Lexical vs. grammatical evidentialityin French and Italian*

MARIO SQUARTINI

Abstract

This article discusses Romance data corroborating a multifarious account

of evidentiality in which di¤erent dimensions connected to the source of in-

formation are distinguished. It will be demonstrated that the diverse distri-

butional patterns of lexical items as opposed to grammatical forms in the

domains of inferential and reportative evidentiality can hardly be accounted

for unless a distinction is made between the source of evidence, intended as

the locus where the information is acquired (internal or external source

with respect to the speaker), and the mode of knowing, i.e., the process

leading to the acquisition of the information (directly visual, indirectly

through inferences, reports).

1. The ‘‘evidential vogue’’

Since the publication of Franz Boas’ work (especially Boas 1938: 133)

it has been generally acknowledged that some languages have morpho-

logical means for obligatory dedicated expression of the information

source specifying how the information has been acquired, e.g., distin-guishing whether it has been directly witnessed (visually, auditorily, etc.)

or indirectly known either as reported information or as the result of

the speaker’s own reasoning (inferences and conjectures). With respect

to this or similar consensus definitions Aikhenvald (2003a: 19) recently

stigmatized an increasing and ‘‘gratuitous extension’’ of evidentiality out-

side its proper domain, a reminder of the misuse of ergativity in the past

decades. According to Aikhenvald (2003a) the limits of evidentiality have

been misconceived, dangerously blurring the distinction between lan-guages where it is obligatorily expressed by dedicated grammatical mor-

phemes and languages where it sparsely appears as a secondary mean-

ing or a pragmatic extension (‘‘evidentiality strategies’’ in Aikhenvald

Linguistics 46–5 (2008), 917–947

DOI 10.1515/LING.2008.030

0024–3949/08/0046–0917

6 Walter de Gruyter

2003a: 2, 18–20). Lazard (2000: 214, 2001), as well as Aikhenvald (2003a:

2), also emphasizes the importance of maintaining a sharp distinction

between grammatical and lexical expressions of evidentiality, the latter

possibly being a universal feature represented by lexical elements such

as the English adverbs reportedly, allegedly, evidently, etc. As is appar-

ent, Aikhenvald and Lazard are mostly concerned with setting bound-

aries underlining the specific nature of grammatical evidentiality (seealso Aikhenvald 2004: 147–151). In what follows, the opposite view

will be taken, exploring how an integrated account of both grammati-

cal and lexical evidentiality can contribute to a better understanding of

the whole domain. In so doing a comparison will be drawn between the

lexical and the grammatical expressions of indirect evidence in Ro-

mance,1 mainly focusing on the domain of inferentiality. It will be dem-

onstrated that a combined treatment of lexical data and grammatical

markers permits us to draw attention to the distinction between two dif-ferent evidential notions, the mode of knowing or type of evidence as op-

posed to the source of evidence. Although already pointed out (Botne

1997: 523–524), so far the interplay of the two notions has been neglected

in most classifications, separately focusing either on the source of evi-

dence (Frawley 1992: 413) or on the mode of knowing/type of evidence

(Willett 1988), or explicitly avoiding the distinction (Aikhenvald 2003a:

26, fn. 2).

The results presented in this article will also demonstrate how lan-guages such as French and Italian, that only have ‘‘evidentiality strat-

egies’’ (Aikhenvald 2003a: 18–20) and not a regular system of dedicated

evidential grammatical a‰xes, can contribute to the discussion surround-

ing the classification of evidential functions. Instead of biasing the results,

the very fact that they are derived from evidentiality strategies, raises ad-

ditional questions on whether the distinction between the source and type

of evidence depends on the poorer grammatical status of evidentiality in

such languages (see the discussion in Section 2) or whether it can be ex-tended to systems where this category is more prominently and consis-

tently grammaticalized.2

The data analyzed in the present article comprise the Italian modal

dovere þ infinitive and the inflectional future, which will be presented

here as grammatical expressions of inferentiality (Section 3). In Sections

4 and 5 they will be compared to lexical items (the Italian adverb eviden-

temente ‘evidently’ and the adverbial construction a quanto pare ‘appar-

ently’) also expressing inferentiality. The comparison with the functionalbehavior of a quanto pare will be particularly interesting, as it requires a

classificational model in which the mode of knowing interplays with the

source of evidence. The same interactional model will also be proved in

918 M. Squartini

Section 6 as relevant in accounting for the functional distinctive distribu-

tion of the French as opposed to the Italian conditional.

2. Preliminaries on grammatical evidentiality and evidentiality strategies

Grammatical evidentiality, intended in Boas’ (1938) sense as an inde-pendent functional domain separated from modality, has been tradition-

ally considered as typologically restricted to certain given languages and

linguistic areas, especially in indigenous languages of the Americas and

in the ‘‘Central Eurasian’’ area (Comrie 2000: 11), thus postulating an

areal coverage certainly less widespread with respect to the virtually ‘‘uni-

versal’’ status of other semantic categories such as modality, tense and

aspect. This is also because, as already noticed in Section 1, the coexis-

tence of evidential meanings in grammatical markers described as mainlyexpressing other functional notions has never been considered as a proper

occurrence of grammatical evidentiality, being rather slotted as a mar-

ginal use (a pragmatic strategy). In this respect it must be overtly spelled

out from the outset that in this article the notion of grammatical evi-

dentiality will be used in a rather unorthodox way with respect to this

traditionally settled paradigm. In particular, it will not be restricted to

obligatory grammatical markers dedicated to evidential meaning, also

including evidential extensions of other grammatical markers. Obviously,this is not merely a terminological question and requires further justifi-

cation. First of all such a choice has an argument-internal justification

with respect to the analysis put forward in this article, which focuses on

a comparison between the semantic import of grammatical vs. lexical evi-

dentiality. Given such a binary distinction, evidentiality strategies, in-

tended as extensions of the core meaning of grammatical markers, clearly

belong to what a language can express by means of the grammar. It

would make no sense to consider them as expressions of lexical meaning,if one aims to discuss possible convergences and divergences between the

semantics of grammatical vs. lexical evidentiality, as is the case in this

article.

But, a more compelling and theoretical reason for subsuming eviden-

tiality strategies under the general realm of grammatical evidentiality is

that the very distinction between grammatical evidentiality and eviden-

tiality strategies is less clear-cut than has been assumed up to this

point. Recognizing the status of grammatical forms as proper evidentialmarkers, as opposed to evidentiality strategies, crucially elaborates on

the notion of primary, as opposed to secondary meaning. Nonetheless,

as discussed in Dahl (1985: 24–25), identifying what is basic and what is

Evidentiality in French and Italian 919

derived is not always a straightforward task, the most crucial point being

that in several cases the basic meaning encompasses di¤erent domains

such as tense and aspect, tense and modality, making it impossible to dis-

entangle them. The solution adopted in Dahl (1985) and pursued in Dahl

(2000: 7) is based on providing definitions of the semantic content of sin-

gle grammatical markers in a way that includes the interplay of di¤erent

semantic domains. This is not tantamount to denying the existence of aprimary meaning and the possibility of distinguishing it from a secondary

and derived one, but requires transcategorial definitions of the grammati-

cal meaning, admitting that a primary meaning can also be formed of ele-

ments derived from di¤erent semantic domains. Pursuing this methodol-

ogy further, it should not be surprising that evidentiality can be conceived

as a part of the primary meaning of a form that also encompasses other

semantic domains, especially epistemic modality. As already noted in Mi-

thun (1986: 90), the evidential ‘‘source’’ and the epistemic ‘‘probability’’coexist in one and the same marker in di¤erent languages (in English as

well in Iroquoioan languages), which might be much more widespread

than so far assumed. In fact, the distinction between evidentiality and

epistemic modality, although in principle possible and desirable (Comrie

2000: 2), can be di‰cult to apply (De Haan 1997: 6). In this perspective

the typology of evidentiality cannot be reduced to a confrontation be-

tween languages having grammatical expression of evidentiality and lan-

guages lacking it. It seems more reasonable to imagine a set of inter-mediate possibilities in which evidentiality blends in di¤erent ways with

epistemic modality (Plungian 2001: 354; Pietrandrea 2004: 200–203,

2005), on a parallel with what occurs with past tense and perfective aspect

(Dahl 1985: 23) that are lumped together in the semantics of a form such

as the French passe simple.

