsandexerciseprepa-rationcells.

UnitscaneasilyavoidtheseproblemsbyensuringthattorchandADVONpartiespossessamicro-purchasecapability.Unitscanaccomplishthisbydeployingper-sonnelwithGovernmentpurchasecards.Anotheroptionistodeployfieldorderingofficersandpayagentswithafundedpurchaserequestandcommitmentcapabilitybeforetheexercise.

UnderstandingContractRequirementsDefiningcontractrequirementsisanongoingpro-

cessbecausecontractchangeswillalwaysbepartoftheplanningprocessforanexercise.However,anychangesinrequirementsmustbecommunicatedtocontractingpersonnelimmediately.

Whilecontractingpersonnelusuallycanmakechang-estocontracts,thecostofthosechangescanbedramat-icallyaffectedbytheamountoftimeneededtoinstitutethem.Contractingpersonnelunderstandthatrequire-mentschange,areupdated,andinsomecasesareevendeletedfromanexercise.Duringtheplanningphase,unitsneedtodifferentiatebetweennice-to-haveandmission-essentialrequirements.Thiscanbeaddressedduringtheformalmilitarydecisionmakingprocessandrockdrillsconductedduringplanningconferences.

Unitsalwayswantflexibilityintheircontracts.Flexibilitycanbeachieved,butthecostwillincreasebecausethecontractorisacceptingrisk.Themostimportantfactorinreducingcostsgeneratedbycon-tractchangesiscommunicationbetweencontractingpersonnelandtheunit.TheCCTneedstobeinformedassoonaspossibleaboutanypossiblechangestorequirements.Agoodruletorememberisthatchangeswillbemoreexpensivetheclosertomissionexecutiontheyaremade.

MortuaryAffairsBlanketPurchasesBecauseofitsimpactonSoldiersandtheirfami-

lies,themortuaryaffairsblanketpurchaseagreementprocessisperhapsthemostsignificantproblemarea.Unitsconductingmultinationalexercisesinnon-NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganizationcountries,inparticular,needtofullyunderstandandplanforthemortuaryaffairsprocessesrequiredforconductingtheexercise.

T

MAY–jUNE 2010 49

Thecommandresponsiblefortheareaofoperationswilldeployamortuaryaffairsteamtothecountrybeforetroopsarrive.Thisteamwillinspectandcer-tifymultiplemortuarybusinessesforuseduringtheexercise.Theprocessformovingandstoringremainswillbespecifiedintheinternationalagreementsignedbeforetheexercise.Theunitshouldrequestthatthemortuaryaffairsteamthoroughlyexplaintheprocessandtheservicesrequiredfromaspecificcontractortotheunit’splanningandlogisticsteams.

InmosteasternEuropeancountries,thegovern-mentgenerallyhasalevelofcontroloverthemortuaryaffairsprocessthatneedstobeunderstoodbyallpar-ties.TheCCTwillhaveanonfundedcontractinplacetocoveralltherequirementsidentifiedbythemortu-aryaffairsteam.TheCCTmayfindthatamortuarybusinesslackstheauthoritytosignaU.S.contract(ablanketpurchaseagreement),andtheUnitedStatesgenerallywillnotsignaforeigncontract;theseissuescanbeworkedoutgivenenoughleadtime.

Adirectrelationshipexistsbetweenthemortuaryaffairsproviderandthepathologyrequirementsoftheexercise.Thepathologyrequirementsneedtobespeci-fiedbytheregionalmedicalcenterresponsiblefortheexercisearea.

Theearliermortuaryaffairsagreementscanbeenteredinto,themoreflexibilitythecontractingoffi-cerswillhavetoadaptthemtospecificexercises.Unitplannersandlogisticspersonnelshouldhavecopiesoftheinternationalagreementsandmortuaryaffairspro-cessesonhandattheunit’sheadquarters.

CCTCommunicationRequirementsCCTsnormallyconductoperationsontheProcure-

mentDesktopDefense(PD2)system,whichprovidesautomated,streamlinedstrategiccontractmanagementsupport.InmanyexercisesconductedinEurope,theCCTcouldnotestablishcommunicationwithsharedserverslocatedinGermany.TheseserversmaintainthePD2contractingsoftwareandarethegatewaytosharinginformationacrossrelevantDepartmentoftheArmyandDepartmentofDefenseorganizations,suchasresourcemanagementofficesandtheDefenseFinanceandAccountingService.

ACCTneedstohaveaccesstoitshome-stationservertoconductcontractingactionsusingPD2.ACCTusuallyacquiresaccessthroughavirtualprivatenetworkconnection(usingacommercialInternetser-viceprovider).CCTsusecommercialInternetserviceprovidersbecauseofthebandwidthlimitationsoftacticalcommunicationsequipment.Unitsmustbepreparedtoplan,identify,andfundtheCCT’smovetoalocationthatcanprovideaccess.

Beforedeployment,CCTsandunitsshouldhavetheirinformationmanagementofficerinvestigateandprovidethecommunicationrequirementsneededto

operateremotelyusingPD2.TheCCT’srequirementscanbeidentifiedandaddressedduringtheplanningphaseoftheoperationbyworkingwiththeexercisingunit’ssignalpersonnel.

VeterinaryCommandRequirementsManyexercisesencounterashortageofsometype

ofclassI(subsistence)orwaterforseveraloften-over-lookedreasons.Forexample,ifcommonlyprojectedwaterconsumptionratesdouble,thereasoncouldbesubstandardhost-nationsanitaryconditionsandlaundrysupport,lackofpropertrackingofconsumedproducts,customsissuesaffectingdeliveriesofwater,orlackofatriggerordecisionpointthatpreventedtheunitfromelevatingtheissueorpursuinganalternatecourseofactionuntiltheproblembecamecritical.

Beforethestartofanyexercise,alllogisticsdeci-sionmakersshouldknowthelocationsofclassIandwatersourcesinthearea,includingthoseinsurroundingcountries,andthetimerequiredtodeliverallVETCOM-approvedclassIandbottledwatersupplies.Unitlogisti-ciansmustbeawareofthepoliticalandculturalsituationsinthecountriesinwhichtheyoperate.Forexample,duringoneexerciseinEurope,theexercisingunitidentifiedaVETCOM-approvedwatersourceinaneighboringcountry,buttradebetweenthetwocoun-trieshadbeensuspendedbecauseofpoliticalproblemsandthewatercouldnotbedelivered.

UnitsshouldalsoensureVETCOMinspectorsareavailableduringtheexercisesitesurveytocoordinateandconductinspectionsofpotentialclassIsourcesofsupply.TheyshouldcontacttheclosestVETCOM-approvedsourcestogaugehowlongitwilltaketodeliv-erclassIsupplies;doingsowillallowthemtoestablisharealisticdecisionpoint.

Contractingformultinationalexercisesisacomplexanddifficultprocess.However,withproperplanningandcoordination,unitscanconductsuccessfulexer-cisesinavarietyoflocations.Ifunitsaddressthefivepotentialproblemareasdiscussedabove,theywillimprovetheirchancesofasuccessfulexercise.How-ever,thesefiveareasarebynomeanstheonlyonesunitsneedtoaddress;theyarejustthemostcommonlyneglectedoreasilyignoredones.Thekeystoaddress-ingtheseareasbeforeanexerciseareproperplanningandincludingtheCCTintheplanningprocessfromtheearliestpossibleopportunity.

Major williaM t. Cundy is an adMinistrative ContraCting offi-Cer at the defense ContraCt ManageMent agenCy in grand rapids, MiChi gan. he holds a baChelor’s degree in aC Counting and finan-Cial ManageMent froM CleMson university and is a graduate of the arMor offiCer basiC and advanCed Courses, the CoMbined arMs and serviCes staff sChool, and the arMy CoMMand and general staff College.

50 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

rainingwithIndustry(TWI)providescompeti- tivelyselectedofficers,warrantofficers,and noncommissionedofficers(NCOs)withexten-siveworkexposuretocorporateAmerica.TheTWIprogramwasoriginallyestablishedtoexposemilitarypersonneltoprivate-sectorproceduresandpracticesnotavailablethroughexistingmilitaryoradvancedciviliantrainingprograms.

ThefirstTWIstudentsparticipatedexclusivelyinprogramsthatsupportedthedevelopmentofskillsinmaterielacquisitionandlogisticsmanagement.Sol-diersreceivedindustrytrainingfor12consecutivemonths,duringwhichtheywereexposedtoinnova-tiveindustrialmanagementtactics,techniques,andproceduresthatbenefitedtheArmy.Aftercompletingthetraining,participantswereimmediatelyplacedinmandatoryfollow-onArmyassignmentsfor2yearstoimprovetheArmy’sabilitytointeractandconductbusinesswithindustry.Today,theTWIprogramhasevolvedtoincludetrainingprogramsthatsupportmar-keting,finance,andotherareasofbusiness.

ProgramAllocationsInfiscalyear(FY)2002,theSecretaryof

DefenseorderedacomprehensivereviewoftheexternaluseofmilitarypersonnelinfellowshipsandTWIprograms.Hisintentwastoreducesuchprogramstominimum-essentiallevels,thusincreas-ingtheoperationalstrengthofDepartmentofDefense(DOD)organizations.ADODexternalutilizationreviewboardrecommendedsuspendingtheFY2003TWIselectionsandreducingthenum-berofallottedspacesthatserveasabaselineforfutureTWIprograms.TheboardalsorecommendedrequiringthatTWItoursbefollowedwithanimme-diatetourinabilletthatwouldmakeuseoftheexperiencegained.

Sincethen,TWItrenddataonallocationsforFY2004through2010showthattheArmyhashad75slotseachyear.Thecurrentbreakdownis51officer,12warrantofficer,and12NCOpositions.Ofthose,sustainmentslotsfluctuatedfrom25inFY2004toalowof20inFY2007andFY2008to27atpresent.

TrainingWithIndustryby Lieutenant CoLoneL MarshaLL n. raMsey

T

4

105

2

27

15

25

2020 2322 21

The Army Combined Arms Support Command, Sustainment Center of Excellence, has 1/3 of the Army’s slots (27 of 75), including 15 officers,6 warrant officers, and 6 noncom-missioned officers.

Sustainment Training-With-Industry Allocations

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

FY10FY09FY08FY07FY06FY05FY04

OrdnanceQuartermasterTransportation

LogisticsAdjutant General

Financial ManagementTotal

The Army had 75 slots each year from fiscal year (FY) 2004 to FY 2010.

50 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

MAY–jUNE 2010 51

Adjutantgeneralandfinancialmanagementalloca-tionsgenerallyaccountfortheincreasednumberofsustainmentslotssincetheywereaddedtohistoricalprogramsthatsupportedthedevelopmentofmaterielacquisition-andlogisticsmanagement-relatedskills.TheAcquisitionCorpsispartofsustainment;addingintheir10slotsbringsthesustainmentslotsto37,orroughlyone-halfoftheArmy’s75slots.

