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SPINOZA AND THE DUTCH CARTESIANS ON PHILOSOPHY AND
THEOLOGY
Abstract
Spinozas Tractatus Theologico-Politicus contains a famous injunction to separate
philosophy from theology and vice-versa. In this paper I argue that, notwithstanding this
injunction, Spinoza made an implicit claim that philosophy can, in certain cases, qualify as a
form of theology. Properly understanding Spinozas complex views concerning the
relationship between philosophy and theology requires us to situate his work in the context of
philosophical discussions taking place during his own time and in his own country of
residence, the Dutch Republic. I argue that his views were developed in response to a thesis
advanced by a group of Dutch Cartesians including Johannes De Raey, Christoph Wittich,
Abraham Heidanus, Lambert van Velthuysen, and others. They held that philosophy and
theology must be separated because neither can fulfil the function of the other; indeed,
neither is even relevant to the function of the other. While Spinoza might seem to have
agreed with this Dutch Cartesian separation thesis, in fact he undermined it.
1. Introduction
Spinozas Tractatus Theologico-Politicus contains a famous injunction to separate
philosophy from theology and vice-versa. In this paper I argue that, notwithstanding this
injunction, Spinoza made an implicit claim that philosophy can, in certain cases, qualify as a
form of theology. Properly understanding Spinozas complex views concerning the
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relationship between philosophy and theology, I contend, requires us to situate his work in
the context of philosophical discussions taking place during his own time and in his own
country of residence, the Dutch Republic. Of particular relevance is a meta-philosophical
thesis advocated by a certain group of Cartesian philosophers and theologians. Their thesis
was developed in response to attacks on Cartesianism from more conservative authors, who
saw it as a source of impiety. It stated that Cartesian philosophy, properly understood, is
neither pious nor impious. It cannot help to answer questions about theology, nor can it
provide knowledge of any relevance to advancing human wellbeing and salvation.
Theo Verbeek has already argued that understanding this Dutch Cartesian thesis is
relevant to understanding important features of Spinozas thought.1 I build upon his work to
argue that Spinozas views concerning between religion and philosophy should be
understood as a conscious repudiation of it. The Dutch Cartesians genuinely hoped to
separate philosophy from theology. Spinoza similarly claimed to separate them, but he meant
far less by this separation than the Dutch Cartesians had meant by it. He held that what
1 See Theo Verbeek, 'Les Cartsiens Face Spinoza: l'Exemple de Johannes de Raey,' in The
Spinozistic Heresy = L'Hrsie Spinoziste: the Debate on the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 1670-
1677, ed. Paolo Cristofolini (Amsterdam: APA-Holland University Press, 1995), Theo Verbeek,
'Spinoza and Cartesianism,' inJudaeo-Christian Intellectual Culture in the Seventeenth Century: a
Celebration of the Library of Narcissus Marsh (1638-1713), ed. Allison Coudert (Dordrecht ;
London: Kluwer Academic, 1999), Theo Verbeek, 'Spinoza et la Tradition des Analytiques
Postrieures,' in Spinoza et les Scholastiqus (Conference at Paris, Sorbonne: 2008), Theo Verbeek,'Spinoza on the Truth and Certainty of Scientific Knowledge (unpublished),' (Utrecht: 2008), Theo
Verbeek, Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise: Exploring 'the Will of God'(Aldershot: Ashgate,
2003) esp. ch.6, Theo Verbeek, 'Wittich's Critique of Spinoza,' inReceptions of Descartes :
Cartesianism and Anti-Cartesianism in Early Modern Europe, ed. Tad M. Schmaltz (London:
Routledge, 2005).
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separates theology from philosophy is a difference in the goals they pursue. And yet he
strongly implied that the distinctive goal of theology, as he defined it, could in certain cases
be ultimately advanced by means of philosophy alone.
2. The Dutch Cartesians
Philosophy inspired by the new methods and theories of Descartes enjoyed a period of
popularity in the Dutch Republic from the 1640s until the end of the century, when
Newtonian and Lockean ideas began to take over.2 Interpretations of Cartesian philosophy
varied widely. Verbeek identifies at least three distinct Dutch Cartesian schools, all
emphasizing different parts of Descartes thought.3 The Cartesian school I shall focus on in
this paper is the one that was most tolerated by officials within the universities. It was
sustained by what Verbeek calls a network of Cartesians:
Those who belonged to this network were, first of all, [Abraham] Heidanus,[Johannes] De Raey, Johannes Clauberg and Christopher Wittich, Lambert van
Velthuysen, and a theological student, Frans Burman. They all knew each other
2 See C. De Pater, 'Experimental Physics,' inLeiden University in the Seventeenth Century: an
Exchange of Learning, ed. Th. H. Lunsingh Scheurleer and G. H. M. Meyjes (Leiden: Brill, 1975),
Edward Grant Ruestow, Physics at Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Leiden: Philosophy and the
New Science in the University, (Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Ides. Series Minor. no. 11.)
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973) 88ff, Caroline Louise Thijssen-Schoute,Nederlands
Cartesianisme. Avec sommaire et tables des matieres en francais., ed. Theo Verbeek (Utrecht: Hes &
De Graaf, 1989), Theo Verbeek,Descartes and the Dutch: Early Reactions to Cartesian Philosophy,
1637-1650 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992).
3 Verbeek, Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise 151-152.
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and were bound by enthusiasm for Descartes philosophy and by strong feelingsof loyalty toward its author and each other.4
All the members of this network (with the exception of Velthuysen)5 were professors of
philosophy, theology, and related subjects at universities in Leiden, Amsterdam, Herborn,
Duisburg, and elsewhere.
What made, or was at least intended to make, this networks version of Cartesian
philosophy more acceptable than other versions was the claim that it had no relevance
whatsoever to what were known as the higher faculties: theology, law, medicine, and other
sciences directly concerned with questions of human conduct and welfare. Universities in this
period, in the Dutch Republic as elsewhere in Europe, were increasingly becoming places of
training for lawyers, doctors, church ministers, and members of the rapidly-growing
government bureaucracy.6 Philosophy was taught as an introduction to general ways of
thinking, before students moved on to study in the higher faculties and receive specific
training for these roles.7 Thus many saw in the new Cartesian philosophy a threat that was
social as well as intellectual.
4 Verbeek,Descartes and the Dutch 70.
5 He, born into a fairly privileged social position, was a full-time amateur theological and philosopher,
who had abandoned medical practice for which he had been trained at Utrecht University. He also, at
times, diverged from the aims and programs of the Dutch Cartesian network (see below, note 52).
6Looking over Europe as a whole, the universities can be seen to have turned out, year after
year, the administrative elite of both Church and state; an elite, be it said, on which both these
institutions relied successfully for their continuity though the revolutions of the mid-seventeenth
century. Henry Arthur Francis Kamen, The Iron Century: Social Change in Europe, 1550-1660,
Revised ed. (London: Cardinal, 1976) 319.