The case of the French and Italian modals devoir/dovere is particularly

interesting in this perspective since their evidential meaning as inferential

markers and their epistemic meaning as means of downgrading the speak-er’s commitment with regard to the factuality of the situation coexist in

most cases, making it di‰cult to ascertain which is a pragmatic extension

and which is part of the basic meaning. This makes a transcategorial so-

lution admitting both evidentiality and epistemic modality as part of the

basic meaning especially viable (on the interplay of evidentiality and epis-

temic modality in the semantics of modals see De Haan 1999a, 1999b,

2001a; Mortelmans 2000; Cornillie 2004; and Squartini 2004).

The present article can thus be considered as an attempt to interpretevidentiality as part of the basic meaning of the modals devoir/dovere þinfinitive, which elaborates on previous research on French (especially

Dendale 1994) and Italian (Squartini 2004). Such a treatment of modals

920 M. Squartini

raises an additional preliminary question concerning their status as part

of the grammatical system as opposed to their interpretation as indepen-

dent lexical items. In fact, modals are mentioned in Aikhenvald (2003a: 2;

see also Aikhenvald 2004: 150) as lexical expressions of evidentiality, but

this is not an issue that can be theoretically solved once and for all, for it

crucially depends on the morphosyntactic behavior of modals in a given

language (De Haan 1997: 151). In this respect Italian modals show somemorphosyntactic peculiarities, including (optional) clitic climbing and

auxiliary switch (Cordin and Calabrese 1988: 572–575), demonstrating

that they can form a monoclausal structure with the dependent infinitive

(Rizzi 1982). Apart from the structural interpretation of monoclausality

(see the discussion in Cinque 2004), the inheritance of morphosyntactic

features of the infinitival verb demonstrates the reduced autonomy of the

modal as main verb (Giacalone Ramat 2001: 123–124), which is prima

facie evidence of an auxiliation process (Ramat 1987: 16) and has in factbeen interpreted as signaling the auxiliary status of Romance modals

(Ledgeway 2000: 155–184; see also Cinque 2004: 142, 170, Fn. 24). The

corresponding French modal devoir, even if showing the opposite behav-

ior as far as clitic climbing and auxiliary selection are concerned (Kayne

1980), also has specific morphosyntactic features common to proper

French auxiliaries (Pollock 1989: 386–391). It is also significant that Old

French modals have morphosyntactic properties, including auxiliary

switch (Pearce 1990: 18–25) as well as clitic climbing and also prefixclimbing (Benucci 2001: 65–68), which permit a monoclausal interpreta-

tion comparable to the structural interpretation of contemporary Italian

modals. Such a diachronic discrepancy, apart from suggesting a non-

strictly unidirectional grammaticalization process, also confirms the in-

trinsic scalar nature of the very notion of auxiliarity (Heine 1993; Kuteva

2001). In this scalar perspective, modals, although not proper grammati-

cal markers, are undoubtedly ‘‘more’’ grammatical than pure lexical

items. This makes significant a comparison between the modals describedin Section 3 and the adverbs in Section 4, considering them as representa-

tives of grammatical and lexical evidentiality, respectively.

3. The inferential gradient

While inferences correspond to a major semantic function in most classi-

fications of evidentiality (from Willett 1988: 57 to Aikhenvald 2003a),their role and status is still a much debated point a¤ecting the boundaries

between evidentiality and epistemic modality. Even those who stress

the epistemic interpretation of inferences (van der Auwera and Plungian

Evidentiality in French and Italian 921

1998: 85–86), admit their intermediate status as a case of interaction with

evidentiality. Their mixed nature is also recognized by Palmer (1986: 57–

60, 69–70), who treats inferentials under the heading of judgments if lan-

guages such as English or German are concerned (as in English John must

be at home), while including them in the section devoted to evidentials in

a language such as Tuyuca. Whatever the ultimate interpretation might

be, it cannot be denied that by marking information as inferential thespeaker provides information on the source of the information, which is

undoubtedly connected with evidentiality.

As for Romance languages, an evidential interpretation has been pro-

posed for the French modal devoir ‘must’ þ infinitive by Dendale (1994),

who insists on its function as evidential (inferential) marker in contrast to

more current interpretations in which devoir þ infinitive is considered an

epistemic marker, marginally admitting evidentiality as a secondary fea-

ture (Kronning 1996, 2003, 2004). The inferential function is also produc-tive in other Romance languages, as the Italian modal dovere þ infinitive

(1) demonstrates.

(1) [Indicando un ragno] Attento, deve essere ancora vivo, perche hovisto che si muove

‘[Pointing to a spider] Be careful! It must still be alive, for I saw it

moving’

The context in (1) is a type of reasoning which, acknowledging Anderson(1986: 274), can be defined as a circumstantial inference, i.e., a mental

process based on external sensory evidence (‘for I saw it moving’). As

has been repeatedly pointed out (Dendale 1994; Dendale and De Mulder

1996: 312, 316–317) not all inferential processes are strictly ‘‘abductive’’

as is the case in (1), where the inference derives a given consequence

from an antecedent (in (1) the external sensory evidence). In particular,

the Italian modal dovere, its French counterpart as well as the corre-

sponding English modal must (Plungian 2001: 354), can also convey in-ferential processes in which any external observable evidence is lacking

and the speaker only bases his/her reasoning process on previous per-

sonal experience or general world knowledge. In (2), a canonical example

of similar mental processes, the speaker knows that the postman regularly

rings the bell around the same time and presumes that this is also the case

on that occasion.

(2) [Suonano alla porta] Deve essere il postino

‘[The doorbell rings] It must be the postman’

The distinction between the two di¤erent inferential processes, the cir-

cumstantial inference in (1) and the inference lacking any external sensory

922 M. Squartini

evidence in (2), is mentioned in typological descriptions of evidential

systems, being referred to as the opposition between apparent (inferred)

vs. assumed knowledge (Barnes 1984: 257–258 on Tuyuca), as well as

inferential vs. expectational (Schlichter 1986: 51–52 on Wintu). A compa-

rable distinction between ‘‘inference inferred from direct physical evi-

dence’’ and ‘‘information from general knowledge’’ is also morphologi-

cally marked in Tsafiki (Dickinson 2000: 407–408, see also Aikhenvald2004: 54–57). Significantly, these two are dubbed as Inferred (1) and

Inferred (2) in Aikhenvald (2003a: 5), suggesting their semantic connec-

tion under the general umbrella of inferentiality. Consistently with this

assumption, Aikhenvald (2003a, 2004: 174–176) uses the label ‘‘infer-

ences’’ as a cover term for di¤erent semantic nuances of the category.

This is apparent when considering Aikhenvald’s (2003b: 139) description

of Tariana markers of ‘‘inferred’’ knowledge, which cover ‘‘generic infer-

ences’’ (based on world knowledge) as well as ‘‘specific inferences’’ (basedon results).

