SPEX 52

Issue 52 07 July 2014

SMU Political-Economic Exchange

AN SMU ECONOMICS INTELLIGENCE CLUB PUBLICATION

Keep a lookout for the new SEIC/SPEX website, coming your way soon!

This Issue in Brief:

The Price of Sporting Prestige: The 2014 FIFA World Cup

With the 2014 FIFA World Cup hosted by Brazil in full swing at this present moment, a team of writers from SEIC analyse the economic pros and cons of hosting a World Cup, and how Brazil could stand to gain and lose from being host to this highly anticipated event.

Reforms for Indonesia’s Future

The 2014 Indonesian Presidential Elections are just around the corner, and SEIC’s Victor Barlian discusses the need for Indonesia’s future leaders to reform the energy and infrastructural development sectors, so as to pave the way for future economic prosperity.

CrISIS Iraq: Origins and Beyond

Rao Pranav explores the origins of the sectarian violence that is plaguing Iraq today, and discusses how the bloodshed and conflict could be resolved in the best way possible.

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The Price of Sporting Prestige: The 2014 FIFA World Cup

by Lee Yin Wei, Tay Qi Hang

Introduction

A global phenomenon, the FIFA World Cup is one of the largest and most anticipated events on the sporting calendar alongside the Olympic Games. This year’s host is Brazil, the 5th largest nation in the world by population and Latin America’s fastest growing economy. Being the chosen host, the 32-day event is estimated to generate some 380,000 jobs and attract more than 600,000 foreign tourists, in addition to $11.5 billion allocated budget. Despite the hype around the world, most of the locals harbour massive discontent for the event, largely due to the controversial proportion of public spending for hosting. In June 2013, a million Brazilians marched during a World Cup warm-up tournament to decry issues such as poor public transportation and woefully underequipped schools and hospitals, which they felt should take priority over the construction of stadiums. In fact, 61% of respondents in a Gallup survey felt that hosting the World Cup would bring about more drawbacks than benefits for their country. Beneath the glitzy spectacle and shiny brand-new stadiums, the World Cup also brings about many local issues which need to be addressed.

Economy Booster

Table1: Consolidated impacts of the 2014 World Cup

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The primary reason Brazil wants to play host to the World Cup is due to the potentially significant economic gains such a popular global sports event could deliver in the short term. Ernst & Young (E&Y), one of the largest multinational audit firms in the world, makes a forecast that Brazil will reap a gain 5 times that of which it has invested in the World Cup. This means that Brazil will generate up to $64 billion from this event, and its government can look forward to collecting $8.12 billion in taxes. Exposure to global media, construction and improvement of infrastructure will contribute to boosting inflow of tourists, investors and business opportunities. As such, E&Y predicts that across the country, GDP, income and employment will all rise (Table 1).

Some of the sectors that will benefit most are: construction, food and beverage, utilities and other businesses. Table 2 summarizes the direct and indirect economic effects on the various sectors in Brazil, and most notably, construction and business services in Brazil would enjoy the greatest benefits directly, along with thousands of small, medium and big-sized enterprises in the country.

Bane for Local Businesses

Yet, a poll conducted by Pew Research Center discovered that 61% of respondents have a negative outlook with regards to Brazil’s gains from being the host, and some of the primary reasons include the restrictions imposed by FIFA and the substantial sum spent on this flagship event, instead of on its tattered education and healthcare systems.

In order to peddle near the playing stadiums during this year’s playoffs, street vendors now have to acquire licenses from the local government, and successful applicants are allowed to sell only FIFA-approved items from its official partners. With a high poverty headcount ratio of 15.9%, and a ranking of 17th out of 140 countries in terms of highest levels of income disparity, the restriction on street hawking near stadiums holding the games has essentially deprived its citizens a chance to benefit directly from an event largely funded by their own taxpayers’ money.

