Spring 2010 Final Print

8/9/2019 Spring 2010 Final Print

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ENQUIRY

Spring 2010

Washington UniversitysUndergraduate Philosophy Journal


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Senior EditorSharon Barbour

Editorial Staff

Vanessa EakenAJ HandlerPeter Murray

Amanda SabeleAdam Sadaka

Nicole Satar

Faculty AdvisorMariska Leunissen

Washington University in St. LouisDepartment of Philosophy


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ENQUIRYWashington Universitys

Undergraduate Philosophy Journal

Spring 2010


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Special thanks to Washington Universitys Department of Philosophy, particularlyMariska Leunissen, Mark Rollins, Dennis Des Chene, and Mindy Danner.


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TABLE OF COnTEnTS

rAdiCAL rESpOnSESTO VAn inwAgEnS

SpECiAL COmpOSiTiOn QuESTiOnByEriC TOrrES 1

BAruCh SpinOzAAnd mOSES mEndELSSOhn: JEwiShphiLOSOphiESOFThE STATE, rELigiOn, And indiViduAL

ByJOnAThAn SALzingEr 5

ThE KnOwLEdgE ArgumEnT, QuALiA, AndThE ABiLiTy

hypOThESiSByKATySOuThwOrTh 10

zOmBiE

idEnTiTy

: A dEFEnSE

OF

phySiCALiSm

FrOm

KripKES idEnTiTyAnd nECESSiTy ByAJAySundAr 14

TEmpOrAL OVErLApASASOLuTiOnTO pArAdOxES

OF COinCidEnCEByAdAm SAdAKA(EdiTOr) 18


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rAdiCAL rESpOnSESTO VAn inwAgEnS SpECiAL COmpOSiTiOn QuESTiOn

The special composition question

asks under what circumstances do a set

of xs compose a greater object y? Re-

sponses to this question run the gambit

from under no circumstances to un-

der every circumstance that there exist a

set of xs. It is this latter response, for-

malized under the heading of Universal-

ism, which is the concern of my analysis.

I believe that tracing the successes

and failures of the Universalist response to

the question of special composition revealsthe holes in our normal intuitions about

the metaphysical basis of composition and

prompts the conclusion that we cannot ever

give a consistent account of where com-

position does and does not apply without

cheapening the notion of composition so

greatly that it no longer refers to anything

at all. In order to make this case I will rstoutline the Universalist outlook and then

consider the advantages such a theory

holds over moderate and nihilist responses

to the special composition question. I will

conclude by arguing that the implications

that come from accepting the Universalist

perspective on the nature of composition

actually point us towards a nihilist answer

to the special composition question, de-spite the diametrically opposite conclusion

Universalism purportedly seeks to reach.

The Universalist response to the

question of special composition is that any

given set of distinct xs compose a unique

y. This is to say that given a universe with

only particles A, B and C, the Universal-

ist will posit that there are seven distinct

entities, three of which are the simples A,

B, and C and four of which are composed

of the physical simples. In total the Uni-

versalist posits A, B, C, AB, AC, BC, and

ABC. I take physical simples to be whatev-

er particles, should there exist any, which

physics determines to exist as irreducible.

The power of this account is that nothing

escapes classication as an object. All ob-

jects we colloquially refer to exist and their

basis for doing so is a simple and univer-

sally applicable rule. Furthermore, the on-tology of Universalism is relatively simple,

despite the tremendous amount of things;

there are only two types, simples and com-

posites, where each is easily identiable.

The immediate trouble with this re-

sponse, however, is twofold. First, it posits

an immense if not innite number of real

distinct entities. And second, Universal-ism construes as objects sets of xs that our

intuitions tell us have nothing to do with

one another. For example, it seems strange

that there is an object composed of my toe-

nails, a single hydrogen atom in the sun,

and a seven-forty-seven parked at Lam-

bert airport, but according to Universalism

not only does this object exist, but this odd

composite is every bit as much an object asare computers, tables, and human beings.

To each of these grievances the Uni-

versalist has a response, however. In re-

gards to the enormous number of objects

that result from the Universalist conception

of composition, the Universalist need only

shrug her shoulders. The fact that Univer-

salism proposes an enormous or perhaps

By: EriC TOrrES

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innite number of objects is not a prob-

lem unique to Universalism; moderate and

even nihilist ontologies may be populated

by innite objects as well if it turns out that

the universe is limitless and therefore lled

with innite irreducible particles. Even if

it is not, the quantity relevant to evaluating

a theorys quality in terms of parsimony is

not tokens but rather types, and Universal-

ism is very tidy in this regard. Universal-

ist theory only proposes the existence of

simples and composites, and every case is

very clear-cut; if an entity exists and is nota simple, it is reducible to a composite of

simples. This is not to say that there can-

not exist composites whose constructions

are not framed in terms of other compos-

ites, but rather that an exhaustive reduc-

tion of any given entity that is not a simple

will invariably result in its being composed

of simples. For instance, we might say that

a book is composed of its pages, but were

we to continue with the process of analyz-

ing the composition of the pages we would

eventually land upon physical simples. I

believe that it is not the quantity of ob-

jects that grounds the intuitive rejection

of Universalism however, but rather the

variety of strange properties of the things

that Universalism classies as objects.To this more serious objection (that

Universalism takes too loose a stance on

what it includes as objects) the Universal-

ist might press her critic as to why exactly

this is a problem. While this conception

of what grounds the composition of an ob-

ject certainly stands in contrast to the way

we casually speak about the world, I pro-

pose that there is no principled reason to

call things like tables and people objects

while not calling the sum of my friend Josh

and the Eiffel tower an object. I believe

that should we wish to speak of composite

objects at all, to impose a distinction be-

tween those things is anthropocentric and

lacking in a justiable metaphysical basis.

To illustrate this point, I propose a

thought experiment. Consider two forks,

one resting on top of another. Our intu-

ition tells us that these two things do not

compose a unique object. But what if plac-ing one fork on top of another enabled

time travel? I believe that it is not far-

fetched to argue that our intuitions would

tell us that in this circumstance, we would

want to say that those two forks compose

a larger object, a timefork, lets say. I pro-

pose that this distinction gives us good

reason to mistrust our intuitions on the

basis that they are rooted in a consider-

ation not of the metaphysics of objects but

rather of their perceived purpose to us.

One may concede that this would

be true without believing that it is cause

for us to doubt our intuitions, however.

It seems plausible that the example I just

gave points towards an answer to the spe-

cial composition question in which thefunction of an entity is a necessary condi-

tion for the xs to compose a further object

y. In regards to the example I just gave,

one might say that in order for two forks to

constitute a further object, they must have

some functional signicance that one fork

resting atop another in our world simply

doesnt have. This is a vague and subjective

2

EriC TOrrES


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criterion, however. It is unclear to me how one

would dene something as being functionally

signicant without appealing to anthropocen-

tric notions of purpose or usefulness. If there

does turn out to be vagueness in this crite-

rion, it follows that there might be vagueness

in composition and therefore vagueness of ex-

istence, which does not seem possible given

that we commonly hold existence as being an

absolute property that is either instantiated or

not. While it remains possible that there may

be an objective line to be drawn delineating a

point after which a set of xs attain function-al signicance, I nd this to be a strange idea

to appeal to and, if nothing else, this theory

proposes a vagueness in terms of epistemol-

ogy, which a Universalist perspective avoids.