In Romance a distinction between generic and specific (circumstantial

in Anderson’s 1986 terms) inferences, even if neutralized by the modal

dovere, has to be maintained in comparing dovere with the inflectional

future, which shows a di¤erent functional pattern. Unlike dovere þinfinitive the future only expresses generic (3) and not circumstantial (4)

inferences:

(3) [Suonano alla porta] Sara il postino

‘[The bell rings] It must be (be:fut) the postman’3

(4) ??[Indicando un ragno] Attento, sara ancora vivo, perche ho visto

che si muove‘[Pointing to a spider] Be careful! It must be (be:fut) still alive, for I

saw it moving’

A similar contrast has been pointed out in French (5), where the future is

not grammatical in circumstantial inferences based on external sensoryevidence (‘for he is tottering with every step’), the modal devoir þinfinitive being instead current in such contexts:

(5) Au loin on voit apparaıtre un homme. Il doit etre (*sera) a bout,car il chancelle a chaque pas

‘A man appears far away. He must be (*be:fut) exhausted, for he

is tottering with every step’

(Tasmowski and Dendale 1998: 330)

Tasmowski (2001: 339) has also shown that when external evidence is ex-

plicitly missing the opposite distribution can be found, as in (6) and (7),

where only the future (6) is grammatical:

Evidentiality in French and Italian 923

(6) On sonne. Je n’attendais personne pourtant. Ca sera Jean peut-etre.

[The bell rings] I was not expecting anybody though. It’s (be:fut)

J., perhaps

(7) ??On sonne. Je n’attendais personne pourtant. Ca doit etre Jean.

[The bell rings] I was not expecting anybody though. It must be J.

Nonetheless, reference to external evidence is not obligatory for devoir þinfinitive, which, like its Italian counterpart, is also grammatical (8) in ge-neric inferential contexts (see also Stage 2003: 207). Also comparable to

Italian is the possibility of interchanging a future in the same context (9):

(8) Tiens on sonne a la porte. Ca doit etre le facteur.

‘[The bell rings] It must be the postman’

(Dendale 1994: 38)

(9) On sonne, ce sera le facteur (Sundell 2003: 224)

‘[The bell rings] It must be (be:fut) the postman’

What Tasmowski (2001: 339) notices with respect to the French inferen-tial markers can also be extended to Italian, for the modal dovere þinfinitive and the future show the same complementary distribution. As

in French, the Italian future (10), unlike dovere þ infinitive (11), is gram-

matical in contexts that can be defined as purely conjectural, their basic

feature being that any evidence, both external and based on general world

knowledge, is lacking.

(10) [Suonano alla porta] Non aspettavo nessuno; sara Gianni.[The bell rings] I was not expecting anybody. It might be (be:fut)

G.

(11) ??[Suonano alla porta] Non aspettavo nessuno; deve essere Gianni.

[The bell rings] I was not expecting anybody. It must be G.

The set of Romance data presented so far demonstrates that the general

domain of inferentiality not only includes the distinction between inferredand assumed knowledge, here labeled as circumstantial and generic infer-

ences, but also comprises pure conjectures, lacking any sensory evidential

basis. With respect to these three semantic functions the modal dovere þinfinitive and the future show a complex distributional pattern that can be

diagrammed as in Table 1.

As shown in Table 1, the functional distribution of the two grammati-

cal markers considered here is only partially overlapping in expressing ge-

neric inferences, while a complementary distribution can be observed asfar as circumstantial inferences and conjectures are concerned. The inter-

mediate position of generic inferences is also derivable from Anderson’s

(1986: 284) semantic map of evidentiality positing ‘‘weak inferences’’

924 M. Squartini

(i.e., generic inferences) in the same column between circumstantial infer-

ential and conjectures.

The coexistence of an overlapping area and two functionally divergent

values suggests the interpretation of the relevant functional domain as a

gradient, whose opposite poles are represented by the nonoverlapping

functions, i.e., circumstantial inferences on the one hand and conjectures

on the other. The overlapping area represented by generic inferences canbe conceived as an intermediate functional domain between the two op-

posite poles:4

Diagram (a)circumstantial inferences —— generic inferences —— conjectures

What is common to the whole gradient is the mode of knowing or type

of evidence (Willett 1988), i.e., ‘‘the path by which the information was

obtained’’ (Botne 1997: 24). Circumstantial, generic inferences as well as

conjectures are all based on the same mode of knowing, the three of them

being products of the speaker’s reasoning process and therefore inferen-

tial processes. However, the three are di¤erentiated along a parameterthat is connected to the balance between the speaker’s involvement as op-

posed to the import of external evidence. While in one of the two poles

(circumstantial inferences), the speaker’s own reasoning is heavily supple-

mented by external sensory evidence, in the opposite pole, all external ev-

idence is missing, the speaker being solely responsible for the reasoning

process. In between, the intermediate area of generic inferences can be

found with a balanced proportion of the speaker’s own reasoning and ex-

ternal information deriving from general world knowledge.The distinction between generic and specific (circumstantial in Ander-

son’s 1986 terms) inferences permits us to return to the issue raised at

the outset of this section, namely the interpretation of the inferential

markers either as epistemic (expressing the commitment of the speaker

on the factuality of the situation), or as evidential (referring to the source

of the information). In this respect it is important to underline that the

inferential gradient charted in (a) cannot be interpreted as an epistemic

scale directly derived from the factuality of the situation, as proposed inFrawley’s (1992: 413) interpretation of a similar gradient in terms of

Table 1. Form/function correlations in the inferential domain

Circumstantial

inferences

Generic

inferences

Conjectures

Future � þ þDOVERE þ þ �

Evidentiality in French and Italian 925

strength of knowledge. Obviously, an inferential process based on exter-

nal sensory evidence corresponds to a stronger epistemic commitment,

while the speaker’s conjectures, lacking any sensory support, are intrinsi-

cally weaker if evaluated on the epistemic scale (Givon 1982). This is

the reason why Dendale (2001: 12), as well as Tasmowski and Dendale

(1998) and Tasmowski (2001: 338–339), insist on the noninferential

(therefore nonevidential and exclusively modal) nature of the French fu-ture as opposed to the modal devoir. Nevertheless, such a categorial sepa-

ration does not appear to be borne out by the very fact that the modal

devoir and the inflectional future share the same functional domain, as is

demonstrated by their functional overlapping with respect to generic in-

ferences. In the perspective adopted in the present article, the epistemic

scale and the inferential gradient can therefore be considered as two inde-

pendent dimensions, as already recognized by Anderson (1986: 284), who

presents them as two parallel columns of his semantic map. Given theirparallel distribution, some connections between the two can be admitted,

as is most prominently the case with conjectures, linked to epistemic pos-

sibility, while circumstantial inferentials are linked to epistemic certainty

or strong probability. In this perspective French and Italian do not sub-

stantially di¤er from languages with a more consistent evidential system

such as Tariana, in which ‘‘specific (circumstantial) inferences’’ are con-

sidered as more reliable than generic inferences (Aikhenvald 2003b: 140),

due to the intrinsic reliability of sensory evidence. Moreover, the prefer-ential connections between di¤erent kinds of inferential processes and de-

grees of epistemic commitment should not be represented as categorial.

As noted by Dendale (2001: 15–16) with respect to the French inferential

forms, the interpretation of the epistemic balance between the future and

the modal devoir is not straightforward, so opposite views can be found in

the literature. In principle, the speaker can be totally confident about the

epistemic status of his/her conjectures, as is demonstrated by the fact that

the Italian future can be combined with epistemic adverbs expressing dif-ferent degrees of factual commitment that span from higher (12) to lower

degrees of certainty (13):

(12) [Suonano alla porta] Sara sicuramente il postino.‘[The bell rings] It is (be:fut) certainly the postman’

(13) [Suonano alla porta] Forse sara il postino.

‘[The bell rings] Perhaps it is (be:fut) the postman’

The interaction with the epistemic scale is more cogent if one considersthat the modal dovere, similarly to the French devoir (Tasmowski and

Dendale 1998: 330), is not compatible with the weaker epistemic adverb

forse (14), and only admits a stronger epistemic commitment (15):5

926 M. Squartini

(14) [Suonano alla porta] ??Forse deve essere il postino.

‘[The bell rings] Perhaps it must be the postman’

(15) [Suonano alla porta] Deve essere sicuramente il postino.

