STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and Romulo Intia y
Morada
Case No. 219 G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977) Chapter I, Page 2,
Footnote No.3
Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta
Case No. 244 G.R. No. L-26702 (October 18, 1979) Chapter I, Page 4,
Footnote No.14
FACTS: Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with
vagrancy. Respondent Judge
dismissed the case on the ground that her court “has no
jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this
case” without prejudice to the re-filing thereof in the Juvenile
Court, because he believed that
jurisdiction over 16 years olds up to under 21 was
transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of
PD 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful
offenders as those over 9 years of
age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense.
ISSUE: W/N the issuance of PD 603
transferred the case of the accused from the regular courts to the
Juvenile Court. HELD: The Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court expressly confers upon it a special
and limited jurisdiction over “criminal
cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of age at the time of
the filing of the case”. The subsequent
issuance of PD 603 known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code and
defines a youth offender as “one
who is over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the
commission of the offense” did not by such
definition transfer jurisdiction over criminal cases involving
accused who are 16 and under 21 years of
age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. LATIN MAXIM:
35
FACTS: Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of
Urdaneta, was charged with violation of
Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, “particularly, for overtaking
a truck”. Petitioner initiated an action for
annulment of said ordinance and prayed for the issuance of
preliminary injunction for restraining
Respondent from enforcing the said ordinance. ISSUE: W/N Ordinance
No. 3, Series of 1964, by the
Municipality of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is valid. HELD: No. Ordinance
No. 3 is said to be patterned after
and based on Section 53 of Act No. 3992. However, Act No. 3992 has
been explicitly repealed by RA No.
4136 (The Land and Transportation Code). By this express repeal,
the general rule is that a later law
prevails over an earlier law. Also, an essential requisite for a
valid ordinance is that it “must not
contravene … the statute” for it is fundamental principle that
municipal ordinances are inferior in status
3 Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez
Case No. 48 G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963) Chapter I, Page 9,
Footnote No.31
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Astorga v. Villegas
Case No. 23 G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974) Chapter I, Page 11,
Footnote No.37
FACTS: Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin
glues. It sought the refund of the
margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law)
stating that the Central Bank of the
Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange
transactions. However, the Auditor of
the Bank refused to pass in audit and approved the said refunds
upon the ground that Petitioner’s
separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord
with the provisions of Sec. 2, par. 18 of
RA 2609. The pertinent portion of this statute reads: “The margin
established by the Monetary Board …
shall be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the
importation of the following: “XVIII. Urea
formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardwood when
imported by and for the exclusive
use of end-users.” ISSUE: W/N “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt
by law from the payment of the
margin fee.
FACTS: House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of
Representatives to the Senate. Senator Arturo
Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by the
Senate. The House, without
notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all
the presiding officers of both houses
certified and attested to the bill. The President also signed it
and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator
Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House
Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of
the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him
and approved by the Senate.
Both the Senate President and the President withdrew their
signatures and denounced RA 4065 as
invalid. Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding
officers of the Congress is conclusive
proof of a bill’s due enactment. ISSUE: W/N House Bill No. 9266 is
considered enacted and valid. HELD:
Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew
their signatures therein, the court
declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not
become a law. The Constitution
requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance of
having a journal is that in the absence of
attestation or evidence of the bill’s due enactment, the court may
resort to the journals of the Congress
to verify such. “Where the journal discloses that substantial
amendment were introduced and approved
and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President
for signature, the court can declare
HELD: The term “urea formaldehyde” used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers
to the finished product as
expressed by the National Institute of Science and Technology, and
is distinct and separate from “urea
and formaldehyde” which are separate chemicals used in the
manufacture of synthetic resin. The one
mentioned in the law is a finished product, while the ones imported
by the Petitioner are raw materials.
Hence, the importation of “urea” and “formaldehyde” is not exempt
from the imposition of the margin
fee. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 25a
4 Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
Case No. 133 G.R. No. L-7995 (May 31, 1957) Chapter I, Page 11,
Footnote No.42
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the
Philippines
Case No. 181 G.R. No. L-25716 (July 28, 1966) Chapter I, Page 11,
Footnote No.42
FACTS: Petitioner is a Chinese merchant who questions the
constitutionality of RA 1180 “An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business” on the following grounds: a) It
is a violation of the Equal Protection of the
Law Clause, denies them of their liberty, property and due process
of law 2) It is a violation of the
constitutional requirement that a bill’s title must reflect the
subject matter of the same because
“regulate” does not really mean “nationalize” and “prohibit” 3) the
Act violates International treaties
and Laws ISSUE: W/N RA 1180 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1180 is
constitutional. In the abovementioned
case, what has been pointed out is the constitutional requirement
that “A bill shall embrace only one
subject as expressed in its title.” This is to prohibit duplicity
in legislation because the title must be able
to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and
consequences of that particular law.
Constitution precludes the encroaching of one department to the
responsibilities of the other
departments. The legislature is primarily the judge of necessity,
adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and
expediency of the law, and the courts have no jurisdiction to
question this. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a, d
FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dismissing the
Plaintiff’s complaint for the collection of sales taxes from
Defendant on the ground that the law which
authorizes collection of the same is unconstitutional. Defendant
Company refused to pay taxes accruing
from its sales because according to them the taxable sites of the
property sought to be taxed is not the
said Municipality. According to the Defendant, RA 1435 or Act to
Provide Means for Increasing Highway
Special Fund is unconstitutional because it embraces two subjects
which are 1)amendment of the tax
code, and 2) grant of taxing power to the local government, and
makes reference to Road and Bridge
Fund. ISSUE: W/N RA 1435 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1435 is
constitutional because it embraces only
one subject reflected by its title “Road and Bridge Fund.”
Statutory definition prevails over ordinary
usage of the term. The constitutional requirement as to the title
of the bill must be liberally construed. It
should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the
power of legislation. When there is
doubt as to its validity, it must be resolved against the doubt and
in favor of its validity. In the
abovementioned cases, what is pointed out is the constitutional
requirement that “A bill shall embrace
only one subject, expressed in its title.” This is to prohibit
duplicity in legislation because the title must
be able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature,
scope, and consequences of that
particular law. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 37, d
5 People of the Philippines v. Buenviaje
Case No. 203 G.R. No. L-22945 (March 3, 1925) Chapter I, Page 12,
Footnote No.46
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Alalayan v. National Power Corporation
Case No. 8 G.R. No. L-24396 (July 29, 1968) Chapter I, Page 12,
Footnote No.46
FACTS: Defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court finding her
guilty for the violation of “illegal
practice of medicine” and “illegally advertising oneself as a
doctor.” Defendant practices chiropractic
although she has not secured a certificate to practice medicine.
She ‘treated and manipulated’ the head
and body of Regino Noble. She also contends that practice of
chiropractic has nothing to do with
medicine and that unauthorized use of title of “doctor” should be
understood to refer to “doctor of
medicine” and not to doctors of chiropractic, and lastly, that Act
3111 is unconstitutional as it does not
express its subject. ISSUE: W/N “chiropractic” is included in the
term “practice of medicine” under
Medical laws provided in the Revised Administrative Code. HELD: Act
3111 is constitutional as the title
“An Act to Amend (enumeration of sections to be amended)” is
sufficient and it need not include the
subject matter of each section. ‘Chiropractic’ is included in the
‘practice of medicine.’ Statutory
definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The
constitutional requirement as to the title of the
bill must be liberally construed. It should not be technically or
narrowly construed as to impede the
power of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it
must be resolved against the doubt and in
favor of its validity. “A bill shall embrace only one subject,
expressed in its title,” to prohibit duplicity in
legislation by apprising legislators and the public about the
nature, scope, and consequences of the law.
LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 7a, 25c, 37, d
FACTS: Republic Act No. 3043 is entitled “An Act to Further Amend
Commonwealth Act No. 121”. In
Section 3 of the same act, Respondent is empowered, in any
franchise contract for the supply of electric
power constituting 50% of the electric power and energy of that
franchisee, to realize a net profit of not
more than 12% annually of its investments plus 2-month operating
expenses; and NPC is allowed to
renew all existing franchise contracts so that the provisions of
the act could be given effect. ISSUE: W/N
Section 3 is a subject which the bill title “An Act to Further
Amend Commonwealth Act No. 121” does
not embrace, thus making it a rider because it is violative of the
constitutional provision requiring that
“a bill, which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than
one subject, which shall be expressed
in its title.” HELD: Section 3 is constitutional. Republic Act 3043
is an amendatory act. It is sufficient that
the title makes reference to the legislation to be amended (in this
case Commonwealth Act 121).