Table2: Direct and indirect on Brazilian sector GDPs

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Opportunity Cost to Education, healthcare

Education has long been regarded as the gateway for those on the lower economic strata to improve on their social standings. According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the current generation is more unlikely to graduate from college than the previous generation, with a rate down from 36% to 23%. The World Economic Forum has ranked the Brazilian education system as amongst the 35 worst education systems in the world. With its education system in tatters, it is no wonder the Brazilians are angered that the government expends such a tremendous budget on a sporting event which could have been otherwise channelled towards improving its depressing education standards. A healthy nation also translates into better gross domestic product (GDP). The economic performance of a nation is interlinked with the health of its citizens; the healthier the latter, the more sustainable economic growth would be. Lack of properly-trained medical professionals and equipment has added to the growing discontent in Brazil, especially amongst the middle and lower income groups. To get an X-ray appointment, a waiting period of months is common; there are approximately 2 beds for every 1,000 individuals. A poll revealed that 48% of Brazilians view healthcare as the biggest issue in the country, ranking above corruption and the prevalence of violence. Displeasure has propelled numerous street riots in the months leading up to World Cup, where masses have protested against using public money on a flagship event instead of improving their shabby healthcare system.

Investment Outlook

Goldman Sachs analysts have discovered a trend that World Cup hosts experience temporary improvements in their stock market performance. Indeed, the Brazil Bovespa Index is up 10.71% in the last 12 months. A World Cup victory is expected to propel Brazilian stocks towards even greater heights. Additionally, Brazil’s high interest rates present to investors high real returns on government bonds of 6% to 7%, thereby attracting more investments in its income-linked products (e.g. asset-backed securities). However, growing local resentment with FIFA and the Brazilian government has been attracting global media attention for the past few months. Such unrest has culminated in a growing number of criticisms from media, businesses and politicians all over the world, which could possibly shake investor confidence and tourism appeal. How the Brazilian government is going to manage such sentiment will have a substantial influence on the country’s potential economic performance in the future.

Boon or Bane?

The economic impacts of the World Cup cannot be underestimated. While the World Cup is predicted to add 0.2% to GDP growth in 2014 – making a 1.8% full-year total – it is also contributing to a 0.5 percentage point to inflation, bringing the latter up to 6.3%. A total of $3.6 billion in taxpayer monies has been poured into the construction of new stadiums for the World Cup. There is a fear that these stadiums could possibly be massively underutilised, and eventually attain an unfortunate moniker of white elephants once the World Cup has concluded. One of these stadiums, the Amazonia Arena, cost $270 million to construct and is situated in the middle of a jungle with no local team in the region.

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More ominously, South Africa – a previous World Cup host – shares an uncannily similar predicament with Brazil too; both are developing third world nations and have spent/are spending a substantial sum of public money to host this flagship event in the hope of boosting their economies. Yet, South Africa has ended up with a massive amount of debt as a result, and the expected economic boost was not as spectacular as it was hoped. It is thus possible for Brazil to end up with unmanageable levels of debt, and see little economic benefits from being a World Cup host.

To many of the locals, such expenditure is exorbitant and unnecessary. Hence, it is important that the Brazilian government takes steps to ensure that the new stadiums will continue to serve an important role in the development of football in the local region, even long after the 2014 World Cup has ended.

Reference

1. Ernst&Young,. (2014). Sustainable Brazil. Retrieved from: http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Sustainable_Brazil_-_World_Cup/$FILE/copa_2014.pdf

2. Antunes, A. (2013). Can Brazil Really Handle The 2014 FIFA World Cup?. Forbes. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/andersonantunes/2013/06/12/can-brazil-really-handle-the-2014-fifa-world-cup/

3. Ernst&Young,. (2014). Sustainable Brazil. Retrieved from http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Sustainable_Brazil_-_World_Cup/$FILE/copa_2014.pdf

4. Antunes, A. (2013). Can Brazil Really Handle The 2014 FIFA World Cup?. Forbes. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/andersonantunes/2013/06/12/can-brazil-really-handle-the-2014-fifa-world-cup/

5. Colitt, R. (2013). Brazil World Cup Kick-Starts Billionaire Boon as Farmers Lose. Bloomberg. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-29/brazil-world-cup-kick-starts-billionaire-boon-as-farmers-lose.html

6. Leahy, J. (2014). World Cup will have little impact on Brazil, says Moody’s. Retrieved from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/770b70c8-b6b7-11e3-8695-00144feabdc0.html#axzz34b5Z2yMT

7. Moody's: 2014 FIFA World Cup to provide temporary lift for Brazil. (2014). Retrieved from https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-2014-FIFA-World-Cup-to-provide-temporary-lift-for--PR_296043

8. Wright, C. (2014). Will Brazil's World Cup Pay Off For Investors?. Forbes. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/chriswright/2014/06/12/will-investors-in-brazil-see-a-world-cup-dividend/