ProgramExecutionAnumberoforganizationsplayvitalrolesin

executingtheTWIprogram.Inparticular,thepro-ponentsforadjutantgeneral,financialmanagement,logistics,ordnance,quartermaster,andtransporta-tionattheArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommand(CASCOM)SustainmentCenterofExcellenceserveastheirrespectivetrainingprogramcoordinators.Theyalsoserveasliaisonsamongindustry,TWIstudents,andtheArmyHumanResourcesCom-mand.Theyestablishandcontrolthestudent’strainingprogrambyvalidatingfieldrequirements,developingtrainingobjectivesandtrainingplans,reviewingtrainingreportsandtravelplans,andvali-datingtraining.

SustainmentleadersaregenerallysatisfiedwithcurrentTWIallocations,consideringcurrentover-seascontingencyoperations.CASCOMschoolscon-tinuetorefinethenumberandtypeofslotsinordertobetterprepareforfuturetrainingrequirements,includingrecommendingadditionsforammunition,mobility,andpetroleumwarrantofficersandpetro-leum,mortuaryaffairs,andelectronicmaintenanceNCOs.Inthemeantime,theycontinuetomonitoranypotentialreallocationofslots.

TWIprovidesSoldierswithtrainingandskillsinbestbusinesspracticestosupportDODrequire-ments.Afterward,participantsusethattraininginavalidatedTWIassignmentposition.Overall,sus-tainmentpositions(minusthoseintheAcquisitionCorps)receiveone-thirdoftheTWIprogramalloca-tions,andtheseallotmentsareincreasing.TWIslotsnowincludemarketingandfinance.Proponencyofficesareinformingcompetitiveofficers,warrantofficers,andNCOsofTWIopportunities.Topara-phrasetheChiefofStaffoftheArmy,takeTWIasanotheropportunitytopicksomethingthatsuitsyouandbroadenyourself.

lieutenant Colonel Marshall n. raMsey is the Chief of the logistiCs branCh proponenCy offiCe at fort lee, virginia. he holds a baChelor’s degree froM the university of tennessee and a Master’s degree froM Central MiChigan university. he is a gradu-ate of the quarterMaster offiCer basiC Course, the ordnanCe offiCer advanCed Course, the arMy CoMMand and general staff College, and the joint forCes staff College.

CASCOMFY2010TWILocationsCommissionedOfficersArmy Adjutant General School (two slots)

•MicrosoftCorporation,Redmond,Washington •LockheedMartinMissilesandFireControl,

GrandPrairie,TexasArmy Combined Arms Support Command (one slot)

•LMI,McLean,VirginiaArmy Financial Management School (five slots)

•ArmedForcesBank,FortLeavenworth,Kansas •GlobalExchangeServices,Gaithersburg,

Maryland •GETransportation,Erie,Pennsylvania •Motorola,Inc.,Schaumburg,Illinois •TheBoeingCompany,St.Louis,Missouri

Army Quartermaster Center and School (four slots) •LMI,McLean,Virginia •ExxonMobilFuelsMarketingCompany,Fairfax,

Virginia •Sunoco,Inc.(R&M),Philadelphia,Pennsylvania •LabattFoodService,SanAntonio,Texas

Army Transportation Center and School (three slots) •FederalExpressIncorporated,Memphis,

Tennessee •LandstarSystem,Jacksonville,Florida •LMI,McLean,Virginia

WarrantOfficersArmy Ordnance Center and School (two slots)

•LockheedMartinMissilesandFireControl,EastCamden,Arkansas

•CaterpillarDefenseandFederalProducts,Mossville,Illinois

Army Quartermaster Center and School (three slots) •LMI,McLean,Virginia •CompassGroup,Charlotte,NorthCarolina •AirborneSystemsNorthAmerica,SantaAna,

CaliforniaArmy Transportation Center and School (one slot)

•CrowleyMarineServices,Inc.,Seattle,Washington

NoncommissionedOfficersArmy Ordnance Center and School (two slots)

•LincolnElectricCompany,Cleveland,Ohio •GeneralDynamicsLandSystems,Sterling

Heights,MichiganArmy Quartermaster Center and School (three slots)

•TheCulinaryInstituteofAmerica,HydePark,NewYork

•TheAmericanCulinaryFederation,St.Augustine,Florida(twoslots)

Army Transportation Center and School (one slot) •A.P.Moller-MaerskTerminals,Inc.,Portsmouth,

Virginia

52 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ATRADOCBestPractice:AVirtualWaytoKeepTrainingCurrent

by DonaLD D. CoPLey, jr.

llArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand(TRADOC)schoolsconductcriticaltasksiteselectionboards(CTSSBs)biannuallyorwhensignificantchangesoccurindoctrineorequip-ment.Thisprocessallowstrainingdeveloperstokeepinstitutionalcoursewarerelevant.AsanArmySoldierSupportInstitute(SSI)pilot,theRecruitingandReten-tionSchool(RRS)hasconductedvirtualCTSSBsanddevelopedindividualcriticaltaskreportsusingthecollaborativeArmyLearningManagementSystem(ALMS)softwarecalledCentra.

TheTRADOCaccreditationteamhostedbySSIatFortJackson,SouthCarolina,from13to24July2009identifiedthevirtualCTSSBasabestpractice.ThisarticledescribesanddefinestheprocessesusedtoleveragetechnologytoconductavirtualCTSSBinageographicallydispersedcommandwhilemini-mizingtheimpactonrecruitingandtemporaryduty(TDY)costs.

Becauseofthefast-pacedchangesoccurringintheU.S.ArmyRecruitingCommand(USAREC),anequallyrapidprocesswasneededtoensurethatallcriticaltasks,Soldiertrainingpublications(STPs),andtrainingproductsforrecruitingSoldiersandcivi-liansremainedrelevant.UndertheguidanceofSSI,RRSdevelopedacompletelyvirtualprocesstocon-ductCTSSBprocedures.Byleveragingtechnology,continuousimprovement,andinnovativethinking,RRScontinuestoshapethefutureoftrainingdevel-opment.ThisnewlydesignedprocesshasallowedRRStoupdatecriticaltasksforall18recruitingskilllevelswithina2-weekperiod.

BeforetheBoardsTrainingdevelopersnormallyfollowtheCTSSB

processwhenconductingajobanalysis.TheRRSproceduresincludejobanalysis,taskanalysis,andtaskmanagement.Duringthe4to16January2010CTSSBs,RRSconducted18differentskill-leveltaskreviewpanels.Throughthesepanels,RRScompletedallthreemajortasksforindividualtrainingdevelop-mentasspecifiedinparagraphsVI–1throughVI–3ofTRADOCRegulation350–70,SystemsApproachtoTrainingManagement,Processes,andProducts.

TheRRStrainingdevelopmentshop,inconjunctionwiththeUSARECdoctrineteamandtheSSIqual-ityassuranceteam,hostednineCTSSBpanelsduringthefirstweekandninemorepanelsduringthesecondweek.TheRRSqualityassuranceevaluator(QAE)developedtheAutomaticSurveyGeneratorsurvey,whichwassenttoallUSARECpersonnel.ThissurveyisthebeginningoftheprocessandiscrucialtothesuccessoftheCTSSBs.

Thesurveycoveredallcurrentcriticaltasks,know-ledge,andskills.Bycapturingdatafromfieldusersbeforetheyarrivedfortheboards,RRSwasabletoidentifysystemchanges,performancechanges,andanyotherenvironmentalchangesthatmightaffecttheperformanceofthecriticaltasks.RRSdoesnotrelyonpanelmemberstosimplyserveassubject-matterexperts.Byusingthesurveysystem,RRScanachievegreaterconsensusfromfieldusersandthereforecon-ductamoreorganizedCTSSBproceeding.

Afterorganizingthesurveydata,10Centraclass-roomswerecreatedinALMS.Theseclassroomsweredesignatedasthesitesforeachweek’sninepanelsandonecentralcontrolpanel.TheRRScommandant,whoisalsotheproponentforcareermanagementfield79(recruitingandretention),approvedtheUSARECopera-tionorder(OPORD)establishingtheCTSSBtasking.Inthisorder,theRRSdirectoroftraining(DOT),theSSIQAE,andtheUSARECdoctrinechiefweretaskedtobepresentduringthepanels’proceedings.

TheRRScommandant,whoservedasthechairmanforall18panelsoverthe2weeks,appointedtheDOTtocoordinatetheCTSSBs.TheDOTselectedthepanelfacilitators,whohostedtheboardproceedingsbasedontheirtrainingdevelopmentbackgrounds.Eachtrainingdeveloperhostedacompletepanelforonespecificskilllevelduringeachofthe2weeks.Thesetrainingdevel-opersusedSharePointtohousetheaudittrailfilesfortheproceedingsandalldocumentationusedduringeachpanel.ThetrainingdevelopersconductedliverehearsalseveryThursdayfor6weeksbeforehostingtheCTSSBs.

TheDOTalsocoordinatedtohavetheSSIQAEpresentfortheproceedingstoserveastheevaluator.Theevaluatorensuredthatrecommendationsoftasksascriticalornoncriticalwerebasedonanappropriate

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The Army Soldier Support Institute hosted an Army Training and Doctrine Command accreditation team visit in July 2009. This article is the first of three that will share the best practices identified during that visit.

MAY–jUNE 2010 53

taskselectionmodel.HealsoensuredthattasktitlesmettherequirementsofTRADOCregulations.TheQAEalsohelpedpanelmemberstounderstandtheirrolesintheCTSSBprocess.

Subject-matterexpertswerechosenthroughtheOPORDannouncement.USARECbrigadeleadershipteamsnominatedallsubject-matterexpertstopartici-pateintheCTSSBs.Nomineeswerescreenedagainstregulatoryrequirementstoensurecompliance.Subject-matterexpertsshouldbeoneskilllevelhigherthanthejobforwhichtheyarerecommendingtasksandshouldhaveatleast1yearofexperienceperformingthosetasks.Theyrecommendchanges,providetechnicalinformation,determinecriticaltasks,anddevelopindi-vidualperformancestepsandmeasuresforeachtaskdesignatedascritical.

DuringtheBoardsDay1ofthevirtualCTSSBallowedpanelmem-

berstobecomefamiliarwithterminology,otherpanelmembers,andperformanceexpectations.Thecom-mandantdeliveredopeningremarksandthenintro-ducedtheDOT,whoconductedabriefoverviewofCTSSBproceduresandoutlinedthedailyprocesses.

Allpanelmemberswererequiredtomeetinthecen-tralcontrolclassroomatthestartandendofeachday;thispermittedinterpaneldiscussions,additionalvotingasneeded,andtie-breakingproceedingsfortheday’sactivities.Allmeetingswereheldfrom1000to2000hoursEasternTime,whichallowedforaneast-to-west-coasttimeadjustmentforallpanelmembers.Duringtheday,panelmemberswenttotheirrespectiveroomsfordeliberations,discussions,andtaskdevelopment.