7 Verbeek,Descartes and the Dutch 6, see footnote 28.
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To combat this perception, the network of Dutch Cartesians (henceforth simply the
Dutch Cartesians) worked together to argue that it is a misguided policy to teach philosophy
as an introduction to the higher faculties. It is only a mistaken conception of philosophy that
leads one to think that it has any relevance to them. Cartesianism corrects this misconception.
Far from being practically corrupting, it aspires to make philosophy practically irrelevant.
Thus the Dutch Cartesians unofficial leader, De Raey, wrote, in a 1687 disputation arguing
for Modesty and Prudence in Philosophising, that the less Theology, Jurisprudence,
Medicine, and other such arts, are known by philosophy, that is to say, the less connected
they are to it, the more excellent and true philosophy is.8 In an earlier 1665 disputation, he
complained that the Philosophy of the Schools had corrupted all the sciences by failing to
keep practical disciplines separate from philosophy.9
To understand why the Dutch Cartesians were keen to make this point, we must
examine the specific criticisms made against Cartesianism by powerful figures within both
the university administrations and the Reformed Church. One figure who was extremely
powerful within both establishments was the minister, professor of theology, and rector of
8Theologiae, Jurisprudentiae, Medicinae, aliarumque artium, tanto minorem cum philosophia
congationem, sive connexionem esse, quanto sublimior & magis vera philosophia est...: Disputatio
Philosophica; Specimen exhibens Modestiae et Prudentiae in Philosophandoin Joannes de Raei,
Cogitata de Interpretatione, quibus natura humani sermonis et illius rectus usus, ab hujus seculi
errore et confusione vindicantur. Accedunt not recentes cum appendice (Amsteldami: H. Wetstein,
1692) 653.
9 Ibid. 651. See Theo Verbeek, 'Tradition and Novelty: Descartes and some Cartesians,' in The Rise
of Modern Philosophy: the Tension between the New and Traditional Philosophies from Machiavelli
to Leibniz, ed. Tom Sorell (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 191.
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Utrecht University, Gisbertus Voetius.10 In hisDisputations Concerning Atheism, published
in 1648 and revised a number of times subsequently,11 Voetius warned against the danger
Cartesian philosophy posed to practical religion. Without calling the Cartesians by name, but
clearly intending them,12
he attacked all those who tried to use a method of doubt to deprive
people of their ordinary understanding of nature, in a manner that would eventually cast
doubt on their religious beliefs as well.13 This, he warned, could lead only to the spread of
impiety:
For as there is no practice which does not presuppose knowledge, and noknowledge which may not be directed towards some practical end; so there is no
practical atheism which does not presuppose some corruption of theory or of thejudgement of the mind, and no speculative atheism which does not proceed to thecorruption of practice; for in this they are mutual causes, as indeed will andintellect are in all other things.14
10 1589-1676
11 Ernest Bizer, 'Reformed Orthodoxy and Cartesianism,'Journal for Theology and the Church 2
(1965): n.80.
12 He could not call them by name, since a 1642 resolution passed by his own university senate
prohibited the explicit discussion of any philosophy besides that of Aristotle. This placed him and
others in the difficult position of refuting Cartesianism without explicitly mentioning it (See Ruestow,
Physics at Leiden 36, Verbeek,Descartes and the Dutch Ch.1.)
13 Bizer, 'Reformed Orthodoxy and Cartesianism,' 30, Gisbertus Voetius,Disputationes Theologicae
Selectae (Utrecht (vol. 4, Amsterdam): Joh. Waesberge, 1648-69) I.131-132.
14Ut enim nulla praxis est qu non prsupponat cognitionem, & nulla cognition qu non ad
utilitatem aliquam dirigi possit: Sic nullus est practicus Atheismus, qui non prsupponat aliquam
corruptionem theori seu judicii mentis; & nullus speculativus qui non procedat ad corruptionem
praxeos; sunt enim sibi mutuo caus; prout in aliis omnibus intellectus & voluntas. Voetius,
Disputationes Theologicae Selectae I.166.
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One key issue was the Cartesian attitude towards what Voetius called Mosaic
Physics, a system of physics that he and others had developed, based on a combination of
Aristotelianism and Biblical literalism.15
Cartesian physics was designed to replace this
system, at least for philosophically-minded people (the Dutch Cartesians admitted that the
old system is perfectly sufficient for everyday purposes).16 They argued that the very idea of
Mosaic physics was based on a misunderstanding of the purpose of Scripture: Scripture is
meant to teach moral lessons, not to serve as a physics textbook, and therefore it often speaks
in an imprecise way, accommodated to the limited scientific understanding of most of its
readers.17Thus, for example, Wittich declared himself against those who wish to forge us a
Physics which is Mosaic, sacred, Christian, etc.18 But Voetius warned that people:
15 A study of this system and its relation to Cartesianism can be found in J. A. van Ruler, The Crisis of
Causality: Voetius and Descartes on God, Nature, and Change,Brill's studies in intellectual history,
v.66(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995).
16
Raei, Cogitata 657.17 Accommodationism was a well-established position within the Calvinist context, even before the
rise of Cartesianism. See Calvins own comments about Scripture: Jean Calvin,A Commentary on
Genesis (London: Banner of Truth Trust, 1965) I.15. See also Reyer Hooykaas,Religion and the Rise
of Modern Science (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1973) 118ff. and Verbeek,Descartes and
the Dutch 7. Wittich claimed that his way of reading Scripture was drawn from Scripture itself:
Christophoros Wittichius, Consensus Veritatis in Scriptura Divina revelat cum veritate
Philosophica a Renato Descartes detecta (Neomagi, 1659) 19-21. Spinoza would make a similar
claim about his own, very different, reading in the seventh chapter of his Tractatus Theologico-
Politicus.
18 Wittichius, Consensus Veritatis 16. Voetius and the Groningen theologian Samuel Maresius were
almost certainly the implicit targets of this attack. See Bizer, 'Reformed Orthodoxy and Cartesianism,'
62ff.
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...who seem so little to value the Mosaic Physics of the scriptures, dictated by theHoly Spirit, and prefer their own conceptions of nature and the universe, ... suchpeople as a consequence cast doubt on the divinity of Scripture and accuse theHoly Spirit of being foolish ... and in this way they confirm atheism andunbelief.19
In this way Cartesian philosophy was said to lead directly to atheism: it makes us doubt the
literal truth of Scripture, and this doubt becomes practically corruptingit leads to what
Voetius called practical atheism, involving arrogance (thinking oneself cleverer than the
Holy Spirit) and impiety (if the Holy Spirit is thought to speak foolishly concerning matters
of physics, why take its moral injunctions seriously?).
