Special Warfare · 2011. 3. 28. · conflicts of the late 20th century, and SF’s performance thus far in the 21st century has been impressive. The quiet perform-ance of their duties

Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–02–2 June 2002 Vol. 15, No. 2

In 1952, facing the threat of communismand mindful of lessons learned during theglobal war that had ended only seven yearsbefore, the United States established the10th Special Forces Group, a small group ofmen that was capable of performingunconventional warfare in Europe.

In the 50 years since, the world has seenmany changes, but not all of those changeshave been for the better. The Cold War hasended, but new threats have emerged.Technology has provided capabilitiesundreamed of 50 years ago, but that tech-nology can be targeted by enemies usingsimple or out-of-date weapons. Our conven-tional forces have no equal on the conven-tional battlefield, but we still require, per-haps more than ever, forces capable of per-forming unconventional warfare.

SF has grown to five active-duty groupsand two groups in the Army NationalGuard. It has retained its UW focus, andthe capabilities and training required forUW have given SF the capability to per-form other missions. Even though SF didnot perform its UW mission in Europe, ithas performed its other missions in allparts of the world. Whenever the nationhas required soldiers for difficult missionsthat must be performed discreetly, it hascalled on Special Forces.

The battle streamers of the SF Regimentread like a roll call of the trouble spots andconflicts of the late 20th century, and SF’sperformance thus far in the 21st centuryhas been impressive. The quiet perform-ance of their duties has in many cases keptSF soldiers from gaining a great deal ofrecognition, and yet within SF’s ranks,there has been no shortage of heroes —men such as Bull Simons, Nick Rowe, DickMeadows, and the many SF recipients ofthe Medal of Honor.

As the articles in this issue of SpecialWarfare make clear, SF soldiers continue toperform their missions throughout the

world on a daily basis. The unique capabil-ities of SF soldiers, their flexibility, andtheir ability to operate on every continentare due in large part to their specializedtraining. That training is and always willbe critical to the success and versatility ofSF. As we celebrate SF’s 50th anniversary,we should not forget that this year alsomarks the 50th anniversary of the creationof the Psychological Warfare Center, theorganization responsible for training Spe-cial Forces and other elements of U.S. psy-chological warfare. As the inheritors of thelegacy of the Psywar Center, we the per-sonnel of today’s JFK Special Warfare Cen-ter and School are both proud of our roleand humbled by its responsibilities.

Major General William G. Boykin

From the CommandantJune 2002 Special Warfare Vol. 15, No. 2

Features2 The OSS Operational Groups: Origin of Army Special Forces

by Ian Sutherland

14 The History of the 1st SF Group in the Republic of the Philippines: 1957-2002

16 A History of SF Operations in Somalia: 1992-1995by Colonel Joseph D. Celeski

28 Operation Focus Relief: 3rd SF Group Builds Relations In Western Africa

31 Exercise Balance Magic: 19th SF Group Practices Medicinein the Heart of Asia

34 The Liberation of Mazar-e Sharif: 5th SF Group ConductsUW in Afghanistan

42 7th SF Group Provides Two Decades of Excellence in Latin Americaby Lieutenant Colonel Paul S. Burton and Captain Robert Lee Wilson

48 Operation White Star: Prelude to Vietnamby Dr. Kenn Finlayson

52 The 10th SF Group Keeps Kosovo Stableby Captains Robert W. Schaefer and M. Davis

56 The 281st Aviation Company: The Roots of Army SpecialOperations Aviationby Dr. C.H. Briscoe

60 The 20th SF Group in Flintlock 2001

Departments62 Enlisted Career Notes

63 Officer Career Notes

64 Foreign SOF

66 Update

68 Book Reviews

PB 80–02–2 ContentsJune 2002 Special Warfare Vol. 15, No. 2

Commander & CommandantMajor General William G. Boykin

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Associate EditorSylvia W. McCarley

Graphics & DesignBruce S. Barfield

Automation ClerkGloria H. Sawyer

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its missionis to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examinationof established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presentedin other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited andshould be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. SpecialWarfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfareand the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial-operations units. Individuals desiring privatesubscriptions should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. SpecialWarfare is also available on the USASOC internal web(https:asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm).

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

A

E T

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Eric K. ShinsekiGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Joel B. HudsonAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

0210001

Headquarters, Department of the Army

The operational elements ofUnited States Army SpecialForces are direct descen-

dants of the units of the U.S. Officeof Strategic Services, or OSS, thatwere infiltrated into metropolitanFrance during World War II. TheOSS units were tasked to organize,train, supply and direct the Maquisof the Forces Francaises de l’In-terieur, or FFI, in support of Oper-ation Overlord, the invasion ofNormandy in June 1944; and Oper-ation Dragoon, the invasion ofSouthern France, in August 1944.

This is not to imply that Army SFis not a direct descendant of theOSS units employed in other areasof the world that were active in thedevelopment, support and directionof the indigenous resistance to Axisoccupation. However, the organiza-tion and the mission of the opera-tional detachments of the original10th SF Group bear a remarkableresemblance to the organizationand activities of the OSS Opera-tional Group, or OG, that becameCompany B, 2671st Special Recon-naissance Battalion, Separate (Pro-visional) in August 1944.

The OGs were Major GeneralWilliam Donovan’s idea. As Lieu-tenant Colonel Serge Obolensky1

explained when he introduced

Major Alfred T. Cox to a group ofnewly assigned officers who wouldform the “French” OGs, the conceptwas to use American soldiers whohad language skills and weretrained in commando-type tactics.

The soldiers would not only pro-vide training and material supportfor the resistance, they would alsoform the nucleus for local resist-ance forces who would attack

enemy facilities and lines of com-munication deep behind the lines.Much of the training that MajorCox and others developed for theOGs was based on the experienceof British commandos. It placed aheavy emphasis on physical train-ing, demolitions, special weaponsand the hit-and-run offensive oper-ational techniques of guerrillas.

Al Cox, an Infantry officer, was astrong and agile athlete who hadplayed three major sports whilestudying civil engineering at LehighUniversity. During his senior year,he had been named captain of thefootball team and co-captain of thebaseball team. He was elected pres-ident of his class during his juniorand senior years, and he was amember of Phi Beta Kappa.2

The OSS had recruited Coxwhen he was an instructor of guer-rilla warfare at the Infantry Schoolat Fort Benning, Ga. With theassistance of men like 1st Lieu-tenant Art Frizzell, Cox led theFrench OGs through the demand-ing training in preparation for theday when the tactics and tech-niques would be put to use againstthe Wehrmacht.

The French OGs arrived inNorth Africa in February 1944.Referred to as Unit B, 1st Contin-

2 Special Warfare

The OSS Operational Groups: Origin of Army Special Forces

by Ian Sutherland

Sergeant Caesar Civetella, a member of OGLafayette, receives the Bronze Star fromMajor General William Donovan in 1945.

USASOC Archive

gent Operational Groups, 2677Headquarters Company OSS (Pro-visional), the French OGs wereorganized as a field-service head-quarters, or FSHQ, commanded byMajor Cox. The OG FSHQ was theechelon above the OG, and it con-trolled and directed the activitiesof two to five OGs. The FSHQ con-sisted of eight officers and 20enlisted men and was comparableto the SF B-detachment of lateryears. Organizationally, the FSHQincluded the operations, medical,communication, supply and admin-istrative personnel who wereactive in the training, preparation,deployment and support of theOGs in the operational area.3

In August 1944, Unit B was re-designated Company B, 2671stSpecial Reconnaissance Battalion,Separate (Provisional) to distancethe purely military OGs from the“agents, spies, and saboteurs” of

the 2677th Headquarters Compa-ny of the OSS. The event thatprompted the separation was theexecution of two officers and 13enlisted men of Mission Ginnyfrom Unit A, 1st Contingent (Ital-ian OGs). All the members ofGinny had been captured March22, 1944, on an operation in Italy todestroy a railway tunnel on the LaSpezia-Genoa railroad line. Duringinterrogation, they had disclosedthe details of their OSS associa-tion, and it was feared that theywere executed because of theirOSS connection.4

The French OGs were awarethat their involvement in guerrillawarfare would bring harsh treat-ment from the enemy if they werecaptured.5 Many of the soldiersmay not have been aware of theimplications of Hitler’s Komman-dobefehl,6 but they sewed the patchof the Seventh U.S. Army on their

left shoulders in the hope that itwould somehow ensure their treat-ment as prisoners of war.

In the spring of 1944, the FrenchOGs7 were placed under the tacti-cal control of the Special ProjectsOperations Center, G-3 SpecialOperations, Allied Forces Head-quarters, in Algiers. The OGs ofUnit B had been organized into 14OG sections, and the plan was foreach section to organize and trainthe French Resistance, the Maquis,for the purpose of delaying themovement of enemy reserves to theinvasion lodgment area in Nor-mandy; to harass enemy lines ofcommunication in their area ofoperations in southern France; andto conduct such sabotage opera-tions as were directed by theSupreme Allied Commander,Mediterranean in support of Oper-ation Overlord.8

To prepare the troops for com-

June 2002 3

OSS Operational Group Field Service Headquarters

Adjutant(First Lieutenant)

Transportation(First Lieutenant)

Commander(Major)

Communications(First Lieutenant)

Ass’t Section Ldr.(Sergeant)

Armorer(T/5)

Admin. Assistant(First Sergeant)

Assistant(Tech. Sergeant)

Assistant(Tech. Sergeant)

Clerk(T/5)

Assistant(T/5)

Assistant(T/5)

Clerk(T/5)

Assistant(T/5)

6 Radio Operators6 Cryptographers

(T/5)

Motorcyclist

Medical(Captain)

mitment deep within the enemy-occupied areas of southern France,the OGs’ arduous training in theAtlas Mountains of North Africahad emphasized night patrollingand scouting, guerrilla warfare,demolitions and fieldcraft.

The first section to be deployedwas Operation Emily,9 commandedby Art Frizzell. Emily departed onthe night of June 6, 1944. But theweather system that battered theNormandy beaches reached South-ern France, as well, and the dropzone was obscured. Emily returnedto Algiers. Two days later, Emily suc-cessfully infiltrated on drop zoneChenier, near La Bastride-du-Haut-mont in the department of Cantal.10

The members of Emily were met onthe drop zone by British Major R.MacPherson of Jedburgh Team Qui-nine,11 who had landed there only afew minutes ahead of them. Emilywas assigned the mission of denyingthe Wehrmacht the use of the rail by-pass from Cahors-Figeac and Figeac-Brive in the Department of Lot.12

OG Justine was the second sec-tion to deploy. Justine, commandedby 1st Lieutenant Vernon G. Hop-per, parachuted onto drop zoneTaille Crayon near Vassieux on theVercours plateau during the earlymorning of June 29. Justine’s mis-sion was to strengthen the Maquisin the Vercours region and to carryout guerrilla warfare against Ger-man supply lines, lines of communi-cation and telecommunications.

OG Louise arrived on drop zoneTandem, in the Department ofArdeche, July 18, to strengthen theMaquis, to harass the Germans,and to reconnoiter the west bank ofthe Rhone River and the area ofAles-Langogne. OG Betsy was alsodropped onto drop zone Tandem,but it arrived July 26. Betsy joinedLouise and assisted in attackingtargets and harassing and attack-ing German installations and linesof communication.

OG Ruth infiltrated Aug. 4 andwas met by a disorganized group ofFrancs-tireurs et Partisans, orFTP,13 personnel who were expect-ing a supply drop. After a consider-able delay in moving to its area ofoperation, Ruth began attackingbridges to prevent the Germans

from moving along the railroadsand highways in the area.

OG Pat and OG Alice weredeployed Aug. 6. Pat parachutedonto drop zone Virgule in theDepartment of Tarn to cut lines ofcommunication within the triangleof Toulouse, Bedarieux and Sever-

4 Special Warfare

Major Alfred T. Cox, commander of the “French” OGs, was an Infantry officer who was teachingguerrilla warfare at the Infantry School when he was recruited by the OSS.

USASOC Archive

ac. Further to the northeast in theDepartment of Drome, Alice landedon drop zone Framboise, three kilo-meters southwest of Bourdeaux, toreconnoiter National HighwayNumber 7 and Route Napoleon, toreport German troop movements,and, with the Maquis, to interdictand harass German columnswhenever possible.

Near dawn on Aug. 12, OG Pegparachuted onto the wrong dropzone. The reception party wasexpecting a supply drop. Accordingto Lieutenant Grahl H. Weeks, theOG team leader, “The Maquis werevery excited about the unexpectedAmerican arrival, and it was sometime before we could get themstarted to work.” Peg’s mission wasto harass German forces along

Route Nationale 117 and to inter-dict lines of communication in theCarcassonne Gap area of theDepartment of Aude.

The next day, Aug. 13, an Italian-speaking section, OG Nancy, infil-trated onto drop zone Armaturenear Saint Christol on the Franco-Italian border to interdict lines ofcommunication in the region of theMontgenevre pass. Another Ital-ian-speaking section, OG Helen,also departed Aug. 13 for France toblock Col de Larche in the Alps, butbecause of weather, Helen had toreturn to North Africa.

Cox was deeply involved in thepre-mission preparation of the OG,and he personally conducted thefinal briefing for each sectionbefore it departed. With the bulk of

his unit in the field, Cox; CaptainMorin, his executive officer; Cap-tain J. ”Doc” Hamblet, the unitmedical officer; and five enlistedmen, boarded a bomber in AlgiersAug. 24. As Mission Lehigh, theywould parachute into southernFrance to aid the resistance move-ment in the Ardeche Departmentand coordinate the operations ofthe other OG sections in the RhoneRiver west-bank area.

Shortly after midnight on Aug.25, Lehigh landed in German-occu-pied France. The infiltration wasgenerally successful, but SergeantCampbell, the unit first sergeant,was injured on landing.14 Anothercasualty of the drop was the radio,15

but Corporal Rockman was able torepair it and establish contact with

June 2002 5

the base station at the Special Proj-ects Operations Center in NorthAfrica. After assembling, the per-sonnel moved by local motor trans-portation to an inn at Devesset.

At Devesset, Cox spoke for sever-al hours with Commandant PaulVaucheret, also known as Vanel,about the enemy and friendly situ-ation in the Ardeche. Vanel waschief of the Interallied MilitaryMission Pectorial and was theappointed commander of the FFI inArdeche.16 Cox learned from Vanelthat the resistance movement inArdeche consisted of approximate-ly 5,000 armed men organized intobattalions. The Armée Secrete, orAS, some of whom were sedentaries(comparable to the minutemen ofcolonial America), owed their alle-giance to General de Gaulle’sComite Francais de la LiberationNationale, or CFLN,17 and werewell-trained, disciplined militaryunits. On the other hand, the FTP,the military arm of the French

communist movement, at bestowed only begrudging allegiance toCFLN. Vanel considered the FTP tobe poorly trained, undisciplinedand generally unreliable.

Vanel explained that the areasalong the German lines of commu-nication were divided into sectors,and that each sector was assignedto either an AS or an FTP battal-ion. For political reasons, there wasno liaison between the sectors,which complicated the coordina-tion of operations.

During the afternoon, Hambletand several others visited the hos-pital at Chambon-sur-Lignon. Theyfound T/5 Bilodeau of OG Louise,who had broken his leg during theparachute jump on July 18. Theyalso found Sergeant Linnell, T/5 St.Sauveur and Private Crough, all ofOG Betsy, who had been woundedby shrapnel from a bomb droppedby a German aircraft Aug. 10; andSergeant Lynch, also of Betsy, whohad suffered a broken collarbone in

a vehicle accident Aug. 20.The four U.S. wounded from OG

Betsy and 25 Maquis casualtiesfrom the German air attack wereinitially treated in the Frenchinfirmary at Vanosc and then evac-uated to the hospital in SaintAgreve, 35 kilometers away. TheFrench doctors had worked furi-ously on the wounded, but theywere unable to save SergeantBarnabe, one of the Betsy squadleaders, who died shortly aftersurgery. Some days later, the otherwounded had been transferred tothe hospital at Chambon-sur-Lignon.

Each OG section had a medicalaidman who had received exten-sive medical training in the U.S.before joining the OSS. The medicsprovided excellent treatment in thefield. Their medical suppliesincluded sulfonamides, which theFrench lacked, and they were laterable to obtain penicillin.18 As amedical officer, Hamblet was avail-able to assist the French in devel-oping field medical services andevacuation systems, but the pace ofoperations precluded that type ofadvisory effort.19

Cox traveled by motor vehicle20

to the sector where the members ofOG Louise were operating. Louisehad received 37 mm guns Aug. 15,and early in the morning of Aug.25, near the city of Vallons, Lieu-tenant Rickerson, the executiveofficer of Louise, with other mem-bers of the section, took withdraw-ing German forces under fire. Latein the afternoon, the Maquis secu-rity force on the flanks of the gunposition withdrew without warn-ing. The Germans attacked theguns, which the Americans wereforced to abandon after a fiercefirefight. Cox learned that this wasnot the first time for a suddenwithdrawal on the part of theMaquis.

Upon his return to Val-les-bains,

6 Special Warfare

Members of OG Alice pose with members of the French Maquis in September 1944. The Ameri-cans had great respect for the dedication of the French partisans.

USASOC ArchiveUSASOC Archive

Cox recommended to Vanel thateach OG section be assigned to asector in which the Maquis haddemonstrated good leadership, dis-cipline and combat ability. Coxinsisted that Vanel ensure properliaison between sectors and that acentrally located reserve ofmateriel and troops be established.The reserve would be deployed totip the scales when it appearedthat the Germans were about todefeat the Maquis.

On the morning of Aug. 27, Cox,Hamblet, Morin, and SergeantsDelage, Beaudoin and O’Lear droveto Annonay. Shortly after arriving,they learned from the Maquis thata German column was movingnorth near Tournon. They departedimmediately for Tournon. Whenthey arrived there, a Frenchmanwarned them that Germans wereonly a few kilometers away.

Cox, Morin, Delage and O’Learstruck out toward the top of a hillto observe the German column,while Hamblet and Beaudoin hidthe vehicle. Unfortunately, theadvance guard of the German col-umn — two open cars and a doubleline of infantry — appeared on theroad in front of the four men andimmediately began firing on them.Morin and O’Lear managed to fadesafely back into the mountains, asdid Hamblet and Beaudoin, whohad moved up after hiding themotor vehicle. Cox and Delage,however, were caught in the open,and they ran, zig-zagging across aplowed field. Fortunately, the Ger-man column was more concernedwith the Maquis than with the twofleeing men.

The German column leap-frogged forward with professionalprecision and placed small-armsfire, automatic-weapons fire andmortar fire on likely ambush sitesalong the road. Cox and Delangemanaged to sprint through a line oftrees to a water-filled ditch some

300 yards from the road, wherethey lay, covered with brush, whileseveral German patrols beat thebushes nearby.

An hour later, the two men werestartled by two women whosplashed up the ditch searching fora place to hide. The nerve-wrackingwait continued, and the womenadded to the danger with theirunconcerned chatter. Miraculously,the German patrols that wereprowling the fields and tree linenearby failed to locate the group.

After dark, two Frenchmen dis-covered the little group and ledthem to a house away from the road.After they changed into Frenchcivilian clothing and hid their wetuniforms and equipment in thebarn’s hayloft, Cox and Delangewere led to the house, where theFrench family, at the risk of theirlives, provided the sanctuary oftheir home to the two men.

The women prepared a meal,which the soldiers devoured andwashed down with a delicious redwine. Tired to the bone, the two

Americans tumbled into bed, dis-turbed only by the noises comingfrom the German column thatmoved throughout the night.

The next morning, still in civil-ian clothing, the two men crossedthe road during a break in the Ger-man column and gained the coverof the heavily forested hills, wherethey once again donned their uni-forms. (Ten days later, Coxreturned to the area to thank thefamily for their hospitality. Helearned that German patrols hadsearched all the homes in the val-ley less than an hour after he andDelage had departed. The men, hewas told, were taken further up thevalley as hostages and later, forsome unexplained reason, shot.)

Morin and O’Lear spent anuncomfortable night in the woods,and when daylight returned, theywere located by the Maquis. Ham-blet and Beaudoin hitchhiked toDevesset, where they were reunit-ed with the other four men later inthe morning. That afternoon, theylearned that personnel from Betsy

June 2002 7

Soldiers of the OGs and members of the Maquis aboard local transportation. The OG memberslater agreed that their training should have placed more emphasis on the operation and mainte-nance of foreign vehicles.

USASOC Archive

had been strafed by what wasthought to have been a U.S. plane.T/5 Raymond Bisson, the sectionmedic, had been killed. LieutenantPaul E. Boudreau, the sectionleader, had been seriously woundedand had been evacuated to the hos-pital at Chambon-sur-Lignon.

Information concerning the Ger-man column that Cox and Delagehad narrowly avoided was passedto the OSS base station in Algiers.Intelligence received from theMaquis in the Tournon area overthe next few days indicated thatGerman combat forces and sup-porting units consisting of approxi-mately 50,000 troops, more than athousand vehicles, a few half-tracks and some artillery, hadpassed through Tournon continu-ously for four days and nights.

On Aug. 29, Cox and LieutenantMcKenzie, who had accompaniedhim to Val-les-bains, learned that aGerman column was preparing tomove from Vallons to Privas.McKenzie hurriedly departed tobring up Louise and the 37 mmguns, which they had recoveredfrom Vallons. Cox, Vanel and thelocal Maquis chiefs performed areconnaissance of the area, but theMaquis became bogged down inendless discussion when theybegan planning.

The Maquis placed a company onevery route the Germans were like-ly to use. Theoretically then, theMaquis would have the Germanssurrounded, but in reality, the Ger-mans blasted through the singleMaquis company on the route theyhad chosen and continued on theirway unmolested by the otherMaquis units. Cox was exasperat-ed; there had been too much talkand not enough action.

Cox knew that small bands oper-ating in true guerrilla fashion —hitting and running, slashing con-tinually at the enemy’s flanks andfading into the countryside —

could exact a tremendous materieland psychological toll on the flee-ing German forces. Unfortunately,the more certain the success of theAllied armies became, the more theMaquis leadership wanted tobehave like a conventional force.The Maquis leadership focusedmore and more on the liberation ofLyon and other large cities in thearea, ignoring the opportunity tobatter the retreating Germancolumns.

During the night of Aug. 29, OGsHelen and Lafayette had parachutedin. In the afternoon, Lafayette depart-ed for the Maquis headquarters atChateau Olivier in a truck providedby the Maquis. OG Helen remainedin Devesset until Aug. 31, then movedby truck to Saint-Etienne.

In the early morning of Aug. 31,after spending the night atChateau Olivier, Lieutenant OdilonFontaine of OG Lafayette, joined byLieutenant Rickerson and T/5Henry D. Collette of OG Louise anda Maquis officer, traveled toChomerac to investigate reports ofGerman forces in the area. Whenthey arrived, they learned thestrength and the location of theGerman units from a GermanPOW who was being held by theMaquis.

Another German prisoneragreed to assist them in contactingthe German commanders. ThisPOW went through the lines andreturned with a Russian who wasthe company commander of a Rus-sian volunteer unit with the Ger-man Army. The Russian told themthat there were five battalions ofGerman troops in the hills east ofChomerac.

The U.S. party left the Russianwith the Maquis and made theirway to the German position, wherethey contacted a German battalioncommander, a major. The majorcontacted his commander, acolonel, who arrived with the other

four battalion commanders.The colonel, who spoke fluent

French, explained to the inter-preter, Collette, that he wished todiscuss terms with the Americancommander. Collette contacted Coxat Devesset, but before Cox couldarrive, a French armored-recon-naissance vehicle appeared andbegan firing at the Germans. With-out further negotiation, the Ger-man officers threw their hands inthe air, shouting, “We surrender toyou Americans!”

The number of German prison-ers taken was two colonels, sixmajors, 22 captains and lieu-tenants, and 3,794 enlisted men.The Americans later learned thatthe two colonels, one of the majorsand 150 other German POWs hadbeen executed on the orders of aMaquis chief for atrocities theyhad committed against the Maquisand French civilians.

At FFI headquarters in Yzeron,Cox learned that the long-awaitedattack on Lyon was scheduled forSept. 2, and he hurriedly returnedto Devesset. On Sept. 1, OGWilliam, commanded by 1st Lieu-tenant Harry L. Herres, arrived insouthern France, parachuting instrong winds just before midnight.Cox issued OG William a warningorder for the attack on Lyon, andhe returned to Yzeron with Ham-blet and McKinzie to arrange theuse of the OGs in the attack. Coxestablished contact with the chiefof staff of the French 1st ArmoredDivision, which would take part inthe attack.

The next morning, Cox joined OGHelen, which was to spearhead theattack in their sector. Apprehensive-ly, Cox watched Helen move out inbattle formation on the outskirts ofthe city. He knew only too well thatif the Germans elected to put up afight, it would take more than thelightly armed Maquis to drive themout. He and Hamblet proceeded on

8 Special Warfare

foot toward the high ground on thewest bank of the Saone River thatoverlooked Lyon. To their amaze-ment, they found that they wereahead of the attacking Maquis.Huge crowds of French civiliansswarmed around them, giving thema wild welcome. “No comic SouthAmerican revolution ever had asmuch firing and as little effect. Theopposition consisted of, at most, twoGerman machine guns and the Mil-

ice21 firing rifles and submachineguns from windows. The Maquisand the French armored carsopened up with all their weapons,spraying the front of the buildings.Civilians were everywhere, huggingand kissing the men as they fired,with complete disregard of all thefiring.”