‘[The bell rings] It must certainly be the postman’

Nonetheless, data such as (14) and (15) only demonstrate that the inferen-

tial gradient is biased by the epistemic scale, particularly a¤ecting the op-

posite poles of the gradient, but this is not tantamount to interpreting the

whole inferential gradient as epistemic. Otherwise one could not explain

why the Italian future, while being compatible with adverbs denoting a

strong epistemic commitment such as sicuramente in (12), is still incom-

patible with circumstantial inferential contexts (see [4] above).6 The con-

trast between (12) and (4) can only be explained assuming that the latterhas a di¤erent evidential basis (sensory evidence) with respect to the

former.7

The data presented in this section show that Italian makes a catego-

rial distinction between the two opposite poles of what has been called

the inferential gradient. This gradient can be represented as a tension

field between the speaker’s most subjective reasoning, where conjectures

originate, and a more objective kind of reasoning based on external ev-

idence.8 An intermediate stage is represented by generic inferences thatare less subjective than conjectures, for they are based on (possibly in-

tersubjective) world knowledge, even though they lack the external val-

idation provided by sensory evidence. Significantly, the intermediate

status of this kind of inference is confirmed by the behavior of the Ital-

ian verb forms under scrutiny that can more freely interchange in such

cases.

In Sections 4 and 5 these results on the grammatical expression of infer-

entiality will be compared to the lexical means used with the same func-tion, focusing on di¤erences with respect to form/function correlations.

4. Lexical expressions of inferentiality

In this section the functional distribution of two lexical items, the adverb

evidentemente ‘evidently’ and the adverbial construction a quanto pare

‘apparently’, will be presented elaborating on their inferential meaning.

What is most significant in the spirit of the present article is that the dis-

tributional patterns of these lexical items correspond to none of the casesdiscussed above, neither to the modal dovere nor to the inflectional future.

This raises new issues in the classification of inferentiality that will be dis-

cussed at the end of this section as well as in Section 5.

Evidentiality in French and Italian 927

The main di¤erence with respect to the grammatical markers analyzed

above is that evidentemente and a quanto pare are restricted to the more

‘‘objective’’ pole of the inferential gradient. Both lexical forms are gram-

matical in circumstantial inferential contexts, where external sensory evi-

dence is explicitly available:

(16) [Indicando un ragno] Attento, evidentemente e ancora vivo, perche

ho visto che si muove

‘[Pointing to a spider] Be careful! Evidently it is still alive, for I

saw it moving’

(17) [Indicando un ragno] Attento, a quanto pare e ancora vivo, percheho visto che si muove

‘[Pointing to a spider] Be careful! Apparently it is still alive, for I

saw it moving’

But, unlike the modal dovere, they are not compatible with genericinferences:

(18) [Suonano alla porta] ??Evidentemente e il postino

‘[The bell rings] Evidently it is the postman’(19) [Suonano alla porta] ??A quanto pare e il postino

‘[The bell rings] Apparently it is the postman’

First of all, the functional behavior of the two adverbials provides an in-

dependent empirical test of the inferential gradient, whose gradual natureimplies that only uninterrupted stretches of the continuum can be covered

by one form. Thus, if the intermediate area is not covered, as is the case

with the adverbials considered here (18)–(19), the implication may be de-

rived that the opposite pole is also barred for these forms (otherwise, the

functional distribution would cover interrupted stretches of the contin-

uum). Such an implicational interpretation of the gradient is confirmed

by the two adverbials, which are only acceptable in the circumstantial in-

ferential (16)–(17), but not in the conjectural pole (20)–(21):

(20) [Suonano alla porta] ??Non aspettavo nessuno; evidentemente e

Gianni

[The bell rings] I was not awaiting anybody; evidently it is J.(21) [Suonano alla porta] ??Non aspettavo nessuno; a quanto pare e

Gianni

[The bell rings] I was not awaiting anybody; apparently it is J.

These data show that the two adverbials partially share the functional do-main of dovere þ infinitive, which is confirmed by the possible collocation

of evidentemente (22) and a quanto pare (23) with the modal dovere when

expressing circumstantial inferences:

928 M. Squartini

(22) [Indicando un ragno] Attento, evidentemente deve essere ancoravivo, perche ho visto che si muove

‘[Pointing to a spider] Be careful! Evidently it must be still alive,

for I saw it moving’

(23) [Indicando un ragno] Attento, a quanto pare deve essere ancora

vivo, perche ho visto che si muove

‘[Pointing to a spider] Be careful! Apparently it must be still alive,

for I saw it moving’

In Table 2 the results of this section are summarized showing the di¤eren-

tial behavior of grammatical and lexical means of expressing inferential-

ity. As mentioned above, the basic result of this comparison is that the

lexical means show a more restricted functional domain concentrating

on the one end of the inferential gradient.

The results charted in Table 2 can be interpreted in di¤erent ways, but

one point that should be stressed is the non-neutralizing behavior of the

lexical markers vs. the tendency of the grammatical markers to spanover wider stretches of the inferential gradient with neutralizing e¤ects.

Such a distinction can be interpreted both diachronically and synchroni-

cally. From a diachronic point of view it is compatible with more general

conclusions on the grammaticalization process of grammatical markers.

A well-known tenet of grammaticalization studies derives from the empir-

ical observation that in most cases the more the grammaticalization pro-

ceeds, the more the meaning of the grams involved becomes general (By-

bee et al. 1994: 5–10). Obviously, lexical items are less grammaticalizedthan grammatical expressions. Therefore, it is not surprising that the in-

ferential adverbs here presented have a more restrictive meaning than

grammatical markers. These results are also compatible with Traugott’s

(1989) account of the grammaticalization of epistemic modality as a pro-

cess of gradual subjectification, since the adverbials, representing the non-

grammaticalized members of the set, also correlate with the most ‘‘objec-

tive’’ pole of the continuum. On the contrary, the most grammaticalized

member of the set, the inflectional future, spans over the most subjectiveside.

Table 2. Form/function distribution in the inferential domain

Circumstantial

inferences

Generic

inferences

Conjectures

future � þ þdovere þ þ �evidentemente þ � �a quanto pare þ � �

Evidentiality in French and Italian 929

From a synchronic perspective the most interesting point is the di¤er-

ent behavior of circumstantial inferences with respect to the other seman-

tic functions. It is apparent from Table 2 that circumstantial inferences

are the only kind of inferential processes showing a biunivocal mapping

with a given evidential marker. On the contrary, generic inferences and

conjectures have no biunivocal means of expression, since they are always

combined with other semantic functions: generic inferences can be lumpedtogether either with circumstantial inferences (dovere þ infinitive) or with

conjectures (future), so that they do not appear separately. Similarly, con-

jectures only appear combined with generic inferences and never alone.

As far as the semantics of inferences is concerned, this raises a basic ques-

tion about the nature of circumstantial inferences: What makes them so

semantically distinct, that they can be expressed by dedicated means of

expression?

In the endeavor to find an answer to this question, a significant elementcan be found in the role of external sensory evidence. As also noted in

Plungian (2001: 352–353), the existence of visible traces or signs makes

inferences radically di¤erent from other reasoning processes, suggesting

a distinction between ‘‘reasoning-motivated vs. observation-motivated

knowledge’’. This is a basic di¤erence if one considers the evidential

meaning of inferentiality: as also suggested by De Haan (2001b: 217–

218) circumstantial inferences, being based on sensory evidence, turn out

to be doubly marked as far as evidentiality is concerned. According to DeHaan’s (2001b) analysis, they are at the same time marked as [þdirect],

which refers to their sensory circumstantial basis, and [� firsthand], due

to their nontestimonial nature. Nevertheless, circumstantial inferences

can also be described as doubly marked for they elaborate on a double

source: not only the speaker as initiator of the reasoning process, but

also the external source of evidence from which the reasoning process

derives. This is radically di¤erent from the evidential mechanism of the

other kinds of reflected evidence (Plungian 2001: 353), for generic infer-ences and conjectures are only based on the speaker’s own reasoning ex-

cluding external evidence. My suggestion in order to make sense out of

this distinction is to capitalize on the interaction between the mode of

knowing and the source of evidence, as already suggested in Botne

(1997) and Squartini (2001).9 What all the members of the inferential gra-

dient have in common is the cognitive process on which the utterance is

based, in all cases being some form of the speaker’s inferential reasoning.