Underlying these accusations was Voetius belief that philosophy and practical
theology are interdependent sciences. Nor was this view peculiar to Voetius. A similar
attitude in the theologian Samuel Maresius20 can be seen in his Theological Dissertation on
the Surreptitious and Evasive Abuse of Theology and Faith by Cartesian Philosophy .21 Other
orthodox Calvinist theologians such as Melchior Leydekker22 made similar arguments.23 The
19qui Phisicam Mosaicam & scripturariam Spir.S. dictatam tam parvi faciunt, ut suos conceptusde universe & rerum natur illi long praeferre videantur ... quique consequenter divinatatem
scripturae labefactant & Spir. S. Inepti ... & sic manus atheorum & atque infidelium confirmant.:
Voetius,Disputationes Theologicae Selectae I.177.
20 15991673
21 Samuel Maresius,De Abusu Philosophiae Cartesianae, Surrepente et Vitando in Rebus Theologicis
et Fidei, Dissertatio Theologica (Groningae: Tierck Everts, 1670). Criticised in Christophoros
Wittichius, Theologia Pacifica, in qua varia problemata theologica inter reformatos theologos agitari
solita ventilantur, simul usus philosophiae Cartesianae in diversis theologiae partibus demonstratur
et ad dissertationem celeberrimi viri Samuelis Maresii modeste respondetur(Leiden: Arn. Doude,
1671), Christophoros Wittichius, Theologico Pacifica Defensa (Amsterdam: Joh. Wolters, 1689).
22 16421721
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physics professor, Arnold Senguerd, in his 1648 inaugural address at the Illustrious School in
Amsterdam, emphasised the strong links between piety and philosophy.24 All these authors
maintained the impossibility of separating philosophical from theological concerns, and more
generally theoretical from practical science.
To rebut the most serious charge against Cartesianism that it leads to practical
impietythe Dutch Cartesians insisted that philosophy not only can but should be separated
from theology and all other sciences concerned with practical human conduct. They argued
for a strict separation between philosophy and the higher faculties, finding the seeds of this
theory of separation in Descartes own writings. Descartes had written, in the Principles of
Philosophy, that his method of systematic philosophical reasoning should be used as a way of
arriving at speculative knowledge, but not at practical knowledge informing ordinary life.25
His outline of his philosophical method began with the proposal that [w]hat is doubtful
should even be considered as false.26 What is not doubtful turns out to be only what can be
23 Bizer, 'Reformed Orthodoxy and Cartesianism.'
24 Paul Auguste Georges Dibon,La Philosophie Nerlandaise au Sicle d'Or(PhD dissertation: Paris;
printed in the Netherlands, 1954) 241.
25 I.3, AT VIIIA.6/CSM I.193. (All references to Descartes works will be to the Adam and Tannery
edition (Ren Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: Vrin,
1974).) and, where possible, to the Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch English edition (Ren
Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch,
vol. 1, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).).
26 I.2, AT VIIIA.6/CSM I.193.
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clearly and distinctly conceived.27 But it would be highly impractical, he implied, for us to
employ such rigorous standards of knowledge when making our everyday life choices.
Remarks like this were taken up and elaborated by the Dutch Cartesians into a full
epistemological distinction between philosophy and the practical sciences.28
According to De
Raey, philosophy does not seek truth simpliciter; it seeks a specific kindof truth, leaving the
practical disciplines to seek another kind:
...the truth which Philosophy seeks differs greatly from that which we find incommon life and in other disciplines. For the latter is, and should be, related toeach of us according to his senses, and considering the ways in which it is usefulrather than harmful to his life, which are different and even contrary [in different
cases]. The other, by contrast, is, and should be, absolute and intrinsic, andknown solely from the intellect, which is always the same, as are its simple andprimitive ideas, which we have seen to be very few.29
One important point is that here philosophical knowledge is defined as being known solely
by the intellect. In a letter to Elisabeth of Bohemia Descartes had suggested that things of
leading relevance to the practical scienceshuman passions and voluntary actionscan be
clearly perceived by the senses, but only obscurely perceived by the understanding alone
27 I.43, AT VIIIA.21/CSM I.207.
28 I shall not discuss whether this was really loyal to the spirit of Descartes, a vexed and complex
question beyond the scope of this short essay. But see Verbeek, 'Tradition and Novelty.'
29...veritas quam Philosophia quaerit multum ab ea differt, quam in communi vita & aliis disciplinas
spectamus. Haec enim ut est, sic quoque debet esse relata ad nos ut unumquodque habet se quod adsensus & considerandi modos, in quibus multiplex diversitas & saepe etiam contrarietas est, quod
non nocet sed utile est ad vitam. Illa ex adverso absoluta & intrinseca est & talis quoque debet esse;
ideoque solo intellectu cognoscitur, qui semper idem & sibi similis est quod ad simplices & primitivas
ideas quas etiam vidimus valde paucas esse.:Disputatio Philosophico; Specimen exhibens
Modestiae et Prudentiae in Philosophando inRaei, Cogitata 652.
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[par lentendement seul].30 Here one might assume that the understanding means the
intellect, and thus, on De Raeys scheme, knowledge of such things should not be part of the
truth sought by philosophy. The way to understand them is, rather, through the senses, or,
more broadly, through everyday experienceDescartes had written this to Elisabeth and De
Raey echoed the sentiment.31
De Raey noted that such knowledgecommon experience or vulgar knowledge is
polymorphous, combining diverse modes and different kinds of wisdom.32 It is largely
based on nave observation, unmediated by philosophical theory.33 But it also has a historical
component. In his lecture On the Wisdom of the Ancients, De Raey claimed that the study
of older forms of philosophy produced by the ancients, including Aristotle, constitutes what
he called natural history rather than natural philosophy.34 By this he meant that the wisdom
of the ancients is a catalogue of convenient and useful beliefs, though not an index of true
philosophical principles. Both in this lecture and in another,35 De Raey suggested that the
historical work of collecting and understanding these practically useful ways of thinking is
30 Descartes to Elisabeth, 28 June 1643. AT III.690-5. According to Descartes, this is because such
things pertain to the union of soul and body, and thus fall into a special category of primitive
notions distinct from those with which philosophy is concerned. In another paper, yet unpublished, I
go into much greater detail in comparing the position suggested in this letter with that of De Raey.
31 AT III.692, Dissertatio de Cognitione Vulgari & PhilosophicainRaei, Cogitata 348.
32Dissertatio de Cognitione Vulgari & PhilosophicainIbid.
33Dissertatio de Cognitione Vulgari & Philosophicain Ibid. 360-361.
34De Sapientia Veterum in Ibid. 381. Translation Verbeek, 'Tradition and Novelty,' 191.