The festive mood of the civiliansand Maquis quickly turned nasty.The Miliciens were ruthlessly hunt-

ed down and summarily executed.Women who were accused of con-sorting with the Germans werestripped, branded, mutilated andtortured before being shot. In thefrenzy, the mob killed several“agents” of allied intelligence, evenas one victim was claiming that hecould prove he was a loyal French-man. Fortunately, in a few days theFFI imposed control over the city,and the mayhem slowly diminished.

Major Douglas G. Bonner of the4th Special Forces Unit22 locatedCox in Lyon, and the two decided toassemble the OG sections atGrenoble. Cox sent Hamblet toarrange the evacuation of thewounded to the assembly area, andby Sept. 17, all units had closed onGrenoble.

The 14 OG sections that had infil-trated southern France were, ingeneral, successful at organizingand training the Maquis. In concertwith those Maquis forces, the OGsconducted operations to destroy pri-ority targets on the railroads andhighways. They also establishedroadblocks and ambushes, and theycut communication and power linesin order to harass and impede theenemy forces that were movingtoward and away from the invasionbeaches.

Through their communicationlink with Algiers, the OGs relayedvital order-of-battle information fortheir area of operations. Several ofthe sections located and assisteddowned allied airmen. The leasttangible, but probably the mostimportant aspect, of the OGs wasthe tremendous lift their presencegave to the Maquis.23

As a result of their operationswith the Maquis, the OGs reported461 German soldiers killed inaction, 467 wounded in action, and10,021 German prisoners of wartaken.

During the stay in Grenoble, Coxconducted a post-operations cri-

June 2002 9

In August 1944, French civilians shave the head of a French woman to punish her for having per-sonal relations with members of the German occupation force.

National Archives

tique. All OG members expressedthe opinion that the extensivetraining they had received waseffective. All personnel hadreceived basic infantry, guerrillawarfare, mountain operations andparachute training prior to deploy-ment. At least 50 percent of thetraining was conducted duringdarkness, and some of the mencommented that the field training

problems were more difficult thanthe operations.

The OG members generallyagreed that more emphasis shouldhave been placed on the operationand maintenance of foreignweapons and vehicles, on methodsof instruction, on French militarynomenclature, and on radio main-tenance and repair (for the radiooperators). The soldiers considered

their equipment, on the whole, tobe satisfactory. Complaints aboutthe footgear and clothing indicatethat the jump boot did not hold upwell in the mountainous terrain,and that the U.S. field jacket didnot provide sufficient protectionagainst the cold. The use of themountain sleeping bag allowed thesoldiers to sleep comfortablyalmost regardless of conditions.The consensus was that the car-bine with folding stock, the .45-cal-iber pistol and the Marlin subma-chine gun were useful at shortrange. However, the soldiersagreed that the Browning Auto-matic Rifle and light machine gunwere essential and should havebeen available from the beginning.

The SSTR-1, the radio issued tothe OG sections, was compact andlightweight, and it had the neces-sary range, but it was not durable.Most of its failures were due tominor flaws in the basic compo-nents and their construction. Withonly two or three exceptions, theoperators had no idea how theradio functioned and thereforecould not correct the failures. Eventhe operators who understood thesets had neither the tools nor thespare parts to repair them. Thepower pack was the second mostlikely component to fail. The major-ity of the power-pack failures wererelated to loose connections, shorts,lack of insulation and overheatingof the unit.

The unanimous conclusionamong the OGs, Jedburghs andother elements was that the OSSunits were committed much toolate to achieve maximum effect onthe Maquis. In the experience ofthe OGs, every day that was spentin training the Maquis brought agreater combat effectiveness.

The consensus was that the realMaquis, the patriotic Frenchmenwho risked everything in order toliberate France from the Nazis,

10 Special Warfare

Bill Mauldin’s cartoon is based on the fact that partisan activities took a psychological toll on thesoldiers of the German occupation force.

Reprinted with permission of Bill Mauldin. Copyright 1944 by Bill Mauldin

were above praise. Many of them,operating in small bands or as indi-viduals, carried the fight to theGermans for three to four yearswithout adequate supplies of food,weapons or ammunition. Theirpresence in the countryside madethe occupation a continual hell forthe Germans.

While the organization and thediscipline of each Maquis unit var-ied, the presence of former officersand NCOs of the French army usu-ally resulted in a well-disciplinedand better-trained force. The FFIorganizations could have beenmore effective had the Maquisbeen required to confine theirefforts to guerrilla warfare, harass-ing the fleeing enemy at everyopportunity. Instead, the FFI oftenattempted to bring together a largeforce as an army of liberation of thelarger towns in the area.

In general, the OG sections werewarmly received by the French;

however, on rare occasions FFIchiefs deliberately hampered OGactivities. The actions of the FFIchiefs often had a political basis:serious animosity existed betweenthe various groups. The consensusamong the OGs was that no politi-cal group should be permitted tohave a “private” army.

After studying the experience ofthe Jedburgh teams in southernFrance, Lieutenant Colonel Ken-neth H. Baker, in his final report ofthe SPOC Debriefing Operationsat Avignon, strongly recommendedthat all future operations contem-plated for Jedburgh teams bestrictly separated from politicalconsiderations. If that was not pos-sible, then the team should be fullybriefed on all the political aspectsof its task, and personnel should beselected with the political aspectsin mind. The same observationswould be valid for OGs as well.

Similar to the French OG sec-

tions, the FA Team, SF OperationalDetachment Regiment, as organ-ized under the original TO&E 33-2approved in April 1952, was autho-rized 15 men: a detachment com-mander, an executive officer and 13enlisted men. The FA team was, intheory, capable of organizing, sup-porting and directing a regimental-sized guerrilla unit.

The functional specialties repre-sented on the FA Team were med-ical, demolitions, communications,weapons, operations and intelli-gence. The scouts of the OG sectionwere replaced on the FA Team byadditional specialists in medical,weapons, demolitions, and opera-tions and intelligence. The fieldradio repairman was added to theFA Team organization because ofthe problems the OSS operationalteams had experienced with theircommunications equipment in thefield. In southern France, the nextechelon in the OG organizationfunctioned in a similar manner tothat envisioned for the FB Team,Special Forces Operational Detach-ment District B.

Colonel Aaron Bank, who was anOG, a Jedburgh and a member ofthe Special Operations Branch ofthe OSS, was involved in andexposed to the OSS/SOE fieldactivities in the European,Mediterranean and China-Burma-India theaters of operation. Bankwas personally involved in the con-flicts that would arise over com-mand and control. In an after-action report, he complained thatInterallied Military MissionIsotrope “had decided beforehandas to our disposition and also thedistribution of our arms, whichimmediately created a barrierbetween us, as I had been briefedto operate as a guerrilla organizerand leader, and the disposition ofmy arms was my own affair.” Banklater concluded, “Jeds should neverwork with Missions as there is a

June 2002 11

OSS Jedburgh teams attend a demolitions class at Milton Hall, England, in 1944. The Jedburghsand the OGs agreed that they were committed too late in the war to achieve maximum effect.

National Archives

constant clash.”24 His experience insouthern France may account forthe hierarchical arrangement ofthe FA, FB and FC teams in the10th SF Group and for the conceptsof their deployment and support.

Bank was also well aware of theOSS/SOE support organizations inNorth Africa, Britain, France andthe Far East. He knew from first-hand experience what was neces-sary for the support of the UW mis-sion that was envisioned for Spe-cial Forces. His experience wasincorporated into the 1952 SFTO&E that established the SFgroup and the SFOB. The SF groupand the SFOB would performessentially the same role as theOSS/SOE command-and-control,logistics-support and communica-tions organizations.

Brigadier General Russell W.Volckmann, who some insist was asresponsible for the development ofU.S. Army Special Forces as Bankwas, certainly made an importantcontribution to the form and sub-stance of the emerging SpecialForces. Volckmann, who hadrefused to surrender to the Japan-ese in 1941, evaded into the moun-tains of northern Luzon and organ-ized five regiments of Philippineguerrillas.25 The OSS and SOEwere not involved in the develop-ment, support or direction of thoseguerrilla forces. The Allied Intelli-gence Bureau, organized under theassistant chief of staff, G2 in theSouthwest Pacific Theater, provid-ed the organization and support forVolckmann’s guerrilla forces.

However, the arrangement didnot work well. “The special opera-tions group was primarily con-cerned with fostering resistanceand conducting sabotage behindthe enemy’s lines, while AIB wasprimarily concerned with strategicand combat intelligence.”26 Beingthat as it may, the “Philippineguerrilla units performed valuable

services by operating coast-and-airwatchers stations, providing infor-mation, obstructing Japanese com-munications and operations, andmaintaining the morale and loyal-ty of the civilian population.”27

Regardless of which person hadthe most influence on the Depart-ment of the Army’s acceptance ofthe organization and on the con-cept of employment of the 10th SFGroup in 1952, the implication isthat U.S. Army Special Forces is asynthesis of the organizational andoperational experience of the OSS.It is not clear whether Aaron Bankand Al Cox, who worked for theCIA after World War II, ever con-ferred during the development ofthe 10th SF Group. Veterans of theFrench OGs now insist that Coxtaught Bank everything he knewabout guerrilla warfare and thattherefore Cox had a definite influ-ence on the ultimate form and sub-stance of the 10th SF Group.

Ian Sutherland is an assistantprosecuting attorney for CapeGirardeau County, Mo. A formerArmy officer who retired in 1979 asa lieutenant colonel, he served in avariety of assignments, includingthe 82nd Airborne Division; the 1stBattalion, 3rd U.S. Infantry (theOld Guard); the 5th Special ForcesGroup; and the American Embassyin Teheran, Iran. He served threeyears in Vietnam with the 5th SFGroup and other government agen-cies. In addition to a bachelor’sdegree, he holds a master’s in zoolo-gy and physiology from TulaneUniversity, a master’s of publicadministration from Harvard Uni-versity, and a law degree from theUniversity of Missouri at Colum-bia. He is the author of The U.S.Army Special Forces, 1952-1982(1990) and Brightlight (2001) ahistorical novel based on his experi-ences in Vietnam. He is currently

doing research for a book on theactivities of the OSS OperationalGroups.

Notes:1 Lieutenant Colonel Serge Obolensky

parachuted into Sardinia in September1943 to persuade Italian General Basso,who was the commanding general of theItalian troops on the island, to assist in neu-tralizing the 270,000 Italian and 19,000German troops on the islands and to assistin securing the flank of the Salerno inva-sion. In August 1944, Obolensky was infil-trated into the southern part of IndreDepartment of France as commander ofOperation Patrick. Serge Obolensky, TheMemoirs of Serge Obolensky: One Man inHis Time (London: Hutchinson, 1960).

2 The Lehigh University Epitome (year-book), 1940.

3 During World War II, the operationalunits, including the OGs, were imbedded inan elaborate organization for command andcontrol, logistics support and communica-tions that, in many respects, was replicatedin the U.S. Army Special Forces operationalbase.

4 Information supplied by Albert Mater-azzi, operations Officer, Company A, 2671stSpecial Reconnaissance Battalion, Separate(Provisional), including basic operatinginstructions for Ginny, report of the Ginnyoperation, report of the first attempt torelieve Ginny party, report of the secondattempt to relieve Ginny party, and otherdocuments related to the execution of theofficers and men of Mission Ginny. Copy inthe Archives, U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand, Fort Bragg, N.C.

5 Cox wrote to the commander of the2677th Headquarters Company OSS (Provi-sional), in early May 1944, “I sincerelybelieve that I am speaking for myself, formany of my officers, and for many of mymen, in saying that we realize fully therisks entailed in our type of operations andthat we are ready and anxious to assumethose risks. … It would be a terrible disap-pointment to many of us if the OG idea wereto be abndoned [sic]”; A. Materazzi docu-ments, letter to Lieutenant Colonel Gamble,Subject: Future Employment of OperationalGroups, dated 8 May 1944.

6 Part of Hitler’s Kommandobefehl (Com-mando Order) stated, “From now on all ene-mies on so-called commando missions inEurope or Africa challenged by Germantroops, even if they are to all appearancessoldiers in uniform or demolition troops,whether armed or unarmed, in battle or inflight, are to be slaughtered to the last man.

12 Special Warfare

It does not make any difference whetherthey are landed from ships or aeroplanes fortheir actions, or whether they are droppedby parachute. Even if these individualswhen found should be prepared to givethemselves up, as a matter of principle, nopardon is to be granted them.”

7 In April 1944, two OGs and personnel fora field service headquarters from Unit B, 1stContingent, were transferred to the UnitedKingdom under the command of LieutenantColonel Serge Obolensky, who was concur-rently the commanding officer of the OGs,European Theater of Operations. NARAMicrofilm M-1623, Roll No. 9, Vol. 4-A, Janu-ary-June 1944, Operational Groups, 6.

8 Directive SHAEF/17240/13/ops, Role ofresistance groups in the South of France,dated 21 May 1944, contained in SpecialOperations in the Mediterranean Theater ofOperations, Section VII, “Resistance inFrance.” Copy located in the Archives, U.S.Army Special Operations Command, FortBragg, N.C.

9 The operation name was used to identifythe OG section and FSHQ. Each operationhad a named signal plan: For Emily it wasHelium, and for Lehigh it was Simone.10 Personal communications with A.P.Frizzell, May 2000.11 Arthur Brown, The Jedburghs: A ShortHistory. Archives, U.S. Army Special Opera-tions Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. Jedburghteams were ostensibly composed of Ameri-can, British and French soldiers, when infact, only 10 of the 101 Jedburgh teamswere so composed. Eighteen of the teamshad two Frenchmen or Dutchmen, depend-ing on the destination; 32 had two Ameri-cans; and 41 had two British soldiers. Theteams were infiltrated into France for thepurpose of organizing, supporting anddirecting the Resistance. Eight teams,Clarence, Claude, Daniel II, Dicing, DudleyII, Edward, Gambling and Stanley II, weredeployed to Holland.12 Initially, the railway bridge over the CeleRiver at Conduche was selected, and onJune 12, 1944, the bridge was destroyed byOG Emily, which was supported by FTP per-sonnel. Operations Report, Company B,2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion,Separate (Prov.), Operation Emily.13 The FTP was controlled by the Frenchcommunist party and was often at oddswith the other resistance groups.14 Of the 27 officers and 155 enlisted menwho parachuted into southern France, 23were listed as wounded in action, 10 ofwhom were injured on the jump. Command-ing Officers Report, Operational Report.Company B, 2671st Special ReconnaissanceBattalion, Separate (Prov.), Grenoble,

France, 20 September 1944, 2. Archives,U.S. Army Special Operations Command,Fort Bragg, N.C. (Also located at RecordGroup 226, E 190 Box 741, NationalArchives II.)15 Damage to radio gear during the para-chute drop was a problem that plagued theoperational units.16 Paul Gaujac, Special Forces in the Inva-sion of France (Translated by Janice Lert)(Paris: Histoire & Collections, 1999).17 Arthur Layton Funk, Hidden Ally. TheFrench Resistance, Special Operations andthe Landings in Southern France, 1944(New York: Greenwood Press, 1992).18 Personal communications with Dr. JohnHamblet, 10 April 2000.19 Hamblet was not the only medical officerwho was infiltrated into France. CaptainFred B. Agee, U.S. Army Medical Corps, wasinfiltrated into the Haute Vienne Depart-ment, as Mission Antagonist, to providemedical services to members of the Maquis;to assist in organizing such other medicalservices as were available for the purpose ofserving members of the Maquis; and tocooperate as far as possible with any doctorslocated in nearby villages who were in anyway serving the Maquis. NARA MicrofilmSet M-1623, Roll No. 9 (OSS Aid to theFrench Resistance).20 Motor transportation was readily avail-able to the Maquis. Unfortunately, the vehi-cles were notoriously unreliable and the dri-ving was often reckless.21 Michael Pearson, Tears of Glory: TheBetrayal of Vercors 1944 (London: Macmil-lan, 1978). The Milice were political policedirected by the puppet government atVichy; they wore distinctive blue uniforms.They were the French equivalent of theGestapo. Their methods were every bit asbrutal as the Gestapo’s and even morehated.22 Funk, Hidden Ally, 38-39. Special ForcesUnit No. 4 was commanded by LieutenantColonel William G. Bartlett. British Lieu-tenant Colonel E.S.N. Head was the deputycommander. The unit consisted of 22 officers(10 U.S. and 12 British) and 42 enlisted men(12 U.S. and 30 British).23 Operations Report, Commander’s Report.24 Isotrope had promised the FTP eightBren automatic rifles and 40 Enfield riflesthat Team Packard had brought in. Bankconcluded that the FTP “was always moreinterested in politics than fighting the Ger-mans. They never used all the arms theyreceived and in my opinion are keeping thearms for ulterior motives. They should bedisarmed as fast as possible.” OperationalReport, Team Packard. National ArchivesRecord Group 226, Entry 101, Box 1, Folders

34 and 35, Location: 190/6/15/4; Martin,“Report on Jedburghs (Zone Sud).”25 Operational Report of Team “Packard” inGard and Lozere Departments, dated 10October 1944, signed Aaron Bank, Captain,Infantry. National Archives Record Group226, Entry 101, Box 1, Folders 34 and 35,Location: 190/6/15/4; “History of OSS Aid toFrench Resistance,” National ArchivesRecord Group 226, Entry 190, Box 741,Location: 190/10/4/2.26 The Special Forces Regimental HistoryCalendar, 1994. Office of the Command His-torian, U.S. Army Special Operations Com-mand, Fort Bragg, N.C.27 FM 31-21, Organization and Conduct ofGuerrilla Warfare, Headquarters, Depart-ment of the Army, October 1951, 6-7.

June 2002 13

Since its activation in July1957, the 1st Special ForcesGroup has maintained a close

association with the Philippines.The 1st SF Group has conducted

numerous missions, ranging fromhumanitarian assistance and for-eign internal defense to the ongo-ing unconventional-warfare opera-tions in support of OperationEnduring Freedom. No matterwhich mission they have beenassigned, the soldiers of the 1st SFGroup have always stood“balikatan” (shoulder to shoulder)with their counterparts in theArmed Forces of the Philippines, orAFP.

During the late 1950s, the 1st SFGroup began training the cadre ofthe Philippine Scout Rangers.Using a curriculum that mirroredthat used by U.S. Army Rangers atthat time, the 1st SF Groupfocused on developing the cadre’sleadership abilities and trainingthem in infantry tactics. Eventual-ly, some of the Philippine scoutunits split off to form the Philip-pine Special Forces, which wereactivated to counter both the grow-ing communist insurgency in thenorthern provinces and the resur-gence of Islamic nationalism in thesouthern provinces.

During the late 1960s, thePhilippine Special Forces were dis-banded because of political in-fighting. The Philippine ScoutRangers survived those turbulentyears and became the nucleus of aPhilippine special-operations com-mand that continues to accomplisha variety of missions ranging fromspecial reconnaissance to civicaction.

The 1st SF Group’s heavyinvolvement in humanitarian-assistance and civic-action pro-grams throughout Asia contributedsignificantly to the success of thePhilippine civic-action program.During the late 1960s and early1970s, the 1st SF Group reorgan-ized into the Special Action ForceAsia, or SAF Asia. This organiza-tion ensured theaterwide security

assistance and provided a U.S.presence in Asia while simultane-ously supporting the 1st SFGroup’s mission in the Republic ofVietnam. The 97th Civil AffairsGroup, the 156th Medical Detach-ment, the 400th Army SecurityAgency Detachment, the 441st Mil-itary Intelligence Detachment andthe 539th Engineer Detachmentaugmented the 1st SF Group’sefforts in accomplishing the SAFAsia mission.

Having gained a vast amount ofexperience in Thailand and in Viet-nam, the personnel of SAFAsiaearned the respect and the admira-tion of the Philippine people. In1972, the rapid response, dedica-tion and professionalism of SAFAsia’s disaster-assistance-and-relief team saved thousands oflives in severely flooded provincesof the Philippines and earned the1st SF Group the Philippine Presi-dential Unit Citation.

In 1974, the 1st SF Group wasdeactivated, ending 17 years of SFinfluence in Southeast Asia.Almost 10 years later, the 1st SFGroup’s colors were unfurled againat Fort Lewis, Wash., and withinone month of its reactivation, the1st SF Group once again haddeployed soldiers to the Philip-

14 Special Warfare

The History of the 1st SF Group in the Republic of the Philippines: 1957-2002

Graduation ceremony for the 1st AdvancedRanger class of the Philippine Army, in 1958. Theinstructors were members of the 1st SF Group.

U.S. Army photo

pines to ensure the stability of theregion. 1st SF Group soldiers con-tinued to hone their combat skillsat Clark Air Force Base, at SubicBay’s Green Beach live-fire area,and at the Crow Valley bombingrange.

Unilateral training, however,was not the 1st SF Group’s onlyfocus during the late 1980s. Thegroup’s detachments, companiesand battalions continued to partic-ipate in the annual ExerciseBalikatan. They also conductednumerous humanitarian-assist-ance and civic-action projectsthrough the program known asJoint Combined Exchange Train-ing, or JCET. But political andenvironmental forces becametraining distracters for the 1stGroup — the U.S. military with-drawal from the Philippines, cou-pled with the eruption of MountPinatubo and unsuccessful negoti-ations of the military base agree-ment, forced the group to reduce itsoperations in the Philippines.

After 1992, the 1st SF Group

continued to send soldiers to thePhilippines, but they were restrict-ed to training Philippine soldiersfor “other than combat” missions.However, the Philippine and Amer-ican people realized the value andnecessity of increasing the combatcapability of the AFP, and by theend of the 1990s, soldiers of the 1stSF Group were once again trainingthe AFP in the war-fighting skillsthat are vital to success in combat.

Even after the Philippine govern-ment signed peace treaties withIslamic nationalist groups, and evenafter communist insurgencies hadalmost ceased to exist in the Philip-pines, a new menace emerged. Ban-dit groups in the southern provinceswere kidnapping and killing Fil-ipinos and foreigners. These groupswere not only destroying the Philip-pine tourist industry, they werespreading fear and discontentamong the people. In the depths ofthe Asian economic crisis, thePhilippine government sought amilitary solution to help deal withthe problem.

After a careful analysis of the pos-sible courses of action and after con-sultation with the U.S. StateDepartment, the Philippine govern-ment decided to establish the light-reaction company, or LRC. The unitconsists of a company of AFP sol-diers from the Philippine special-operations command, armed withthe latest equipment and trained bythe 1st SF Group. Accompanied bysoldiers of the 1st SF Group, theLRC is currently conducting a vari-ety of operations throughout thePhilippines.

Almost immediately after thetragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, thepresident of the Philippines offeredto assist the U.S. in the global waron terrorism. After definite confir-mation of links between Philippinebandit groups and terrorist cells,the Philippine people once againwelcomed the soldiers of the 1st SFGroup to train, advise and assistthe AFP in destroying those organ-izations. Today soldiers of the twocountries are once again standingshoulder-to-shoulder, helping to ridthe world of the terrorist plague.

The 1st SF Group has a proudhistory in the Philippines, andtoday’s 1st SF Group soldiers goforth in the spirit of the SF soldierswho went before them. Alongsidetheir AFP counterparts, they willaccomplish their assigned missionswith the dedication and the quietprofessionalism that are symbol-ized by the green beret.

This article was written by mem-bers of the 1st Special ForcesGroup.

June 2002 15

A soldier from the 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group, teaches Philippine soldiers to conduct insertionand extraction operations. The training took place at Fort Magsaysay in May 2001.

Photo by Kyran V. Adams

The conflict in Somalia pro-vides an excellent example ofthe value of integrating

United States Army Special Forces,or SF, in conjunction with otherspecial-operations forces, or SOF,in a military operation other thanwar in both rural and urban com-bat environments.

Although A-detachments fromthe 1st, 3rd, 5th and 10th SFGroups operated in Somalia duringthe period of U.S. involvement, theseven casualties of the conflict —one killed in action and six wound-ed in action — occurred during therotation of the 5th SF Group.

The United Nations role in Soma-lia was unique. For the first time,U.N. forces were used to resolve anintra-state conflict in a failed state.Fourteen warring tribal clans haddevastated the country in a civilwar that had begun with the col-lapse of the Siad Barre regime in

1991. A severe drought, widespreadbanditry and escalating clan war-fare had brought on the largestfamine of that decade. By the end of1991, more than 4.5 million peoplehad been displaced as refugees, andmore than 300,000 Somalis haddied of starvation.

The first use of SF occurred inJanuary 1991, during the noncom-batant evacuation operation, or

NEO, of the U.S. Embassy. An SFsergeant from the 5th SF Group,who was already deployed to Soma-lia as a member of a technicalassistance field team, was taskedto serve as an SF liaison element tothe U.S. Marines. From aboard acircling AC-130, the SF NCO pro-vided information about locationsthroughout Mogadishu to assistthe Marines as they conducted the

16 Special Warfare

A History of SF Operations in Somalia: 1992-1995

by Colonel Joseph D. Celeski

The views expressed in this arti-cle are those of the author and donot necessarily reflect the officialpolicy or position of the UnitedStates Special Forces Command,USASOC, USSOCOM, the Depart-ment of the Army, the Departmentof Defense, or the U.S. government.

A U.S. Air Force C-130 off-loads humanitarian-relief supplies in Somalia during Operation Pro-vide Relief. The delivery of food supplies was difficult because of a lack of force protection forthe airlift personnel.