But Universalists are not out of the

woods yet. Consider a set of simple xs that

compose a greater y at time t, let us say a

toaster. Now at time t1, this toaster has

been destroyed. The simples that composed

the toaster have now been entirely rear-

ranged such that they, and only they, make

up a blender. According to Universalism,

there is nothing to suggest a difference be-

tween the toaster and the blender. In fact,

based on the claims of Universalism, it seems

that these entities must be the same object.

To this, the Universalist might respondthat yes, it is the same object; it has merely

changed its appearance, which is something

that should not be at all counterintuitive. In

the same way that we consider a frowning

child and a smiling child the same child, so we

should consider the blender and the toaster the

same entity. One might posit that the differ-

ent properties of the toaster and the blender

make such a rearrangement go beyond mere

aesthetics, but the Universalist may claim that

the smiling child too has different properties,

literally speaking. While most of them would

not be relevant to what we generally consider

different, the smiling child has the property of

exhibiting happiness while the frowning child

has the property of exhibiting sadness. The

fact that we would not call them two separate

children actually works in favor of a Univer-

salist position. The critic is again pressed to

provide an account of identity that is not based

upon the physical substructure of a given ob-ject. While this is certainly not an impossible

task, it at least puts the burden on the side of

the critic of Universalism to come up with a

reason why particulate substructure cannot

be the basis of our identication of an object.

While this previous example does not

disprove the Universalist response, it does

much to undermine the force of the original

claim that all sets of xs compose distinct ys.

The previous example shows that for Univer-

salism to succeed, the identity of objects can-

not have to do with anything but the simple

particulate substructure. Consider a more ex-

treme version of the previous example. What

if the xs at time t were at time t1 strewn about

in no relation to one another? It is problem-

atic to our casual notion of the identity of ob-jects to propose that they compose the same y

as was once a toaster, but it seems that this is

what the Universalist must say. While such a

conclusion is not paradoxical, the Universal-

ist case crafts a very cheap notion of composi-

tion. If they attempt to introduce any further

criterion for circumstances under which a set

of xs compose y, they too are subject to the

rAdiCAL rESpOnSESTO VAn inwAgEnS SpECiAL COmpOSiTiOnQuESTiOn

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problem of vagueness that plagues the mod-

erate accounts. This example I believe gets to

the heart of our problem with Universalism.

If composition does not necessarily make any

claims on the form or function of the xs that

compose a further y, it seems to make no more

demand of the world than that there exist xs.

Saying that the xs compose a further object is

a hollow notion if there is nothing else that we

can learn from such a relationship than that

the xs exist. The appealing parsimony

and broad application of the Universal-

ist case seem compromised by the sharp-ly degraded notion of composition that it

provides and it seems that Universalism,

when considered in detail, is actually a

version of nihilism with a different hat on.

wOrKS CiTEd

Van Inwagen, Peter. Material Beings.

Ithaca, NY. Cornell University Press, 1990

Sattig, Thomas. Metaphysics and Episte-

mology Lectures, Washington University

in St. Louis. St. Louis, MO. September-

November, 2008.

EriC TOrrES

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BAruCh SpinOzAAnd mOSES mEndELSSOhn: JEwiSh phiLOSOphiESOFThE STATE, rELigiOnAnd indiViduAL

As modernity slowly emerged across

Europe, Jews were faced with the questionsof what identity to assume and what role to

play in European society. Of particular con-

cern to Jewish intellectuals at the time was

how the state, which had previously been

characterized by the inuence of interme-

diary bodies and importance of corporate

identities, and religious powers would in-

teract with the Jewish populace in light of

the changes. In response to the politicaland economic climate of the mid-17th cen-

tury, Jewish philosopher Baruch Spinoza

endeavored to strengthen individual free-

dom and widen liberty, envisioning a soci-

ety that dramatically differed from his own.

In the Theological-Political Trea-

tise, Spinoza sought to weaken the hold of

religion over the individual and encour-aged Jews to reject their particularistic be-

liefs in favor of a universal system based

upon natural law. Just over a century

after Spinozas work was published, the

German Haskalah the Jewish Enlight-

enment thinker Moses Mendelssohn

responded to the same issue of interac-

tion between the state, religious author-

ity and individual with Jerusalem. As the

Aufklarung the German Enlightenment

developed traction in his native Germa-

ny and Enlightenment ideals spread across

Europe, Mendelssohn witnessed the rise

of the modern centralized state and a shift

from governments interacting with collec-

tive entities to the individual. Mendels-

sohn sought to synthesize traditional Jew-

ish and Enlightenment ideals and argued

that Jews were fully able to participate inEnlightenment thinking while remaining

true to Judaism. This, he reasoned, was

possible because Judaism revealed leg-

islation that could be dened by the very

particularizing elements in Mosaic Law;

this law was not intended to coerce the

mind but rather provide eternal truths

as long as the need for Jewish distinc-

tiveness persists (Mendelssohn, 24-24). Although they lived in different

times and under different circumstances,

both Spinoza and Mendelssohn recognized

the need to examine the relationship be-

tween the state and individual religious

belief as the character of Europe changed.

Both men envisioned a society governed

by a social contract between citizens, ab-sent of civil or coercive authority held by

religious powers, with individual religious

freedom. Spinoza, however, cast aside

Mosaic Law and forged a secular vision for

future European life, based upon univer-

sal natural laws. Mendelssohn differed

from Spinoza in this respect; he viewed

Mosaic Law as valid because it contains

eternal truths that make Jews unique and

believed that Jews should continue to be

observant but not let their religion prevent

interaction with European society. Both

Spinoza, who was excommunicated from

the Jewish community, and Mendelssohn,

whose religious beliefs were publicly chal-

lenged on several occasions, faced severe

criticism for their views from others with-

By: JOnAThAn SALzingEr

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6

in and outside of the Jewish community.

However, the models that they conceived

for the state and its relationship to individ-

ual religious belief have had lasting inu-

ence on political and religious philosophy.

In the mid-17th century, the per-

vasive mercantilism and political turmoil

across Europe posed a unique situation for

Jews living there. As the seeds of capital-

ism took hold, Jews came to be regarded as

possessing distinct and desirable qualities,

including knowledge of and familial ties

across much of Europe. Although mostJews were still subject to the repressive

laws of the Middle Ages and power of in-

termediary bodies, by proving useful to the

mercantilist goals of European states, some

Jews were granted opportunities, particu-

larly in the economic sphere, that they did

not posses before. It is from this evolving

context that Baruch Spinoza examined the

question of what roles Jews were to play in

European society. While most Jews across

Europe remained largely oppressed, Spi-

noza resided in Holland, which was rela-

tively liberal; he observed Amsterdam to

be a place where people of every sect and

nation live together in the greatest harmo-

ny (Spinoza, 257). In Amsterdam, deci-

sions to make a loan to someone were notpredicated on religion and religion or sect

does not come into it because this does

not help win or lose a case before a court,

and no sect is so hugely resented by oth-

ers that its members are not defended

by the public authority and under the pro-

tection of the magistracy (Spinoza, 257).

