PEOPLE V. ACOSTA (GR. NO. 126351)

FACTS: Appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo was a 38-year old mason, married, and a resident of Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City, at the time of the offense charged. He used to be a good friend of Almanzor "Elmer" Montesclaros, the grandson of private complainant, Filomena M. Marigomen. On February 27, 1996, a few hours before the fire, Montesclaros, in the belief that appellant and his wife were the ones hiding his live-in partner from him, stormed the house of appellant and burned their clothes, furniture, and appliances. Montesclaros lived in the house owned by said complainant and located at Banahaw St., Mountain Heights Subdivision, Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City. It was this house allegedly set on fire by appellant.

At about 4:00 to 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, the nephew of prosecution witness Mona Aquino called the latter, simultaneously shouting that appellant Raul Acosta, their neighbor, was carrying a stove and a kitchen knife. She went out of her house and approached appellant who, when asked why he was carrying a stove and a knife, replied that he would burn the house of complainant Filomena M. Marigomen.

Owing to the fearsome answer of appellant to witness Aquino’s query, she returned immediately to her house. A few minutes after closing the door, she heard the sound of broken bottles and the throwing of chair inside the house of complainant. When she peeped through her kitchen door, she saw appellant inside complainant’s house, which was unoccupied at that time. Thereafter, appellant poured kerosene on the bed (papag) and lighted it with cigarette lighter. The fire was easily put off by appellant’s wife who arrived at the place.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of arson.

HELD: In this case, we find the trial court correctly held that the following circumstances taken together constitute an unbroken chain of events pointing to one fair and logical conclusion, that accused started the fire which gutted the house of private complainant. Although there is no direct evidence linking appellant to the arson, we agree with the trial court in holding him guilty thereof in the light of the following circumstances duly proved and on record:

First, appellant had the motive to commit the arson. It is not absolutely necessary, and it is frequently impossible for the prosecution to prove the motive of the accused for the commission of the crime charged, nevertheless in a case of arson like the present, the existence or non-existence of a sufficient motive is a fact affecting the credibility of the witnesses. Appellant had every reason to feel aggrieved about the incident and to retaliate in kind against Montesclaros and his grandmother.

Second, appellant’s intent to commit the arson was established by his previous attempt to set on fire a bed ("papag") inside the same house (private complainant’s) which was burned later in the night. Prosecution witness Mona Aquino testified that at around 5:00 in the afternoon of the same day, she saw appellant carrying a gas stove and knife. When she asked him what he was going to do with the stove, he answered that he was going to burn the house of private complainant.

Third, appellant was not only present at the   locus criminis  before the incident, he was seen inside the yard of the burning house during the height of the fire. At around 1:00 in the morning of February 28, 1996, prosecution witness Lina Videña was awakened by the barking of their dog, so she went to the back of their house to investigate.

Fourth, appellant’s actions subsequent to the incident further point to his culpability. At around 12:00 noon of the same day, private complainant went with prosecution witness Lina Videña to the place of Kagawad Tecson. They were about to leave when appellant arrived. Private complainant asked him why he burned her house and appellant answered, "So what if I burned your house?" Then appellant stared meanly at private complainant, who got nervous and had to take medications. The following day, appellant threatened prosecution witness Mona Aquino, saying that if she would testify against him, he would also burn her house.

People of the Philippines vs Arnel Nocum, et. al.G.R. No.179041, April 1, 2013

FACTS:On or about September 12, 1998 in Muntinlupa City, REYNALDO MALLARI together with ARNEL NOCUM, REY JOHNNY RAMOS, CARLOS JUN POSADAS, PANDAO POLING PANGANDAG took and carried away one Toyota Tamaraw FX valued at more or less Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to the damage and [prejudice] of its owner, Lourdes Eleccion. In the course of the commission thereof, Erico Medel, the driver of the said vehicle, was killed. When the case was called for arraignment on November 10, 2000, only Mallari appeared as his co-accused remain at-large. He pleaded “not guilty” to the charge. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution’s lone witness was Chris Mahilac (Mahilac), a self-confessed member of “FX gang,” a syndicate notorious for carjacking Toyota FX vehicles. Mahilac testified that the “FX gang” was active in Metro Manila and Mindanao. Nocum led the syndicate’s criminal activities in Metro Manila while Pangandag, who was the head of the Land Transportation Office in Lanao Del Norte, led the Mindanao operations. Ramos, Posadas and Mallari were members of the gang.

On December 15, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision finding Mallari guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping with homicide. The trial court ruled that the testimony of Mahilac that Mallari participated in the theft of the FX taxi and the kil l ing of its driver, Medel, cannot be negated by Mallari’s denial and uncorroborated alibi. It also found that the commission of the crime was a result of a planned operation with Mallari and all the accused doing their assigned tasks to ensure the consummation of their common criminal objective.

On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision affirming with modification the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court held that Mahilac’s positive identification of Mallari as a member of the “FX gang” and his participation in the theft of the FX taxi and kill ing of its driver, Medel, sufficiently established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

According to the CA, the fact that the prosecution presented Mahilac as its sole witness is of no moment. His positive and credible testimony is sufficient to convict Mallari, whose defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the straightforward testimony of the former.

ISSUE:WON there is a lack of material evidence to justify the accused’s conviction.

RULING:We find no reason to deviate from these courts’ evaluation as to Mallari’s culpability.

The crime of carnapping with homicide, as well as the identity of Mallari as one of the perpetrators of the crime, is duly established by circumstantial evidence.

The culpability of Mallari for the complex crime of carnapping with homicide is duly established by the confluence of circumstantial evidence. Mahilac testified that he was present when Mallari and his co-accused, all members of the “FX Gang,” gathered in Muntinlupa City to plan and conspire to steal vehicles and sell them to unscrupulous buyers in Mindanao. Immediately after said meeting, Mahilac saw Mallari hail the FX taxi driven by Medel, talk to him, board it together with two other conspirators, and head south towards the direction of Quezon province. A few days later, Mallari and his companions met Mahilac in Cagayan De Oro City on board the same FX taxi they rode in Muntinlupa City. All these show that Mallari’s original criminal design was to carnap the taxi and that he accomplished his purpose without the consent of its owner.

In fine, all the elements of the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, as well as the identity of Mallari as one of the perpetrators of the crime, were all proved beyond reasonable doubt. The foregoing circumstances inevitably lead to the lone, fair and reasonable conclusion that Mallari participated in stealing the FX taxi driven by Medel and in kil l ing him.

Mallari’s defense of alibi deserves no credence.

Mallari’s claim that he was helping his wife with household chores at thetime the crime was committed does not deserve credence. This defense of alibi cannot prevail over the testimony of Mahilac which, taken in its entirety, leads to the reasonable conclusion that Mallari participated in the commission of the crime. Moreover, alibi is inherently weak, unreliable, and can be easily fabricated.65 Hence, it must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused.Petition is dismissed.

PEOPLE VS MACABANDO

P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.22 This law punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political, and national security implications than destructive arson.23

The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these elements have been proven in the present case. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his own house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited houses. These allegations were established during trial through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the trial and appellate courts found credible and convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection which stated that damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been intentional. Moreover, the certification from the City Social Welfare and Development Department likewise indicated that the burned houses were used as dwellings. The appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was used as a residence. That the appellant’s act affected many families will not convert the crime to destructive arson, since the appellant’s act does not appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness when compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established evidence only showed that the appellant intended to burn his own house, but the conflagration spread to the neighboring houses.

In this regard, our ruling in Buebos v. People24 is particularly instructive, thus:

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson.