20
n BRIGADIER (RETD) GURMEET KANWAL Strategic Stability, Tactical Aggressiveness China and India, both Asian giants and emerging world powers, have begun to exer- cise immense influence in international political and economic affairs. As China’s GDP is much larger than that of India, it enjoys a correspondingly greater interna- tional clout at present. Political and eco- nomic relations between India and China are much better now than these have ever been since the 1962 border war between the two countries. Mutual economic dependence is growing rapidly every year, with bilateral trade increasing at a brisk pace. Even though it is skewed in China’s favour, bilateral trade has crossed $50 billion (`2,25,500 crore) and is expected to touch $60 billion (`2,70,000 crore) soon. If India’s trade with Hong Kong is included, China is already India’s largest trading partner. However, growth in the strategic and se- curity relationship has not kept pace with the political and economic relationship. De- spite prolonged negotiations at the political level to resolve the long-standing territorial and boundary dispute between the two countries, there has been little progress on this sensitive issue. China has a clandestine nuclear warheads-ballistic missiles-military hardware technology transfer relationship with Pakistan that causes apprehension in India. Also, in recent years, China appears to have raised the ante by way of its shrill political rhetoric, frequent transgressions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and unprecedented cyber attacks on Indian net- works. The security relationship has the po- tential to act as a spoiler in the larger relationship and will ultimately determine whether the two Asian giants will clash or cooperate for mutual gains. Arguably, while the India-China relationship is relatively stable at the strategic level, China’s political, diplomatic and military aggressiveness at the tactical level is acting as a dampener. In its annual report to the US Congress on China’s military power, the Pentagon has revealed that the Second Artillery, China’s strategic missile force, has deployed long-range CSS-5 (DF-21) nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles close to the Indian borders. It has also been widely reported that China has agreed to provide two new nuclear reactors to Pakistan in violation of its non-proliferation commitments and in complete disregard of the Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines. The “all-weather” friendship between China and Pakistan is in Chinese President Hu Jintao’s words, “higher than the moun- tains and deeper than the oceans”. Under a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighbourly Relations, signed during Pre- mier Wen Jiabao’s 2005 tour, China has guaranteed Pakistan’s territorial integrity. Had it not been for the cover provided by its nuclear shield, an internally unstable and economically failing Pakistan would have been in no position to wage a proxy war against India in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere through its mercenary terrorists. The Chinese are engaged in building ports, roads, gas pipelines and even dams in Pakistan, including in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK). The Chinese also have plans PAGE 4 Power Play In a quarter of a century from today, China may just end up placing its military and diplomatic force to be able to affirm more power and influence than it is today, with a greater propensity to assert itself on issues and project power far beyond its shores Dr Monika Chansoria PAGE 5 The Ultimate Victory While there is a global fascination for China, the supremacy of the US soft power is grad- ually being challenged Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor PAGE 10 An Unquestionable Act AFSPA is not and cannot be a solution to our internal security caused by ethnic, social and governance problems. With changed po- litical and operational circumstances, it may be desirable to review the Act; more impor- tantly its application Viewpoint By General (Retd) V.P. Malik PLUS Cyber Threat From China 7 Showcasing Advanced Tech 8 Technologies & Systems to Protect 11 the Frontiers Viewpoint: The Elephant is Bumbling 12 Act Fast 14 Avoid Delays 16 First & Exercise 18 News in Brief 19 Let’s Dance Together As two large countries with a shared border and a long history of peaceful coexistence, the Governments of China and India have a responsibility towards their own people and the people of Asia. Both can and must work together in the interest of peace, stability and the future prosperity of Asia. CHINA FOCUS COVER STORY >> SP’s AN SP GUIDE PUBLICATION ROUNDUP October-November l 2010 IN THIS ISSUE The ONLY journal in Asia dedicated to Land Forces Volume 7 No 5 SP’s LAND FORCES 5/2010 ` 100.00 (India-based Buyer Only) WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET 1 ILLUSTRATION: Anoop Kamath CAN INDIA AND CHINA RISE TOGETHER PEACE- FULLY IN A HIGHLY COMPETITIVE WORLD? Yes No Don’t Know Join the poll & comment SP’s

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Page 1: SP's Land Forces Oct-Nov 2010

SP’s LAND FORCES5/2010

n BRIGADIER (RETD) GURMEET KANWAL

Strategic Stability, Tactical AggressivenessChina and India, both Asian giants andemerging world powers, have begun to exer-cise immense influence in international political and economic affairs. As China’sGDP is much larger than that of India, it enjoys a correspondingly greater interna-tional clout at present. Political and eco-nomic relations between India and China aremuch better now than these have ever beensince the 1962 border war between the twocountries. Mutual economic dependence isgrowing rapidly every year, with bilateraltrade increasing at a brisk pace. Even thoughit is skewed in China’s favour, bilateral tradehas crossed $50 billion (`2,25,500 crore)and is expected to touch $60 billion (`2,70,000 crore) soon. If India’s trade withHong Kong is included, China is alreadyIndia’s largest trading partner.

However, growth in the strategic and se-curity relationship has not kept pace withthe political and economic relationship. De-

spite prolonged negotiations at the politicallevel to resolve the long-standing territorialand boundary dispute between the twocountries, there has been little progress onthis sensitive issue. China has a clandestinenuclear warheads-ballistic missiles-militaryhardware technology transfer relationshipwith Pakistan that causes apprehension inIndia. Also, in recent years, China appearsto have raised the ante by way of its shrillpolitical rhetoric, frequent transgressionsacross the Line of Actual Control (LAC) andunprecedented cyber attacks on Indian net-works. The security relationship has the po-tential to act as a spoiler in the largerrelationship and will ultimately determinewhether the two Asian giants will clash orcooperate for mutual gains. Arguably, whilethe India-China relationship is relativelystable at the strategic level, China’s political,diplomatic and military aggressiveness atthe tactical level is acting as a dampener.

In its annual report to the US Congresson China’s military power, the Pentagonhas revealed that the Second Artillery,China’s strategic missile force, has deployed

long-range CSS-5 (DF-21) nuclear-tippedballistic missiles close to the Indian borders.It has also been widely reported that Chinahas agreed to provide two new nuclear reactors to Pakistan in violation of its non-proliferation commitments and incomplete disregard of the Nuclear SupplierGroup guidelines.

The “all-weather” friendship betweenChina and Pakistan is in Chinese PresidentHu Jintao’s words, “higher than the moun-tains and deeper than the oceans”. Under aTreaty of Friendship, Cooperation and GoodNeighbourly Relations, signed during Pre-mier Wen Jiabao’s 2005 tour, China hasguaranteed Pakistan’s territorial integrity.Had it not been for the cover provided by itsnuclear shield, an internally unstable andeconomically failing Pakistan would havebeen in no position to wage a proxy waragainst India in Jammu and Kashmir andelsewhere through its mercenary terrorists.

The Chinese are engaged in buildingports, roads, gas pipelines and even dams inPakistan, including in Pakistan OccupiedKashmir (PoK). The Chinese also have plans

PAGE 4Power Play

In a quarter of a century from today, Chinamay just end up placing its military anddiplomatic force to be able to affirm morepower and influence than it is today, with agreater propensity to assert itself on issuesand project power far beyond its shores

Dr Monika Chansoria

PAGE 5The Ultimate VictoryWhile there is a global fascination for China,the supremacy of the US soft power is grad-ually being challenged

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

PAGE 10An Unquestionable ActAFSPA is not and cannot be a solution toour internal security caused by ethnic, socialand governance problems. With changed po-litical and operational circumstances, it maybe desirable to review the Act; more impor-tantly its application

Viewpoint By General (Retd) V.P. Malik

PLUS

Cyber Threat From China 7Showcasing Advanced Tech 8Technologies & Systems to Protect 11the Frontiers

Viewpoint: The Elephant is Bumbling 12Act Fast 14Avoid Delays 16First & Exercise 18News in Brief 19

Let’s Dance TogetherAs two large countries with a shared border and a long history of peaceful coexistence, the Governments of China and India have a responsibility towardstheir own people and the people of Asia. Both can and must work together inthe interest of peace, stability and the future prosperity of Asia.

CH INA FOCUS COVER STORY>>

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R O U N D U P

October-November l 2010

IN THIS ISSUE T h e O N L Y j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s

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ILLUSTRATION: Anoop Kamath

CAN INDIA AND CHINARISE TOGETHER PEACE-FULLY IN A HIGHLY

COMPETITIVE WORLD?Yes No Don’t Know

Join the poll & comment

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SP’s LAND FORCES5/2010 3

CH INA FOCUS COVER STORY <<

to build a rail link through the KhunjerabPass to link up with the main railway line inPakistan so as to gain access to Karachi port.It was recently reported by Selig Harrisonin the International Herald Tribune that7,000 to 11,000 Chinese People’s Libera-tion Army soldiers are deployed in thenorthern areas of Gilgit-Baltistan. They areperhaps there for counter-terrorism activi-ties to prevent Islamist terrorists from mov-ing into Xingjian through the KarakoramRange. The military presence in PoK, thedenial of visa to the General Officer Com-manding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C), NorthernCommand and the issuance of stapled visasto residents of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)clearly indicates that China has discardedthe charade of neutrality between Indiaand Pakistan over the status of J&K.

Strategic Relationship: Competition or CooperationOn April 11, 2005, China and India an-nounced a new “strategic and cooperativepartnership” after a summit-level meeting be-tween Prime Minister Manmohan Singh andPrime Minister Wen Jiabao. International an-alysts were quick to note that the prospects ofa more cooperative relationship betweenthese two growing economies had significantglobal implications. A meaningful strategicpartnership will lead to mutually beneficialsynergies between Chinese and Indianeconomies. India is rapidly emerging as aleader in software development. Its knowl-edge-based industries are attracting the inter-est of major information technology (IT)enterprises from all over the world. China isnow a leading base for the manufacture of IThardware. Synergising India’s software capa-bility and China’s hardware strength will pro-duce an unbeatable combination.

The rapidly growing appetite of both thecountries for energy and their high depend-ence on oil and gas imports is forcing both tosecure oil equity abroad. Chinese and Indianoil and gas companies have often been incompetition with each other to invest inoverseas fields and have driven up prices byoutbidding each other. A strategy based oncooperation rather than competition willhelp both the countries secure better termsand will enable them to share their risks.They could follow a consortium or joint ven-ture approach for bidding and invest in shar-ing infrastructure costs such as buildingjoint pipelines. So far, cooperation in thisfield has been extremely limited.

China and India’s coordinated approachin international negotiations is proving to bemutually beneficial to both. When two coun-tries that represent more than a third of theglobal population speak in unison, as hasbeen seen in their coordinated approach inthe Doha round of WTO negotiations and onenvironmental issues, particularly in the

2009 World Climate Summit at Copen-hagen, the world has no option but to sit upand take note. China and India played acalming role in the 2008-09 global financialmeltdown that has now begun to peter out.They are likely to work together towards thelong-pending reform of the international fi-nancial architecture. As both the countrieshold substantial foreign exchange reserves,they will increasingly play a greater role indecision-making in the existing BrettonWoods organisations.

The reform of the UN Security Council(UNSC) is yet another area for cooperation.Just as India had played a very positive role inChina’s membership of the UN and its subse-quent inclusion in the UNSC, India expectsChina to support its aspiration for a seat in anexpanded UNSC. This will quite naturally in-crease Asia’s clout in world affairs. However,so far such explicit support has not beenforthcoming. In Asia, China and India shouldwork together for peace and stability andbroader regional economic integration tomake the 21st century truly Asia’s century.Counter-terrorism is another area in whichChina and India can cooperate for mutualbenefit as both countries are victims of pan-Islamist fundamentalist terrorism emanatingfrom across their borders. In this context, Ex-ercise Hand-in-Hand series of joint militaryexercises, conducted at Kunming in 2007and at Belgaum in 2008, were steps in theright direction. Both also need to work to-gether to counter the menace of narcoticstrafficking from the Golden Crescent on oneside and the Golden Triangle on the other.

Areas of ConcernIn the Indian perception, there are severalmajor areas of concern that are limiting thegrowth of the bilateral relationship. Theforemost among these is the “all-weather”friendship between China and Pakistan i.e.in Chinese President Hu Jintao’s words,“higher than the mountains and deeperthan the oceans.” China’s military aid hasconsiderably strengthened Pakistan’s war-waging potential and enabled it to launchand sustain a proxy war in J&K and in otherparts of India. Therefore, by implication, it isalso China’s proxy war.

Other contentious issues include China’scontinous opposition to India’s nuclearweapons programme; its deep inroads intoMyanmar and support to its military regime;its covert assistance to the now almost de-funct Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam(LTTE) in Sri Lanka; its increasing activitiesin the Bay of Bengal; its attempts to isolateIndia in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

while keeping India out of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation; and its relentless ef-forts to increase its influence in Nepal andBangladesh. China’s efforts to develop portfacilities in Myanmar (Hangyi), Chittagong(Bangladesh), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Mal-dives and at Gwadar in Pakistan are seen bymany Indian analysts as forming part of a“string of pearls” strategy to contain Indiaand develop the capacity to dominate thenorthern Indian Ocean region around2015-20. Though at present the IndianNavy dominates the northern Indian Ocean,a maritime clash is possible in future as thePLA Navy begins operations in the IndianOcean—ostensibly to safeguard its sea lanesand protect its merchant ship traffic.

In an article, “Warning to the IndianGovernment” (posted on the website of theChina Institute of International StrategicStudies on March 26, 2008), Zhan Lue, aCommunist Party member, warned Indianot to “walk today along the old road of re-sisting China” as the People’s LiberationArmy is now well-entrenched in Tibet andwill not repeat its mistake of withdrawingafter a border war as it did in 1962. He ex-tolled the virtues of the PLA’s newly devel-oped capabilities and went on to advise India“not to requite kindness with ingratitude.”Another Chinese scholar advised his govern-ment to engage India’s neighbours to breakIndia into 26 parts. These surprisingly sharpattacks in scholarly journals do not appearto be isolated pieces of writing. Analysts inIndia believe that such scurrilous writingscould not have been published without theexpress sanction of the Chinese authoritiesas almost all Chinese media are state con-trolled. This type of rhetoric sets back effortsat reconciliation and mutual understanding.

