SPOUSES Romualdez - Digest

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SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNISGARAY

G.R. No. 167011 / April 30, 2008 / CHICO-NAZARIO, J. :

SUBJECT: Due Process of Law

FACTS:

2000 respondents Dennis Garay and Angelino Apostol before COMELEC filed election charges against thepetitioners for violating:

a. Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) Sec. 261(y)(2) - knowingly making any false or untruthful statementsrelative to any data or information required in the application for registration as new voters

b. Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) Sec. 261(y)(5) - committed by any person who, being a registered voter,registers anew without filing an application for cancellation of his previous registration

c. Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189 (Voters Registration Act) - for failure to apply for transfer ofregistration records due to change of residence to another city or municipality

Petitioners indicated in their application that they are residents of Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, theywere and still are residents and registered voters of Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City, and that they did notindicated the length of time which they have resided in Burauen, Leyte.

2004 - COMELEC issued June 11 Resolution directing the filing of two separate informations against petitioners forviolation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of Republic Act 8189 before RTC.

SEC. 10. Registration of Voters. A qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list ofvoters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides to be able to vote in anyelection. To register as a voter, he shall personally accomplish an application form forregistration as prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies before the Election Officer onany date during office hours after having acquired the qualifications of a voter.

The application shall contain the following data:

g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;

j) A statement that the application is not a registered voter of any precinct

SEC. 45. Election Offense. The following shall be considered election offenses under this Act.

j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.

Petitioners contentions:

1. They did not make any false or untruthful statements in their application for registration:a. They intended to reside in Burauen, Leyte, since the year 1989 and took actual residence on 2000 by

leasing for (5) years a house there.b. Barangay District of Burauen passed a Resolution of Welcome for them.


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2. Lack of Due Process - Election offenses charged against them are entirely different from those which theystand to be accused of before the RTC by the COMELEC:a. They were charged in RTC for violating:

1) Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code2) Section 12 of the Voters Registration Act

b. They were not given right to refute or submit documentary evidence against the new charges filed by

COMELEC.c. Lacson v. Executive Secretary - the real nature of the criminal charge is determined by the actual recitalof facts in the Complaint or Information; and that the object of such written accusations was to furnish theaccused with such a description of the charge against him, as will enable him to make his defense. Theelementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the Complaint orInformation, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.

3. Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration Act is vague it is contrary to Section 14(1) and Section 14(2),Article III of the 1987 Constitution because it does not refer to a definite provision of the law on the violationof which would constitute an election offense.

Section 14 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution - No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense withoutdue process of law.

Section 14 (2). Article III of the 1987 Constitution - In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumedinnocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informedof the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet thewitnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the productionof evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of theaccused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

COMELEC contentions:

1. Filing of request for the cancellation and transfer of Voting Registration Record does not automaticallycancel the registration records.a. At the time of application for registration at Leyte petitioners voting registration in Barangay

Bagong Lipunan ng Crame Quezon City was still valid and subsisting. They cannot claim ignorance ofsection 10 on the procedure for transfer of registration records by reason of transferred newresidence to another municipality.

b. Petitioners cannot claim an honest mistake - election law is mala prohibita. Proof of criminal intent isnot necessary.

ISSUE:Whether COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.

HELD:

Due Process:

1. Complaint filed by Garay with the COMELEC is couched in a language which embraces the allegationsnecessary to support the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) ofRepublic Act No. 8189. Mere perusal of the Complaint-Affidavit would readily show that Section 10 ofRepublic Act No. 8189 was specifically mentioned therein. It supports the charged filed by COMELEC inRTC.

2. Spouses are registered as new voters of the Municipality of Burauen, Leyte, despite they are registeredvoters of Quezon City (1997):


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a. Double Registration is an election offense - A person qualified as a voter is only allowed to registeronce. If a person registers anew as a voter in spite of a subsisting registration, the new application forregistration will be disapproved. The registrant is also liable not only for an election offense of doubleregistration, but also for another election offense of knowingly making any false or untruthfulstatement relative to any data or information required in the application for registration.