Inthemainpanelduringday1,theprimaryvotingwascompletedforeachskilllevel.Aparliamentarypro-cedurewasusedtoensureorderlyvotingontasks.AllmemberswererequiredtovoteusingthesurveyengineinsideCentra.Thisallowedindividualvotingtoremainanonymousandavoidedundueinfluenceonpanelmem-berstovoteinanyonedirection.Tasktitle,conditions,standards,anddifficulty,importance,andfrequencymodeldesignationwereallputtoavote.Oncevotingforalowerskilllevelwascompleted,thepanelsbrokeintoseparateCentrasessionstodevelopindividualtasks.

Trainingdevelopershostedeachofthe18skilllevelsinapanelforumusingCentrasoftware.Thesesessionshadallofthecapabilitiesneededtoconductvirtualreal-timecollaborativework.TrainingdevelopersbroughtuptheSTPs,taskworksheets,knowledge,andskillsrequiredtoensurethatallaspectsoftaskdevelopmentweredonewithinTRADOCguidance.

Subject-matterexpertsusedelectronicpublica-tions,application-sharingtechnology,SharePointfiles,RecruitingProNet-threadeddiscussions,andanyothertechnologyneededtotransferfiles,discussoperatingsystems,andintegratetechnologyintoeachcritical

task.Alltrainingdevelopersoperatedoutofthesameofficetoensuretheavailabilityofsupportstaff.

AftertheBoardsOncethepanelswerecompleted,theRRScom-

mandantsignedtheCTSSBexecutivesummarytoapprovethecriticaltasklist.Thiswasanotheradvan-tageofhavingthecommandantserveasthechairman.Hecouldimmediatelyapprovethetasklistbecausehewasactivelyinvolvedinthedeliberationprocessandtaskdiscussions.

Partoftheexecutivesummaryincludedthetotaltaskinventorybyjobandskilllevel.Withinthepanels,theRRStrainingdevelopmentshopreviewed18occupa-tions:recruiter,recruitingstationcommander,guidancecounselor,recruitingoperationsnoncommissionedofficer,recruitingmastertrainer,healthcarerecruiter,healthcarestationcommander,recruitingfirstsergeant,recruitingcompanycommander,recruitingbattalionexecutiveofficer,recruitinghumanresourcesofficer(S–1),recruitingbattalionoperationsofficer,recruitingbattalionadvertisingandpublicaffairs,recruitingbat-talioninformationofficer,recruitingbattalionmissionandmarketanalyst,recruitingbattalionsupplyspecial-ist,recruitingbattalionbudgetspecialist,andrecruitingbattalioneducationservicespecialist.

OncetheCTSSBpanelswerecompleted,theDOTconductedtaskmanagement.TheRRStrainingdevelopersusedthenext2weekstouploadtaskdataintotheAutomatedSystemsApproachtoTraining(ASAT)database(soontobereplacedbytheTrainingDevelopmentCapability[TDC]).Thispermittedsub-missionofanupdateddatabasecapturetotheDigitalTrainingManagementSystem(DTMS)team.Thispro-cessprovidedthefieldforcewiththenewcriticaltaskdatawithin3weeksofcompletingtheCTSSBprocess.InadditiontotheDTMSupdate,newSTPsandofficerandcivilianfoundationstandardmanualswerecre-atedinaspiraldevelopmentprocessandpublishedtomatchtheDTMSdatabase.

ThisnewCTSSBprocesshasdoneamazingthingsforUSAREC.TheUSARECG–4/G–8hasrecognizedthattheeliminationofTDYcostrequirementshasresultedinannualsavingsof$400,000.ThenewdesignallowsfortheCTSSBprocesstobeperformedbiannually.Thisprocessishelpingtokeepcriticaltaskscurrentwhilekeepingpacewiththeever-changingneedsofUSAREC.

donald d. Copley, jr., is the direCtor of training and personnel developMent at the arMy re Cruiting and retention sChool at fort jaCk son, south Carolina. a retired arMy CoMbat veteran, he holds a baChelor’s degree in Mar keting and Master’s degrees in huMan re sourCe ManageMent and huMan resourCe developMent, and he is working on a ph.d. de gree in applied ManageMent and deCision sCi-enCes with a speCialization in leadership and organizational Change.

54 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

DeployedArmyBandsby Chief Warrant offiCer (W–5) john s. fraser

rmyBandsbegandeployinginsupportofOperationIraqiFreedom(OIF)in2003andinsupportofOperationEnduringFreedom(OEF)in2004.Currently,fourbandsareinIraq,threeatthedivisionlevelandoneatthecorpslevel.The56thArmyBand,ICorpsBand,fromJointBaseLewis-McChord,Washington,isservingastheUnitedStatesForces-Iraqband.The3dInfantryDivisionBandfromFortStewart,Georgia,isservingastheU.S.Division-NorthBand,the1stArmoredDivisionBandfromWiesbaden,Germany,astheU.S.Division-CenterBand,andthe34thInfantryDivisionBand,MinnesotaArmyNationalGuard,astheU.S.Division-SouthBand.The34thInfantryDivisionBandwillbereplacedbythe1stInfantryDivisionBandfromFortRiley,Kansas.

In2004,elementsofthe25thInfantryDivisionBandprovidedinterimbandsupporttoU.S.forcesinAfghani-stan.In2005,elementsofthe10thMountainDivisionBanddidthesame.ArmybandshavehadapermanentpresenceinAfghanistaninsupportofOEFsince2006.Leadingthewayin2006wasthe10thMountainDivi-sionBand.After12months,itwasrelievedbythe82dAirborneDivisionBand,whichwassubsequentlyrelievedin2008bythe101stAirborneDivisionBand.The82dreturnedthefavorandrelievedthe101stin2009andiscurrentlyonstation.

TheArmyBandMissionArmybandsinIraqandAfghanistanhavethe

opportunitytoaccomplishtheircoremission:toprovidemusicthroughoutthespectrumofmilitaryoperationstoinstillinourforcesthewilltofightandwin,fosterthesupportofourcitizens,andpromoteournationalinter-estsathomeandabroad.

Divisionandcorpscommandersandbandcommand-ersmustconsiderusingArmybandsinastrategicratherthaninanoperationalortacticalsense.Bandsinafor-wardtheaterprovidemorale-supportperformancesforU.S.forces.Theyalsohaveauniqueabilitytoinfluencethefutureofthepeopleandnationtowhichtheyaredeployed.Armybandscanalsoinfluencethefuturerela-tionshipsamongU.S.citizensandtheU.S.Governmentandthecitizensandgovernmentsofothercountries.ThenumberofmissedopportunitiestoemployArmybandsinthismannerisincalculable.Armybandsdeployforonereason:toprovidemusicsupportforthecommand-er’sstrategicvision.

TypesofBandSupportDeployedArmybandsprovideseveraldifferenttypes

ofsupport.Theseincludestrategicoutreach,forcesup-port,familysupport,publicdiplomacy,communityrela-tions,education,andrecruiting.

Strategic outreach. Asstrategicoutreach,deployedArmyBandsprovidelivemusicinvirtuallyeverygenre,includingmodernrock,rock-and-rollclassics,swing,countryandwestern,salsa,martial,classical,traditionalAmericana,patriotic,andceremonialmusic.

Force support. Armybandsintheaterhavesup-portedbirthdaycelebrationsoftheMarineCorps,Navy,andAirForce,inadditiontotheArmy’sbirth-day.DeployedArmybandshavealsosupportedArmy

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The 1st Armored Division Band performs songs during Operation Iron Tuba for the people of Balad, Iraq. (Photo by SGT Kani Ronningen)

MAY–jUNE 2010 55

branchcelebrations,unitorganizationaldays,andcoalitionforceactivities,includingtheAustraliaandNewZealandArmyCorps[ANZAC]DayandtheBritishRemembranceDayobservances.Alltradition-alU.S.holidaysaresupportedinmultipleiterationsbythevarioustheatercommandsandorganizations.ArmybandmembershaveevenparticipatedinthesupportofAmericancitizennaturalizationceremo-nies.Armybandsalsosupportmemorialceremoniesforfallencomrades.

Family support.Throughtoday’sadvancedtechnol-ogies,alldeployedArmybandscontributetofamilysupport.ExamplesincluderecordingaudioandvideomusicalselectionstobeairedatimportanteventsathomestationandwebcastingChristmasconcertsfromIraqinrealtime.

Public diplomacy. DeployedArmybandshavepro-videdprofessionalmusicinsupportoftheembassiesoftheUnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdomattheirhomesitesaswellasattheirsatellitelocations.NotonlyhaveArmybandsdirectlysupportedtheoperationalanddip-lomaticmissionsoftheembassies,buttheyalsohaveprovidedmorale-supportperformancesforDepartmentofStateemployees.ArmybandsupportoftheseStateDepartmentmissionsrangesfromhigh-visibilityeventsfordignitariestoquiet,behind-the-scenesevents.

Community relations.Whiledeployed,Armybandmembersparticipateinanumberofactivitiesthatfosterthesupportofthehostnation’scitizensandpromoteU.S.nationalinterests.Theseactivitiesensurethatthefuturerelationshipsamongourcitizens,governments,andcultureshavememorableandpositivefounda-tions.CommunityoutreachcanbeassophisticatedasadvancedmusicclassesatlocalschoolsoffineartsorassimpleasteachingahandfulofBoyScoutsandGirlScoutstoplayrecorders.

Education. EverythingArmybandsdoisrelatedtoeducation.Notonlyaretheyengagedinthemusiceducationofhost-nationyouthandadults,buttheyalsoeducatetheirownforcesonwhatthebandbringstothefight.Allbandmembersshouldeducateleadersonhowtousetheband’suniquecapabilitytodirectlyenhancethemissionor,throughmoraleperformances,indirectlyenhancethemissionbyrejuvenatingthemilitaryper-sonnelthroughmusic.

Recruiting. Inacombattheater,recruitingmayseemlikeanunusualmissioninanunusualvenue.AnyArmybandleaderwhohasbeenaroundawhileknowsthatourforceshavemuchuntappedmusicaltalentthatgoesunnoticed.Whilebandsusuallydonotactivelyrecruitinacombattheater,potentialArmybandsmenoftencometothebandleaderwithinterestintheArmybandprogram.Thismaybeduetobandshavingmuchmoredirectcontactandinteractionwithforcesinacombat

theaterthanwedoinacontinentalUnitedStatesgar-risonenvironment.

TransportationArrangingfortransportationisaconstantmission

challenge.Withtheexceptionofbuglersupportformemorialceremonies,routinebandmissionsarealowpriorityforaviationassets.Travelingbyairplaneisgenerallynotaproblem.However,travelingbyheli-copterorgroundtransportationcanbeasignificantlogisticschallenge.

Armybandmemberswouldliketotakeeverythingtheyownoneverymission,butwhenusinghelicop-tersandevensomegroundtransportation,theloadmustbekeptsmallandlight.Fifteenhundredpoundsofequipmentisaboutthelimit.Beforetheadventofmine-resistantambush-protected(MRAP)vehicles,bandsfacedthechallengeofmovingabrassquintetbyup-armoredhigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehicle(HMMWV)convoy.AHMMWVsimplyhasnoplacetoputatubainaroadcase.Now,withtheadventofvariousiterationsofMRAPsandup-armoredlightmediumtacticalvehicles,movingabandbyconvoyislessofachallenge.