Spinozas conception of an ideal

state, which would allow Jews to hold an

unbiased place in society, found itself at

odds with many of the entrenched monar-

chical and religious powers across Europe

at the time. Spinoza saw modern faith as

having been turned into nothing more

than credulity and prejudices (Spinoza,

7). This transformation of otherwise ra-

tional men into brutes was not a natu-

ral development; according to Spinoza,

it was a tool used by rulers to hold power

over their citizenry: It may indeed be the

highest secret of monarchical governmentand utterly essential to it, to keep men di-

vided, and to disguise the fear that sways

them with the specious name of religion

(Spinoza, 6). In order to establish control

and loyalty, Spinoza says that pomp and

ceremony has been used to adorn religion

and ensure zealous observance (Spinoza,

5). He asserts that states should not use

religion as a divisive tool to maintain pow-

er and that the purpose of the state should

be to free everyone from fear and allow

for freedom and diversity of thought so

that Jews and Christians can live together

in harmony (Spinoza, 252). Further, Spi-

noza argues, Trying to control everything

by law will encourage vices rather than cor-

rect them (Spinoza, 254). He goes on tosay that freedom of judgment must nec-

essarily be permitted and people must be

governed in such a way that they can live

in harmony, even though they openly hold

different and contradictory positions (Spi-

noza, 257). This claim is the crux of his ar-

gument for how Jews and European soci-

ety at large should interact: people should

JOnAThAn SALzingEr


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BAruCh SpinOzAAnd mOSES mEndELSSOhn

reject the authority of those whose power

is derived from divisiveness, fear and co-

ercion, and all people should be allowed to

freely express their own personal beliefs

and live their lives benevolently alongside

even those they disagree with. This lib-

eral society will naturally enter into a so-

cial contract to ensure that natural rights

are not alienated, says Spinoza, yielding a

democratic form of government under the

aegis of a sovereign power (Spinoza, 200).

The harmonious society envisioned

by Spinoza required the removal of barriers which set members of different religious

groups apart. According to Spinoza: It

has been the case for a long time that one

can hardly know whether anyone is Chris-

tian, Turk, Jew or gentile, other than that

he has a certain appearance and dresses

in a certain way or attends one or another

church and upholds a certain belief or pays

allegiance to one magistrate rather than

another (Spinoza, 7). In his view, empha-

sis of these differences creates avoidable

conict. He contends that the differences

between Judaism and Christianity should

not cause people to live disharmoniously;

he argues that the division of the Old and

New Testament is not because the books

of the Testaments differ in doctrine, norbecause they were written as conventional

texts, nor, nally, because the universal

religion, which is supremely natural, was

anything new except to those people who

did not know it (Spinoza, 168). He makes

the case that the Laws revealed by God to

Moses were nothing but the decrees of the

historical Hebrew state alone, and accord-

ingly that no one needed to adopt them

but the Hebrews, and even they were only

bound by them so long as their state sur-

vived (Spinoza, 9). As a consequence of

this view, Spinoza takes the stance that

Jews should discard Mosaic Law in favor of

a way of life based upon universal morals.

With the dismissal of particularistic Jew-

ish law, as well as his rejection of the idea

of Jewish chosenness, Spinoza advocates-

limited religious power and encourage Jew-

ish acculturation into European society.

As the early-modern period of Spi-noza drew to a close, Jewish and Gentile

relations expanded considerably as Jews

came to occupy increasingly important

economics roles. Despite increasing eco-

nomic interdependence, however, Jews

and gentiles largely did not closely associ-

ate until the onset of the Enlightenment in

the 18th century. It is in the context of the

Aufklarung in Germany that Moses Men-

delssohn emerged as the gurehead of the

Haskalah. Mendelssohn sought to recon-

cile his beliefs in Judaism and in Enlight-

enment thinking, calling for Jews to be

permitted to participate in secular endeav-

ors by dividing the religious and secular

aspects of their lives. Mendelssohn viewed

his Judaism as a personal issue and as a fac-tor which should not prevent him or other

Jews from engaging in secular endeavors.

Indeed, he lived his own life at the van-

guard of Jewish and Christian interaction.

Mendelssohns idea of the state and

its relationship to an individuals religion

shares many similarities with Spinozas

view. Mendelssohn echoes Spinozas be-7


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JOnAThAn SALzingEr

lief that civil and religious powers should

grant freedom of thought and religious

practice; Jews should not be compelled

to give up their integrity by being forced

to publicly afrm beliefs they do not hold.

According to an account by a student at-

tending a lecture given by Mendelssohn,

he instructed that Jews must throw off

the heavy yoke under which the king and

judges of this country, who are not of our

people, have harnessed us; to throw off,

furthermore, that other yoke which we

have taken upon us with the rule of ourown rabbis and communal leaders (Men-

delssohn Visits the Seer of Koenigsberg).

Like Spinoza, Mendelssohn believed that

state and religious authorities are unable

to legislate what the human mind thinks,

and that genuine religious belief cannot

be compelled. According to Mendelssohn,

state and church have as their object ac-

tions as well as convictions, the former

insofar as they are based on the relations

between man and nature, the latter insofar

as they are based on the relations between

nature and God (Mendelssohn, 56-57).

He explains that while people may elect to

give up their independence and enter into

a social contract with other members of the

state which punishes and rewards based onpositive laws, the churchs prerogatives

can never conict with ours (Mendels-

sohn, 59). This social contract allows the

state, when necessary, to resort to pub-

lic measures, coercive laws, punishments

of crime, and rewards of merit, however,

religious bodies can have no such contract

because all contracts presuppose cases of

a collision [in interests] to be decided and

no such collision is possible if the church

cannot have conicting prerogatives

with the individual (Mendelssohn, 59).

Mendelssohn differs from Spinoza

in his view of revealed legislation; he intu-

its that the revealed Mosaic Law remains

valid because it was passed to the Jews by

God not in his capacity as Creator and Pre-

server of the universe, but God as Patron

and Friend by covenant of their ancestors,

as Liberator, Founder and Leader, as King

and Head of this people (Mendelssohn,127). These laws, which represent the par-

ticularizing elements of Jewish existence,

remain valid because they hold public and

private felicity as their ultimate aim (Men-

delssohn, 25, 127). Mendelssohn holds that

this contention is in keeping with his belief

that the mind cannot be coerced because

of the Mosaic law, there is not a single one

which says: You shall believe or not be-

lieve. They all say: You shall do or not do.

Faith is not commanded, for it accepts no

other commands than those who come to it

by way of conviction (Mendelssohn, 100).