This means that they share the same mode of knowing, even if they di¤eras far as the source of the evidence is concerned, with circumstantial in-

ferences crucially involving an external source.10 Elaborating on Fraw-

ley’s (1992: 413) distinction between the two basic sources, self and

930 M. Squartini

other, it is possible to conclude that circumstantial inferences are marked

both by the feature [þ other], representing the external sensory evidence,

and by the feature [þ self], representing the role of the speaker’s own rea-

soning. On the contrary, generic inferences and conjectures, being only

the product of the speaker’s own reasoning, can be described as simply

[þ self]. The di¤erence is represented in Diagram (b), which is a modified

version of the inferential gradient presented in Diagram (a) above.

Diagram (b)

circumstantial inferences generic inferences conjectures

[þ other]/[þ self] [þ self] [þ self]

The representation given in Diagram (b) corresponds to an unorthodox

use of Frawley’s (1992) categorization, for in his model any inferential

process is conflated into the category self, but the data presented in Sec-

tions 3–4 demonstrate the peculiarities of circumstantial inferences urginga revised interpretation of the distinction between self and other. Focus-

ing on the di¤erent source of evidence of circumstantial inferences as op-

posed to generic inferences and conjectures is not tantamount to neglect-

ing what they have in common, for, unlike Frawley, the notion of source

of evidence is supplemented by another evidential category, the mode of

knowing, since the three kinds of mental processes considered here are ul-

timately all conceivable as inferences.

Even if a distinction between the mode of knowing or type of evidenceand source of evidence has been proposed in Botne (1997) most classifica-

tions tend to implicitly or explicitly neglect it. Instead of considering the

two as di¤erent interacting dimensions, classificational models have been

generally preferred in which one of the two dimensions is considered as

the basic organizational principle. This has also led to divergent struc-

tures depending on whichever dimension has been considered as preva-

lent. Thus, Frawley’s (1992: 413) account, which is based on the prelimi-

nary distinction between internal (self) and external (other) sources ofevidence, di¤ers from Willett’s (1988: 57) model, which elaborates on the

primary branching of direct and indirect type of evidence (see also Squar-

tini 2001 for a comparative appraisal of the two classificational models).

The crucial point is that none of these models can adequately represent

the special nature of circumstantial inferences, empirically demonstrated

by the data presented in Sections 3–4. Circumstantial inferences challenge

Willett’s (1988) model since they are at the same time definable as a case

of direct evidence (the sensory evidence directly perceived by the speaker)and indirect (as inferences they are indirectly produced by the speaker’s

own reasoning). As mentioned above, Frawley’s classification also proves

inadequate, for circumstantial inferences are simultaneously expression of

Evidentiality in French and Italian 931

the category self (as inferential processes produced by the speaker) and

the other (as based on external sensory evidence). In such a deadlock,

the solution here proposed envisages a combination of Willett’s type of

evidence and Frawley’s source of evidence, which can account for the pe-

culiarities of circumstantial inferences marked as [þ other] and at the

same time expressing an indirect mode of knowing. In Section 5 addi-

tional empirical arguments will be provided confirming the role of thefeature [þ other] in the functional distribution of one of the lexical items

here considered (a quanto pare) and corroborating the hypothesis of a

multifarious account in which the source of evidence and the mode of

knowing can be conceived as two interacting dimensions.

5. Inferences, reports, and the feature [Bother]

The data presented in Section 4 demonstrate that the two lexical items

considered here, a quanto pare and evidentemente, cover the same func-

tional stretch of the inferential gradient, being both restricted to circum-

stantial inferences. However, if the whole evidential domain is taken into

account, the functional distribution of the two adverbs turns out to be

distinct. In particular, a quanto pare is also compatible with reports (24),

while evidentemente disallows them (25).11 This property is tested in (24–

25) using the collocation of the two adverbs with the inflectional form ofthe conditional, whose evidential reportative function has been repeatedly

pointed out in Romance (see Dendale 1993 among others and the discus-

sion in Section 6 below):

(24) A quanto pare il presidente sarebbe scomparso: lo dicono i giornali

‘Apparently the president has disappeared (be:cond disappeared):

that is what the newspapers say’

(25) ??Evidentemente il presidente sarebbe scomparso: lo dicono i

giornali

‘Evidently the president has disappeared (be:cond disappeared):

that is what the newspapers say’

The behavior of a quanto pare, neutralizing the distinction between in-

ferences and reports, is not surprising, if one considers that some of the

corresponding adverbials in other languages show the same neutraliza-

tion pattern. The French adverb apparemment, mentioned by Lazard

(2000: 214) in his list of French evidential lexemes, has been proved inRamat (1996: 293) as occurring as a reportative (corresponding to En-

glish allegedly) as well as an inferential marker (English evidently), and

the same neutralization is also demonstrated in Ramat’s data by the Irish

932 M. Squartini

construction is cosuil. However, apart from Dendale (1994: 37), who inci-

dentally notes the di¤erent behavior of the French adverb apparemment

as opposed to the modal devoir, what has not been focused on is that the

distributional patterns of a quanto pare and similar adverbs in other lan-

guages do not cover the whole domain of inferentiality, being restricted

to circumstantial inferences. Now, the distributional pattern of a quanto

pare can be connected to the conclusions reached in Section 4 with respectto the interaction of the source of evidence and the mode of knowing.

Being restricted to circumstantial inferences, a quanto pare can be con-

sidered as marked with the feature [þ other]. Thus, it is not surprising

that it also expresses reports, which, being based on external evidence,

can also be defined as [þ other]. Such a characterization of reports as

[þ other] is obviously compatible with Frawley’s (1992: 413) original ac-

count, in which they are primary representatives of his category other.

What Frawley does not recognize is the role of the category other as away of connecting reports and circumstantial inferences, provided that in

his model the latter depend on the category self. Although a di¤erent ter-

minology and a di¤erent model are used, such a connection is recognized

in Plungian (2001: 352), who suggests treating reports as a special case of

inferences, which he describes as ‘‘synchronic inference’’: instead of hav-

ing access to sensory evidence, as is the case in ‘‘retrospective inferences’’,

the speaker reports a synchronic indication gathered from other people.

While in Plungian (2001) this is only a working hypothesis, his finalmodel preferring a solution in which reports are separated from infer-

ences (Plungian 2001: 353), the solution proposed here maintains the con-

nection throughout, considering it as another instance of the interaction

between the mode of knowing and the source of evidence. In this perspec-

tive the neutralization pattern shown by a quanto pare can be described

as a spread of the feature [þ other] across di¤erent modes of knowing,

including all cases based on an external source of evidence, i.e., circum-

stantial inferences and reports, and excluding those lacking it, i.e., ge-neric inferences and conjectures. If compared to a quanto pare, the non-

neutralizing behavior of evidentemente can be deemed as confirming

the independence of the source of evidence and the mode of knowing.

While a quanto pare can be described exclusively by means of the feature

[þ other], irrespective of the mode of knowing, evidentemente requires a

double descriptive label, including reference to the mode of knowing (in-

ference) and the source (other).

The neutralization of inferences and reports characterizing a quanto

pare also confirms the internal flaws of most current classificational mod-

els of evidentiality, making their deficiencies even more apparent than

in the conclusions of Section 4. The problems noted in Section 4 with

Evidentiality in French and Italian 933

respect to Willett’s (1988) and Frawley’s (1992) models basically derive

from the inaccurate account of the special nature of circumstantial infer-

ences, which makes it impossible to single them out from the rest of the

inferential gradient. The additional problem made apparent by the data

presented in this section is that a quanto pare also requires a model that

accounts for the neutralization of circumstantial inferences and reports.