Constitutional provision is satisfied if title is comprehensive
enough to include the general object which
accomplishment. Title doesn’t need to be a complete index of the
contents of the act. LATIN MAXIM:
24a, 37, d
6 Cordero v. Hon. Cabatuando
Case No. 81 G.R. No. L-14542 (October 31, 1962) Chapter I, Page 12,
Footnote No.47
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Tobias v. Abalos
Case No. 291 G.R. No. L-114783 (December 8, 1994) Chapter I, Page
12, Footnote No.47
FACTS: Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the
Philippines. Section 54 of this act
expressed that indigent tenants should be represented by Public
Defendant of Department of Labor.
Congress then amended this in Republic Act No. 2263: “An Act
Amending Certain Sections of Republic
Act No. 1199.” Section 19 of the amendatory act says that mediation
of tenancy disputes falls under
authority of Secretary of Justice. Section 20 also provides that
indigent tenants shall be represented by
trial attorney of the Tenancy Mediation Commission. ISSUE: W/N
Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No.
2263 is unconstitutional because of the constitutional provision
that “No bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in
the title of the bill.” HELD: Sections
19 and 20 are constitutional. The constitutional requirement is
complied with as long the law has a
single general subject, which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and
the amendatory provisions no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with
or foreign to the general subject, will
be regarded as valid. Constitutional provisions relating to subject
matter and titles of statutes should not
be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede proper
legislation. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 37, d
FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7675, otherwise known as "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized
City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong” because Article VIII, Section 49 of this act
provided that the congressional district of San
Juan/ Mandaluyong shall be split into two separate districts.
ISSUE: W/N the aforestated subject is
germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675. HELD: RA 7675 is
constitutional. Contrary to Petitioners'
assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate
and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city but is a natural and logical
consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one
title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court
so as not to cripple or impede
legislation. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ
in the title of an enactment, language
of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein.
LATIN MAXIM: 20a, d
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Lidasan v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 148 G.R. No. L-28089 (October 25, 1967) Chapter I, Page
13, Footnote No.51
FACTS: The municipal council of Navotas, Rizal adopted its
Ordinance No. 13, section 2 of which
provided that “all owners and proprietors of the industry known as
fishing, with nets denominated
‘cuakit’ and ‘pantukos,’ before engaging in fishing in the bay of
this jurisdiction within three leagues
from the shore-line of this municipality, are obliged to provide
themselves with a license issued by this
municipal government, after payment of a fee of P50 annually,
payable every three months.” The
authority for the enactment of the ordinance was from section 2270
of the Administrative Code. ISSUE:
W/N Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now Section
2324 of the Administrative Code of
1917, is invalid. HELD: Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of
1916, now section 2323 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is valid. It does not violate Paragraph
17, section 5 of the Philippine Bill
which provided “that no private or local bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than
one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of
the bill” because the Administrative Code
is neither a private nor a local bill. The Administrative Code of
1917 has for its title, “An Act amending
the Administrative Code.” It does not violate Paragraph 17, section
3 of the Jones Law, which provided
“that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than
one subject and that subject shall
be expressed in the title of the bill,” because it was merely a
revision of the provisions of the
Administrative Code enacted for the purpose of adapting it to the
Jones Law and the Reorganization Act.
LATIN MAXIM: 37
FACTS: Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790, which is entitled
“An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” as unconstitutional on
the ground that it includes barrios
located in another province, which is Cotabato, violating the
constitutiona l mandate that “No bill which
may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of
the bill.” This question was initially presented to the
Respondents, which adopted a resolution in favor
of RA 4790, prompted by the upcoming elections. ISSUE: W/N Republic
Act 4790 is constitutional. HELD:
Republic Act 4790 is null and void. The title “An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton, in the
Province of Lanao del Sur” projects the impression that solely the
province of Lanao del Sur is affected
by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there
that communities in the adjacent
Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the
people in the towns of Cotabato that
were affected by the law, and the province of Cotabato itself that
part of their territory is being taken
away from their towns and provinces and added to the adjacent
Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the
public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually
affected by the bill. These are the
8 Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Reyes
Case No. 169 G.R. No. 43263 (October 31, 1935) Chapter I, Page 13,
Footnote No. 53
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People of the Philippines v. Ferrer
Case No. 208 G.R. No. L-32613-14 (December 27, 1972) Chapter I,
Page 13, Footnote No.50
FACTS: Respondent executed a chattel mortgage in favor of
Petitioner. He failed to pay some of the
installments. Petitioner proceeded to foreclose its chattel
mortgage. The mortgaged property was sold
at a public auction by the sheriff of the City of Manila. After
applying this sum, with interest, costs, and
liquidated damages to Respondent’s indebtedness, the latter owed
the company a balance of P275.47
with interest. The company instituted an action for recovery when
he failed to pay the deficiency of the
debt. He pleaded as a defense that the company, having chosen to
foreclose its chattel mortgage, had
no further action against him for the recovery of the unpaid
balance owed by him, as provided by Act
No. 4122. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 4122, entitled “An Act to amend the
Civil Code by inserting between
Sections fourteen hundred and fifty-four and fourteen hundred and
fifty-five thereof a new section, to
be known as section fourteen hundred and fifty-four-A,” is valid.
HELD: Act No. 4122 is valid and
enforceable. The controlling purpose of Act No. 4122 is revealed to
be to close the door to abuses
committed in connection with the foreclosure of chattel mortgages
when sales were payable in
installments. The general rule is adopted in this jurisdiction to
the effect that a title which declares a
statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and
the precise nature of the amendatory act
need not be further stated. The proper approach in cases of this
character should be to resolve all
presumptions in favor of the validity of an act in the absence of a
clear conflict between it and the
Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 37
FACTS: Private Respondents were respectively charged with a
violation of Republic Act No. 1700,
otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act. RA 1700 outlaws the
Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) and other “subversive associations” and punishes any person
who “knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member” of
the CPP or any other organization
“subversive” in nature. Tayag filed a motion challenging the
validity of the statute due to its
constitutional violations. The lower court declared the statute
void on the grounds that it was a bill of
attainder and that it is vague and overbroad. The cases were
dismissed, to which the Government
appealed. ISSUE: W/N the title of the act satisfies the
constitutional provision on bill titles. HELD: Yes.
The title of the bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its
contents, and need not recite the details of
the Act. It is a valid title if it indicates in clear terms the
nature, scope and consequences of the
will be read fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the
legislative intent. The Anti-Subversion act
fully satisfies these requirements. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 51d
Case No. 33 G.R. No. L-32476 (October 20, 1970)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People of the Philippines v. Valeriano Valensoy y Masa
Case No. 230 G.R. No. L-9659 (May 29, 1957) Chapter I, Page 14,
Footnote No. 55
FACTS: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA 6132. The
said Act purportedly encompasses
more than one subject for the title of the Act allegedly fails to
include the phrase “TO PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.” The statute
plainly reads: “An Act
Implementing Resolution to Both Houses Numbered Two as Amended by
Resolution of Both Houses
Numbered Four of the Congress of the Philippines Calling for a
Constitutional Convention, Providing for
Proportional Representation Therein and Other Details Relating to
the Election of Delegates to and the
Holding of the Constitutional Convention, Repealing for the Purpose
Republic Act Four Thousand Nine
Hundred Fourteen, and for Other Purposes.” ISSUE: W/N RA 6132 is
unconstitutional for embracing
more than one subject. HELD: No. The inclusion of the title is
superfluous and therefore unnecessary
because the title expressly indicates that the act implements
Resolutions on both Houses Nos. 2 and 4
respectively of 1967 and 1969, and both Resolutions No. 2 and 4
likewise categorically state in their
titles that the Constitutional Convention called for therein is “to
propose amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines,” which phrase is reiterated in
Sec. 1 of both Resolutions. The power to
propose amendments to the Constitution is implied in the call for
the convention itself, whose raison
d’etre is to revise the present Constitution. It is not required
that the title of the bill be an index to the
body of the act or be comprehensive in matters of detail. It is
enough that it fairly indicates the general
subject and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act so as
not to mislead Congress or the people.