DoD photo

operation.By Jan. 31, 1992, a tenuous

cease-fire was in place, and a smallcontingent of U.N. militaryobservers had deployed to Somalia.The cease-fire was ineffective:thefts by bandits and confiscationsof relief supplies by warring clansstill posed a threat to the deliveryof relief supplies. The U.N.deployed forces in April 1992(under U.N. Security Council Reso-lution 751) to provide protection forthe U.N.-sponsored humanitarianaid and to provide a secure envi-ronment for the delivery of reliefsupplies.

When the additional observersfrom the U.N. Operation in Soma-lia, or UNOSOM, were unable toimprove the situation, PresidentGeorge Bush authorized the use ofU.S. forces to increase the airlifts offood. Operation Provide Reliefbegan Aug. 15, 1992, and endedDec. 9, 1992.

The U.S. involvement in Somaliarepresented a new use of thearmed forces as a means of resolv-ing and containing an intra-stateconflict. The mission of the jointtask force (the staff of the U.S. Cen-tral Command, or CENTCOM; andthe 1st Marine ExpeditionaryForce) was threefold: Provide airliftof humanitarian relief, providesupport services, and provide forceprotection for airlift forces.

In August 1992, elements of the2nd Battalion, 5th SF Group,deployed to Mombassa, Kenya, aspart of Operation Provide Relief.Their mission was to provide secu-rity to U.S. Air Force personnelduring humanitarian-assistanceairlift flights. The deployment con-sisted of approximately 70 person-nel: seven personnel from the 2ndBattalion’s forward operating base,FOB 52, who acted as the com-mand-and-control element; and SFB-detachment 540 with four A-detachments. To assist in the secu-

rity role, the 2nd Battalion person-nel brought along two desert-mobility vehicles, or DMVs, armedwith .50-caliber machine guns andMK-19 40 mm grenade launchers.

Air Force C-130s and C-141s flewmultiple relief flights of humanitar-ian supplies to airfields at Bardera,Baledogle, Baidoa and Kismaayo.The SF security teams loaded theirDMVs aboard Airborne BattlefieldCommand and Control Center, orABCCC, aircraft. The ABCCC C-130s circled the airfields while therelief flights were on the ground.The planes were prepared to landand provide security or to partici-pate in ground combat-search-and-rescue missions, as required.

SF medics and other team mem-bers would occasionally fly in thelanding aircraft. They conductedassessments and facilitated thetransfer of supplies by coordinat-ing with clan factions; tribal elders;the U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment; U.N. relief agencies;and personnel from nongovern-ment organizations, or NGOs.

In early October 1992, SF per-sonnel made their first landing inSomalia. A three-man survey-and-assessment team from the 2/5th SFGroup accompanied members of anAir Force engineering team intoBelet Huen. Led by CWO 3 RickDietrich, the team contacted thefactions and clan elders to work outagreements for the continued land-ing and delivery of relief supplies.On occasion, if the threat warrant-ed, the mounted SF security ele-ment would land and deploy intopositions on the airfields while theoff-loading of humanitarian sup-plies took place.

In November, the staff of the 2ndBattalion redeployed to the U.S.Company C, 2/5th SF Group, whichhad just arrived in Somalia,assumed the quick-reaction-force, orQRF, mission. The ABCCC aircraftmade two flights each day (morningand afternoon), with a two-houroverlap between the flights. A six- toeight-man QRF flew in each air-craft. Each SF team flew a morningflight one day, flew an afternoon

June 2002 17

A desert mobility vehicle of the quick-reaction force is loaded aboard a C-130. While aircraft deliv-ered food supplies, the QRF aircraft circled overhead to provide security.

Photo courtesy Ken Barriger

flight the next day, and took thethird day off. Company C’s fourdetachments flew the QRF missionsfrom Nov. 23 to Dec 28.

On Dec. 4, personnel from B-detachment 560 landed at theBaledogle airfield to provide secu-rity for Air Force engineers whowere there to conduct an airfieldassessment for follow-on landingsof forces of the 10th Mountain Divi-sion. The Americans were met bythe local Somali airfield securityforce, who greeted them by point-ing their weapons at them. Thesecurity force and the engineersdeparted the airfield.

On Dec. 10, A-detachment 565was given the mission of securingthe Baledogle airfield. Detachment565’s plan was to infiltrate its twoDMVs, its eight personnel, and anAir Force combat-control team rid-ing motorcycles, from a C-130. B-detachment 560 would conductcommand and control, and main-tain security around the aircraft onthe ground until the airfield was

secure. Two Marine Corps AH-1Cobra gunships provided air coverand relayed information about thestrength and positions of hostileforces. Once on the ground, Detach-ment 565 confiscated 27 weaponsand large quantities of ammuni-tion from the Somali airfield secu-rity force at gunpoint. The SF sol-diers found three technical vehi-cles, two jeeps equipped with 106mm recoilless rifles, and a landrover with an M-2 .50-calibermachine gun and an M-1919A4.30-caliber machine gun. The teamdisabled the 106 mm recoillessrifles and confiscated the 106 mmammunition. After the airfield wassecure, the ODB established com-mand and control in the controltower, which offered a better viewof Detachment 565’s roving vehiclesecurity force. Air Force engineersarrived to assess the asphalt sur-face of the runway. By late after-noon on Dec. 10, all elements hadreturned to Mombassa by C-130.

On Dec. 11 and 12, the team

returned to the Baledogle airfield.They did not encounter any Somaligunmen this time. The Air Forceengineers brought in heavy equip-ment to clear vegetation from thesides of both the runway and thetaxiways. On Dec. 11, Detachment565 confiscated 18 more weaponsfrom Somalis who were movingnear the airfield. On Dec. 12,Detachment 565 confiscated 10more weapons from Somalis.

On Dec. 16, Detachments 565 and564 were assigned to an airfield-security mission in Kismaayo. Thepurpose of the mission was tosecure the airfield for the landing ofcoalition Belgian peacekeepingforces. Detachment 565 confiscated18 weapons. Detachment 564 con-fiscated eight cases of small-armsammunition, rounds for a 57 mmrecoilless rifle, and two rifles.1

Restore HopeWhen clan violence continued to

interfere with UNOSOM reliefoperations, the need for expandedpeacekeeping in Somalia was clear.On Dec. 3, 1992, U.N. Resolution794 authorized “all means neces-sary to establish a secure humani-tarian assistance environment.”President Bush authorized thedeployment of U.S. forces on Opera-tion Restore Hope.2 OperationRestore Hope — called the unifiedtask force, or UNITAF — was aU.S.-led joint and multinationalforce that would use military meansto enforce the U.N. mandate.

On Dec. 9, to ensure that reliefsupplies would be delivered toMogadishu’s outlying districts andthat the lines of communicationnecessary for humanitarian reliefwould be protected, CENTCOMdeployed combat forces from theU.S. Marines, the 10th MountainDivision, and Army SOF, includingSF coalition-support teams, orCSTs, from the 1st, 3rd, 5th and

18 Special Warfare

SF soldiers of the QRF conduct a security sweep of the Baledogle airfield on Dec. 10, 1993. TheSF soldiers secured the airfleld so that Belgian peacekeeping forces could land.

Photo courtesy Ken Barriger

10th SF Groups.UNITAF was responsible for

seven major operational areas: TheFrench were in Oddur; the Canadi-ans in Belet Huen; the Australiansin Baidoa; the Italians in Buulo-Barde; the Marines in Bardera; theBelgian contingent and aninfantry-battalion task force fromthe 10th Mountain Division inKismaayo; and forces from theMarines and the 10th Mountain,along with the remaining membersof the multinational force, inMogadishu.

Members of Company C, 2ndBattalion, 5th SF Group, per-formed the first SF ground missionin Somalia. They had deployedfrom Mombassa to Belet Huen inlate December 1992 with five A-detachments to form the ArmySOF, or ARSOF, component of ajoint special-operations task force,or JSOTF, led by Special Opera-tions Command-Central, or SOC-CENT. Company C was augmentedby Detachment 526 from CompanyB, 1/5th SF Group, which wasassigned to the Marine-controlledBardera sector. As CSTs from theother SF groups arrived, therequirement for a command-and-control element larger than anadvanced operational base, orAOB, became obvious. On Jan. 12,1993, the FOB from the 2/5th onceagain deployed to Mogadishu toserve as the ARSOF headquarters.

The Marines had secured the portof Kismaayo Dec. 20, 1992. SF B-detachment 560 (with two A-detach-ments) was assigned to Kismaayo asthe special-operations command-and-control element, or SOCCE. TheSOCCE had one team located as farsouth as the Somalia-Kenya border,living with and monitoring the activ-ities of General Morgan and hisarmed clan. The team assisted in thedemobilization of Morgan’s armedsoldiers and in collecting the soldiers’weapons (a classic mission of uncon-

ventional warfare, or UW).One team in Belet Huen was reas-

signed to the town of Fer Fer (alongthe Ethiopian border) to monitorEthiopian military incursions intoSomalia and to monitor and interdictshipments of illegal arms. A-detach-ment 316 (from the 3rd SF Group)was the Moroccan CST; teams fromthe 2nd and 3rd battalions of the10th SF Group were assigned asCSTs with the Italian, German andFrench contingents.

The missions of the Army SpecialOperations Task Force, or ARSOTF,were to conduct UW by sendingteams to meet with clan leaders andby assisting the U.N. with demobi-lization efforts and weapons collec-tion; to provide force protection(countersniper and battlefield infor-mation gathering); to provide areaassessments that update intelli-gence; to provide selected CSTs toU.N. forces; to facilitate humanitar-ian activities; to conduct border sur-veillance and interdict shipments ofillegal arms; and to provide areasecurity to relief operations (includ-

ing convoy security-escort duties).A significant amount of combat

occurred in the Kismaayo sectorbetween armed Somali factionsand troops of the 10th MountainDivision. Initially, the 10th did nothave access to intelligence on theclan factions, and it requiredhuman intelligence. After coordi-nating with the intelligence assetsof the 10th, SF teams began sup-plying reconnaissance reports andarea assessments. CSTs were alsoable to provide situational aware-ness related to their clan factionsand their multinational partners.

Other missions that SF per-formed in support of the 10thMountain Division included:• Mounted reconnaissance of

remote areas in order to conductarea assessments and to makecontact with clan and factionleaders. During a recon opera-tion in March 1993, four mem-bers of a CST from Company A,2/5th, were traveling to a meet-ing of tribal elders in BeletHuen. Their vehicle struck a

June 2002 19

SF soldiers at a base camp in Belet Huen display weapons they had seized from warring Somalifactions during area-reconnaissance patrols.

Photo courtesy Joseph Celeski

mine, mortally wounding themedic and injuring the otherthree passengers. The medic,Sergeant First Class RobertDeeks, was able to treat thewounded before he died. He wasthe only SF soldier killed inaction in Somalia.

• Surveillance of the Ethiopianborder in order to report acts ofbanditry against humanitarianorganizations, to ascertain thesource of arms-smuggling, andto report incursions by Ethiopi-an forces into Somalia.

• Special reconnaissance ofnamed areas of interest in andaround Kismaayo.3SF teams were assigned to work

with all three of the major clan fac-tions — General Morgan’s, GeneralAideed’s and Colonel Jess’s — toassist in demobilizing clan fightersand to confiscate the armed fac-tions’ heavy weapons. In accom-plishing these UW tasks, the SFteams became the primary sourceof battlefield intelligence.

By the end of February 1993, theSOCCENT JSOTF had redeployed,

leaving the FOB of the 2/5th SFGroup as the commander of theARSOF component of the JTF. Theteams from the other SF groupsalso returned home, and from thattime on, SF’s Somalia involvementwas handled through a rotation ofunits from the 5th SF Group.

In mid-February, Company C,2/5th SF Group, consolidated itsteams to establish the AOB head-quarters and a base of operations onthe compound of the AmericanEmbassy in Mogadishu. For theremainder of their time in Somalia,the SF soldiers assisted in providingsecurity for food-relief operations.

Armed and mounted A-detach-ments traveled in relief columns toprovide protection from snipers andfrom looting and attack. The JTFcommander also assigned the A-detachments to perform severallong-range reconnaissance mis-sions. On those missions, thedetachments, despite carrying a fullwar-load of weapons and ammuni-tion on their DMVs, attempted toappear less threatening by assum-ing a casual posture — wearing soft

caps or Middle-Eastern style head-gear. They would enter a village,find out which clan was in chargethere, and establish a rapport thathelped to set the stage for thearrival of Marine mechanizedinfantry who would come to disarmthe locals.

Continue HopeOn April 12, 1993, the 2/5th

Group’s FOB and its organic teamsredeployed to Fort Campbell, Ky.On May 4, with food supplies flow-ing again and with more than37,000 U.N. soldiers deployed toSomalia, UNITAF passed opera-tions to the U.N.-led UNOSOM II.On May 5, the U.S. forces remain-ing under Operation Restore Hopeassumed a new mission, OperationContinue Hope, which expandedthe U.N. mandate to include opera-tions under the Title VII charter —peacemaking.

A large U.S. logistics-support ele-ment remained in Mogadishu, aswell as a U.S. QRF composed ofassets of the 10th Mountain Divi-sion. The SOCCE from Company B,1/5th SF Group, which haddeployed to Somalia in March 1993with two mounted A-detachments(523 and 525), was under the oper-ational control of the QRF. Withoutthe presence of the massive combatpower of the U.S., the warring fac-tions became more aggressive intheir activities. By early June,UNOSOM II forces in Mogadishuwere closed-up in their separatecompounds.

Prior to the assumption ofresponsibility by UNOSOM II,SOCCE 520 had conducted opera-tions during April 1993 in supportof UNITAF. Each of its area-famil-iarization missions produced valu-able intelligence for UNOSOM,CENTCOM, the Defense Intelli-gence Agency, and other govern-ment agencies. SOCCE personnel

20 Special Warfare

SF soldiers from Detachment 525 depart Mogadishu on an area-assessment mission in April1993.

Photo courtesy Dave Jesmer

met many of the indigenous lead-ers and gained an appreciation forthe terrain and operations of coali-tion forces in the areas ofKismaayo, Bardera, Baidoa,Merka, Belet Huen and Galcaio.On April 23, Detachment 525engaged in combat with militia-men from the Al-Itihad Al-Islami,or AIAI, fundamentalist Islamicorganization near Gaarbaharey.

Mounted SF teams frequentlyencountered “technicals.” The lightcivilian pickup trucks served as thearmed clansmen’s firepower-and-mobility platforms. The trucks hadbeen hastily camouflaged withspray paint, and heavy machineguns had been mounted on thetruck beds. Members of the militiawould pile onto the trucks, armedwith AK-47s, machine guns, androcket-propelled grenades, orRPGs. Many of the armed truckswere initially rented by NGOs forprotection. NGOs could not legallypay for protection with humanitar-ian funds, so they would list theirarmed guards as “technical assis-tants” on their books — thus thenickname “technicals.”

A split team from Detachment525, led by Sergeant First ClassOtto Hicks, was in the area ofBardera when the companyreceived the mission to attempt toco-opt the AIAI in the town of BelaHow into working with the U.N.The team drove its two DMVs toBela How and attempted to negoti-ate with the AIAI. When the nego-tiations failed, the team left town,followed by one technical. Whenthe two DMVs were close to friend-ly lines, Hicks decided to stop thetechnical so that the team wouldn’tbe caught between two militia fac-tions. After deploying his two vehi-cles in a wadi, Hicks and anotherNCO walked back to intercept thetechnical and to direct the Somalimilitia to stop following them. Thetechnical stopped and opened fire

while its armed militiamendeployed. The Somalis were imme-diately engaged by one of the DMVgunners, who killed the technicalgunner, disabled the truck’s .50-caliber machine gun and destroyedthe vehicle.

The Somalis suffered one deadand three wounded. There were nofriendly casualties. For their actionsthat day, several members ofDetachment 525 were recommend-ed for decorations.

In mid-May, SOCCE 520 wastasked to deploy mounted detach-ments and a liaison element toKismaayo following an outbreak offighting there. SOCCE 520 partici-pated in a combined contingencyoperation with the QRF and Bel-gians and conducted special-recon-naissance, or SR, missions in andaround Kismaayo. As warlordMohamed Farah Aideed’s anti-UNOSOM propaganda increased,SOCCE 520 also took the lead inplanning the seizure of the mainradio station in Mogadishu.

Company B, 1st Battalion, 5thSF Group, conducted force-protec-tion activities in support of UNO-SOM II. The company employedcounter snipers in static positionsat the embassy compound androamed to “hot spots” around theuniversity complex. As the situa-tion warranted, the companyextended its sniper positions toexternal areas and to U.N. strong-points throughout Mogadishu. Asone of the commanders of the 10thMountain Division task force stat-ed, “Periodically, one of our sniperteams armed with Barrett .50-cal-iber or M-24 7.62 mm sniper rifleswould observe and engage a mili-tiaman driving a technical or car-rying a crew-served weapon. Thesesnipers were lethal, and theyproved [to be] a superb deterrentagainst the movement and trans-port of militia weapons near ourcompounds. With a single shot,they could reach out and touch abelligerent at 1,000 meters, andthey did so frequently.”4

June 2002 21

SF soldiers in DMVs accompany convoys of relief supplies to provide security from attacks bybandits and warring Somali factions.


In Mogadishu, U.S. militarysnipers made shots that averaged400 meters. The rules of engage-ment for UNOSOM II were uniquein that they allowed forces toengage technicals or men who werecarrying crew-served weapons (e.g.,RPGs or machine guns) withoutprovocation. Any Somali clansmenarmed with sniper weapons (a riflewith a scope could fit the category)could also be engaged withoutprovocation. However, clansmenwho carried AK-47s but did notpoint them at U.N. forces in athreatening manner were consid-ered to be off-limits.

SF aerial snipers assisted the avi-ation assets of the 10th MountainDivision’s 2-14th Infantry Task Forcewhen they began the “Eyes OverMogadishu” program — the nearlyconstant presence of armed heli-copters over the city. Retired ColonelLawrence E. Casper, who command-ed the Falcon Brigade Task Force inMogadishu, wrote about the use ofurban snipers in his book, Falcon

Brigade: “A Special Forces soldier,equipped with night optics and aBarrett .50-caliber sniper rifle sus-pended from the troop compartmentceiling of a Black Hawk, was able toplace a couple of armor-piercingrounds through the tube of an aban-doned 120 mm mortar, rendering ituseless. The mortar crew fled inhaste upon hearing the approachinghelicopter.”5

Casper further describes thisunique employment of snipers inan urban environment, “Our heli-copter snipers also provedextremely effective. Equipped withthe Barrett, the sniper flights wereusually in concert with our ‘EyesOver Mogadishu’ night missions.The sniper aircraft (UH-60) wouldtrail the lead helicopter by about ahalf-mile. Although the aircraftwere completely blacked out, if thelead helicopter attracted groundfire, the sniper aircraft wouldobserve, acquire, and engage thetarget with the aid of night-visionaccessories. Typically, the helos

carried two teams of snipers andspotters equipped with a hand-held laser designator. The SpecialForces snipers would sit on woodenbenches in the troop compartmentwith their feet braced againstcargo straps and their rifles slungfrom the ceiling. Airborne sniperswere only employed for a couple ofmonths; we eventually ceased oper-ations because of concerns for theteams’ safety if the aircraft experi-enced a hard landing.”6

After Aideed’s militia attackedand killed several Pakistani peace-keepers in June 1993, U.N. forcestook a more aggressive role to sub-due Aideed’s influence. On June 5,personnel from SOCCE 520 accom-panied officials of the UNOSOMCeasefire and Disarmament Com-mittee on an announced forcedinspection of the so-called autho-rized weapons-storage sites. SFpersonnel assisted in the catego-rization of the various weaponsand in developing target folders forpossible use in the future. Usingthe targeting information, SOCCE520 briefed AH-1 pilots, AC-130crews and QRF commanders andstaff on all targets prior to theseizure-and-destruction operationsconducted June 12.

The first direct activities againstAideed began with AC-130 gun-ships destroying his home, hisgarage compound (a storage areafor technicals), and his clan’sweapons-storage areas. SOCCENTdeployed a JSOTF with four AC-130s and two KC-135 air-refuelingtankers to control this phase of themission. The deputy commander ofthe 5th SF Group, LieutenantColonel “Moe” Elmore, wasassigned to the headquarters ofUNOSOM II as the special-opera-tions coordination element, orSOCOORD, to enhance coordina-tion between the JSOTF and UNO-SOM. Beginning June 12, the gun-ships conducted four nights of

22 Special Warfare

Two SF snipers set up a Blackhawk helicopter prior to an aerial sniper mission as part of “EyesOver Mogadishu.” The wooden bench was taken from a U.N. dining hall.


armed-reconnaissance and direct-action operations. From June 12 toJune 17, SOCCE 520 providedground control for AC-130 strikeson selected targets in Mogadishu.

During the same period, the com-pany also provided CSTs to coali-tion forces that were conductingcordon-and-search operations atthe Aideed enclave, and it placed asniper team atop a building over-looking the Aideed compound. Dur-ing the AC-130 strikes, the Compa-ny B commander and his sniperteam were perched atop the build-ing and called for close air support,or CAS, from the AC-130s.

On the fourth night of the gun-ship attacks, UNOSOM II forcesmounted a cordon-and-search mis-sion with four multinational unitsto flush Aideed’s leadership fromhis compound, to clean upMogadishu and to reassert U.N.control. The SOCCE and its two A-detachments split into three CSTsin order to maneuver with Pak-istani, Italian and Moroccan forces.The CAS team with the Moroccantask force came under intense fireduring the operation and respond-ed upon the task-force command-er’s request with fire from MK-19grenade launchers that silencedobserved sources of enemy fire. Fol-lowing nine hours of combat, theteam’s disabled DMV was towedback to the U.S. Embassy com-pound under the supporting fire ofa counterattack by forces of theFrench Foreign Legion.

During the remainder of Juneand July, Aideed clansmen con-stantly attacked U.N. forces inretaliation for the actions early inJune. In late June, CENTCOMdirected SOCCE 520 to develop aconcept for the capture of Aideed.Major Dave Jesmer, the CompanyB commander; a British SAS offi-cer who was observing the compa-ny’s operations; and LieutenantColonel Elmore devised a plan to

capture Aideed during his vehicu-lar movements. The concept was toemploy SR teams and aerialsnipers to detect Aideed when hewas in vehicular movement, thenattack the column with Cobrasfrom the 10th Mountain Division.Upon the arrival of the MarineExpeditionary Unit, the missionwas handed over to the Marines.However, Detachment 523 contin-ued to provide an aerial sniperteam that performed aerial targetinterdiction at night. The mission,later referred to as Eyes OverMogadishu, proved to be a valuablealternative to the use of Cobra gun-ships at night. On Aug. 10, the aer-ial sniper team evaded antiaircraftfire and destroyed a Somali techni-cal armed with a 57 mm rocket podthat had been firing on the airfieldand that had killed at least twoSomali militiamen.

The security of Mogadishu deteri-orated throughout July, as was evi-denced by the increasing frequencyof attacks on the U.N. compoundsand by the ambushes of U.N. vehi-cles in the city. The danger inherentin urban guerrilla warfare was

brought home to SOCCE 520 whena two-vehicle convoy carryingElmore to the airport wasambushed not more than two milesfrom the embassy compound.

On July 23, Sergeant Major PatBallogg planned to accompanyDetachment 523 on a counter-sniper operation.7 The group,mounted in 523’s DMVs, was goingto a range area out of town to zeroweapons before moving into theoperational area. Elmore hadmissed his helicopter taxi from theembassy compound to the airfield,and the unit gave him a lift. One ofthe column’s DMVs was armedwith a MK-19 grenade launcher;the other carried a .50-caliber M-2machine gun. The trail vehicle alsohad one squad automatic weaponand an M-24 sniper weapon. Eachmember of the group had his per-sonal weapons with the basic load,as well as other ammunition for fir-ing at the range. Individuals wereprotected by Kevlar helmets and“Zinner” body armor. As a precau-tion against land mines, the DMVshad been equipped with Kevlarsoft blast blanket linings and witharmored front windows. The SFpersonnel locked and loaded theirweapons, pointed them outward,and departed the embassy com-pound around 10 a.m., choosing anunused route along side streets.

The column rounded a corneronto a straight dirt road about 300meters long. The two-story, flat-front buildings on either side of theroad left just enough room for twovehicles to pass. The street wasdeserted, and a ruined blue bus saton the left side. About 200 feetdown the road, Ballogg (in the leadvehicle) could see a side street oralley. Suddenly, Ballogg’s vehiclewas hit by two rounds: one in thecenter of each side of the armoredwindshield. The shooters were inthe blue bus. Simultaneously,armed clansmen in the alley to the

June 2002 23

The Aideed compound, following attacks byAC-130 gunships on June 12, 1993.


right opened fire. The Somalis (8-12 personnel) had AK-47s andeither threw grenades or firedRPGs (this was uncertain in theconfusion). The enemy was as closeas 14 feet, and the action took placein seconds.

Ballogg was hit in the rightshoulder and in the right hand byan AK-47 round. Pieces of one ofthe rounds that hit the windshieldcame through and inflicted addi-tional wounds on his side and inhis mouth. SFC Mike Bowers, rid-ing in the hatch position as thegunner in the lead vehicle, was hitabove the right knee and lost fourinches of his right femur.

Sergeant First Class ChuckBeebe, riding in the trail vehicle,immediately provided effectivefire, killing the Somalis who wereattempting to sweep forward to thelead vehicle. Ballogg, althoughwounded, could still use his M-16,and he returned the Somalis’ fireas Sergeant First Class LanceHoepner drove through the killzone while firing his 9 mm pistolover Ballogg’s right shoulder. The

vehicle came within five feet of theattacking Somalis.