China’s moves are seen by Indian ana-lysts to be part of a carefully orchestratedplan aimed at the strategic encirclement ofIndia in the long-term to counter-balanceIndia’s growing power and influence in Asia,even as China engages India on the politicaland economic fronts in the short-term. Astwo large countries with a shared border anda long history of peaceful coexistence, theGovernments of China and India have a re-sponsibility towards their own people andthe people of Asia. Both can and must worktogether in the interest of peace, stability andthe future prosperity of Asia. Healthy com-petition for markets can have positive spin-offs as long as it is conducted in a spirit of co-operative security. China must not hold res-olution of the territorial dispute hostage toits successful integration of Tibet with thenational mainstream. Once the long-stand-ing territorial dispute is resolved, there is noreason why the dragon and the elephantcannot dance together. Gurmeet Kanwal is Director, Centre for LandWarfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi.

It was quite amusing to read recent media reports

on the Air Chief’s statement that 50 per cent of the

Indian Air Force (IAF) systems and equipment

were obsolete. A newspaper report termed this as

a “startling revelation”. Either our honourable fourth

estate is totally ignorant about matters military or

their comprehension is weak because what the Air

Chief revealed is known to the strategic community

for the past nine years or so. The request for infor-

mation (RFI) for the so-called 126 aircraft deal was

issued in 2001 and even today it is not known by

when this deal will be finalised and by when will the

combat aircraft start coming into the country. The

strength of the IAF has been reduced by more than

eight strike squadrons, at a time when the opera-

tional challenges and threats in India have in-

creased exponentially and this news has been in

circulation for many years. The inefficiency of our

current procurement system will ensure that at

least another decade will go by the time the new

aircraft are absorbed in the IAF. The Indian Navy

is in a better position than the rest though their sub-

marine fleet stands diminished. In this context, the

state of procurement for the Indian Army is quite

startling. The army air defence systems are either

obsolete or on the verge of obsolescence. No new

system has been introduced in the past 20 years.

As far as the artillery is concerned, no new gun has

been introduced in the army since the last 30

years. The mechanised forces, which will be at the

forefront of the battles in the plains and deserts,

ostensibly seem better off, but detailed scrutiny re-

veals that the modernisation of the T-72 tanks

which constitute the largest number of the existing

tank fleet, and their overhaul, are both way behind

schedule severely affecting the operational effi-

ciency of the equipment on the battlefield. More-

over, they are virtually devoid of any night fighting

aids which will cripple their operational effective-

ness. The infantry combat vehicle, the BMP II, the

mainstay of the army’s mechanised infantry, is also

blind at night and thus will be severely handi-

capped in operations at night. The infantry, the

“Queen of Battle” is also handicapped by the exis-

tence of obsolete small arms which have no night

sights, and other equipment, which is on the verge

of obsolescence. There is nothing new, except fer-

vent hopes, aspirations and plans which never

seem to fructify. An industrial age army is expected

to fight information age conflicts. So how startling

is this revelation?

Let for a change, the spotlight shift from Com-

monwealth Games to the inertia of the political

leadership, the bureaucracy, and the military in se-

curing the nation. Let the slothfulness of India’s de-

fence procurement system which is preventing

timely modernisation of the armed forces to pre-

pare for future threats, be exposed.

ED

IT

OR

IA

L

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

Once the long-standingterritorial dispute is resolved, there is no reason why the dragonand the elephant cannotdance together

Indo-China Joint Excercisein Belgaum, 2008

PHOTOGRAPH: SP Guide Pubns

Page 4: SP's Land Forces Oct-Nov 2010

n DR MONIKA CHANSORIA

As the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations (ASEAN) gears upfor a meeting of the Asia-Pacificregion’s security architecture,much heed is being paid to the

fact that India and the United States havebeen extended an invitation for the meet—translated by many as a potential sore pointfor China. Given that China reaffirms that itwould commit itself to becoming a force forpeace and stability in Southeast Asia—maintaining and enhancing relations withASEAN so as to achieve its regional objec-tives appears to be assuming prime impor-tance in the Chinese policy-making process.

There is a growing sense of apprehen-sion and unease especially among nations

within Asia that with its rapidly expandingmilitary reach and prowess, coupled withhigher stages of economic growth, the mili-tary spending power of the People’s Republicof China (PRC) is only bound to increase—thus furthering its intent to chip away atclaims of other nations through mecha-nisms of coercive diplomacy. A question inthe foreseeable future that seems pertinentis whether Beijing is keeping a wide array ofoptions available including that of militarycoercion following diplomacy so as to pressfor politico-diplomatic advantage as it standsto resolve impending disputes in its favourwhile bargaining from a position of strength.

China asserts its sovereignty over sec-tions of the 1.2 million square miles of theSouth China Sea and finds itself in con-tention with Taiwan and other ASEANmembers including Vietnam, Brunei,Malaysia and the Philippines. The South

China Sea is known for containing valuableand unexploited reserves of oil and naturalgas and is home to fishing grounds as well.As these nations vie for their share in theSouth China Sea, it stands to pose as a sym-bol of realist power play as far as achievinggoals in national interest for all contendingnations are concerned.

In what could be described as a prudentmove by China is that it has chosen to adopta cooperative and lithe approach towardsthe Southeast Asian nations. This can beread as an effort by the Chinese leadershipto keep the US involvement in the region atbay or at least keep it restricted to minimal-istic levels as a large section within the Chi-nese policy making views the US’ motives inthe region to contain (ezhi) China. This canbe seen in light of the US Pacific Command

mission statement which reiterated, “…ready today and preparing for tomorrow,the US Pacific Command promotes securityand peaceful development in the Asia Pacificregion by deterring aggression, enhancingregional security cooperation, responding tocrises and fighting to win.” Therefore, theinvitation extended to the US and Indiawithholds geo-strategic and political under-tones as well. In that the ASEAN has takennote of India’s rising geo-political impor-tance and its potential to emerge and estab-lish itself as a potential challenge to China’sgrowing clout within Asia. Hence, the presence of the US and India in forums suchas the ASEAN is sure to suffice as a counter-balance to China. India is uniquely placedto play a significant role in the Asia-Pacificbalance of power. The recent times have wit-nessed a rapid growth in Indian interests—economic, political and strategic—as well as

a growing realisation that developments inthe Asia-Pacific do in fact, impinge upon In-dian interests.

The Chinese campaign strategy notesthat striking only after the enemy has struckdoes not mean waiting for the enemy’s strikepassively. The strategy affirms not to give up‘advantageous chances’ in campaign or tac-tical operations. China is likely to use the ar-gument in order to justify use of forceincluding offensive and pre-emptive strikesas defensive in nature.

The fact that China’s gradual rise topower has ushered in benefits even for theASEAN member-states cannot be denied.However, an equally reinforcing reality of Bei-jing making strident efforts to augment thatpolitical, economic and military influence inthe region, more so to resolve the outstanding

maritime territorial disputes in its favour, canalso not be annulled altogether.

Therefore, even if the ASEAN nations ad-vocate active engagement with China, thepossibility of ongoing economic engagementand collaboration in the regional security ar-chitecture will not provide long-term an-swers/solutions to the existential disputes.Any sense of drawing complacency regard-ing China’s lack of certain technological ca-pabilities owing to which it will be difficultfor it to translate its ambitions into reality,would likely prove to be an impetuous op-tion. The fact is that Beijing is circumspectlyworking towards bridging these existentialgaps. As China’s regional influence in South-east Asia rises, a critical reality that standsto be taken cognizance of, is that China hascompleted its task in what is described as the‘first island chain’— primarily coastal oper-ations. Thereafter, the ‘second island chain’strategy aims to develop the capability toproject power beyond the second islandchain starting from the arc from Japanthrough Guam, Northern Australia and In-donesia. Moreover, as the Sino-Russian gapin nuclear naval forces is narrowing. By2030, China is expected to have more nu-clear assets at sea as compared to Russia.

The ASEAN nations are wary of the factthat the power projection capabilities beingbuilt up by the PLA shall indeed intimidateASEAN countries in the backdrop of the im-pending maritime disputes in the region.Laying added emphasis on the PLA Navy, the2008 Chinese White Paper on National De-fence had stated that in line with the off-shore defence strategy, the PLA Navy haschosen to take informationisation as the ori-entation and strategic priority of its militarymodernisation drive. The PLA Navy hasdeepened reforms and innovations in train-ing programmes and methods, and is focus-ing on maritime integrated joint operationsto further enhance the integrated combatcapability in conducting offshore cam-paigns. Additionally, the PLA Navy hasstepped up building of ship bases, berthingareas, supply points, docks and airfields. It isin this context that the new Chinese navalbase at Sanya, on Hainan Island, capable ofhousing a large fleet of surface warships andalso of serving as an underwater naval basefor submarines, including nuclear SSBNswill allow China to extend its influence in theSouth China Sea and command superiornaval presence closer to important sea lanes.Eventually, the PLA Navy aims to operateand sustain itself in the northern IndianOcean Region by about 2015.

For that reason, it is highly plausiblethat in a quarter of a century from today,China may just end up placing its militaryand diplomatic force to be able to affirmmore power and influence than it is today,with a greater propensity to assert itself onissues and project power far beyond itsshores. The formulation that Beijing’s economic expansion has offered and willlikely continue to offer positive trade-offs tothe Southeast Asian region has a flip side toit as well. The rise of China, economicallyand its consequent policy of engaging theregion, by no means can take the light awayfrom the military-security dimension giventhe apprehensions of the ASEAN states vis-à-vis China’s quest to seek regionalhegemony. The author is a Senior Fellow at the Centre forLand Warfare Studies, New Delhi.

SP’s LAND FORCES 5/20104

Power PlayIt is highly plausible that in a quarter of a century from today, China may just end up placing its military anddiplomatic force to be able to affirm more power and influence than it is today, with a greater propensity toassert itself on issues and project power far beyond its shores

www.spslandforces.net

>> CH INA FOCUS D I P LOMACY

PHOTO

GRAPH

: PIB

The rise of China, economically and itsconsequent policy of engaging the region, byno means can take thelight away from the mili-tary-security dimensiongiven the apprehensionsof the ASEAN states vis-à-vis China’s quest toseek regional hegemony

Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh meeting with Prime Minister of China, Wen Jiabao, during his visit to the

United States, in New York on September 24, 2008

Page 5: SP's Land Forces Oct-Nov 2010

SP’s LAND FORCES 5

CH INA FOCUS M I L I TARY STRATEGY <<

n LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

In the article ‘The Rise of China’ pub-lished in the November-December1993 issue of Foreign Affairs, NicholasD. Kristoll, the former New York Timescolumnist stated that China’s econ-

omy would surpass that of the US to be-come the world’s largest by the middle of21st century. He predicted that China’s eco-nomic growth would have a certain nega-tive influence on the world’s economy. Hedeclared that if there were to be a powervacuum in the Pacific and Far Eastern re-gions, China would take advantage of it asan opportunity to expand its regionalsphere of interest. His observations haveturned out to be prophetic. Today, whilethere is a global fascination for China, grad-ually the supremacy of the US soft power isbeing challenged. The success of China’snational strategy employed so far and flow-ing from that their military strategy needsto be studied and analysed so as to establishthe veracity of global concerns regardingChina’s conduct and stance in the future.As a first step, strategic and militarythinkers need to study the evolution and de-velopment of China’s military thoughtthrough the ages which would indicate thetrend of China’s military strategy and theirmilitary conduct in the future, and also givean insight into the mental condition ofChina’s military leadership and their sol-diery. This article briefly deals with the evo-lution of China’s military thought in thefollowing context: l The warring states eral Maoist military thought l People’s war under modern conditionsl Active defence

l Local wars under high-tech conditionsl Local wars under conditions of “infor-

matisation”

The Warring States EraChinese have their own unique perceptions,which may be difficult to appreciate withoutan examination of their ancient militarythought and ancient statecraft. Recent Chi-nese writings about the future security envi-ronment have referred to “the warring stateera” in Chinese history which pertains to theperiod from 475 BC to 221 BC. During thisage, the classics of Chinese statecraft wereproduced and it was also the time whenmulti-state competition to become powerful,featured schemes and plots, small wars, inter-state conferences, treaties, and anarchyemerged. China’s military authors have calledthe future multi-polar world quite similar tothe warring states era and declare that thefuture security environment resembles thewarring states era in many ways. The Direc-tor of Research at the General Staff Depart-ment of the PLA has published six volumesof studies on ancient statecraft in 1996 thatcontained specific advice of how to compre-hend the current and future security envi-ronment. In this context, China’s concept ofcomprehensive national power and the influence of Sun Tzu’s “art of war” are alsoimportant driving factors.

Comprehensive National Power: Thecurrent Chinese concept of ComprehensiveNational Power (CNP) was invented in1980s but stems from Chinese traditionalmilitary philosophy. By CNP, it generallymeans the sum total of the powers orstrengths of a country in economy, militaryaffairs, science and technology, educationand resources and its influence (China Insti-

tute of Contemporary International Rela-tions 2000). In a more abstract manner, itrefers to the combination of all the powerspossessed by a country for the survival anddevelopment of a sovereign state, includingmaterial and ideational ethos, and interna-tional influence as well (Huang Shuofeng1999). Ancient Chinese strategists also at-tempted to help their country to achievedominance through war avoidance strate-gies. The Chinese are of the view that a cal-culating CNP can aid a nation for war as wellas in coordinating a political and diplomaticoffensive during crisis in peacetime.

Sun Tzu’s Art of War: This was writ-ten 2,000 years ago. It throws light on gen-eral principles of how the PLA may fight inthe future. Another source frequently re-ferred to by Chinese military thinkers is the36 military strategies or stratagems, the lastof which is—“Running away as the bestchoice. Evade the enemy to preserve troops.The Army retreats: No blame. It does not vi-olate the normal practice of war.” The otherstratagems include deception, ingenuity andstealth—the characteristics which are foundin the “art of war” and later in the works ofMao Zedong. These ancient and moderntexts constitute the military heritage that isimprinted on the soldiery before they enterservice and then throughout their profes-

sional military education experience. The artof war begins by proclaiming “war is a mat-ter of vital importance to the State…. It ismandatory that it be studied thoroughly.”PLA demonstrates this idea by the degree ofplanning it undertakes prior to any militaryoperation, or an exercise. Sun Tzu’s maincontribution can be attributed in the field ofmilitary strategy where he argued that “thebest policy is to take a state intact” and “tosubdue the enemy without fighting is theacme of skill”. While overt military strengthis important, other aspects of national powerare essential to waging war.

