SPECIAL PROCEEDINGSMichelle Josephine Eden M. Silva

FULE VS CA

FACTS:On April 26, 1973 Amado G. Garcia died, he owned property in Calamba, Laguna. On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule field with CFI Laguna a petition for letters of administration and ex parte appointment as special administratix over the estate. Motion was granted. There was an allegation that the wife was Carolina Carpio. Preciosa B. Garcia, wife of deceased, and in behalf of their child: Agustina B. Garcia opposed, which was denied by CFI. Preciosa alleged that Fule was a creditor of the estate, and as a mere illegitimate sister of the deceased is not entitled to succeed from him.

CA reversed and annulled the appointment of Fule. Preciosa became special administratrix upon a bond of P30k.

ISSUE: What does the word resides in Revised Rules of Court Rule 73 Section 1 Mean?

HELD:RULE 73, SECTION 1. if the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled at the CFI in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, And if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI of any province in which he had estate. The court 1st taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

Fules own submitted Death Certificate shows that the deceased resided in QC at the time of his death, therefore the venue of Laguna was improper.

Venue is subject to waiver (RULE 4 SECTION 4), but Preciosa did not waive it, merely requested for alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse. However, venue is distinct from jurisdiction which is conferred by Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended to be with CFIs independently from the place of residence of the deceased.

RULE 79SECTION 2, demands that the petition should show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts such as death, name, last residence, existence, situs of assets, intestacy, right of person who seeks administration as next of kin, creditor or otherwise to be appointed. Resides means actual residence. It should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In its popular sense the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. As distinguished from legal residence or domicile requires bodily presence and an intention to make it ones domicile.

Preciosa is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix.

Tasiana Ongsingco vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan and Jose de Borja

Facts:Petitioner Tasiana Ongsingco is the wife and judicial guardian of Francisco de Borja, who was declared incompetent by the CFI of Rizal. Francisco de Borja is the surviving spouse of Josefa Tangco whose estate is being settled in the same court. Respondent Jose de Borja is the son of Francisco de Borja and administrator of the estate of Josefa Tangco.

After Francisco was declared incompetent, Tasiana took possession of two parcels of land situated in Santa Rosa, Nueva Ejica and commenced the threshing of the palay crop standing thereon. Jose filed a motion in the estate proceedings of Josefa praying that Tasiana be restrained from threshing the palays until the ownership of the lands has been resolved by the court or by agreement of the parties.

Tasiana opposed the motion and stated that the question of ownership can only be threshed out elsewhere and not by the probate court. She then filed an action in the CFI of Nueva Ecija to prevent Jose from interfering with the harvest. The CFI of Nueve Ecija granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by Tasiana.

Meanwhile, the CFI of Rizal issued an order restraining Tasiana in the threshing of the palay harvested in the disputed lands. Tasian filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. She then filed a petition for certiorari with prohibition in the Supreme Court.

Issue:Whether the CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction to resolve the ownership dispute between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja?

Held:No.

InFranco vs. OBrien,it was held that the question of ownership is one which should be determined in an ordinary action and not in probate proceedings, and this whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the estate.

In another case it was held that the general rule is that questions as to title to property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings or stating the rule more elaborately, When questions arise as to the ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of a deceased person but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administrative proceedings.

Based from the foregoing, it thus appears obvious that the CFI of Rizal exceeded its jurisdiction in acting upon the question of ownership in its capacity as probate court. Such question has been squarely raised in an action pending in the CFI of Nueva Ecija. It is of no consequence that what respondent court merely did was look into the identity of said properties. This question is necessarily imbibed in the greater issue of ownership and being interwoven one can hardly draw the line of demarcation that would separate one from the other.

A probate court cannot act on questions of ownership lest it exceeds its jurisdiction.

EUSEBIO VS EUSEBIO

FACTS:Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died on November 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition, in the City of Quezon. On December 4, 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly filed. By an order, dated March 10, 1954, said court overruled this objection and granted said petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal taken, from said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her aforementioned sister and brothers.