To clear the ambush zone, thetrail vehicle backed up and fired asthe lead vehicle moved forward.Bowers was combat-ineffectivebecause of the pain of his wound.The Zinner vest kept him in theturret, and he could not get out. Hehad to stand on his injured leg.Hoepner, in the lead vehicle, droveas fast as he could to the airfield —on flat tires.

Fortunately, when the grouparrived at the airfield, a Moroccanmedical platoon was trainingthere. The Moroccans immediatelybegan to bandage the wounded SFsoldiers. Hoepner, an SF medic,took over the treatment.8 Balloggand Bowers were flown by heli-copter to the field hospital, wherethey remained for a short timebefore being transferred to Land-stuhl, Germany. They were laterawarded Purple Hearts; Hoepnerand Beebe received decorations forvalor. Bower later received the Vet-erans of the Office of Strategic Ser-vices Award as the “Operator of the

Year” in 1995 for his actions.9During early August, Detach-

ment 525 trained Malaysiansnipers, who had received newequipment just prior to theirarrival in Somalia. At the sametime, Detachment 523 intensifiedits aerial sniper coverage toinclude support for a renewedattempt by the QRF to captureAideed.

JTF-SomaliaCompany C, 3rd Battalion, 5th

SF Group, deployed on its rotationto Somalia in September 1993.Upon arrival, it assumed the ongo-ing missions from elements of the1st Battalion, 5th SF Group. Pri-marily, the B-detachment per-formed as the SOCCE to the UNO-SOM II QRF while the A-detach-ments performed traditional rolesof SR, DA and coalition-support.The employment of SF sniperteams became the primary form ofDA throughout the city, includingthe continuation of the Eyes OverMogadishu program aboard avia-tion assets of the 10th MountainDivision. Company C employedsniper teams at the embassy com-pound, at the Pakistani stadiumand on top of the soap factory. Italso had a team of snipers hiddenin a shipping container at the newport area.

CSTs operated with Pakistani,Bangladeshi, Moroccan and Egypt-ian forces at their strongpoints inthe city. These teams were instru-mental in providing daily situa-tional awareness and direct linksto AC-130 CAS, if needed. Theremaining teams were tasked withSR to ascertain the locations ofshipments of illegal weapons.

As a result of increased hostili-ties from Aideed’s warring clan fac-tion, CENTCOM deployed TFRanger to apprehend Aideed. Thatdecision resulted in the tragic

24 Special Warfare

One of the DMVs involved in the ambush in Mogadishu on July 23, 1993. Note the bullet strikeson the front and side windows.


Ranger mission and the clash withAideed’s forces on Oct. 3, 1993. Theraid by TF Ranger was just one of aseries of raids conducted through-out Mogadishu to apprehend keymembers of Aideed’s leadershipinfrastructure. Task-force Ranger’spicture-perfect air assault quicklychanged to brutal, close combatwhen members of the task forceattempted to rescue the pilots of aBlackhawk downed by RPG fire.After the battle and the subse-quent extraction of TF Ranger fromSomalia, U.S. armor units deployedto UNOSOM II under the com-mand of JTF-Somalia.

Company C, 3/5th SF Group, waspresent in Mogadishu during theOct. 3 raid by Task Force Ranger,but it did not participate in the bat-tle. The company did assist in otherways: Two of the unit’s DMVs wereon loan to the Rangers that day. Allthe company’s medics were dis-patched to the hospital to treat thetask force’s wounded, and othermembers of the company reportedto the hospital to give blood. Lieu-tenant Colonel John Holcombe, thesurgeon general of the 46th CombatSupport Hospital in Mogadishu,later remarked, “The SOF medicstreated every casualty correctly.They made tough medical decisions.They ran out of supplies. They didan outstanding job. They were very,very good.”

Immediately after the raid, SOC-CENT was ordered back intoMogadishu to form the JSOTF-Somalia under an expanded U.S.military presence, JTF-Somalia.Company C, 3/5th SF Group, wasplaced under the operational con-trol of the JSOTF. The companycommander was assigned the mis-sion of forming a sniper task forcecomposed of organic SF, NavySEALs from the carrier battlegroup, and Marine snipers fromthe 13th Marine ExpeditionaryUnit. These snipers were deployed

to positions around the city to pro-vide force protection.

The snipers carried out severalsuccessful engagements, includinga shot taken by SF snipers at thePakistani stadium on a technical ata range of 900 meters. Throughoutthe remainder of October and intomid-December, SOF snipers count-ed more than 26 successful engage-ments on armed clansmen.

Company C performed other mis-sions, such as providing armedescorts for U.S. Air Force personnelwho were performing airfieldassessments on airfields in Bale-dogle, Baidoa and Kismaayo. Thecompany also performed humani-tarian activities — mainly deliver-ing school supplies and clothing toSomali children in various safe sub-urbs of Mogadishu. For a short peri-od of time, one SF detachment per-formed foreign internal defensewith an element from the UnitedArab Emirates. The UAE contin-gent had received new sniper

weapons, and SF personnel formedan impromptu mobile training teamto teach the UAE soldiers about theweapons system and about theemployment of urban snipers.

The withdrawalWhen the drawdown of U.S. forces

began in mid-December 1993, theJSOTF-Somalia began a phasedwithdrawal to the environs of the air-field. Company C, 3/5th SF Group,with its six teams and an additionalA-detachment from the 1/5th SFGroup, withdrew from the embassycompound to sniper positions sur-rounding the airfield and old portarea. One team remained at the uni-versity compound to provide force-protection for U.S. logistics units.More than six sniper engagementsoccurred during this period, involvingSomali hostiles equipped with RPGsor crew-served weapons. The JSOTFcontinued to provide armed recon-naissance missions over Mogadishu

June 2002 25

Members of Company C, 3/5th SF Group, distribute school supplies and children’s clothing dur-ing a humanitarian-assistance mission.


nightly with the AC-130s.On Jan. 15, with the arrival of

the B-detachment headquartersfrom 1/5th SF Group, Company Credeployed. As the mission contin-ued to draw down, the Marineswere given the responsibility forproviding a presence on theperimeter of the airfield, and theremaining SF contingents in the-ater redeployed home. By March,the Marines had relinquishedresponsibility to the Egyptianforces under UNOSOM II. The U.S.Congress mandated the withdraw-al of all U.S. troops from Somaliaby March 31, 1994, and the JSOTFheadquarters and staff withdrewto Mombassa. They returned to theU.S. in April.

NEO SomaliaAs UNOSOM II forces began to

withdraw and to downsize afterAmerican forces had withdrawn, itwas feared that the Somali clanswould once again assume their bel-ligerent posture toward the U.N. InApril 1994, the commander of U.S.Central Command tasked SOC-CENT to be prepared to conduct anNEO in the coming months.

As the situation deteriorated inthe fall of 1994, the USLO inMogadishu felt it prudent toremove the bulk of the 150 or soAmerican citizens from Moga-dishu. In September, SOCCENTwas tasked to assist with a low-key, semi-permissive NEO of theUSLO in Mogadishu. It formed asmall JSOTF with AC-130 gun-ships to provide overhead CAPduring the operation to evacuatethe Americans through the west-ern portion of Mogadishu. TheAmericans were collected,processed and moved to the air-field via an old airport bypassroad outside of town. From theMogadishu airfield (still UNO-SOM II-controlled), they were

flown to safe havens in Kenya.The NEO was conducted withoutincident.

Operation United ShieldIn January 1995, Combined Task

Force United Shield, formed fromthe 1st Marine ExpeditionaryForce, was given the mission toassist in the withdrawal of allUNOSOM II forces fromMogadishu. SOCCENT was alertedand began planning for the missionSept. 30, 1994. In early January1995, SOF planners deployed toCamp Pendleton, Calif., andbriefed the JTF commander, Lieu-tenant General Zinni, to gain hisapproval for the SOF portion of theoperations plan.

The JSOTF United Shield wasformed to conduct operations fromJan. 9 through March 10, 1995. TheJSOTF headquarters was formedfrom members of the SOCCENTstaff, augmented by a senior war-rant officer and NCOs from the1/5th SF Group. The JSOTF also

had an Air Force detachment ofAC-130s and KC-135s from the16th Special Operations Squadron,headquartered at the MombassaAirport.

From Jan. 26 to Jan. 28, theJSOTF deployed to Mombassa. Inearly February, the USS BelleauWood, with the 23rd Marine Expe-ditionary Unit, or MEU, steamednorth from Mombassa, rehearsingamphibious assaults along the coastof Kenya. The commander of the1/5th SF Group (who was theARSOTF commander) and his S3were the SOCOORD to the MEU.Company B of the 1/5th and four ofits A-detachments, deploying asCSTs, were on board. Aboard ship,SF teams joined with civilian sub-ject-matter experts to teach theMarines nonlethal means of combatfor use against the Somalis. The A-detachments learned to use stickyfoam, beanbag rounds, weapon-firednets, etc., and then instructed theMarines in their use. The JTF com-mander was interested in employ-ing nonlethal weapons to avoid an

26 Special Warfare

Mounted teams from Company B, 1/5th SF Group, aboard the USS Belleau Wood at the port ofMombassa, Kenya. The ship was en route to Mogadishu.

Photo courtesy Rickie Young

all-out firefight.The SF advanced operating base,

or AOB, and three CSTs wentashore via Marine hovercraft inmid-February, approximately twoweeks ahead of the Marines’ relief-in-place of the remaining UNO-SOM II forces. One CST was heldin reserve, to provide guides asrequired, or to act as a CST forwithdrawing Pakistani andBangladeshi units. An Air Forcecombat-control team went ashorewith the AOB to provide air trafficcontrol for evacuation aircraft, aswell as to provide additional con-trol of JTF aircraft overMogadishu.

The CSTs linked up with theirPakistani and Bangladeshi coun-terparts, made detailed sectorsketches, performed tacticalrecons, and conducted rehearsalsfor the upcoming relief-in-place bythe Marines. The CSTs maintainedcontact with their counterparts tofacilitate the Marines’ comingashore. The relief-in-place beganFeb. 27, 1995. The CSTs passedtheir sector sketches and their areainformation to the Marines as theycame ashore.

On Feb. 27 and 28, the AOB andthe CSTs moved their vehicles andequipment back to the BelleauWood. The members of both the B-detachment and the A-detach-ments exfiltrated with the Marineelements on March 1. The JTF leftthe beach March 2, without inci-dent. Lieutenant General Zinniwas the last Marine off the beach.By March 3, all units had steamedout of the operational waters ofSomalia. The task force returned toMombassa, and Operation UnitedShield was over. The assets of the5th SF Group conducted redeploy-ment activities throughout earlyMarch, and all forces were back atFort Campbell by March 10,1995.

Colonel Joseph D.Celeski is commanderof the 3rd SpecialForces Group. His pre-vious assignment wasdeputy commander,U.S. Army SpecialForces Command. Colonel Celeskienlisted in the Army in 1974. In 1978,he graduated from Army OfficerCandidate School and was commis-sioned as an armor officer. In 1983,Colonel Celeski completed the SFQualification Course and wasassigned to the 5th SF Group as adetachment commander. His otherassignments in the 5th Groupinclude company commander, battal-ion S3, group S3, and battalion com-mander. Colonel Celeski has alsoserved as adviser to the Royal Jor-danian 1st Armor Battalion; as theJ3 ground operations officer and asthe deputy J5 for plans in the SpecialOperations Command-Central; asG3 and as chief of staff with the U.S.Army SF Command; and as com-mander of the Combined Joint Spe-cial Operations Task Force in Saraje-vo, in support of NATO’s OperationJoint Forge. Colonel Celeski is agraduate of the Armor OfficerAdvanced Course, the Infantry Offi-cer Advanced Course, the MarineAmphibious Warfare Course, theArmy Command and General StaffCollege, the Air Force Command andGeneral Staff College, the ArmedForces Staff College, the Army WarCollege and the Army Force Manage-ment Course. He holds a bachelor’sdegree in political science fromColumbus College and a master’sdegree in public administration fromShippensburg University.

Notes:1 Written summary provided by Master

Sergeant Ken Barriger, February 2002.2 “United States Special Operations Com-

mand History,” USSOCOM History andResearch Office, MacDill AFB, Fla., Septem-ber 1998, 44-48.

3 “US Army Forces, Somalia,” 10th Moun-tain Division After Action Report, Summa-ry, Headquarters 10th Mountain Division,Fort Drum, N.Y., 2 June 1993.

4 Lawrence E. Casper, Falcon Brigade:Combat and Command in Somalia andHaiti (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Reiner Publish-ers, 2001), 133.

5 Casper, Falcon Brigade, 96.6 Casper, Falcon Brigade, 133-34.7 Interview with Command Sergeant

Major Pat Ballogg, 4 February 2002.8 “The … true hero in the ambush was SFC

Lance Hoepner, who had the presence ofmind to call in a SITREP to me enabling usto get a MEDEVAC to the airport and aCobra gunship in the air, return fire withhis 9 mm and get the damaged vehicle outof the kill zone. Once at the airfield, he wasthe one to treat our two casualties in thevehicle.” E-mail from Lieutenant ColonelDave Jesmer, 27 February 2002.

9 The story as related, courtesy of CSM PatBallogg.

June 2002 27

From August 2000 until December2001, elements of the 3rd SpecialForces Group, in coordination with

the United States Department of State,deployed to western Africa to train units ofthree countries as part of Operation FocusRelief, or OFR.

The Focus Relief initiative was firstannounced by President Bill Clinton in anaddress to the Nigerian National Assembly

in August 2000. Theoperation’s primarygoal was to equipand train as manyas seven battalionsof soldiers fromNigeria, Ghana andSenegal to conductpeace-enforcementoperations in SierraLeone, where rebelsof the Revolution-ary United Front,

or RUF, were battling United Nationspeacekeepers and the government of SierraLeone over control of that country’s dia-mond mines.

Another goal of OFR was to rebuild rela-tions with the Nigerian military and to helpimprove its effectiveness. Until May 1999,when President Olusegun Obasanjo waselected and Nigeria was returned to civilianrule, the country had spent 16 years undera military government, and it was trying tore-establish its military forces. As part of

OFR, the U.S. extended a $66 million mili-tary-aid-and-training package to Nigeria, ofwhich $20 million was to be used for a mili-tary training program.

The 3rd SF Group’s primary goal was todevelop and implement a program toinstruct soldiers of Nigeria, Ghana andSenegal in the tactics and techniques ofcombat operations that they would need incombating the RUF. The 3rd SF Groupdelivered nearly seven battalions’ worth ofuniforms, medical equipment, communica-tion systems, rifles, mortars, machine guns,ammunition, and light-wheeled noncombatvehicles to the three nations.

On Aug. 23, 2000, the first of the 3rd SFGroup’s soldiers in Nigeria, A-detachment353, established a medical mobile trainingteam, or MTT. In addition to training near-ly 100 Nigerian soldiers in combat lifesav-ing techniques used for preventing shockand for stabilizing and evacuating injuredor wounded people, the MTT began build-ing rapport with the Nigerian soldiers.That rapport would be beneficial later on,when the 3rd SF Group would begin train-ing Nigerian infantry battalions.

On Oct. 9, 2000, 250 members of the 3rdGroup’s 2nd Battalion began the first 10-week OFR training rotation, in Nigeria.The Nigerian 26th and 195th motorizedinfantry battalions (from Sokoto andIbadan) participated in training thatfocused on individual and collective combattasks that would be required in conducting

28 Special Warfare

Operation Focus Relief: 3rd SF GroupBuilds Relations in Western Africa

A soldier from the 3rd SFGroup trains a Nigeriansoldier in combat lifesav-ing techniques duringOperation Focus Relief inAugust 2000.

Photo by J.B. Keefer

company-level offensive and defensivecombat operations against the RUF inSierra Leone. The training was alsodesigned to build up the capabilities ofcombat-support units and to strengthencompany-level command and control. Theprogram of instruction, or POI, had beenvetted by both the U.N. and the Depart-ment of State.

During the training rotation, each Niger-ian soldier received uniforms, load-bearingequipment, a Kevlar helmet, a poncho, can-teens, an entrenching tool and a new rifle.The 2nd Battalion trained more than 1,200soldiers. Lieutenant Colonel Dino Roth,commander of the 2nd Battalion, said theNigerian soldiers were willing and eager tolearn. The greatest problem for U.S. andNigerian soldiers was the heat — tempera-tures ranged from 88 to 95 degrees. Withthe majority of training taking place onrifle ranges and mortar ranges, water sup-plies were a major concern. Ceremonieswere held in mid-December 2000 to cele-brate the end of OFR I. Many Nigerian dig-nitaries praised the success of the trainingand thanked the soldiers of the 2nd Battal-ion, 3rd SFG, for a job well-done.

On May 29, 2000, the 3rd Group’s 1st

Battalion, commanded by LieutenantColonel Jay Glover, began the second train-ing rotation, OFR II, in Ghana and in Sene-gal. The 1st Battalion’s Forward Opera-tional Base, or FOB, 31 was located inAccra, Ghana. FOB 31’s Advanced Opera-tional Base, or AOB, 310 instructed onebattalion of Ghanaian infantrymen, whileAOB 330 instructed one battalion of Sene-galese infantrymen in Theis, Senegal.

OFR II taught the same 10-week POIthat had been used during OFR I. BothGhana and Senegal provided a 750-manbattalion, continuing the strenuous train-ing during possibly the worst months of theyear. The weather fluctuated from hot tohotter, increasing the number of heat casu-alties. Both battalions graduated early inAugust, providing two additional battal-ions for peace-enforcement duties in SierraLeone.

OFR III was the largest of the three rota-tions. Elements of the 3rd Group’s 3rd Bat-talion, which was commanded by Lieu-tenant Colonel Timothy Sherwood, con-ducted the training from Sept. 17 to Dec.15, 2001. The 3rd Battalion trained threeNigerian battalions — more than 2,200 sol-diers — at four locations in Nigeria: Abuja,

June 2002 29

Photo by David D. Underwood Jr.

Soldiers from the 1st Bat-talion, 3rd SF Group, issueweapons to Senegalesesoldiers who are receivingsmall-arms training aspart of Operation FocusRelief.

where FOB 33 provided command and con-trol for the three other locations; Ilorin,where AOB 370 trained the 222nd Niger-ian Infantry Battalion; Serti, where AOB380 trained the 20th Nigerian InfantryBattalion; and Bernin Kebbi, where AOB390 trained the 1st Nigerian Infantry Bat-talion. Training for all three Nigerian bat-talions followed the 10-week POI that had

been used during the previous OFR rota-tions. According to the U.S. Ambassador toNigeria, Howard F. Jeter, OFR III facilitat-ed an unprecedented level of cooperation,rapport and interoperability between thegovernment of Nigeria, the Nigerian Min-istry of Defense and the U.S. Embassy.

FOB 33 was the first U.S. Army unit todeploy with the Joint Base Station, or JBS,and to integrate the JBS into its communi-cations package. JBS allowed the FOB toconnect to SIPR and NIPR nets and tooperate DSN phone lines. The JBS provid-ed communications with the SCAMP radio,which transmitted secure high-frequencycommunications to the AOBs and to the3rd SF Group base operations at FortBragg, N.C.

Each AOB developed excellent rapportwith the Nigerian battalion it was train-

ing, resulting in outstanding host-nationparticipation and cooperation in the train-ing program. Each OFR rotation endedwith a field-training exercise that maxi-mized the participation of the host-nationmilitary forces.

OFR owes its success to the men of the3rd SF Group. Each battalion in the 3rd SFGroup deployed its entire FOB into theatre,providing command and control, logisticssupport, and internal and external commu-nications for seven AOBs and 28 A-detach-ments. Each battalion was responsible fortraining more than 1,500 soldiers, for moni-toring their progress and for providing anynecessary remedial training. The teammembers taught the classes and issued theequipment.

Addressing the soldiers of his company,Major David Duffy, commander of Compa-ny B, 3/3rd SF Group, said, “The hard workand effort you have put into the last 10weeks of training … have been remark-able. The cooperation, camaraderie andprofessionalism demonstrated every day ofthe training period have been nothing lessthan phenomenal.”

This article was written by members ofthe 3rd Special Forces Group.

30 Special Warfare

Photo by Jim Hampshire

A Nigerian battalioncommander thanks thesoldiers from the 3rd SFGroup who trained hissoldiers during Opera-tion Focus Relief.

While America was being rocked bythe tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001,a group of Special Forces medical

sergeants and other medical personnel fromthe 19th Special Forces Group were trainingin one of the most remote areas of the world,Mongolia, as part of Exercise BalanceMagic. Far from the 21st-century technologythat is available in the United States, thesoldiers gained a unique insight into thepractice of unconventional medicine.

Eight SF medical NCOs, the 19th SFGroup surgeon, the 19th SF Group dentist,the former 19th SF Group surgeon and the20th SF Group veterinarian, along with per-sonnel from the 426th Civil Affairs Battalion,trained in Mongolia to improve their skills inobstetrics (childbirth), in dental care and inveterinary medicine — skills that are criticalin unconventional warfare, or UW. The exer-cise was supported by a dedicated C-130 fromthe U.S. Air Force’s 353rd Special OperationsGroup. In addition, personnel from the 19thGroup performed an airborne operation withthe Mongolian defense forces, making theexercise truly a joint-combined event.

The medical focus of Exercise BalanceMagic required SF medical NCOs to devel-op their skills in non-trauma subspecial-ties — veterinary, dental and obstetric —that are difficult for SF medics to acquirein the U.S. The goals in those skill areasare outlined in the 18D scope of practice,formulated by the surgeon’s office of theU.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Because 18Ds now have to meet a para-medic requirement, more than 90 percentof the 18D refresher medical training dur-ing the last three years has been devoted totrauma. But in deployments for UW, asdetachments gain and maintain rapportwith the local population, many of thedemands placed on SF medics will involvethe non-trauma subspecialties.

MongoliaMongolia offers a unique training envi-

ronment. Its terrain is mostly open plainsor steppe, but about 10 percent of the ter-

June 2002 31

Exercise Balance Magic: 19th SF Group Practices Medicine in the Heart of Asia

The 19th SF Group’s dentist talks with a local horsemanduring Exercise Balance Magic, conducted in Mongoliain 2001.

U.S. Army photo

rain is forest. Mongolia’s average altitudeis more than 5,000 feet above groundlevel, and its average annual temperatureis below freezing. The population of 2.5million is predominantly Mongol, but thecountry has many minority groups, suchas Kazakhs and Uzbecks. Forty percent ofMongolians are under the age of 15.Almost half of the people of Mongolia livein the capital city of Ulaanbaatar.

Agriculture and livestock are Mongo-lia’s economic foundation, but the growingdevelopment of the country’s vast mineralresources will drive Mongolia’s growth inthe future. Foreign investment is encour-aged, and Mongolians welcome Americanswarmly. The Mongolian language is diffi-cult to master. The U.S. Army’s only Mon-golian speaker, a member of the UtahNational Guard’s 300th Military Intelli-gence Battalion, accompanied the missionto provide crucial language support. Civil-ian-contract translators also providedvaluable assistance, making it possible forthe SF medics to conduct training at dif-ferent locations simultaneously.

ObstetricsThe obstetrics portion of the medical

mission required all eight SF medics toperform at least one hands-on delivery(most medics performed more), and sever-al of the NCOs observed other procedures,such as Caesarean sections. The obstetricstraining was conducted in Ulaanbaatar atthe 1st Woman’s Hospital, which averages

15 deliveries a day and accounts for 45percent of the babies born in the city eachyear. By the end of the mission, the medicshad performed 20 deliveries, had observedanother 100, and had examined and caredfor 34 newborns. The two physicians haddelivered two babies under primitive con-ditions, and they had observed three Cae-sarean sections and a hysterectomy.

Dental trainingThe purpose of the dental training was

to allow the SF medics to develop theskills needed to provide emergency dentalcare to team members and to providebasic dental care to the local population.Training included diagnosis and treat-ment of simple and complex dental prob-lems (including oral infections andabscesses, extractions, and simplerestorations). The training was conductedin Ulaanbataar, at the oral and maxillofa-cial clinic of the Central University Hos-pital, the main teaching hospital for theNational Medical University of Mongolia.By mission’s end, the medics had treated122 patients and had performed 241extractions. Their training experience inthe oral clinic was unique: All the casesinvolved complex extractions, and thepatients had been referred by other facili-ties. The objective was for the 18Ds toacquire as much experience as possible.Fortunately, the doctors had sufficienttime to allow the NCOs to perform the

32 Special Warfare

A medical NCO from the 19th SF Group assists a Mon-golian dentist. NCOs performed fillings, extractions andother dental procedures.

U.S. Army photo

Medical NCOs from the 19th SF Group assist the 19thSF Group surgeon and Mongolian medical personnel inperforming a Caesarean section.

U.S. Army photo

extractions themselves and to workthrough most of the complications thatthey encountered.

Veterinary medicineWith the help of the School of Veteri-

nary Science and Biotechnology at theMongolian State University of Agricul-ture, medics participated in hands-onprocedures with horses, cattle, sheep andgoats. During the training, the medicsperformed physical exams, selected meth-ods of animal restraint, made casts andadministered medication (including vac-cinating and deworming 250 sheep and25 horses). The medics encounteredadvanced cases involving canine kerato-conjuntivitis and ulceration, canine trau-matic injury with multiple orthopedicinjuries, and infectious respiratory dis-eases of sheep. Additional classes andpractical exercises taught the SF medicssubjects such as foodborne diseases andcarcass evaluation.

