Universiteit GentFaculteit Letteren en Wijsbegeerte

WHY THE US WENT TO WAR WITH SPAIN: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

Laurens De Lombaert00706708American History and Politics I (Prof. Ken Kennard)2012-2013On April 25 1898 U.S. Congress declared war on Spain. This seemingly straightforward decision had major repercussions on a national and global scale. The Spanish-American War itself is well-documented and its consequences are widely known. After a U.S. military victory, a cease fire agreement with Spain was negotiated on August 12 1898 and the Treaty of Paris, detailing the terms of the peace, was signed on December 10 1898. As a result Cuba gained independence, Puerto Rico became a protectorate and more war entered upon the Philippines. Many see it as the U.S. entering the global politics scene for real and view it as the start of the U.S. acting like an overtly imperialist nation. About the exact reason why the U.S. went to war, however, a lot of discussion still exists. In this paper I will give an overview of the different factors and circumstances that played an important role in the U.S.s decision to go to war and along the way discuss the different opinions of historians concerned with the subject. I will focus on the most recent discussions and end with an analysis of my own. A thorough reading through all the material shows that every author cites, with varying degrees of importance, four explanations that drove the U.S. to war. These are an enraged and inflamed public influenced by the yellow journalism of William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer, businessmen pushing for war, Congressional politics putting the screw on the McKinley administration and the enigma McKinley himself. Beneath all these issues lies the ever present foreign policy doctrine of not getting involved with other sovereign nations that the U.S. is so famous for. While this doctrine did play some part, it, surprisingly, is never present on the forefront of the arguments cited by historians. At the center of the question why the war started stands President William McKinley. He was a Civil War veteran and thus well acquainted with the horrible effects of war and the devastation it could bring to soldiers, their families and whole nations. It is no surprise that he openly opposed war but Nick Kapur argues that the fact that it was he who took the final steps that made war unavoidable presents a basic problem of interpretation to any historian writing on the war or the origins of American imperialism (18-19).Opinions of McKinley have greatly evolved over time. Right after the conflict he was seen as a strong leading figure who did everything he could to prevent war and who, when diplomacy failed on account of Spain, decided decisively in favor of war. During the 1920s the focus came on public opinion and yellow journalism. Key figure was William Randolph Hearst, the soon to be newspaper giant, whose New York Journal will always be affiliated with the term yellow journalism and the Spanish-American War. Hearst was engaged in a circulation war with Joseph Pulitzers New York World and saw the atrocities committed by Spain in Cuba in the mid 1890s as the perfect excuse to raise his newspapers profile. Spain at that time was hated for its reconcentrados policy. It forced farmers to move from the countryside, where insurgents were resorting to economic warfare in order to render the island useless for Spain, to the city to get them under their control. Few arrangements were made for these farmers which resulted in many of them getting sick and poor (OFFNER, 51). When Hearst sent his reporters to Cuba, however, they complained that there was no war, upon which Hearst famously would have replied You furnish the pictures and Ill furnish the war (KAPUR, 19). Kenneth Whyte, biographer of Hearst, remarks that the origins of that quote remain unaccounted for. He also believes that if Hearst really had uttered the famous phrase, he probably did not mean by it what we make of it today. In his opinion Hearst was genuinely concerned with the Cuban sufferings. He, like many at that time, saw the Cuban revolution as a mirror image of the American one: another New World country standing up against its Old World dominator and getting free of its suffocating grip. But it is a fact that the New York Journal exaggerated if not invented many of the atrocities taking place in Cuba. This sensational reporting about Spains misrule excited many New-Yorkers. But the claim that yellow journalism was the driving force behind the U.S.s decision to take on Spain, has long been disproved. Yes, the reviled reconcentrados policy, the explosion of the USS Maine in February 1898 in the harbor of Havana and the humiliating letter written by Spanish minister to Washington Enrique Dupuy de Lme in December 1897 in which he criticized president McKinley as weak and a would be politician (KAPUR, 23) were sensationalized in the New York Journal and aroused anti-Spain sentiments, but their effect has been exaggerated. The newspaper-reading public was more realistic about the conflict and furthermore, they knew that Hearsts paper was not about dry non-fiction stories nor did they expect this from their New-York journal, claims Whyte. Auxier investigated how Mid Western newspapers covered the lead up to the conflict. He came to the conclusion that not only was the influence of Hearsts and Pulitzers papers limited to the New-York region, other papers did not follow its lead in style. They wrote more rationally and objectively about the pending war and cited American economic imperialism, military strategy, political idealism and humanitarianism (532-533) as being the true interests of the U.S. in the conflict. 