Maoist Military ThoughtMao wrote on every aspect of the military—the philosophy of war, strategy, tactics, or-ganisation, logistics, the importance of manin warfare, the relationship between thearmy and the society, between the party andthe army and so forth. Most of Mao’s writ-ings, the published ones, belong to the erabetween the Zunyi Conference of 1935,when his military ‘line’ became party’s ‘line’and the end of civil war in 1949. During thatperiod, he developed several concepts of waras a social product; war as a form of politicswith bloodshed; the necessity for the weak toengage in a protracted war with a powerfulenemy; the establishment of ‘red’ baseswhere the entire population could be mo-bilised for a total war; the concentration ofa superior force to attack the enemy’s weak-nesses; treating the enemy as a supplier ofweapons; treating the soldiers humanelyand giving them political education; partycontrol of the armed forces which were geo-graphically scattered; the three strategicphases of protracted war—strategic defen-sive to conserve one’s strength, strategic

The Ultimate Victory

While there is a global fascination for China, the supremacy of the US soft power is gradually being challenged. Read through the article to know more about the success of China’s national strategy, which hasflowed from its evolving military strategy.

Active defence is some-times called China’s military strategy orstrategic guideline

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: Wikipedia

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consolidation to build up strength, and fi-nally the strategic offensive to annihilate theenemy and achieve victory—and he pre-scribed the style of war for each phase i.e.guerrilla wars for the phase of strategic de-fensive, conventional war of movement ormobile warfare during the consolidationphase and then stand-up warfare by divi-sional strength and above during the strate-gic offensive phase. During all these phases,Mao emphasised the importance of manover machine (weapons) which he was laterto call the ‘spiritual atom bomb’.

The belief in the ultimate victory of thepeople despite an adverse balance of forcesmeant that for China all wars would be-come protracted wars in which the peoples’power would ultimately prevail. Anotherimplication of the belief in the ultimate vic-tory of the people was regarding the con-cept of defeat. Total destruction did notmean defeat and Chairman Mao believedthat so long as the Marxist-Leninist ideol-ogy survived in the human mind, militaryforces could be built up from the scratch tocontinue the struggle. Mao’s political goalsand strategic doctrine was therefore derivedfrom the Marxism-Leninism- Mao Tse Tungthought and these in turn determinedChina’s military capability.

People’s WarThe doctrine of People’s War was derivedand developed during the Japanese War(1913-45) in China. It is a doctrine for asym-metric wars, a recipe for the weak to resistthe strong. It is a doctrine of a defensive warto be fought on Chinese territory of fightingone or more invaders with total mobilisationof China’s population. In the worst case sce-nario, in a nuclear setting, it envisaged theinvolvement of the following steps: l A pre-emptive nuclear first-strike against

Chinese nuclear installations, cities andindustrial centres.

l The enemy invades the Chinese territoryin force.

l Other adversaries invade China fromother directions.

l The PLA opposes the invasion at the bor-ders. While simultaneously the generalmobilisation of the people is ordered.

l The PLA forces organised in military re-gions manage their own theatres of warto contain the threat.

l When the enemy penetrates deeper, theywould encounter the second echelonarmies organised in the military districts.

l Deeper inland, the People’s Militia will beready to fight by harassing the enemy,cutting his supply lines, providing intel-ligence about his movements, laying ambushes, and generally fighting a pro-tracted guerrilla war.

l The actions of People’s Militia would givethe time for regular forces to be musteredand reorganised in the depth areas forcounter attacks and counter strokes.

l Even if the enemy were to occupy certaintowns and cities, the wide expanse ofChina’s countryside would be adequateto wage a protracted war.

l The doctrine envisages that the enemywill be finally forced to withdraw fromthe Chinese territory.A similar strategy would be applied in de-

fensive non-nuclear settings. The People’sWar doctrine is not for application for pro-active offensive settings beyond the bordersof China. In any case, two out of the threeelements which constituted the land forcesduring Mao’s time i.e. the Provincial Armiesand People’s Militia were designed andequipped to operate locally in their ownareas. Only the field armies could be em-ployed beyond the Chinese borders.

Some aspects of warfighting can be un-derstood through a series of aphorisms ofChairman Mao who had said, “Our strategyis to pit one against 10; our tactics is to pit10 against one. And never fight a battled un-prepared. And again concentrate two, three,four or even 10 times the enemy forces.” The

other aphorisms deal with tactics for guer-rilla warfare, the establishment of bases inthe countryside, concepts of envelopmentand annihilation and so forth.

People’s War Under Modern ConditionsIt took two to three years after the death ofMao for a clear pattern to emerge. In October1979, Xu Xiangqian, the then Minister of De-fence, wrote, “To master advanced modernmilitary thinking, we must combine Marx-ism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought with thepractice of modern warfare and realisticallysolve problems regarding the theory andpractice of building a people’s army andlaunching a people’s war under modern con-ditions.” Modernisation of PLA and the adap-tation of new ideas to the doctrine of People’sWar were seen as complementary rather thanto the detriment of national defence. The dra-matic cuts to the military funds in the 1981budget compelled the PLA to submit to theparty’s modernisation priorities. Financialconstraint revealed the impossible task ofmodernising a huge army of nearly 250 com-bat divisions and 2,800 independent regi-ments in the main and local forces toacceptable levels. Accordingly, People’s Waroffered China a way out of the above dilemmaas its doctrine relied on the masses to oppose

an invading enemy. People’s War under mod-ern conditions was therefore preached as adoctrine of necessity rather than a move wel-comed by the military.

Active DefenceActive defence is sometimes called China’smilitary strategy or strategic guideline. Eventhough active defence advocates that Chinawill strike after the enemy has struck, yet theline between accepting the enemy’s firststrike and use of pre-emption to defend Chinais blurred. In 1936, Mao had defined, “Activedefence is also known as offensive defence ordefence through decisive engagements. Pas-sive defence is known as pure defence. Passivedefence is actually a spurious kind of defenceand the only real defence is active defence, de-fence for the purpose of counter-attackingand taking the offensive—militarily speakingour warfare consists of alternate use of de-fensive and the offensive. In our case, itmakes no difference whether the offensive issaid to follow or to precede the defensive, be-cause the crux of the matter is to break theencirclement and suppression.”

War under High-Tech ConditionsNew regulations were promulgated in 1999to fight wars under modern high-tech con-

ditions. Mao’s basic military princi ples wereupdated to conform to military develop-ments and new technologies of the late 20thcentury. After issue of the new regulations,the National Defence University published abook, On Military Campaigns, to be used to in-struct PLA officers on their new warfightingdoctrine. The book provides detailed insightsas to how PLA intends to conduct operationsat the operational level of war at army groupand higher levels in the future. The book ad-dresses itself to larger principles but sometactics can be inferred.

Based on the existing military regions tocommand forces from all services in their re-spective regions, in times of war or nationalemergency, war zone headquarters will beestablished. War Zone HQ are “joint” organ-isations as are military regions, but theboundaries may be redrawn based on thestrategic missions. Within a war zone, therewill be a direction of main effort as well assupporting directions (to achieve secondarymissions). Under the overall war, zone com-mander would be the commanders for themain direction along with the commandersfrom the services participating in the opera-tion. The smallest level organisation in theground forces is the Group Army or what wecall a “Corps”.

Local Wars under Conditions of Informatisation China’s Defence White Paper 2008 stressesthe need for modernisation throughoutChina’s armed forces, achievable in partthrough new acquisition programmes, butmore generally and importantly through aprocess of informatisation, a coordinated,network-centred enhancement programme.The network-centred approach is consideredvital for optimising component contribu-tions to both offensive and defensive opera-tions, and particularly critical to success in“local wars”. China is developing new, tech-nologically advanced equipment, using anambitious and exponential “leapfrog devel-opment” programme. In doing so, it notesthe importance of previous modernisationin allowing a significant reduction in the sizeof its armed forces, with the inference thatfurther force reduction may be possible.

US Annual Report to the Congress -2010 The 2010 US Annual report to the Congressmentions about the concept of informatisa-tion and emphasises on the effects of moderninformation technology on military decisionsand weapons employment cycles. The termofficially entered the PLA’s lexicon in 2002when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)General Secretary and Central Military Com-mission (CMC) Chairman Jiang Zemin in aspeech before the 16th Party Congress, re-ferred to the concept as necessary for thePLA’s rapid modernisation and for enablingintegrated joint operations. Jiang’s addressrecognised that moving China’s military on apath towards informatisation would requireintegrating the entire PLA with common in-formation systems as well as a new organisa-tional model for warfighting. The PLAformally institutionalised the concept in2004. PLA analyses of the US and coalitionoperations in Iraq and Afghanistan have re-emphasised the importance of informatisa-tion and joint operations. Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor is a former Com-mandant of the Army War College.

CH INA FOCUS M I L I TARY STRATEGY>>

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People’s War under modern conditions waspreached as a doctrine of necessity rather thana move welcomed by the military

PHOTOGRAPHS: China MoD website

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CH INA FOCUS D I P LOMACY <<

n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH

“Thus it is in war that the victorious strategistonly seeks battle after the victory has been won,whereas he who is destined to defeat, first fightsand afterwards looks for victory”

– Sun Tzu, The Art of War

News about cyber attacks originat-ing from China during the recentCommonwealth Games shouldnot have come as a surprise andneither should Jeffrey Carr’s as-

sessment of China directing Stuxnet atIndia, including the partial failure of INSAT4B. To say that the Chinese Government isoblivious to hackers operating from its terri-tory would be the height of stupidity. It is im-possible for a country that has a vice like gripon her population and is notorious for inci-dents like Tiananmen massacre and more re-cently the spiriting away of some 10,000civilians during anti-government agitationin Xinjiang. The fact is that cyber attacksemanating from China are obvious parts ofa well defined government programme. Rac-ing to achieve greater comprehensive na-tional power coupled with the ambition to beat the top of the world order by surpassingUSA, China couldn’t care less if is brandedas the top cyber terrorist country in theprocess. Chinese cyber warfare capabilitiesare deep, pervasive, and a threat not only toforeign governments and militaries but alsoforeign corporations and individuals.

PsycheAn analysis of the behaviour of China overthe years brings out three distinct features—ambiguity, deception and ruthlessness. Theformer two also being vigorously emulated byChina’s ardent disciple Pakistan, which hasorganised its own hackers and is allegedly re-sponsible for originating viruses like ‘seabrain’. What is unambiguous is China’s doc-trine of pre-emption and surprise, which be-lies her facade of being a peaceful nation.Surprise, deception and shock effect are allhallmarks of a bully and China’s super powerambitions are making her erratic and intimi-dating, disregarding international behaviourand norms, be it the South China Sea, the Seaof Japan or cyber space. Cyber warfare alignswith Chinese characteristics of ambiguity, de-ception and ruthlessness, especially as it isvery difficult to accurately pinpoint the pointof origin of cyber attacks. Even if it gets tracedin the vast Chinese territory, China blatantlydenies any government patronage while art-fully orchestrating the same. Vast segments ofpopulation employed in this activity will con-tinue their hacking activity behind the ironcurtain of communist China.

There are numerous examples of China’sarrogance, ruthlessness and vile—overrun-ning Tibet in 1951, grabbing 38,000 squarekilometres of Indian territory of Aksai Chin;death of millions of her own population dur-ing what she termed the Great Leap; advisingPakistan to raise a militia (today’s jihadis) tofight India in the hinterland; threatening Indiaduring 1971 war with Pakistan; 1979 inva-sion to teach Vietnam a lesson; brazen nuclearand missile proliferation to Pakistan, NorthKorea and Saudi Arabia (Silkworm missilesold to latter) in contravention of the MissileTechnology Control Regime (MTCR), NuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and NuclearSuppliers Group (NSG); the 1989 Tiananmenmassacre, continuously threatening Taiwan,unilaterally extending maritime boundaries in

South China Sea with scant regard to Viet-nam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and thePhilippines; wilful, periodic and deliberate in-cursions into Indian territory, wanting Inter-national Offshore Rule (IOR) to be recognisedas Chinese sphere of influence and managedby Chinese nuclear submarines and carriers;claiming Arunachal Pradesh as a Chinese ter-ritory and labelling it as South Tibet, etc.These are all signs of an exceedingly aggres-sive nation.

GenesisChina today is believed to have the most ex-tensive cyber warfare capabilities in theworld and more importantly it has the ruth-lessness to use it offensively. The genesis per-haps was suspicion of its own citizens that acommunist country like China has nurturedsince Mao’s long march. Keeping a grip onthe vast population was no easy task and re-quired employing every conceivable meas-ure. Focussed investments was usheringtechnological advancements at a fast pace.Surveillance of the citizenry required cyberchecks as well. Cyber surveillance require-

ments include deciphering encrypted e-mails and documents, for which Chinaemploys parasite software programmestermed ‘bots’ that allow their users to hijacknetworked computers. The Chinese have es-tablished an Internet spy network, whichperhaps is the most extensive in the world.

The requirement of keeping tabs on thepopulation for internal security led the Chi-nese Government to build the Great Firewallwith the ability to control total Internet ac-tivity within the country. Any traffic on theInternet (coming in or going out of China)can be cut off by the flip of a switch. Noother country has such extreme measuresin place. China’s spat with Google last yearwas unprecedented. China would like thateven private companies submit their com-puter security technology for governmentapproval, rendering their computer encryp-tion inside China useless and showing theChinese how to penetrate their computersystems. Using the current technology,China can hack into most programmes notonly by breaking codes but also throughcapturing information upstream on Inter-net servers since these are under state con-trol. Tight control over Internet has resultedin better cyber defence capability. However,all this has now been overtaken by China’sglobal ambitions and today her cyber focusis mostly outwards.

Set UpChina has organised its bots into ‘botnets’ or‘bot armies’ that form a highly extensive In-ternet spy network. Enormous amount ofcomputer hardware and communicationequipment is also being exported. This pro-vides opportunities to embed malware at thedevelopment/manufacture stage itself; theparasite can lie dormant till activated by Chi-nese masters. Keeping the information infra-structure under tight government control,China leverages its manpower resources toconduct far more direct and holistic cyberwarfare operations than any other country.Hacking is a flourishing career and govern-ment is known to have been recruiting themthrough agencies by placing advertisementsin Chinese language newspapers. Creation ofmalware (trojans, trapdoors) for embeddedvulnerabilities is well rewarded. According tothe US sources, in addition to employingthousands of its own hackers, Chinese gov-ernment manages massive teams of expertsfrom academia and industry as cyber militiaswith support and direction of the PLA.

The PLA’s network warfare battalion,

electronic warfare battalions, intelligence andpsychological warfare battalions have all beenmeshed into the cyber warfare conundrum.Web Defacement Groups spearheaded by PLAwere formed more than a decade back andnational level cyber defence exercises and fieldexercises have been held over the years. Theseinclude simulated attacks on foreign coun-tries like India, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea,etc. Such exercises have graduated to ‘offen-sive computer operations and cyber warfare’exercises to rehearse pre-emptive cyber strike.Several cyber warfare units have been formedin China by hiring the best IT graduates andculling requisite manpower from some25,000 software companies. Focussed re-search is also being done at the State Labora-tory for Information Security. Scores ofspecialists are working at another research fa-cility at Datang since the past six years to takecontrol of national networks of countries likeIndia, Taiwan and Japan.

Cyber TerrorismThe Chinese have made cyber warfare a vitalingredient of the country’s war doctrine.China perceives information warfare as acheap and effective method to reign supreme,match the US and the West and believes thataggressive information warfare improves herstature, which confirms the hallmark of a psy-chotic bully. Cyber attacks originating from

China, especially the ones integrating IW andEW have definite direction and involvement ofChinese Government and the PLA. China isaccused of hacking the Pentagon as well asBritish and German Government networks.Indian websites of the Ministry of External Af-fairs (MEA), Bhaba Atomic Research Centre(BARC), National informatics Centre (NIC),Ministry of Defence (MoD), National SafetyCouncil (NSC), Federation of Indian Cham-bers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), DalaiLama’s office and Indian embassies abroadhave been hacked/defaced by Chinese web de-facement groups. Data from Defence Researchand Development Organisation (DRDO), Hin-dustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), navaldockyards, nuclear installations, militarybases, defence HQs, Institute of Defence Stud-ies and Analyses (IDSA) and other think tankshas been stolen by the Chinese hackers. Con-sidering the sophistication, finesse and pat-tern, cyber attacks in India have ChineseGovernment patronage, though China wouldlike us to believe that these are courtesy crim-inal gangs based in Sichuan and Guangdong.

China not only hacked Google but ex-ploited a previously unknown vulnerability ofMicrosoft’s Internet explorer browser, hack-ing into several websites worldwide (nowbeing referred to as ‘Aurora’). Major cyber at-tacks by China against the US commenced in2004 hacking into military laboratories, Na-tional Aeronautics and Space Administration(NASA) and World Bank. This was followedby hacking the State Department, missionsabroad, systems in Washington, Naval WarCollege and Commerce Department’s Bureauof Industry and Security in 2006. In 2008,election campaigns of Barack Obama andJohn McCain were hacked. Again in 2009, of-fices of Senators were attacked. This was alsothe year when “Ghostnet” which penetratedinto more than 1,200 systems in 103 coun-tries (including India) was discovered to havebeen originated in China. Chinese hackersalso stole data from Lockheed Martin’s F-35fighter programme. The latest global cyberterrorism act has been the deadly virusStuxnet, which in all probability originated inChina. Which other country will be interestedto see INSAT-4B impaired? The worm report-edly infected some 60,000, 13,000 and over6,000 computers in Iran, Indonesia andIndia, respectively.

Implications for IndiaOur dependence on China/foreign vendorsfor hardware, software and telecommunica-tion equipment and parts makes our vulner-ability all the more precarious. All theseimports would invariably have bots that noware user friendly and difficult to detect sincethey do not slow down the system, as was thecase earlier. Indian companies operating inChina should have no doubt that their entirecomputer systems are or will be compro-mised. Indians using Internet in Chinashould be equally aware that they have sev-eral bots inside their system. Most Chinesewebsites have embedded bots. Logging on tosuch a website implies automatic download-ing of bots/botnets into your computer. Moresignificantly, China can break into websitesanywhere in the world to install bots.

Like her satellite industry, Chinese cyberwarfare effort has been in place for long andhas absorbed foreign doctrines and concepts.The evolution from a defensive concept (monitoring population for internal security)

Cyber Threat From ChinaWe need a parallel defensive and offensive approach. We must develop a credible deterrent, shedding the fear ofannoying the dragon, a euphuism that limits our capacity to interpret the signals emanating from China

ILLUSTRATION: Anoop Kamath

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I N T ERNAL SECUR I TY>>

SP’s LAND FORCES 5/20108

www.spslandforces.net

n SUCHETA DAS MOHAPATRA

The third edition of India’s only exhi-bition dedicated solely to homelandsecurity, Indesec 2010, showcaseda range of products and solutions tosecure t he borders, coasts, aero-

space, and to counter the rising internal in-surgencies in the country. Organised by theAssociated Chambers of Commerce and In-dustry of India from September 6 to 8, 2010,the expo witnessed leading edge technologyfrom across the world including Europe, theUS, Israel, France, etc. The expo was inau-gurated by the Minister of State for HomeAjay Maken focused on homeland and bordersecurity, network-centric operations andmaritime security. Several conferences andpanel discussions on issues like internal secu-rity and cyber security were also organised.

For the first time, the Homeland SecurityExecutive Mission of the US India BusinessCouncil (USIBC) attended the expo. The del-egation was being led by Admiral James Loy,Senior Counsellor at The Cohen Group anda former Deputy Secretary in the US Depart-ment of Homeland Security, and Lt GeneralHarry Raduege, Chairman of the DeloitteCenter for Cyber Innovation and co-chair-man of the Commission on Cyber Securityfor the 44th Presidency. Loy said, “There aremany common areas where the US andIndia can work together. We can share ourpractices and technology. Here at the expo,there are 20 companies from the US, display-ing solutions developed in a post-9/11 envi-ronment. It is an extraordinary effort tobring forward and offer tools helpful to peo-ple around the world.” Speaking about cybersecurity, Rauduege said, “Today everythingthat we do in homeland security ends withcyber security. We have to develop the rightpolicies and procedures. I feel we need to ad-dress this complex area in three ways—peo-ple, process and technology.”

While many companies seemed upbeatabout the Indian defence and homeland se-curity market, few did not seem very happy.Bureaucratic hurdles and delayed decision-making seemed to have dampened theirspirit. Maurice IDOUX, Vice President, HGHSystems said, “It is extremely difficult to sellin India. It is a complicated process.” ButJohn Gordon, International Trade Sector Ad-viser Security & Defence, UK Trade & Invest-ment seemed quite satisfied with the Indianmarket, “Nothing happens overnight. Com-panies need to understand the market andknow how to do business. We advise compa-nies to do the homework first.”

Northrop GrummanNorthrop Grumman presented its capabilitiesin command and control, situational aware-ness and unmanned ground vehicle systems.Using its critical incident response system(CIRS) together with TouchTable(tm), thecompany demonstrated the ability to inte-grate seamlessly a variety of national securitysolutions into a common situational aware-ness display for crisis management. Also ondisplay was the integrated tactical commandand control services (I-TaCCS) and inte-grated joint operational command and con-trol services (I-JOCCS). The company alsoshowcased its unmanned ground vehiclesystems for remote handling of hazardousthreats including bomb disposal, tactical andsurveillance operations and the highly ver-satile heavy duty robot Andros F6A vehicle,  

WallopWallop Defence Systems demonstrated its ex-

pendable infra-red aircraft countermeasures.The advanced dual-band spectral flares andtraditional magnesium teflon viton (MTV)infra-red countermeasures helps counterthreat posed by air-to-air and ground-to-airIR-guided missiles. The company’s full-rangeof innovative expendable IR decoys includ-ing spectral flares and traditional MTV flaresare compatible with most countermeasuredispensers and are fitted with unique safetyand arming mechanisms.

BAEBAE Systems concentrated on discoveringhidden networks with its analytical tools suchas Detica NetReveal and TxtReveal Ana-lyzer. Through its wholly owned subsidiaryDetica, the company unveiled national secu-rity technologies at the homeland securityexpo. Detica’s NetReveal tool enables govern-ment and law enforcement agencies to gener-ate intelligence that will identify and counterthose who threaten the safety of the public,the security of the state or seek to commit se-rious and organised crime. Detica’s TxtRevealAnalyzer is a search and analysis software so-lution designed specifically to enable analysts,investigators or field based personnel to un-lock the intelligence hidden in volumes ofstructured, unstructured or free text data.

CobhamAt Indesec, Cobham cameras positioned ona dog became a crowd puller, although thecompany had many more solutions in itskitty. The company also demonstrated thevehicle intercom systems (VIS) that providesthe customers with a complete capabilityacross a wide spectrum of platform typesand functions, ranging from light vehicles toheavy armour and command centres. Cob-ham’s family of VIS includes ROVIS(AN/VIC-3), LV 2 and the new TacG2 pro-viding clear, reliable communications in anycombat environment. While LV2 has been

built for use on light vehicles, medium ar-mour and heavy armour, ROVIS (AN/VIC-3)is for medium and heavy armoured vehicles.

SRTSRT launched AIS Class B Plus which hasboosted transmit power for extended range;integrated satellite for global tracking; alertmessage transmit and receive options; andanti-tamper and internal UPS system. Thedevice can be configured to send and receivepre-determined messages to provide usersand authorities with alerts. The other prod-ucts included AIS Class A (conforms to IMOAIS Class A specifications); AIS Class (guar-antees users best performance in terms oftarget acquisition and range); AIS Receiver(full dual channel receiver with field range)and AIS Identifier (ultra low cost AIS trans-mit only tracking device).

General Dynamics General Dynamics showcased three key se-curity and resilience capabilities—protectionof critical national infrastructure; deploy-able infrastructure and urban intelligence.The company’s approach to intelligence,surveillance, targeting and recognition(ISTAR) and its new virtual extra sensoryperception (VESPer) system gives securityforces a real edge. The company showcaseda host of ISO containerised solutions fromborder security and surveillance units toemergency accommodation, sanitation andmedical facilities.

HoneywellHoneywell’s stall at the homeland securityexpo highlighted on T-Hawk, the unmannedmicro air vehicle providing real time situa-tional awareness in critical situations; uni-versal surveillance integration platform, citysurveillance, etc. Also on display was thecompany’s building solutions, universal sur-veillance (HUS) and the remotely manage-

able electronic surveillance solution.

ITTITT showcased a range of products includ-ing night vision goggles, night vision binoc-ular, helmets for ground personnel andaviation helmets. But one of the most strik-ing was the SpearNet, the next generationultra high frequency (UHF) radio. It is a pow-erful communication tool that provides aseamless, self-healing ad-hoc networkingand multi-hop routing capability, allowingSpearNet to multiply force effectiveness.

MistralMistral’s mobile surveillance van (MSV) wasa part of the displays at homeland securityexpo. The MSV is a unique, custom designedsolution for law enforcement agencies, eventmanagement companies and private secu-rity companies.

IRobotsiRobots Corporation displayed devices whichcan be used by security forces to see, hearand evaluate dangerous situations from asafe distance. The company showcased the210 Negotiator and Packbot 510. The 210Negotiator is an affordable surveillancerobot for public safety professionals. Like-wise, the Packbot 510 performs multiplemissions like route clearance, explosive haz-ard identification for surveillance.

OTTSouth Africa’s Offroad Truck and Trailer(OTT) showcased its latest mine protected ve-hicle—Puma M26-15. It is based on TATALPTA 715c 4x4 truck and has a maximumgross vehicle mass of eight tonnes. It is pro-tected against mines, improvised explosivedevices (IED) and NATO calibre small armsballs fire. The Puma has been manufacturedkeeping in mind the homeland security mar-ket where its combination of mobility, agility,protection and fire power enables securityforces to take the battle to the militants withconfidence and effectiveness.

French companiesHGH Systems showcased its Vigiscan, thepanoramic infrared vision system for imme-diate detection and tracking of intruderseven in complex backgrounds. Eurilogic dis-played telemetry solutions like trunkeyground stations (antenna to data analysing),on board data acquisition system, flight testcentres engineering, debriefing solutions,data link and video link, etc. Proengin prod-ucts included hand held detectors to detectbiological and chemical warfare agents inairports, metros and other vulnerable areas.Lacroix demonstrated its expertise in autoprotection, training simulation, defenceequipment, pyrotechnic components, home-land security, and law and order mainte-nance. Aria Technologies offered softwarepackages to evaluate the CBRN releases inthe environment.

Indesec 2011Indesec 2010 saw an increased participationof companies as compared to previous years.And if the organisers are to be believed, thefourth edition of Indesec to be held from June20-22, 2011 at Pragati Maidan, New Delhimay have a still larger gathering. Brigadier(Retd) Raj Manchanda, Director, Indesec Expo2010 said,” We have got very good responsefrom the industry and next time we will try tobring in more companies.” (For more information and videos log on towww.spshomelandsecurity.com)

Showcasing Advanced TechIndesec 2010 provided an opportunity for Indian and international companies to promote homeland securitysolutions and latest technologies

PHOTOGRAPHS: Abhishek / SP Guide Pubns

Northrop Grumman Wallop

Mistral

IRobots

OTT’s Puma M26-15

Page 9: SP's Land Forces Oct-Nov 2010

FLIR Systems opens your eyes to an extraordinary new level of EO/IR performance in handheld sensors for today’s global special operations forces. Our Recon® III family of systems meet long range and medium range needs with compact, lightweight design, modular versatility and the highest resolution in its class. You’ll also fi nd internal GPS, laser pointer and rangefi nder capabilities for precise target geo-location. For a fi rst-hand look, go directly to the source. www.FLIR.com/GS© 2010 FLIR Systems, Inc.

Page 10: SP's Land Forces Oct-Nov 2010

In early 1990s, I was commanding a division that had troops deployed forcounter-insurgency operations in Manipur, Nagaland and a part ofArunachal Pradesh. During the run-up

to the Manipur Assembly elections, a leaderof a political party in order to garner students’support and votes, made the removal of theArmed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA), amajor electoral issue. When he won the elec-tions and became the Chief Minister, I wentto meet him. I asked him about his plansabout the AFSPA. He said that in view of the“popular demand”, he would write to theHome Ministry and have it removed from thestate. I told the Chief Minister that it was ‘ok’with me. I will pull out troops from the 60-oddposts, bring them together outside Manipurand train them for their primary role of fight-ing a conventional war.

“But you cannot do that! What will hap-pen to the law and order situation?” he said.I appreciated his concern and told him po-litely but firmly that I couldn’t help himmaintain that without a proper legal cover. Isaid, “I cannot have my subordinates holdme responsible for giving them any unlawfulcommand.” Then, very respectfully I stated,“Sir, the best way out is to create conditionsin the state wherein the AFSPA is not neces-sary. If you and the Centre do not considerand declare Manipur as a ‘disturbed area’,the AFSPA cannot be applied. Please do notblame the AFSPA for the problems of Ma-nipur. The fact is that despite several elec-tions in the state, we have not been able tocreate conditions wherein this Act need notbe applied in Manipur. The armed forces can-not create those conditions. These are prima-rily of political, ethnic and socio-economicnature, under your charge now.”