Deriving such a neutralization pattern from Willett’s and Frawley’s ac-counts is made impossible by the same structural reasons that hinder the

singling out of circumstantial inferences. Since all kinds of inferences are

dominated by the same hierarchical node, the node labeled ‘‘inferring’’ in

Willett (1988: 57) and the node self in Frawley (1992: 413), any neutral-

ization pattern including other modes of knowing necessarily comprises

the whole inferential gradient, which is not desirable since the neutraliza-

tion pattern demonstrated by a quanto pare only a¤ects circumstantial in-

ferences, excluding other kinds of inferential reasoning.To sum up, the data presented here can be considered a challenge to the

hierarchical structure that characterizes the current classificational models

of evidentiality, urging revisions that could allow us to disentangle the

role of circumstantial inferences. In a sense, Plungian’s (2001: 353) classi-

fication can be considered a revision of the unidirectional hierarchical

models represented by Willett’s (1988) and Frawley’s (1992). The main

novelty in Plungian’s (2001: 353) classification is that it can be interpreted

both top down and bottom up: in the former case the main hierarchicaldistinction is between direct vs. indirect evidence, while in the latter there

is the basic opposition of personal (speaker’s own) evidence vs. mediated

evidence. Nonetheless, Plungian’s (2001) model, although less rigid than

Willett’s and Frawley’s in its bidimensional orientation, is still incompat-

ible with the behavior of the adverbial a quanto pare, for Plungian’s re-

flected evidence comprises the whole inferential gradient (inferentials and

presumptives), so that circumstantial inferences cannot be singled out and

connected to ‘‘mediated evidence’’ (reports).12

The disadvantages of the hierarchical models presented so far could be

avoided radically, i.e., by dismissing any hierarchical layering and treat-

ing all evidential types as an unlayered set of meanings which can be or-

ganized and neutralized without restrictions. In a sense, this is the path

taken by Aikhenvald (2003a: 3–5), who distinguishes di¤erent language

types according to the neutralizations empirically attested in her sample

without proposing any principled and unitary model. Thus, Aikhenvald’s

(2003a) model does not exclude a priori the possibility of an evidentialmarker covering reports and circumstantial inferences, which in fact

corresponds to her definition of ‘‘nonfirsthand’’ that ‘‘typically covers in-

ference based on visible traces and reported information’’ (Aikhenvald

934 M. Squartini

2003a: 4). Nonetheless, the totally nonhierarchical model proposed by Ai-

khenvald (2003a) has the disadvantage of not providing any principled

account of preferable form/function correlations, making any neutraliza-

tion pattern equally possible. On the contrary, the solution proposed here

is based on the assumption that a hierarchical model such as Willett’s or

Frawley’s can be maintained, provided that it is conceived as covering

only one dimension of evidentiality (either the mode of knowing or thesource of evidence), while the other dimension is considered to be inde-

pendently interacting.

The above discussion was intended to demonstrate the empirical ade-

quacy of a system based on the distinction between the source of evidence

and the mode of knowing. Actually, the whole argument can be consid-

ered as flawed by one of its major prerequisites, i.e., the assumption that

lexical and grammatical markers of evidentiality should be accounted for

by one and the same model. Nonetheless, the basic empirical result re-mains that the major classificational models proposed for grammatical

markings of evidentiality cannot account for the functional distribution

of a lexical item such as the Italian a quanto pare. Moreover, as is appar-

ent from the definition of Aikhenvald’s (2003a: 4) ‘‘nonfirsthand’’ men-

tioned above, the neutralization of reports and circumstantial inferences

is also a typical feature of grammatical markings of evidentiality, which

makes a revision of the current classificational models even more urgent.

Further research is needed in order to verify the wider typological cover-age of the interactional model proposed here. In the meantime, the dis-

cussion in the next section will demonstrate that the interaction of the

mode of knowing and the source of evidence not only accounts for the

behavior of a quanto pare, but is also more adequate in accounting for

some peculiarities of the Romance grammatical system.

6. Inference, reports and the feature [C self]

The basic result of the discussion on a quanto pare is that the source of

evidence and the mode of knowing are two independent dimensions, pos-

sibly interacting one with the other. This implies that none of the recog-

nized modes of knowing (inferences and reports) is totally equivalent to

one given source of evidence, as postulated in Frawley’s (1992: 413) clas-

sification, where all inferential processes are derived from the self source,

while all reports are derived from the category other. This result hasbeen made apparent considering an evidential lexical marker crosscutting

the distinction between inferences and reports. In order to demonstrate

that similar conclusions can also be extended to grammatical markers,

Evidentiality in French and Italian 935

the analysis will now focus on a form that also shows a neutralization

pattern of inferences and reports. This is the case of the French condi-

tional (26) whose reportative evidential function has often been pointed

out, either as a proper evidential marker (Dendale 1993) or as a ‘‘mixed

marker’’ expressing both evidential and modal meaning (Kronning 2003).

(26) Aux dernieres informations, les concurrents auraient franchi le CapHorn (Charaudeau 1992: 464)

‘According to the latest information, the competitors have rounded

(have:cond rounded) Cape Horn’

The French conditional also has an inferential function, whose evidential

meaning has been explicitly noted in Tasmowski (2001). A significant

point is that the inferential conditional is restricted to questions (27),

which makes its distribution di¤erent from other French inferentialmarkers mentioned above:

(27) On sonne; serait-ce Geraldine?

‘[The bell rings] Is (be:cond) it G.?’

(Melis 2001: 75)

Interestingly this neutralizes the distinction between inferences and re-

ports in questions, given that the conditional also occurs in questionswith the speaker reporting an opinion attributed to the addressee, who is

asked for confirmation:

(28) — Ce que vous dites est terrible: l’angoisse serait le prix a payer

pour l’emancipation de l’individu?

‘What you are saying is terrible: is (be:cond) anguish the price to

pay for the individual’s emancipation?’(Le Nouvel Observateur 1634, 1996: 14, Haillet 2001: 319)

The di¤erent function of the conditional in (27) and (28) is demonstrated

by a comparison with Italian in which the two contexts are not neutral-

ized by the same form, a conditional being required in the reportative

question (30), while a di¤erent inferential marker (the future) occurs in

(29). As shown in (29–30), the two forms have a complementary distribu-

tion in these contexts (see also Jensen 2000: 1279), which makes themuninterchangeable.

(29) Suonano. Sara (*sarebbe) G.?

‘[The bell rings] Is (be:fut/*be:cond) it G.?’

(30) — Cio che lei dice e terribile: l’angoscia sarebbe (*sara) il prezzoda pagare per l’emancipazione dell’individuo?

‘What you are saying is terrible: is (be:cond/*be:fut)13 anguish

the price to pay for the individual’s emancipation?’

936 M. Squartini

The comparative appraisal of French and Italian requires a classifica-

tional model of evidentiality allowing for the divergent behavior of the

two languages. Since in French the two functions (reports and inferences)

are neutralized, they need to have something in common, but, at the same

time, since they are expressed by di¤erent forms in Italian, the classifica-

tion should also account for the divergences between the context in (29)

and the one in (30). Drawing a lesson from the results of Sections 4 and5 it could be noted that the di¤erence between French and Italian cannot

be grasped using only Willett’s (1988) category of indirect (type of ) evi-

dence. Proceeding from Willett one could conclude that the French con-

ditional neutralizes the distinction between inferences and reports, being

definable as a general marker of indirectivity. In a sense this is correct

and permits us to highlight the di¤erent behavior of the Italian condi-

tional, which, unlike its French counterpart is restricted to one single

function (report) not extending to the whole domain of indirectivity.Nonetheless, this cannot comprehensively account for the behavior of

the French conditional, which, as noticed above, does not neutralize the

whole set of functions connected to inferentiality. Indeed, the French con-

ditional is only admitted in direct and indirect (Korzen and Nølke 2001:

142) questions, but not in declarative sentences (32), where other inferen-

tial markers are required (31).

