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SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
1
Strengthen, Prepare, Detect, ReactStrengthen, Prepare, Detect, React(SPDR)
to Mitigate the Insider ThreatPI Meeting
21 June 2007Adventium Labs: Tom Haigh, Charles Payne
General Dynamics: Johnathan Gohde
SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
2
Outline
• Insider threat problem and examples• SPDR approach• Accomplishments in past 6 months
– Architecture and Evaluation– Scenario implemented and working with Mission
Monitor (Demonstration)– Attack planning, attack recognition and sensor
generation (Demonstration)– Prototype DREDs with key features operational
• Plans for next 6 months
SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
3
MI Problem & Examples
• Malicous insider (ARDA Workshop, 2005)– Is in organization: Ames (CIA), Hansenn (FBI), Montes (DIA) – Has approved/necessary access, privilege, or knowledge of organization’s
information systems, information services, and missions.– Is motivated to adversely impact missions by compromising confidentiality,
integrity, and/or availability
• Recent insiders:– Information Week (May 10 2007), Leandro Aragoncillo, career Marine with
a top secret security clearance, served under two vice presidents in the White House (2 yrs) and then the FBI (4 yrs), stole classified information in an attempt to foster a political coup in the Philippines, his home country.
– The Washington Times (April 6, 2007) Richard Sylvestre, U.S. Navy contractor sabotaged a national security computer network at a Navy command center in Italy. A criminal complaint, “would have shut down the entire network that tracks the locations of ships and submarines.”
– CICentre.com (March 7, 2007), Paul R. Hall, signalman on USS Benfold, e-mailed Al Qaeda contact, advising that Battle Group would pass through Straits of Hormuz in 19 days and would be highly vulnerable to small weapons such as RPGs.
SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
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SPDR Solution
Workstation with Embedded DRED Security Processor
(Malicious) Insider
SPDR Reasoning Engine
Inspect EncryptHoneypot FilterProxy
All Network Access controlled by Detection & Response Embedded Device (DRED).
Restricts range of feasible attack plans, hence reducing amount of reasoning required.
Attack PlanRecognition
Mission &ProvenanceMonitoring
Attribution Response
Attack Plan & SensorGeneration
Attack Plan and Mission Models
SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
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Accomplishments
• Requirements, Architecture, Design, & Evaluation– Submitted draft CDRL A003, 13 Feb 07– Added Mission & Provenance Monitors, Attribution Engine
• Improved attribution• Will include in July update of A003
• Initiated collaboration with BBN– Both using Adventium’s network model– Began discussion of integration options
• Defined and implemented evaluation scenario & mission monitor– Carrier-base Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) mission planning– Based on GD tactical SOA– Demonstration today
• Restructured attack plan and sensor generation– Improved efficiency and scalability– Demonstration today– Interface with plan recognition module (YAPPR)
• Operating DREDs– Key functions operational– Several form factors
SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
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Plan Generation
Plan Recognition
Sensor Configuration
DistributedSecurity Modules
Response
Off-line
Online
Per userPolicy
SensedEvents
ResponseCommands
PlanLikelihood
ImplementedResponses
PlanLibrary
SensorConfiguration
MissionMonitor
ProvenanceMonitor
AttributionPlanLibrary
EventTraps
MissionProgress
SignedMetadata
SPDR Architecture
MissionProgress
PolicyDatabase
SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
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Mission & Provenance Monitors
• MM tracks the progress of each mission with respect to its plan– Uses functional dependency and timing model of the mission– Receives mission message notifications from DREDs– Reports mission step anomalies or delays to the PRM
● PM preserves message data & metadata that can be used, if a mission fails, to help identify the cause of the failure and the user responsible
– Receives message information from DREDs
– Stores info in database for use in attribution analysis
SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
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Evaluation Scenario
• Anti-surface warfare using Tactical SOA (TSOA) developed by General Dynamics.
• Carrier-based scenario: threat assessment, flight plan development, hand-off to E-2C.