Spinoza and Mendelssohns respec-

tive visions of the relationship between the

state and individual religious belief were

pioneering responses to the challenges ofmodernity. These two intellectuals, despite

differences in their immediate situations,

shared much in common between their re-

spective philosophies regarding the need

for individual freedom of thought, though

they parted ways over the afrmation of Mo-

saic Law and importance of maintaining a

distinct Jewish identity. As a result of their8


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BAruCh SpinOzAAnd mOSES mEndELSSOhn

controversial positions, both men faced

harsh criticism from segments of the Jew-

ish community and the European society.

Spinozas views were particularly

radical for his time; he called for a compre-

hensive departure from the prevalent cor-

porate and collective form of governance of

the day, removal of the power held by many

contemporary civil and religious authori-

ties and Jewish rejection of Mosaic Law

and the concept of chosenness. Spinozas

claims challenged the power of the Jewish

community as a corporate entity with civilauthority and threatened Judaism as a re-

ligion by casting aside those aspects which

historically distinguished it from other

religious denominations. Because of Spi-

nozas wrong opinions and behavior, the

Jewish community excommunicated him.

Mendelssohns views, while not as

extreme as Spinozas, placed him in a pre-

carious position in society as well. His ac-

ceptance of Enlightenment ideals, advocacy

of the subordination of religious beliefs to

secular academic and philosophic endeav-

ors, and dismissal of the coercive power

of Judaism attracted the ire of many crit-

ics. In arguing against ecclesiastical pow-

er while remaining an observant Jew and

afrming Halakha Jewish religious law, Mendelssohn alienated both orthodox

and heterodox Jews and Christians. Men-

delssohns attempts to blend his Judaism

with enlightenment ideals led many to be-

lieve that the synthesis he settled on was

merely a waypoint in converting to Chris-

tianity; his faith was publicly challenged

by prominent Christians Johann Cas-

par Lavater and August Friedrich Cranz.

Despite the critical reception that

Spinoza and Mendelssohn received, their

arguments addressed important issues re-

garding the proper relationship between

state and individual religious belief and

manners of relating their conceptions of

Judaism to the limits of political and reli-

gious power. Their respective positions of-

fer interesting and widely inuencial per-

spectives on the struggle by Jews to dene

their role and identity in modern Europe.

wOrKS CiTEd

Mendelssohn, Moses. Jerusalem: Or on

Religious Power and Judaism. Trans. Allan

Arkush. Hanover, NH: Brandeis University

Press, 1983.

Spinoza, Benedictus de. Theological-Polit-

ical Treatise. Trans. Michael Silverthorne

and Jonathan Israel. Cambridge: Cam-

bridge University Press, 2007.

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10

ThE KnOwLEdgE ArgumEnT,QuALiA, AndThE ABiLiTyhypOThESiS

The Knowledge argument is used

to refute physicalism by showing the im-portance of phenomenal feels called qua-

lia. In this paper, I examine the Knowl-

edge argument with the example of Mary,

a color expert who has lived her entire life

in black-and-white, to show that there is

important information that exists outside

of the purely physical realm. I analyze two

counterarguments to this position, which

attempt to avoid the conclusion of theKnowledge argument, and I offer an expla-

nation of why these are insufcient to sub-

vert the argument. This leads to the no-

tion of epiphenomenal qualia, something

that at rst appears impossible, but which

deeper analysis reveals is plausible. I ex-

amine Frank Jacksons argument, which

shows that there is no reason why epiphe-nomenal qualia cannot exist. I conclude

by examining the Ability Hypothesis, the

Physicalists rebuttal to the Knowledge ar-

gument, which I argue does not adequate-

ly controvert the Knowledge argument.

The Knowledge argument is often

introduced with a thought experiment

about a woman called Mary who is the

worlds leading expert on color and color

vision in spite of the fact that she has, since

birth, lived in a cell where everything is ei-

ther black or white. Despite the fact that

she knows all of the physical information

about colors, she has never experienced

color and therefore does not know what it

is like to see color. One day she escapes

her cell and goes to a meadow where she

sees color for the rst time and learns what

it is to see color (Lewis 281-283). BecauseMary learns more about color after leaving

her cell, it cannot be the case, the argument

goes, that everything can be explained us-

ing just physical information. So Physical-

ism, the argument that all information is

purely physical information that has been

discovered by chemists, physicists, and

biologists must be false (Jackson 273).

There is an important difference betweenfactual information and rst person ex-

perience; someone can know all the facts

about something but not know what it is

like to experience it until she experiences

it. This indicates the existence of qualia,

phenomenal information beyond physical

information. Qualia are what it is like to

have a sensation and include (1) Percep-tual experiences, for example, experiences

of the sort involved in seeing green... (2)

Bodily sensations, for example, feeling a

twinge of pain(3) Felt reactions or pas-

sions or emotions, for example, feeling de-

light, lust, fear, love...(4) Felt moods, for

example, feeling elated, depressed, calm,

bored, (Stanford Encyclopedia). By us-

ing qualia to explain these sensations

instead of relying on physical explana-

tions, the Knowledge argument provides

a better account of Marys experience with

color and proves Physicalism to be false.

Two counterarguments which seek

to avoid the conclusions of the Knowl-

edge argument do so either by comparing

the unknown experience to known expe-

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11

riences, or by giving a more precise de-

scription of the experience (Lewis 282).

Those who use comparisons to ex-

plain away the Knowledge argument are

misguided because using experiences to

explain other experiences presupposes that

all people experience the same events in

the same way. For instance, suppose I ask

what it is like to eat Nutella and my friend

attempts to explain it to me as chocolate

peanut butter. I have never eaten choco-

late and am allergic to peanut butter. One

part of the analogy totally fails because Ido not know what it is like to eat chocolate,

and the other part of the analogy fails be-

cause when I eat peanut butter my throat

swells shut, and this would not happen if

I ate Nutella because it is not made from

peanuts. Thus, I will never know what it is

like to eat Nutella until I eat it. This ex-

ample illustrates that one cannot use com-

parisons to other experiences to explain a

particular experience because one does not

know if the other person shares in the same

background information or whether the

other person experiences the comparative

event in the same way. Qualia are personal

sensations and can only be accessed by in-

trospection, not third person perception.

The second counterargument holdsthat by giving a more precise description

of the unknown experience the Knowledge

argument can be avoided (Lewis 282).

Those who put forth this claim think that

explaining what it is like to do something

can be done by breaking that action into

smaller experiences and because the per-

son knows what it is like to have these

smaller experiences they will know what it

is like to have the bigger one. Lewis says

that these sub-experiences could be ex-

planations of the larger event in terms of

their causestheir effectsor.the physi-

cal states of the nervous system that me-

diate between those causes and effects,

(Lewis 283). However, if we apply this

argument to Mary, one would explain to

her the things she already knew as a result

of being a color expert. Thus, according

to this argument, if she knew what it was

like to have the sub-experiences then sheshould not have learned anything new on

her escape to the meadow. Because of this,

knowing which sub-experiences make up

an experience does not fully capture what

it is like to have that experience, and there-

fore do not derail the Knowledge argument.

There are certain aspects of life that

cannot be explained by Physicalism and

thus qualia are necessary. The example of

Mary shows that Physicalism alone cannot

explain everything. The fact that the two

most plausible rebuttals to the Knowledge

argument fail to bring it down also supports

the acceptance of the Knowledge argument.