35 Raei, Cogitata 453-490.
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vital in the higher faculties, though it must be borne in mind that they do not embody
philosophical truth.36
De Raey might have had in mind here the category of moral certainty, said by
Descartes to contain whatever is as certain as is necessary for the conduct of life.37
But
Descartes, unlike De Raey, did not seem to think the distinction between genuine and moral
certainty lined up with that between philosophy and non-philosophy; indeed, he pointed out
that much of his physicsthat is, his philosophymight be regarded as only morally
certain.38 De Raey, on the other hand, saw the distinction between genuine certainty and the
lesser form as a criterion for demarcating philosophy from non-philosophy.
On the other hand, he did not mean to imply that common experience is always of an
inferior order of certainty to philosophical knowledge. For another important part of common
knowledge, he held, is faith.Dogmas of faith are beyond the grasp of philosophy, according
to De Raey, but this is because they belong to a higher rather than a lower order of
36De Aristotele et Aristotelicisin Ibid. 471. Translation Verbeek, 'Tradition and Novelty,' 193.
37Principles IV.205, AT VIIIA.327-8/CSM I.289-90. Spinoza refers to moral certainty (whether or
not this is the same idea as that of Descartes) at various points, e.g.: Benedict de Spinoza, Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus, trans. Edwin Curley (This translation not yet published, 1670) 30-33. (All page
number references to the Tractatus will be to Volume Three of the Gebhardt edition: Benedictus de
Spinoza, Opera, ed. Carl Gebhardt (Heidelberg: Carl Winters, 1924).)For a discussion of Spinozas
notion of moral certainty, contrasted with the more general idea that was (perhaps) the one referred to
by Descartes, see Verbeek, Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise 75-81.
38Principles IV.205, AT VIIIA.327-8/CSM I.289-90.
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knowledge: those truths held by faith from revelation cannot also be referred to philosophy,
for those we have said to be above philosophy.39
Sense-experience, the study of ancient wisdom, and faith were thus the various
components of common experience according to De Raey. The higher faculties, being based
on these kinds of knowledge, were completely separated from philosophy.40 De Raey
continued throughout his career to instruct the other members of his network in this line of
thinking, as we can see in a letter to Wittich from 1680:
Over time I have been certainand I have written and said this more than once inclear wordsthat Medicine, Jurisprudence, and Theology have their foundation
and subject in the common intellect of men, which is really to say, they do notcome from Philosophy, of which Physics is a part (from which I distinguishMedicine).41
This separation theory implies that all of the ideas necessary for the comprehension of
non-philosophical subjects must come, at least partly, from a source outside of the intellect,
39Dissertatio de Cognitione Vulgari & Philosophica in Raei, Cogitata 348-349. Descartes says
things that imply this, for instance Principles I.24, AT VIIIA.14/CSM I.201
40Disputatio Philosophico; Specimen exhibens Modestiae et Prudentiae in Philosophando in Ibid.
653.
41 Letter to Wittichius, 12 August 1680 in Ibid. 660. The point about medicine is outside the scope of
this paper, but is discussed in some detail in Theo Verbeek, 'Les Passions et la Fivre: lIde de laMaladie chez Descartes et quelques Cartsiens Nerlandais,' Tractrix: Yearbook for the History of
Science, Medicine, Technology and Mathematics 1 (1989). The main reason not to include medicine
within philosophy, for De Raey, was that again it does not depend only on the absolute ideas of the
intellect. Verbeek links this point to Descartes correspondence with Elisabeth: Verbeek, 'Tradition
and Novelty,' 195-196.
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since knowledge from thepure intellect pertains to philosophy.42 But Descartes had claimed
that we possess only two modes of thinking: the perception of the intellect and the operation
of the will.43 In making its judgments, the will could either bind itself to the clear and
distinct perceptions of the intellect or venture beyond them.44
De Raeys non-philosophical
knowledge, since it is explicitly defined as having sources beyond the pure intellect must
therefore, in Cartesian terms, amount to an extension of the will beyond the perceptions of
the intellect.
This is precisely the domain in which Descartes had warned we are prone to error. 45
But De Raeys view seems to have been that the danger of error of which Descartes had
warned concerning philosophical judgments is either not present or not pressing in the case
of practical judgments. At any rate, whether inviting a risk of error or not, the Dutch
Cartesian theory that philosophical can be separated from non-philosophical knowledge
depends upon the possibility of the will exceeding the bounds of the intellect in one case and
42 See note 29 above. De Raey did write to Wittich, at one point, that he believed the intellect to betwo-fold, such that philosophy pertains to one of its sides, and the other disciplines pertain to the
other (in uno homine duplicem inveniri intellectum Raei, Cogitata 656.) But this does not
sound very Cartesian and it does not square with what he usually says. Perhaps he is using the term
intellect here loosely, to refer to mental activities in general.
43Principles I.32, AT VIIIA.17/CSM I.204
44Principles I.35, AT VIIIA.18/CSM I.204-5
45 Principles I.35, AT VIIIA.18/CSM I.204-5. But this raises the question of how to read Descartes
comments to Elisabeth, to the effect that we perceive voluntary actions and passions clearly by the
senses. Perhaps we perceive such things clearly by the senses, but not distinctly (see Principles I.46
for an example of this), and therefore while such perceptions are practically necessary they should not
be taken as true? Again, I explore these questions in a different paper.
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not in the other. This, in turn, depends upon Descartes distinction between will and intellect.
It is important, therefore, that Voetius rejected this distinction, as we saw,46 and so did
Spinoza,47 as will soon become relevant.
De Raeys views are subject to many difficulties. He was much more interested than
Descartes had been in the question of how practical science is possiblethat is, systematic
thinking on practical questions. He therefore had to say something about what the appropriate
methodology in such sciences ought to be. Probably under the influence of Clauberg, he
recommended the use of Ramist methods in the practical sciences.48 But he failed to defend
Ramism as the best available means of combining sense-experience, history, and faith, in the
way that Descartes had defended his method as the best method for philosophy using
methodological doubt.49 He also struggled to specify the precise demarcation between
46 Voetius,Disputationes Theologicae Selectae I.166.
47Ethics II.P49.C. (The edition of Spinozas original texts that I use is Spinoza, Opera. The
translation of the Ethics I use is Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, trans. Edwin Curley, The Collected
Works of Spinoza (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).) Wittich criticises this anti-Cartesian
doctrine of Spinozas in Christophoros Wittichius,Anti-Spinoza; sive examen Ethices B. de Spinoza,
et Commentarius de Deo et ejus attributis. (Epistol.) (Amsteldami, 1690) 129.