1960s liberal historians, like William Appleman Williams, highlighted economic reasons as being the main cause behind the war. They wrote how men like McKinley believed that the answer to current U.S. economic difficulties and social unrest was economic expansion. Walter LaFeber, protg of Williams, expands on this idea in his 1963 study The New Empire. However, some argue that LaFebers book falls short on evidence. The men holding expansionist ideas at that time were few and their influence on foreign policy was little. More importantly, it is well known that U.S. businessmen opposed the war because they feared it would cost the nation a lot of money. War and ensuing instability was believed to be bad for business. Offner takes a different view. Unable or unwilling to take sides, he believes that those businessmen with investments in Cuba wanted its government to work together with Spain against the rebels to protect their property while the men making money off the Cuban trade favored a swift intervention against Spain (51-52). The historian Patterson joins in with LaFeber and he adds as proof the context of that time. He believes that the U.S. was ready for foreign (economic) expansion. Even more, it seemed the only logical step since Frederick Jackson Turner had recently declared the domestic frontier closed. The U.S., a nation made up of people that needed to move forward, felt the urge to expand (its eyes had been on China for some time) and the appeal of the overseas Spanish territories was too tempting to resist (351-352). But LaFeber, although his theory sounds appealing, has trouble to repudiate the arguments concluded by Julius Pratt. Pratts study, already conducted in 1934 and backed by newspaper research, concluded that business was thoroughly opposed to an armed intervention in Cuba. It was only after the war ended with a U.S. victory that they discovered the unforeseen possibilities of the war. A far eastern base, for example, could defend the threatened markets in China. As the year ended spokesmen of the business and financial interests of the nation were hailing the incalculable expansion of the influence of the United States among other nations or declaring philosophically that the year had witnessed a complete change in the temper and aspirations of the American people (200).Already soon after Williams and LaFeber made their ideas about the conflict known, a new contending view was being put forward. This new school of interpretation saw McKinley as a political pragmatist who tried to achieve a peaceful solution but ultimately chose war to avoid the disintegration of his party and a disaster in the upcoming fall elections (KAPUR, 21). The leading historian here is John L. Offner. He cited a Republican Revolt in Congress in early April as forcing McKinleys hand. Not unlike the yellow journalism theories, they also perceive of McKinley as being morally weak. Both schools of thought agree with the undocumented quote by Theodore Roosevelt that McKinley had no more backbone than a chocolate clair. The last four decades have seen a general acceptance of this perception of McKinley as a pragmatic but morally weak politician who gave in to a war crazed Congress. Very recently gaining strength is the view that McKinley in fact did have a backbone. Historians like Paul Holbo see McKinley as extending his power over foreign policy through the conflict. An example of this can be found in McKinleys twice postponed war message delivered to Congress on April 11 1898. McKinley addressed three issues in this speech. He stated that the U.S. meant to relieve the suffering of the people of Cuba. Next he asked Congress to give him full power to act to do whatever was necessary to halt the fighting in Cuba. And finally, he took up the question of Cubas status. He vehemently opposed recognizing Cuban independence. He argued that granting recognition would not help end hostilities but would only limit the freedom of the U.S. army and navy to act on foreign soil. In his eyes the Cuban revolutionary junta did not yet deserve recognition, certainly not until the danger of its being subjugated by the parent state has entirely passed away (McKinley). Especially the Democrats had trouble with McKinley asking for full power. Senator Edmund W. Pettus (D-Al) and other Democrats interpreted the speech as McKinley advising Congress to give the President power to intervene and make war, if he sees fit, without declaring war at all. But LaFeber, while recognizing that Congress was asking McKinley for war, thought that Congress has more trouble handling McKinley than the President had handling Congress (KAPUR, 21). So despite Congressional resistance, McKinley, after great effort, re-established his authority over American foreign policy. He contributed substantially to strengthening the institution of the presidency (HOLBO, 1333). The president eventually went to war but he did it on his terms. After the Maine incident he calmed public opinion down and asked for time to cautiously contemplate repercussions. He exhausted all diplomatic options and seemed to give diplomacy a fair shot. When this diplomacy failed, he asked Congress to wait to undertake action until he could give a presidential address. It is only then that he laid out his terms for conflict and his view of a future for Cuba. He later solved the tricky problem regarding Cubas status through the Platt amendment.