Because Mary has all the physical informa-

tion possible but still does not understand

what it is like to see color before she escapesher cell, qualia must exist. That is, because

it is possible to have all the physical facts

and not know what it is like to experience

something, qualia must be important.

The conclusion of the Knowledge

argument entails epiphenomenalism: if

one knows all the physical information

about something without knowing the as-

ThE KnOwLEdgE ArgumEnT, QuALiA, AndThE ABiLiTyhypOThESiS


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sociated qualia, qualia cannot possess

physical causal powers. In Marys case,

she knows all the physical information

in the world about color and color vision,

but she does not know the qualia of see-

ing color. If qualia had causal powers then

Mary would know about them because

she knows all the physical information,

but because Mary does not know the qua-

lia involved with seeing color, qualia must

have no physical manifestations. Thus, de-

spite being caused by physical brain states,

qualia lack causal powers, a notion whichcauses qualia to be epiphenomenal. This

is problematic because it is traditionally

thought that qualia are causally efcacious.

While epiphenomenal qualia ini-

tially appear to present a problem for the

Knowledge argument, Frank Jackson dem-

onstrates that there is no knockdown ref-

utation of the existence of epiphenomenal

qualia by pointing to multiple objections

to epiphenomenal qualia and each objec-

tions downfall (Jackson, 277). One ex-

ample Jackson gives is that it is generally

thought that qualia have a physical cause,

like the hurtfulness of pain and the inclina-

tion to exhibit pain behavior, for example.

Jacksons argument is that although it may

seem like the qualia of pain caused thephysical movement it could also be that it

is just a coincidence that the two events are

linked, or perhaps they are linked because

activating one part of the brain causes both

to occur (Jackson 276). The other argu-

ment Jackson presents and then rebuts

centers around evolution. It states that

qualia must be an evolved characteristic

since not all animals have them, and since

traits are evolved to help animals survive,

qualia must have been evolved for surviv-

al purposes. The argument then asks how

qualia could help humans survive if they

did nothing in the physical world. Jack-

son rebuts this argument by noting that

some evolved characteristics are simply

side effects of characteristics that evolved

for survival; they are not helpful in surviv-

ing. He uses polar bears coats as an ex-

ample, noting that the coat evolved to be

a warm coat, but that to make it that wayit was also heavy and slows the animal

down. The weight of the coat is not con-

ducive to survival and is just a byproduct

of the evolution of a warm coat (Jackson

277). Thus, the idea of epiphenomenal

qualia is not untenable and the Knowl-

edge argument continues to stand strong.

There are Physicalists who think

that the Knowledge argument can be

avoided through the use of the Ability Hy-

pothesis. The Ability Hypothesis focuses

on a distinction between knowing-that

and knowing-how. Knowing-that rep-

resents knowledge of physical informa-

tion, whereas knowing-how refers to the

actual action being performed (Lewis 293).

For example, Mary knows which patternsof neurons re when a person sees red, but

she does not know how red looks. Propo-

nents of this argument go on to say that the

Knowledge argument is mistaken in look-

ing for a change in factual knowledge be-

tween what Mary knew before seeing the

meadow and what she knew after. Instead,

they argue that Mary learned how, and

KATySOuThwOrTh

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that learning what an experience is like

means gaining certain abilitiesabilities to

remember, imagine, and recognize rather

than gaining particular sensational knowl-

edge about the experience (Lewis, 293).

Through the Ability Hypothesis,

Physicalists attempt to rebut the Knowl-

edge argument, but in this attempt they

fail to acknowledge the importance of sen-

sations in understanding an experience.

How does the Ability Hypothesis affect

Mary? For Mary, the Ability Hypothesis

implies that the only thing Mary learnedfrom actually seeing colors in the meadow

was how to remember, imagine, and rec-

ognize them (Lewis 293). For Mary this

does not sound like such a bad conclu-

sion. But now lets think about Bart, who

is about to go sky diving for the rst time,

after spending years meticulously studying

everything there is to know about jump-

ing out of planes. The sensations that Bart

feels as he drops through the sky and then

is whipped upward by the opening of his

chute the dropping in his stomach and

the air whooshing by his ears are more

signicant when discussing what it is like

to skydive than the sensationless physical

facts and descriptions that can be used to

recall or imagine the jump. Thus, while itmay be possible to avoid the conclusions

of the Knowledge argument with the Abil-

ity Hypothesis, it is better not to do so in

order to accurately describe experiences.

The Knowledge argument shows

that everything cannot be explained us-

ing purely physical information. Instead,

qualia are needed in order to know the

experience of phenomena feels. While

Physicalists attempt to rebut this claim

and avoid the use of qualia either by ex-

plaining the experience using more pre-

cise descriptions of what is happening, or

by explaining the experience by breaking it

down into sub-experiences, both of these

methods do not bridge the gap between

physical facts and what it is like to actu-

ally experience something. This leaves the

problem of epiphenomenal qualia, qualia

which can have no physical cause in the

world. At rst this seems impossible be-cause qualia are typically thought to have

causal powers, but Frank Jacksons argu-

ment demonstrates that it is not necessary

that qualia have physical causal powers.

wOrKS CiTEd

Jackson, Frank. Epiphenomenal Qualia.Philosophical Quarteryly 32: 127-136,1982. Rpt. In Philosophy of Mind: Classi-cal and Contemporary Readings. David J.Chalmers. New York, New York: Oxford,2002.

Lewis, David. What Experience Teaches,Proceedings of the Russellian Society,

1988. Rpt. In Philosophy of Mind: Classi-cal and Contemporary Readings. David J.Chalmers. New York, New York: Oxford,2002.

Nida-Rmelin, Martine, Qualia: TheKnowledge Argument, Stanford Encyclo-pedia of Philosophy. 2002. Web.

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14

Saul Kripke, in Identity and Ne-

cessity, argues that all identity relationsare necessary, and that no identity rela-

tions are contingent. He concludes from

this analysis that physicalism is false and

that the mind and the brain, because one

can posit a possible world in which a brain

exists without a mind, are distinct. In this

paper, I contend that physicalism can be

saved from Kripkes account of necessary

identity, and ultimately that the commit-ted physicalist can maintain her position

while still accepting that all identity is

necessary. First, I will outline Kripkes ar-

gument for necessary identity. I will then

contest the claims that the arguments for

philosophical zombies and necessary iden-

tity pose serious problems for physicalism.