3. Lacson case does not support their claim of lack of due process:

a. There appears no incongruity between the charges in the Complaint and the Informations filedbefore the RTC.

b. Charges contained in Complaint and Informations filed by the COMELEC are based on the same set offacts.

c. Informations filed by COMELEC - based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in Garayscomplaint.

4. Petitioners were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in Garays Complaint -Affidavit thrufiling Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss and a Memorandum.a. In Preliminary investigations petitioners were informed of the complaint and of the evidence

submitted against them to which they actively participated.b. In Orquinaza v. People - The court held that the designation by the police officer of the offense

(sexual harassment) is not conclusive as it is within the competence of the prosecutor to assess theevidence submitted and determine the appropriate offense (acts of lasciviousness) to be charged.

Validity of the Law:

5. The Court is not convinced on the vagueness of Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189:a. Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of election offenses under the same Act - without

doubt, crystal in its specification that a violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189 isan election offense. The challenged provision renders itself to no other interpretation.

b. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is not applicable a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligencemust necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Facial invalidation or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate. It is subject to the same principles governingoverbreadth doctrine. Like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its faceonly if it is vague in all its possible applications.

c. In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan :

The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed fortesting "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, FirstAmendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute.With respect to such statute, the established rule is that 'one to whom application of a statute isconstitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also betaken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might beunconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context,like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as amatter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.'"

6.

To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity. InSantiago v. Comelec held that a portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue delegation oflegislative powers, not because of vagueness.a. Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties

whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departurefrom the usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and permit decisions to be made in asterile abstract context having no factual concreteness .

b. For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described as a"manifestly strong medicine" to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining
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the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have allegedly been violated mustbe examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant has been charged. ( Younger v.Harris)

c. In David v. Arroyo - Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of alaw that "reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,constitutionally unprotected conduct." ( Broadrick v. Oklahoma) - claims of facial overbreadth are

entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms , seek to regulate only " spoken words "and again, that " overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked againstordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct ." Facial challenge on theground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger mustestablish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid .

d. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan - A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because generalterms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much lessdo we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutorycommand requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is notrestricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in astatute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislativewill is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act. Moreover, it is a well-settled principleof legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinaryacceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or speciallegal meaning to those words . The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrainedphilologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.

7. Section 45 (j) conjointly with the provisions Sections 10 (g) and (j) - reveal that the matters that arerequired to be set forth under the sections are crucial to the achievement of a clean, complete,permanent and updated list of voters. The factual information required by the law is sought not for mereembellishment but is directly relevant to the right of suffrage, which the State has the right to regulate.

8. Phraseology in Section 45(j) is employed by Congress in a number of our laws. In Gatchalian - "any of theprovisions of this [A]ct" as all-embracing the legislative fiat intends to punish not only those expresslydeclared unlawful but even those not so declared but are clearly enjoined to be observed to carry out thefundamental purpose of the law.

Jurisdiction and Power of COMELEC:

9. COMELEC did not gravely abused its discretion - Omnibus Election Code and Article IX (C), Section 2 (6) ofthe 1987 Constitution - the task of the COMELEC whenever any election offense charge is filed before it isto conduct the preliminary investigation of the case, and make a determination of probable cause. It issuccinct that courts will not substitute the finding of probable cause by the COMELEC in the absence ofgrave abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to anevasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all incontemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason ofpassion or hostility .a. Power to prosecute include the right to determine under which laws prosecution will be pursued. The

courts cannot dictate the prosecution nor usurp its discretionary powers. As a rule, courts cannot

interfere with the prosecutors discretion and control of the criminal prosec ution.b. Resolutions of 11 June 2004 and 27 January 2005 are AFFIRMED.

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SPOUSES Romualdez - Digest