While the primary mission of the SFmedic is to preserve the health of theteam, knowledge of veterinary care isinvaluable in extended or UW operations,where animals play a key role either bytransporting equipment or from their rolein the economic stability of a community.Many of the medical skills that are nec-essary for the treatment of humans aresimilar to the skills needed for the treat-ment of animals. Veterinary traininggives SF medics additional practice andexperience that will strengthen theirdiagnostic and treatment skills forhuman patients as well.

Throughout the exercise, the team aug-mented the hands-on exercises with lec-tures to ensure that medics understoodthe theoretical basis for the treatment.Exposure to highly competent Mongolianhealth-care personnel, who are well-trained in Russian-style medicine, andtime spent working with the group den-tist and the group surgeon gave the 19thSF Group medics unique insights into thepractice of low-technology medicine in arugged and austere environment. Theskills the medics acquired will be critical-

ly important to success in UW, and toestablishing trust with indigenous forces.The exercise also set the stage for furthertraining with the Mongolian militaryforces during 2002.

This article was written by the medicalstaff of the 19th Special Forces Group.

June 2002 33

An SF medical NCO performs a veterinary medicalinspection on Mongolian livestock during OperationBalance Magic.

U.S. Army photo

The liberation of the city of Mazar-eSharif in northern Afghanistan on Nov.10, 2001, marked the first major mili-

tary victory of Operation Enduring Freedomand boosted the confidence of the NorthernAlliance. The liberation heralded the defeatand the collapse of the Taliban, not only innorthern Afghanistan, but throughout

Afghanistan.After the libera-

tion of Mazar-eSharif, the Talibansuffered defeat afterdefeat at the handsof opposition forcesthat were integrat-ed with UnitedStates Special For-ces detachments.The success of theopposition forces notonly vindicated the

strategic choices made by the U.S. nationalleadership, it also demonstrated the power,viability and full-spectrum utility of U.S.Army Special Forces and the relevance ofSF’s role in unconventional warfare, or UW,in the 21st century.

Moving forward to our pastOn Aug. 10, 2000, the commanding gener-

al of the U.S. Army Special Forces Commandissued a memorandum stating that SF wouldreturn to its core mission of UW. In that

memo, he stated, “Unconventional Warfare isthe umbrella mission for everything we do.”Only 13 months later, elements of the 5th SFGroup participated in the liberation ofMazar-e Sharif, after fighting one of the mostunusual campaigns in the history of UW. Thepast was indeed prelude.

BackgroundMazar-e Sharif, the second largest city

in Afghanistan, is the cultural, economic,religious and strategic center of northernAfghanistan. The magnificent BlueMosque at the center of the city isbelieved to be the burial place of Ali, thecousin and son-in-law of Mohammed andthe fourth Caliph of Islam. The city wasonce a waypoint on the ancient Silk Road,and it boasts an ethnically diverse popu-lation of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras andPashtuns. Because it has the longest air-field runway in Afghanistan, and becauseof its proximity to Freedom Bridge, aroad/rail bridge that spans the AmuDarya River between Afghanistan andUzbekistan, Mazar-e Sharif is also amajor economic hub.

Mazar-e Sharif served as a strategicallyvital Soviet base during the 1980s. Duringthe late 1990s, the city was the scene of bitterinternal fighting, and it changed hands sev-eral times. A militia under General AbdulRashid Dostum, an Afghan of Uzbek ethnici-ty who served as an officer during the com-

34 Special Warfare

The Liberation of Mazar-e Sharif: 5th SFGroup Conducts UW in Afghanistan

General Abdul RashidDostum, leader of thelargest Afghan faction ofthe Northern Alliance.

DoD photo

munist regime of Najibullah, had controlledmuch of Northern Afghanistan since 1992.However, Dostum had been forced to fleeAfghanistan in May 1997 when some of hissubordinates betrayed him and joined forceswith the Taliban. An uprising by ethnic Haz-aras forced the Taliban from Mazar-e Sharifafter only five days, but it also led to fightingbetween the militia forces of the Uzbeks andthe Hazaras.

Although Mazar-e Sharif had beenspared the shelling that devastated othermajor cities in Afghanistan, thousands diedas the Taliban and factions of the NorthernAlliance struggled to control the city. Thedead included 11 Iranian diplomats and anuntold number of Hazaras who were mas-sacred when the Taliban seized the cityAug. 8, 1998. When the city fell, the rem-nants of the Northern Alliance forces, rep-resenting three of the major factions, with-drew southward through the Balkh Valleyto strongholds in the mountains. Thelargest faction was the predominantlyAfghan-Uzbek Jumbish Milli Islami forces,commanded by General Dostum. GeneralMohammed Atta commanded the mainlyAfghan-Tajik Jamiat-e Islami forces, andHaji Mohammed Mohaqqeq led the Hazaraforces of Hizb-e Wahdat. Although the fac-tions were relatively secure in the steepmountains and deep river valleys, theywere effectively cut off from nearly all

external support. They remained isolated,poorly equipped and struggling to survive,until early November 2001.

Combat operationsOn Oct. 20, 2001, the first SF element

(Detachment 595) infiltrated the Darya-eSuf valley, whose rugged terrain providedthe Northern Alliance forces with a sanctu-ary approximately 110 kilometers south ofMazar-e Sharif. After linking up with Gen-eral Dostum, the detachment immediatelybegan an assessment of the situation andbegan preparing for offensive action againstthe Taliban.

During the next two weeks, Detachment595 continued its assessment and begandirecting a series of airstrikes against theTaliban forces to the north. With bothNorthern Alliance and Taliban forces wide-ly dispersed, it was sometimes necessaryfor the detachment to split into multiplecells. In order to move effectively on thebattlefield, the detachment, which had noorganic means of mobility, adopted indige-nous methods of transportation. Despite arelative lack of experience on horseback,especially in difficult terrain and at night,the detachment borrowed horses andmules from General Dostum’s horse-mounted forces. Using horses and mules astheir primary means of battlefield move-

June 2002 35

Despite its relative lack ofexperience on horseback,A-detachment 595, whichhad no organic mobilityassets, borrowed horsesand mules from GeneralDostum’s horse-mountedforces.

DoD photo

ment, the SF soldiers achieved a level ofbattlefield mobility that, in the inhos-pitable terrain, was unmatched by anymotorized vehicle.

The success of the initial airstrikes pro-vided the Northern Alliance forces an oppor-tunity to begin pushing northwest towardthe Balkh Valley. But the ill-equippedNorthern Alliance forces lacked the armsand ammunition necessary for a sustainedoffensive. Their ability to defend against aTaliban counterattack after they hadmounted an offensive operation was prob-lematic at best. Although the Northern

Alliance forces had received limited sup-plies of blankets, rice and horse feed, theexpected deliveries of arms and ammuni-tion had not yet arrived. Furthermore, assurviving Taliban forces regrouped and con-centrated their defenses, it became more dif-ficult for the Northern Alliance to advance.

In preparation for an expanded SF pres-ence and in anticipation of a protractedcampaign, ODC 53, a small command-and-control element, infiltrated Darya Suf Nov.2, 2001. This eight-man element, composedof SF soldiers and personnel from U.S. AirForce special-tactics squadrons, was taskedto provide high-level liaison with GeneralDostum, to assist in operational planningand to provide command and control forthe expanded SF presence. Two days later,A-detachment 534 infiltrated at Darya-eBalkh, which is located approximately 40kilometers west of Darya Suf, and linkedup with Jamiat-e Islami forces under Gen-eral Mohammed Atta.

The three SF elements, working in concert,would assist the Northern Alliance forces inthe critical battle for Mazar-e Sharif. Despite

their past differences, the three Afghan fac-tions had agreed to cooperate in order toachieve their shared goal of liberatingMazar-e Sharif. Furthermore, all the Afghanfactions had agreed to nominally subordinatetheir forces to General Dostum. This cooper-ation, while welcome and necessary, requireda great deal of coordination to synchronizethe maneuver of ground forces and, mostimportantly, to prevent fratricide.

Few of the factional commanders, at anylevel, possessed any experience in the con-duct of large coordinated offensives. Mostwere extremely proficient at performingsmall-unit actions. But combining theirforces (three separate and distinct majorformations and numerous subordinate com-mands) into a coordinated offensive underone major formation was clearly unchartedterritory and a distinct challenge.

Except for the senior commanders, theforces of the Northern Alliance lacked a reli-able means of battlefield communication.Their communication systems, mainly two-way radios, had no interoperability withthose of U.S. forces. Furthermore, the multi-ple subordinate commanders, many of whomhad never been trained in map-reading,lacked any means of tracking and reportingtheir locations as the offensive progressed.

Finally, because the disparate forceslacked any semblance of a uniform, visualidentification, particularly at long dis-tances, was nearly impossible. The tasks ofpreventing fratricide and synchronizingmultiple combat elements fell to the SFdetachments. The SF detachments weresplit into sub-elements — three-man cellsin many instances — so that they couldsupport as many commanders as possibleand provide accurate reporting on theprogress of the battle.

The planned offensive called for simulta-neous attacks through the Darya BalkhRiver valley in the west and through theDarya Suf River valley in the east. Theadvancing forces would meet at the conflu-ence of the two rivers. At the southern edgeof the Balkh Valley, where the steep moun-tain passes give way to fertile plains, theforces of Dostum and Atta would attack onaxes parallel to the Tangi Gap. Mohaqqeqforces would conduct supporting attacks in

36 Special Warfare

Except for the senior commanders, the forces ofthe Northern Alliance lacked a reliable means ofbattlefield communication. … Furthermore, themultiple subordinate commanders, many ofwhom had never been trained in map-reading,lacked any means of tracking and reporting theirlocations as the offensive progressed.

the east to screen Dostum’s flank. All threeforces would join for an assault on theheavily mined and well-defended TangiGap. Once they passed through the gap,the city of Mazar-e Sharif would lie 40 kilo-meters to the north.

Dostum had boldly declared that the cityof Shulgerah, centrally located in theBalkh Valley, was key to controlling north-ern Afghanistan, and that once Shulgerahfell, Mazar-e Sharif and the six northernprovinces would fall like dominoes. Dostumbelieved that his forces required only suffi-cient arms, ammunition and air support.But given the stiff resistance of the Talibanand the tentative advances of the NorthernAlliance forces, Dostum’s claims appearedto be far from a sure bet.

The diligent efforts of the SF detach-ments, their interagency partners and theAir Force personnel provided the arms,ammunition and air support, and theoffensive began Nov. 5, 2001, with an MC-130 delivering two BLU-82 15,000-poundbombs. In the west, Atta’s forces had seizedthe village of Akopruk with little resist-ance as local Taliban forces surrendered

and pledged allegiance to the NorthernAlliance. That victory was short-lived, how-ever. In a stunning turnabout, the sameTaliban forces attacked Atta’s forces asthey entered Akopruk. The surprise attackforced the stunned Jamiat forces to with-draw and regroup.

The battle resumed Nov. 6. In the east,after a rapid initial advance facilitated bydevastatingly accurate airstrikes, Dostum’sand Mohaqqeq’s forces stalled near the vil-lage of Boi Becha, where a series of well-defended Taliban positions controlled keyavenues of approach. In one instance, theTaliban mounted a counterattack and near-ly overran a position manned by three mem-bers of Detachment 595. The team membersmaintained their position and calmly direct-ed airstrikes, preventing a serious setbackfor the Northern Alliance offensive.

Meanwhile, precision airstrikes againstthe Taliban positions in Boi Becha had seri-ously weakened the Taliban defenses, but theairstrikes had failed to dislodge the defend-ers. Throughout the day, Dostum’s cavalryhad massed behind the ridges to the east ofthe village. As the sun began to set, the cav-

June 2002 37

Not all members of theNorthern Alliance werelucky enough to havemotorized transportation.General Dostum’s forcesused horses and mulesas their primary meansof battlefield movement.

DoD photo

alry mounted a charge. Hundreds of horse-men, firing their rifles while at a full gallop,assaulted the Taliban positions.The first cav-alry attack of the 21st century, facilitated bySF-directed airstrikes, sent the stunned Tal-iban forces fleeing, and the morale of theNorthern Alliance forces soared.

While Dostum’s forces were engagedaround Boi Becha, Atta’s forces were

engaged in a fierce battle to retake Ako-pruk. Again, airstrikes directed by teams ofSF soldiers facilitated the ground action ofthe Northern Alliance. The NorthernAlliance forces made a series of rapidadvances through the Balkh Valley againstTaliban forces. Despite being reinforced bythousands of volunteers from Pakistanimadrassas and by contingents of al-Qaedaforces, the Taliban were in a headlong

retreat toward the Tangi Gap.By Nov. 9, the retreating Taliban forces had

reorganized, and they concentrated theirdefense on the key terrain around the TangiGap. While his forces advanced, Dostum com-municated not only with his commanders butalso with Taliban commanders throughoutnorthern Afghanistan. Using an internationalmaritime satellite telephone powered by carbatteries and solar panels, Dostum, in keepingwith Afghan tradition, negotiated with Tal-iban commanders in every northern provincefor their surrenders and for their loyalty.Although negotiations with some Talibancommanders were successful, other command-ers resisted, particularly those who had closeties to the Kandaharis and to al-Qaeda.

The Afghan tradition of surrender andtransfer of loyalty is not unlike what the U.S.experienced during the Civil War, with pris-oner exchanges, paroles and pardons. TheAfghans, in keeping with their custom,expect soldiers who have surrendered toabide by the conditions of their surrenderagreement and to behave honorably. But thevast numbers of Arabs, Pakistanis,Chechens, Uighers and other foreign nation-als who were members of al-Qaeda ignoredthe Afghan custom. They used individualsurrenders as a means of furthering theircause, often creating treacherous conditions.

The final push began early on the morn-ing of Nov. 9, with Northern Alliance forcesmassing near the Tangi Gap. The Talibanforces were well-positioned around the nar-row, heavily mined gap, and they were sup-ported by rockets and artillery. Once again,teams of SF soldiers, moving around thebattlefield and directing airstrikes againstTaliban positions, helped establish the con-ditions necessary for successful groundassaults by Northern Alliance forces. As keyTaliban positions were systematicallyreduced by SF-directed airstrikes, theNorthern Alliance forces advanced. The pre-cision of the airstrikes left the surviving Tal-iban forces stunned, and those who could doso began to flee their positions.

As word of the defeat reached the Tal-iban forces in Mazar-e Sharif, many ofthem abandoned their positions andretreated toward Konduz, but the path oftheir retreat was heavily interdicted by

38 Special Warfare

Airstrikes directed byteams of SF soldiersassisted the groundoperations of the North-ern Alliance and allowedits forces to make rapidadvances.

DoD photo

SF-directed airstrikes that produced aswath of destruction. Near midday on Nov.10, triumphant Northern Alliance forces,accompanied by their SF advisers,streamed into Mazar-e Sharif and werewelcomed by jubilant crowds of citizens. Inthe other provinces, simultaneousadvances by Northern Alliance forces, cou-pled with negotiated surrenders, led to analmost complete collapse of the Taliban innorthern Afghanistan.

The remaining Taliban and al-Qaedaforces, still more than 600 strong, consoli-dated and formed a stronghold at the for-mer Sultan Razzia Girls School near theheart of Mazar-e Sharif. Their position waslocated in a heavily populated residentialdistrict, only blocks from the Blue Mosque.The forces fortified the school compoundand, although surrounded, they refused tosurrender. When fighting erupted, Dostum,who was highly confident of the capabilitiesof the SF detachments, requested airstrikesagainst this last bastion of Taliban power inMazar-e Sharif, despite the proximity of theBlue Mosque and the density of the civilianpopulation. SF soldiers directed four bombsinto the three-story school building, reduc-ing part of it to rubble and setting the con-ditions for an assault that would clear outthe surviving Taliban forces. With the elim-ination of the Taliban resistance, Mazar-eSharif was completely liberated.

As Dostum had predicted, the northernprovinces fell like dominoes, and the Tal-iban was dealt a stunning defeat fromwhich it would not recover. Within twoweeks, despite a four-day insurrectionstaged by Taliban prisoners at Qala-I-Jengi prison, the last remaining pocket ofTaliban resistance in northern Afghan-istan, at Konduz, was cleared. Within fourweeks, the Taliban had surrendered atKandahar, the birthplace and the heart ofthe Taliban movement. On Dec. 21,Afghanistan established an interim gov-ernment in Kabul.

The challenge of UWAlthough the missions assigned to the SF

detachments operating in northernAfghanistan appeared to be relatively

straightforward — advise and assist theNorthern Alliance in conducting combat oper-ations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda —there were many challenges that made themission difficult and that required the inge-nuity and adaptability of SF soldiers.

The situation on the ground presentedchallenges in four areas: organization,training, logistics and morale. Althoughthe major factions were united in theiropposition to the Taliban, they had signifi-cant differences with each other, and theyfelt no real allegiance to anything higherthen their own party or ethnic group. Atone time or another during the previousdecade, the groups had taken up armsagainst one another or supported eachother’s rival factions. Although none ofthese events were uncommon in internal

Afghan politics, they created a significantlevel of distrust between the factions. Allthe factions had a common distrust of Dos-tum. His history as a commander in theAfghan army under the puppet regime ofthe hated Najibullah, and his role in fight-ing the mujahedeen still generated tensionamong the leaders of the factions.

The Northern Alliance forces generallylacked organization at either the tactical orthe operational level. Even within the fac-tions, there appeared to be little organiza-tion. Contingents were developed aroundgeographic or ethnic loyalties. A force fromone village might have 200 men, while theforce of another village might have only 50.

The lack of organization was compound-ed by the fact that the Afghan command-ers, who were more pragmatic than ideo-logical, changed sides frequently (usuallygoing to the side that appeared to have thebest chance of winning) and took their

June 2002 39

As Dostum had predicted, the northernprovinces fell like dominoes, and the Talibanwas dealt a stunning defeat from which itwould not recover. Within two weeks, … thelast remaining pocket of Taliban resistance innorthern Afghanistan, at Konduz, was cleared.

troops with them. Dostum’s ability to per-suade opposing commanders to switchsides — often demonstrated during late-night negotiations conducted outside thepurview of U.S. forces — did not lessen ten-sions. Although switching sides is a tradi-tional Afghan approach to conflict resolu-tion, the ill will that commanders feeltoward their former enemies is not easilydissolved. And, as the reversal at Akoprukdemonstrated, new allies can quicklyrevert to enemies.

As former Taliban switched their alle-giance to the Northern Alliance, the fac-

tions sometimes tried to win their loyaltyin order to ensure post-conflict power. Forexample, ethnic Pashtuns who had beenstaunch supporters of the Taliban changedtheir allegiance to the Jamiat-e Islami, butwere still identified as Taliban by the eth-nic Hazaras of Hezb-e Wahdat, who hadsuffered mightily at the hands of the Pash-tuns. The resentment necessitated fre-quent and close cooperation between theSF detachments who were working withthe different factions in order to preventfratricide. The SF detachments also exer-cised care to prevent the appearance thatthe U.S. forces favored one faction overanother.

Although the Northern Alliance forceshad been fighting the Taliban for severalyears, many of them lacked any formal mil-itary training. Having been recruited from

rural populations of farmers and nomads,few of the soldiers could read, and fewerstill could use a map or a compass. Whilemany of the soldiers were proficient in theuse of their individual weapons and werecapable of conducting ambushes, they wereonly marginally capable of conducting larg-er offensive operations.

When the SF soldiers arrived inAfghanistan, they found that even theunits that appeared to be well-trained andwell-organized did not have sufficienttraining and organization to overcome theshortages of weapons, ammunition, foodand clothing. The overall logistics postureof the Northern Alliance forces was lessthan favorable, as were the type, quantityand condition of the weapons used by theNorthern Alliance. Finally, the success ofthe Taliban had left the Northern Allianceforces with low confidence and low morale.

These challenges, while not uncommonin a UW scenario, were exacerbated bystrategic and environmental pressures.Operation Enduring Freedom had begunwith a series of airstrikes against key tar-gets throughout Afghanistan. Although theattacks caused significant damage, theydid little to reduce the Taliban’s control ofAfghanistan. Indeed, the Taliban becamemore defiant and accused the U.S. of strik-ing civilian targets. Despite the falsenessof the claims, the Taliban forces were suc-cessful in garnering some internationalsympathy, particularly in the Middle East.That sympathy resulted in internationaldemands, some of which came from keyU.S. allies, for the U.S. to bring an end tocivilian casualties.

Simultaneously, domestic pressures fortangible results were also mounting. Final-ly, because of an already dismal humani-tarian situation in Afghanistan, manyobservers feared that a catastrophe ofunimaginable proportions would befall thecountry with the onset of the harsh winter.These factors combined to produce an oper-ational imperative for rapid and tangibleprogress.

The difficulty of placing U.S. forces onthe battlefield made the compressed time-line even more problematic. The HinduKush mountain range, with peaks rising

40 Special Warfare

An SF soldier gives med-ical aid to a captured Tal-iban soldier who waswounded during the lib-eration of Mazar-e Sharif.

DoD photo

above 17,000 feet, combined with the onsetof winter and increasingly poor weather tomake infiltration difficult. The treacherousterrain made airborne operations almostimpossible, and the high altitudes and lowtemperatures made rotary-wing infiltra-tion extremely difficult.

When the imperative for quick resultscombined with the difficulties of infiltra-tion, the SF detachments were compelledto go on the offensive only days after theyhit the ground. There was no time fordetailed assessments, force reorganizationor remedial training for the NorthernAlliance forces. There was barely enoughtime to gain the trust and confidence of thenotoriously xenophobic Afghans. Neverthe-less, each SF element managed to do so.The key elements in overcoming the obsta-cles presented by the compressed timelinewere the SF soldiers’ cross-cultural-com-munications abilities, their demonstratedcompetence and professionalism (especial-ly with regard to medical care), their abili-ty to operate in a decentralized mannerand their genuine commitment. Thosequalities contributed immeasurably to theSF elements’ ability to rapidly integratewith the Northern Alliance forces.

The weather and the difficult terrain alsolimited the allowable cargo load of the infil-tration platforms; therefore, the amount ofequipment that the detachments couldbring was limited. The most significant lim-itation was that detachments were unableto bring any vehicles that would providethem with battlefield mobility. The detach-ments were able to partially overcome thatlimitation by adopting indigenous methodsof transportation. However, there are no“extra” horses and mules in Afghanistan.Every horse that an SF soldier used was oneless available for use by a Northern Alliancesoldier, and every mule that carried ruck-sacks was one less available for carryingfood or ammunition for the NorthernAlliance forces.

Again, the adaptability and the ingenu-ity of the SF soldiers allowed them todevelop a solution. In what may have beena first for SF, one detachment managed toinfiltrate with two six-wheeled vehiclesthat resemble large golf carts. They had

been borrowed from the 1-87th Infantry ata forward staging base. The vehicles, whichwere easily loaded onto MH-47s, provideda much-needed logistics-support capability.Despite their unsuitability for the mostsevere terrain, the vehicles allowed twodetachments to move large quantities ofsupplies rapidly. Their utility became morecritical as the pace of the offensive becamemore swift. The vehicles not only support-ed a movement of more than 100 km, theyalso survived the conflict. They werereturned to their owners with a few bulletholes and some marks of wear, but theyremained fully mission-capable.

Despite significant challenges, SF ele-ments demonstrated that a small numberof SF soldiers can produce sizable results.The principal reason that SF can producesuch results (and will continue to do so) isthe quality of the soldiers found on SFdetachments.

It was the young men on those detach-ments who won the war in the north: menwho fought alongside their Afghan counter-parts, becoming, for a time, the focus of theAmerican effort in Afghanistan. And consid-ering the individual strength and resolve ofthose men, they can be described in thewords of Shakespeare: “He is a soldier, fit tostand by Caesar and give direction.”

This article was written by personnel ofthe 3rd Battalion, 5th Special ForcesGroup.

June 2002 41

Six-wheeled vehicles provided the SF soldiers a much-needed logistics-support capability. Two of the vehiclesfit easily onto an MH-47.

DoD photo

The 7th Special Forces Group, with itsregional focus of Latin America, hasplayed an important role in Central and

South America.The group’s presence has beenparticularly important over the last 20 years.Whether battling Marxist guerrillas, main-taining peace along contested borders, restor-ing legitimate government to besiegednations, or stemming the flow of illegal drugsinto the United States, 7th Group soldierswere ready for each new requirement. Theirmissions over the last two decades highlightthe many successes of the Latin Americanpeople and U.S. foreign policy in the region.

EvolutionIn 1982, numerous right wing and Marx-

ist dictatorships existed throughout LatinAmerica; two decades later, every country inthe region except Cuba has a democratical-ly elected government. The primary focus ofU.S. Latin American foreign policy in the1980s was regional stability through con-taining communism, mainly in Nicaragua,El Salvador and neighboring Central Amer-ican countries. Today, counternarcoticsefforts in the Andean Ridge region of SouthAmerica have become a dominant concernof U.S. foreign policy. The policy of engage-ment — developing, and maintaining closesocioeconomic and military ties with coun-tries to strengthen their democratic institu-tions — has also been a key U.S. goal. Thispolicy evolution, from counterinsurgency to

counternarcotics and engagement, can beclearly illustrated in the 7th SF Group’smissions of the past two decades.

El Salvador, 1979-1990After suffering a military coup late in

1979, El Salvador rapidly destabilized andappeared to be headed toward civil war.Within a year of the coup, the MarxistFarabundo Marti para Liberacion Nacional,or FMLN, arose from the union of five small-er insurgent groups.1 The FMLN fueled itsmovement with popular dissatisfaction forgovernment reforms, and it was backed withweapons and training received from othercommunist regimes.