Kripke outlines the argument thatall identity is necessary. He writes, If

X=Y, then X and Y share all properties, in-

cluding modal properties (131). If X and

Y share all modal properties, then it fol-

lows that X=Y must hold true in all pos-

sible worlds. Kripke uses the example

of heat=molecular motion, an identity

relation that appears to hold contingent-

ly, but in fact (like every identity rela-

tion) holds necessarily. The argument for

Heat=molecular motion as contingent

rests on the claim that people had very

specic circumstances in mind under

which, so they thought, the judgment that

heat is the motion of molecules would have

been false. Consequently, those arguing

for contingent identity need only imagine

a situation in which we have had the very

same sensation and it would have been pro-duced by something other than the motion

of molecules. Kripke disputes this claim,

arguing that positing such a situation con-

ates heat with our feeling of heat. Rather,

Kripke argues, if we identify heat as iden-

tical with mean molecular kinetic energy,

then we would have to imagine a situation

in which heat (as molecular motion) exist-

ed without molecular motion (128). Sincethis situation is absurd, Kripke concludes

that if X=Y, X could fail to be Y no more

than X could fail to be X, and therefore that

if heat is identical with molecular motion,

then that identity must be necessary and

hold true in every possible world. Kripke

concludes, The identity theorist who holds

that pain is the brain state, also has to holdthat it is necessarily the brain state He

has to hold that we are under some illu-

sion in thinking that we can imagine that

there could have been pains without brain

states (132). Thus, for Kripke, we can see

that if one can conceive of a philosophical

zombie, a person in a possible world exact-

ly like a person in our world but without

any conscious experience, then minds and

brains are not necessarily identical and if

they are not necessarily identical, they can-

not be identical at all, and must be distinct.

I contend that conceiving of a phil-

osophical zombie could in fact be used as

ammunition for a physicalist argument.

Imagine that a normal human being makes

the claim I am conscious. Obviously, the

By: AJAySundAr

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15

claim would be true, and barring some

extreme solipsistic argument, we have no

reason to doubt that the statement is false.

However, if a zombie were to utter that ex-

act same phrase in a possible world, the

claim would have to be false, since by de-

nition philosophical zombies are not con-

scious. now consider the same situation

except that the phrase is I believe I am

conscious. while the claim is still true for

the normal human, the truth-value of the

zombies claim is far less clear. Presumably

the zombie could hold this belief even with-out having consciousness, in the same way

that I could still hold a belief while asleep or

otherwise unconscious. we must consider

how this is so. We know of our conscious-

ness through direct privileged access to it,

but being conscious by itself does not entail

the belief of consciousness after all, one

could be conscious and through stubborn-

ness or even lunacy deny it. Rather, there

must be some sort of cognitive mechanism

to move from consciousness to the belief of

consciousness, and both the zombie and I

must have it. whatever this cognitive mech-

anism is, it must lead in the humans case

from the (fact that I am conscious to the

belief that I believe that I am conscious.)

This same mechanism, which is by deni-tion the same in both the human and the

zombie, must lead in the zombies case

from the (incorrect) fact that I am con-

scious to the same, mistaken, belief that

I believe I am conscious. If the process

by which we derive belief of consciousness

is like this, then we have no reason to con-

dently assert that we are not philosophi-

cal zombies, and that we could be just as

mistaken as the zombie could in our belief

in conscious states. if this is true, then the

zombie argument is rendered accid the

whole point of the zombie experiment was

to distinguish between the mental (as con-

scious experience) and physical (as brain),

but if we have reason to doubt that we have

conscious experience, then physicalism

holds: the physicalist could just as eas-

ily use the zombie thought experiment to

assert that there is no mind, only brain.

I will grant Kripkes argument thatwe can conceive of philosophical zombies,

and I will even grant that mind and body

are distinct; however, I would argue that

even given this, physicalism could still be

salvaged. To do so, I will outline an argu-

ment rst sketched by Allan Gibbard in

Contingent Identity. Consider a lump of

clay, Lumpl, and a statue formed from the

clay, Goliath. Lumpl is identical with Goli-

ath: they coincide in their spatiotemporal

existence, and both pick out one specic

object in the world. Now imagine that the

creator smashes the statue, thereby ending

both the statue and the clay. Here, Gibbard

argues, the statue and the piece of clay are

identical. They began at the same time, and

on any usual account, they had the sameshape, location, color, and so forth ev-

erything that happened to one happened

to the other; and the act that destroyed the

one destroyed the other (191). Now, how-

ever, Gibbard moves to a parallel example

he writes, Suppose I had brought Lumpl

into existence as Goliath, just as I actual-

ly did, but before the clay had a chance to

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dry, I squeezed it into a ball. In this case,

the statue would have ceased to exist, but

the piece of clay would continue to exist.

Gibbard concludes that this case shows

an example of contingent identity (192).

I do not wish to make the exact

same conclusion as Gibbard to claim that

the example above is a case of contingent

identity would pose more problems here

than it would solve. Rather, I would grant

the convinced Kripkean that the statue

and the lump of clay are distinct things,

but that they are distinct in a non-myste-rious way that physicalism can account

for. Even if we grant that Lumpl and Go-

liath are distinct entities, they are distinct

in a very mundane way, and the statue be-

ing distinct from the lump of clay does not

contradict the tenets of physicalism. The

physicalist could maintain, for example,

that the statue is a lump of clay that is orga-

nized in a specic way, and though Goliath

and Lumpl both point out the same object

in the world, they differ in the way they are

organized. In a parallel sense, the mind

could simply be a brain organized in a cer-

tain way. The physicalist could also argue

that Lumpl and Goliath only differ concep-

tually (with Goliath being picked out by its

aesthetic qualities and Lumpl by its lackthereof). My argument is not for any given

specic reason why Goliath and Lumpl are

distinct, only that if they are indeed dis-

tinct; they are distinct in a way that can

be accounted for by physicalism. If such a

physicalist explanation can be accounted

for between Goliath and Lumpl, a parallel

explanation can be accounted for between

mind and brain as well. Insofar as a physi-

calist account can be given in this manner,

the notion of minds and brains as distinct

no longer poses a threat to physicalism,

but rather physicalism can still hold even

if minds and brains are distinct entities.

The core of my argument is not that

minds and brains are not distinct, or that

contingent identity is possible or impos-

sible. Rather, I believe that even if con-

tingent identity is impossible, and even if

minds and brains are distinct, a coherent

physicalist account can still stick despiteclaims to the contrary. Even if philosophi-

cal zombies are conceivable, the physicalist

can account for them, and can even use the

idea of zombies as support for physicalism.

Moreover, even if minds and brains are

distinct, they can be distinct without re-

linquishing physicalism, at least insofar as

a statue and a lump of clay can be distinct

without appeal to the supernatural. Thus,

while Kripkes arguments are compelling

as reasons against contingent identity,

they need not pose the problems for physi-

calism that appear on the surface. This

would suggest a revision of physicalism to

create coherent theses for the mind-body

problem, and such a revision, though likely

large in scope and detail, provides hope forprogression within the physicalist position.

wOrKS CiTEd

Kripke, Saul A. Identity and Necessity.

Philosophy of Mind: a guide and anthol-

ogy. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004. 128-33.16

AJAySundAr


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17

Print.

Gibbard, Allan. Contingent Identity.

Journal of Philosophical Logic 4.2 (1975):

187-221. Print.