In recent months, the Chief Minister ofJammu & Kashmir, trying to hijack the AFSPAagenda from the opposition parties and sepa-ratists, is making the same demand and thesame mistake of putting the horse before thecart. However, what we must concede is thatin the last 20 years, the national attentionand focus of the international communityhas shifted markedly towards the humanrights issues. The media, therefore, is more ac-tive in highlighting such issues and tends tolook at the AFSPA negatively.

The AFSPA was enacted by the Parlia-ment in 1958 for the “disturbed areas” of

the North-east. Later, it was extended to dis-turbed areas declared anywhere in India. Ithas four essential paragraphs. Para 3 statesthat if the Governor of a State/Union Terri-tory or the Central Government is of theopinion that the whole or any part of theState/Union Territory is in such a disturbedor dangerous condition that the use of thearmed forces in aid of the civil power is nec-essary, the government by an official gazettenotification may declare the whole or af-fected part to be a disturbed area. Para 4states that a commissioned officer, warrantofficer, non-commissioned officer or anyother person of equivalent rank in thearmed forces in a disturbed area may: l Fire upon/use force, even causing death,

against any person contravening lawand order or carrying weapons, ammu-nition or explosives, if in his opinion it isnecessary for maintenance of law andorder and after giving due warning.

l Destroy an armed dump or fortified posi-tion or a shelter from which armed at-tacks can be made or can be used fortraining by hostiles, if necessary to do so.

l Arrest without warrant any person whohas committed a cognizable offence andmay use suitable force, if necessary todo so.

l Enter any premises without a warrant toarrest a terrorist/suspect, or to recover awrongfully confined person, stolen prop-erty, or arms/explosives wrongfully kept. Para 5 of the Act lays down that the ar-

rested persons will be handed over to thenearest police station ‘with the least possibledelay’. Para 6 states that ‘no prosecution,suit or other legal proceeding shall be insti-tuted except with the previous sanction ofthe Central Government, against any personin respect of anything done under this Act’.

Due to its prolonged promulgation in theNorth-east and J&K, people often ask as towhat has been achieved with the AFSPA. Wemust understand that the AFSPA is not andcannot be a solution to our internal securitycaused by ethnic, social and governanceproblems. It is only a political instrument toenable the armed forces to bring the level ofinsurgency or terrorism under sufficientcontrol. When such a situation is achieved,it is for the political authority to negotiate aconflict resolution as has been done in somestates of the North-east and Punjab. In J&K,it has enabled us to create conditionswherein we could hold free and fair electionsand allow the state to be run by its electedpeople. And what if such military operationshad not been possible or successful?

The 1958 Act may have been describedas a ‘special power’. But those of us whohave commanded troops in such situationshave always looked upon it as a legal protec-tion to conduct effective operations. What isalso quite obvious is the fact that as andwhen the law and order situation improvesin a ‘disturbed area’ and we have elected rep-resentatives governing the state, they find itdifficult to continue with this Act. The rea-

sons could be:l Democratic societies all over the world

abhor large-scale and extended deploy-ment of troops in their midst.

l Human rightists and the media over theyears have dubbed the AFSPA as a ‘dra-conian’ power given to the militaryagainst the civilians. It has become aconvenient tool for the secessionists todemand withdrawal of troops or clippingtheir wings.

l Despite strict discipline and training,there are aberrations of human rights vi-olations by troops. Commanders oftenfind difficulties in punishing the guiltydue to factors like secessionists’ moti-vated false allegations, lack of evidence,organisational loyalty and avoiding badpublicity.

l The army is not adequately transparenton human rights violation issues like thenumber and nature of complaints received, investigated, offenders pun-ished, etc.

l There are hardly any cases of the CentralGovernment giving sanction to prose-cute the accused guilty of human rightsviolations. The need for the AFSPA to counter insur-

gency and anti-terrorist operations is unquestionable. However, with changed polit-ical and operational circumstances, it may bedesirable to review the Act; more importantlyits application. My suggestions would be tomake more judicial magistrates accompanymilitary patrols, increase joint military-civilpolice operations so that the police does thehouse search and arrests, streamline earlyhandover of arrested persons when policedoes not accompany patrols, the army bemore transparent in its dealing with humanrights aberrations, and the Central Govern-ment explain the reasons whenever permis-sion to prosecute the accused cannot be given.

What is even more important is thatlarge-scale and extended deployment oftroops for internal security should be avoided.This would be possible when we make thecivil/police organisations more effective. Also,the state political leaders in disturbed areasshould assess the law and order ground situ-ation in the Unified Command and avoidmaking the AFSPA a public agenda. (The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the writer.)

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An Unquestionable ActAFSPA is not and cannot be a solution to our internal security caused by ethnic,social and governance problems. With changed political and operational circum-stances, it may be desirable to review the Act; more importantly its application.

PHOTOGRAPH: Wikipedia

to the offensive concept has been easy. Na-tional level cyber offensive plans may nothave fully crystallised yet, but would definitelymature before the end of this decade. Chinesecyber warfare capabilities pose an expandingserious threat to India especially since it is aninstitutionalised and focussed national effortby the Chinese. Penetration, theft, interfer-ence, injecting viruses, and jamming of ournetworks, C4I2SR, army intranet, UAV data,radio/microwave/cellular/satellite communi-cations/satellite and missile launches/pro-grammes are all possible.

RequirementFrom the above, there should be little doubtthat there is absolutely no scope for compla-cency. We need to have a sustained institution-alised national effort. Such an effort wouldneed continuous monitoring, review and pe-riodic upgradation least it gets lost in shroudsof secrecy like the numerous intelligence fail-

ures. Protection against cyber threats is a con-tinuous process which needs proactive effortsby specialists to prevent attack and if it doeshappen, contain the damage and assist in swiftrecovery. The US is already raising a cybercommand to wage digital warfare and bolsterdefence against mounting threats to its com-puter networks. It is prudent for us to create atleast a dedicated task force for enhancing ourcyber warfare capabilities and focus on mak-ing ‘cyber dominance’ an essential componentof our war doctrine. At the national level, weneed to mull that in consideration of the mam-moth organisation, infrastructure and invest-ments by China in cyber warfare, what exactlywe require. Palming off the responsibilitymerely to National Technical Research Organ-isation (NTRO) is unlikely to achieve much. Dowe follow the Chinese model?

Since we are some years behind, a dualapproach will be required; instituting defen-sive measures as well as developing an offen-

sive capability as a deterrent. We must realisethat the days of Mahabharata are gone anddefensive measures by themselves meannothing. Cyber warfare threat is no less thana nuclear threat. It is a dirty war that can col-lapse your economy and security. It requiresa commensurate response. We simply have todevelop a deterrent to China’s national levelcyber warfare offensive plans against us.There may even be a requirement to selec-tively demonstrate such deterrence to a bullylike China if she attacks us. That would be theonly way to ensure credibility of such deter-rence. If our satellites are being interfered byChina, what is stopping us develop capabilitiesto redirect the Chinese missiles?

Defensive and offensive approach China’s cyber warfare capabilities pose a po-tent threat to India. We need a national ef-fort—a parallel defensive and offensiveapproach. We must develop a credible deter-

rent, shedding the fear of annoying thedragon, a euphuism that limits our capacityto interpret the signals emanating fromChina. Though we are late starters, fortu-nately China’s offensive cyber warfare capa-bility is not fully developed yet. If we do notwake up and get our act together, we will notonly lose the asymmetric war but the conven-tional one as well, and our regional and globalambitions. Additionally, information age mul-tiplication opens up several vulnerabilities.We lack indigenous capability in hardware,critical software and communication equip-ment and depend on imports largely fromChina. Vulnerabilities are well known in em-bedded system commercial protocols, virtualnetworks and telecommunication infrastruc-ture. We need a fundamental shift from indi-vidual entity to central overview, control andassessment of security measures. Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch is a former Direc-tor General, Information System, Indian Army.

Continued from page 7

www.spslandforces.net

GENERAL (RETD) V.P. MALIK

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T ECHNOLOGY <<

www.amgeneral.com

Abattle is ultimately won (or lost)on the land. It is the warriorsfighting on the land who finallyhold or capture the territory.Thus, the effectiveness of the land

systems that helps the soldiers to perform tothe best of their abilities plays a crucial rolein a battle scenario. Mobility, agility, commu-nication, lethality and protection, availableto the soldier are vital factors that determinethe effectiveness of a land system.

Defence Research and Development Or-ganisation (DRDO) has pioneered a widerange of technologies and systems for landbased applications.

MBT Arjun MK-I is the contemporary ar-moured combat tank that has been devel-oped by DRDO. It has been extensively testedby the Army over a variety of terrain spe-cially hot Indian desert. Weighing littleunder 60 tonnes, its 1,400 hp engine pro-vides power to weight ratio of 22 hp pertonne and can take it to a maximum speedof 70 km/hr. It can clear vertical obstaclesup to 0.91 m and has medium fording capa-bilities up to 2.1 m. Its excellent mobility indesert has been very well established duringextensive trials. The MLC-70 class mobilebridging systems provide MBT Arjun the re-quired reach and deployability in riverineterrains where permanent bridges are notavailable. The advanced hydro-pneumaticsuspension provides excellent ride, comfortand a highly stabilised platform giving it theprecision “firing-on-the-move” capability.

The thermal imaging system providesnight vision and firing capability. The Kan-

chan Armour provides excellent protectionto the tank and its crew. Arjun MK-II willhave explosive reactive armour (ERA) as ad-ditional protection against tandem war-heads. It will also have additional featuressuch as missile firing capability from themain gun, autotracking, commander’ssight with night vision and ammunitionwith enhanced penetration.

The experience and expertise gainedduring the process of development of MBTArjun have been utilised to moderniseAjeya Tanks. These tanks of Russian originhad been the mainstay of Indian Army andthe modernisation has given them a newlease of life.

A wide range of combat/support vehicleshave also been developed by DRDO to meetthe land fighting capabilities of a modernarmy. These include mobile bridging systemslike Sarvatra Bridge, BLT-72 and modularbridge, armoured engineered reconnaissancevehicle (AERV), armoured amphibious dozer,counter mine flails and so on.

Another area where DRDO has devel-oped considerable expertise involves re-motely operated vehicles such as Daksh,disrupter mounted robot (DMR) and gunmounted remotely operated vehicle (GMR).These systems have been designed for ap-plications in conventional warfare as wellas homeland security missions.

The dedicated efforts of DRDO towardsenhancing self-reliance in defence systemshave empowered the nation with state-of-the-art combat vehicles, bridging systems andcombat engineering support systems.

Technologies and Systems to Protect the Frontiers

PHOTO

GRAPH

S: DRDO

Armoured Engineer Recce Vehicle

Arjun Tank

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SP’s LAND FORCES 5/201012

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The elephant bumbles through theforest; the mahout atop concen-trating on his precarious perch. Instead of guiding the elephantthrough the maze of thick foliage,

he keeps peeking over his shoulder to ob-serve how other mahouts fortify their holdto prevent falling. The elephant has thestamina to carry on for days on end but doesnot know where to go, often ending up mov-ing in circles. Sensing the master’s preoccu-pation, he sometimes gobbles up largeamount of mahua or such flowers that gethim intoxicated. His inebriated amble giveshim temporary relief though he keeps hop-ing his rudderless journey will find directionsome day. Why is India referred to as an ele-phant? Which direction are we going?

Strategic ForethoughtSuccessive Defence Ministers have gone onrecord to say that India’s strategic interestsencompass areas from Malacca Straits toMiddle East, Commonwealth of IndependentStates (CIS) countries and the whole of Asia.These statements including the regionalpower/emerging global power claims boildown to semantics in the absence of requi-site follow up. It is a shame that even 63years after independence we still do not havea National Security Strategy (NSS). Shouldsomeone demand reason through RTI, per-haps we will witness blame game betweenthe National Security Advisor (NSA) and theMinistry of Defence (MoD), with the ForeignMinistry sitting on the fence. MoD is yet tocreate an institutionalised strategic thinkingmechanism within itself, individual intelli-gence being no substitute. Do not confusethis with Headquarters (HQ) Integrated De-fence Staff (IDS) that has a separate HQ,denying the much hyped integration withMoD before its creation. Not that there is lackof intellect in the country for strategicthought—a sizeable strategic communityexists. HQ IDS, preceded by the Defence Plan-ning Staff (DPS), undertakes excellentstrategic planning, but there is no follow upand the papers are gathering dust up theline. The National Security Council (NSC)does strategic thinking but only in advisorycapacity. There are a host of think tanks,mostly in the national capital, but these donot have access to requisite government in-puts and neither does the government takethem seriously. Given that political mastersmay not be able to coin NSS on their own,what stops them from tasking bureaucracyto produce the draft in say six months,analyse, debate and implement it. The mili-tary would readily provide assistance inchalking out the NSS. Councils and commit-tees are no substitute for institutionalisedstrategic planning.

Defining NSS will usher in responsibility.At present, there is blissful ambiguity, sansresponsibility and blame of failures can con-veniently be put on the military. Hopefully,this is not an incentive for not having a NSS.Having read the Henderson Brooks Report,the CVC (in response to a RTI) observed it isdamning on the competence of the generalsof that time. What about political and bu-reaucratic incompetence of forcing the ill-advised forward policy; pushing a grossly ill-equipped and untrained army into alpinewarfare despite protests by the Army Chief.Remember the famous quote of the 1950s“you can scrap the army”? All this is amplynarrated in books published on the 1962war. Then why are we scared of bringing out

the official history? Had we defined the NSScoinciding with becoming a Republic, perhaps our subsequent history would bedifferent. Forget our neighbours and our am-bitions as regional/global power; the flip sideof not having a NSS should be apparent fromour internal mess including Jammu & Kash-mir, North-east and Maoist insurgencynotwithstanding announcements that wewill solve the latter in three years. Consider-ing that we permitted the problem to festerand expand for 30 years after using an ArmyDivision to crush the hardcore in Naxalbari,this can hardly be a possible timeframe.

In the absence of a NSS, we will continueto grope in the dark and fail to appropriatelydeal with our main adversaries (China, Pak-istan), falling prey to their machinations. All-party meets or Cabinet Committee of Security(CCS) meets at times of crisis cater at best tofire-fighting. A NSS would enable chalkingout short-, medium- and long-term plans forholistic implementation, reviewed on quar-terly, and six-monthly or yearly basis. Intelligence

How does one task intelligence agencies in theabsence of a strategy to guard your nationalinterests? If you do not know what your aimsand objectives are, what tasking can you do?That is why it is New York Times that tells us11,000 People’s Liberation Army (PLA)members are present in Pakistan occupiedKashmir (PoK). We might as well ask thepaper how many PLA are building roads andmanning three star hotels in Nepal, develop-ing ports, waterways and industrial parks inMyanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Theconcept of human intelligence appears tohave been given the burial. We had littleinkling of the massacre and Maoists activitiesin Nepal, attempted coup in Bangladesh, anti-India wave in Fiji or more recently how thingswould suddenly change in Kashmir. Littlewonder a former Intelligence Bureau (IB) of-ficial pens down in his book that irrespectiveof who rules at the Centre, the bulk of Indianintelligence is focused on targeting the oppo-sition. No surprises his statement has notbeen questioned.