The current theories around the origins of the Spanish-American war all go back to John Offner and Walter LaFeber. Therefore their theories will be more thoroughly reviewed. Despite the fact that some historians focus on business, economic expansionism or domestic pressure from Congress, it is obvious that all theories begin and end with McKinley. Therefore Nick Kapurs findings on the enigma McKinley are also a necessary read to understand the Spanish-American War.Offner puts great emphasis on the domestic political affairs at the end of the 19th century. Politicians in both parties tried to exploit the situation. Democratic president Grover Cleveland at first supported the Cuban insurgents but this changed when the nationalists were destroying American property. The Republicans saw an opening and then championed Cuban independence. When McKinley became president the conflict kicked into a higher gear and his administrations inaction now gave the Democrats an edge. McKinley, because of his diplomatic offerings, seemed to favor Spain so the Democrats started demanding independence for Cuba. The sinking of the USS Maine and the speech given by Senator Redfield Proctor (R-VT), who visited the island and saw firsthand the inhumane conditions Spain subjected the Cubans to, readied the nation for war. The Republicans were willing to back up the presidents course of action but they pressed him for an ultimatum to counter the Democrats. McKinley obliged and his ultimatum requested armistice, an end to the reconcentration policy and an expanded relief. Spain replied that an armistice was only possible if the rebels asked for it first. The rebels declined, fearing that Spain was only going to use this time to regroup, regain strength and revise war tactics. McKinley then, as promised, readied to hand over the issue to Congress. It was at that moment that the Great Powers of Europe stepped in. Several of them (Germany, France, the Vatican and Austria) supported Spain. But as seen in different papers examining the stance of the European nations, none of them were willing to put their money where their mouths were. At that time most nation states were dealing with their own problems and most of them were eyeing China. So in effect they were more anti-U.S. than willing to back Spain. Great-Britain on the other hand openly supported the U.S. Because they were the only nation influential enough to put together a European block, the Great Powers remained divided and lackluster. Offner puts great emphasis on the diplomatic efforts undertaken by McKinley and cites this as a clear example of his humanitarian ideals. In Offners eyes, McKinley, only after he exhausted diplomacy, went to war with the easing of Cubas suffering as his main objective. In his April 11 speech McKinley first detailed the Spanish misrule and the horrors commited and only next did he continue to describe the economic costs of the Spanish-Cuban war for the U.S. Offner, in his analysis of the speech, found that McKinley did not want to recognize the insurgent republic because the Cubans were not ready for self-government (this should be seen in the context of the time when Social-Darwinism and the survival of the fittest were common theories and Anglo-Saxons thought themselves superior second to none) and because the U.S. army needed carte blanche to successfully wage the war. It would also be more difficult to obtain reimbursement for the damages afflicted by the Cubans on U.S. goods and property if they were a sovereign nation. McKinley wanted to hold the island under U.S. control until it could establish a responsible government, in other words, until the U.S. was certain that Cuba would play ball with them. The refusal to recognize the Cuban rebels resulted in a stalemate in Congress, only to be broken by the Teller Amendment. This solution fell short of recognizing the existing Cuban republic but it satisfied the widespread perception that the U.S. was intervening in Cuba to help the Cuban people and not to annex the island. It also implied that removing Spain from the island would ultimately result in full Cuban sovereignty. In Offners analysis McKinley was a humanitarian at heart who was forced into war by Congress. He thought that Spain would listen to the U.S.s threats and would agree to resolve the conflict through diplomacy. Especially after the shift in Spanish government, when Prxades Mateo Sagasta and his Liberal Party were in charge, Spain seemed to express the wish to avert war. However, McKinley still underestimated Spains will to fight. Cuba was one of the last colonial possessions of the once so glorious but now dying Spanish empire. Spain would rather fight a losing war, if for no other reason than to preserve honor, than to just give up the last evidence that it was once a force to be reckoned with. The Spanish government also knew that a giving-in to the U.S. would