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Paradoxes of coincidence arise from

the problem of co-location: How can dis-tinct objects wholly exist in one place at the

same time? To fully address these puzzles,

we must restrict the question at hand to

material objects subject to the natural laws

of our universe. We say objects coincide if

and only if they share the same spatial lo-

cation and are comprised of identical parts

at or during a given time. Furthermore, by

Leibnizs Law, we say objects are numeri-cally distinct if do not share the exact same

set of properties. Of the many solutions to

the paradoxes of coincidence, most fall into

one of two categories: monism or pluralism.

Monism adheres to the anti-coincidence

principle, which states only one object can

exist in a specic spatial location at a given

time. Specically, I will address the domi-nant sorts account, which claims coincid-

ing objects are dominated by the sort that

determines its persistence conditions. On

the other hand, pluralism rejects the anti-

coincidence principle, embracing the no-

tion that multiple objects can be co-located

and share identical parts. Of the views that

fall into this category, I will address the

temporal parts account, which presupposes

perdurantism [i]. This account claims that

objects coincide at a given time if and only

if their temporal segments perfectly over-

lap. Although both monist and pluralist

solutions provide convincing support, the

paradoxes of coincidence are best resolved

by the temporal parts account because it

strictly obeys Leibnizs Law without caving

to philosophical concessions. Moreover, it

explains coincidence in a way that is unob-jectionable; it reduces coincidence to noth-

ing more than the temporal equivalent of

overlapping roads. I will begin by laying

out two examples of the paradoxes of co-

incidence and will follow by explaining

how the dominant sorts account and tem-

poral parts account attempt to solve them.

At rst glance, it seems ridiculous to

say material objects ever coincide. Peoplecannot coincide with walls, protons cannot

coincide with neutrons, and so on. All fac-

ets of our universe seem to oppose material

coincidence as we have dened it. But cer-

tain cases force us to think otherwise. First,

let us consider the case of the clay and the

statue. Suppose an artist nds a lump of

clay, and after days of hard work, sculptsthe clay into the statue of David. Although

it is intuitive to say the statue and the lump

are the same, further thought shows they

differ in a variety of aspects. They have dif-

ferent histories: the lump existed before

the artists efforts, but the statue did not.

Additionally, they have opposing modal

properties: the lump can survive being

smashed, but the statue cannot. It follows

from Leibnizs Law that the two objects are

distinct. So while it appears the artist has

only one object in his possession, it seems

there are actually two, both of which occu-

py a single location and consist of identical

parts. A second case is that of Tibbles and

Tib. Suppose Tibbles is a fully functioning

male cat, while Tib consists of every part

By: AdAm SAdAKA(EdiTOr)

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18


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of Tibbles save for his tail. Tibbles and Tib

are distinct in a variety of ways. For one,

Tibbles and Tib are comprised of different

parts. Furthermore, their modal proper-

ties are different: Tibbles potentially can

wag his tail, while Tib can never undertake

such an action. By Leibnizs Law, Tibbles

and Tib cannot be one and the same. Now

imagine Tibbles is in a terrible car crash re-

sulting in the loss of his tail. Surely Tibbles

survives, as cats can survive the loss of an

outer appendage. Obviously Tib survives

as well, unharmed by the accident. We areleft with the fact that after the accident, two

distinct objects wholly exist in one place,

the cat-except-a-tail region, and share all

the same cat-parts. Hence, it appears it is

possible for two material objects to be co-

located and comprised of identical parts.

The dominant sorts account is a

monist solution to these issues. The afore-

mentioned paradoxes distinguish between

two distinct entities which are said to co-

incide. The dominant sorts account does

away with the problem of co-location by

eliminating one of the two contenders.

Consider the following principle: For any

object O and sort S, if O is an S, then the

persistence conditions of O are determined

by S [ii]. This principle seems completelyrational, but runs into trouble when faced

with the paradoxes of coincidence. If one

object is clearly two different things, how

can it have opposing persistence condi-

tions? The dominant sorts account of coin-

cidence rejects this principle, and instead

claims that if an object O is of two sorts,

S1 and S2, it can only have the persistence

conditions associated with its dominant

sort. The dominant sort is dened as that

which determines the objects persistence

conditions [iii]. Take the paradox of the

lump of clay and the statue. Before the art-

ist molds the clay, the object in question is

only a lump and nothing else, and there-

fore its persistence conditions are in accor-

dance with that sort. (For ease, call it SLUMP

)

Thus, SLUMP

must be this objects dominant

sort. But when the lump is molded into a

statue, we encounter the paradox: the ob-

ject is seemingly both a lump and a statue,and therefore is of both sorts. The object

in question is ostensibly both SLUMP

and

SSTATUE

; however, new persistence condi-

tions (e.g. cannot survive being smashed)

result in SSTATUE

becoming the objects

dominant sort. One object cannot magical-

ly become a different one, so it follows that

the original lump must be destroyed when

the statue comes into existence. No object

can change its dominant sort. We are left

with an object that is solely a statue and

no longer a lump of clay, conforming to

the anti-coincidence principle. Similarly,

in the case of Tibbles and Tib, we must say

that after the accident, Tib goes out of exis-

tence. The surviving object from the crash

is still a functioning cat that eats, dreams,sleeps, thinks, and so on, even though he

no longer has a tail. Because the persis-

tence conditions of cats allow for the loss

of appendages, we must classify what is left

of Tibbles to exclusively be Tibbles. That

is, STIBBLES

is the objects dominant sort.

Because no object can change its domi-

nant sort, Tib must be annihilated in the19

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20

AdAm SAdAKA(EdiTOr)

process. Therefore the object in question

(a cat without a tail) is only Tibbles, which

observes the anti-coincidence principle.

Although the dominant sorts ac-

count apparently solves the paradoxes of

coincidence, there is something very odd

about saying the lump of clay simply goes

out of existence when it is sculpted and

that Tib goes out of existence even though

it goes untouched. This view is highly

counterintuitive. What is more troubling is

what happens when the statue is smashed.

After smashing the statue, it would seemthat the resulting object is once again a

lump. But because no object can change its

dominant sort, this account asserts that a

new lump of clay is created. The new lump

differs from the original lump because the

two have different histories (the new lump

came into existence only after smashing

the statue), therefore the two lumps must

be numerically distinct. It seems highly im-

plausible to say we can annihilate a lump

of clay by merely molding it, and then cre-

ate a new, different lump of clay merely

by smashing a statue, even though both

lumps are composed of identical parts.

The dominant sorts account faces

even larger problems when we consider

some denitions of modern art. Supposethat instead of sculpting the lump of clay

into a statue, the artist leaves it as is, and

decides he would like to invite all of his art-

ist friends to judge his new work. Imag-

ine further that all of his friends consider

his work to be a masterpiece and a per-

fect representation of postmodern cubism.

Although the artist has not altered the clay

in any way whatsoever, the lump of clay

no longer exists and has been replaced by

a postmodern cubist statue. If our percep-

tion of aesthetics alone is the sole require-

ment to create art, then our perception is

all that is needed to destroy a lump of clay.

Correspondingly, if we change our aesthet-

ic preferences, we can destroy the artwork

and create a new lump of clay. The same

line of thought applies to the case of Tibbles

and Tib. After the accident, Tib is entirely

unharmed, so it is odd to say Tib is annihi-

lated when Tibbles loses his tail. To claimthe loss of an external part can destroy a

separate object seems highly outlandish.