Our approach to intelligence appears outof sync for coping with emerging threats.Post-26/11, we have established the Na-tional Investigation Agency (NIA). Do weneed the NIA? Of course, we do, but this or-ganisation gets into action “after” the inci-dent has occurred. How about preventing

the incident? With asymmetric warfare hav-ing made borders irrelevant, should we notbe looking for a single national level intelli-gence agency, responsible for both externaland internal intelligence? With added taskof existing NIA, the overall set up can still becalled NIA. How come decades after inde-pendence and having faced insurgencies foryears, we do not have an institutionalisedmechanism of intelligence collection, colla-tion and more importantly assessments thatresult in recommended responses to emerg-ing threats rather than groping aroundwhen Maoists raise violence levels or valleyyouth pick up stones.

Leadership & GovernanceIt is no secret that governance has becomethe biggest casualty in the last more thanfour decades with bursting accounts in Swissbanks/Liechtenstein’s LTG Bank, foreign as-sets, etc. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi ob-served years back that out of every `1 spenton welfare projects, just 17 paise reach theground. Today, the figure has gone even

below 7 paise, if at all it reaches. A benchheaded by the Chief Justice of India observedthat benefits of a national scheme like Na-tional Rural Employment Guarantee Act(NREGA) are not reaching the intended ben-eficiaries. Yet we say that there is no problemof governance. In Nagaland, you find a 500-bed hospital and medical college at Dimapurbut practically the entire state does not havex-ray facilities. How do you expect the popu-lation that is heavily afflicted with tubercu-losis to travel to Dimapur for x-ray especiallywith inadequate public transportation?Travel three hours south from Port Blair andyou find stark naked tribal women in pour-ing rain begging for food with children intow, never mind the crores for tribal welfareprogrammes. Every year you see road repairin Kashmir commencing just before snow-fall, enabling completion on paper and re-lease of fresh funds next summer on accountof damages due to snowfall.

Mohan Murti, former Europe Director,CII says that Europeans believe that Indianleaders are too blinded by new wealth anddeceit to comprehend that the day will comewhen the have-nots will hit the streets (theirassessment appears outdated—a countryready to tip over the precipice). They ques-tion whether the Indian nation is in coma. AGerman Member of Parliament, recently,

said on television, “If all the scams of the lastfive years are added up, they are likely torival and exceed the British colonial loot ofIndia of about a trillion dollars.” In an edito-rial on India, a German business daily wrote,“India is becoming a Banana Republic in-stead of being an economic superpower. Toget the cut motion designated out, assur-ances are made to political allays. Specialtreatment is promised at the expense of thepeople. So Mayawati, the Chief Minister ofUttar Pradesh, the most densely inhabitedstate, is calmed when an intelligence agencyprobe is scrapped. The multimillion dollarsfodder scam by another former Chief Minis-ter wielding enormous power is put in coldstorage. The Prime Minister chairs over thiskind of unparalleled loot.” Are we surprised16 former Chief Justices are being labelledcorrupt? Has this not become a national culture? Do we have a plan to check thisgrowing malaise?

Quite logically we are critical of the ‘goodTaliban’ and the ‘bad Taliban’ concept. Aredemocracies of two types—soft and hard? Ifnot, then how come we are capitulating torats of Pied Piper Pakistan in Kashmir? IfSheikh Abdullah could be incarcerated inprison outside Kashmir for so many years,how come Geelani and his cahoots were al-lowed to wallow in the squalor being directedfrom across the border and pollute the valley?Were we a hard democracy earlier that hasturned soft now? Why are we scared to ac-knowledge the nexus between J&K’s opposi-tion and Hijbul Mujahideen? Why are wescared to give figures of forcible marriages byPakistani infiltrators in J&K, the sharp rise invenerable diseases courtesy this unholy rab-ble and adverse effects on ancient Sufi cul-ture? Why not agree to the hardlinersdemand of plebiscite with proviso that in-stead of Kashmir it would be held pan-India—anyone who does not want to be partof India can get out. Why are we hesitant toarrest people flying the Pakistani flag in J&K?Obama favours a mosque on ground zero butwhy is construction of a Gompa being deniedto the Ladakhis at Kargil for the past severaldecades? Is it because they have not picked upthe gun? Why is it that while China and Pak-istan have re-written the demography ofTibet and PoK, respectively, we have failedmiserably to even rehabilitate thousands ofmigrants (forced to flee) back into J&K. Nodoubt we have earned the distinction of a softdemocracy having displayed tremendousdeficit of national will.

Negative arrogance appears to be replac-ing the need to improve governance — a trendthat does not bode well for the country. Ob-serve the raised hackles when the currentArmy Chief commenting on the Kashmir sit-uation implied we had failed to build on gainsover a period of time (the situation brought toa level by security forces) when other initia-tives should have been taken. Similar state-ments by a civilian probably would haveevoked no response. Political sensitivity to themilitary is more perhaps because truth hitsharder. No hackles rose when reviewing thesorry state of governance, Narayan Murti,former chairman of Infosys, said, “In areaswhere public governance is involved, we havehardly made any progress…the politicians andbureaucrats are trapped in a colonial mindset.They feel they are the masters and there is noneed to show fairness and transparency…thepenalty for corruption is minimal. As a result,

The Elephant is BumblingHow does one task intelligence agencies in the absence of a strategy to guardyour national interests?

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ILLUSTRATION: Anoop Kamath

P.C. KATOCH

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MASTER IN STRATEGY

Design and product ion of e lectron ic defence systems by ELETTRONICA S.p.A.

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n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH

With the mention of the worddefence, one visualises thewholesome construct of thearmy, the navy and the airforce, but any talk of defence

communications simply boils down to proj-ect defence communications network (DCN),which is only a very small part of how defence communications needs to be strate-gised and developed. Defence communica-tions are a neglected sector notwithstandingthe hype of information warriors in themaking. Not only are communications ofthe three services mismatched, little thoughtis being given to the required synthesis of in-formation and communications. The con-cept of Information and CommunicationTechnology (ICT) is yet to take off.

In the Second Lebanon War, SpecialForces of the three services of Israeli DefenceForces (IDF) discovered they could not com-municate with each other after being in-ducted into Lebanon. In the Indian context,such mismatch will be in entirety for ourown Indian Defence Forces (IDF). Inter serv-ice communications will remain at servicesHeadquarters (HQ) level unless correctiveactions are taken. Without such actions, in-formation warrior of one service will talk tohis counterpart in another service by goingvertically up to his service HQ, horizontallyto the next service HQ and then down to hiscounterpart. Even this will happen only ifthe inter-service formats are standardised.Any talk of existing jointness in the threeservices today is a gross misnomer.

Future ScenariosThe battlefield of tomorrow will be a non-linear, multi-dimensional battlespace char-acterised by nuclear ambiguity, increasedlethality, a very high degree of mobility cou-pled with simultaneity of engagement andincreased tempo of operations with com-pressed time and space, and coupled withhigh degree of transparency. In our context,the nuclear factor will further limit the depthand duration of conflict which would beshort and intense. This would call for a swiftand concerted response by the three servicescoupled with quick decision-making, theframework of which would already have tobe in place, with a joint command and con-trol structure to direct the operations.

That a single service cannot cope withfuture scenarios is an acknowledged fact.This is relevant not only to conventional warbut spans the complete conflict spectrumplus disaster management, out of area con-tingencies (OOAC) and the like. For the Armyitself, future military operations will be com-bined and joint comprising of all arms andinter-service elements. These operations willrequire units and sub-units of other arms tooperate subordinately or in cooperation witheach other. The mission specific link up withsister services will optimise the combat po-tential even at tactical levels.

JointmanshipJointness is essential to military success. Suc-cess in war has been contingent on the com-mon sense idea of jointness as seamlessintegration. Jointness implies achievinghigher joint combat effectiveness throughsynergy from blending particular servicestrengths on mission basis. In non-tradi-tional terms of military strategy and doc-trine, some term it as a response to theevolving nature of warfare. Given the fact

that in future all the services will have to op-erate jointly, even in smaller contingencies,jointness enhances the increasing synergyof modern military forces i.e. complemen-tary operations built around a key force (in-stead of a key service). In other words, nosingle weapon or force reaches its full poten-tial unless employed with complementarycapabilities of the other services.

Project DCNProject DCN is still a few years away and willsimply link the three services down to CorpsHQ and equivalent levels plus a few static en-tities. Most significantly, the project does notinclude development of requisite software.The vital handshake therefore is missingwithout which DCN actually boils down to ahighway sans traffic. The three services andHQ of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) arerequired to develop the software individuallywith attendant problems of interoperability.This denotes a lopsided approach and indi-cates the low priority accorded to a strategiccommunications project like the DCN.

Information and Communication TechnologyOur military is yet to fully realise the essentialrequirement of viewing information from thestrategic viewpoint and recognise it as a mis-sion critical resource. This requires a synthe-sis of communications and information. Inits concerted efforts to modernise, the mili-tary must align with this truth and stop treat-ing the information as just another resource.Communications cannot be planned in isola-tion anymore. They must be part and parcelof the command, control, communications,computers, intelligence and interoperability(C4I2) package in concert with our pursuitof net-centric warfare (NCW) capabilities.Significantly, the planned reorganisation ofPakistan Army’s General Headquarters(GHQ) envisages merger of the communica-tions branch into the information systemsbranch. The Chinese PLA is getting in-formised at a fast pace and Pakistan Army isfollowing suit with focused investments inrelevant sectors including communicationsand information.

Current StatusThe current status of our military jointman-ship in terms of communications or shall wesay communications and information can begauged from the following:l There is no common tri-service commu-

nication philosophy. l No policy for tri-service cyber security

and information assurance has beenevolved. As a result, required informa-tion assurance control objectives are notbeing addressed holistically.

l No tri-service policy for data handlingand data storage has been defined. Ab-sence of a clear policy has resulted indata centres mushrooming all over.

l The DCN is coming up as a strategichighway but individual services and HQIDS are developing requisite softwareseparately. This will result in seriousproblems of interoperability.

l Little progress has been made towardscommon standards and protocols for thethree services. Tri-service net-centricity isabsent. Large number of command andcontrol equipment and networks arebeing established but lack common stan-dards and protocols. Several interoperabil-ity constraints exist within each service.

l In the current dispensation, the army

strategic operational information dis-semination system (ASTROIDS) underdevelopment will not be interoperablewith its naval and air force counterparts.

l There is mismatch between the radio setsof the three services. For certain contin-gencies, the Army plans to cater to addi-tional radio sets to be given to sisterServices as an ad hoc measure.

l The army intranet which was extendedto HQ IDS since its raising was with-drawn some three years back.

l E-learning in the IA has met a dead endfor the time being as Army intranet is yetto be made fully secure and bulk of thecourse material is classified.

l Army intranet has not been extended toDefence Services Staff College (DSSC) andCollege of Defence Management (CDM)since these are tri-service institutionsunder HQ IDS though some 90 per cent ofthe students and faculty are from Army.

l Within the Indian Army, the tacticalcommunication system (TCS), approvedby three successive Defence Ministers,has still to see the light of the day, withits void seriously affecting test beds andfielding of sub systems of the tacticalcommand, control, communications andinformation (Tac C3I). The TCS is onlylooking inwards—within the Army.

l The concept of ICT is yet to be evolved. Inthe periodic tri-service conferenceschaired by the Defence Minister, the ICTplans discussed are different for commu-nications and information systems.

l The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has noinstitutionalised framework within itselffor strategies. That is why we have voidsin the National Security Strategy,Roadmap for Revolution in Military Af-fairs (RMA), tri-service NCW philosophy,tri-service ICT/communication philoso-phy, tri-service cyber security and infor-mation assurance policy, tri-servicepolicy for data handling and data storageand the like. Even the initial projectionsfor a defence communications satellitewere solely by the Indian Navy.

The RequirementThe Government/military needs to take thefollowing steps:l Accept that true jointness in the services

simply cannot be achieved in the absenceof a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). Merelydefining a joint war-fighting doctrine bythe services will not suffice. The politicalhierarchy needs to thrust down integra-tion and jointmanship as a fait accompliby appointing a CDS without furtherdelay. Sixty-three years down the linefrom independence our polity must re-alise that appointing a CDS does notimply facilitating a military coup. The ex-panding combined threat from Chinaand Pakistan requires that we optimiseand enhance our defence potential posthaste and a CDS with full operational

powers is a vital link in all this. l A tri-service NCW philosophy, ICT/com-

munication philosophy, cyber securityand information assurance policy, policyfor data handling and data storageshould be evolved.

l The project to evolve common standardsand protocols for the services must be ac-corded top priority.

l Uniformity of communications and in-formation systems under procurementby the three services should be ensuredincluding new items like software definedradios (SDRs).

l Communications and information sys-tems planning should be seamless; hori-zontally and vertically, with adequatesafeguards. An integrated communica-tion network that enables requisite stan-dard signal communication support toall the three services needs to be estab-lished. Even a project like TCS (whichneeds acceleration) should cater to par-allel links with sister services.

l The military must evolve and implementan enterprise level information securityassurance programme (ISAP). Necessaryenablers to provide core competencies forgestating and sustaining the ISAP mustbe developed as part of capacity building.At present, numerous applications arecoming up, some of them without ade-quate security solutions.

l The army intranet must be made fully se-cure and should be re-extended to HQIDS. It should also connect the DSSC andCDM for which additional funds could beallotted by HQ IDS with approval of MoD.This will enhance jointness and facilitatee-learning of the three services.

l Indigenous capability needs to be devel-oped against enemy electro-magneticpulse (EMP) attacks (nuclear and non-nuclear) as also for checking/testing ofhardware and software against embed-ded malware. The Centre for Artificial In-telligence & Robotics (CAIR) needs toexponentially increase the capacity to de-velop new and varied algorithms in orderto keep pace with rapid induction of newsystems. The Scientific Advisory Group(SAG) must find ways and means to ac-cord SAG approvals in telescoped time-frame. We need to speedily advance ourchip manufacturing capabilities, asphere in which we are decades behindChina and which has serious implica-tions for network and communicationsecurity.