All the details provided for in RA 6132 are germane to and are
comprehended by its title. LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 9d, 51d
FACTS: Defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for violation of Section 26 of Act
No. 1780 by concealment of a bolo. The defendant moved to quash the
information on the ground that
the title of the act, which was “an Act to regulate the
importation, acquisition, possession, use, and
transfer of firearms, and to prohibit the possession of same except
in compliance with the provisions of
this Act,” did not include weapons other than firearms, and that
Section 26 violated the constitutional
provision that “no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall
be expressed in the title of the bill.” ISSUES: 1. W/N Act No. 1780
violated the one subject-one title rule
2. W/N it was inconsistent with the Constitution. HELD: No. At the
time of the enactment of Act No.
bills to be enacted into a law and not to law that was already in
force and existing at the time the 1935
Constitution took effect. The provision of Section 26 germane to
the subject expressed in the title of the
Act remained operative because it was not inconsistent with the
Constitution, pursuant to Section 2 of
10 People of the Philippines v. Apolonio Carlos
Case No. 204 G.R. No. L-239 (June 30, 1947) Chapter I, Page 16,
Footnote No.63
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People of the Philippines v. Leoncio Lim
Case No. 210 G.R. No. L-14432 (July 26, 1960) Chapter I, Page 19,
Footnote No.83
FACTS: The People’s Court found the Appellant, guilty of treason.
Appellant attacked the
constitutionality of the People’s Court Act on the ground that it
contained provisions which deal on
matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its
title, such as: (1) a provision which retains
the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance; (2) a provision
which adds to the disqualification of Justices
of the Supreme Court and provides a procedure for their
substitution; (3) a provision which changed the
existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail, and (4) a provision
which suspends Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: W/N the People’s Court Act was
unconstitutional. HELD: No. The People’s
Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own
machinery for the indictment, trial
and judgment of treason cases. The provisions mentioned were allied
and germane to the subject
matter and purposes of the People’s Court Act. The Congress is not
expected to make the title of an
enactment a complete index of its contents. The constitutional rule
is satisfied if all parts of a law relate
to the subject expressed in its title. LATIN MAXIM: 9a
FACTS: In March 1954, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources pursuant to the authority
granted him by Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 4003 (Fisheries Act)
issued Fisheries Administrative Order No.
37. Section 2 of said order prohibits trawl fishing in certain
areas in Samar. FAO No. 37 was subsequently
amended with FAO No. 37 –1. Leoncio Lim, the accused in
violation of said order, challenged its legality
on the ground that FAO No. 37 –1 was contrary to Act No. 4003,
the former having no fixed period and
thus establishing a ban for all time while the latter stating th at
prohibition “was for any single period of
time not exceeding five years’ duration.” ISSUE: W/N Section 2 of
FAO No. 37–1 was invalid. HELD:
Section 2 of FAO No. 37 –1 was valid. Although FAO No.
37 –1 was defective because it failed to specify a
period for the ban, it was ruled that in case of discrepancy
between a basic law and a rule issued to
implement it, the basic law prevails because the rule cannot go
beyond the terms and provisions of the
law. FAO No. 37 –1 would be inoperative in so far as it
exceeded the period of five years for any single
Case No. 68 G.R. No. 115381 (December 23, 1994)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Case No. 57 G.R. No. L-34526 (August 9, 1988)
FACTS: DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 was filed asking the LTFRB
to allow provincial bus
operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above
and below the LTFRB official rate for a
period of one year. LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No.92-009
allowing for a range of plus 20% and
minus 25% of the prescribed fares. PBOAP, without a public hearing
and permission from LTFRB, availed
of the deregulatory policy and announced 20% increase in existing
fares. Petitioner filed a petition
opposing the increase in fares. SC issued a temporary restraining
order to prevent PBOAP from
implementing fare increase. ISSUES: 1. W/N authority given by LTFRB
to PBOAP to increase prices at 20%
instead of 15% is unconstitutional on the ground that there was no
filing for a petition of purpose in the
said increase. 2. W/N PBOAP proved that there was a public
necessity for the increase thus violating the
Public Service Act and Rules of the Court. HELD: 1. LTFRB did not
have authority to delegate its powers
to PBOAP. 2. PBOAP was not able to prove and provide such public
necessity as reason for the fare
increase. LATIN MAXIM: None
FACTS: Congress approved RA No. 6125 entitled “An act imposing
STABILIZATION TAX ON
CONSIGNMENTS ABROAD TO ACCELERATE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES FOR
OTHER PURPOSES” Petitioners expected to pay 4% of the aggregate
value from July 1, 1972- June 30,
1973, as provided in the Act. The Central bank released Monetary
Resolution No. 1995 which states
that: For exports of bananas shipped during the period from January
1, 1972- June 30, 1972; the
stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 6%. For exports of
bananas shipped during the period from July 1,
1972 to June 30, 1973; the stabilization tax shall be at the rate
of 4%. For exports of bananas shipped
during the period from July 1, 1973- June 30, 1974; the
stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 2%. ISSUE:
W/N Central bank acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it issued
Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995. HELD: Central Bank acted with
grave abuse of discretion. In case
of discrepancy between the basic law and the rule or regulation
issued to implement the said law, the
12 China Banking Corp. v. CA
Case No. 59 G.R. No. 121158 (December 5, 1996) Chapter I, Page 19,
Footnote No.84
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Case No. 140 G.R. No. L-14740 (September 26, 1960)
FACTS: Petitioner extended loans to Native West Corp. and its
president, So Ching, in return for
promissory notes to pay the loans. Two extra mortgages were
additionally executed by So Ching and his
wife on July and August 1989. The loans matured but So Ching was
not able to repay the said loans. This
caused Petitioner to file for extra judicial foreclosures of the
two mortgaged properties. The properties
were to be sold/auctioned on April 3, 1993. On April 28, 1989 the
court ruled on the side of So Ching.
The issuance of the preliminary injunction was granted; therefore
the sale of the two mortgaged
properties was stopped. Petitioner sought for reconsideration and
elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals. They were appealing that Act No. 3135 was the governing
rule in their case, instead of
Administrative Order No. 3 as So Ching was contending. ISSUE: 1.
W/N Petitioner can extra-judicially
foreclose the properties. 2. W/N Administrative Order No. 3 should
govern the extra judicial foreclosure.
HELD: 1. Petitioner can foreclose the properties. 2. Act No. 3135
is the governing law. Administrative
Order No. 3 cannot prevail over Act 3135. It is an elementary
principle that a stature is superior to an
administrative directive. Thus, the statute cannot be repealed or
amended by the administrative
directive. LATIN MAXIM: None
FACTS: The decedent is a driver for People’s Land Transportation
Company, of which Petitioners are
manager and proprietor. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission
awarded the decedent’s widow
the amount of P3,494.40, plus burial expenses not exceeding P200.