9. Badkar, M. (2014). Here's A Reason Why Some Brazilian Politicians Could Want Their Team To Lose At The World Cup - Business Insider. Business Insider. Retrieved from http://www.businessinsider.sg/impact-of-brazil-world-cup-on-elections-2014-6/#.U5z60PmSy_g

10. Data.worldbank.org,. (2014). Brazil | Data. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/country/brazil 11. Index Mundi,. (2014). Brazil Population below poverty line - Economy. Retrieved from

http://www.indexmundi.com/brazil/population_below_poverty_line.html 12. Chao, J. (2014). Hope fades in Brazil for a World Cup economic boost. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from

http://online.wsj.com/articles/hope-fades-in-brazil-for-a-world-cup-economic-boost-1401242039 13. Caldwell, K. (2014). World Cup fever sends Brazil's shares soaring - Telegraph. Telegraph. Retrieved from

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/investing/shares/10894900/World-Cup-fever-sends-Brazils-shares-soaring.html

14. Global Research,. (2014). Brazil: A World Soccer Cup for Corporations. Retrieved from http://www.globalresearch.ca/a-world-cup-for-corporations/5386974

15. Khazan, O. (2014). What the U.S. Can Learn From Brazil's Healthcare System. The Atlantic. Retrieved from http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2014/05/what-the-us-can-learn-from-brazils-healthcare-mess/361854/

16. Progressive.org,. (2014). Brazil's Poor Pay World Cup Penalty. The Progressive. Retrieved from http://progressive.org/brazil-poor-pay-world-cup-penalty

17. Chin, C., & Leal, F. (2014). Why Brazil's youth turned against the World Cup. The Week. Retrieved from http://theweek.com/article/index/262495/why-brazils-youth-turned-against-the-world-cup#axzz34xoSIFtK

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Reforms for Indonesia’s Future

by Victor Julistiono Barlian

Introduction

Indonesia, being South East Asia’s largest economy with a GDP of close to US$1 trillion in 2013, has enormous economic potential. After the1998 financial crisis, the archipelago nation has come back stronger than before. It has undergone political reforms and has made significant progress in its macroeconomic management.

Currently Indonesia enjoys a relatively stable political climate and robust economy. Democracy is blossoming, with the last three general elections conducted peacefully. Inflation has dropped from double to single digits and both its public and private debt has fallen significantly. The political stability and improved macroeconomic management has caused Indonesia’s economy to remain resilient even during the 2008 global financial crisis, making it “The World’s Most Stable Economy in the Last Five Years” according to The Economist.

Indonesia is also the world’s 4th largest country in terms of population size, with around 240 million individuals. With a young demographic, Indonesia offers great potential in terms of productivity and creativity. In 2011, Indonesia’s total median age is 28.2 years, which implies that 50% of the population is below 28.2 years Against this backdrop, it did not come as a surprise that McKinsey predicted that Indonesia would rise from the world’s 16th largest economy to the world’s 7th largest come 2030.

The growth story of Indonesia is promising. Nevertheless, it is not without any challenges. In this article, I would like to highlight two major challenges that need to be resolved immediately in order for Indonesia to continue progressing economically. The upcoming presidential election in July would pose a pivotal moment for Indonesia, where the nation will elect its leader for the next five years. Therefore, it is important that the next government should take a clear stance on these pressing issues.

Infrastructural Reforms

The first reform that Indonesia should engage in is with regards to the infrastructure sector. If one were to

visit Indonesia’s capital – Jakarta, you would immediately notice that infrastructure is indeed a big

problem. Traffic jams are widespread, and it could take hours for one to reach a destination not too far

away. Indonesia is indeed behind its peers by a wide margin in terms of infrastructure adequacy. Data

from the World Bank shows that the country’s logistics costs were 27% of gross domestic product (GDP),

higher than those in Japan (10.6%), South Korea (16.3%) and the US (9.9%). Furthermore, the country’s

competitiveness in terms of infrastructure and logistics was ranked 118th out of 148 countries in the 2013-

2014 Global Competitiveness Index, released by World Economic Forum (WEF). To put things into

perspective, let us take a look at Indonesia’s infrastructure in terms of seaports, railways and road

networks and compare it to its peers. Looking at Indonesia’s standing in terms of dwell time at seaports in

Figure 1 below, we can see that Indonesia lags behind its peers. The dwelling time at Jakarta’s Tanjung

Priok port is higher compared to its regional peers and key seaports around the world.