Need for a reliable and robust ICTIn the jointmanship paradigm, our militaryhas only taken some nascent steps. We aredecades away from integration in its trueform and spirit. We need to take measuresfrom the existing state of cooperative func-tioning and patchy jointness to deconflictoperations, advancing to joint and finallyintegrated operations. Unless vital steps aretaken and the baggage of legacy thinking isshed, jointmanship will be elusive and ourgoal of achieving net-centric warfare capabilities will remain utopian. There arecertain hard decisions required at variouslevels and the Government/MoD too needsto take holistic stock and act fast. The requirement is to speedily establish a reli-able and robust ICT network which allowsinteroperability of the three services withinthemselves and with the government spanning the strategic, operational and tactical domains.

Act FastA reliable and robust ICT network which allows interoperability of the three services within themselves andwith the government spanning the strategic, operational and tactical domains is the need of the hour

Success in war has been contingent on the common sense idea ofjointness as seamless integration

Page 15: SP's Land Forces Oct-Nov 2010

SP’s LAND FORCES5/2010 15

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TECHNOLOGY>>

SP’s LAND FORCES 5/201016

www.spslandforces.net

n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH

Rapid developments in technologyhas revolutionised warfare. Asarmies and nations invest in rev-olution in military affairs (RMA),the key to success will lie in at-

taining higher levels of net centricity; effec-tive command and control across the force,an accelerated decision-action cycle and anability to conduct operations simultaneouslywithin an all arms group. Harnessing infor-mation technology will act as a force multi-plier to enhance operational effectiveness ofcommanders and troops at all levels by en-abling exchange, filtering and processing ofever increasing amounts of digital informa-tion at present available but not integrated.The commanders at all levels require perti-nent information in real/near real time inorder to enhance their decision-making andcommand capability. This is very relevant atthe cutting edge as well, where decisive con-tact battles will be fought.

A battlefield management system (BMS)is essential in facing present and future con-flict situations. Security of such an impor-tant operational information system (OIS)like the BMS requires little emphasis. Whatis the BMS, what security is required andhow to go about establishing the same are is-sues that merits attention. Not only shouldsecurity solutions be foolproof, they need tobe developed, tested and instituted in concertwith fielding of the BMS.

Battlefield Management System The Indian Army (IA) lacks an integrationtool supporting every level of military usersranging from individual soldier to BattalionGroup/Combat Group Commander in thetactical battle area (TBA) that can providein near real time an appropriate, commonand comprehensive tactical picture by inte-gration of inputs from all elements of thebattle group. Requirements at these levelsare of battlefield transparency through sit-uational awareness and a common operat-ing picture (COP)—pick up the enemy muchbefore he picks you up, see the target and di-rect fire in quick time using the bestweaponry available, as also monitor theafter effects. Situational awareness existingin the Indian Army is currently on ad hocbasis whereas the requirement is of an inte-grated network system. Most foreign armiesincluding those deployed in Iraq andAfghanistan have situational awarenesspackages of various types. We require a sit-uational awareness package customised toIndian Army requirements. Fielding of theBMS will be an important facet of capabilitybuilding in the Army.

Operational necessity of the BMS con-stitutes the vitals for having a faster deci-sion process by commanders at allechelons, better decisions based on reliableoperational information provided in realtime and the ability to quickly close the sen-sor to shooter loop. Overall scope of the sys-tem is to integrate, test and field a BMS dulyintegrated with other components of thetactical command, control, communica-tions and information system (Tac C3I). Forsuch a system to be customised to meet In-dian Army’s specific requirements, it willneed to be first integrated and tested in acontrolled environment in a test bed labo-ratory followed by validation trials in field

conditions. It is only after successful valida-tion of the system in field that the processfor equipping will begin. The concept of theBMS is to have an ideal system whichshould be able to integrate the means ofsurveillance and engagement through anautomated decision support and commandand control system. Exploitation of tech-nology would aim at rapid acquisition, pro-cessing and transfer of information,enhanced situational awareness, and ca-pacity to react to information and sharpenthe ability to synchronise and direct fire,thereby establishing and maintaining over-whelming operational tempo.

The objective of the system is to providea command, control and information (C2I)integration tool supporting every level ofmilitary user ranging from individual soldierto Battalion Group/Combat Group Com-mander in the TBA, which will provide in

near real time an appropriate, common andcomprehensive tactical picture by integra-tion of inputs from all elements in a battlegroup. The integration will include inputsfrom command and control elements, de-tachments, supporting arms, surveillancedevices and headquarters, thereby providinga distinct edge in the successful conduct ofoperations and optimisation of resources.Capabilities required of the BMS would in-clude: First, provide a command and controlsystem spanning the TBA spreading acrossindividuals, detachments, combat platforms,sensors, sub units, units to the BattalionCommander/Regiment Commander; sec-ond, achieve faster reaction capability andflexibility in command and control by pro-viding information automatically at theright place in the right time, thereby com-pressing the OODA loop; third, provide astrong foundation for making decisionsbased on near real time, consistent and wellstructured information, thereby enhancingthe information handling capability of com-manders at all levels; fourth, strengthen in-formation exchange by having a strongmessaging and replication mechanism; fifth,

improve and modernise presentation of in-formation in near real time; sixth, integratewith other command and control system.

Security SolutionSoftware systems must be engineered withreliable protection mechanisms, while stilldelivering the expected functionalities. Theprincipal obstacle in achieving these two dif-ferent but interdependent objectives is thatcurrent software engineering processes donot provide adequate methods and tools toachieve security goals. Despite rigorous useof many preventive measures and protectiveshields there exist faults and security loop-holes, which elude their detection effortsand do not surface until the software is op-erational. Several studies have shown thatno matter how much effort has been putinto the early stages of the software devel-opment, building fault or vulnerability free

software has proven nearly impossible inpractice. These faults may lead to serioussoftware failures, and security loopholesoften leave the system vulnerable to attacksand abuse. The requirement is of securesoftware systems including automatedmonitoring of software failures and intru-sions. Additionally, degradation of privacyin the increasingly digital world has led tothe concept of a credential system that al-lows the construction of privacy-preservingaccess control infrastructures. However, likewith any other technology, there can berisks associated that require mitigation tech-niques. In addition, adoption of a systemsengineering approach can reduce the im-pact of human nature on information secu-rity assurance, by appropriate considerationin the selection of minimally intrusivemechanisms that constrain human errorsand yet are able to achieve objectives andsupport compliance verification.

Security is a process. If you cannotmeasure it, you cannot improve it. The re-quirement is to move from a reactive ap-proach to security towards a more proactiveinformation risk management. In the back-

drop of primary security properties like ac-cess control, authentication and integrity,security coverage can be improved in prod-ucts and solutions during the design phases.By defining security assurance indicators,the deployment phases can also benefitfrom innovative monitoring tools that canprovide near-real-time assurance that secu-rity policies are effectively implemented.Standard based approaches covering designand deployment and using commerciallydriven security metrics can help measureand reduce security costs. Key distributionagain is an important aspect. Random keydistribution provides appropriate solution tothe problem of secure key establishmentand needs to be considered in resource con-strained sensor networks like the BMS.While it is generally believed that guaran-teed security can only be obtained at veryhigh communication costs, commercial solutions are available that provide securityagainst adversaries with small additionalcommunication cost. These need to be examined and tested through extensive simulations and trials. Additionally, on linekey distribution for vastly deployed OIS like the BMS needs to be examined by theIndian Army.

It is important to remember that the BMSis to be part of the Tac C3I network. There-fore, it would be prudent to have a separatesecurity solution, as should be for each com-ponent of the Tac C3I, to prohibit compro-mise of the entire network in case one of theOIS is compromised. A single security solu-tion for entire Tac C3I would be inappropri-ate no matter the number of firewalls. Thisis even more relevant in the Indian contextwhere bulk of the hardware and software isbeing imported sans testing facilities for em-bedded vulnerabilities.

The Indian SceneAs per the Cipher Policy Committee (CPC),all security solutions of confidential andabove security classification can only be de-veloped by the Centre for Artificial Intelli-gence & Robotics (CAIR). This policy wasdrafted decades back. The stipulation ax-iomatically not only covers all OIS includingthe BMS, it cuts out commercially availableoff the shelf (COTS) security solutions andtotals up to a gigantic number consideringthe ever increasing number of security so-lutions that India requires/will require (in-cluding by the security establishment) withincreasing digitisation and networking. It isalso for such reason that CAIR is in favourof a single security solution for entire TacC3I, while the Indian Army has been oppos-ing the same for valid reasons. The flip sideis that CAIR actually does resort to consid-erable outsourcing. The stipulation of devel-oping confidential and above securitysolutions only by CAIR was put in place cou-ple of years back because CAIR being partof Defence Research & Development Organ-isation (DRDO) is a government organisa-tion, such stipulation discounted dualhandling (particularly foreign nationals)and it inadvertently gave a lien or rather astranglehold to the DRDO over vital infor-mation systems individually or in conjunc-tion with the public sector undertakings(PSUs). This left the private industry highand dry albeit dual handling takes a backseat when outsourcing is resorted to. Thetime factor is also pertinent where the in-

Avoid DelaysIndia has little defence against embedded vulnerabilities in both hardware and software. We need to get ouracts together in order to prepare adequately for the 21st century challenges. The military too must ensure off-setting any asymmetric advantage to the enemy.

ILLUSTRATION: Anoop Kamath

F I F T H O F A S E R I E S O F S I X A R T I C L E S O N B A T T L E F I E L D M A N A G E M E N T S Y S T E M

Page 17: SP's Land Forces Oct-Nov 2010

digenous development of confidential andsecurity solutions by CAIR generally takesan exceedingly long period of time.

A vital issue connected with the securitysolutions is their certification and for thepurpose, the lone agency we currently haveis the Scientific Analysis Group (SAG). SAGstarted off as a crypto unit many decades’back, which at some point of time was giventhe added charter of certification. It has anannual capacity of evaluating and certifyingabout a dozen security solutions that isgrossly inadequate for a developing countrylike India where vital security solutions bynumerous agencies right from the PrimeMinister’s Office (PMO) to the lowest rungwere required ‘yesterday’. The process ofevaluation and certification of individual so-lution requires a minimum of six months,which may prolong up to three times. Delaysoccur invariably when the DevelopingAgency (DA) sends solutions to the SAG forcertification with incomplete/inaccuratedocumentation to avoid being labeled behindschedule by the user. This results in the se-curity solution shuttling between the DAand SAG, with the user suffering inordinatedelays in testing, evaluation and eventual

fielding of concerned information system.The limited capacity of SAG is affecting notonly the military establishment but also thecountry as a whole including intelligenceagencies, homeland security and the like.Some attempts were made in the recent pastto decentralise the certification of securitysolutions but it was a non-starter. The rea-son that the proposed decentralisation wasto be taken on by government organisationsonly, meant that certification was below con-fidential level and the DRDO was unable toprovide requisite scientists and mathemati-cians even for this.

What Needs to be DoneThe following issues merit urgent attentionby the Government and the military:l An overall assessment exercise is re-

quired to establish the type and quantityof security solutions that India requireson progressive basis; in the immediate,short, medium and long-terms.

l The CPC policy needs a total review inthe backdrop of the 21st century re-quirements. This review must also ad-dress the self-inflicted bottlenecks ofCAIR and SAG.

l For developing security solutions, thepolicy should take into account COTS so-lutions (including their possible customi-sation) and development by specificallychosen and nominated indigenous pri-vate industry having administered anoath of secrecy akin to a government or-ganisation. There should be a reason ofmistrust as these Indian nationals underoath would be no different from the per-sonnel of CAIR.

l Immediate measures are required to en-hance the evaluation and certification

capacity of SAG to perhaps three/ fourtimes within a time bound schedule. Thisshould include nomination of specifi-cally chosen and nominated cells of in-digenous private industry, administer anoath of secrecy and functioning underSAG for evaluation and certification ofsecurity solutions below secret classifica-tion. This is a practice followed abroadand we should have no reservations onthe issue considering that the individualsare Indian nationals akin to employeesof SAG.

l SAG should examine the feasibility ofcutting down the time for evaluation andcertification of individual security solu-tions from six to three/four months.

l Where decentralisation of evaluationand certification of security solutionswithin government organisations isplanned, government must ensure this isaccompanied with a package of provi-sion of requisite scientists and mathe-maticians by DRDO on immediate basis

and the authorisation should be of secretand below classification.

l There is a requirement to ensure severepenalty on DAs who submit security solu-tions for evaluation and certification withincomplete/inaccurate documentation.

l Prioritisation of the systems being referred to the evaluation and certifyingagency (currently SAG) should be doneat various levels within the services andeventually at the Ministry of Defence inthe backdrop of operational require-ments and fielding schedule of varioussystems.

l The country at present has little defenceagainst embedded vulnerabilities inboth hardware and software. Continuedintransigence on the issue has severenational security ramifications. Weneed to address this issue urgently andholistically.

Avoidable Asymmetric AdvantageThe increasingly tightening bottlenecks ofdeveloping, evaluating and certification ofsecurity solutions is restricting India’s capa-bilities. In the present circumstances, the defence and security establishments in par-ticular will continue to experience ‘avoidabledelays’, slowing upgradation of net-centricwarfare (NCW) capabilities. This would givean avoidable asymmetric advantage to ouradversaries, particularly those that areworking post haste on offensive cyber war-fare capabilities. We need to get our acts to-gether in order to prepare adequately for the21st century challenges. The military toomust ensure offsetting any asymmetric ad-vantage to the enemy. The author is a retired Lieutenant General of theIndian Army.

SP’s LAND FORCES5/2010 17

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The defence and securityestablishments in partic-ular will continue to experience avoidable delays, slowing upgrada-tion of NCW capabilities

We require a situationalawareness package customised to the IndianArmy requirements.Fielding of the BMS will be an importantfacet of capability building in the Army.

Page 18: SP's Land Forces Oct-Nov 2010

SP’s LAND FORCES 5/201018

www.spslandforces.net

A soldier from the Indian army fires theJavelin anti-tank missile on November 8during Yudh Abhyas 2010, an annual bilateral training exercise, at DonnellyTraining Area, Alaska.

there is no fear of repercussions and there isno accountability.” Murthy recommendedabolishing generalised administrators of In-dian Administrative Service and replace themwith ‘specialists’ under a new Indian Manage-ment Service.