After 5 years, Respondent, in a civil
case filed by the mother of the decedent, ordered Petitioners to
pay the award plus P500 as attorney’s
fees for failure to comply. Petitioners pray that the decision be
annulled or modified based on Section 1
Rule 11 the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and
prays further that the P500 in atty’s
fees exceeded the allowed fees according to Sec.6 Rule 26 of the
said Rules. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Rules of
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission amended R.A. No. 772 and as a
result deprived the court of
its jurisdiction over the case. 2. W/N the court committed a grave
abuse of discretion in awarding the
P500 in attorney’s fees. HELD: Petition was dismissed. 1. The
Commission, or any of its rules, cannot
amend an act of Congress. Furthermore, the Rule was promulgated
more than 2 years after the court
had acquired jurisdiction over the main case. 2. The court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in
awarding the P500 since the said rule only applies to the
Commission and not the Court. LATIN MAXIM:
30, 35, 46a
13 Grego v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 120 G.R. No. 125955 (June 19, 1997) Chapter I, Page 23,
Footnote No.98
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Case No. 141 G.R. No. L-15807 (April 22, 1963)
FACTS: One of the Respondents was elected for his 3 and final term
as councilor of the 2nd District of
Manila. His qualifications are being questioned by herein
Petitioner, who is also asking for the
suspension of his proclamation. Petitioner brings into
consideration the fact that Respondent was
removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon finding of serious
misconduct in an administrative
case held on October 31, 1981. Petitioner argues that Respondent
should be disqualified under Section
40(b) of the Local Government Code. Petitioner further argues that
the Local Government Code should
be applied retroactively. ISSUE: W/N or not the Section 40 of the
Local Government Code should be
applied retroactively due to its wording. HELD: Section 40(b) of
the Local Government Code should not
be applied retroactively. It is understood that statutes are not to
be construed as intended to have a
retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such
intent is expressly declared or clearly
and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. The
fact that the provision of the Code in
question does not qualify the date of a candidate’s removal and
that it is couched in the past tense
should not deter the court from applying the law prospectively. The
term to be looked at in the issue is
REINSTATEMENT, which has a technical meaning, referring only to an
appointive position. Since
Respondent was reelected, this does not fall under the scope of the
term. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 46c
rd
FACTS: Respondent issued Ordinance No. 24 charging slaughterhouses
in the municipality certain fees
including “slaughterhouse fees,” “meat inspection fees,”
“corral fees,” “and internal organ fees,”
pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 655. Petitioners questioned the
validity or said Ordinance. ISSUE:
W/N Respondent, in the issuance of Ordinance No. 24, exceeded the
limits of its jurisdiction provided by
Commonwealth Act 655. HELD: Respondent exceeded its jurisdiction in
the issuance of the said
ordinance. The Commonwealth Act only allowed Respondent to charge
slaughterhouse fees. When
Respondent ordained the payment of other said fees, it overstepped
the limits of its statutory grant. The
only other fees that would be acceptable were veterinary or
sanitary inspection fees since it was
mentioned in the statute. Incidentally, the court ordered
Respondent to refund the fees with the
exception of “slaughterhouse fees.” One of the rules of statutory
construction is that “certain sections
the parts are not so interblended and dependent that the vice of
one necessarily vitiates the others.”
LATIN MAXIM: 15a, 37
Case No. 85 G.R. No. 49439 (June 29, 1983)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Francisco Lao Lim v. CA and Benito Villavicencio Dy
Case No. 73 G.R. No. 87047 (October 31, 1990)
FACTS: Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of 25,000 sq/rn,
subject of an expropriation
proceedings granted by the court in favor NHA. Respondents claimed
they should be paid the assessed
value of P6,600.00 pursuant to PD 42. Petitioner opposed the
payment claiming that it was too
excessive. He cited PD 464 which provides just compensation not to
exceed the market value declared
by the owner in the amount of P1,400.00. Respondent Judge granted
the payment of P6,600.00, but
Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD 1224 which states that the
government shall choose between
the value of real property as declared by the owner x x x or the
market value determined by the City or
Provincial Assessor, whichever is lower. ISSUE: W/N PD 464 as
amended by PD 1224 determines the
valuation on just compensation. HELD: Courts accord the presumption
of validity to executive acts and
legislative enactments, x x x because the legislature is presumed
to abide by the Constitution x x x. The
Respondent Judge should have followed just compensation in
expropriation cases, that the lower value
made by the landowner should be the basis for fixing the price. The
petition for Certiorari is granted.
LATIN MAXIM: 37
FACTS: Private Respondent entered into a contract of lease with
Petitioner for a period of 3 years. After
it expired, Private Respondent refused to vacate the premises, and
hence, the filing of an ejectment suit
against the Respondent. The case was terminated by a compromise
agreement, and the lease continued
from 1979 to 1982, then from 1982 to 1985. The Petitioner filed
another ejectment suit. The trial court
dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the lease contract
has not expired; and (2) the
compromise agreement entered into constitutes res judicata.
Petitioner appealed to the RTC of Manila
and then to the CA which also affirmed the decision of the trial
court. ISSUE: 1. W/N the continuance of
lease is made to depend upon the will of the lessee? 2. W/N the
action for ejectment is barred by
compromise agreement on res judicata? HELD: This is untenable
because the continuance of lease is not
dependent upon the will of the lessee. On the compromise agreement,
the lease is not for perpetual
renewals unless the language employed indicates that it was the
intention of the parties. On the second
issue, the compromise agreement does not apply because the present
case requires a different set of
evidence. The compromise agreement does not foreclose any cause of
action arising from a violation of
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Case No. 169 G.R. No. L-25246 (September 12, 1974)
FACTS: Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the
authority to regulate JaiAlai from local
governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB). The City of
Manila passed an Ordinance No.
7065 authorizing the mayor to allow the Associated Development
Corporation (ADC) to operate a JAI-
ALAI. Then President Marcos issued a PD 771 revoking all powers and
authority of local governments to
grant franchise, license or permit, to Jai-Alai and other forms of
gambling. Then President Aquino issued
an E.O. No. 169 expressly repealing PD. No. 810 which revokes and
cancels the franchise granted to the
Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation. In 1998, ADC tried
to operate a Jai-Alai, but the Games
and Amusement Board intervened and invoked P.D. 771 which expressly
revoked all existing franchises
and permits to operate all forms of gambling issued by local
governments. ISSUE: 1. W/N the franchise
granted by the City of Manila to ADC is valid in view of E. 0. No.
392 which transferred from local
governments to the GAB the power to regulate Jai-Alai. 2. W/N the
ADC is correct in assailing that P.D.
771 is violative of equal protection and non-impairment clauses of
the Constitution. HELD: R.A. 409
provides that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the
power “to franchise” the operation of
Jai-Alai. And E.O. 392 removes the power of local governments to
issue license and permit. All laws are
presumed valid and constitutional. PD 771 was not repealed or
amended by any subsequent law. It did
not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because
the said decree had revoked all
franchises issued by the local governments without exceptions.
LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 6c, 37, 44, 50
FACTS: Petitioner, an “Iglesia ni Cristo”, was a member of the
Respondent Union which had with their
Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop
provision allowed under R.A. 875:
“Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of
employment for all permanent employees
workers covered by this Agreement “ RA 3350 amended RA 875: “but
such agreement shall not cover
members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor
organization.” Petitioner resigned from Respondent
Union, which wrote a formal letter to the Company
asking to separate the Petitioner from service. ISSUE: 1. W/N RA
3350 violates right to form or join
association? 2. W/N RA 3350 is constitutional? 3. W/N the lower
court committed grave abuse of
discretion when ruling that the Union should pay 500 and attorney’s
fee. HELD: The right to join
associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a
labor organization. Section 1 960 of Art III
form associations for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged. Article 2208 of the Civil Code
provides that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation may be
awarded “when the defendant’s act has
compelled the Plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest”
and “in any other case where the court
deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered”. LATIN
MAXIM: 9a, 40b
16 Tañada v. Tuvera
Case No. 287 G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986) Chapter I, Page
37, Footnote No.159
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Case No. 55 G.R. No. 31025 (August 15, 1929)
FACTS: Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the
disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as
required by law. The government
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not
so when it was “otherwise provided” as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their
approval. ISSUE: W/N the clause “otherwise provided” in Article 2
of Civil Code pertains to the necessity
of publication. HELD: No, the clause “otherwise provided” refers to
the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication per se, which cannot in any event be
omitted. Publication in full should be
indispensable. Without such notice or publication, there would be
no basis for the application of the
maxim “ignorantia Legis non excusat”. The court, therefore,
declares that presidential issuances of
general application which have not been published shall have no
force and effect, and the court ordered
that the unpublished decrees be published in the Official Gazette
immediately. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a
FACTS: The Litigants here compromised a civil case on July 13,
1928, agreeing that if within a month
from the date thereof the Plaintiffs failed to repurchase a certain
land, the ownership would vest in the
Defendants. But when the Plaintiffs duly tendered the amount, the
Defendants appealed that by that
time, August 13, 1928, the time when the Plaintiffs tendered it,
the stipulated or fixed period had
already elapsed. ISSUE: W/N the stipulated period elapsed on the
time of tendering. HELD: No. The
repurchase of the land was made within the stipulated period. The
above issue depends upon the kind
of month agreed upon by the parties, and on the day from which it
should be counted. Article 7 of the
Civil Code had been modified by Sec. 13 of the Administrative Code,
according to which “month” now
means the civil month and not the regular-30-day month. In
computing any fixed period of time, with
reference to the performance of an act required by law or contract
to be done within a certain limit of
time, the day from which the time is reckoned is to be excluded and
the date of performance included,
unless otherwise provided. There is nothing in the agreement
providing otherwise. LATIN MAXIM: 2a,
39a
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Case No. 161 G.R. No. 8223 (March 4, 1914)
FACTS: Plaintiff filed two actions of unlawful detainer to recover
possession of certain properties in
Manila. The trial court decided in favor of the Plaintiff. The
unsuccessful Defendants having appealed in
both cases on Dec. 9, 1920 to the Court of First Instance of
Manila, it is their duty to conform with the
provisions of Sec. 88 of the CCP, as amended by Act No. 2588, in
case they desire to avoid the
immediate execution of the judgment pending the appeal, to pay the
Plaintiff, or to deposit in court, “on
or before the TENTH day of each Calendar month”, the sums of money
fixed by the Justice of the Peace
as the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property
held by them. The Defendants made
such dilatory payments however they failed to make such payments on
or before the tenth day of the
month. As a result, the Plaintiff moved the court to execute the
judgments. The court ordered the
immediate execution of the judgment. ISSUE: W/N the payments were
made on or before the Tenth day
of each month.