ISSUE:What is the situs of the residence, Pampanga or Quezon?

HELD:

It is not disputed that Andres Eusebio was, and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other properties. Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot at 889-A Espaa Extention, in said City. While transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr. Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the decedent remained until he was brought to the UST Hospital.

It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained" (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p.70; Restatement of the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently.

In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's petition.

JIMENEZ VS CAGR 75773

FACTS:Virginia Jimenez filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 5346, praying to be appointed as administratrix of the properties of the deceased spouses Lino Jimenez and Genoveva.

Private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr., son of Leonardo Jimenez, Sr., filed a motion for the exclusion of his father's name and those of Alberto, Alejandra, and Angeles from the petition, inasmuch as they are children of the union of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson and not of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy and because they have already received their inheritance consisting of five (5) parcels of lands.

Petitioner Virginia Jimenez was appointed administrator of the Intestate Estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy but included the 5 parcles of land mentioned by private respondent. Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. moved for the exclusion of these properties from the inventory on the ground that these had already been adjudicated to them.

Two (2) years after, petitioners filed an amended complaint dated December 10, 1984 before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII, docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 16111, to recover possession/ownership of the subject five (5) parcels of land as part of the estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy and to order private respondents to render an accounting of the produce therefrom. Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the action was barred by prior judgment in CA-G.R. No. SP-13916 dated November 18, 1982 and by prescription and laches. However, petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending that (1) the action was not barred by prior judgment because the probate court had no jurisdiction to determine with finality the question of ownership of the lots which must be ventilated in a separate action.

ISSUE: Whether in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate) the lower court has jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership.

RULING:Petitioners' present action for recovery of possession and ownership is appropriately filed because as a general rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. Since the probate, court's findings are not conclusive beingprima facie,a separate proceeding is necessary to establish the ownership of the five (5) parcels of land.

The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action.All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

CALMA VS TANEDO

FACTS:The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the owners of a certain property. They were indebted to Esperanza Taedo, and these debts were chargeable against the conjugal property. Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a will wherein she appointed her daughter, Maria Calma, as administratrix of her properties. In the probate proceedings in the CFI of Tarlac, Maria Calma was appointed judicial administratrix of the properties of the deceased. While these probate proceedings were pending, Esperanza Tanedo filed a suit for collection against Eulalio Calma. The CFI of Tarlac rendered judgment for the payment of this sum. In the execution of this judgment, despite the third party claim filed by Fausta Macasaquit, the conjugal property was sold by the sheriff. Maria Calma, as administratrix of the estate of Fausta Macasaquit, brought an action to ask that the sale made by the sheriff of the property be annulled and that the estate of Fausta Macasaquit be declared the sole and absolute owner thereof.

HELD:The sale of the property made by the sheriff in execution of the judgment rendered against Eulalio Calma for the collection of the indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal property, is void and said property should be deemed subject to the testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit. The probate proceedings were instituted in accordance with Act No. 3176:

SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, in accordance with the provisions of this Code relative to the administration and liquidation and partition proceeding, unless the parties, being all of age and legally capacitated, avail themselves of the right granted to them by this Code of proceeding to an extrajudicial partition and liquidation of said property.In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community property in order to pay the outstanding debts and obligations of the same, such sale shall be made in the manner and with the formalities established by this Code for the sale of the property of deceased persons. Any sale, transfer, alienation or disposition of said property effected without said formalities shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that belonged to the vendor at the time the liquidation and partition was made.

The testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit having been instituted, the liquidation and partition of the conjugal property by reason of her marriage to Eulalio Calma should be made in these proceedings, to the exclusion of any other proceeding for the same purpose. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the wife, the legal power of management of the husband ceases, passing to the administrator appointed by the court in the testate or intestate proceedings instituted to that end if there be any debts to be paid. Thus, Eulalio Calma having ceased as legal administrator of the conjugal property had with his wife Fausta Macasaquit, no complaint can be brought against him for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property, and that the action should be instituted in the testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit in the manner provided by law, by filing it first with the committee on claims.