Shortly after the suspension of U.S. aid toEl Salvador, the U.S. State Departmentdecided that the biggest threat to the coun-try and the region was the leftist insur-gents, and aid was promptly restored. In1982, the U.S. military began training andadvising the Salvadoran army in Honduras,and by 1983, U.S. military advisers were liv-ing with and advising Salvadoran brigadesthroughout the country.2 Many of the advis-ers were from the 7th SF Group.

The U.S. placed an informal cap of 55 sol-diers on the advisory mission in El Sal-vador, and typically one officer and one NCOworked with a brigade.3 The advisers pro-vided much-needed tactical and technicalassistance to their Salvadoran counter-parts. While the principal mission of the

42 Special Warfare

7th SF Group Provides Two Decades of Excellence in Latin America

by Lieutenant Colonel Paul S. Burton and Captain Robert Lee Wilson

U.S. soldiers was advising, at times theyfound themselves engaged in combat.Sergeant First Class Gregory Fronius, of the3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group, was killedMarch 31, 1987, during an FMLN attack ona Salvadoran camp in El Paraiso. One yearlater, the same camp was attacked again.4

The SF advisors provided more than tech-nical and tactical assistance during the ElSalvador mission. They incorporatedhuman rights into all aspects of their train-ing and worked to transform the Salvado-ran army into the type of professionalorganization that could gain the respect andsupport of the civilian populace. The hardwork of the SF advisers had a profoundeffect on the conflict. As the Salvadoranarmy increased in professionalism andcapability, the guerrillas found their popu-lar support waning, and in 1990, the FMLNsigned a peace treaty with the Salvadorangovernment. The work of the soldiers of the7th SF Group in El Salvador, largely over-looked by people outside of the special-oper-ations community, is one of the great mili-tary success stories of recent times. It illus-trates how a small group of SF soldiers candramatically alter the strategic situationand affect national centers of gravity.

Panama, 1989-1990During the late 1980s, relations between

the U.S. and Panama deteriorated. General

Manuel Noriega, commander of the Pana-manian Defense Forces, or PDF, effectivelyseized power in Panama in 1988 when hedecided to ignore all orders of Panama’scivilian government. Relations between thecountries soured further when Noriega wasindicted in the U.S. on drug-smugglingcharges. In 1989, when Panama held itselections, Noriega invalidated the results.The opposition candidates organized a largeparade and protest in Panama City, butNoriega promptly suppressed the demon-stration using pipe- and bat-wielding thugshe named his “dignity battalions.”

As Noriega consolidated power in 1989, heset the stage for a collision between his coun-try and the U.S. In December, he declared astate of war with the U.S., and there wereseveral skirmishes between U.S. forces andthe PDF. The 7th SF Group had one element,its 3rd Battalion, permanently stationed inPanama.As the situation worsened, one com-pany from each of the group’s two statesidebattalions rotated to Panama to augment the3rd Battalion. To prepare for the loominghostilities, the SF units participated in sever-al joint training exercises. On Dec. 19, 1989,U.S. forces began Operation Just Cause toneutralize the PDF; to create a stable, demo-cratic environment in Panama; and to appre-hend Noriega.

The 7th Group’s 3rd Battalion, reinforcedby troops from Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th

June 2002 43

A soldier from the 7th SFGroup (left) instructsMexican soldiers inadvanced marksmanshiptechniques during theMexican Training Initia-tive in 1997.

U.S. Army photo

Group, formed the key combat elementknown as Task Force Black. Elements of TFBlack already in-theater disabled vital PDF-controlled TV and radio stations at H-hour,just prior to the invasion of U.S.-basedforces.5

Another element of TF Black received themission to secure the Pacora River bridge,which would be the key avenue of approachfor the PDF as it attempted to reinforce itsforces at the Torrijos-Tocumen airport. Thiselement, commanded by Major Kevin Hig-gins of Company A, 3/7th SF Group, arrivedat the bridge as a PDF armed convoy pre-pared to cross. Staff Sergeant DanielMcDonald fired an AT-4 and halted the leadvehicle instantly, as other members of Com-pany A fired on trailing vehicles. The men ofCompany A cleared the remaining vehicles,seized several prisoners, and established ablocking position to prevent the PDF fromcrossing the bridge. Throughout the night,TF Black defended the bridge against sever-al attacks by motorized PDF forces, at timesdirecting fire from AC-130 gunships circlingoverhead. At 2:30 p.m., Dec. 20, TF Blackwas relieved in place by elements of the

82nd Airborne Division.6Personnel from the 7th Group secured

many PDF garrisons throughout Panama.7Many of the SF soldiers in Task Force Blackhad lived in Panama for years; they knewthe psyche of the typical PDF commander,and in some cases, they knew the Panaman-ian officers personally. SF soldiers wouldapproach garrison commanders anddemand that they surrender unconditional-ly in order to avoid a battle with follow-onU.S. forces. Most of the PDF commanderssurrendered on the spot.

As garrison after garrison surrendered orfell to U.S. forces, Panama was rapidly liber-ated from Noriega. The strongman himselfsurrendered to U.S. forces Jan. 3, 1990, afterhiding in the Papal Nunciatura for nearlythe whole invasion. Just Cause ended offi-cially Jan. 12, 1990, but the 7th Group’swork was far from over. Operation PromoteLiberty began immediately after hostilitiesended in Panama, and the group transi-tioned into foreign-internal-defense andnation-building activities.

The 7th Group deployed its headquartersand its 2nd Battalion (reinforced with ele-

44 Special Warfare

Soldiers from the 7th SFGroup who are servingas observers with JTFSafe Border receive anoperations briefing inPatuca, Ecuador, in 1995.

U.S. Army photo

ments of the 1st Battalion) to Panama tosupport Promote Liberty, and its forces wereoperational by Jan 4, 1990. The forces wereinstrumental in restoring order and in re-establishing a civil-defense force through-out the country. The 7th Group accom-plished its objectives rapidly in PromoteLiberty, and it redeployed all but one com-pany Feb. 15, 1990.

The defense of the Pacora River bridgewas the 7th Group’s most dramatic missionduring Just Cause, but it can be argued thatth group’s greatest contribution to the oper-ation was orchestrating the surrender ofnumerous PDF garrisons. The culturalexpertise and interpersonal skills of the SFsoldiers were force multipliers; they con-served combat power that would have beenused to neutralize the garrisons (not tomention numerous lives). The final effects ofJust Cause and Promote Liberty are evi-dent: Panama assumed control of the Canalin 1999, and the country has had numerousfree elections during the last decade.

MOMEP, 1995-1998In 1995, Ecuador and Peru went to war

over disputed territory in the Amazonbasin, a dense jungle region that bothnations have claimed for decades. Followingsome bloody skirmishes earlier in the year,the two countries signed the ItamaratyTreaty in February 1995, establishing acease-fire and created a peacekeeping mis-sion — The Military Observer Mission,Ecuador and Peru, or MOMEP, to ensurethat both sides adhered to the treaty.8 TheU.S. component of the peacekeeping forcewas organized under Joint Task Force SafeBorder, and it consisted primarily of officersand soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, 7th SFGroup. MOMEP was headquartered inPatuca, Ecuador, and it maintained a pres-ence in Bagua, Peru. From the two sites, sol-diers of the 7th Group maintained check-points in the isolated jungle regions to helpkeep the peace. Enlisted soldiers and offi-cers selected from all three of the 7thGroup’s battalions, initially spent 179 daysdeployed to Joint Task Force Safe Border;rotations were later shortened to 90 days.

The 7th Group’s presence in Latin Ameri-

ca was a key factor in getting the two con-tentious nations to work toward a perma-nent settlement. MOMEP was another mis-sion that accomplished a great deal butreceived little recognition outside militarycircles. General Barry McCaffrey, the com-manding general of U.S. Southern Com-mand at the time of MOMEP’s inception,stated, “This was the most successful peace-keeping mission in U.S. history.”9 The con-tinued peace along the Ecuador-Peru borderis a testament to the accomplishments ofthe soldiers who participated in MOMEP.

Mexican Training InitiativeAs part of a renewed commitment by the

Clinton administration for increased mili-tary cooperation between the U.S. and Mex-ico, the U.S. Army was directed to performthe Mexican Training Initiative, or MTI, toprovide training that would enhance thecapabilities of the Mexican army. The mis-sion of training Mexico’s counterdrug forceswas delegated to the commander of the 7thSF Group.

MTI training began in April 1996 at FortBragg, N.C. Soldiers from Company B, 3rdBattalion, 7th SF Group, trained officers of theMexican army in advanced marksmanship,reconnaissance, close-quarters battle andhuman rights to enhance the Mexican army’scounterdrug capabilities. The MTI missionlater rotated to personnel from the 7thGroup’s 1st and 2nd battalions and GroupSupport Company. Training also includedMTI instructor courses, which taught selectedMexican army officers to build effective train-ing cadres in Mexico. A large number of Mexi-can officers deployed to Fort Bragg for MTIfrom 1996 until September 1998, when theprogram was discontinued.10

The MTI was ground-breaking in terms ofthe level of cooperation that the U.S. andMexican governments achieved. It was partof a larger effort to improve relations withour southern neighbor.

Colombia 1998 – PresentMore than 80 percent of the cocaine that

is consumed globally comes from theAndean Ridge region of South America,and much of the cocaine from the Andean

June 2002 45

Ridge comes from Colombia.11 Profits fromthis illicit trade help finance insurgenciesthat have raged for three decades and havecost thousands of Colombians their lives.The largest insurgent group, the Revolu-tionary Armed Forces of Colombia, orFARC, fought the government to a stale-mate for years. In 1998, in a dramatic over-ture to attain a peace agreement with therebels, Colombian president Andres Pas-trana granted the FARC a demilitarizedzone.12 Until 2002, when the governmentrescinded the demilitarized zone, theFARC used its Switzerland-sized piece ofColombia as a staging base for waging waragainst the Colombian military and forsupporting cocaine production.

President Pastrana, exasperated by theviolence stemming from the drug tradeand pressured by the U.S. and Europe,developed Plan Colombia with foreignsupport in 1999. The U.S. governmentpledged $1.5 billion in aid to the besiegedColombian government. A large portion ofthe U.S. aid would consist of militarytraining and equipment, especially much-needed helicopters. The provision of mili-tary aid held one caveat, however: the mil-

itary aid could be used only for counter-drug operations, not for combating insur-gent forces. With the narcotics trade soentwined with the insurgency and theareas under insurgent control, keepingthe two operations separate would proveto be a daunting task.

The Colombian army decided to create anew unit that would be specifically trainedfor combating narcoterrorist operations. Thenew unit, the Counter-Narcotics Brigade, orBACNA, would be formed and trained in thearea of Colombia known as Tres Esquinas.The 7th Group received the mission to trainthe new unit one battalion at a time and tohave all three of the BACNA battalionsoperational by December 2000.

Although the 7th SF Group had main-tained a presence in Colombia, not untilPlan Colombia went into effect did the 7thGroup deploy an organic company. In orderto train the BACNA, the 7th Group woulddeploy a reinforced company on a 90-daycycle to train each battalion. At the end ofthe cycle, a new SF company would rotate into train the next battalion. The strategywould enable the 7th Group to accomplishits counterdrug mission in Colombia and

46 Special Warfare

Soldiers from the 7th SFGroup train Colombiansoldiers in airmobile oper-ations in 2000 as part ofthe Colombian Coun-ternarcotics Initiative.

U.S. Army photo

remain engaged throughout the rest of Cen-tral and South America. The operationaltempo resulting from the 7th Group’s com-mitments at the end of the 1990s requiredthat every detachment in the group deployinto theater during its battalion-deploy-ment cycle.

The first elements to deploy for theBACNA training mission, which came to beknown as the Colombian CounternarcoticsInitiative, or C2I, arrived in Tres Esquinasin March of 1999. In a matter of weeks, thefirst BACNA battalion was receiving multi-echelon training. A-detachments worked inthe field with squads and platoons, trainingthem in the finer points of patrolling andcombat operations. Simultaneously, otherSF soldiers worked with the BACNA staff tobuild their capabilities for planning andoperational control. The first iteration of C2Iwas a resounding success, and immediatelyafter completing its training, the firstBACNA battalion deployed to support coun-terdrug operations.

The two subsequent C2I iterations con-ducted training at Larandia, which has bet-ter facilities for training and logistics thanTres Esquinas does. The second and thirditerations were as successful as the first,and the last battalion of BACNA was opera-tional in December 2000, right on schedule.As the war against narcoterrorists contin-ues in Colombia, soldiers from the 7thGroup continue to provide additional train-ing to BACNA units as they rotate off thefront lines of the drug war.

ConclusionThe 7th SF Group has been and

remains heavily engaged in Latin Ameri-ca. The group has played an importantrole in many of the pivotal events in thecountries of Central and South Americaduring the past two decades. The 7thGroup’s missions have varied from peace-time engagement to advisory operationsto combat, and the group’s advance notifi-cation has varied from a few months to afew minutes. The diverse missions andvaried planning times come as little sur-prise to the 7th Group’s soldiers, each ofwhom carries a unit coin etched with a

large, red “7” and the words, Lo que Sea,Cuando Sea, Donde Sea (Anything, Any-time, Anywhere).

Lieutenant Colonel Paul S. Burton isexecutive officer for the 7th SF Group. Hisprevious special-operations assignmentsinclude S3, 7th SF Group; S3, SOTD; com-pany commander, battalion staff officerand detachment commander in the 3rdBattalion, 7th SF Group; and detachmentcommander in Company A, 1st Battalion,7th SF Group. He holds a bachelor’s degreein history from Arizona State Universityand a master’s degree in military art andscience from the Command and GeneralStaff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

Captain Robert Lee Wilson is command-er of Headquarters and Headquarters Com-pany, 7th SF Group. He previously servedas an SF detachment commander in the 7thSF Group. Commissioned through ROTCas an Infantry officer, Wilson holds a bach-elor’s degree in finance from the Universityof Connecticut.

Notes:1 Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, eds., El Sal-

vador at War: An Oral History (Washington, D.C.:National Defense University Press, 1988), li.

2 Ibid.3 Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Lambert, Lieutenant

Colonel Frank Pedrozo and Colonel Ranger Roach,“Interview: Special Forces in El Salvador,” SpecialWarfare, October 1993, 35.

4 Sergeant First Class John Terzian, “SF Advisers inEl Salvador: The Attack on El Paraiso,” Special War-fare, Spring 2001, 25.

5 Wayne Kirkbride, Special Forces in Latin America(Published by the author, 1991), 126.

6 Ibid., 125.7 http : / / ca l l .army.mil /products /ctc_bul l /90-

9/9091ch1b.htm.8 Sergeant First Class Douglas Ide, “M-O-M-E-P

Spells Peace,” Soldiers, February 1996, 31.9 Major Sean Swindel, 7th SF Group War College

Brief, November 1996, Slide 30.10 Lieutenant Colonel Edward Reeder, Mexican Train-ing Initiative After Action Report, October 1998, 3.11 Drug Enforcement Agency Web site, Cocaine pro-duction information, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/cocaine.htm.12 Juan Forero, “Colombian Rebels Hijack a Plane andKidnap a Senator,” New York Times, 21 February 2002.

June 2002 47

Prior to the Vietnam War, UnitedStates Army Special Forces soldiersconducted three years of intensive

operations in Laos. From July 1959 toOctober 1962, SF soldiers rotated throughthe country as mobile training teams, or

MTTs, in support of the RoyalLaotian government’s opera-tions against the Pathet Laocommunist insurgency. Themission, Operation WhiteStar, formally ended with thedeclaration of Laotian neu-trality in July 1962. It provedto be a foreshadowing of thewider use of SF in Vietnam.

Operation White Star intro-duced the SF soldiers to theclassic foreign internaldefense, or FID, mission. Ini-tially, the MTTs and units ofthe French army shared theresponsibility for improvingthe combat capabilities of theLaotians, whose army wasplagued with dissension andlow morale.

The first rotation of Ameri-cans arrived in Laos in July

1959. Called “Hotfoot,” and led by Lieu-tenant Colonel Arthur D. “Bull” Simons,the contingent consisted of 107 SF soldiersfrom the 77th SF Group.1 Wearing civiliandress and theoretically operating in a clan-destine fashion, Simons’ men trained mem-

bers of the Royal Laotian army in coun-terinsurgency tactics. Hotfoot was subse-quently renamed White Star; the SF sol-diers began wearing military garb; and thenumber of SF soldiers gradually increasedto a peak of 433 by July 1962.2

Simons based his training teams in themilitary districts established by the RoyalLaotian army. The northern district washeadquartered in Luang Prabang; the cen-tral district operated around the capital ofVientiane; the lower central district cen-tered on Savannakhet; and the southerndistrict was headquartered near Pahkse.3Simons later increased the number oftraining teams to accommodate a fifth dis-trict that was located in the Plain of Jarsarea, west of Ban Man.4

Simons’ men began training the Lao-tians on Sept. 1, 1959, with an initial classof 1,138.5 Simons later returned with thesixth White Star rotation in November1961. By that time, the mission hadexpanded to include training for Laos’ Meoand Kha tribes as well.

From the outset, the SF soldiers foundthemselves trying to overcome two funda-mental hurdles: the French and the Lao-tians. Of the two, the French proved to be ashort-term problem, because the Frenchadvisory element, the Mission MilitaireFrancaise d’Instruction pres le Gouverne-ment Royal du Laos, withdrew from thecountry Dec. 17, 1960.6

The French, entrenched in Laos since

48 Special Warfare

Operation White Star: Prelude to Vietnam

by Dr. Kenn Finlayson

USASOC Archive

A soldier from the 7th SFGroup assigned to theWhite Star mission in Laosin 1961.

the formation of the Royal Laotian army in1954, grudgingly acceded to the Americansthe authority to teach military skills andtechniques, but they retained the right toteach the tactical employment of weapons.

Sergeant Roy Mathews worked with theFrench Royal Marines in the southern Laot-ian town of Pakse. “At that time we were notallowed to teach any tactics whatsoever,” hesaid. “We were strictly technical advisers. …We could not say ‘This is the way it isdeployed.’ The French Royal Marinesstepped in and taught the combat part of it.”7

The Laotians soon came to prefer theAmericans to the French. Simonsexplained why that occurred: “I think thatthe French have had beat into their skullsfor many, many years the colonial attitudeas well as the big-brother attitude and theidea that these people will look up to thembecause they are French and because theyare white. Nothing could be further fromthe truth.” Eventually the Laotians easedthe French out and turned all of the tacti-cal training over to the Americans.

The second hurdle confronting the Amer-icans lay with the Laotian people them-selves. In the late 1950s, Laos had onlyrecently become a sovereign nation, andthe new state presented a cultural andpolitical conundrum for the White Starpersonnel. The majority of the Laotiantrainees were recruited from small villagesand hamlets around the country. In mostinstances, the only requirement for mili-tary service was that the trainee be tallenough to reach a certain mark on a bam-boo stalk.8 Most of the trainees were illit-erate, and many did not know that Laoswas an independent nation or that it pos-sessed a standing army. Their allegianceremained in their village or their tribe, andthey were not particularly motivated tofight or even to learn to fight. Compound-ing these problems was the general cultur-al make-up of the Laotian people:

They are dreamy, gentle, bucolic,nonaggressive people … who live inbamboo-and-thatch houses on stilts,wading tranquilly in their marshypaddies, fishing in the lazy rivers, andworshipping in the curly-roofed pago-

da. They are content. They live in asubsistence economy, and generallythere is enough rice to go around. TheLao gentleness traditionally hasenchanted the foreign visitor, particu-larly the one not trying to go anywhereor do anything in a hurry.9

The White Star advisers faced an almostinsurmountable task in trying to instill asense of urgency and purpose in the Laot-ian soldiers, to implement rigid trainingschedules and to inculcate an aggressiveattitude toward the Pathet Lao, who wereattempting to take over the country. All thewhile, the SF soldiers had to communicatethrough interpreters and share trainingtime with the French army. With the phys-ical and cultural difficulties inherent in themission, the Americans often fell victim tounrealistic expectations and the ensuingfrustration at their inability to achieveprogress in the training of their Laotiancounterparts. As one member recounted inan interview in 1962:

We weren’t ready for [the situationthat] we walked into. We weren’t men-tally prepared, and all the new teamswere given the same idea. The teamthat replaced me came in there so fullof go, go, go that they couldn’t hold it. …That was the biggest problem wehad — no true picture of what the sit-uation was. I went over there withsuch an … illusion.10

The White Star teams generally operat-ed in a decentralized manner, often as half-teams of six or seven men. The prevailingphilosophy — that the team on the groundcould best assess the requirements of theunits being trained — gave the teams con-siderable freedom to conduct the trainingas they saw fit. The higher echelons pro-vided supplies for the teams and took careof personnel and administration problems,but they rarely conveyed to the teams anyguidance on training or advising.

As one veteran of White Star describedthe situation: “We were teaching too manysubordinates over there when we shouldhave been teaching the superiors. Whyteach the lower-grade people when higher-

June 2002 49

ups don’t know how to utilize [the skillstaught]? It’s a waste of time.”11

The Laotian culture figured prominentlyin the effectiveness of the Americans’ styleof teaching. Laotian officers and NCOswere reticent about risking any loss ofprestige by placing themselves in positionswhere they might be seen as deficient in aparticular skill. Providing the Laotianswith face-saving alternatives, such asworking after hours with the officers,proved difficult and doubled the workloadof the SF team. In addition, the status-con-scious Laotian officers, particularly thoseof field-grade rank, made the advisory rolefrustrating for the American officers. Inattempting to advise a Laotian battalioncommander, an American captain or lieu-tenant often found it necessary to tenderhis advice in such a manner as to allow thecommander to arrive at the appropriatedecision on his own, and at his own pace.As one adviser remarked:

He was a colonel and I was a captain.And he didn’t expect me to tell himanything, but I [learned] to make sug-gestions or comments, [then] not to saya thing about it for 24 or even maybe48 hours. Then he would come up withthe same thing as his own idea and[he] would be just as happy as a littlechild would. … So I would say, “Fine

Colonel, wonderful idea, that is reallythinking,” and everybody was happy.12

The presence of the Americans did bringenhanced prestige, along with the addedbonus of improved equipment and an occa-sional helicopter flight, to the Laotianunits and their commanders. In this sense,the Americans were welcome. However, ina larger context, a profound sensitivity totheir recent past precluded many Laotiansfrom wholeheartedly embracing the Amer-ican advisers. One veteran of White Starfelt that the Laotians were reluctant totake advice from the Americans because oftheir recent experience with the French:

“They said, well, if we do what they sug-gest or tell us, [Laos] will eventually end uplike it was before ’54, except the U.S. will berunning [the country] instead of the French.So actually I think we were more or less liai-son personnel rather than advisers.”13

Working with the Royal Laotian armyposed a complex set of problems for theWhite Star teams. Following the initial rota-tion, the mission expanded to incorporatethe Kau and Meo hill tribes. The expansionintroduced further complexity.

The training of the hill tribes most close-ly mirrored the pure SF unconventional-warfare mission. The SF teams trainedcompanies of 100 men for a counterinsur-gency mission. In January 1960, SF began

50 Special Warfare

Virtually identical to theOSS mission of trainingKachin hill tribes duringWorld War II, White Staralso proved to be a train-ing ground for SF mis-sions in Vietnam.

USASOC Archive

training the Kau, who were previouslyknown as the Maquis companies, after theFrench resistance movement of World WarII. The Kau proved to be adept fighters,and they quickly drew the admiration ofthe American advisers. Captain NewlinHarpersett noted, “The leaders are intelli-gent, hard-working and quick to learn.They are a terrific guerrilla potential inthe mountains of this particular region.They respect us and thank us for all wehave taught them.”14

The Meo tribesmen proved to be equallykeen pupils, and under the American tute-lage, both tribes developed into effectivecounterinsurgency forces. The Americanrelationship with the tribes continuedthroughout the war in Indochina, as SFMTTs visited Laos after the close of theWhite Star mission.15 If anything, the SFadvisers proved to be more successful atworking with the hill tribes than they wereat working with the Royal Laotian army.

In many ways, the White Star operationrepresents the quintessential SF mission.Virtually identical to the World War II mis-sion in which the Office of Strategic Ser-vices’ Detachment 101 trained the Kachinhill tribes in Burma, White Star proved tobe a training ground for the SF soldiers,and the experience paid many dividendsduring the Vietnam War.

On many levels — technical, tactical, cul-tural and political — an analysis of theWhite Star operation reveals the require-ments and the pitfalls inherent in bothFID and counterinsurgency missions. Inhaving to deal with a culture radically dif-ferent from that of the U.S., the White Starsoldiers learned valuable lessons. Closeassociation with the Central IntelligenceAgency and the U.S. Department of Statewere also hallmarks of the White Star mis-sion. The mission underwent various per-mutations, going from a supposedly clan-destine operation conducted by militarypersonnel in civilian clothes to a majorcommitment for SF in the years leading upto the Vietnam War.

The list of White Star veterans containsmany of the most notable figures in thehistory of SF, including Bull Simons, DickMeadows, Charlie Beckwith and Elliot

Sydnor. Many of those who served with theWhite Star teams went on to play promi-nent roles in the SF operations in Vietnamand in various operations years afterward.The lessons gained from White Star arevalid in today’s SF environment, and theyreinforce Brigadier General William B.Rosson’s observation:

“An individual or a unit may be extreme-ly well-trained for counterinsurgency interms of tactical and technical proficiency,yet be of little value for want of ability tocommunicate with the friendly forces weseek to assist and for want of understand-ing of the problems and attitudes of thecountry concerned.”16

Dr. Kenn Finlayson is the command his-torian for the JFK Special Warfare Centerand School.