(31) Max doit etre la: je vois sa voiture

‘M. must be there: I see his car’

(Leeman 2001: 226–227)

(32) ??Max serait la: je vois sa voiture

‘M. is (be:cond) there: I see his car’(Leeman 2001: 226–227)

Due to these restrictions, the French conditional cannot be simply defined

as a general marker of indirect evidence covering all kinds of reports and

inferences. In this respect, a parallelism can be found with the behavior ofa quanto pare, that shows a neutralization pattern covering reports and

only a subset of the inferential domain. As shown above, this makes it im-

possible to account for it in a hierarchical model such as Willett’s (1988)

and Frawley’s (1992), in which the whole inferential domain is totally

contained under the general category of indirect evidence (Willett 1988)

or self (Frawley 1992). Similarly, the French conditional covers reports

and only some inferences (those embedded in a question), which makes

it equally incompatible with a hierarchical model including all inferencesunder the same overarching category. The puzzle concerning the behavior

of a quanto pare was solved above by disentangling the notion of source

of evidence from the mode of knowing. The same procedure will now be

Evidentiality in French and Italian 937

followed in an attempt to find a solution that may account for the distri-

bution of the French conditional.

It must be admitted that the results reached on the behavior of a quanto

pare cannot be extended as such to the French conditional, the way the

latter crosscuts the inferential gradient being di¤erent from the former.

As shown in Section 4, the adverbial a quanto pare is restricted to circum-

stantial inferences, which are distinguished by the feature [þ other]. Onthe contrary, the French conditional occurs in generic inferential (33)

and purely conjectural contexts (34):

(33) On sonne; serait-ce Geraldine?‘[The bell rings] Is (be:cond) it G.?’

(Melis 2001: 75)

(34) On sonne. Je n’attendais personne pourtant. Serait-ce Jean

peut-etre?

[The bell rings] I was not expecting anybody. Is (be:cond) it J,

perhaps?

(Tasmowski 2001: 339)

However, as repeatedly pointed out (Diller 1977; Haillet 2001) the condi-

tional is also compatible with inferential processes based on sensory evi-

dence, thus spanning the whole inferential gradient.

(35) Aurait-il froid, que je le vois si transi?

‘Is (have:cond) he cold, for I see him so numbed’

(Tasmowski 2001: 338)

Due to the absence of restrictions, it would make no sense to use the fea-

ture [þ other], which in connection with inferences accounts for the re-

striction to external sensory evidence, as is the case with a quanto pare.

However, what the French conditional has in common with a quanto

pare is the connection with the source of evidence. As noted by Aikhen-

vald (2003b: 144–145), ‘‘The use of an evidential in a question presup-poses the questioner’s assumption about the answerer’s source of infor-

mation.’’ Therefore, if an inferential marker occurs in a question, the

questioner assumes that the answerer will be able to produce an inferen-

tial statement. More generally speaking, a question involves a switch of

the evidential responsibility from the questioner to the answerer, the for-

mer explicitly negating its role as the source of the information. This is a

marked configuration in which the speaker ceases to be the source of the

information, as is the default case, attributing it to the addressee. UsingFrawley’s features [other]/[self] such a configuration can be described

as [� self], indicating that the speaker has given up his/her role as the

source of the information. In this perspective, the divergent behavior of

938 M. Squartini

French and Italian could be explained as follows: the French conditional

is a marker of the source of evidence sensitive to the feature [� self],

while the Italian conditional as reportative marker is sensitive to the other

dimension of evidentiality, the mode of knowing. This explains why the

Italian conditional is restricted to one given mode of knowing (reports),

while the French conditional is more generally compatible with any func-

tions characterized by the feature [� self], irrespective of the mode ofknowing (either inferences or reports).

One consequence of this analysis is that reports can be described ei-

ther as [þ other] or as [� self] depending on what source of evidence is

concerned. This forces us to consider the category report as internally

structured in order to admit di¤erent reportative submodes, which is

not surprising if one considers that most classifications distinguish di¤er-

ent kinds of reports (see among others Frawley 1992: 413 distinguishing

quote, report, hearsay, etc.). Particularly interesting from my point ofview is Aikhenvald’s (2003a: 15, 2004: 50–51, 177–178) subdistinction

between reported or hearsay and quotative, distinctive elements being

the degree of accuracy of the speaker in reporting another’s utterances

and, what is mostly relevant, in stating the exact authorship of the re-

port. Unlike quotatives, proper reports do not necessarily indicate the

exact source, thus admitting a lower degree of accuracy and frequently

acquiring ‘‘an overtone of information the speaker does not vouch for’’

(Aikhenvald 2003a: 15, 2004: 179–186).14 In my interpretation this over-tone is not an ‘‘epistemic extension’’, but rather a di¤erent evidential

function: the speaker explicitly distances him/herself from the informa-

tional content of the utterance by stressing his/her role as the nonsource

[� self]. On the contrary, the feature [þ other] could cover the case de-

scribed by Aikhenvald (2003a: 15) as quotative, in which the speaker

accurately reports other utterances, without overmarking any evidential

distance.15

The interpretation of the French conditional as a way of marking someform of distance with respect to the informational content of the utter-

ance is current in most analyses of the evidential status of this form: Vet-

ters (2001: 198–199) particularly insists on the refusal of the ‘‘prise en

charge enonciative’’ as the main semantic element of the French reporta-

tive conditional and, even more explicitly, Tasmoswki (2001: 342) consid-

ers the ‘‘non-prise en charge enonciative’’ as the common element linking

the reportative conditional and the inferential conditional in questions.

From this point of view the analysis proposed here is totally compatiblewith Tasmowski’s (2001) conclusions on the common evidential status of

these two uses of the French conditional. Still, my analysis di¤ers from

Tasmowski’s with respect to the semantic interpretation of what she calls

Evidentiality in French and Italian 939

the ‘‘non-prise en charge enonciative,’’ since Tasmowski (2001: 340) con-

siders the speaker to be the source of the information in the inferential use

of the French conditional in (27), which is obviously in contrast with the

idea of labeling this use as [� self]. Actually, Tasmowski’s assumption is

totally compatible with some occurrences of the French inferential condi-

tional, such as (36), in which the speaker uses the conditional in order to

express his/her own inference. In this particular case it would make nosense to consider the addressee as the source of the information, for he

actually knows whether his wife is out of town or not and cannot be ex-

pected to produce an inference on a piece of information that he knows as

a fact.

(36) X: Ta femme serait-elle absente?

Y: Qu’est-ce qui te fait croire ca?

X: Eh bien! Il manque un bouton a ta chemise et tu as une tache

de jaune d’oeuf sur ta cravate

‘X: Is (be:cond) your wife out of town?

Y: What makes you think that?

X: Well, one of your shirt buttons is missing and you have an eggyolk stain on your tie’

(from Diller 1977: 5)

Interestingly, the comparison with Italian provides additional clues in

order to detect the peculiar nature of a context such as (36) as opposedto more canonical uses of the conditional in (27). The significant compar-

ative point is that Italian does not admit any inferential verb form in a

context such as (36). Obviously the conditional cannot occur in (36), this

being due to the nonexistence of inferential conditional in Italian as op-

posed to French (see [29] and [30] above). What is more relevant is that,

unlike (29), where the French conditional can be translated by an Italian

conjectural future, in (36) the future (Sara via tua moglie? ‘Is (be:fut)

your wife out of town?’) is barred. The Italian conjectural future becomesgrammatical only if a canonical inferential context is restored, i.e., if the

context makes it clear that the speaker attributes to the addressee the

role of source in the inferential process (Che pensi, sara via tua moglie?