REYES VS MOSQUEDA

FACTS:Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and was survived by his sister Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters, herein petitioners Ruperto Reyes et. al. The heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M in the CFI for the administration of Pascuals estate. Ursula then filed a motion to exclude some properties included alleging that these were donated to her in a donation mortis causa in 1966. This was granted by the CFI without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. An appeal was made to the SC. The SC then issued a TRO enjoining the CFI from enforcing the order.

Among the properties donated to Ursula is lot 24 which was also donated in 1969 in a deed of donation inter vivos in favor of Ofelia Parungao who was then a minor at the time of the donation. When she reached the age of majority, she had the donation registered but found out that the certificate of title was missing so she filed a petition for reconstitution of title which was granted and she registered the donation and was issued a new TCT in her name.

Ursula then sold the lot in favor of the Reyes. Benjamin Reyes filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Ofelias TCT which prompted Ofelia to file a petition for recovery of possession against Benjamin Reyes. The CFI issued a joint decision for the 2 cases ruling that Ofelias TCT was null and void. The IAC affirmed thus an appeal to the SC.

ISSUE:Whether or not the probate has jurisdiction to exclude properties donated to Ursula.

HELD:

YES.It was stressed in the order of the probate court that it was without prejudice to the final determination in a separate action. It is well-settled that although a probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties, it can determine whether or not the properties should be included in the inventory to be administered. Such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action.

DIVINA VS CA

FACTS:

The petition is an action for recovery of sum of money based on an extra-judicial agreement.Eleuterio was married to Juanita, although their union was not blessed with a child. Upon Eleuterio's demise, Juanita invited her three in-laws to participate in the extra-judicial settlement of the estate of her husband, they being the only heirs.Almost eight years after the signing of the extra-judicial settlement, Juanita's in-laws filed a complaint for revocation and annulment of the extra-judicial settlement of estate of Eleuterio, naming Juanita as defendant. In due time, however, Maximo and Trinidad withdrew as plaintiffs, leaving Concepcion, represented by her daughter, Amelia Tinoco, to pursue the case.

The complaint alleges that Juanita, by means of strategy and stealth and through fraud and illegal means, convinced and lured the plaintiffs therein in executing the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Eleuterio M. Muoz; that defendant Juanita has not paid each of the plaintiffs the amount of P55,788.00 or a total of P167,364.00 contrary to the stipulation in the said document.

The trial court, while upholding the validity of the Extra-Judicial Settlement, is of the belief that petitioner Concepcion was not paid the balance of her share giving credence to the affidavit of respondent Juanita signed in 1980 acknowledging such fact.

The affidavit, however, was executed on the same day that the extra-judicial partition was signed. On that very day, it is understandable that respondent did not have the cash to pay her co-heirs and as she testified, she had to sell some properties in order to give her in-laws their agreed share.

On the other hand, the appellate court, while also finding the Extra-Judicial Settlement valid, found that all the heirs, namely Concepcion, Trinidad and Maximo were indeed paid their share.

ISSUE:

HELD:

The extra-judicial settlement agreement is a contract, wherein the parties may establish such stipulations, clauses and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided that the legitime of the compulsory heirs are preserved. In the absence of fraud and provided all requisites are met, the same should be upheld as valid and binding between parties.

Extra-judicial partition, being a speedy and less expensive method of distribution of the estate, is specifically provided for in Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, that in the absence of a will and where the decedent left no debts and the heirs are all of age, the heirs may divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.

In proceeding with the actual partition of the properties mentioned in the deed, the parties, of course, are duty bound to abide by the mutual waiver of rights agreed upon in the document.A party can not, in law and in good conscience, be allowed to reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit him.