Military and National DefenceDefence preparedness and modernisation ofthe military is based on the long-term inte-grated procurement plan (LTIPP). The LTIPPshould actually flow from the NSS, which isnot defined. Hence, the LTIPP obviously isnot based on a holistic appraisal of whatIndia should have in terms of defence. NSSwould enable net assessment including sim-ulations, opposition analysis, critical reviewsand low-probability high-impact contin-gency planning. Defence Minister A.K.Antony admitted last year we are lagging inprocurement by some 15 years. Who is ac-countable for this mess and resultant loss ofcombat capability? Going by past experienceof delays prolong into eternity, the future ap-pears bleak both in terms of quantity andquality, especially in comparison to Chinariding a revolution in military affairs (RMA).The gap is increasing exponentially and isdangerous in the face of growing Chineseaggressiveness. It is no secret that today ourmilitary is inadequately equipped. PerhapsGurmeet Kanwal’s recommendation of aNational Military Commission to go into thewhole gamut of restructuring and moderni-sation merits serious consideration.

Can there be a greater absurdity thanholding crisis meetings to review the ArmedForces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) on ac-count of heightened civilian casualties in thevalley when the forces responsible for theselarge number of civilian casualties are pri-marily police and CRPF (both not underAFSPA) and not the military. Why do we lackguts to say that AFSPA has been thoroughlydebated by Parliaments in the past and can-

not be diluted? The simple truth is that thearmed forces are sent in when the State hasfailed to control the situation. Have guts toadmit governance deficit and make visible ef-forts to improve it. By diluting AFSPA, do youwant the armed forces to fail and let the Statecapitulate? Are we capitulating to Pakistanimachinations? How would China and Pak-istan deal such stone pelting in their owncountry? Should such assessment not giveus the required clue? National security andnational interests simply cannot be diluted.

Instead of discussing dilution of AFSPAand working on the next economic packagefor J&K, we need to take stock of what hasbeen the effect of earlier ‘economic packages’.What is the employment they generated, if atall? On face value, no significant developmentgenerating employment appears to have hap-pened over the years other than induction ofthe railway and hydel projects. Do we have anestimate of the unemployed youth in J&K anda plan of employment? Mere announcementsof economic and political packages are notlikely to achieve much especially consideringwhat actually reaches the ground.

Despite strong recommendations of theKargil Review Committee, the Governmenthas failed to appoint a Chief of DefenceStaff (CDS). The reason being cited is thatthere is no consensus within the services.In UK, after no consensus for 18 years, theCDS was simply thrust down upon the mil-itary. Why can’t we follow suit if the re-quirement is nationally accepted. Evenwhen there was consensus amongst serv-ices during 2005, no CDS was appointed.The ploy being used over the years is thatan outgoing incumbent is induced with thecarrot of post-retirement employment tostate that time for appointment of a CDSwas not opportune. Today, with combinedand heightening threat from China andPakistan, there is urgent need of a CDS.However, intransigence being the order of

the day, there is little chance of this happen-ing where even NSS and national securityobjectives remain undefined.

Government apathy towards military(advertent and inadvertent) has been onthe rise. Order of precedence and conse-quent prestige of the military is being con-sistently eroded. Forget the Sixth PayCommission, approved payments and ar-rears of Fourth and Fifth Pay Commissionsordered by Supreme Court are being deniedby simply going back to the court time andagain ensuring decades of delay. Experienc-ing the inefficacy of regular administrativecadre in border/troubled areas, the Britishhad gone in for a Frontier AdministrativeService employing military officers. Despitefailure of governance in insurgency areas(which we fail to acknowledge), powers areloath to implement such system. Yet Britishlegacy of ‘divide and rule’ is well adapted inensuring no consensus for appointing CDS.This was more in evidence during theNDTV programme (September 12) on onerank one pension (OROP) where bureau-crats attempted to draw a wedge betweenthe officers and personnel below officerrank (PBOR) by stating the latter have beengiving their due—a mischievous misinfor-mation. Support was garnered through aprofessor who was equating the militarywith fire-fighting services. The programmealso highlighted the incredibly low compen-sation being given to disabled veterans. Re-member Honorary Captain Bana Singh(PVC of Siachen fame) having had to join amarch in Jammu for being paid Rs 112 permonth for the Param Vir Chakra? Over theyears, the services have been denied mem-bership in the National Pay Commissionand the recent order of a High Court to es-tablish a separate Pay Commission for thearmed forces will perhaps be swept underthe carpet in one pretext or the other. Expressing shock over the payment of a

monthly pension of Rs 70 to a 90-year-oldwidow of an Army officer, the SupremeCourt on September 17 issued a notice tothe Centre and the army seeking its response to a PIL filed by her.

What an irony that in a country whereon one hand successive Presidents havelauded the armed forces for their yeomanservice and as the last bastion, they alongwith veterans (including disabled) aretreated in such shoddy fashion. Letters byveterans written in blood and return ofmedals to the President (the Supreme Com-mander) are treated as routine and coun-tered through political statements that thisis not expected from veterans. Look at theirony. Gujjars or Jats take to violence anddestroy crores worth of government prop-erty and politicians huddle to find wayshow to meet their demands. Some seniorveterans have written to the President andPrime Minister of the dangers of such apa-thy citing isolated case of veterans taking toviolence (copies of letters circulating theweb). Hopefully, the government realisesthat abjuring veterans can inadvertentlypush them to join the Maoists or adopt vio-lence as a livelihood. This would be a hope-less situation for India with 60,000 weapontrained individuals retiring every year fromthe Indian Army alone.

National Security RequirementsWorld attention, including India, is rivetedon assessing which way China is going.While it is important to do so, it is doublyimportant to chalk out the direction the Indian elephant should take after definingour national security requirements in a systemic institutionalised manner. The mahouts need to do their bit. Without this,we may succumb to the balkanisation intent of our adversaries. (The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the writer.)

MissionPossible

The vast desert surrounding the Ne-vada National Security Site (NNSS),which is home to millions of tonnes

of low grade nuclear waste as well asCold War era nuclear weapons, is nowbeing guarded by autonomous robot ve-

hicles. The US Nuclear Security Adminis-tration has deployed mobile detection as-sessment response system (MDARS)robot, a camera on a mini-Hummer, toprotect the area.

The MDARS roams around in the

desert, alerting a remote operator whenit encounters something that shouldn’tbe there. At present there is only oneMDARS robot on patrol, but NNSA plansto add two more in the next six months.

The MDARS is neither completely au-tonomous nor completely controlled.Equipped with forward looking infrared(FLIR), radio-frequency identification(RFID), radar and light detection andranging (LADAR) sensors, the MDARS isable to operate a 12-hour shift withoutbeing refuelled. On patrol, it can functionon its own for up to 16 hours, using itsdiesel engine to power it at a speed up to32 kph. It has enough intelligence to

complete random surveillance routes,and enough sensors and cameras to no-tice anything out of the ordinary.

The MDARS can save facilities worthmillions of dollars by reducing the needfor stationary cameras, sensors andwired connections. The robot providesautomated intrusion detection and in-ventory assessment capability for use inwarehouses and storage sites. The pro-gramme is managed by the Office ofProduct Manager, Force Protection Sys-tems at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Overalltechnical direction for the programme isprovided by the Space and Naval WarfareSystems Center, San Diego.

PHOTO

GRAPH

S: US Army

E X C E R C I S E

PHOTO

GRAPH

: NNSS

F I R S T

Robots on PatrolMDARS robot now guarding Nevada National Security Site

Continued from page 12

Page 19: SP's Land Forces Oct-Nov 2010

INDIA OFFERED AMERICAN DEFENCEEQUIPMENT During the visit of Defence Minister A.K.Antony to Pentagon in October 2010, the UShas offered defence equipment to India fromAmerican companies to help the country pro-ceed with its plans to modernise its armedforces. The US State Department spokesmanP.J. Crowley said if India was planning to upgrade its defence capabilities then it shouldbuy US defence equipment. India’s procure-ment of military hardware and the US own-ing the best hardware was also discussed inthe Pentagon talks between the defence min-isters of both the nations.

BRITISH ARMY TO DEPLOY PARACHUTE BUGGY The British Army’s special forces regiment,the Special Air Service (SAS), has been test-ing parachute buggies in dummy runs tocheck if it could be used to attack militantsin Afghanistan. The Rhino Air buggy mustbe launched from 8,000 ft and can float 40km at about 16 kph. The Rhino can bedriven by two men out of a transport plane,who steer it in mid air onto the ground, andtroops that operate on foot after landing be-hind enemy lines. The buggy’s design isbased on a quad bike and can carry half a

tonne of kit, including ammunition andmedical supplies.

INDIA AND JAPAN BEGIN ARMY-TO-ARMY TALKSIndia and Japan have begun their first four-day army-to-army talks to continue to expandtheir military ties. Indian Air Force Chief Mar-shal P.V. Naik, also Chairman of the Chiefs ofStaff Committee in Tokyo, will further discussthe defence relationship between the nations.The Japanese counterpart in India, led byMajor-General Koichiro Bansho, will discussjoint combat exercises, anti-piracy patrols tocounter-terrorism and service-to-service ex-changes with the Indian Army. India is en-gaged in such talks with eight other countriesincluding the US, the UK, Israel, France, Aus-tralia, Malaysia, Bangladesh and Singapore.

US AND ISRAEL SIGN AGREEMENTFOR DAVID’S SLING WEAPON SYSTEMThe US Department of Defense and Israelhave signed an agreement for the develop-ment of the David’s sling weapon system. Theagreement will support the efforts initiatedunder the US-Israel short-range ballistic mis-sile defence project agreement, signed by bothnations in 2008. The defence system agree-ment will support the efforts to develop an Is-raeli capability against short-range andtheatre ballistic missiles, large-calibre rockets,and cruise missiles. The project also includescontinued development of the stunner inter-ceptor to provide lower-tier intercept capabil-ity for Israel’s multilayered missile defencesystem. The signing of the project agreementimplies continued US commitment to the de-fence of Israel.

UK SELECTS FORCE PROTECTIONLIGHT PROTECTED PATROL VEHICLEThe UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has se-lected Force Protection Europe (FPE) as thepreferred bidder for the ocelot light protectedpatrol vehicle (LPPV) programme. The16,500 lb Ocelot vehicle is designed to allowcrew and passengers to be seated in a protec-tive pod, which uses formula one racing tech-nology. The fuel tank and transmission arekept in a V-shaped armoured spine to deflectany potential blast away from the vehicle andto protect the key components. FPE will de-sign, develop and build the vehicles in the UKalong with Ricardo under the LPPV pro-gramme. The final number of vehicles andthe price is yet to be determined, with the ini-tial vehicles expected to be available from2011. Dunkeswell-based Supacat was alsoshortlisted along with FPE, which hoped tosupply 200 SPV400 vehicles worth £100 m,according to BBC News.

GULF STATES SPEND $123 BILLION ONUS ARMS Arab states of the Persian Gulf have orderedUS weapons worth $123 billion (`5,54,900crore), providing a huge boost to the US mili-tary industry. The first phase of Saudi Ara-bia’s US arms package, worth $67 billion (`3,02,200 crore) , is soon to go before the USCongress for approval. The initial package in-volves 85 new F-15 jet fighters, upgradinganother 70, and a successor contract that in-volves the upgrade of radar and missile de-fence systems of the Saudi Navy’s easternfleet. The UAE had signed contracts worth$35 billion-$40 billion (`1,57,900 crore-`1,80,500 crore) to buy military equipmentthat includes Thaad, a high altitude missiledefence system, and upgrades to the Patriotmissile defence system. Oman is expected tospend $12 billion (`81,200 crore) for 18 newF-16 jet fighters and upgrades for another 12jets. Kuwait will be spending $7 billion(`31,500 crore) on replacing and upgrading

warplanes and new command and controlsystems. The total value of all US arms dealswith Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman andKuwait is estimated at $122.88 billion(`5,54,600 crore) over the next four years.

ONLINE PROJECTS FOR DISBURSING PENSION Defence Minister A.K. Antony has stressed onthe quick and timely payments to the ArmedForced Pensioners. Addressing the 263rdFoundation Day of the Defence Accounts Department (DAD) Antony called upon theofficials to make full use of technology in accounting, pension and audit matters. “Although financial processes are no doubtlengthy and complex, unnecessary delays andsuperfluous objections must be avoided, as faras possible,”Antony said. Compared to thecivil pension structure, the defence pensionstructure is so complex that it gives rise to alot of complaints and grievances,” he added.Launching three e-governance projects of theDAD on the occasion, the Defence Ministerhoped that this would “ensure quick and accurate disbursement of pension”. The threeweb-enabled online automation projects areProject Suvigya, Project Aashraya and Proj-ect Sankalan.

INDIA AND SOUTH KOREA SIGN TOBOOST DEFENCE COOPERATION

India and South Korea signed two landmarkmemoranda of understanding (MoU) on Sep-tember 3, 2010 to give a huge boost to thestrategic partnership between the two coun-tries. The two MoUs were signed at the end of90 minutes of intensive discussions, markedby warmth, between the delegations of thetwo countries, led by their Defence Ministers,A.K. Antony and Kim Tae-young in Seoul.This was the first ever visit of a Defence Min-ister of India to South Korea. Antony was ac-companied by a high-level delegationincluding the Defence Secretary PradeepKumar, Vice Admiral R.K. Dhowan, Lt Gen-eral K.T. Parnaik, Dr Prahlada and SundaramKrishna. The first MoU signed by Antony andKim envisages exchange of defence relatedexperience and information, mutual ex-change of visits by military personnel and experts including civilian staff associatedwith defence services, military education andtraining and conduct of military exercises, exchange of visits of ships and aircraft, asjointly decided between the two countries.The MoU further envisages cooperation inhumanitarian assistance and internationalpeace keeping activities. The second MoU wassigned by the Chief Controller of Researchand Development of DRDO, Dr Prahlada andVice Commissioner, Defence Acquisition andProcurement Agency (DAPA) of South Korea,Kwon Oh Bong. To be operational under theoverarching umbrella of India-South KoreaDefence Agreement, the MoU aims at identi-fying futuristic defence technology areas ofmutual interest and pursuing R&D works inboth the countries.

SP’s LAND FORCES5/2010 19

News in Brief Publisher and Editor-in-ChiefJayant Baranwal

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Page 20: SP's Land Forces Oct-Nov 2010

SHOCK-PROOF. VIBRATION-PROOF.AND EVEN FUTURE-PROOF.

Over 115,000 DRS systems have been fielded for Blue Force Tracking and FBCB2. And thanks to a powerful Dual Core processor and flexible architecture, today’s JV-5 is ready for future applications. From the Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P) and beyond. Which means U.S. joint forces will see returns on this hardware investment for years to come.

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