InstrumentMaintenanceAnotherchallengeismaintainingmusicalinstruments

whiledeployed.Maintenanceofmusicalinstrumentsabovetheuserlevelisnonexistentintheaterunlessthebandhasanoncommissionedofficertrainedtoaccom-plishthistask.Bandpersonnelareprohibitedfromper-forminginstrumentmaintenancetasksforwhichtheyhavenotbeenadequatelytrained.Anamateurefforttorepairaninstrumentcouldresultinpermanentdamagetoitsprecisionmechanisms.

Instrumentrepairisamastercraftthattakesyearstolearn.Trainingopportunitiesareavailableandrangeinintensityfromafewdaysatamilitaryrepairfacilitytoayearatonlyafewcollegesinthecountry.Mostcivilian

The 1st Armored Division Band’s strategic support mission includes performing for the local community. (Photo by SGT Kani Ronningen)

56 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

instrumentrepairtechnicianslearntheold-fashionedway:throughapprenticeshipwithamastercraftsman.

Armyleaderssupportingbandsmustensurethatadequatefacilitiesandresourcesareprovidedforthebandtoconductapreventivemaintenanceprogram.Thisincludesinstrumentrepairkitsauthorizedbythemodificationtableoforganizationandequipment,acleanworkingenvironment,adeepsinkforwashingoutbrassinstruments,plentyofmaintenancesupplies,andadditionalequipmentandsuppliesasdeterminedbythebandcommander.

Bandleadersatalllevelsmustensurethatpropercareistakenandmaintenanceperformedtopreventprematureagingofinstruments.Inevitably,manymusi-calinstrumentsaredamagedbeyondrepairbyexcessivewearandtearinaperformanceenvironmentforwhichprofessionalmusicalinstrumentswereneverintended—thedeployedtheater.Bandleadersmustplanforinstru-mentrepairandreplacementthroughtheresetprocess.ThisprocesshasbeenverychallengingforArmybandssinceallmusicalinstrumentsandmusicalsupportequipmentarecommercialoff-the-shelfproducts.

ResetTheArmyForceGenerationprocess,asthepar-

entplanofreset,shouldbemodifiedforArmybandsbecausebandinstrumentsmustberepairedorrefur-bishedquicklyafterredeployment.Armybandmembersmustbewithouttheirmusicalinstrumentsfortheshort-esttimepossibleforseveralreasons.

Theabilitytopracticeisthemostcriticalreasonthatbandmembersmustkeeptheirequipmentwiththem.Withoutcontinualpractice,musiciansquicklylosetheirhighlyperishableindividualandcollectivemusi-calskills.Aswithanyphysicalrequirement,thelonger

onedoesnotexercisespecificmusclegroupsorskills,thelongeritwilltaketoregainthoseskills.ForArmybandmembers,thoseskillsarespecificallyestablishedanddelineatedbyregulationandassessedbybandcom-manders.Onceindividualskillsareregainedtostandard,collectivetrainingcanbegin.

AnothercriticalreasonthatbandmembersmusthavetheirequipmentwhentheyredeployisthatArmybandmissionrequirementsanddemandsforArmybandpar-ticipationdonotdecreaseafterredeployment.Actually,justtheoppositeistrue.Followingredeployment,Armybandsaremoreindemandbytheircommandandotherorganizationsthattheynormallysupport.

Forthesetworeasons,aredeployedArmyband’smusicalinstrumentsandsupportequipmentmustberepairedorreplacedasquicklyaspossible.Bandswiththeforesighttoidentifymusicalinstrumentstoreplacebeforeredeploymentshoulddosowhiletheunitisstilldeployed.Thiswillensuremissioncapabilityaftertheirreturn.

DoctrineDoctrineonhowArmybandsshouldbeemployedis

sometimesmisinterpreted.Armybandcommandersareexpertsinallbandmatters,includingemploymentoftheirbands.ByArmydoctrine,ArmybandoperationsisahumanresourcescorecompetencythatrequirestheG–1’sattention.Inbothagarrisonandadeployedenvironment,theG–1ordeployedC–1ofacommandresponsibleforanArmybandmusttakeownershipofthatband.Alongwiththebandcommander,theG/C–1handlesallbandmatters,includingoperations,undertheguidanceofthecommandchiefofstaff.

Armybandsnevershouldbedeployedwithapre-conceivedplanofmissionsforwhichtheyhavenotbeentrained.Armybandscancontributetothecom-mondefenseoftheirhomebase,aconvoy,oraremoteforwardoperatingbasewhenandonlywhenthetacticalsituationdictates.Theuniqueindividualandcollectiveskillsofbandmembersshouldneverbeignored,takenforgranted,orwasted.Armybandsbringtotheareaofoperationsauniquecapabilitythatnootherunitpos-sessesandthatshouldbeusedtothefullest.Leadersshouldalwaysbeencouragedtotakeownershipofthecommand’sbandandtoadvocatesupportingthebandcommanderandbandoperations.

Chief warrant offiCer (w–5) john s. fraser is the CoMMander of the 56th arMy band, i Corps band, at joint base lewis-MCChord, washing ton. he holds a b.s. de gree in liberal arts froM the state university of new york and is a gradu ate of the arMy band seCtion/group leader Course, the arMy band enlisted bandleader Course, the warrant offiCer bandMaster Course, the warrant offiCer ad vanCed Course, the war rant offiCer staff Course, and the warrant offiCer senior staff Course.

Members of the 34th Infantry Division Band perform as the “Red Bulls” rock band at Contingency Operating Base Adder on 14 June to celebrate the Army’s 234th birthday. The Red Bulls are part of the 34th Infantry Division Band, Minnesota Army National Guard. (Photo by SGT Mark Miranda)

MAY–jUNE 2010 57MAY–jUNE 2010 57

heUnitedStates,initsninthyearofcombatoperationsinSouthwestAsia,employsatleastoneciviliancontractorforeveryservicememberonthebattlefield.1EventhoughhalfofthePentagon’sbudgetpaysfortheseprivatecontractors,282percentofthemarenotU.S.citizens.3Onemightask,sowhat?WhiletheglobalizationofU.S.militarylogis-ticsrevolutionizedbattlefieldsupport,italsofundamentallychangedhowdevelopednationsprocuremilitaryresources.Economicglobalizationhascreatedarequirementforstrategicresourcemanagement.AlthoughtheUnitedStatesisleveragingtheinternationaleconomytosupportitsoperationsinIraqandAfghanistan,itisnotyetstrategicallymanagingtheresourceconsequences.OthernationswillmimicU.S.globallogisticstechniques.Whentheydo,iftheUnitedStateshasnotlearnedtomanageitsresourcedependencies,itsmilitaryadvantagewillbeblunted,ifnotbroughttoascreechinghalt.

TheU.S.Military’sGlobalizationofLogistics In1985,theArmybeganitslarge-scaleforayintocontractedlogisticssupportwiththe

LogisticsCivilAugmentationProgram(LOGCAP),4aprogramdesignedtosupportshort-termmilitaryoperations.5Theprogramalsoreducedthetooth-to-tail6ratiooftheArmy.7Strategi-cally,thedevelopmentofLOGCAPisnottherealnewsstory.Therealnewsiswhathap-penedwhenLOGCAPbecameintegratedintoaworldwidelogisticsnetwork.In2003,whentheUnitedStatesbeganOperationIraqiFreedom,thespiralingneedforcontractedlogisticssupportjusthappenedtocoincidewithanexponentialgrowthinthesocialandpoliticalphe-nomenonthatwascoinedthe“globalization”oftheworldmarketplace.8Together,thesefac-torscontinuetofueltheunprecedenteduseofforeigncontractorstoprovidelogisticstoU.S.troopsandallotherU.S.Governmentagenciesintheater.

Bylate2007,over180,000contractorsand160,000U.S.troopssharedtheIraqbattle-field.9Bylate2009,over104,000contractorsand64,000troopssharedtheAfghanistan

TheGlobalizationofMilitaryLogistics

by Major Christine M. sChverak

1JamesJayCarafano,Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat—Afghanistan, Iraq, and Future Conflicts,PraegerSecurityInterna-tional,Westport,Connecticut,2008,p.38.

2Ibid.,p.66.3MosheSchwartz,Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis,CongressionalResearchServiceReport

forCongress,14December2009,pp.10and13.4Ibid.,pp.43–44.5Ibid.,p.43.LOGCAPisapragmaticinitiativewithintheDepartmentofDefensetoreducebothlogisticscostsandtheeffectsofmanpower

shortagesontheaterlogistics.ArmyRegulation700–137,LogisticsCivilAugmentationProgram,statesthatLOGCAP’spurposeis“topreplanfortheuseofciviliancontractorstoperformselectedservicesinwartimetoaugmentArmyforces.Utilizationofciviliancontractorsinatheaterofoperationwillreleasemilitaryunitsforothermissionsorfillshortfalls.ThisprovidestheArmywithanadditionalmeanstoadequatelysupportthecurrentandprogrammedforce.Specificadvancedacquisitionplanningobjectivesareasfollows:a.Resolvethecombatsupportandcombatservicesupportunitshortfallsrepresentedinoperationsplans(OPLANS)andintheArmyprogram.b.Considerconversionofexistingsupportunitsbaseduponavailabilityofcontractsupportinwartime.c.ProviderapidcontractingcapabilityforcontingenciesnotcoveredbyglobalOPLANS.d.Provideforcontractaug-mentationincontinentalUnitedStates(CONUS)duringmobilization.”

6Tooth-to-tailisametaphorfortheideaofallocatingpersonnelandresourcestothefighters(theteeth)whilereducingmilitarypersonnelandresourcesallocatedtothesupplyline(thetail).Facingbudgetshortfalls,theideaistokeepaleanArmybyresourcingprimarilythewarfighters.WithLOGCAP,theArmyisabletomeetthedemandforlogisticssupportincontingencieswithoutcarryinglargelogisticscapabilityasaninhousemilitaryfunctioninpeacetime.

7LOGCAPtook7yearstoimplementanddidnottrulybecomearealityuntil1992whenBrown&RootServices(nowKBR)wonthefirstcon-tracttoprovidesupporttoU.S.forcesinSomalia.Carafano,pp.43–44.

8Globalizationis“thedevelopmentofanincreasinglyintegratedglobaleconomymarkedespeciallybyfreetrade,freeflowofcapital,andthetap-pingofcheaperforeignlabormarkets.”Merriam-Webster’sOnlineDictionary,<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/globalization>,accessedon25February2010.ThewebpagefortheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophydiscussesglobalizationasa“fundamental[change]inthespatialandtemporalcontoursofsocialexistence....Asthetimenecessarytoconnectdistinctgeographicallocationsisreduced,distance[iscompressed]...[such]thatalterationsinhumanity’sexperiencesofspaceandtimeareworkingtounderminetheimportanceoflocalandevennationalboundaries.”(WilliamScheuerman,“Globalization,”StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,21June2002,<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/globalization>,accessedon25February2010.