• Embedded in general network traffic to extend attack surface
• 2 classes of insider:– On carrier network but outside mission– Inside mission
GD Simulation
F18
F18
UAV
E2C
DRED DREDDREDDREDDREDDRED
Server Server User UserUserUser
Expanded Carrier in GD ASuW Scenario
SPDR Plan Recognition and Response
YAPPR
ResponseEngine
SCOAPGenerated
COAs
SCOAPGenerated
SensorPlacement
Plan Generation
Plan Recognition
Sensor Configuration
DistributedSecurity
Response
PolicyDatabase
MissionMonitor
ProvenanceMonitor
Attribution
SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
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External
Networks
Evaluation Testbed – Summer 2007
DRED-1
(Sunfire)
DRED-2
(Sunfire)
DRED-3
(VIA-C3)
DRED-4
(VIA-C7)
Air Ops
Workstation
(Dell)
Strike Ops
Workstation
(Dell)
CDC
Workstation
(Dell)
Intel Ops
Workstation
(Dell)
SPDR
Security
(Sunfire)
Rogue
Workstation
(Dell)Common Server
EMail, File
(HP/Compaq)
FW/Router
Smart Switch
card reader
DRED-y
(t.b.d.)
DRED-x
(t.b.d.)
Non-Mission
Workstation
(Dell)
SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
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3-Layered Plan Generation
X A
B C
D
Y
B C
HB
HC
0xFFBA
AnnotationAP3 (observable)Observable host-to-hostand intra-host actions(very simple plans)
P2 (tactical)Only need detailfor 2 zones(1000’s of objects)
P1 (strategic)Zone level abstract path analysis(100 objects)
Sensor/effector relevant annotations
NetBase Ontology (Class Definitions)Build once, use often, for many networks
Is being used by BBN for CSISM
Test network model with over 20K instances, built using automated scanner
Reduces problem size two orders of magnitude.
Generates all interesting plans in a few seconds.
SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
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Example Level 1 & 2 Outputs
Top Level Goal g1: steal ssh_priv_key_edc…
Level 1, Plan 13 : [e,k,g,h]e: vint(zone_client, zone_wireless, c_wap_service(zone_wireless), credz__J5)g: read(credz_4l5, zone_internal, c_ssh_service(zone_internal), sshd_rexec_exploit)h: read(ssh_privkey_edcfc828b41a41fe12cf476b721bc279ec657b31, zone_internal, c_ssh_service(zone_internal), credz_4l5)k: vint(zone_internal, zone_client, c_smtp_service(zone_internal), smtp_redirect_exploit)
92 Level 2 expansions: ( ( S1 S2 ) ( S3 S4 ) ( S5 S6 S7 ) ( S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 )) ( ( S1 S2 ) ( S3 S4 ) ( S5 S6 S7 ) ( S8 S9 S10 S13 S14 S12 )) ( ( S1 S2 ) ( S3 S4 ) ( S5 S6 S7 ) ( S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 )) ( ( S1 S2 ) ( S3 S4 ) ( S5 S6 S7 ) ( S8 S9 S10 S13 S14 S12 )) ( ( S1 S2 ) ( S3 S4 ) ( S5 S6 S7 ) ( S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S12 )) ( ( S1 S2 ) ( S3 S4 ) ( S5 S6 S7 ) ( S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S12 )) ( ( S1 S2 ) ( S3 S4 ) ( S5 S6 S7 ) ( S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 ))…
S1 : connect(iface(med_gravity_wlan, ip_192_168_13_13), gravity_wap_service)S2 : create_if(con(iface(med_gravity_wlan, ip_192_168_13_13), gravity_wap_service), labs_wep_secret, med_labs_switch2, ip_10_0_1_2)…
Plan 8. : 6 expansions Plan 5. : 92 expansions Plan 1. : 6 expansions
SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
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YAPPR Plan Recognition Module
• YAPPR – Yet Another Probabilistic Plan Recognizer – SIFT, U. Edinburgh, DARPA Integrated Learning– Input: library of hierarchical task network plans (AND/OR graph)– Compiles plan library into form suitable for rapid online recognition– Online: sequentially estimates probabilities of possible intentions
given observation stream• Tests on YAPPR scalability
– Randomly generated plan libraries of various sizes– e.g. “Large” plan lib (near limits of current YAPPR implementation):
• 10 high level intentions (HLI)• 10 distinct high level plans (HLP) of 10 steps each per HLI• 10 distinct low level plans (LLPs) of 10 steps each per HLP
– Compilation times (an offline activity) on the order of 1 minute– This is larger than we expect real plan library to be for AsuW
scenario • Planner ---> YAPPR interchange format
– Plan library is emitted by planner in this form.– Translator to YAPPR HTN representation is being tested at SIFT
SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
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DRED in a Nutshell
SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
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DRED: Prevent
• Focus is on enforcing authorized behavior to thwart insider attack
• Authorized behavior is what is required for this user for this mission
• Prevention opportunities exist for network through application layers
SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
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DRED: Detect
• Focus is on discovering events that may suggest an insider attack and on providing sufficient evidence to support (later) attribution of an attack.