give reason to some groups to start a civil war at home and attack the monarchy, which further explains its decision to try and stand its ground. But the evidence of how the U.S. dealt with Cuba and more specifically the Philippines after the war does not support this theory of McKinley the humanitarian. Offner ascribes the actions in the Philippines to a shift in policy due to unexpected consequences of victory but shifts so sudden are very rare in foreign policy (PATTERSON, 356). The way Offner sees it, economic loss, the explosion of the Maine nor the subsequent outrage by the public were good enough reasons for McKinley to go to war. Offner concludes that McKinley entered a popular war against Spain that he did not want and believed was avoidable, but at the same time he secured his objectives of a unified nation and a free hand in Cuba (61). Some historians pose the question whether the U.S. believed that the conflict between Spain and Cuba would end soon (with a clear winner resulting in peace for the island) or would result in a stalemate of prolonged atrocities. If the first was true, the U.S. intervention would be directed as much against Cuban independence as Spanish sovereignty (this is what historian Louis A. Prez believes when he quotes McKinley saying an intervention meant hostile constraint upon both the parties to the contest), the second would back the humanitarian claim that Offner made (PATTERSON, 348). LaFeber, as mentioned, championed the theory that the U.S. sought after foreign export markets and territory to revive and expand its troubling economy. To him this expansionism was the primary cause behind the war. He also repudiated the yellow journalism theory and believed that McKinley, contrary to what some would argue, had no trouble handling the supposedly revolting Congress. However, it is a well known fact that business strongly opposed war in the months leading up to it. LaFeber said that there was a shift in opinion right before the war but Kapur finds this dubious especially since LaFeber has been unable to provide his ideas with enough hard evidence. Regardless of hard evidence, there are some facts that seem to support the economic explanation for war. First, the U.S. had already once proposed buying Cuba from Spain. Also, it is obvious that McKinley from the start never wanted to grant the Cubans independence. These two facts make it seem clear that the U.S. never fully supported the Cuban cause, so the armed intervention must have been the result not of humanitarian but of more selfish motives. The conflict in the Philippines that followed the Spanish-American war (but lets not fall into the post hoc ergo propter hoc trap), the racist context of that era (more than half of the Cuban population was black) and the well known Far East fascination that came about after the closing of the domestic frontier all seem evidence in favor of LaFeber. Besides the lack of evidence, there are other arguments to be made against the LaFeber thesis. Several historians claim that only few leading figures were buying into the ideas of foreign expansion and that their influence on policy was little. Cuba did not really posses any major clear-cut economic benefits for the U.S. Its eyes were focused on China and the Far East and their way of getting a foot through the door were annexation of Hawaii and the creation of what would be known as the Panama Canal (GLEIJESES, 706). But these are hard things to prove. LaFebers theory could use more evidence but that recommendation alone is not enough to declare all his ideas false or invalid. Historian Nick Kapur understands that everything revolves around McKinley. Therefore he proposes that instead of focusing on McKinleys actions, we should concern ourselves with the why of them. One possible explanation why this has not been done before is that McKinely was a private man, never showing his hand. He left no written memoirs and there are almost no letters known that he wrote. He preferred face-to-face conversation or a talk on the telephone. However, Kapur argues that a lot of his inner thought can be deduced from his speeches (which he all wrote himself), his administrations documents (which he always approved of personally) and memoirs about him written by other people. From these sources he concludes that William McKinley was a true humanitarian. He served during the Civil War and this greatly affected his perspective on war. It is therefore no surprise that he stated the atrocities committed by Spain as the first and foremost reason for an armed intervention. When he asked the U.S. public for donations to set up a relief program for the Cubans, he himself anonymously donated $5000 a large sum for he was by no means a wealthy man (27). He also was an avid supporter of the principle of arbitration. In his eyes it was the only humane and successful method of settling