9T.ChristianMiller,“ContractorsOutnumberTroopsinIraq,”The Los Angeles Times,4July2007.AstheUnitedStatesdrawsdown,thesenum-bersaredecreasing.Inlate2009,theUnitedStateshadover113,000contractorsand130,000troopsinIraq—aratioof.87to1.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS

HEADLINES

WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT

COMMENTARY

FOCUS

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58 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

battlefield—aratioof1.63to1.10Buttheincreaseinbattlefieldcontractorsisnotthemostimportantaspectofthisglobalizationphenomenon.Realinsightcomesfromexaminingthecontractoremployees’countriesoforigin.

In2007,contractorsinIraqcomprisedroughly21,000Americans,43,000foreigncontractors,and118,000Iraqis.11In2007,7ofthetop10corporationsdoingbusinesswiththeU.S.GovernmentinIraqwerenotevenU.S.companies.12Bylate2009,contractorsinAfghanistancomprisedroughly9percentU.S.employ-ees,16percentthird-countrynationals,and75percentlocalnationals.13

UnplannedMilitaryOrganizationalChangeBychoosingtohireforeignlogisticscontractors,the

UnitedStatesstrategicallyaltereditsnationallogisticssystemfromaprimarilyclosed,state-basedorgani-zationalsystemtoaprimarilyopen,non-state-based

organizationalsystem.14Historically,theUnitedStatesandmostnation-stateshaveprocuredwarresourcesfromwithintheirownborders.RearAdmiralHenryE.Ecclesdescribedthepost-WorldWarII-eraorga-nizationalsysteminhisseminalbook,Logistics in the National Defense.15Inhisbook,Ecclesdescribeda“closedorganizationalsystem”reflectingwhathecalledthe“nationallogisticsbridge.”(Seefigureatleft.)

ThenationallogisticsbridgefocusedentirelyontheUnitedStates.Itportrayedstrategiclogis-

ticsfromitsgenesisintheU.S.economy,movingontotheproductionofdefensearticlesintheUnitedStates,andendingwiththedistributionofthosedefensearticlestoatheaterofwar.ForEccles,strategiclogis-ticsstartswiththeU.S.economy’sfundamentalnaturalelements:people,rawmaterials,location,andnaturalresources.16

Today,manyeconomistswouldfindtheseelementstobesimilartothefactorsofproduction.17Eccleswrotethatthefundamentalnaturalelementscreateabasicnaturaleconomy,whichinturngeneratesagrossnationalprod-uct(GNP).18PartoftheGNPisthenextractedthroughtaxesandusedtohireU.S.companiestoproducedefensearticles.ThedefensearticlesarethentransportedsomedistancefromtheUnitedStatestothetheaterofwar,wheretheyareprovidedtoservicemembers.

Lookingtoorganizationaltheory,onecanviewEccles’logisticsbridgethroughthelensoftheresourcedependenceperspective(RDP).TheRDP,

Gross National Product(Defense Needs: Men, Materiel, Facilities, Services)

21 3

Department of Defense

Functional commands

and regional commands

Ground

Sea

Air

Jointcommands

CivilDefense

Essential Civilian Needs

Basic National Economy

1: People, raw materials, and geography2: Political social system3: Education, science and technology,

industry, skilled and unskilled labor4: Agriculture, manufacturing,

transportation

The fundamental natural elements (1)create a basic national economyconsisting of the other three elements of the economy (2, 3, and 4).

4

NationalGovernment Tactical commands

And tactical forces

FundamentalNatural Elements

Civilian surplus(Non-essentials that could be diverted to a military e�ort by reductions in standards of living.)

10Ibid.11Ibid.12Ibid.(Pleasenotethatthislistdoesnotincludethediversenationalityofallthesubcontractorsinvolved.)Inlate2009,contractorsinIraqcomprised26percentU.S.employees,

47percentthird-countrynationals,and26percentIraqis.13MosheSchwartz,p.13.14Thedifferencebetweenanopenandclosedorganizationalsystemliesintheenvironmentthattheorganizationreliesontogetitsinputsinordertoproduceanoutput.Aclosed

organizationalsystemdependsonitsowninnerenvironmenttogetitsinputs,ignoringitssurroundings.Itisimpervioustonewexternalinputs,eveniftheinputsarethere.Anopenorganizationalsystemdependsoninnerandexteriorinputstoproduceanoutputorresult.Itadaptstonewexternalinputsbyrapidlyintegratingtheinputintoitsoutput.(MaryJoHatch, Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives, OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,1997,pp.78–79.)

15HenryE.Eccles,Logistics in the National Defense,TheStackpoleCompany,Harrisburg,Pennsylvania,1959,pp.54–55.16Ibid.17CampbellR.McConnellandStanleyL.Brue,Economics,13thed.,McGraw-Hill,Inc.,NewYork,1996,pp.22–23andG-10.Factorsofproductionareacountry’seconomic

resources—itsland(includingallnaturalresources),capital(includingallmanufacturedaidstoproductionliketools,machinery,equipment,factories,transportation,anddistributionfacilities),labor,andentrepreneurialability.

18Grossnationalproductis“thetotalmarketvalueofallfinalgoodsandservicesproducedannuallybyland,labor,andcapitalandentrepreneurialtalentsuppliedbyAmericanresidents,whetherthoseresourcesarelocatedintheUnitedStatesorabroad.”Ontheotherhand,grossdomesticproductrefersto“thetotalmarketvalueofallfinalgoodsandser-vicesproducedannuallywithintheboundariesoftheUnitedStates,whetherbyAmericanorforeign-suppliedresources.Finalgoodsare“goodswhichhavebeenpurchasedforfinaluseandnotforresaleorfurtherprocessingormanufacturing(duringtheyear).”(McConnellandBrue,pp.G-13andG-11).

This chart represents Henry Eccles’ national logistics bridge. Eccles wrote that the fundamental natu-ral elements create a basic natural economy, which in turn generates a gross national product.

MAY–jUNE 2010 59

developedbyJeffreyPfefferandGeraldR.Salancik,isatheorythat“emphasizesthepointthattheenvironmentisapowerfulconstraintonorganizationalaction.”19

UsingtheRDPtheorytoanalyzeEccles’logisticsbridge,theNation’sabilitytowagewarislimitedbyitsresourceenvironment—itsownfundamentalnatu-ralelements.Underthisclosed-systemmodel,theUnitedStatescanonlywagewartotheinsularlimitsofitspeople,itsindustrialcapacity,andmostimpor-tantly,itsGNP.

Eccles’systemisaclosedorganizationalsystembecausedefenseneedsaremetfromelementsorresourc-esthatareassumedtocomefromwithinthecountryitself.Thisresultsinarelativelystableandsomewhatmechanisticsystemsviewofthelogisticsbridge.(Seefigureattopleft.)Ecclesnotesthatthissystemisregen-erativeinthattheproductionofallthedefenseneedsinsidetheUnitedStatesfuelsanincreasedGNPovertime.

ThisisEccles’logic:TheU.S.Government,throughGovernmentprocurementactivities,returnspartoftheGNPbacktoU.S.businessesintheUnitedStatesbycontractingforgoodsorservices.TheU.S.businessesusethatmoneytobuildoroptimizeexistingindustrialinfrastructureandcapacity,producegoodsforthemili-taryeffort,andpayU.S.workers.

ThoseU.S.businessesandtheirworkersthenpaytaxesthatgeneratemoreFederalrevenue.Theindustri-alinfrastructurealsofuelsmorecapacityforbusiness,whichinturnfurtherincreasestheGNP.Ineffect,Eccles’logisticsbridgepositsthatalltheenvironmen-talresourceconstraintscanbeexpandedovertimebyaregenerativeGNPcyclethatoccurswhenthedefenseproductioneffortiswithinU.S.borders.20

Today’sOpenOrganizationalSystemToday,however,DODisnotusingEccles’famed

logisticsbridgeinthesameway.Globalizationhasradicallytransformedthisbridgeintoamoreopenorganizationalsystemthatcapitalizesonthewider,globalenvironment.UsinganRDPperspective,theopen-systemviewdemonstratesthatboththeavailablefactorsofproductionandtheavailablelabormarkethaveexpandedwellbeyondU.S.domesticborderstoaworldofglobalizedcompanies.Thesecompaniescanbeprivateorownedbyforeigngovernments.21

ToupdateEccles’logisticsbridge,wehavetomodifythemodeltoincludeglobalization.Today,LOGCAPhasmodifiedthelogisticsbridgebyexpandingtheresourceenvironmentthatusedtoconstraintheNation’sabilitytowagewar.(Seelowerfigure.)

Defense articles

U.S. company and national production

fuels

Gross nationalproduct

fuel

s

U.S. natural elements and basic natural economy (people,

industrial infrastructure, materials, and natural

resources)

Produces money, a percentage of

which is reinvested in the economy

World War II- Era National Logistics Bridge

19MaryJoHatch,Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives,OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,1997,pp.78–79.“ResourcedependencetheorywasmostfullydevelopedbyJeffreyPfefferandGeraldSalancikwhopublishedtheirideasin1978.TheirbookwasprovocativelytitledThe External Control of Organizationstoemphasizethepointthattheenvironmentisapowerfulconstraintonorganizationalaction.Althoughresourcedependencetheoryisbasedontheassumptionthatorganizationsarecontrolledbytheirenvironments,thesetheoristsalsobelievethatmanagerscanlearntonavigatetheharshseasofenvironmentaldomination.”

20 AcriticismofEccles’regenerativeargumentisthatitassumesthatincreasedgovernmentalspendingdoesnothaveanegativeimpact.Forexample,procuringgoodsandservic-esoverseasmayactuallyincreasetheU.S.GNP.CheaperoverseaslaborandproductionratesmayallowtheUnitedStatestopaylessforproductsandservices,leavingmoreresourcesinsidetheNationforothereconomicactivitiesthatwillincreaseGNP.

21OneexamplewouldbeSaudiAramco,anoilcompanyownedbytheSaudiArabiangovernment.

This conceptual diagram illustrates how Eccles’ bridge is a closed-loop system and how it is regenerative in that the U.S. production of defense articles results in a monetary reinvestment in the economy.

Defense articles

Foreign basic national economy and foreign GNP

Any foreign nation’s raw materials

Produces money, a percentage of

which is reinvested in the economy.

fuel

s

fuelsForeign company

Gross National Product (GNP)

fuel

s

US company andnational

production

Defense articles

Produces money, a percentage of

which is reinvested in the economy

U.S. natural elements and basic natural economy

(people, industrial infrastructure, materials,

and natural resources)

Today’s National Logistics Bridge

This diagram of today’s more open organizational system reflects how a portion of the U.S. gross national product is diverted to foreign companies.