• DRED manager collects all events (except Mission Status)
• Some event consolidation by the DRED is anticipated for efficiency
SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
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DRED: Respond
• Focus is on thwarting misuse and on supporting attribution
• Each response is determined by the Response Module but coordinated through, and directed by, the DRED Manager
• Response may also include additional logging without further restriction
SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
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DRED: Manage
• Focus on what can be managed easily
– pf makes an effective 'policy router'
• Split policy into static and dynamic parts (see above)
• Leverage Adventium's policy management strategy for distributed policy enforcement points [DARPA OASIS Dem/Val, DHS EFW/VPG]
DRED-based Policy (static)
User-based Policy(dynamic)
SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
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DRED Status
• July
– diverse implementations
• Sunfire Bump-in-the-wire (2)
• Mungo-based breadboard (1)
– user-based pf rules
– IPsec between multiple DREDS using X.509 authentication
– simple HTTP proxy
– snort, honeyd
• September
– proxy configuration for message compliance and mission status
– DRED policy management
– user authentication for user-based policy
• January
– log collection and consolidation
– integration with DSM Manager and Mission Monitor
– performance tests
SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
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1: Requirements, Architecture, Design, Evaluation Plan (CDRL A003)
2: Spiral 1 (Component Development)
3: Spiral 2 (Integrated System)
4: Spiral 3 (System Hardening)
5: Test and Evaluation
6: Program Management & Travel
1
1 4
Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec Mar Jun
FY-08FY-07
2 3
1. CDRL A003 Delivered (Feb.) Revisions in July 07, January 08, and June 08.2. Initial DRED: User-based IP filtering and sensing (Mar.)3. Initial planner: Strategic and tactical levels (Apr.) NetBase ontology (network model) shared with BBN4. Scenario defined: Carrier flight planning (Mar.)6. Functional Model of Scenario (Jun.)
4
5
9
10
11
5. Components operational (Jul.) Demonstrations in September
7. Testbed complete (Oct.)8. Initial integration (Oct.)9. E2E demonstration (Jan.)10. Final software build complete (Mar.)11. Red Team evaluation complete (May)
SPDR Plans and Timeline
8
7
2 3
Program Review Deliverable (update) Final Report
6
SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
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Strengthen, Prepare, Detect, React (SPDR)
Research Challenges:• Thwart plausible, but unknown attacks
• Identify malicious insiders even when all their actions are authorized
• Minimize impact on benign activities
• Ensure sufficient strength of sensing and control mechanism, so insider with physical access cannot disable or avoid it.
• Maintain compatibility with evolving DoD systems– Push security toward the endpoints
– DoD Enterprise Sensor Grid Strategy
– GIG vision of end-to-end encryption
Objective: Thwart and attribute insider attacks by combining AI-based plan generation, sensor synthesis and plan recognition with HW-based, tamper resistant, end-point sensing & control
Benefits:• Increased accountability• Rapid, targeted response to malicious insiders• Minimizes impact on benign activities, thereby
improving mission effectiveness
Approach:• Adapt existing Adventium & SIFT reasoning technologies
• Exploit evolving COTS hardware capabilities
• Military relevance via GD-AIS application scenarios
Innovations: • A priori reasoning anticipates attacks, informs defenses,
and generates sensors
• Intelligent attack recognition reduces false alarms and supports targeted response creation
• Unbypassable, tamper-resistant network endpoint for sensing and control (important for insiders)
SRS Phase II PI Meeting 21 June 2007
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Questions?
Comments?