Notes:1 Stephen Sherman, Who’s Who from White Star

(Houston, Texas: Radix Press, 1994), 1-4.2 Ibid., II.3 Arthur D. Simons, text of briefing, October 1959.

Contained in the collected papers of Brigadier Gener-al Donald Blackburn, ARSOF Archives, USAJFK-SWCS, Fort Bragg, N.C., 2.

4 Ibid.5 Ibid., 8.6 Sherman, III.7 Interview with Roy Mathews, conducted by Dr.

Stanley Sandler, USAJFKSWCS historian, in 1989.8 Alfred J. Kraemer and Edward C. Stewart, Cross-

Cultural Problems of U.S. Army Personnel in Laos andTheir Implications for Area Training, The GeorgeWashington University Human Resources ResearchOffice, September 1964, 5.

9 Oden Meeker, The Little World of Laos (New York:Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1959), 23.10 Kraemer and Stewart, 5.11 Ibid., 6.12 Ibid., 13.13 Ibid.14 Newlin R. Harpersett, “Maquis Report,” 26 Janu-ary 1960, ARSOF Archives, USAJFKSWCS, FortBragg, N.C., 3.15 James K. Bruton, letter written to Dr. Stanley San-dler, 30 August 1990, ARSOF Archives, USAJFK-SWCS, Fort Bragg, N.C.16 Brigadier General William B. Rosson, “Accent onCold War Capabilities,” Army Information Digest(May 1962), 5.

June 2002 51

Since the conclusion of the NATO air warin the summer of 1999, the men of the10th Special Forces Group have main-

tained a presence in the Serbian province ofKosovo in support of NATO’s Kosovo Forces,or KFOR.

With the introduction of ground forces thatsummer, the KFOR commander divided Koso-vo into five sectors, known as MultinationalBrigades North, East, South, West and Cen-tral. Each sector was placed under the subor-dinate command of one of the NATO coun-tries. The U.S. military contingent, Task Force

Falcon, is responsible for MultinationalBrigade-East, or MNB-E.

MNB-E borders Serbia and the formerYugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, orFYROM. The commander of MNB-E/TaskForce Falcon is usually a brigadier generalfrom a U.S. maneuver division. He com-mands two U.S. brigades; a Russianbrigade, or RUSBDE; a Greek battalion, orGRKBAT; and a combined battalion of Pol-ish and Ukrainian forces, or POLUKRBAT.In support of Task Force Falcon, the per-sonnel of the 10th SF Group operate a spe-

52 Special Warfare

The 10th SF Group Keeps Kosovo Stable

by Captains Robert W. Schaefer and M. Davis

U.S. Army photo

10th SF Group soldiersof A-detachment 092with their Russian coun-terparts near Kamenica,Kosovo, in January 2002.

cial-operations command-and-control ele-ment, or SOCCE.

The SOCCE commands all special-opera-tions forces in MNB-E; a reconnaissanceand surveillance, or R&S, section; four liai-son teams, or LTs; and three liaison-coordi-nation elements, or LCEs. The SOCCE hasproven to be an invaluable source of situa-tional awareness and real-time informationfor the commander of Task Force Falcon.

Working with other NATO units often pre-sents conventional commanders with uniquechallenges. An LCE is assigned to the RUS-BDE, the GRKBAT and the POLUKRBAT tohelp solve any problems that might arise.The LCE lives on its host unit’s compoundand conducts all its operations in conjunctionwith the supported unit. In addition to build-ing rapport, the LCE ensures interoperabili-ty and a real-time, redundant communica-tions link between the host nation and TaskForce Falcon.

In the early days of the Kosovo mission,

LCEs called in artillery support for the Rus-sian Airborne Brigade (the first instance ofsuch interaction since World War II). TheLCEs also commanded Russian and Polishsoldiers during complex tactical operationsagainst armed insurgents. The SF soldiers’skills in languages and cross-cultural com-munication allow them to assist the host-nation commanders, staff and leaders ofsmall units with mission planning, actions onthe objective, and medical support.

The SF soldiers in Kosovo often draw ontheir skills in unconventional warfare, orUW. Nowhere are those skills used andadapted more than on the LTs. LTs live andwork with Kosovars in the different munic-ipalities, or opstinas. The LTs’ mission is toprovide “ground truth” to the task force. Inorder to do that, LTs divide their sectorsinto smaller sectors, based on the size andthe ethnic origin of the sector’s population.Each LT uses two-man teams to patrol itssector daily.

June 2002 53

LCE Helps Storm Terrorist CampIn late spring 2001, members of the RUSBDE, together with their LCE, captured a

suspicious Kosovar at a traffic-control point near the northern Kosovo border with Ser-bia. The Kosovar was carrying a pistol and a notebook that contained grid coordinates,weapons serial numbers and ammunition counts. Because the man possessed an ille-gal weapon and because there was incriminating evidence, the KFOR soldiers detainedhim and transported him to the Russian compound for interrogation.

From the interrogation, the RUSBDE and the LCE learned that a terrorist trainingcamp was operating in the Vela Glava Valley, along the Serbian border. The camp wassaid to have 30 members, entrenched weapons systems and mortar pits. On the basisof that information, the RUSBDE began preparing a mission to eliminate the traininginstallation. The LCE aided the Russians with the orders and rehearsals, and it escort-ed the Russian element to the alleged training camp’s location.

As the KFOR soldiers arrived at the camp, they observed members of the insurgencypatrolling at a small roadblock. The KFOR soldiers dismounted from their armoredvehicles and were immediately met with gunfire from the woodline. Members of both theRUSBAT and the LCE returned fire and began maneuvering for an assault on theenemy positions. With the support of an MK-19 grenade launcher and an M-2 .50-cal-iber machine gun, the composite U.S./Russian patrol secured the training camp withoutsustaining casualties.

As the patrol consolidated on the objective and began to reorganize, it processed andtreated nine prisoners (two wounded and seven unscathed); captured enemy uniforms,weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, and machine guns; and obtained valu-able information about the insurgency.

Each team’s goal is to know and “live” itssector. The two SF warriors make them-selves approachable in order to follow thespecial-operations imperative, “Know youroperational environment.” Patrol memberswear uniforms that have no identifyingpatches or badges, and unlike other NATOsoldiers, the SF soldiers wear no ballistichelmets, load-bearing equipment, or bodyarmor. Although NATO forces routinely use

such equipment as a means of force protec-tion, the LT patrols rely on their extensivetraining and situational awareness toremain alert and out of danger. Theirapproachability allows them to gain valu-able information, but it also adds to theirwarrior ethos and mystique. The Kosovarsuse the LTs to relay information to the taskforce because they know that when theyinform the LT patrols first, their problems

54 Special Warfare

Liaison Team Aids Local ElectionIn September 2001, Tefik Agushi, leader of the largest group of minority Romas (gyp-

sies) in the U.S. sector of Kosovo, died. During the previous year, when Kosovo hadelected municipal leaders in the first nationwide democratic election in the history ofthe region, the U.N. municipal administrator had appointed Agushi the official repre-sentative for the Roma community. Agushi’s death left the Roma community with noformally recognized leader. The situation gave rise to a conflict: The U.N., the KFORand the ethnic Albanian municipal leadership wanted the Romas to conduct a demo-cratic and U.N.-sanctioned general election, but the Romas were adamant about choos-ing their new leader in accordance with their traditional methods.

Because the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, would beconducting nationwide parliamentary elections in another month, OSCE was originallyasked to provide assistance with the Roma election; however, because the election of amunicipal assemblyman was not required by the U.S. Department of State, the assist-ance would not have been part of the OSCE’s charter, and the organization could nothelp. The U.N. and KFOR threatened to simply appoint a leader from the Roma com-munity, and the Romas threatened to boycott any further political cooperation with thenew government — thereby thwarting the international community’s goals for Kosovo.

At that point, the liaison team, or LT, responsible for the Roma community inter-vened. Unfettered by bureaucracy and familiar with the strange and sometimes eccen-tric (by Western standards) traditions of the Romas, the LT met with the U.N. munici-pal administrator and made recommendations for solving the problem. The local U.N.staff was not trained in conducting elections, and their minority-affairs officer wasinexperienced, so the U.N. administrator accepted the recommended course of actionand asked the LT to assume responsibility for the project. He knew that the Romaswould adopt a course of action proposed by the SF soldiers, whom they had come toaccept as members of their community.

By building a consensus among all interested organizations before implementing aplan, and by consulting with OSCE on internationally recognized election procedures, theLT was able to tailor an electoral process that satisfied the requirements of the interna-tional organizations and that respected the traditions of the Roma community. Becausethe LT worked outside regular Army KFOR procedures, and because it had a reputationfor getting things done, all the parties were more willing to compromise and work towarda common goal. As a result, two SF soldiers were able to accomplish what hundreds ofhigh-level international representatives could not. The resulting election was the firstdemocratic election in Kosovo for a minority group. The election, under the eyes of inter-national observers, became a watershed event for the community, which now felt that theinternational organizations had finally come to recognize the Romas and their way of life.

are often quickly alleviated. This value tothe populace, the rapport that the patrolshave with the locals, and the mystique sur-rounding the soldiers from an “unknown”but obviously “special” unit help deter anythreat.

The patrols work with municipal leaders;citizens; business owners; government organ-izations; nongovernment organizations, orNGOs; and local KFOR commanders andtheir staffs to solve local issues and to learnhow the population will react to various task-force initiatives. The “ground truth” that theLTs are able to provide becomes an indis-pensable tool for daily operations of the taskforce.

Often, the LTs are the only conduit of infor-mation available to the task force concerningthe current situation in Kosovo, includingincipient insurgencies, smuggling and otherillegal activities. Such information is vital indetermining potential flashpoints, identifyingpersons who are to be detained, and defining

daily operational needs.Some of the missions that the task force

deems necessary are beyond the scope of itsorganic assets. Those missions require theuse of the SOCCE’s R&S section, which has amore robust capability for conducting specialreconnaissance than the task force’s organicscouts or long-range surveillance forces. TheR&S section encompasses a variety of spe-cial-operations specialties. The R&S sectionprovides the task-force commander withmature operators who can operate inextreme conditions and who can send near-real-time imagery to the SOCCE, from whichit is relayed to the TF Falcon tactical-opera-tions center. R&S missions can be nominatedby the SOCCE elements, by the TF FalconG2, or through the SOCCE internal targetingprocess. The interoperability of Army SOFand other services’ SOF in the SOCCE is atrue success story.

Because of the 10th SF Group’s UW roots,skills in the languages of the Balkans andproficiency in special reconnaissance anddirect action, the soldiers of the 10th SFGroup are ideally suited for aiding TF Falconand KFOR in the mission of maintaining asafe and secure environment in Kosovo.

Captain Robert W. Schaefer is the S5 for the2nd Battalion, 10th SF Group. CaptainSchaefer was commander of the first RUSLCE in Kosovo in 1999 and subsequentlyreceived the 1999 OSS/SOCOM Award ofExcellence for his actions with the RussianAirborne Brigade. During 2001, he served ascommander of the liaison team in Gnjilane,Kosovo. He is a distinguished military gradu-ate of the University of Louisville.

Captain M. Davis is commander of SF A-detachment 051. During the fall of 2001, heserved as the SOCCE/company executiveofficer for Company B, 2nd Battalion, 10thSF Group, during the unit’s rotation to Koso-vo. He is a distinguished military graduate ofJames Madison University.

June 2002 55

Captain Don Redd, commander of A-detachment 093,discusses current affairs with a Serbian businessman inStrpce, Kosovo.

U.S. army photo

Dedicating Army helicopter units tothe support of special-operationsground forces — a concept that

seems basic today — was, in fact, a by-product of the Vietnam War.

In April 1964, the United States initiat-ed efforts to upgrade the quality and thetimeliness of U.S. strategic intelligence. Tobring the collection of strategic intelligencemore under American control, the U.S. cre-

ated Project LeapingLena, which wouldpenetrate the HoChi Minh trail. Thatproject led to the cre-ation of SpecialForces DetachmentB-52 (later calledProject Delta).1

The success of B-52 led to increasedoperational demandsthat resulted in theformation of ProjectsOmega (B-50) andSigma (B-56), both ofwhich ran from May1966 to May 1967.As special operationsexpanded across the

borders of Cambodia and Laos, the Omegaand Sigma projects led to the creation ofCommand and Control North, South andCentral under the Military AssistanceCommand Vietnam-Studies and Observa-

tions Group, or MACV-SOG. Project Deltaremained the only special-operations forceunder the command of the 5th SF Group.2

The increased operational demands alsoleft less time available for B-52 to trainreplacements, prompting the establish-ment of the MACV Recondo School to trainnew personnel for the teams. The trainingat the MACV Recondo School was laterexpanded to include long-range reconnais-sance teams that were assigned to U.S. andallied forces.3

At the urging of Majors Arthur Strangeand Charlie Beckwith, the 145th AviationPlatoon (lift) was placed under the opera-tional control of the 5th SF Group on Dec. 25,1965, to provide dedicated helicopters andcrews for Project Delta’s training and opera-tional missions. One month later, the 6thAviation Platoon (attack) joined the 145th toform the 2/171st Aviation Company.

On July 14, 1966, the 281st AviationCompany (assault helicopter) assumed themission of supporting the 5th SF Group,and it retained that mission until Feb. 23,1970. According to Clyde J. Sincere Jr.,once the 281st was assigned to support the5th Group, “U.S. Special Forces becamemore responsive in fielding mobile-reactionforces to deal with crisis situations.”4

With the exception of operational securi-ty, deception was the most important factorduring helicopter infiltrations of teams.5Experience had proved that infiltrationwas best accomplished at last light —

56 Special Warfare

The 281st Aviation Company: The Roots of Army Special Operations Aviation

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

USASOC Archive

The “Wolf Pack” patchof the 281st AviationCompany.

pilots could still see well enough to insertthe force and slip away from the landingzone, but in a few minutes, air and groundelements would be covered by darkness.Because the enemy soon became familiarwith that tactic, U.S. forces had to devisemethods of confusing him as to the exactpoint of debarkation. Helicopters often setdown briefly at three or more points in thevicinity of the primary landing zone to cre-ate uncertainty, and teams rappelled intovery small clearings or climbed down ropeladders into old bomb craters.6 Anothertrick was to fly three helicopters in singlefile. The lead helicopter would touch downmomentarily to discharge its reconnais-sance team as the other two aircraft passedoverhead. The lead helicopter would thenrejoin the flight as the last one in the file.7

Rapid extraction of a compromised teamwas extremely important, and command-and-control elements had to be prepared toextract teams at a moment’s notice. Cap-tain Bill Larrabee, who was a Project Deltaoperations officer, explained, “We have ourown choppers assigned to us. We have threechoppers — two gunships and a slick —manned at all times. The crews sleep onthem. If one of our patrols gets into trouble,[they] only [have] to whisper one word intoa radio, and the choppers are in the air toget [them] out, day or night.”8

During the Vietnam War, night helicopterflying was risky business, because night-

vision goggles were not available. Limitedtime for remaining on the objective (about20 minutes) also made night operationsmore difficult.9 Aircrews had to rely onstrobe lights and pen flares to guide them tothe teams that were waiting to be extracted.But once the members of the aircrew estab-lished visual contact with the team on theground and made verbal identification, theteam could no longer use strobes and flares.Their use was forbidden in order to protectthe pilot’s night vision. To further protectthe pilot’s night vision, the co-pilot focusedhis attention on the instruments inside thecockpit while the pilot focused his attentionoutside the helicopter.

The probability that a force would haveto be recovered before the completion of itsmission was inversely proportional to thesize of the force. Road-runner teams (com-posed of four Vietnamese) and long-rangereconnaissance teams (composed of two SFsoldiers and four Vietnamese) were themost vulnerable to enemy forces. Ordinari-ly, helicopters lifted small patrols fromlanding zones. But if a team had to berecovered from a position that was unsuit-able for the aircraft to touch down, res-cuers would lift team members using arope ladder or a block-and-tackle rig. Teammembers could snap-link onto the ropes orhold on to the ropes and lock arms.10

Use of the folding ladder to facilitatehelicopter extractions dates back to the

June 2002 57

USASOC Archive

A crew chief from the281st stands beside aUH-1C “Hog Frog” that isequipped with 2.75-inchrocket pods and a “chin-mounted” 40 mm gre-nade launcher.

World War II helicopter demonstrations ofOtto Sikorsky.11 But it was not untilSergeant Major Charles T. McGuire designedthe first-generation individual extractionharness — initially a snap-link and ropesling that fit under the armpits, and later aweb harness — that soldiers could escape inseconds, ascending with the aircraft.12 Hold-ing on with their arms, however, denied res-cued soldiers the ability to return fire duringlift-out.

The second-generation harness, theSTABO system, corrected the problem andallowed the soldiers to keep their hands free.The STABO rig proved to be one of the mostinnovative reconnaissance hardware items

produced during the Viet-nam War. Another inser-tion/extraction systemwas the metal-rung andcable-ladder system thatwas created for the U.S.Navy CH-46 helicopter.Master Sergeant NormanDoney adapted that sys-tem for use with UH-1helicopters.13

Excerpts from the mis-sion reports of several

Project Sigma road-runner and reconteams in the vicinity of Phouc Vinh andnear the Long Nguyen Secret Zone in theIII Corps Tactical Zone highlight the dan-ger of helicopter extractions under fire:

RT Msn 1 extracted by sling under firevic XT988682 at 011810 May 1967.

RT Msn 4 extracted by sling under firevic YT008813 at 030850 May 1967.

RT Msn 13 infiltrated vic XT981651 at151245 May 1967. Team encountered VCforce of seven men at 151500 May andopened fire, killing 2 VC.

RR Msn 1 was fired on vic XT678527during movement to LZ. One man woundedin action, left arm (died of wounds) andteam extracted under fire at 281710 April1967 vic XT665509.

RR Msn 22 infiltrated vic XT938346 at140807 May 1967, and was extracted byrope ladder vic XT973389 at 151000 May1967.

RR Msn 23 infiltrated vic XT941622 at

150837 May 1967. Team observed 30 manVC platoon vic XT956637. At 151430 May,team spotted by estimated two VC platoonsvic XT963363. VC fired a rifle grenade nearthe team and began advancing. A teammember threw an M-26 grenade when theVC were about 15 meters away, killing fiveVC. Team took cover in two old foxholes andkilled four additional VC. Gunships sup-pressed fire and team was extracted underfire vic XT963636 at 151525 May 1967.14

The pilots who flew those dangerousmissions were young men, 19 and 20years old, who were attracted by theadventure of the Army’s helicopter pilotprogram. Possessing superb hand-and-eyecoordination, courage and a youthfulsense of invincibility, the pilots of the281st regularly flew their birds into hotLZs with little or no thought for their ownsafety, and they forced their aircraft dothings that they were not designed to do.The Hog Frog pilots loaded their gunshipswith so many rockets and with so muchammo that they routinely had to performa “lift and bounce, lift and bounce” maneu-ver on their skids in order to get theirbirds airborne.15

Directed by their crew chiefs, the pilotseased their aircraft down through triple-canopy jungle, with limbs and branchesonly inches from the rotors. When the air-craft were low enough, the aircrew woulddrop a jungle penetrator or a STABO kit topick up the ground forces; then they wouldreverse the process to escape. These actsrequired superb coordination and completetrust among the aircrew.

The lines below are taken from the poem“Fire in the Hole,” written by James R. Jar-rett, who served in Project Delta. They revealthe strong bond that formed between the spe-cial-operations ground and aviation forces inVietnam:

Darkened jungle holds the fate,Comrades trapped beyond the gate.Aircraft screaming fast and low,Death pursues the team below.Courage their shield from loss of hope,Hope as frail as STABO rope.Rotors whine, gunners in the door,Swiftly go these dogs of war.

58 Special Warfare

USASOC Archive

A warrant-officer pilotand crew chief of the281st’s 22nd AssaultPlatoon stand in front oftheir “slick” command-and-control helicopter.

A creed unknown to most mankind,Never leave a man behind.

The effects of the Vietnam War werenumerous, and many are still with ustoday. The STABO rig of the Vietnam erahas evolved into the single-point individualextraction system. While helicopter rap-pelling continues to be the staple of the AirAssault School, the fast-rope insertion-extraction system offers more advantagesto the ground forces and reduces helicopterhover time.

But one of the most significant effects isthe hereditary connection of the 281st Avia-tion Company to the 160th Special Opera-tions Aviation Regiment. Often the impor-tance of training special-operations groundforces and air elements together is over-looked, but operations in Panama, South-west Asia and Afghanistan have revalidatedthe need for that training. The strong cama-raderie, created in training and reinforcedin combat, between the Army SOF groundforces and their organic air assets duringVietnam not only continues, but promises topay dividends in future operations.

Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command histori-an for the U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand.

Notes:1 Project Leaping Lena required a large amount of

specialized equipment. Because Captain LarryO’Neill, the supply officer, habitually marked theshipments for Detachment B-52 with a chalk triangle,the unit became referred to as Project Delta. ColonelRobert Mitchell and Fred Funk, interview by Dr. C.H.Briscoe and Dr. Kenn Finlayson, 4 September 2001,transcript, hereafter Mitchell & Funk interview, U.S.Army Special Operations Forces Archives, U.S. ArmySpecial Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.

2 Colonel Francis J. Kelly, Vietnam Studies: SpecialForces 1961-1971 (Washington, D.C.: Department ofthe Army, 1973), 107-08; Mitchell & Funk interview.

3 Kelly, 107-08; Mitchell & Funk interview.4 Shelby Stanton, Special Forces at War: An Illus-

trated History, Southeast Asia 1957-1975 (Char-lottesville, Va.: Howell Press, 1990), 153.

5 Kelly, 143; Mitchell & Funk interview.6 Mitchell & Funk interview.7 Kelly, 143.8 Jim Morris, War Story (New York: Dell, 1979), 278-

79; Mitchell & Funk interview.9 Kelly, 143; Mitchell & Funk interview.

10 Kelly, 146-47.11 Ralph Alex, “How Are You Fixed for Blades? TheSaga of the Helicopter, Circa 1940-60,” in Walter J.Boyne and Donald S. Lopez, eds., Vertical Flight: TheAge of the Helicopter (Washington, D.C.: SmithsonianInstitution Press, 1984), 21-22.12 Kelly, 146-47.13 The STABO rig, which freed the individual’s handsto fire his weapon during ascent, was developed byMajor Robert L. Stevens (the ST of STABO), CaptainJohn C. Knabb (the AB of STABO), and Sergeant FirstClass Clifford Roberts (the O part of STABO). ShelbyL. Stanton, Rangers at War: Combat Recon in Vietnam(New York: Orion Books, 1992), 303; Mitchell & Funkinterview.14 Kelly, 205-10.15 Mitchell & Funk interview.

June 2002 59

During Flintlock 2001, a SpecialForces A-detachment from the 20thSF Group, Detachment 2031, togeth-

er with active-component A-detachmentsfrom the 3rd SF Group, deployed as part ofAdvanced Operational Base, or AOB, 390.The 35-day deployment was preceded by afive-month train-up. The exercise encom-passed excellent team training, an austereenvironment and interaction with the localmilitary and host-country civilians.

A National Guard SF team that isattached to an active-component forward

operational base, orFOB, finds itself ina unique situation.Detachment 2031had to analyze themission require-ments and theintent of the mis-sion from the per-spective of both the20th SF Group andthe 3rd SF Group.This was a some-what challenging

task, because the requirements of the twogroups did not necessarily coincide. The20th SF Group placed its emphasis on uni-lateral training, and the 3rd SF Groupplaced its emphasis on foreign internaldefense, or FID. After conducting a detailedmission analysis, Detachment 2031 arrivedat a reworked mission statement that was

approved by the commander of the 20thGroup:

ODA 2031 conducts unilateral tacti-cal training and trains 120 Malianpersonnel in light-infantry skills aspart of Flintlock - 01 from 09 June2001 to 12 July 2001 in the vicinity ofSikasso, Mali in order to increase theFID skills of the detachment, theorganic capability and efficiency ofthe Malian Army, and promote stabil-ity in the region. Be prepared to con-duct real-world unilateral operationsin theater immediately upon notifica-tion by FOB.

The mission statement addressed all of theissues raised for Detachment 2031 by bothgroups, and the statement served the detach-ment well throughout Flintlock 2001.

In accordance with the first clause of themission statement, Detachment 2031 ini-tially focused on internal training. The com-mander of the 20th Group, however, advisedthe detachment to make the most of theopportunity afforded by the 3rd Group andby the environment in Mali. The detach-ment conducted training based on its mis-sion-essential task list: FID; direct action, orDA; and unconventional warfare, or UW.The training was especially effective, as theaustere environment added a level of real-ism and stress that cannot be replicated inthe armory in Springfield, Mass., where the20th SF Group has its headquarters.

60 Special Warfare

The 20th SF Group in Flintlock 2001

U.S. Army photo

Soldiers from the 20thSF Group build rapportwith Malian airborne sol-diers during a wing-exchange ceremony.

Detachment 2031 was also able to focuson cross-training and SF common-tasktraining. Again, the real-world environmentand the excellent support from AOB 390contributed to an outstanding training situ-ation. The deployment allowed all membersto have an unmatched training experience.

Even if no other training had been con-ducted, the exercise would have been a suc-cessful one for Detachment 2031. But thedetachment’s role during the Flintlock 2001exercise was to train 120 Malian soldiers incheckpoint operations and light-infantryskills. The detachment spent months devel-oping the program of instruction, or POI,which was based largely on similar FIDmissions performed in Latin America by theU.S. Southern Command, or SOUTHCOM.