48 See his letter to Wittich of 1680, 654-61 in Raei, Cogitata esp. 659.
49 Descartes himself can be interpreted as having exposed the deficiencies of Ramism. Ramus
proposed, for example, that following true logical method requires one to dispute with others, to
imitate the virtues of the greats, and to study scripturePetrus Ramus,Dialectique (Paris: Andr
Wechel, 1555) 159. Yet these humanistic methods seem to come under attack in the first part of the
Discourse. De Raey, to my knowledge, never successfully demonstrates that the latter should be
interpreted only as an attack on such methods as applied tophilosophy (nothing in theDiscourse
suggests this limitation). For discussion of Descartes anti-humanism see Ren Descartes and tienne
Henry Gilson,Discours de la mthode. Texte et commentaire par tienne Gilson (J. Vrin: Paris,
1925). For a discussion of the general influence of Ramism during this period see: Dibon,La
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physics and medicine, and to justify the claim that they have nothing at all to do with each
other.50
Despite its problems, however, De Raey managed to acquire for his networks version
of Cartesianism a degree of official tolerance and respectability within the universities. He
distinguished their version of Cartesianism from others that were more radical and generally
condemned, such as those of Regius and Spinoza.51The network also worked to sustain a
united front behind De Raeys thesis of the separation between philosophy and practical
knowledge; when Velthuysen published a work that seemed to apply Cartesian methods to
practical political questions, Wittich wrote to reprimand him for diverging from the official
Dutch Cartesian position.52
The separation thesis also gained political support. In 1656 the States of Holland, led
by Jan De Witt, published the final draft of an edict designed to prevent conflict between
philosophers and theologians. It stipulated that each group was to pursue its science
Philosophie Nerlandaise au Sicle d'Or. Works exploring the links between Ramism and
Cartesianism are: Nelly Bruyre, Mthode et dialectique dans l'uvre de La Rame: Renaissance et
ge classique (Paris: Vrin, 1984) esp. 385-394, Andre Robinet,Aux sources de l'esprit cartsien:
l'axe La Rame-Descartes de la Dialectique de 1555 aux Regulae (Paris: J. Vrin, 1996).
50Many Cartesians outside De Raeys network ignored this distinction, especially after 1662, when
Descartes Treatise on Man was published (in a Latin translation by Florent Schuyl). See Verbeek,
'Cartsiens face Spinoza.', Verbeek, 'Les Passions et la Fivre.'
51 Letter to Wittich, Raei, Cogitata 660. See also Verbeek,Descartes and the Dutch 73.
52 Willem Frijhoff, Marijke Spies, and Myra Heerspink Scholz,Dutch Culture in a European
Perspective. 1, 1650, Hard-Won Unity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 324-325.
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independently and not to get involved in the others discussions.53 This was a political
victory for the Dutch Cartesians. They had managed both to establish their brand of
Cartesianism as a philosophy acceptable in the universities and to have their views about the
separation between philosophy and the higher faculties partly reflected by public policy.
3. Spinoza on Philosophy and Theology
I believe that this politically-charged situation provides the context in which Spinozas
philosophy must be understood. Spinoza was certainly aware of the work of the Dutch
Cartesians. It is commonly believed that he attended classes at Leiden University from
around 1659, where he could not have avoided coming into contact with the work of De Raey
and other prominent members of the Dutch Cartesian network.54 And, as Verbeek points out,
Spinozas:
first published work, Principia philosophi Renati Des Cartes (1663), wasoriginally written for a certain Johannes Casearius (c.1641-1677), who
matriculated as a student in theology in Leiden in 1661, at a time when De Raeywas the only regular professor of theology. As a result, it seems likely not onlythat Spinoza was familiar with De Raeys ideas but also that his own work onDescartes Principia and even the Tractatus de intellectus emendatione can beseen as commentaries on the ideas developed by De Raey during his lectures. 55
53 Herbert H. Rowen,John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 1625-1672 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1978) 407.
54 Steven M. Nadler, Spinoza : a Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 191ff.
55 Verbeek, 'Spinoza and Cartesianism,' 175. In fact Spinoza gave oral lessons on Descartes to
Casearius, which his friends requested him to publish in writing. See Letters 8-9 and Lodewijk
Meyers Preface to the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy. See also Nadler, Spinoza 205-206.
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Moreover, Jacob Ostens forwarded a letter he had received from Velthuysen to Spinoza and
vice-versa in 1671.56 Later the two philosophers corresponded directly.
From the other side, the Dutch Cartesians were, often painfully, aware of Spinoza.
Verbeek suggests that De Raeys work in the late 1660s was composed in conscious reaction
to that of Spinoza and his friend Lodewijk Meyer.57 His reaction was largely motivated by
the association many people had apparently made between Spinoza and Cartesianism, due to
the publication of the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy in 1663.
The latter work offered an alternative interpretation of Descartes philosophy, one
which, especially in the AppendixtheMetaphysical Thoughts, threatened the Dutch
Cartesian separation theory by using Descartes metaphysical concepts, particularly that of
God, to draw out a number of important and far-reaching theological implications. On
Spinozas reading, Cartesian philosophy could not be kept separate from theology in the way
the Dutch Cartesians had proposed. It is true that Spinoza sometimes implied that there is a
division of intellectual labour between theology and philosophy. He left the theologians to
decide whether God could violate his own established laws of nature in order to perform
miracles.58He also begged off discussing angels: Fortheir essence and existence are known
only through revelation, and so pertain solely to theology.59 But these concessions to non-
56 Letters 42-3.
57 Verbeek, 'Cartsiens face Spinoza,' 82.
58 Baruch Spinoza, Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, ed. Michael L. Morgan, trans. Samuel Shirley,
Spinoza: Complete Works (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2002) II.9,
203.
59 Ibid. II.12, 208.
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philosophical theology would not have reassured the Dutch Cartesians. Purporting to stay
entirely within the bounds of Cartesian philosophy, the Thoughtsdiscussed Gods various
attributes; this is clear from the very chapter headings of the second book: Of Gods
Eternity, Of the Unity of God, Of the Immeasurableness of God, etc. These were
traditional topics for metaphysics in the tradition defended by Voetius, which, as we saw,
placed metaphysics and theology in a continuum.60 The clear implication of this exercise was
that Cartesian philosophy had a significant theological application, even if there remained
some theological questions that lay outside its field of enquiry.