60 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

Ultimately,evenwiththemoreopenorganizationalsystem,theNation’sabilitytowagewarisstilllim-itedbyitsoverallGNP.However,thenewmodelsug-geststhattheUnitedStatesisnolongerlimitedtothefundamentalnaturalelementsandthebasicnationaleconomyexistinginsideitsborders.

TheUnitedStateshasexpandeditscapabilitiestoincludetheentireglobalmixofnaturalelementsandforeigneconomies.TheabilitytoproducedefenseproductshasbeenexpandedfromU.S.companiestoanyglobalcompanywiththecapabilitytoproducegoodsorservices.Ratherthanabridge,today’slogis-ticssystemlooksmuchmorelikeaspiderweb,withdifferentitemssuppliedthroughindependentstrands.Thisopensystemismuchmoreflexibleandcanrap-idlyadjusttochangesintheresourceenvironment.

ConsequencesofHiringForeignContractorsThesizeandscopeofthecurrentglobalizationofworld

marketsisunprecedented.Soaretheeffects.Theconse-quencesoftheuseofforeignlogisticscontractorsposebothstrategicadvantagesandstrategicchallengesfortheUnitedStatesinatleastsixkeyareas.Thefirststrategicconsequenceofthisopensystemviewiseconomic.HiringforeigncontractorsdoesnotrejuvenatetheU.S.GNPtothesameextentthatEccles’closedorganizationalsystemsuggests.WhentheUnitedStateshireshost-nationandthird-nationcontractors,theregenerativeeffectofthosecontractsiseconomicallybeneficialtothehostnationandthethird-partynations,insteadoftheUnitedStates.

Onapositivenote,itappearstheUnitedStateshasfoundanindirectwaytoharnessthefreemarketsystemforwealthredistributiontoneedynation-states.Thiscanbealong-termstrategicadvantage.Bycontracting81,000Iraqisin2007,forexample,

theUnitedStatesprovidedasignificantstabiliz-ingopportunitytoIraqaswellasanincentiveforittobecomepartoftheglobalizedeconomy.ThisisimportanttoIraq,theUnitedStates,andtheworldbecauseitcontributestoreachingthegoaloflong-termstabilityintheMiddleEast.Thegeniusofthisendeavoristhatthemoneyneverflowsdirectlyintothehandsofthenation-state,whereitcouldbediverted,squandered,ormismanaged.Itgoesdirectlyintothehandsofcommerciallyorientedentrepreneursandindividualemployees.

Ontheotherhand,becausethemajorityoftheU.S.defensebudgetisnotgoingtoU.S.corporations,theUnitedStatesgetslesstaxrevenueandlessgrowthinitsownindustries.Asaresult,whilethewareffortisnotrejuvenatingtheU.S.GNPasmuchasitcould,theGNPstillremainsthesinglemostconstrainingfactorontheNation’sabilitytowagewar.AsauthorGeoffreyParkerputit,“greatsumsofmoneyarethesinewsofwar.”22

Thesecondstrategicconsequenceofusingforeignlogisticscontractorsisintheexpansionofpersonnelavailabletoanationtoconductwar.Lookingbacktohistory,today’suseofforeigncontractorsonthebattle-fieldisanalogoustothelevée en massethattripledNapoleon’sFrencharmyin1year.Fromabout1792to1815,politicalandsocialchangesledFrancetobecomeanationofcitizensinsteadofanationofkingsandserfs.23

AfterFrancemadeeveryoneacitizen,itbecamepos-sibletocallfortheentireFrenchmalepopulationtojointhemilitary.24NationalismamongthepeoplehelpedtotriplethesizeoftheFrencharmyalmostovernight.Withsomanymenunderarms,NapoleonexpandedhisArmy’smilitarystructure,leadingtoamoremaneu-verableandsustainableforce.25Hislargerarmyandreorganizedmilitarystructureledtomultiplebattlefieldsuccesses—untilhisenemiescopiedhim.

Today,theUnitedStatesfieldsasmallvolunteerforce,butbyprivatelycontractingwithcompanies(notcountries),theUnitedStateshasessentiallyadded217,832peopleinsupportoftheatercontingencylogistics,andveryfewofthemarefromtheUnitedStates.26TheUnitedStatesthenfunnelsthelimitednumberofAmericanservicemembersintokeywar-fightingpositions.

Thethirdstrategicconsequenceisthequalityofperformance.TheuseofU.S.andforeigncontractorsonthebattlefieldhasdecidedlyledtooutstandingbattlefieldlogisticssupport.Onebenefitofprivate

22GeoffreyParker,The Cambridge History of Warfare,CambridgeUniversityPress,NewYork,2005,p.430.23Ibid.,pp.57–58.24Ibid.,p.8.25StevenT.Ross,“NapoleonandManeuverWarfare,”U.S.ArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege,FortLeavenworth,Kansas,2008,p.106;MacGregorKnoxand

WilliamsonMurray,The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300–2050,CambridgeUniversityPress,NewYork,2001,p.67.26ThisfigureisthenumberofcontractorsinbothIraqandAfghanistaninSeptember2009.(MosheSchwartz,p.5.)

United StatesPower

ProjectionCapability

Raw material inputs

Knowledge andequipment inputs

Industrial facilityinputs

Labor inputs

R esource Dependence P erspective Know Where Your Key Resources Come From

The resource dependence perspective illustrates how U.S. power projection capability is dependent on the sources of all its key resources.

MAY–jUNE 2010 61

foreigncontractorsisthestrategicadvantagethatcomeswithreducingthelengthofthemilitary’ssup-plylines.Historically,armieshavehadtoconcludeoperationswhensupplylinesbecometoolongbecausethelinesaretooslowandtooopentoenemyattack.Asaresult,thespeedofanarmy’sadvancehastra-ditionallydependedontheabilityofitslogisticstokeeppace.NobetterexamplecanbefoundthanthedesertexploitsoftheGermanGeneralErwinRommelinNorthAfricaduringWorldWarII.27Theadvanceofhismotorizedarmywasoftenconstrainedbyhisinabilitytopushfuelquicklytohistanks.28

Today,theUnitedStatesisreducingtheeffectoflongsupplylinesbypayinglocalandforeigncorporationstoprovidesuppliesneartheareaofoperations.Mov-ingsuppliesbyprivatemeansmakesthesupplylinelookmorelikeaweb.Privatesupplymovementinitiallymakesitmoredifficultfortheenemytoidentifysupplylines,anditmaysignificantlyshortenthedistancebasicsuppliesandserviceshavetotraveltoreachtroops.29

ThefourthstrategicconsequenceofusingforeignprivatecontractorsisalikelylossoftheU.S.“monopolyoverthetechnologyand[otherproprietary]meansusedtogeneratecombatpower.”30Essentially,globalizationissoextensivethattheUnitedStatescannotcontrolorcontainit.CompaniesunderGovernmentcontractoftenindependentlymovethephysicallocationoftheirpri-vatebusinessesoutsidethecountryorsubcontractwithforeigncompaniestomeettheircontractualobligations.

TheArmy’sfieldingoftheblackberetin2000isagoodexampleofthedebaclesthatcanensue.31AlthoughaU.S.companywonthecontracttoproducetheberet,thecompanyhadtosubcontractwithproductionfacilitiesinChinaandSriLanka.32ACongressionalResearchServiceReporttoCongressnotedthattheDepartmentofDefensehadknownfor25yearsthat

nomanufacturerwascapableofcreatingaberetmadewhollyintheUnitedStates,eventhoughthelawrequiredit.33WhilegettingfabricfromChinamaynotseemtobeabigdeal,itmostcertainlywouldbeabigdealifnomanufacturerintheUnitedStatescouldprovidetitanium,akeycomponentinaircraftandothermilitaryhardware.

Thispotentiallossoftechnologyandotherpropri-etarymeanstogeneratecombatpowertiesintothefifthandsixthstrategicconsequencesofusingforeigncontractors:resourcecompetitioninaglobalsupplychain.Thefifthconsequenceofusingforeigncontrac-torsissimplytheU.S.dependenceonthisglobalsup-plychain.Inessence,theUnitedStatesisprocuringcomponentsforitsweaponsthroughexteriorstrategiclinesofcommunication.34PartsfrommanydifferentsupplypointsconvergeintheUnitedStatesforfinalassembly,muchlikeseveraldivergentunitsconvergeonamilitaryobjective.

DuringWorldWarII,asEcclessuggests,theUnitedStatespredominantlyproduceditsweaponsbymobilizingitsownindustrialbaseandminingitsownrawmaterials.Atthattime,theUnitedStatesprocuredthemajorityofitsweaponsandcomponentsthroughinteriorlinesofcommunicationthattheUnit-edStatescontrolledandprotected.

Thenewgloballogisticsmarketfordefensearticleslookslikeaspiderweb.Eachstrandrepresentsaprivatecompanyprovidingamilitaryresource.Thewebisflex-ible,andthespider(theNation)caneasilyrepairtheweb.However,thewebisnowpartofthewargame,withmultiplespidersvyingforterritoryonthewebstrands.

Thus,thesixthconsequenceisthatasothercountriesmimicLOGCAP,resourcecompetitionwilldevelop(akeytheoreticalpointinRDP).Thisisapparentistwoways.First,asallspidersarenowonthesameweb,the

27WhenGeneralRommelenteredNorthAfricain1941,hefoundhisfuelsupplylinesatethertohis“warofmobility.”(FieldMarshalErwinRommel,Rommel and his Art of

War,GreenhillBooks,London,2003,p.135.)28GeneralRommelcontinuallypushedhismotorizedforcestotheverylimitsoftheirfuel,optimisticallyhopingforresupply.(Ibid.,p.135.)Sometimeshecountedonsupplies

fromcapturedBritishpositions,likeTobruk,Libya,aboutwhichGeneralRommelwrote,“OurvictoryatTobrukhadbeenatthecostofthelastofourstrength,sincefightinganenemywhohadsuperiornumbersofmenandequipmenthadtakenitstollonmyunits.Butnowthatwehadamassedenormousbootyintheshapeofmunitions,petrol,rationsandsuppliesofallkinds,thepreparationofanotheroffensivestrikewaspossible.”(Ibid.)Rommel’soptimisticattitudeonsuppliesinvitedcriticism.Forexample,inApril1941,RommelattackedMersaelBrega.His5thDivisiondesired4daysofrefueling.Hegavethem24hoursinstead.(Ibid.,p.65.)Rommel’sItaliancounterpart,GeneralItaloGariboldi,criticized“thatsuppliestotheItalo-Germantroopsweresolimitedthatnoonecouldassumeresponsibilityforsuchanundertaking,oranswerfortheconsequencesthatmightensue.”(Ibid.,p.66.)WhenRommel’stroopsadvancedonMechili,Libya,sometanksdidrunoutoffuel.(Ibid.,p.67.)Rommeladvancedquickly,tookMechili,andcontinued.Intheend,hepushedhismotorizedforcesover900mileswhilehismainsupplybaseremainedbehindinTripoli.(Ibid.,p.73.)OnesolutiontoRommel’slackofsupplieswastouseupto85percentofcapturedenemyvehiclesashistransportpool.(Ibid.,p.139.)Healsofocusedattacksonareasthathethoughtwouldeasehissupplyproblems,likeTobrukandBirHacheim,Libya.(Ibid.,pp.110and139.)