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Furthermore, Indonesian domestic shipping rates are also much higher than international rates. For example, the cost of shipping a 40-foot container from Padang to Jakarta is US$600 while the cost of shipping the same container from Jakarta to Singapore is only US$185, despite Singapore being further away.

In terms of railway and road density, Indonesia also lags behind significantly when compared to Japan,

India, and China as shown in the figures below.

The National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) estimates that Indonesia needs to invest at least 7% of its GDP in infrastructure so as to achieve the ideal 7%-8 % levels of economic growth. However, in 2013, its total infrastructure expenditure (inclusive of investments by the private sector) was only US$34 billion, or 4% of total GDP. If this figure remains constant, this will inevitably cause the logistics cost-to-GDP to remain high at over 27 %, hampering productivity and in turn, economic growth.

The Need to Redirect Fuel Subsidies towards Infrastructure Expenditure

Despite the lack of expenditure on infrastructure, Indonesia spent around US$30 billion on energy subsidies, while capital expenditure was only approximately US$15 billion (Figure 4). This already low

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Figure1: Dwell time at key seaports (Source from Worldbank)

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Figure2: Rail lines (Source from Worldbank) Figure3: Road density (Source from Worldbank)

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figure is aggravated by the government’s move to revise its 2014 state budget by reducing capital expenditure further, and adding another US$10 billion towards energy subsidies (Figure 5).

Although the logical way to improve infrastructure in Indonesia is to remove the subsidies and allocate it towards developing infrastructure, this is indeed a politically challenging move. Every time there is a plan to increase fuel prices, the public has always responded negatively. For example, last year’s 44% hike in fuel prices sparked anger and protests from the public. This issue would be inherited by the next government, by means of the huge financial burden on the energy subsidy to the 2015 state budget.

Oil and Gas Sector Reforms

Besides infrastructural reforms, there is a need for a reform in Indonesia’s energy sector as well. Despite having abundant energy resources, Indonesia is currently on the brink of becoming a net energy importer. Indonesia’s net energy exports were 3.5% of its GDP in 2010, but this figure declined rapidly to 0.42% of GDP in 2014. This is a problem that needs to be resolved immediately, as a continual decline in energy would put further pressure on Indonesia’s overall trade balance and eventually harm Indonesia’s economic well-being. The precarious state that Indonesia’s energy sector is currently in is due to the decline in oil output levels and an expected increase in domestic energy consumption levels in the coming years. Indonesia was once a net exporter of oil. In 1977, Indonesia’s oil production was 1.7 million barrels per day (bpd), while its consumption was only 285,000 bpd. This suggests that the surplus was 1.4 million bpd, which is similar to Indonesia’s current levels of oil consumption. However, things began to change in 1991 as Indonesian oil production levels started to decline. In 2003, Indonesia’s oil consumption finally surpassed its consumption levels for the first time. Since then, oil production has always been below consumption levels. From its peak 1.7 million bpd in 1991, Indonesia has seen a 47% decline in oil production to 882,000 bpd in 2013. It is a pity to see Indonesia’s current condition bearing in mind that it was once one of the major oil exporting nations and a member of OPEC.

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Figure4: Revised government expenditure 2014 (Source from Ministry of Finance)

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The decline in oil output was due to the lack of upstream developments. Almost 80% of Indonesian oil production comes from old oilfields that were exploited before 1975. Major oilfields in Indonesia are drying up, and there is lack of exploratory work. Weak government management, bureaucracy and an unclear regulatory framework are the main culprits of this lack of exploration. According to Indonesia’s upstream regulator, SKK Migas, it would take 5 to 8 years from the time of initial drilling to prove reserves, develop feasibility plans and finally open a new field. 5 to 8 years is a not short period, thereby making the case that decisive actions to reform this sector are urgently needed.

On the consumption side, we see a robust intake of energy in the past few years. Figure 6 shows that as Indonesia’s economy grows, its primary energy consumption has increased as well. Being a young and growing nation, it is expected that Indonesia’s energy consumption will continue to increase in the next few years.

As Indonesia’s energy consumption is highly geared towards oil (44%), we can therefore expect its oil consumption to rise in the coming years. If Indonesia maintains this energy mix and no further development in the sector is apparent, Indonesia could risk having an energy crisis in the next few years.