FACTS: This is an appeal by the government from an order of the
court, setting aside the forfeiture of a
bail bond. Judgment was rendered against the principal on February
7, and the sureties were notified on
the same day to produce the thereof their principal. On Feb 28, the
court ordered that the Defendant’s
bond be forfeited and the execution issued against the principal
and the sureties for the amount
thereof, and that an alias warrant be issued for the arrest of the
Defendant. By various orders of the
court, the sale was postponed from time to time, and finally
occurred on July 8, 1912, with government
as the purchaser. On July 10, 1912, the principal was arrested. On
July 13, 1912, the court, on
application of the sureties, set aside the order of forfeiting the
bond, and ordered the sheriff to annul
the sale. ISSUE: W/N the execution sale occurred on the date
directed by the court. HELD: Sec. 4 of the
Code of Civil Procedure provides: “unless otherwise specially
provided, the time within which an act is
required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first
day and including the last; if the last
be a Sunday or a legal holiday, it shall be excluded.”
This section is only applicable if there is a
computation needed to be done. However, in this case, there is no
necessity for such computation for
the date is fixed for when the act be performed. It is also
directed that the sale should take place on a
HELD: The payment made on August 11, 1921 was one day late. The
term “month” must now be
understood to refer to calendar month, inasmuch as Sec 13 of the
Administrative Code has modified Art.
18 PNB v. CA
Case No. 238 G.R. No. 98382 (May 17, 1993) Chapter I, Page 47,
Footnote No.195
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Hidalgo v. Hidalgo
Case No. 124 G.R. No. L-25326 (May 29, 1970) and G.R. No. L-25327
(May 29, 1970) Chapter II, Page 52,
Footnote No.19
FACTS: To secure payments of his loans, Private Respondent
mortgages two lots to Petitioner bank. For
failure to pay the obligation, Petitioner bank extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgaged property and won
the highest bidder at the auction sale. Then, a final deed of sale
was registered in the Buacan Registry of
Property in favor of the Petitioner bank and later sold the said
lots to a third party. The notices of sale of
Appellant’s foreclosed properties were published on March 28, April
11 and April 12, 1969 issues of the
newspaper Daily Record”. The date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday,
while the dates April 11 and 12 fall
on a Friday and Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135
requires that the notice of auction sale
shall be “published once a week for at least three consecutive
weeks”. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner bank
complied with the requirements of weekly publication of notice of
extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgages. HELD: It must be conceded that that Article 13 is
completely silent as to the definition of
what is “week”. In Concepcion v. Andueta, the term “week” was
interpreted to mean as a period of time
consisting of seven consecutive days. The Defendant-Appellee bank
failed to comply with the legal
requirement of publication. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9a, 9b
FACTS: Petitioners pray to Agrarian Court to be entitled as share
tenants to redeem parcel of land they
are working from the purchasers where no notice was previously
given to them by the vendor of the
latter’s intention to sell the property and where the vendor did
not execute the affidavit required by
Sec. 13 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code before the
registration of the deed of sale. Agrarian Court
dismissed petitions, stating that the right of redemption granted
by Sec. 12 of the same code is only for
leasehold tenants and not for share tenants, claiming that share
tenancy and leasehold tenancy are
within the jurisdiction of the code – that the code
expressly grants said right to leaseholders only and
nobody else. Moreover, the court held that if the intention of
Congress was to extend the right of
redemption to share tenants through judicial legislation, the
section would have expressly said so.
ISSUE: W/N not the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the
Agrarian Reform Code addresses only
leaseholders and not share tenants. HELD: Agrarian Court fell into
several erroneous assumptions and
premises, reducing “agricultural lessee” to only “leasehold
tenants”. The purpose of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy.
The policy of the State is to establish
would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute. LATIN
MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 11a, 12a, 36a, 37, 40a
Maxims invoked by lower court: 6c, 30b, 43
19 U.S. v. Navarro
Case No. 300 G.R. No. 6160 (March 21, 1911) Chapter II, Page 52,
Footnote No.20
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Litex Employees Association v. Eduvala
Case No. 149 G.R. No. L-41106 (September 22, 1977) Chapter II, Page
53, Footnote No.22
FACTS: They made an oath before an election officer in the
municipality of Piddig (in proceedings in
connection with the general election held on Nov. 2, 1909) that
they owned real property with the value
of P500. Evidence showed that the Appellants, except for Daniel
Navarro and Genaro Calixtro, did not
own property of the assessed value of P500. ISSUE: W/N the said
statute’s true test of property
qualification to vote is the actual/market value of the property
owned or the assessed value thereof.
FACTS: Respondent, Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of Labor Relations,
required referendum election
among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their affiliation
with Federation of Free Workers.
Petitioners contended that there was no statutory authorization for
the Respondent to require
referendum election and that Respondent and the Bureau were beyond
jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N there is
a statute authorizing Respondents and giving them jurisdiction.
HELD: Article 226 of the Labor Code
addresses this. Respondent and the Bureau were within jurisdiction.
Petition denied. Article 226 of
Labor Code is very clear concerning executive department’s
“original and exclusive authority to act”.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 20a, 24a
HELD: It was the intention of the legislator as proved from an
examination of the immediate context of
provisions of the statute defining “property qualifications” of a
voter, and of the statute as a whole. In
the statute, property qualification is an alternative to
qualification based upon an annual payment. Both
qualifications are under a single head, suggesting an intimate
relation between the two in the mind of
the legislator. Another section of the statute disqualifies people
who are delinquent in the payment of
public taxes assessed since Aug. 13, 1898, from voting. This
provision was directed to the case of
delinquency in the payment of land taxes as well as all other
taxes. The statute as a whole (as an
election law) is intended to secure purity of the ballot box. If
the property qualification is actual/market
value, it would be highly improbable to enforce the statute within
a reasonable time because it will be
20 Regalado v. Yulo
Case No. 255 G.R. No. L-42293 (February 13, 1935) Chapter II, Page
55, Footnote No.25
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
B.E. San Diego Inc. v. CA
Case No. 26 G.R. No. 80223 (February 5, 1993) Chapter II, Page 56,
Footnote No. 27
FACTS: Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao, Albay. On
November 16, 1931, Act No. 3899 which
provided for the age retirement among justices was approved. A few
years later, Petitioner became 65
years of age (age retirement as provided by Sec. 203 of the
Administrative Code, amended further by
Act. No. 3899). Shortly thereafter, Esteban T. Villar was appointed
as Justice of Peace to take the place
of Petitioner. On December 17, 1934, Villar assumed office. ISSUE:
W/N under the provisions of Section
203 of the Administrative Code, as further amended by Act No. 3899,
the Justices of Peace and auxiliary
justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act shall
cease to hold office upon reaching the age of 65.