While the Thoughts did not have a great deal to say about practical theology, it
became increasingly clear in Spinozas following works that he took philosophy to have
consequences in that domain as well. It would be hard to imagine a different result,
considering the close links most thinkers made between speculative and practical theology at
this time. Indeed, in the Ethics Spinoza drew highly significant ethical and political
conclusions out of certain metaphysical views concerning the nature of God and his
relationship with the world. These views, he claimed, teach us:
that we act only from Gods command, that we share in the divine nature, andthat we do this the more, the more perfect our actions are, and the more and morewe understand God that we must expect and bear calmly both good fortune
60 Wolfson notes the interesting similarity between the titles of theMetaphysical Thoughts (Cogitata
Metaphysica) on one hand and of BurgersdijcksInstitutiones Metaphysic and Suarezs
Disputationes Metaphysic on the other. (Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza (NewYork: Meridian Books, 1958) I.35.) Both the latter authors were admired by Voetius. But to me the
more striking similarity is between the chapter headings of the second book of the Thoughts and those
of the second book of BurgersdijcksInstitutions. See Franco Burgersdijck,Institutionum
Metaphysicarum, Libri Duo. Opus Posthumum Omni Cura ac Diligentia ex ipsius Authoris Manu-
Scripto Collectum (Lugduni Batavorum: Apud Hieronymum de Vogel 1640).
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and bad to hate no one, to disesteem no one, to mock no one, to be angry at no
one, to envy no one.. [and] how citizens are to be governed and led, not so thatthey may be slaves, but that they may do freely the things which are best.61
It is not the purpose of this paper to explain how Spinoza derived these practical conclusions
from his metaphysical principles. But it is worth noting here that the Ethics pursued precisely
the chain of reasoning from speculative theological ideas to practical consequences that
Voetius had claimed to be unavoidable and the Dutch Cartesians had claimed to be
illegitimate.
One key reason for this must be that Spinoza, as noted already, rejected the
distinction between will and intellect, which the Dutch Cartesians needed to uphold their
distinction between the appropriate methods for true judgment in philosophy on one hand and
common experience on the other. Voetius had argued that since will and intellect are mutual
causes, the Dutch Cartesian distinction between philosophical knowledge and common
experience cannot hold.62 It is not entirely clear to me what Voetius meant by saying that will
and intellect are mutual causes; it suggests that they are causes of each other, but something
weaker than this almost paradoxical notion may be intended. At any rate, it seems to suggest
that will and intellect are so causally intertwined as never to act independently of each other.
Thus if separating categories of knowledge depends upon rendering the will free from the
intellect, as the Dutch Cartesians proposed, then no such separation is possible that is to
say: Voetius inference is valid. Since Spinoza granted the main premise of this inference in
an even stronger formclaiming that the will and the intellect, beyond being mutual causes
61 Spinoza, Ethics II.P49.S, II/135-136.
62 Voetius,Disputationes Theologicae Selectae I.166.
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are, are in fact one and the same63he was right to embrace the conclusion. Indeed, the
above-quoted passage from the Ethics, concerning the practical ramifications of his
philosophy comes directly after a statement identifying will and intellect.
In the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (henceforth simply Tractatus), however,
Spinoza claimed to separate theology from philosophy. Let us now turn to this work and see
how this claim ought to be interpreted. In it, Spinoza often used the word theology as
interchangeable with faith [fides]. He defined the latter as thinking such things about God
that if the person is not familiar with them, obedience to God is destroyed, and such that, if
obedience to God is posited, these beliefs are necessarily posited.64Obedience to God was
said to consist only in Justice and Lovingkindness, or[sive] in the love of one's neighbor.65
While obedience seems to carry connotations beyond this, connotations, that is, of
submission to some rule or law, it is important that Spinoza failed to include these in his
strict definition here, stressing that obedience consists only [sola] in justice and
lovingkindness themselves. Thus, on his view, faith consists of exactly those beliefs that are
necessary for motivating one to be just and charitable to ones neighbour, although Spinoza
pointed out that this requirement in no way entails that the beliefs in question must be true.66
As we have seen, however, the Ethics provided both ideas about the nature of God
and ideas about how we can learn to hate no one, disesteem no one, mock no one, be angry
63Voluntas, & intellectus unum, & idem sunt. Ethics II.P49.C, II/131.
64 Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus 175.
65obedientiam in sola Justitia, & Charitate, sive amore erga proximum consistere. Ibid. 177.
66Faith does not explicitly require true tenets, but only such tenets as are necessary for obedience,
which strengthen our hearts in love towards our neighbors. Ibid. 176.
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at no one, envy no one, and so on. The latter teaching seems to meet Spinozas definition of
obedience, while the former consists of a number of beliefs about God. Spinoza did not
explicitly suggest that between these two teachings there is the kind of strong entailment
described in his definition of faith in the Tractatusthat is, that one cannot have the
obedience without the beliefs, nor the beliefs without the obedience. But it is easy to imagine
that, if one is strongly committed to a Cartesian-type project of believing nothing except what
can be rationally justified according to a rigorous standard, one might well end up in a
position such that obedience to God is unachievable except by way of the beliefs about God
systematically demonstrated in the Ethics. And, if one is also keen to draw out the major
logical consequences of all ones beliefs, it will happen that one cannot sustain such beliefs
without seeing the rightness of obedience.
It is clear enough that Spinoza does suppose it possible that somebody can end up in
such a rigorously intellectualist position. Most of us, he admits, do most of our practical
thinking using our imagination, that is, roughly, thinking in terms of stories, pictures,
feelings, and whatever experiences we happen to have had. The more one is able to think inthis way, Spinoza contends, the less one is able think using the intellectthat is, roughly,
using sound philosophical reasoning. But the converse is also true. The more one is able to
use the intellect the less one is able to use the imagination:
For those who have the most powerful imaginations are less able to grasp thingsby pure intellect. And conversely, those who are more capable in their intellect,and who cultivate it most, have a more moderate power of imagining.67
Thus it seems that one could, by increasingly cultivating the intellect, come to depend on it
almost exclusively. Nor, given the unity of will and intellect discussed above, could one hope
67 Ibid. 29.
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as perhaps De Raeys ideal philosopher would to develop a robust intellect while
retaining the capacity to make practical judgments independently of it.68 And so it seems that
one could end up in just the position described above: holding only those beliefs that meet a
rigorous intellectual standard.