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The impending energy crisis in Indonesia would pose numerous problems if it is not resolved immediately. Hence, reforms in the oil and gas sector should be the top priority of the incoming government.

Conclusion

While Indonesia does indeed face issues in other sectors as well, the two problems that were highlighted in this article are in my opinion, of the greatest threat to Indonesia’s economic progress, and I therefore feel these issues require urgent attention from the Indonesian government.

The two presidential and vice presidential candidates have shown their concerns and have outlined their strategies to address the issues in both the infrastructure and energy sectors, despite having different approaches. Overlooking the grandiose plans that were outlined by the candidates, what is crucial, in my opinion, is the ability of the next government to execute their vision and mission well, as the execution and implementation of policies has always been one of the Indonesian government’s weakest points. For now, let us await the arrival of 9 July 2014 - the day when Indonesians would vote in its top leaders, and see if this very day would be the country’s turning point for the better.

References

1. Indirasardjana, P. (2014). 2020 Indonesia Dalam Bencana Krisis Minyak Nasional 2. CLSA (2014). Block by block – Technocrats get things rolling 3. CLSA (2014). Energizers – How sector reform is essential for growth 4. McKinsey Global Institute (2012). The archipelago economy: Unleashing Indonesia’s potential 5. Indonesia Investments (2013). Population of Indonesia http://www.indonesia-investments.com/culture/population/item67 6. The Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf

7. Jakarta Post (2014) budget cut will put RI’s already low logistic competitiveness at risk http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/06/02/budget-cut-will-put-ri-s-already-low-logistic-competitiveness-risk.html

8. Indonesia Investments (2013). Logistics Costs Reduce Economic Potential of Indonesia http://www.indonesia-investments.com/news/news-columns/world-bank-report-logistic-costs-reduce-economic-potential-of-indonesia/item1079

9. Bisnis Indonesia (2014) BAPPENAS: Indonesia Butuh Investasi Infrastruktur 7% Terhadap PDB http://finansial.bisnis.com/read/20140413/9/219093/bappenas-indonesia-butuh-investasi-infrastruktur-7-terhadap-pdb

10. Indonesia oil and gas upstream challenges - http://www.gbgindonesia.com/en/energy/article/2014/indonesia_s_oil_and_gas_sector_upstream_challenges.php

11. US Energy Information Administration - Indonesia http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=id#pet

44%

21%

32%

2% 1%

Oil Natural gas Coal Hydro-electricity Renewables

Figure8: Indonesia energy consumption 2013(Source from BP statistical review of world energy 2014)

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CrISIS Iraq: Origins and Beyond

by Rao Pranav

As the world commemorated the centennial anniversary of WWI this past month, a secret agreement between Great Britain and France for the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire, reached towards the end of the war, lies at the heart of the conflagration in Iraq today.

The Sykes – Picot Agreement, named for the English negotiator and the French consul who were the signatories to the document, carved out under English and French “mandates” an area that spans all of modern day Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Though one would assume that a lot of thought would have gone into breaking up such a large piece of land with so many religious and ethnic intricacies, a cursory glance at the map attached shows the simplicity assumed by both sides when it came to apportionment. And this attitude of the parties is apparent from a statement made by Sir Mark Sykes to the prime minister at Downing Street: "I should like to draw a line from the "e" in Acre to the last "k" in Kirkuk." Further, the agreement went against a promise the British had made to Hussein bin Ali, the Sharif of Mecca, granting future independence to the Arab people if they rose up against the Ottomans.

Under the convention, the region marked A would fall under the French mandate and the region in blue would fall under direct French control; the area marked B fell into the English mandate and the pink area was under direct English control. The region in yellow to the west of the map covered the city of Jerusalem, a city holy to three religions, and hence, to be administered by an international committee. Now, though the British and the French might not have intended for this to happen, the borders drawn by the convention went on to become a key consideration in the future formation of states and nations in the region. And the arbitrariness of the borders, along with the breaking of the promise made to the Sharif of Mecca for independence brought about by the Sykes – Picot Agreement, are what the ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) is now using to leverage their claim for an Islamic caliphate in the region.