G.R. No. L-31454 December 28, 1929Estate of the deceased Francisco Arquiza. ISIDRA GAAS, ET AL. vs. PILAR FORTICH

FACTS:

January 23, 1926, Francisco Arquiza, of Cebu, made his last will and testament in which he bequeathed all of his property to Pilar Fortich his then wife. Later, upon his death, this will was admitted to probate as his last will and testament. Pending the administration of his estate, Isidra Gaas as natural guardian of the minors, Felicisimo Arquiza and Soledad Arquiza, respectfully prays this honorable court to declare said minors to be the legal heirs of the deceased Francisco Arquiza and for such other and further relief to which they may be entitled.

To which the executrix made a general and specific denial, and alleged the following special defenses:First special defense, alleges:That the petitioners Soledad and Felicisimo, surnamed Arquiza, alleged acknowledged natural children of the deceased Francisco Arquiza, represented by their guardianad litemIsidra Gaas, have no right to succeed in the properties of the herein deceased Francisco Arquiza; and asSecond special defense, alleges:That assuming that there is merit in the petition which is objected to by this pleading, the action to acknowledge the aforesaid minors has prescribed.

In a well considered and exhaustive opinion, the lower court sustained the petition and found that all of the legal rights of Federico Arquiza was vested in the petitioners, who were his legitimate children, and that, as such, they were entitled to one-third of the estate.

ISSUES:I. The lower court erred in holding that the alleged signature of Francisco Arquiza in the original Exhibit C is genuine.II. The lower court erred in holding that Federico Arquiza, father of the appellees Felicisimo and Soledad Arquiza, was a natural son of the deceased Francisco Arquiza.III. The lower court erred in declaring them entitled to one-third of the estate left by him, and in not dismissing the petition of the appellees.HELD:I. Upon the question of the signature, the lower court says: It was genuine.Professor Del Rosario is an expert witness by profession and was brought from Manila to Cebu to uphold the theory of the opponent and is no more disinterested than the opponent's attorneys, while Mr. Calhoun is a banker living in Cebu and has absolutely no interest in the present case of the parties thereto. Professor Del Rosario did confine himself to a statement of the facts, and his opinion thereon, with his reasons for his opinion, but his testimony is really a brief for the opponent. In the light of these facts, the court cannot but regard his opinion as strongly biased.

II. In the instant case, the record is conclusive that the father acknowledged Federico Arquiza as his child, and it is also conclusive that at the time of his birth or conception, his parents were single. The finding of the lower court that Federico Arquiza was a natural son of Francisco Arquiza is well sustained by the evidence.

III. As to the fifth assignment of error, the lower court cites and relies upon the case of Larena and Larena vs. Rubio (43 Phil., 1017), and says:This is not an action to compel the recognition of Federico Arquiza under the provisions of the Civil Code. Such an action is barred. This is a proceeding to obtain a declaration of the rights of the petitioners as the legitimate children of Federico Arquiza to inherit in representation of their father from their grandfather. It was not necessary for Federico Arquiza to bring an action for recognition because he had acquired the status of a recognized natural child under Law 11 of Toro by the tacit recognition of his father. His vested rights were transmitted to his legitimate children, and they had no need to bring an action against Francisco Arquiza or his heirs to compel the recognition of their father, Federico Arquiza, as the natural son of Francisco Arquiza.

If Federico Arquiza were still living, he could intervene in these proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his natural father, without the necessity of a proceeding to compel his recognition, as is required by the Civil Code; and Francisco Arquiza having left no legitimate descendants, or ascendants, Federico Arquiza, if he had survived his father, would have been entitled to one-third of the latter's estate.Article 842 of the Civil Code provides:If the testator leaves no legitimate ascendants or descendants, the acknowledged natural children shall be entitled to a third of the estate.

And article 843 provides:The rights granted natural children by the preceding articles are transmitted on their death to their legitimate descendants.

The facts found by the trial court and sustained by the evidence bring the appellees within those provisions.