international differences. He asked Spain to agree to the U.S. serving as arbitrator between them and Cuba and was deeply disappointed and did not understand their reasoning when they declined. However, when Spain supposed arbitration and agreed to submit to its findings to solve the mystery of the explosion of the USS Maine, McKinley declined. Giving up control over internal affairs suddenly did not seem so appealing. Also important to Kapur was McKinleys religious Methodist upbringing. McKinley believed that God had a divine plan for the American people and for himself in particular. McKinley is what he calls a believer in the Victorian ideals of rationality and self-restraint. He never gambled, was a teetotaler and eschewed all mention of sexual matters. He was a devoted husband to his invalid wife and his only notably vice was that he smoked. But most importantly, McKinley wanted the American people and the world to know that he truly was a virtuous man. Kapur writes that it was important to recognize that McKinley was deeply concerned with making sure that the character he truly possessed was well known to the world (31). McKinley himself admitted that, even if nothing could be done with Spain, he still wished to show that he speared no effort to avert trouble (32). This certainly explains why the otherwise so closed president was very open about his diplomatic undertakings and why he tried his best to portray going to war as not his decision, as can be seen in his April 11 speech. In this speech McKinley says that The issue is now with Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the laws, I await your action (McKinley). His choice of words is very interesting. He makes it look like he opposes war and he that tried everything he could to avert it, but ultimately will accept Congresss decision. He references the Constitution to emphasize that he only abides the law which legalizes his further actions. Also, he claims that the issue is now with Congress, a smart move meant to wash his hands of future responsibility. But he clearly, although indirectly, asks Congress to declare war at the same time (I await your actions). Confusingly, he claims to be a humanitarian but is asking for war. McKinley knew very well how Congress would vote, which indicates that, in essence, his speech was directed at the media and the U.S. constituents. He wanted them to know what a true humanitarian he was. While it seems clear to me, after reading through the speech, that McKinley blames Spains stubbornness for the war, Offner surprisingly sees the message as absolving Spain, arguing that the president applauded Sagastas actions. McKinley did give some credit to Sagastas administration, but on the whole is unforgiving of Spain. What further supports Kapurs claim that McKinley was very concerned with his image, is the fact that he postponed the speech twice. This was due to the fact that while he was preparing his speech, diplomatic negations were still pending. Awaiting the outcome, McKinley wanted to make sure that he would not look stupid, asking Congress for war while at the same time still being engaged in diplomacy. Critics of McKinley have stated that he should have given Spain more time to comply with U.S. demands and also that he was weak, caving in to Congresss demands. This last view has been rectified, noting that McKinley in fact had Congress under control and knew exactly what he wanted to achieve by giving this speech. Theoretically, Congress could have started a war before the president asked for it, but McKinley created a situation in which Congress could not proceed before he allowed them. Thus only he could decide when the nation would go to war. Furthermore, McKinley succeeded in his objectives: ending the conflict in Cuba which he viewed as detrimental to his own economic concerns and antithetical to his humanitarian convictions, keeping Congress under his control and getting rid of Spain. This was all done on his terms and conditions. He was able to move his nation to war while maintaining the rhetoric of peace. Kapur quite nicely sums the speech up as not a policy failure, but merely a policy change (36). He comprehends that McKinley, from the beginning of the conflict and especially with his bullying diplomatic tactics, was not merely allowing for the possibility of war but actually considering this possibility as a diplomatic tool. One of these threats was him asking Congress for $50 million for defenses after the Maine exploded, obviously preparing his nation for war. He threatened with an armed intervention from the very beginning, on the one hand hoping it would be enough to scare Spain but on the other hand readying his nation for the possibility of it. So if McKinley had not truly expanded every effort for peace, he had expanded effort he was willing to expand (36) and he was not afraid to go through with his war threats.