This makes it seem very much as if Spinoza was trying, in the Ethics not simply to
discover philosophical knowledge, but, more specifically, to discover philosophical
knowledge that would qualify as faiththat is, the knowledge about God that people with
heavily cultivated intellects will require in order to act with justice and charity. Thus the
proposed separation between theology and philosophy in the Tractatus cannot be anything
like as strong as that proposed by the Dutch Cartesians. Indeed, it appears that Spinozas
work was partly motivated by the urge to respond to the Dutch Cartesian denial that
philosophy has any relevance to theology or any other practically oriented science. He had
shown that philosophy, even philosophy in a new Cartesian idiom, was capable of producing
truths relevant to theology. That he did so in a book that began as lectures for a student of De
Raeys makes it almost impossible that he was not aware who he was confronting in
propounding this view. The Ethics and the Tractatus, then, can be seen as having continued
the push against De Raey, showing that the new methods in philosophy render it as capable
68I think that when Spinoza speaks of the intellect in the passage in the Ethics where he identifies it
with will, he means to give a very general sense, which encompasses both of what he callsimagination and intellect in the Tractatus (and elsewhere in the Ethics). For instance, in refuting the
Cartesian claim that the will extends further than the intellect, he writes: I grant that the will extends
more widely than the intellect, if by intellect [one] understand[s] only clear and distinct ideas. But I
deny that the will extends more widely than perceptions, orthe faculty of conceiving. (II.P49.S,
II/133)
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of encouraging piety as the traditional philosophy had claimed itself to beindeed as
necessary for that purpose in the case of highly intellectual people.69
What, then, are we to make of the claim in the Tractatusthat: there is no
connection or no relationship between faith, orTheology, and Philosophy?70
Spinoza
explained what he meant by claiming that philosophy and faith pursue different ends: the
goal of Philosophy is nothing but the truth, whereas the goal of Faith, as we have shown
abundantly, is nothing but obedience and piety. For this to entail the strong separation
between philosophy and theology posited by De Raey, it would have to be the case that one
cannot achieve the theological goals of obedience and piety by pursuing the philosophical
goal of truth. But this, we have seen, seems not to have been Spinozas view. As far as piety
goes, Spinoza was quite clear that it could be produced by reason alone, that is (I assume) by
pure philosophy.71 And, as we have seen, the philosophical pursuit of truth in the Ethics was
69
Voetius implied that traditional philosophy is not only capable of encouraging piety, it is the onlysafeguard of piety: ...once the idea of God and the worship of God is allowed to go from being
honoured and unwounded to being insulted and dishonoured, and the principles of natural light and
rules of all logic and metaphysics are degraded, how shall natural and supernatural theology be
restored to their place? Where shall they be sheltered for protection against infidels, fanatics,
Sceptics, heretics, and libertines? Voetius,Disputationes Theologicae Selectae I.214.
70 Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus 179.
71
Cupiditatem ... bene faciendi, quae eo ingeneratur, quod ex rationis ductu vivimus, pietatem voco.Ethics, IV.P37.S. Curleys translation obscures this point by translating pietas as morality. Perhaps
he wants to distinguish thispietas from thepietas spoken of in the Tractatus, which is not exclusively
engendered insofar as we live according to reason. But I would rather say thatpietas in general is, for
Spinoza, simply the desire to act well, and that the Tractatus speaks aboutpietas in this more general
while the Ethics speaks of a specific variety of it.
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held to produce a great deal of beliefs that appear to be conducive to obedience or at least,
what seems to come to the same thing, to knowledge of the rightness of charity and justice.
I add what comes after the hyphen in the last sentence because somebody might
contend that I have read too much into Spinozas strict definition of obedience as consisting
onlyof justice and charity. Really, this person might say, Spinoza meant obedience to mean
what the word itself suggests: submission to a certain rule or law, which, in this case,
mandates justice and charity.72 Pursuing justice and charity because one understands their
value is different from pursuing them because the law tells one to do so, and so it is not
obedience. But if this is what Spinoza meant then it seems he ought to have regarded the
value of obedience as entirely instrumental, deriving from the value of justice and charity
themselves. And in that case the fact that a philosopher pursues the latter goods for their own
sake, rather as a matter of obedience, in no way undermines the view that philosophy serves
precisely the function Spinoza ascribed to theology, so long as its function is defined (as
surely it should be) in terms of its ultimate end.
Therefore nothing Spinoza says about the separation between philosophy and faith, ortheology, implies that philosophy cannot in certain cases be faith. While the two activities
pursue different goals, there seems no good reason to insist that, for Spinoza,pursuing
nothing but the truth necessarily results in ones achieving nothing but the truth.73 People
72 One thing that might confirm this objection is the way in which Spinoza suggests at one point that
the natural light cannot reveal that obedience alone is the way to salvation. (Spinoza, TractatusTheologico-Politicus 188.) This is an intriguing passage, but I it would take me too far afield to
comment on it here.
73 In my view, the idea that philosophy seeks nothing buttruth is, taken literally, plainly false.
Philosophers of every kind do not seek any and every truth they are capable of finding out. They seek
the truths that are in some way significant, even if this means only truths that satisfy their special
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whose pursuit of truth is not very successful may never arrive at the true beliefs necessary for
generating obedience. But the Ethics strongly suggests that there are such true beliefs, and
that they are within the reach of some people. And so while the separation between
philosophy and theology might hold in many, even most, cases, it need not indeed cannot
hold in the case of a person with a highly cultivated intellect.
There are, however, further difficulties for my interpretation. In Chapter Fourteen of
the TractatusSpinoza listed seven universal tenets of faith, of which he claimed if any of
these tenets is taken away, obedience is also destroyed.74 The problem is that many of these
tenets seem, at least taken literally, to be contradicted by things taught in the Ethics,
suggesting that philosophy gets in the way of the beliefs required for obedience rather than
producing them. This is a notorious problem, which has received a good deal of scholarly
attention.75 I do not presume to solve it. I shall only reiterate that Spinoza seems quite clearly
to have claimed in the Ethics that the theological ideas presented there, whether or not they
conform to the universal tenets, are capable of inspiring just the kinds of moral attitudes that
he associates with obedience. Therefore they should qualify as faith on his earlier definition
curiosity. But this means they seek something besides mere truth, e.g. the satisfaction of curiosity. For
an elaboration of this argument in contemporary terms see Philip Kitcher, 'The Ends of the Sciences,'
in The Future for Philosophy, ed. Brian Leiter (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004).
74 Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus 178.
75
Alexandre Matheron proposed that all of the tenets could be taken as consistent with what is arguedin the Ethics: Alexandre Matheron,Le Christ et le Salut des Ignorants chez Spinoza (Paris: Aubier
Montaigne, 1971) 94-127. Daniel Garber disputes Matherons reading: Daniel Garber, 'Should
Spinoza have published his philosophy?,' inInterpreting Spinoza: Critical Essays , ed. Charlie
Huenemann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Verbeek takes a similar line: Verbeek,
Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise 34.
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or, again, if not as faith than as something capable of achieving precisely the same goal as
faith, and to which therefore Spinozas criterion for distinguishing philosophy from faith
cannot apply.
Spinozas view of the relation between philosophy and theology is, therefore, in
direct contrast to that of the Dutch Cartesians. Spinoza did not imagine any distinct practical
function that philosophy was essentially incapable of serving, whereof theology and other
practical disciplines must take over. He admitted that philosophy and theology are separate
because they pursue independent goalsunderstanding on one hand, obedience on the other.