29Formorecomplextechnology,however,theeffectsarealmosttheexactreverse.30Carafano,p.37.31TheBerryAmendmentrequiredthattheberetbecompletelymadeintheUnitedStates.“TheBerryAmendment,codifiedat10U.S.C.2533a,isastatutepassedbyCongress

in1941that“requirestheDepartmentofDefense(DOD)togivepreferenceinprocurementtodomesticallyproduced,manufactured,orhomegrownproducts,notablyfood,cloth-ing,fabrics,[handtools,specialtytools],andspecialtymetals...[i]nordertoprotecttheU.S.industrialbaseduringperiodsofadversityandwar.”Itwasoriginallywrittentoensure“thatU.S.troopsworemilitaryuniformswhollyproducedwithintheUnitedStatesandtoensurethatU.S.troopswerefedwithfoodproductsproducedintheUnitedStates.”Otherrestrictionswereaddedlater.Therestrictionsapplytoprimecontractorsandsub-contractors.However,“theDefenseFederalAcquisitionRegulationSupplement(DFARS)[225.7002]includesexceptionsfortheacquisitionoffood,specialtymetals,andhandormeasuringtoolswhenneededtosupportcontingencyoperationsorwhentheuseofotherthancompeti-tiveproceduresisbasedonanunusualandcompellingurgency.”(ValerieB.Grasso, Congressional Research Service [CRS] Report to Congress: The Berry Amendment: Requiring Defense Procurement to come from Domestic Sources,U.S.LibraryofCongress,Washington,DC,21April2005.)

32Ibid.,p.4.33Ibid.,p.16.34“Aforceoperatesoninteriorlineswhenitsoperationsdivergefromacentralpoint.Interiorlinesusuallyrepresentcentralposition,whereafriendlyforcecanreinforceor

concentrateitselementsfasterthantheenemyforcecanreposition....Aforceoperatesonexteriorlinesofoperationwhenitsoperationsconvergeontheenemy.”(FieldManual3–0,Operations,DepartmentoftheArmy,Washington,DC,2008,pp.6-12–6-13.)

62 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

marketwilllikelyprovideothercountrieswithmilitarytechnologyoriginallydevelopedfortheUnitedStates,thusweakeningourtechnologicaledge.Itwillalsopro-videothercountrieswithproductionfacilitiesthattheUnitedStatesnolongerpossesses.Butasglobalizationexpands,allthespiders(nations)willhavetograpplewiththestrategicrealitiesinherentinaglobalsupplychainfortechnologyandsustainment.

Second,thespiderwebisalsomobile,movingout-sideanyonespider’scontrol.CompaniescurrentlyworkingwiththeUnitedStatesmayalsoseekbusinessfromothernot-so-friendlycountriesinneedofcon-tractedlogisticsandsecuritysupport.35

AsEcclescontends,acountry’sabilitytowagewarisultimatelyconstrainedbyitseconomiccapabilities,whichmaybemeasuredbyitsGNP.Inlargerglobalconflicts,theUnitedStateswillonlygetthelogisticsresourcesifitcanoutbidalltheothercompetitors.SincemostlogisticscontractorsarenotU.S.citizensorU.S.corporations,theUnitedStatescannotnational-izetheseprivatecompaniesorevenarguefornationalloyalty.Asaresult,warwillbemoreexpensiveandasavvyenemycouldbuyupkeylogisticsresourcesjusttokeepthemfromtheUnitedStates.

StrategicallyManagingResourceDependenciesGivenitscurrentdependenceonglobalcontracting,36

theUnitedStatesmaybeunabletoreturntoEccles’closedsystem,wherealltherawmaterialsforproductionareproducedsolelyintheUnitedStates.However,theUnitedStatescanlooktotheRDPtheoryforconceptualideasonhowtolessentheriskofitsglobalsupplychain.

First,theUnitedStatesmustidentifythekeypowerdependencerelationshipsitmaintainswithitsfragileglobalsupplyproviders.37Thenextkeystepistoiden-tifyanyrelationshipsthatinterferewiththeresourceexchangebetweentheUnitedStatesandtheforeigncontractors.38Thebasicideaistoestablishcountervail-ingsourcestooffsetthepotentialpowerofasingleresourceprovider.39

Inthecorporateworld,forexample,Company1maydependonCompany2forrawmaterialsneededforitsmanufacturingprocess.BecauseCompany1reliesonCompany2,itwouldseektodiluteCompany2’sstrengthbyincreasingitsnumberofsimilarsuppli-ers,buyingoutCompany2,orperhapsworkingoutanarrangementtohaveavoteonCompany2’sboardof

directors.40ProponentsoftheRDPnotethat“manag-ingresourcedependencerequirescarefuldefinitionandmonitoringoftheenvironment.Italsocallsforimagina-tionwithrespecttobalancingthepowerofothersbydevelopingthepowerofyourownorganization.”41

Justasprivatecompaniesmanagetheirresourcedependencies,theUnitedStatesmustidentifyandmanageitsglobalizedresourcedependencies.Today,theUnitedStatesdoesthisinaveryreactivemanner.Forthemostpart,theNationjustidentifiessupplyproblemswhenacriticalresourceissueisalreadyhavingadetrimentaleffectonthetroops.

WehavelawstokeepcertainresourceswithintheNation’sborders,butmoreactiveinvolvementisrequiredtotrulymanageourincreasingresourcedependencies.Inthefuture,theUnitedStatesneedsacentralizedadministrativebody(orperhapsGovern-ment-ownedcompanies)withtheproactivemissionofmanagingU.S.resourcedependenciestobalancepowerandprotecttheglobalsupplychain.

Formostofourhistory,theUnitedStatesacquirednationalmilitarylogisticscapabilitiesthrougharathermechanistic,closedorganizationalsystemthatlimitedtheresourcesavailableforwartotheresourcespresentwithintheboundariesoftheNation.Today,globaliza-tionhastransformedtheU.S.militarylogisticssystemtoamuchmoreopenorganizationalsystemwithunan-ticipatedresourcedependenciesonexternalsources.

Althoughopensystemscanreactquicklytochangeandareextremelyflexible,thechallengeistomanageanunprotectedresourceenvironmentthatincludestheentireworldpopulation.Thisevolvedsystemposessomeseriousstrategicchallenges.Becauseoftheexpectedexpansionofeconomicglobalization,futureuninterrupteduseoftheglobalsupplynetworkwillrequiretheUnitedStatestoconstantlycounterbalancesoleresourcepowersamongitsglobalsupplychain.

Major Christine M. sChverak is an aCtive duty arMy judge advoCate and an assoCiate professor of ContraCt and fisCal law at the judge advoCate general’s legal Center and sChool (tjaglCs). she has a b.a. degree in journalisM froM indiana university, a j.d. degree in law froM the university of florida, and an ll.M. degree in Military law froM tjaglCs. she is a graduate of the CoMbined logistiCs offiCers advanCed Course and the interMediate level eduCation Course at fort lee, virginia.

35Thisindustryalreadyexistsamongprivatesecuritycontractors(PSCs)hiredtoprotectgovernmentagencyofficialsinIraqandAfghanistan.AccordingtotheGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,PSCsarealreadyrecruitedandhiredbytheUnitedKingdom,SouthAfrica,Nepal,SriLanka,Fiji,Iraq,theUnitedNations,nongovernmentalorganizations,andeventhemedia.(“RebuildingIraq:DODandStateDepartmentHaveImprovedOversightandCoordinationofPrivateSecurityContractorsinIraq,butFurtherActionsareNeed-edtoSustainImprovements,”ReporttoCongressionalCommittees,UnitedStatesGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,Washington,DC,July2008,p.7.)

36“MostanalystsnowbelievethatDODisunabletosuccessfullyexecutelargemissionswithoutcontractorsupport.”(MosheSchwartz,p.13.)37Hatch,p.78.38Ibid.,p.79.39Ibid.,p.80.40Ibid.41Ibid.,p.81.

MAY–jUNE 2010 63

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS

HEADLINES

WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT

COMMENTARY

FOCUS

QuadrennialDefenseReviewAddressesForceBalanceandContractingImprovements

The2010QuadrennialDefenseReview(QDR),releasedbytheDepartmentofDefense(DOD)inFeb-ruary,isthefirstQDRtomakecurrentconflictsthepriorityofbudgeting,policy,andprogrammingefforts.TheQDR,whichcoversfiscalyears2011to2015,seekstofurtherrebalancetheforceandreformDOD’sinstitutionsandprocessestobettersupporttheurgentneedsofthewarfighter.DODalsowantstoensuretaxpayerdollarsarespentwiselyandthatnewweaponsareusable,affordable,andtrulyneeded.

TheQDRaddressestheimportanceofpreserving,enhancing,andequippingtheAll-VolunteerForceandthecivilianworkforcesupportingit.DODplanstoexpanditsCivilianExpeditionaryWorkforcetoaugmentmilitaryefforts,concentrateonthemen-talandphysicalhealthofallitsforces,andmakethewayDODequipsthoseforcesapriorityforimprovement.

DODplanstoinstitutionalizerapidacquisitioncapabilitieswithout“sacrificingcostandscheduleforpromisesofimprovedperformance.”EffortstoimprovetheColdWar-eraU.S.exportcontrolsys-tem,whichis“hinderingU.S.industrialcompetitive-ness,”andrapidlogisticssupporttoforcesabroadarealsopriorities.

DODalsoplansto“worktoreducethenumberofsupportservicecontractors,inanefforttoestab-lishabalancedworkforcethatappropriatelyalignsfunctionstothepublicandprivatesector.”Withthereductioninthenumberandtypeofcontractorsonthebattlefieldcomesanefforttoreducethecostofcontracts.DODwillbegintoemployfixed-pricedevelopmentcontractsmorefrequently,constrainthetendencytoaddprogramrequirementsthroughcon-figurationsteeringboards,andbetterlinkthecon-tractfeestructuretoperformance.

Ontheacquisitionside,DODplanstoaddandtrain20,000personnelby2015toaddressshortfallsincontractoversight.DODwillcreate9,000newpositionsandconvert11,000contractpositionstoGovernmentpositions.DODwillalsobeincreasingitsrelianceonindependentcostanalysis“toensurethatdecisionsonacquisitionandlogisticsprogramsarebasedonthemostrealisticcostestimatespossi-ble.”Thecreationofnewprogramswillalsoundergotoughscrutinytoensurethatthebestalternativeswiththefewestrisksareselected.

ArmyContractingHeadquartersUnitstoMoveFromVirginiatoAlabama

TheArmyContractingCommandandExpedition-aryContractingCommandheadquarterswillmovefromFortBelvoir,Virginia,toRedstoneArsenal,

Alabama,byAugust2011,resultinginthereassign-mentof79Soldiersand234civilians.