But if we suppose Tib survives, we would

be forced into saying Tibbles dies from the

loss of his tail, which also seems wrong (In

general, cats can survive such traumas).

Furthermore, because Tib shares a head

with Tibbles, it is plausible that Tib en-

gages in cat-like activities as Tibbles does,

such as eating, thinking, and so on. We are

left with an epistemic choice to determine

which object survives and which object is

destroyed. In both cases, it is ridiculous to

presume we can create and destroy materi-

al objects with the power of thought alone.

A nal blow to the dominant sorts

view is that it cannot account for coin-ciding objects of the same sort. Suppose

there is a single piece of paper that con-

tains two identical memos written at dif-

ferent times. Again, we encounter an ob-

ject that is two distinct objects (differing

histories) in the same place at the same

time. Because both are of the same sort,

SMEMO, the persistence conditions of both


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21


are identical, so it is impossible to assign

a dominant sort. This account cannot ad-

equately solve paradoxes of this nature.

Pluralists reject the anti-coincidence

principle and accept the notion that two or

more distinct objects can share the same

parts and location at a given time. This ap-

proach is best explained by the temporal

parts account of coincidence. While it may

be counterintuitive to say two distinct ob-

jects wholly coincide, by this view, there is

really nothing problematic about it. From

this perspective, coincidence can be best vi-sualized by considering overlapping roads:

Consider now the case of U.S. Route 29,

which runs from the western suburbs of

Baltimore, Maryland, to Pensacola, Flori-

da. As U.S. 29 passes through Charlotte it

becomes Tyson St.a street wholly located

within the state of North Carolina. The two

roadways in this case are not identical, but

they are partly identical, for Tyson St. is iden-

tical to a proper spatial part of U.S. 29 [iv].

By presupposing perdurantism, the tempo-

ral parts account denes coincidence to be

a given time, or time interval, when distinct

temporal segments perfectly overlap, just

as Tyson Street perfectly overlaps a seg-

ment of U.S. Route 29. During the overlap,

neither object is exclusively present; in-stead, they equally occupy one four-dimen-

sional region in space-time. This accounts

for why we identify only one object when

two distinct objects coincide. It follows that

if coinciding objects occupy a single loca-

tion, they must also share parts at the time

of coincidence. Consider again the case of

the lump of clay and the statue. According

to the temporal parts account, the lump

of clay is a four-dimensional space-time

worm, while the statue is a shorter, distinct

worm. After the clay is sculpted, we seem-

ingly have two distinct objects coinciding

in one location. According to the temporal

parts account, the statue-worm intersects

a temporal segment of the lump-worm at

the time (or time interval) of coincidence.

Therefore, the statue-worm composed of

the lumps temporal slices that span the

time of coincidence. Because both persist-

ing objects share a temporal segment, at agiven moment both objects share a three-

dimensional location. As a result, we only

perceive one physical object but accept the

existence of both the statue and lump. The

case of Tibbles and Tib can be viewed in a

similar light. This case is equivalent to a

road in which one lane merges into the main

road [v]. Tibbles and Tib are both persist-

ing four-dimensional objects, and after the

accident, their temporal worms merge into

one four-dimensional region and perfectly

overlap. Although they are distinct objects,

Tibbles and Tib are perfectly co-located

and therefore share all the same parts at

the time of coincidence. In both cases, two

distinct objects share one location and one

set of parts. The temporal parts accountperfectly explains these paradoxes of coin-

cidence, allowing objects with distinct his-

tories and different modal properties to be

co-located and composed of identical parts.

Although the temporal parts theory

of coincidence accounts for many of the

shortcomings that plague the dominant

sorts account, it faces its own set of criti-


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22

AdAm SAdAKA(EdiTOr)

cisms. This view runs into trouble when we

consider two distinct, coinciding objects

that come into existence and are destroyed

at the same moments in time. For example,

suppose that through some chemical acci-

dent, clay is created from aqueous miner-

als. Moreover, suppose that the clay comes

into existence in the form of the statue of

David. Although the lump of clay and the

statue are created simultaneously, they still

differ in a number of aspects and must be

considered distinct from one another. Now

imagine the chemist treats his product witha series of chemicals that instantly disin-

tegrate the object, annihilating the statue

and lump together. These distinct space-

time worms are numerically identical, per-

fectly overlapping at every instant of their

existence. This creates a paradox: at the

core of four-dimensionalism is the belief

that every distinct object is a unique space-

time worm. If two objects have identical

worms, they must be one in the same; how-

ever, this cannot be the case here because

the statue and lump of clay are denitively

distinct. The answer to this objection is as

follows: The object in question is bound to

our universe, but it has counterparts in al-

ternate universes that account for all pos-

sible ascriptions. Simply put, just becausethe two space-time worms happen to be

identical in one case does not assure they

must be identical in all cases. It is plausible

to assume that in an alternate universe,

the product of the accident is smashed by a

hammer rather than annihilated by chemi-

cals. In this alternate case, the lump would

survive, but the statue would be destroyed.

Even when objects have entirely identi-

cal histories and properties, Leibnizs Law

still distinguishes them by their modal

possibilities. Unlike other solutions to

the paradoxes of coincidence, embracing

Leibnizs Law in the strictest sense does

not weaken the temporal parts account.

One of the most appealing features of

the temporal parts account of coincidence

is that it actually embraces the notion of

coincidence. Unlike monist solutions, the

temporal parts theory uses Leibnizs Law

to its advantage, grounding its frameworkin the undisputable claim that two distinct

objects are present wherever coincidence

occurs. The dominant sorts account of co-

incidence fails precisely because it tries to

circumvent Leibnizs Law. By recognizing

only the sort that determines persistence,

this view fails to fully account for the true

nature of an object. An object might be a

letter, but when it is folded into a paper

plane, the dominant sorts account claims

the letter goes out of existence, even though

it is clearly still there. On the other hand,

the temporal parts account captures co-

incidence in the literal sense: two distinct

objects simultaneously existing in one giv-

en location. By positing that coincidence

occurs during the overlap of four-dimen-sional temporal segments, this view ex-

plains coincidence in a way that is not only

conceptually simple, but also undeniable.

wOrKS CiTEd

Hawley, Katherine. Temporal Parts.


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23


Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1

Oct. 2004. Web.

Sider, Theodore. Four-Dimensionalism

An Ontology of Persistence and Time).

New York: Oxford UP, 2003. Print.

Wasserman, Ryan. Material Constitu-

tion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-

phy. 25 Feb. 2009. Web.

nOTES

[i] Objects persist through space-time as

four-dimensional worms and have tem-

poral parts; distinct objects have distinct

space-time worms.

[ii] Material Constitution, Stanford En-

cyclopedia of Philosophy, 2009 ed.

[iii] Theodore Sider, Four-Dimensional-

ism An Ontology of Persistence and Time

(New York: Oxford UP, 2003), 162.

[iv] Material Constitution, S.E.P.

[v] Sider 152.


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