And he held that a person can pursue either goal without pursuing the other. But beneath this
superficial doctrine of separation lay a strong conviction that philosophy is, in some cases,
perfectly capable of advancing the practical goal of theology simultaneously with advancing
its own goal. This makes the mutual independence of philosophy and theology far less
symmetrical than it was for the Dutch Cartesians. It is hard to see why pursuing obedience
and piety vigorously enough should ever lead on its own to understanding not, at least,
without invoking the miracle of grace. But the Ethics makes it possible to see why pursuingunderstanding could sometimes lead to obedience and piety.
I can think of one more possible objection to this interpretation. While the end of
Book Two of the Ethics claims that its metaphysical teachings can lead to knowledge of
moral truths, there is still the question of whether such knowledge can, in Spinozas words,
move the heart to obedience,76 that is, whether it can actually cause one to act charitably
and justly. It is possible that while the philosophy in the Ethics tells us how we ought to act,
76 Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus 176.
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only the stories in Scripture can sufficiently motivate us to act in those ways.77 In this way
philosophy might, for Spinoza as for the Dutch Cartesians, fail in an important practical
function, one in which only theology can succeed.
But I find it very unlikely that this was Spinozas view. He did acknowledge that true
knowledge of what is good does not always produce an indomitable desire to do it other
desires can overpower the desire that arises from knowledge of good. 78 On the other hand, it
is very important that his definition of faith refers specifically to beliefs about God. Whatever
may be said of knowledge concerning good and evil, the knowledge about God presented in
the Ethics does seem sufficient to move the heart to obedience. At IV.P37, for example, we
find the assertion that the good which everyone who seeks virtue wants for himself, he also
desires for other men; and this desire is greater as his knowledge of God is greater. This
looks very much like an assertion that knowledge of God, in proportion to its strength, moves
one towards charity: towards the desire to procure for others what one wants for oneself.79
77Susan James proposes that Spinozas view is that our principles are made liveable through the
narratives that make our individual and collective lives intelligible. Susan James, 'Narrative as the
Means to Freedom: Spinoza on the Uses of Imagination,' in Spinozas 'Theologico-Political Treatise',
ed. Yitzhak Y. Melamed and Michael A. Rosenthal (Cambridge: Cambrdige Univesrsity Press, 2010),
252. But this is not because he believes that understanding is inherently incapable of moving the heart
to obedience on its own; rather, it is because [t]he true understanding of the world that reasoning
provides is in Spinozas view extremely powerful, but it isnot easy to come by.
78Ethics IV.P17 and its S. On this matter see Martin Lin, 'Spinozas Account of Akrasia,'Journal for
the History of Philosophy 44, no. 3 (2006).
79Again, further on in the Scholium (a passage already quoted) Spinoza claims that the desire to do
good can be generated in us according to the guidance of reason. This desire is piety. From this
definition we might conclude that the relationship between obedience and piety seems to be that
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Moreover, the countervailing desires and passions that can cause even the person who knows
what is good to fail to do it are held, in Book Five, to be conquerableand the knowledge of
God undoubtedly plays a major role in that conquest.80
There is, of course, a great deal more to be said about this fascinating and important
dimension of Spinozas ethical and religious thinking.81 But the textual evidence seems to
support the thesis that philosophy, for Spinoza, is capable of generating beliefs about God
true beliefs, as it happensthat can move the heart to obedience. It is capable, that is to say,
of playing the role of theology, while continuing to play its role as philosophy.
4. Conclusion
One thing that follows from this interpretation is that Spinoza, far from seeing his philosophy
as opposing theology, as some have believed, understood his philosophy to be capable of
being a kind of theology. He developed this view as an alternative strategy to the Dutch
Cartesians in deflecting the accusations of people like Voetius. As Voetius saw it, the new
philosophy was a device for propounding dangerous heresies. The Dutch Cartesians
obedience is a special case of piety: piety is the desire to do good in general, while obedience is the
desire to treat others with justice and charitysurely a vital part of doing good.
80 SeeV.P20.S
81
Some discussion can be found in Herman de Dijn, 'Ethics IV: The ladder, not the top: theprovisional morals of the philosophy,' in Ethica IV: Spinoza on Reason and the Free Man. Papers
Presented at the Fourth Jerusalem Conference, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel & Gideon Segal (New York:
Little Room Press, 2004), Richard Mason, The God of Spinoza: a Philosophical Study (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), Matheron,Le Christ et le Salut des Ignorants chez Spinoza. and
in many other places.
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contended that philosophy did not and could not propound heresies; it is categorically
incapable of penetrating into matters of theology, or indeed into matters of any practical
importance.82Spinozas contention was that philosophy does propound a view of things that
people like Voetius would take to be a heresy, but the heresy is a benign one.
Of course such a contention would never have satisfied Voetius. But perhaps Spinoza
was attempting to capitalise on the success the Dutch Cartesians had had in making their
philosophy officially tolerated. The separation they had promoted between theology and
philosophy held, in Spinozas view, in most cases. It is only in the case of a very rare type of
highly intellectual person that philosophy merges with theology. Perhaps Spinoza thought it
should follow that, with respect to general society, his position should be regarded as being
82 An entirely different line of response, a fascinating one that I have unfortunately not had room to
discuss here, is that taken by Arnold Geulincx. Very roughly, Geulincx argued that philosophy could
successfully provide insights of moral and spiritual relevance, that it could do so on its own, unaided
by revelation, but that it could only do so after revelation had taken place. He explained this by way
of a metaphor:
...what happens with those who gaze upon Atoms with the aid of the Microscope (a wonderful and
miraculous invention of our time and of our Netherlands)for the tiniest specks that have almost
evaded the naked eye come into view with the aid of this instrument as true bodies, so that what could
never otherwise be seen, their diverse parts, colours, angles, hollows, and swellings, can now easily
be seen; but, what is also most remarkable, the Microscope being withdrawn after having been
applied for a little while, they are able to discern and distinguish with their eyes alone things that they
would never have seen at all if they had not first seen them with the aid of the instrument, their naked
eyes now able to penetrate the mysteries of the dust that formerly would not even have shown upwithout a magnifying glassalso happens with me. The Word of God is my Dutch Tube, and what I
have seen with its aid, and would not have seen without it, I also see in some measure without its aid;
in fact I still see such things well enough without the Tube later, and as perfectly as if I were still
equipped with it. Arnold Geulincx, Ethics, ed. Martin Wilson and Anthony Uhlmann, trans. Martin
Wilson (Leiden: Brill, 2006).
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as innocuous as that of the Dutch Cartesians. I am not sure that it does follow it seems very
much to depend on how much influence highly intellectual types will have upon society at
large. But at any rate it seems there is much to be gained from understanding Spinozas views
on philosophy and theology as having been formed in conscious response to the Dutch
Cartesians.
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