HELD: Justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act will not
be affected by said amendment (Act
No. 3899). LATIN MAXIM: 1, 46a
FACTS: On March 3, 1986, Petitioner instituted an action in the RTC
of Valenzuela against Private
Respondent De Jesus for recovery of possession of a parcel of land
in said area. In her defense, De Jesus
argued that the land in question was covered by PD 2016 (a
complementary provision of PD 1517, which
aims to protect tenants from unjust eviction.) ISSUE: W/N PD 2016
is a valid defense of De Jesus in
upholding her rights as a lessee. HELD: PD 2016 is a valid ground
for De Jesus in invoking her rights as a
tenant. While it may depart from its source, PD 1517, said
provision still aims to protect the tenants
from unscrupulous landowners from demanding a steep price for the
land, as well as unjust eviction.
LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 25a
21 Araneta v. Dinglasan
Case No. 84 G.R. No. L-2044 (August 26, 1949) Chapter II, Page 56,
Footnote No. 29
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Endencia and Jugo v. David
Case No. 98 G.R. No. L-6355-56 (August 31, 1953) Chapter II, Page
56, Footnote No.33
FACTS: Executive Orders, in pursuance of Commonwealth Act No. 671
(Emergency Powers Act), were
questioned for its validity until the National Assembly Convention
of 1942 ISSUE: W/N the proclamations
are valid. HELD: These Executive Orders are valid because they have
been enacted during the time of the
inability of the Congress to function. That when Congress convened
again on Jan. 1, 1942, said
proclamations were also terminated. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 9a
FACTS: RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer
shall be considered exempt from
income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a
diminution of his compensation fixed by
law. While Art. 8, Sec. 9 of the Constitution states that judges
shall receive compensation as fixed by
law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office. Petitioners question the legality of
RA 590. ISSUE: W/N RA 590 unconstitutional. HELD: No. Saying that
the taxing of the salary of a judicial
officer is not a decrease in compensation is a clear interpretation
of “Which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office”, by the Legislature. Through
the separation of powers, such a task
must be done by the Judiciary. Judicial officers are exempt from
taxes on his salary not for his own
benefit but for the public, to secure and preserve his independence
of judicial thought and action. LATIN
MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 24a
22 Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
Case No. 84 G.R. No. L-34568 (March 28, 1988) Chapter II, Page 61,
Footnote No.50
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
CIR v. Limpan Investment Corporation
Case No. 77 G.R. No. L-28571 and L-28644 (July 31, 1970) Chapter
II, Page 62, Footnote No.55
FACTS: Prior to this case, Petitioners contested the adoption of
Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by,
Antero Agonoy and Amanda Agonoy, stating that under Art. 335 of the
Civil Code, that those who have
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children
by legal fiction, cannot adopt.
Petitioners stated that the Agonoys already had a daughter of the
Estrella Agonoy, who is the deceased
mother of the Petitioners, and that the Agonoys also have the
Petitioners as grandchildren.
Furthermore, the Petitioners argued that the adopting would
introduce a foreign element into the
family unit, and would result in the reduction of their legitimes
in terms of inheritance. The Respondent
Court ruled in favor for Agonoy. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent Court
erred in their decision. HELD: No, the
court was correct. In enumerating the persons who cannot adopt in
Art. 335, the children mentioned
therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, do not include
grandchildren. To add grandchildren in
this article where no grandchild is included would violate the
legal maxim that, what is expressly
included would naturally exclude what is not included. LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 9a, 30a
FACTS: In 1959 and 1960, Respondent Corporation filed income tax
returns which later were bases for
deficiency due to disallowance by the BIR. Brought to the Court of
Tax Appeals, the deficiencies on both
cases were decided upon at P26,137 and P7,240.48, resolved at
September 20, 1967 (L-28571) and
December 11, 1967 (L-28644) respectively. ISSUE: W/N the CTA
committed an error in its fixed date of
the payment of surcharges and interests. HELD: The CTA’s decision
on the date of payment of
surcharges and interests are in error. Section 51 of the NIRC
provides the following- On Tax shown on
the return, in failure to pay the required amount on or before the
date prescribed, interest upon such
unpaid amount shall be collected as part of the tax, at the rate of
one per centum a month, from the
date prescribed for the payment until paid, provided that the
maximum amount for the interest doesn’t
exceed the amount corresponding to a period of 3 years. The same
goes with deficiencies, except that
the additional tax must be paid within 30 days of the notice, else
the same interests apply. With regard
to surcharge, if the amount in the notice isn’t paid within 30
days, a surcharge of 5 per centum of the
amount of tax unpaid. In L-28571, the interest shall be computed
from September 7, 1962 to September
6, 1965, at 1% for 3 years, plus the surcharge of 5% on failure to
pay the deficiency tax. In L-28644, from
April 4, 1963 to April 3, 1966, the interest shall be at 1% a month
for 3 years, plus the 5% surcharge.
LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 24a, 26
23 Cebu Portland Cement v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu
Case No. 53 G.R. Nos. 24116-17 (August 22, 1968) Chapter II, Page
62, Footnote No.56
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General
Case No. 260 G.R. No. L-17888 (October 29, 1968) Chapter II, Page
62, Footnote No.57
FACTS: Efforts of defendant Treasurer to collect from Plaintiff
municipal license tax from 1960, 1961, as
well as penalties, amounting to a total sum of P204,300, have all
been met with rebuff. Municipal tax
imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21. Finally on June 26, 1961,
defendant Treasurer decides to avail
of Civil remedies as provided for under Sec. 2304 of the Revised
Administrative Code; he gives Plaintiff a
period of ten (10) days within which to settle the account from
receipt thereof. On July 6, 1961,
defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the Plaintiff
that he was distraining 100,000 bags of
Apo Cement in satisfaction of Plaintiff’s delinquency in municipal
license tax; notice was received by
Plant Officer-in-Charge Vicente T. Garagay, who acknowledged the
distraint. Said articles (the cement
bags) will be sold by public auction to the highest bidder on July
27, 1961, proceeds thereof will in part
be utilized to settle the account. Despite notice of sale, it did
not take place on July 27, 1961 but on
January 30, 1962 ISSUE: W/N the distraint and public auction were
valid.
FACTS: Petitioner seeks a refund from Respondent Central Bank on
the claim that it was exempt from
the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of “UREA AND
FORMALDEHYDE”, asseparate units
used for the production of synthetic glue. The specific language of
the Act speaks of “UREA
FORMALDEHYDE”, a finished product which is distinct and different
from “UREA” and
“FORMALDEHYDE”. Petitioner argues his view, citing the statements
made on the floor of the Senate,
during consideration of the bill before said House, by members
thereof (referring to the Journal).
Petitioner would assail as devoid of support in law the action
taken by the Respondent Auditor General
in an endorsement to Central Bank causing it to overrule its
previous resolution and to adopt the view in
such endorsement to the effect that the importation of urea and
formaldehyde, as separate units, did
not come within the purview of the statutory language that granted
such exemption. ISSUE: W/N
Petitioner’s allegations are valid. HELD: The Act clearly states
“UREA FORMALDEHYDE” as a finished
product and not “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE” as separate units.