‘What do you think? Is (be:fut) your wife out of town?’). The comparison

of French and Italian makes it apparent that (36) is not a canonical con-

text of questioned inferences. It can be regarded rather as a pragmatic

extension of the inferential conditional towards the direction of a mira-

tive usage expressing surprise with respect to new or unexpected informa-tion (DeLancey 1997, 2001; Lazard 1999). The point made here is that,

apart from noncanonical extension, the French conditional occurring in

proper inferential questions, can be interpreted as shifting the evidential

940 M. Squartini

source from the speaker to the addressee, thus making the label [� self]

reasonable.

7. Conclusion

This article has demonstrated that the study of the lexical expression ofevidentiality is not only significant from a diachronic point of view, i.e.,

with respect to the grammaticalization path of evidential markers (Ai-

khenvald 2003a: 26), but it is also synchronically relevant in determining

a consistent classificational model of evidentiality as a linguistic category.

Crucially elaborating on the unitary treatment of lexical and grammatical

markings, the above discussion has focused mainly on the inferential sub-

domain of evidentiality, investigating its internal structure. The data pre-

sented have demonstrated the internal partition of the inferential gradientranging from circumstantial inferences to conjectures and including ge-

neric inferences as an intermediate step. More significantly, a preferential

connection between circumstantial inferences and reports was demon-

strated, challenging most current classifications of evidentiality and pro-

viding further evidence in favor of a distinction between the mode of

knowing and the source of evidence. More research is now needed in or-

der to test the explanatory adequacy of such a bidimensional model with

respect to the internal structure of reports. The behavior of the Romanceconditional suggests that some subdistinctions in the reportative area, in-

cluding preferential neutralization patterns with other evidential domains,

can also be accounted for by postulating an interaction between the

source of evidence and the mode of knowing.

Received 30 July 2004 University of Turin

Revised version received

23 January 2006

Notes

* I am indebted to two anonymous referees for their most valuable comments. This re-

search was funded by the FIRB 2003–2005 grant L’italiano nella varieta dei testi

directed by Carla Marello (Universita di Torino). Correspondence address: Mario

Squartini, Dipartimento di Scienze del Linguaggio e Letterature moderne e compa-

rate, Universita di Torino, Via S. Ottavio 20, I-10124 Torino, Italy. E-mail: mario.

squartini@unito.it.

1. Although in this article attention will be paid mainly to French and Italian, some

generalizations on the grammatical expression of evidentiality can also be extended to

Evidentiality in French and Italian 941

Ibero-Romance languages (see Squartini 2001). As for Ibero-Romance, see also Costa

Campos (2003), Cornillie (2004), Haßler (2002, 2003).

2. See Squartini (2005) for a comparison of French and Italian with Rumanian, the only

Romance language with clear grammatical markers dedicated to evidentiality (Fried-

man 2003: 212–213).

3. Abbreviations used: fut ¼ Future, cond ¼ Conditional.

4. This inferential gradient expands on the current typological distinction between generic

and circumstantial inferences, adding conjectures as an opposite pole with respect to

circumstantial inferences. Nonetheless, this does not exclude that a wider typological

application of the gradient might require subtler distinctions in the inferential domain

(see the case of Kashaya in Oswalt 1986: 38–39, 41–42), especially in languages that

mark the type of sensory evidence (visual, auditory, etc.) for directly perceived situa-

tions (see the discussion in Anderson 1986: 279–280).

5. Pietrandrea (2004: 188) mentions some marginal cases showing collocations of dovere

with forse ‘perhaps’, which require further research.

6. Elaborating on similar French data Tasmowski and Dendale (1998: 330) suggest that

the epistemic notion of certainty can be interpreted either with respect to the speaker’s

confidence or to the communicated message, the French future expressing the former

kind of certainty and devoir þ infinitive the latter. However, referring to the speaker

as the locus where the confidence expressed by the future is formed is equivalent to ad-

mitting a di¤erent source as opposed to the external, and potentially objective, sensory

evidence on which the judgment expressed by devoir þ infinitive is based.

7. Other evidence showing that the distribution of the epistemic adverb sicuramente is

independent from the evidential interpretation of the future can be found in (i–ii),

which demonstrate that sicuramente, unlike the future, is not sensitive to the evidential

source available, being compatible both with circumstantial (i) and generic inferences

(ii):

(i) [Indicando un ragno] Attento, e sicuramente ancora vivo, perche ho visto che si

muove

‘[Pointing to a spider] Be careful! It is certainly still alive, for I saw it moving’

(ii) [Suonano alla porta] E sicuramente il postino.

‘[The doorbell rings] It is certainly the postman’.

8. Recognizing a sort of objectivity ranking of evidential sources is not tantamount to in-

terpreting them as epistemic: di¤erent sources can be ranked on an evidential scale that

is independent from the epistemic scale of certainty (see Oswalt 1986: 38–39). See also

Nuyts (2001a: 34–35, 2001b), introducing the notion of intersubjective evidentiality.

9. As noted by an anonymous referee the distinction between mode of knowing and

source of evidence is di‰cult to apply to the grammatical expression of direct evidence,

due to the intrinsic connection between the source itself (visual, auditory, etc.) and the

way it is acquired (vision, audition, etc.). Nonetheless, the distinction can be more

safely applied to the speaker’s internal cognitive processes such as inferences, which,

being based on indirect sources of evidence (Willet 1988), involve two di¤erent dimen-

sions: the inferential process itself (corresponding to the mode of knowing) and the

source on which the speaker bases the cognitive process (external sensory source, logi-

cal expectations, etc.).

10. Actually, any inferential process involves some form of external input internally elabo-

rated by the speaker. However, circumstantial inferences still di¤er from other types of

inferential reasoning, due to the necessary requirement of an additional external source

based on a posteriori evidence (‘retrospective evidence’ in Plungian 2001: 352–353).

942 M. Squartini

11. Apart from the adverb asseritamente, which only occurs in juristic specialized texts

(Venier 1991: 34), in standard colloquial Italian there is no adverb restricted to repor-

tative contexts such as English allegedly, reportedly or French pretendument (Nøjgaard

1992–1995: 235–236).

12. As noted above, a way of singling out sensory evidence inferences connecting them to

reports (described as ‘synchronic inferences’) is tentatively proposed in Plungian (2001:

353), but the suggestion is ultimately dropped in favor of his alternative final model.

13. The future becomes grammatical in Italian if temporal reference is shifted to the deictic

future, while the conditional in (30) can also refer to the deictic present.

14. Note, however, that this is only a possible extension of the distinction: as also noted by

Aikhenvald (2003a: 6, 2004: 58–59) subtypes of reportivity can be distinguished on a

di¤erent basis (see also Anderson 1986: 289), as is the case of the opposition between

reported (1) and reported (2) in Uto-Aztecan (‘‘previously known to the hearer’’ vs.

‘‘previously unknown to the hearer’’, Willett 1991: 161–166). This presupposes a prag-

matic interpretation (old vs. new information) of reportative evidentials, on which see

also Blass (1989). Furthermore, two di¤erent reportative markers in one language may

also be distinguished on a textual and genre-sensitive basis, one of the two forms only

occurring in narratives (myths or stories), as is the case in Tonkawa (Aikhenvald 2004:

51).

15. Palmer’s (1986: 70, 73) distinction between quotative and report, based on data from

Hidatsa, partially overlaps Aikhenvald’s (2003a: 15) opposition, even though in Palmer

the main focus is on the ‘‘intersubjective’’ nature of quotatives (‘‘the speaker regards

what he has said to be something that everyone knows’’, i.e., including the speaker) as

opposed to the totally external character of reports (information given by someone

else, i.e., originally not shared by the speaker). For a distinction between subjective

and intersubjective evidentiality see Nuyts (2001a: 34–35, 2001b).

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