BothcommandswillcolocatewiththeArmyMaterielCommandandtheArmySecurityAssis-tanceCommand,whichwillalsomovetoRedstoneArsenal.

A Leader Development Strategy for the 21st CenturyseekstobalancethedemandsoftheArmyForceGeneration(ARFORGEN)modelwiththeeducationaldemandsoftheforcebybetteraligningtimelinesforcoursesandkeydevelopmentalpositionswiththedeploymentcycle.Thestrategywasdevelopedusinglessonslearnedfromongoingconflicts,assessmentsofthefutureoperationalenvironment,theChiefofStaffoftheArmy’sGreenBookarticle,“TheArmyofthe21stCentury,”andFieldManual3–0,Operations.

Inthestrategy,theChiefofStaffestablisheseightimperativestointegratepolicies,programs,andinitiatives“todevelopleaderswiththerequiredqualitiesandenduringleadercharacteristics.”Theimperativeshighlighttheneedto—❏ EncourageanequalcommitmentbytheArmy

institution,leaders,andindividualcivilianandmilitarypersonneltolife-longlearninganddevelopment.

❏ Balancecommitmenttothetraining,education,andexperiencepillarsofdevelopment.

❏ Useoutcome-basedtrainingandeducationtoprepareleadersforhybridthreatsandfull-spectrumoperations.

❏ AchievebalanceandpredictabilityinpersonnelpoliciesandprofessionalmilitaryeducationinsupportofARFORGEN.

❏ ManagetheArmy’smilitaryandciviliantalenttobenefitboththeinstitutionandtheindividual.

❏ Prepareleadersbyreplicatingthecomplexityoftheoperationalenvironmentintheclassroomandathomestation.

❏ Produceleaderswhoarementorsandwhoarecommittedtodevelopingtheirsubordinates.

❏ Prepareselectedleadersforresponsibilityatthenationallevel.Theimperativeswillguidefurtherchangesin

leaderdevelopmentandensurethattheArmyisabletodeveloptheagileleadersneededtomakedecisionsinanever-changingenvironment.

RECENTLY PUBLISHED

64 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

SustainmentSoldiersSupportHumanitarianAidOperationsinHaiti

SustainmentSoldiersfromacrosstheArmyhavebeenprovidingearthquakevictimsinHaitiwithfood,water,andotherlogisticssupportaspartofOpera-tionUnifiedResponse.EightpersonnelfromtherapidportopeningelementsoftheMilitarySurfaceDeploymentandDistributionCommanddeployedfromFortEustis,Virginia,andarrived2daysaftertheearthquakeaspartofaU.S.TransportationCom-mandteamtoidentifywhichtransportationandlogis-ticscapabilitieswouldbestsupporttherelief.

FortBragg,NorthCarolina,initiallydeployed896SoldiersfromtheXVIIIAirborneCorps,the82dAirborneDivision(AirAssault),andotherunitstoprovidehumanitariansupporttosurvivors.Inlessthanaweek,theseSoldiersdelivered54,738poundsofsup-pliesandequipment,including3,600gallonsofbottledwaterand14,400mealsready-to-eat.Overall,FortBraggisexpectedtodeployasmanyas3,000SoldierstoHaitiinsupportofOperationUnifiedResponse.

The3dSustainmentCommand(Expeditionary)(ESC)fromFortKnox,Kentucky,hadkeyleadersonthegroundwithindaysoftheearthquakeandsentoverhalfoftheESCoverthecourseofamonthtobepartofJointLogisticsCommand-Haiti.

Thefirstgroupof3dESCSoldiersworkedwiththeNavyandCoastGuardtoreopenHaiti’smainport,establishedtwologisticshubsawayfromtheair-port,andplannedfora2-weekUnitedNationsWorldFoodProgramsurgeoperation.The7thSustainmentBrigadehassincejoinedtheESC,ashaveanumberoflogisticsunitsfromacrosstheservices.

The530thCombatSustainmentSupportBattalion,49thQuartermasterGroup,fromFortLee,Virginia,joinedtheseunitsinearlyFebruary.The49thQuar-termasterGroupisprovidingmortuaryaffairssupporttoJointTaskForce-Haitiandwaterpurificationanddistribution,fuelstorageanddistribution,andlogis-ticssupporttotheWorldFoodProgram.The49thGroupSoldierswillremaininHaitiatleastthroughAugust.

Below: Parachute riggers from the 11th Quartermaster Company, 189th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, 82d Sustainment Brigade, prepare container delivery system bundles for delivery in support of Operation Unified Response. (Photo by SPC A.M. LaVey)

Left: A water purification specialist from the 82d Water Detachment, 16th Quartermaster Company, 530th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, provides fresh water in Haiti. (Photo by SPC A.M. LaVey)

Soldiers of the 331st Transportation Company, 24th Transportation Battalion, 7th Sustainment Brigade, 3d Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), assemble causeway sections to facilitate the loading of equipment onto ships prior to departing for Haiti. (Photo by SFC Kelly Jo Bridgwater, 7th Sustainment Brigade Public Affairs)

MAY–jUNE 2010 65

NewArmamentResearchandDevelopmentComplexIsUnderConstruction

TheArmyArmamentResearch,DevelopmentandEngineeringCenter(ARDEC)isinthemidstofdevelopingaFuzeEngineeringComplex,whichwillbelocatedatPicatinnyArsenal,NewJersey.Thecomplexisbeingbuiltinresponsetoa2005BaseClosureandRealignmentCommissionrecommen-dationtoestablishajointcenterofexcellenceforguns,weapons,andammunitionresearchbybring-ingtogetherelementscurrentlylocatedatAdelphi,Maryland,underthesameroofasotherFuzeDivi-sionelements.

The$18millioncomplexincludesrenovationsofcurrentbuildingsthatwillbeusedasofficespace.Twonewresearchfacilitieswillalsobeconstructed:oneforfuzeexplosiveresearchandtheotherforfuzeelectromagneticresearch.Twoammunitionstor-agebunkersarealsobeingbuilt,andsomeoftheunit’sanechoic(soundabsorbent)chamberspacewillalsoberenovated.Thefacilityisexpectedtobecom-pletedbyOctober2011.

TARDECConstructingNewVehicleResearchandDevelopmentFacility

TheArmyTankandAutomotiveResearch,Development,andEngineeringCenter(TARDEC)isbuildingtheGroundSystemPowerandEnergyLaboratory(GSPEL)atDetroitArsenal,Michigan.GSPELwillbea30,000-square-footcomplexhous-ingeightlaboratoriesdedicatedtotheresearchanddevelopment,modeling,andtestingofgroundvehiclesofallsizesandtheirindividualcomponents.GSPELalsowillprovidefacilitiestosimulateawidevarietyofenvironmentalconditions—extremetem-peratures,humidity,andsolarconditions—inwhichtotestmannedandunmannedgroundvehicles.

GSPELwillbethecornerstoneoftheArmy’snextgenerationofpowerandenergyinitiativesandwillincludelaboratoriesforresearchanddevelopmentofhybrid-electricvehicles,fuelcells,alternativefuelandpropulsionsystems,criticalcombatvehiclefuelefficiency,auxiliarypower,andfieldsustainability.

TARDECworkedwiththeSouthwestResearchInstituteinSanAntonio,Texas,todevelopthedemandingequipmentandfacilityspecificationsforthecomplex.GSPELisexpectedtobecompletedbylate2011.

SustainmentCenterofExcellenceNamedTRADOCInstituteofExcellence

TheArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand(TRA-DOC)namedtheSustainmentCenterofExcellence(SCoE)atFortLee,Virginia,anInstituteofExcel-lenceon17February.TheSCoEisthefirstTRA-DOCCenterofExcellencetoearnthedesignation.

LieutenantGeneralDavidP.Valcourt,deputycom-mandinggeneralofTRADOC,presentedtheawardtoMajorGeneralJamesE.Chambers,commandinggeneraloftheArmyCombinedArmsSupportCom-mandandSCoE,fortheorganization’sInstituteofExcellenceaccreditationratingsindoctrine,organi-zation,training,materiel,leadership,personnel,andfacilities.

TheInstituteofExcellenceawardrecognizesorganizationsthathaveexcelledininternalevalua-tion,externalevaluation,andaccreditation.Giventhatthesecondtwoareasarehardtoachievewith-outproperinternalevaluation,thequalityassuranceteamswithintheSCoEplayedkeyrolesinpreparingtheinstitutionforsuccess.Theywerealsorespon-sibleforpreparingtheSCoE’ssubordinateorganiza-tions,11ofwhichachieved“InstituteofExcellence”ratingsfortheSeptember2008toJanuary2010accreditationyear.

SustainmentSymposiumandExpositionTheAssociationoftheUnitedStatesArmywill

holditsInstituteofLandWarfareSustainmentSym-posiumandExpositionfrom22to24JuneattheGreaterRichmondConventionCenterinRichmond,Virginia.Formoreinformationortoregister,visitwww.ausa.org.

InternationalDefenceLogisticsandSupport2010InternationalDefenceLogisticsandSupport

2010willbeheld29Juneto2JulyattheHotelLePlazainBrussels,Belgium.Theconferencebringstogetherover200ofthemostseniorlogis-ticsprofessionalsacrossEuropetodiscussthechallengesandsuccessesofjointlogistics.

Theconferencewillbeginwithacontractedlogisticssupportfocusday.OthertopicsincludelogisticsinAfghanistan,improvingyourlogis-ticsfootprintintheater,andworkingwithcoali-tionpartnerstoprovidesustainableandreliablelogisticssupport.Theconferencewillalsoholdsessionsaboutdevisingadrawdownstrategyandmeetingcost-cuttingrequirementswithoutcom-promisinglogisticscapabilities.

Theconferenceisdesignedforsupply-chain,procurement,acquisition,defensemateriel,anddatamanagementprofessionalsaswellasprojectteamleadersandsenioroperationallogisticians.Formoreinformationortoregister,visittheconferencewebsiteatwww.defencelog.com,call+44(0)207–368–9465,oremaildefencelogistics@wbr.co.uk.

UPCOMING EVENTS

PERIODICALS POSTAGEAND FEES PAIDAT PETERSBURG VIRGINIAAND ADDITIONAL CITIES

ISSN 0004–2528DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYARMY SUSTAINMENTUS ARMY LOGISTICS UNIVERSITY2401 QUARTERS ROADFORT LEE VIRGINIA 23801–1705

Official Business

o SupporttothePolishMilitaryContingento AligningMetricstoAchieveSupplyChainGoalso AmmoManagementInformationSystemsChallengeso TheCorpsLogisticsPlanningandDecisionCycleo Coblenz1919:TheFirstSustainmentCenterofExcellenceo SustainingtheAfghanNationalArmyEmbeddedTrainingTeamo BCS3:TakeAnotherLooko ArmyAmmunitionIndustrialBaseinDecayo WeaponSystemSustainmentSourcingo TheEvolutionofPetroleumSupportintheCENTCOMAORo MovingTowardaMoreSustainableArmyFoodProgramo ContractOversightintheOperationalEnvironment

Coming in Future Issues