Individual statements made by
Senators do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much
less do they indicate the view of the
House of Representatives. If there was any mistake in the printing
of the bill, it should be corrected by
legislation and not by judicial decree. The Auditor General was
just doing his duty, following what was
written in the statute. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43
HELD: Both actions are valid. According to the Revised
Administrative Code: “The remedy by distraint
shall proceed as follows: Upon failure of the person owing any
municipal tax or revenue to pay the
same, at the time required, the municipal treasurer may seize and
distraint any personal property
belonging to such person or any property subject to the tax lien,
in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax
or charge in question, together with any increment thereto incident
to delinquency and the expenses of
the distraint.” The clear and explicit language of the law leaves
no room for doubt. Also, this being a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff must be deemed to
have accepted as conclusive the
24 Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines
Case No. 248 G.R. No. L-26419 (October 16, 1970) Chapter II, Page
62, Footnote No.58
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Case No. 66 G.R. No. L-25316 (February 28, 1979)
FACTS: Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan
with the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-intent of Respondent. They
mortgaged real estate properties to
secure the loan; loan was approved on April 30, 1953. Mortgage
contract was executed by Petitioners in
favor of DBP on March 23, 1954. As of July 31, 1965, outstanding
obligation of the Petitioners with DBP
was P13, 983.59. Petitioner wrote Respondent offering to pay P14,
000 for his outstanding obligation
out of his back pay pursuant to RA 897 (Back Pay Law). Respondent
advised Petitioners of the non-
acceptance of this offer on the ground that the loan was not
incurred before or subsisting on June 20,
1953, when RA 897 was approved. Respondent filed on October 14,
1965 an application for the
foreclosure of real estate mortgage executed by the Petitioners;
Respondent Sheriff scheduled the
public auction after advising Petitioner of the application for
foreclosure filed by DBP. ISSUE: W/N the
obligation of the Petitioners was subsisting at the time of the
approval of RA 897, the Amendatory Act of
June 20, 1953, to RA 304, the original Back Pay Law. W/N the trial
court erred in declaring that the loan
of the Petitioners was not subsisting when RA 897 was enacted on
June 20, 1953. HELD: RA 897 has
clear provisions that expressly require that the obligations for
which back pay certificates may be
accepted as payments must be subsisting at the time RA 897 was
approved (June 20, 1953). While
Petitioner’s loan was approved on April 30, 1953, they only availed
of it much later on March 23, 1954.
The obligation therefore attaches only on March 23, 1954. It cannot
be said that there was an obligation
subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. LATIN MAXIM: 6c,
7a, 43
FACTS: The Petitioner filed a case for mandamus which the lower
court has denied. Petitioner seeks to
overturn the ruling relying on a right that, according to the
Petitioner, RA 2023 grants to them.
Paragraphs 1 & 2 of section 62 of RA 2023 compels employers to
deduct from the salaries or wages of
members of credit unions the debts of the employees and pay it to
said credit union. The lower court
has already granted there is no such right granting first priority
to the loan to credit unions in the payroll
collection. ISSUE: W/N RA 2023 converts KMMRC credit union’s credit
into a first priority credit. HELD:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The
RA Petitioner relies on clearly does
not state the loans shall be granted first priority in the salary
collections. According to Justice Recto in a
subsequent opinion, “it is well established that only specific
legal rights are enforceable by mandamus,
right is doubtful”. Justice Barrera adds: ”… the writ never issues
in doubtful cases. It neither confers
powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a
power already possessed and to
perform a duty already imposed. LATIN MAXIM: 7a
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Alfredo Ramos v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 252 G.R. No. L-41295 (December 4, 1989) Chapter II, Page
62, Footnote No.60
FACTS: Petitioner is the grantee of a legislative franchise to
install, operate and maintain an electric
light, heat and power plant in the municipality of Davao. On two
different occasions it imported
materials and equipment for installation in its facilities.
Petitioner is arguing that the taxes levied against
its imports should be waived by the collector of customs in Cebu
(the materials were delivered at the
port of Cebu) pursuant to section 17 of (pre-commonwealth) Act 3636
(Standard Electric Power and
Light Franchise Law) which states that if any competing company
should be granted franchise more
favorable than the one previously granted to another company, the
latter shall enjoy the same
advantages given in the other franchise. ISSUE: W/N section 17 of
act 3636 applies to the case of
Petitioner. HELD: No. Firstly, the provision cited by Petitioner
states that the franchise must be granted
to a ‘competing party’. NPC, to which the contract with tax
exemptions was given, is not a competing
party to Petitioner. Secondly, Petitioner cannot rely on RA 358 as
amended by RA 987 to support its tax
exemption. Exemption from taxation is never presumed, it is always
explicitly stated. LATIN MAXIM: 6c
FACTS: The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan sued Ramos et al for
the recovery of its 74 hectare
fishpond. Atty. Angel Cruz, a private lawyer and head of the Cruz,
Durian and Academia law firm,
volunteered himself and his firm to serve as counsel for the
municipality. He stipulated in the complaint
that the municipality is obliged to pay them not less than 20% of
the amount to be recovered.
Petitioners move to disqualify said private law firm as counsel on
the ground that it is illegal for the
municipality to hire a private counsel. ISSUE: W/N it is legal for
the municipality to hire a private counsel
in filing a case. HELD: No. Under section 1683 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the provincial fiscal
shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal
thereof in any court. Furthermore, under
section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, the municipal attorney shall
act as legal counsel for the
municipality and perform such duties and exercise such powers as
may be assigned to them by the
council. The municipality’s interest would be best protected if the
municipal attorney handles its
litigation. These laws are implemented as well so as not to burden
the municipality with the expense of
hiring a private lawyer. LATIN MAXIM: 7a
Case No. 47 G.R. No. L- 30642 (April 30, 1985)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Case No. 40 G.R. No. 92163 (June 5, 1990)
FACTS: Petitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees
of Respondent Corporation who died
as a result of a cave-in while working in underground mining
operations. Petitioners, with the exception
of Floresca, recovered damages under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act. However, a later report on
the accident showed there was negligence on the part of Respondent
Corporation. Thereafter,
Petitioners filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent
Corporation’s reckless and wanton
negligence. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners have the right to choose between
availing of the work er’s right
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or suing in the regular courts
under the Civil Code for higher
damages. HELD: Petitioners may sue in the regular courts under the
Civil Code for higher damages.
However, in light of the fact that they have already recovered
damages from the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, if they are awarded a greater amount in the
regular courts, the amount received
from this Act shall be deducted to prevent the instance of double
recovery. An injured party cannot
pursue both courses of action simultaneously. In allowing
Petitioners to sue in regular courts, the Court
stated that it did not legislate in this case but rather, applied
and gave effect to the constitutional
guarantees of social justice. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 17, 40a
FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and charged with the crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murders allegedly committed during a failed coup attempt
from November 29 to December
10, 1990. Petitioners contend that they are being charged for a
criminal offense that does not exist in
the statute books because technically, the crime of rebellion
cannot be complexed with other offenses
committed on the occasion thereof. ISSUE: W/N case of Petitioners
falls under the Hernandez doctrine.
HELD: The doctrine in the case People v. Hernandez remains as the
binding doctrine operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof. The
charges of murder and multiple frustrated murders are absorbed in
the crime of simple rebellion.
Therefore, charges against Petitioners in the information should be
understood as that of simple
rebellion under the RPC. Furthermore, in a concurring opinion,
Justice Feliciano states that if the court
ruled that the charges of murder could be prosecuted separately
from rebellion, then the principle of
non-retroactivity would be violated. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 46a, 48
27 Manikad v. Tanodbayan
Case No. 162 G.R. No. 65097 (February 20, 1984) Chapter II, Page
63, Footnote No.65
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Senarillos v. Hermosisimo
Case No. 278 G.R. No. L-10662 (December 14, 1956) Chapter II, Page
67, Footnote No.74
FACTS: Petitioners were members of the Export Processing Zone
Authority (EPZA) Police Force and were
charged with crimes of smuggling, theft and violations of AntiGraft
Law and Anti-Fencing Law before the
Respondent. Petitioners argue that the power to investigate
complaints of this nature are lodged
exclusively upon the EPZA and is not in the Respondent’s
jurisdiction. Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A states:
“The EPZA in the exercise of its sole police authority over the
export processing zones shall have the
power to receive and investigate complaints relative to violation
of penal laws committed inside the
zones owned and administered by the Authority…” ISSUE: W/N Section
7 of P.D. 1716-A precludes the
Respondent from investigating complaints within the Export
Processing Zone. HELD: No, the use of
“sole” in P.D. 1716-A refers to police authority. Although the EPZA
Police Force is the only police
authority within the Zone, it is not the only authority that may
investigate complaints, especially those
which fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. LATIN
MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 35
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed as Chief of Police in Sibonga,
Cebu. Upon the charges filed by
Petitioner, Senarillos was suspended by Municipal Mayor of Sibonga
and investigated by a “police
committee” composed of 3 councilors created by Resolution No.2
Series 1952 of the municipal council.
The committee came up with an adverse decision subsequently signed
by the members of the council.