There is a myriad of explanations why the U.S. went to war with Spain. They all focus on different aspects and highlight different motives and use different evidence to support their claim. This can be very confusing and the lack of sources is somewhat frustrating. However, I agree with Kapur when he proposes that McKinley is at the center of it all. Whether it is yellow journalism, public outrage, pressure from Congress or business, all historians eventually link this up with their view of McKinley. They think of him as a chocolate clair, a realistic and pragmatic politician, a humanitarian, an expansionist Having read all the different views, I would suggest that McKinley was a very shrewd and cunning politician. He was conscious about his appearance and at the same deeply concerned with the Cuban problem. He understood how to assert authority over a disunited Congress. He knew how the game should be played and he was very good at it. All possible motives for war discussed above were probably in play, and McKinley tried to the make the best of the situation. He was also able to play it out the way he wanted it to. Giving Cuba independence was a clear no-go for him, but that does not mean that his humanitarian ideals were faked. The fact that Cuba did not present obvious benefits for the U.S. plays in favor of the view of McKinley as wanting to do good by the Cuban people. It seems almost absurd that the president would start a war with Spain over Cuba just to gain control over the Philippines. The cost of the war (U.S. lives, economic instability, government spending for the actual war) greatly outweighed the benefits. Therefore I do not follow LaFebers theory completely. But it is clear, from the way the U.S. acted in the Philippines, that the U.S. did come to see the possible benefits of the territory acquisition. It is of course always possible that McKinley was playing the long game and that he saw the future possibilities. The decision for war was also a very symbolic one. It was a further standing up to the Great Powers and the U.S. victory had a major result: it meant the stepping of the U.S. on the international scene as a global power to be reckoned with. It seems obvious to me that McKinley truly did not like Spain, its actions and what it represented. So, being the strong-minded man that he was, he was hard on Spain and diplomacy needed to proceed as he saw fit. When he believed that there was no other outcome possible than war (because Spain was too proud to give in to his demands) he made sure that he would come off as the good guy. McKinley must have known that his strong diplomacy might ultimately result in war. This only means that he was a man who knew what it took and was not afraid to pursue his own goals. Like Perez says, the Spanish-American war was as much directed against the Spanish monarchy as it was against Cuban independence. McKinley intervened to get rid of Spain and to gain control over a possible troublesome sovereign Cuba. Granting Cuba sovereignty was obviously out of the question (too much trouble too close to home) and annexation was also not an option (too many black people living on the island), but with the Platt amendment he pulled off a third option: Cuba without the Cubans. Cuba formed its own civil government and did gain independence on May 20 1902 but economic and foreign policy restrictions were imposed. These included the prohibiting of alliances with other countries and the reserving of the right to intervene. The U.S. also established a perpetual lease of the infamous Guantanamo Bay. But the humanitarian aspect and the refusal to grant Cuba sovereignty are not mutually exclusive. It is also an understandable decision in light of the then prevailing social-Darwinism and racial context. McKinley saw multiple benefits for a U.S. intervention: it would stop the more violent suffering and it would be advantageous to the U.S. economically and politically. The path chosen by McKinley is in this light the most profitable one. The question of the Philippines is a difficult and tricky one. I have to admit that since the focus of my paper was on Cuba, I am not as well read about the subject as I should be to legitimize my claims, but I believe that the reason for taking the Philippines needs to be understood from the perspective of global balance of power. When the U.S. defeated Spain it comprehended that other countries would be waiting in line to risk their chance. Letting Germany and the more threateningly Japan gain control over the island was out of the question. Taking it was more of a statement than a deliberate move and the economic possibilities were only realized later. McKinley never mentioned the Philippines and the island is almost never mentioned in the media. Also, businessmen only afterwards reacted positive about the potential it might have as an output market and only then saw it as a step closer to China. Therefore the acquisition of and the actions in the Philippines do appear to be more of an afterthought.In conclusion, president McKinley, touched by the suffering so close to home, outraged by the horrors committed by a detested and symbolically important old power saw a possibility in the conflict. When Spain did not agree with his stubborn vision how the situation could and should be peacefully resolved, McKinley, while skillfully asserting his control over Congress and ever careful with how he and his actions would be perceived, took the necessary actions to achieve his goals. He succeeded.

Bibliography

Articles

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McKinley, William. Message to Congress about Cuban Intervention (April 11 1898).

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WHYTE, Kenneth. Author of The Uncrowned King: The Sensational Rise of William Randolph Hearst. Random House Canada, 2009. Interviews with him conducted by WatchMojo on Youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=otzmmr8iidI (The Rise of William Randolph Hearst), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-BO2fNIJiFA (William Randolph Hearst Biography), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h0mjkLPvrQM (yellow journalism: origins and definition), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Abzd41k_OhQ (hearst and the Spanish-american war) (last consulted on 22/12/2012).

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Wikipedia. The Teller Amendment. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teller_Amendment (last consulter on 22/12/2012).8