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ISIS was formed in the wake of the United States’ operations in Iraq post-9/11, and is a successor to the group called Al-Qaeda in Iraq. And, though the group has been around for some time, they began their offensive against the Iraqi government only earlier this year in January, by taking control of the western Anbar province. Further, unlike general conceptions of militant groups, ISIS is highly organized and strategic in its outlook for the Islamic State it envisages. In a recent audio address, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the so called emir of the Islamic State, called on Muslim engineers, doctors and military personnel from around the world to help in the nation building process. This ‘professionalism’ is also apparent in the latest issue of the Islamic State Report, a fancy weekly propagandist webzine released by the ISIS, titled “Smashing the Borders of the Tawaghit” (Tawaghit meaning non-Muslim creations in Arabic). It talks at length about the steps taken thus far by the ISIS to destroy what was started in 1916 and has pictures showing ISIS fighters freely crossing what used to be the border between Iraq and Syria, along with some of several Shi’ite soldiers being rounded up for execution.

The vast progress that ISIS has made in its quest to set up a Sunni caliphate, along with re-emphasizing the religious and ethnic frailties of the region, also brings to the fore a fear that the map of the Middle East will not survive this onslaught. Further, there is a feeling that at least some of the plethora of stakeholders involved in this mess have already accepted this. For example, the Kurdistan Regional Government, the near-autonomous ruling body of the predominantly Kurdish north of Iraq, has taken control of regions left behind by Iraqi forces in the wake of ISIS attacks, including the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. And the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, recently stoked long burning fires by stating that he would support a call for independence by Kurdistan. This is indicative of the wide-ranging changes that eventually will need to be effected in order to bring an end to the perpetual violence in the region.

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From all the facts available at this point, it can be inferred that the best short term solution is for the Iraqi government to get rid of the incumbent prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, who has thus far concerned himself with tackling ISIS more because of their religious affiliation rather than for the reason of them being religious extremists tearing apart the country he governs. Replacing him with someone who is seen as being religiously neutral could go a long way in reducing the support ISIS has from Iraqi tribal leaders who have had enough of Nouri al-Maliki.

However, the fact remains that the manner in which border lines are currently drawn in the Middle East makes it highly susceptible to violent outbursts, and the only way many see to eradicate this is to revise the map, possibly on the basis of religion and ethnicity. There is no doubt that any such process would be long drawn out and would have innumerable barriers to success, but it is time to at least get the process underway.

References

1. Sarajevo marks 100 years since Archduke Franz Ferdinand shooting. (2014, June 28). . Retrieved June 30, 2014, from

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28062876

2. Sykes-Picot Agreement. (2014). In Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved

from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/577523/Sykes-Picot-Agreement

3. Osman, T. (2013, December 14). Why border lines drawn with a ruler in WW1 still rock the Middle East. . Retrieved June 30,

2014, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25299553

4. Mezzofiore, G. (2014, June 30). Iraq Isis Crisis: Is This the End of Sykes-Picot?. . Retrieved July 1, 2014, from http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/iraq-

isis-crisis-this-end-sykes-picot-1454751

5. Howeidy, A. (2014, June 26). Iraq timeline: From invasion to ISIS. Al-Ahram.

6. Sennott, C. (2014, June 17). How ISIS Is Tearing Up The Century-old Map Of The Middle East. . Retrieved June 30, 2014, from

http://www.mintpressnews.com/how-isis-is-tearing-up-the-century-old-map-of-the-middle-east/192553/

7. Hall, J. (2014, June 25). ISIS militants produce slick weekly magazine packed with English language Islamist propaganda designed to

recruit and radicalise would-be extremists in the West. Daily Mail.

8. Middle East, Ethnic Groups. (n.d.). . Retrieved June 30, 2014, from http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml

9. Middle East, Religions. (n.d.). . Retrieved June 30, 2014, from http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/577523/Sykes-Picot-Agreement


SEIC Correspondents for Issue 52:

Wong Shi Jun Aaron (Vice President, SPEX) Undergraduate Lee Kong Chian School of Business Singapore Management University [email protected]

Zhou Li (Creative Director) Undergraduate School of Economics Singapore Management University [email protected]

Lee Yin Wei (Writer) Undergraduate School of Economics Singapore Management University [email protected]

Tay Qi Hang (Writer) Undergraduate School of Economics Singapore Management University [email protected]

Victor Julistiono Barlian (Writer) Undergraduate Lee Kong Chian School of Business Singapore Management University [email protected]

Rao Pranav (Writer) Undergraduate Lee Kong Chian School of Business Singapore Management University [email protected]

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SPEX 52