This was appealed to and affirmed by the Commissioner of Civil
Service and by the Civil Service Board of
Appeals. ISSUE: W/N Sibonga had jurisdiction to investigate the
Chief of Police Senarillos. HELD: No.
Under RA No.557 the investigation of police officers must be
conducted by council itself and not by a
mere committee thereof. Sibonga therefore had no jurisdiction to
investigate the Chief of Police
Senarillos. RA No.557 has eliminated the provision authorizing
investigation by a committee council.
Hence, the decision against him was invalid, even if concurred in
by the rest of the councilors. The fact
that the decision of the Municipal Council was issued before the
decision of the Supreme Court cannot
validate the action of the police committee. The initial proceeding
was illegal ab initio and the
subsequent reaffirmation of the decision of the municipal council
by the civil service authorities could
28 People of the Philippines v. Moro Macarandang
Case No. 211 G.R. No. L-12088 (December 23, 1959) Chapter II, Page
69, Footnote No.87
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People of the Philippines v. Mapa
Case No. 213 G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967) Chapter II, Page
69, Footnote No.89
FACTS: Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of
firearms in Lanao. Defendant,
admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and
ammunitions, invokes as his legal excuse the
appointment issued to him by Governor Dimakuta as secret agent
shown in the Governor’s letter which
he presented as and evidence. He was granted this appointment for
having shown good faith by
previously surrendering to the office of the Governor a firearm. He
has then been appointed as SECRET
AGENT to assist on the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and
is authorized to hold and carry
in his possession 1 Riot shotgun. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent tasked
to assist in the maintenance of peace
and order falls among those authorized to possess firearms. HELD:
Yes. It may be true that the Governor
has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit but section
879 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides the “peace officers” are exempted from the
requirements relating to the issuance of
license to possess firearms. The appointment sufficiently put him
in the category of “peace officer”
equivalent even to a Municipal Police expressly covered by section
879. Wherefore the decision
appealed from is reversed and the Defendant acquitted. LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 24a
FACTS: Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He
invokes in his defense that he was an
appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of Batangas. He
sought to be acquitted as the case of
People v. Macarandang used the same defense providing evidences of
his appointment. ISSUE: W/N a
Secret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms.
HELD: No. The court held that the law
cannot be any clearer. The law does not contain any exception for
secret agent therefore holding this
position would not constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution
for a crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunitions. Wherefore the conviction of the accused
must stand. The Court’s ruling
29 Co v. CA
Case No. 65 G.R. No. 100776 (October 28, 1993) Chapter II, Page 69,
Footnote No.91
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Case No. 150 G.R. No. L-2934 (November 29, 1951)
FACTS: Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1,
1983 a check drawn against the
Associated Citizens’ Bank, postdated November 30, 1983. The check
was deposited on January 3, 1984.
It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given
by the bank being: “CLOSED
ACCOUNT.” A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage
company against Petitioner. At the time of the issuance of the
check, the delivery of a “rubber” or
“bouncing” check as a guarantee for an obligation was not
considered a punishable offense, an official
promulgation made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner is criminally liable.
HELD: No. According to them, Que v. People should not be applied
retroactively in accordance with the
prospectivity principle of judicial rulings and the operative fact
doctrine. The decision in Que should not
be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of Co and others
similarly situated who relied on the opinion
of the Secretary of Justice. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2a, 46a
FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store
located in the City of Manila and an
importer of flour who sells either to bakeries or to retail dealers
for purposes of retail. Sometime in
September 1948, the Treasurer of the City of Manila assessed
against him the sum of 566.50php which
represents the alleged deficiency municipal license tax due from
him on his gross sales of flour to
bakeries after deducting the sales made to retail dealers for
purposes of resale. ISSUE: W/N the sales of
flour made by the Petitioner to bakeries to be manufactured into
bread are retail or wholesale. HELD:
The sale of flour to bakeries to be manufactured into bread and to
be resold to the public, in the
Case No. 149 G.R. No. 48634 (October 8, 1941)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Central Capiz v. Ramirez
Case No. 56 G.R. No. L-16197 (March 12, 1920) Chapter III, Page 79,
Footnote No.8
FACTS: On September 15, 1941, Respondent granted the Popular Front
Party of Abad Santos the
exclusive right to propose the minority election inspector in the
first congressional district of Pampanga,
and to the Popular Front Party of Petitioner, the minority
inspector in the second congressional district
of the said province. Eleven days later, Respondent modified its
ruling and awarded the minority
inspector to the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos. ISSUE: W/N
Respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion. HELD: Where the minimum number of votes required by law
was polled by a mere coalition
or alliance of minority parties, the right to minority
representation in the board of election inspectors to
which such coalition is entitled, cannot be claimed by any of the
component parties which have
thereafter separated. Respondent shall have the discretion to
choose the minority inspector. LATIN
MAXIM: 36a, 37, d
FACTS: Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner Corporation
for a term of 30 years, a supply of all
sugar cane produced on her plantation, which was to be converted
later into a right in rem and recorded
in the Registry of Property as an encumbrance upon the land, and
binding to all future owners of the
same. The Respondent refuses to push through with the contract
thinking it might violate Act No. 2874,
“An Act to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of public
domain, and for other purposes,”
since more than 61 percent of the capital stock of the corporation
is held and owned by persons who
are not citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States.
The land involved is a private
agricultural land. ISSUE: W/N said Act no. 2874 is applicable to
agricultural lands, in the Philippine
Islands which are privately owned. HELD: The limit and purpose of
the Legislature in adopting Act No.
2874 was and is to limit its application to lands of public domain
and that lands held in private
ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any
manner whatsoever thereby. Jones Law
of 1916: “That no bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more
than one subject, and that subject
31 Eugenio v. Drilon
Case No. 104 G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996) Chapter III, Page
81, Footnote No.20
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People of the Philippines v. Purisima
Case No. 221 G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978) Chapter III,
Page 76, Footnote No.16
FACTS: Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from
Petitioner, two lots. Private respondent
suspended payment of his amortizations because of nondevelopment on
the property. Petitioner then
sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was
registered under their name. Respondent
prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him.
Applying P.D. 957 “The Subdivision
and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree”, the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission ordered
Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate Private
Respondent’s purchase contract over one lot
and immediately refund him of the payment (including interest) he
made for the lot sold to the spouses.
Petitioner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957
saying it should have not been given
retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the
non-payment of the amortizations.
ISSUE: W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will
be given retroactive effect. HELD: No. Respondent Executive
Secretary did not act with grave abuse of
discretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to
cover even those contracts executed prior
to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for
retroactivity in its entirety, but such can
be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. “The
intent of the statute is the law.” LATIN
MAXIM: 9a
FACTS: Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the r
espective Defendant with “illegal
possession of deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree
No. 9. An order quashed the
information because it did not allege facts which constitute the
offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed
to state one essential element of the crime, viz.: that the
carrying outside of the residence of the
accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or
on the occasion of, connected with or
related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized
lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners
argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts
need not be related to subversive
activities and that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized
for reasons of public policy. ISSUE:
W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related
to subversive activities. HELD: The
primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a
legislative measure is to search for and
determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is
the controlling factor. Because of the
problem of determining what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes
necessary to inquire into the intent and
enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the
decree and the stiff sanctions
stated therein. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, b2
32 People of the Philippines v. Echaves
Case No. 207 G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 (January 28, 1980) Chapter III,
Page 77, Footnote No.22
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. City of Cebu
Case No. 4 G.R. No. L-14526 (March 31, 1965) Chapter III, Page 82,
Footnote No.23
FACTS: The issue is whether or not P.D. 772, which penalizes
squatting and similar acts applies to
agricultural lands. The lower court denied the motion and ruled
that agricultural land is not part of P.D.
772 on the basis of Ejusdem Generis (of the same kind or species)
since its preamble does not mention
the Secretary of Agriculture. The order of dismissal by Echaves was
then appealed to the Supreme Court,
thus bringing the case at hand. ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. 772
applies to agricultural lands HELD: The
Supreme Court held the same ruling that the lower court did,
declaring that P.D. 772 does not apply to
pasture lands because its preamble shows that “it was intended to
apply to squatting in urban
communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in
squatter areas made by well-to-do
individu