Prior to deploying to Fort Bragg, Detach-ment 2031 had rehearsed all classes at theSpringfield armory. This preparation allowedthe detachment to provide the AOB with ameaningful plan immediately upon itsarrival at Fort Bragg. Once on the ground inMali, Detachment 2031 ran three iterationsof its three-day POI. As a result, the detach-ment was able to train three 40-man pla-toons through the “crawl” and “walk” phasesof light-infantry tactics. During the last iter-ation of training, the teams from the 3rd SFGroup attached personnel to observe theMalians and ultimately to take control of thehost-nation troops in order to continue train-ing and finish the exercise once Detachment2031 had re-deployed.

The success of Detachment 2031 was duein large part to the skill, professionalismand preparation of its soldiers and theirability to work together. In this regard,Detachment 2031 was greater than thesum of its parts, as are all successful A-detachments. Detachment 2031 has sup-ported operations in the U.S. EuropeanCommand and SOUTHCOM, and it hasworked with the 10th, 7th and 3rd SFgroups. The institutional memory of theteam stretches back to 1973, but no oneremembers a true integration of NationalGuard and active-component units prior toFlintlock 2001.

During the exercise, the ODA was integrat-ed into both FOB 33 and AOB 390. The rap-port that developed among all personnel was

critical to Detachment 2031’s accomplish-ments. Upon its arrival at Fort Bragg, thedetachment was incorporated into CompanyC, 1/3rd SF Group. Throughout the deploy-ment, National Guard teams and active-com-ponent teams were treated alike. In fact, themix of National Guard and active-componentteams was critical to the operations in Sikas-so. Because of problems with air transporta-tion, many of the mechanics and support per-sonnel were late in arriving at Sikasso. Butelectrical power to the AOB was not delayed,because Detachment 2031’s personnel includ-ed two licensed electricians who installed allrequired wiring and generator hookups.Detachment 2031 personnel also included anemergency-room nurse, who provided a capa-bility that is not nor-mally available inthe AOB during anactive-componentdeployment.

Similarly, theactive-componentpersonnel at theAOB and ODA lev-els were an invalu-able asset to theNational Guard sol-diers. They provid-ed subject-matterexpertise on new equipment that would oth-erwise have been unavailable to the Nation-al Guard personnel. On average, the sol-diers of Detachment 2031 had graduatedfrom the SF Qualification Course at FortBragg 15 years earlier.

The Flintlock 2001 deployment/exercisewas an unqualified success. The command-er’s intent, as briefed to the group com-mander, was accomplished, and Detach-ment 2031 built an excellent rapport withFOB 33, AOB 390 and the two active-com-ponent A-detachments. To a man, thedetachment felt that Flintlock 2001 wasworthwhile and that integrating NationalGuard and active-component units is anexcellent way of operating.

This article was written by members ofthe 20th Special Forces Group.

June 2002 61

U.S. Army photo

A soldier from the 20thSF Group instructs Maliansoldiers on small-unittactics.

62 Special Warfare

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

The Special Forces Prior Service Accessions Program has establishedprocedures for evaluating and accessing CMF-18-qualified NCOs whohad previously served on active duty or in the reserve component andwho are interested in re-applying for SF service in the active component.Those who are eligible include prior-service personnel, SF reserve-com-ponent personnel, and active-duty soldiers who are SF-qualified but arenot serving in a CMF-18 skill.Applicants will be accessed on active duty under a conditional contract.The contract specifies that if soldiers are selected by the assessment-and-review board, they will serve on active duty in CMF 18. Soldiers whodo not meet the assessment prerequisites or the board criteria will bereclassified into another MOS as directed by the Total Army PersonnelCommand, or TAPC, consistent with the needs of the Army.The Special Warfare Center and School will evaluate an applicant’sphysical ability, duty performance, psychological stability and securityclearance prior to the applicant’s appearance before the assessment-and-review board. Evaluation criteria include a complete physical examina-tion, the Army Physical Fitness Test, psychological testing, and a 12-mileroad march. The assessment-and-review board will convene at FortBragg once the candidates have completed their assessment-and-evalua-tion criteria. Applicants who are selected by the review board will beaccessed into active-duty SF in accordance with the guidelines of bothTAPC and the Army Recruiting Command. Applicants who are notselected will not be re-evaluated for at least 12 months.For more information, telephone MSG Brian Nulf at DSN 239-8423/9002or commercial (910) 432-8423/9002.

Former SF soldiers may beaccessed on active duty

June 2002 63

Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

The SF Officer Branch at PERSCOM provides the following data from thefiscal year 2003 battalion-command selection board:• All officers selected in the tactical and TSS categories performed excep-

tionally well in branch-qualifying, or BQ, major positions. Those in theinstitutional category performed nearly as well.

• BQ time as a major ranged from 22 to 45 months, with 29 months theaverage.

• Four of those selected (two TSS and two institutional) were non-residentMEL 4 graduates. Thus, resident MEL 4 is not a discriminator.

The battalion-command cut is extremely tough for SF because of the smallnumber of SF battalion commands and the exceptional quality of the SFBranch. Anything less than exceptional BQ performance as a major is adiscriminator. SF officers who are not selected for battalion command butperform well as lieutenant colonels still have a chance of being selected forcolonel — an opportunity not available in the other combat-arms branch-es. Of the 17 SF lieutenant colonels who were selected for colonel on thelast board, four had not commanded as lieutenant colonels.

SF Branch chief LTC Chris AllenDSN [email protected]

LTC assignments MAJ Jack JensenDSN [email protected]

MAJ assignments MAJ Ron Tuczak DSN [email protected]

CPT assignments MAJ Roy DouglasDSN [email protected]

Future readiness CPT Steve JohnsonDSN [email protected]

Field-grade tech Ms. Sandra BryantDSN [email protected]

The commercial telephone prefix for the numbers listed above is (703) 325-.Address correspondence to Department of the Army; U.S. Total Army PersonnelCommand;Attn:TAPC-OPE-SF; 200 Stovall Street;Alexandria,VA 22332-0414.

PERSCOM points of contact

Competition keen for SFbattalion command

64 Special Warfare

Foreign SOFSpecial Warfare

In the Chengdu military region of southwest China, the Chinese army istraining a special-operations force. According to Chinese reports, the forceis making “extensive use of high-technology and new-generation equip-ment” and is training to perform a range of “reconnaissance and intelli-gence-gathering, secret infiltration, raiding and sabotage, joint operations,hostage rescue,” and other missions. The unit benefits from a trainingenvironment that ranges from tropic-like jungle areas, to plains, and tomountains that are more than 4,300 meters above sea level. The trainingenvironment also includes large cities and extensive rural areas. Substan-tial training — including a two-month exercise — has been conducted insnow-covered mountainous areas of the region in winter, with the goal ofimproving the unit’s capabilities to operate in a “high-altitude frigid zone.”

The Bundeswehr’s still-developing Special Operations Division, or DSO,and one of its subordinate elements, the Special Forces Command, or KSK,have received increased media coverage since the Sept. 11, 2001, terroristattacks on the United States. The DSO, which includes two airbornebrigades trained for traditional air assault missions as well as the KSKand other elements, was established several years ago and is expected toreach a full strength of 8,000 personnel by the end of 2003. Despite aus-tere German military budgets, DSO elements are reportedly receiving newequipment, including communications means, light armor and specializedweapons. DSO still lacks long-range air transport and modernized combathelicopters. It has been a stated German goal in on-going transformationand military-reform efforts to create mobile forces capable of dealing withthe new challenges in the contemporary operational environment. The waron terrorism quickly highlighted the DSO as the German force best-suitedfor missions beyond traditional central European and regional require-ments. KSK soldiers, whose past overseas missions have reportedly includ-ed deployments to the Balkans and to the Middle East, are widely report-ed to be engaged in combat operations in Afghanistan together with spe-cial units from the U.S., Britain and other allies, but the German govern-ment has been largely silent on specifics.

Over the last few months, a number of regional specialists have reportednew activity by Sendero Luminoso — the Maoist Shining Path terroristgroup that was largely dismantled in the 1990s. Shining Path members arereportedly reorganizing politically in Peruvian universities and in poverty-stricken settlements around Lima, as well as preparing for bombings andother direct terrorist acts in urban and rural settings. The growing dangerof renewed activity was particularly underscored by a bomb detonationshortly before the arrival of President Bush in Lima in March 2002. In addi-tion, some regional specialists believe the Shining Path may be allied withexternal terrorist groups, including the Revolutionary Armed Force of

Shining Path may targetU.S. interests in Peru

German special-ops in public eye

Chinese Army trains special-operations force

June 2002 65

Colombia and Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda. Long involved in the drug tradewith Peruvian coca cultivators and Colombian traffickers, Sendero is alsoreportedly linked to opium-poppy cultivation and heroin-trafficking to fundits reorganization and sustainment efforts. Peruvian Interior Minister Fer-nando Rospigliosi recently acknowledged that Shining Path reorganizationattempts are under way, and while stipulating that a return to the wide-spread terrorism of the early 1990s is unlikely, he did note the potential forattacks on U.S. interests in Peru.

The Ukrainian General Staff has announced its intention to create specialunits capable of conducting reconnaissance-sabotage missions and otheroperations on enemy territory. The new units will also perform counter-terrorist duties and operate together with other rapid-reaction and so-called “front line” forces that collectively may total 50,000 personnel by2005. The formation and equipping of these new units is termed part of alarger Ukrainian military reform and restructuring effort.

The Mexican Popular Revolutionary Army, or EPR, guerrilla group contin-ues to project a political presence and a public face through its internet pub-lication, El Insurgente, as well as through it armed actions and surpriseappearances. The EPR — engaged earlier this year in a recruiting effort inthe Costa Grande mountains of Guerrero state — issued a statement in Maycondemning Mexican President Vicente Fox as a supporter of Yankee impe-rialism. The EPR singled out the Fox administration’s support of counter-terrorist cooperation and activities with the U.S. and others. In particular,the EPR charged that Fox “allowed Argentine, Spanish, and, of course, Yan-kee police to act inside Mexican territory to apprehend and [to] send backhome those who were fighting for social causes and who still had faith inMexican solidarity … the Fox administration is acting in complicity with theimperialists’ fight against alleged terrorists.” Also noted was support of “thecreation of the Northern Command and the participation of the MexicanNavy in joint military maneuvers with the United States, even though theSDN [National Defense Secretariat] denies this.” In recent months, armedEPR members have shown up in a number of villages where they distributedpropaganda leaflets, painted slogans on local structures, and encouragedresidents to join them in their efforts against the government. The propa-ganda leaflets emphasized the enduring links that the EPR members haveto past guerrilla movements. Some of the leaflets celebrated the memory ofthe Mexican guerrilla leader Lucio Cabanas Barrientos, who was killed inthe Guerrero mountains by the Mexican Army and police in 1974. While theEPR appearances have not involved observed acts of violence, the late-Jan-uary killing of a leader of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, byarmed men wearing military-like gear and carrying assault rifles, was sus-pected by some to have links to EPR. The PRI official was killed by AK-47and shotgun rounds. Regrettably for the violent area, guerrillas, drug traf-fickers, paramilitaries and other criminal or political groups can be num-bered among the suspects.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military StudiesOffice, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

The Ukraine to create special-operations forces

Guerrilla group condemnsMexican president Fox

for supporting U.S.

Army SF Command’s Burford receives first star

Brigadier General David P. Bur-ford was promoted in a ceremonyApril 26, 2002, at the U.S. ArmySpecial Operations Command’sDick Meadows Field.

Burford, deputy commandinggeneral of the U.S. Army SpecialForces Command, received his starsfrom his wife, Susan, and fromMajor General Geoffrey C. Lambert,commander of the Army SF Com-mand. Burford is a NationalGuardsman from the 20th SpecialForces Group, Fort McClellan, Ala.

European detachmentassigned to 112th SOSB

Thirty-two soldiers formerlyassigned to the 52nd Signal Battal-ion in Stuttgart, Germany, official-ly became members of U.S. special-operations forces April 2, 2002. Thesoldiers are now designated as adetachment of the 112th SpecialOperations Signal Battalion, butare forward-deployed to the SpecialOperations Command-Europe.

The 52nd Signal Battalion hasbeen responsible for providing com-munication to the special-opera-tions community in the Europeantheater since 1985.

The unit is responsible for opera-tions from the southernmost tip ofAfrica to Finland in the north, saidArmy Lieutenant Colonel JohnForsyth, director of SOCEUR’s com-munications and electronics division.

“What is special about the sol-diers,” Forsyth said, “is they areable to operate in small units ofjust one or two men, making themhighly mobile. The soldiers also

must have the ability to solve prob-lems quickly.”

The split in the unit will leave avoid within the 52nd Signal Battal-ion, according to the battalion com-mander, Lieutenant Colonel CyrusE. Gwyn Jr. “It’s a bittersweetmoment,” he said. “They brought awarrior attitude to the battalion …especially in physical fitness andsoldier skills.”

About 100 people attended a 45-minute ceremony in WashingtonSquare at Patch Barracks, duringwhich the special-operations soldierschanged their guidon and berets fornew ones that bore the symbol of the112th Special Operations SignalBattalion. — David Josar, Euro-pean Stars & Stripes

SF manuals cover survival,resistance, pack animals

When soldiers are working withina non-permissive environment, thenecessity to evade capture is para-

mount, especially during conflictwith nations that do not abide by theGeneva Conventions. FM 3-05.70,Survival (formerly FM 21-76), hasbeen submitted to the Army Train-ing Support Center for printing andfor distribution to the force. Themanual provides in-depth informa-tion about the terrain, vegetation,weather and other conditions thatare critical to SF soldiers’ ability tosurvive in various environments.

Chapters 20, 21 and 22 of FM 3-05.70 address survival movementin hostile areas; camouflage andstalking methods; contact with thelocal populace; survivor’s behavior;and changes in political allegiance.The other chapters have beenupdated from earlier versions ofthe manual.

Closely allied to survival areresistance and escape. The Centerand School has completed the pub-lication and distribution of FM 3-05.71, Resistance and Escape,dated August 2001, to aid soldiersin surviving captivity and to pro-vide instruction on various tech-niques of escape. The manual isclassified confidential.

During recent operations inAfghanistan, U.S. Army SpecialForces once again found them-selves accomplishing the missionby using pack animals. Pack ani-mals were used extensively duringthe Korean War, were importantduring Operation Uphold Democ-racy in Haiti, and are usedthroughout the U.S. SouthernCommand’s area of responsibility.

FM 31-27, Pack Animals in Sup-port of Army Special Operations,published in February 2000, helpsto prepare soldiers for the chal-

66 Special Warfare

UpdateSpecial Warfare

BG David P. Burford’s wife, Susan, pins a star on hisshoulder during the ceremony at Fort Bragg April 26.

Photo by Kyle Cosner

lenges of moving personnel andequipment in denied areas. Redes-ignated FM 3-05.213, it is undergo-ing revision.

Measures of effectivenessimportant in PSYOP

Discerning the measures of effec-tiveness, or MOE, to determinecampaign success may be one ofthe most difficult steps in the exe-cution of psychological operations,or PSYOP. Taking into considera-tion the myriad processes andfunctions that contribute to thesuccess or failure of a PSYOP pro-gram presents even further chal-lenges. As the target audience’sattitudes, beliefs and behaviors areexamined, can the supported com-mander accurately surmise thedegree to which PSYOP con-tributed to the success of his mis-sion? After any operation, PSYOPcommanders and planners areoften called upon to explain theoutcome of PSYOP campaigns.

The Psychological OperationsTraining and Doctrine Division,Directorate of Training and Doctrine,U.S. Army Special Warfare Centerand School, is soliciting suggestionsfrom the PSYOP community to helpclarify which MOE methodologiesmay be feasible for evaluation andmodification of PSYOP programs.Examples of successful MOE wouldalso be useful.

The PSYOP Division will use thefeedback to provide assistance toMajor Russell Hampsey, a PSYOPanalyst at the Special OperationsCenter for Force Structure,Resources, and Strategic Assess-ments, Wargaming Simulationsand Analysis Division, U.S. SpecialOperations Command. Hampseyleads a team of experts who aredeveloping a methodology that willascertain not only the degree ofPSYOP success, but also the fac-tors contributing to an effectiveprogram. The PSYOP Division isproviding PSYOP doctrinal exper-

tise to Hampsey’s project.Together with Major Todd Ges-

ling, an operations-research-sys-tem-analysis officer; and David R.Holdsworth, a senior military ana-lyst with the Illinois Institute ofTechnology Research Institute’sModeling and Simulation Informa-tion Analysis Center, Hampsey hasdevised a prototypical model toassist PSYOP personnel in accurate-ly determining the effectiveness oftheir programs.

The model examines PSYOP taskexecution and the target-audiencebehavioral responses to determinecampaign success. Task executionidentifies whether or not the devel-opment, production, distribution,and dissemination tasks are com-pleted to standard. The model alsoexamines the magnitude and thedirection of any change in the targetaudience’s behavior.

Finally, the model assesses successin terms of the degree that the targetaudience’s behavior change is sus-tained over time and how the changealigns with campaign objectives. Themodel therefore evaluates the com-pleted tasks from planning to execu-tion; most notably, the PSYOP prod-ucts, the media selection, and theobjective in relation to the targetaudience’s actions.

The progress of the proposedMOE model will be discussed in anarticle in a future issue of SpecialWarfare. Interested persons mayprovide input to Hampsey at DSN299-6950, commercial (813) 828-6950; or e-mail [email protected] may also contact Lynn Gilfus,PSYOP Training and DoctrineDivision, at DSN 239-1318, com-mercial (910) 432-1318; or [email protected].

DoD reinstates NationalDefense Service Medal

The Department of Defense hasreinstated the National DefenseService Medal for members of theU.S. armed forces serving on active

duty on or after Sept. 11, 2001.The authorization to reinstate

the NDSM is contained in MILPERmessage number 02-150. TheNDSM is now awarded for honor-able active service during the fol-lowing inclusive periods: June 27,1950, to July 27, 1954; Jan. 1, 1961,to Aug. 14, 1974; Aug. 2, 1990, toNov. 30, 1995; and Sept. 11, 2001,to a date to be determined.

For the award of the NDSM afterSept. 11, 2001, the following per-sons will not be considered as per-forming active service:• Army National Guard and U.S.

Army Reserve personnel onshort tours of duty to fulfilltraining obligations under aninactive duty training program.

• Any service member on temporaryduty or temporary active duty toserve on boards, courts, commis-sions and like organizations.

• Any service member on active dutyfor the sole purpose of undergoinga physical examination.Executive Order 12778, dated

Oct. 18, 1991, has authorized a one-time-only exception for members ofthe Army National Guard and U.S.Army Reserve who were part of theselected reserve in good standingduring the period Aug. 2, 1990, toNov. 30, 1995.

For more information, telephoneArlette King at DSN 221-9171, orcommercial (703) 325-9171; e-mail:[email protected]; orvisit the home page of the ArmyAwards Branch at http://www.pers-com.army.mil/tagd/awards.

June 2002 67

Green Berets in the Vanguard:Inside Special Forces 1953-1963. By Chalmers Archer Jr.Annapolis, Md.: Naval InstitutePress, 2001. ISBN: 1-55750-023-1(hardback). 168 pages. $28.95.

Chalmers Archer Jr. offers aunique historical perspective onU.S. Army Special Forces duringits formative years. An African-American who served as a med-ical sergeant during the earlydays of U.S. Army Special Forces,Archer provides an engagingstory for those who are interestedboth in special operations and inthe initial stages of U.S. militaryinvolvement in Southeast Asia. Inthe book, Archer skillfully blendshis capabilities as an award-win-ning writer and as an educatorwith his military experience toproduce a thoughtful and capti-vating story on his rich experi-ence in Special Forces.

Archer weaves an intriguingstory about his life in SpecialForces with the values he grew upwith and the importance of team-work and communities. He has anuncanny knack of offering macroand micro perspectives of situa-tions on the ground. At the sametime he offers strategic sugges-tions of the employment of SF, healso speaks authoritatively on thelocal norms and customs of thehost-nation people with whom heserved. Archer pays close atten-tion to what is happening at thegrass-roots level and ties it clear-ly into a strategic framework.

Archer views SF soldiers asfield diplomats, trainers, leadersand fighters. He bases his account

on a variety of missions and oper-ations that took him to Hawaii,Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, Oki-nawa and Laos.

Trained as a medical NCO,Archer brings a values-based anddignified appreciation for the sup-port that he and his teammatesprovided to host-nation communi-ties. A former college professor,Archer reflects authoritatively onpast SF operations and operators,and he expresses a kinship withthose who went before him.Throughout the book, he stressesthe values of teamwork, commit-ment, courage and community.The values-based, multifacetedroles and the human dimensionsof SF form a theme that hesuperbly carries throughout thebook.

Interspersed throughout thebook are a variety of colorfulvignettes that help explain thelegacy of Army SF. Archer tells of

the origins of the green beret andshoulder-sleeve insignia, of earlyrelations with OGAs, of traininghost-nation soldiers, and of thegap between policy-makers andthe troops on the ground who hadto execute the policy. Archer fin-ishes the book with some insight-ful lessons learned and a wiselook toward the future.

Archer writes a thoughtfulaccount of his service in SpecialForces. His commendable historyof the training, missions andtypes of soldiers during the earlydays of SF helps to fill a gap inthe rich lineage of Army SpecialForces. Archer’s book is relevantto those who are interested in theearly years of the U.S. involve-ment in Southeast Asia, as well asto those who enjoy a well-writtenand authoritative account of SFhistory. Green Berets in the Van-guard is highly readable, relevantand recommended.

MAJ Fred T. Krawchuk1st Battalion, 10th SF GroupStuttgart, Germany

U. S. Army Special Warfare: ItsOrigins (Revised Edition).Alfred H. Paddock Jr. (Lawrence,Kan: University Press of Kansas,2002). ISBN 0-7006-1177-0. 280pages. $35.

U.S. Army Special Warfare: ItsOrigins, by Alfred H. Paddock Jr.,was published in 1982 in a verylimited paperback edition by theNational Defense University, orNDU. Possession of the book waspretty much limited to those fortu-nate enough to know the author or

68 Special Warfare

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

to have access to NDU’s generousshelves. To those few fortunateenough to acquire a copy, the bookwas a treasure. It was lent only tothe most trustworthy, and withmaledictions should it not bereturned promptly.

In the years since its publication,the book has become a collector’sprize. One bookstore in Washing-ton, D.C., asked almost $200 for awell-used copy, a fact that gave thebook’s author, who received noth-ing from its publication, near car-diac arrest.

In addition to being rare, thebook was unique. It was one of thefew books extant that describedthe creation of Special Forces inprecise detail and without mythi-cal attachments to earlier irregu-lar organizations, such as the NewEngland rangers, “Swamp Fox”Marion’s partisans, or variousCivil War irregulars. And, unlikemany books that address thefounding of Special Forces, it wasnot a memoir but a serious histo-ry. That is an important distinc-tion. While the book may not havehad the personal experiences andviewpoints that often make mem-oirs engaging reading, it had thefacts, carefully researched andmeticulously referenced.

Late last year, the University ofKansas wisely decided that thebook deserved to be reprinted.Unfortunately for the author, butfortunately for the reader, reprint-ing demanded computer-format-ted text. The original had beenwritten on a typewriter. Theauthor, Al Paddock, had to retypethe entire text.

During the intervening years,he had continued probing into theearly days of the Army’s Psycho-logical Operations and SpecialForces organizations, acquiringadditional information andinsights. He was particularly for-tunate in locating and receivingaccess to the papers of Major Gen-eral Robert A. McClure, a central

figure in the development of bothof these organizations.

As he retyped the book, Paddockintegrated the additional facts andreferences. The result is a book,which while technically a reprint,is largely new, with numerous sec-tions enhanced by extensive addi-tions of information. The revisededition has all the strengths of theoriginal and even greater depth.

As indicated above in the discus-sion of the earlier work, this is aserious history. There are hundredsof end notes. These are so full ofinteresting facts, explanations, andreferences that the reader will findhimself flipping back and forth todetermine “Who said that?” Thereare also some 36 pages of notes, 14pages of sources, a nine-page index,and a highly helpful glossary.

These dry facts concerning theauthor’s historical probity shouldnot intimidate the reader. Despiteits meticulous presentation of facts,the book is highly readable. It is not,like much that has been writtenabout Special Forces, a tale of der-ring-do and door-kicking. It is, oncethe World War II roots have beenexplained, a story of organizationalstruggle. It is a story of how RobertMcClure and his three guerrilla-

warfare paladins, Colonels Volck-mann, Fertig, and Bank, struggledto establish Special Forces in anArmy whose attitude varied fromantipathy to hostility. This storyshould be a revelation to those whothink there was an element ofinevitability about the creation ofSpecial Forces.

This very readable book providesprime professional knowledge notonly of the foundation of Psycho-logical Operations and SpecialForces but also of the workings ofmilitary bureaucracies. I heartilyrecommend it to every Psychologi-cal Operations and Special Forcesoperator, regardless of grade orassignment. I would like to partic-ularly recommend it to the seniorSF NCO who told me with sinceri-ty that SF was created by the CIAand to the SF officer who, withequal sincerity, assured me thatPresident Kennedy created SpecialForces.

COL J. H. CrerarU.S. Army (ret.)Vienna, Va.

June 2002 69

Special Warfare

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ■ Headquarters, Department of the Army

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