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Space StationEngineering andTechnologyDevelopmentProceedings of the Panel onProgram Performance andOnboard Mission ControlAugust 6-7, 1985

Ad hoc Committee on Space Station Engineeringand Technology Development

Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board

Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems

National Research Council

NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESSWashington, D C. 1985

NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approvedby the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose membersare drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, theNational Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. Themembers of the committee responsible for the report were chosen fortheir special competences and with regard for appropriate committeebalance.

This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authorsaccording to procedures approved by a Report Review Committeeconsisting of members of the National Academy of Sciences, theNational Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine.

The National Research Council was established by the NationalAcademy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of scienceand technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge andof advising the federal government. The Council operates in accordancewith general policies determined by the Academy under the authority ofits congressional charter of 1863, which establishes the Academy as aprivate, nonprofit, self-governing membership corporation. The Councilhas become the principal operating agency of both the National Academyof Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in the conduct oftheir services to the government, the public, and the scientific andengineering communities. It is administered jointly by both Academiesand the Institute of Medicine. The National Academy of Engineeringand the Institute of Medicine were established in 1964 and 1970,respectively, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences.

This report and the study on which it is based were supported byContract No. NASW-4003 between the National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration and the National Academy of Sciences.

Copies of this publication are available from:

Aeronautics and Space Engineering BoardNational Research Council2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20418

Printed in the United States of America

Panel on Program Performance andOnboard Mission Control

Members

JOSEPH F. SHEA (Chairman), Senior Vice-President, Engineering,Raytheon Company

LAWRENCE R. GREENWOOD, Vice-President, Strategic Operations,Ball Aerospace Systems Division

JOHN V. HARRINGTON, ConsultantDONALD P. HEARTH, Director of Space Sciences and Technology,

University of ColoradoRICHARD W. HESSELBACHER, Manager, Division Advanced Development and

Information Systems, Space System Division, and President, Managementand Technical Services Company, General Electric Company

KENNETH F. HOLTBY, Senior Vice-President, The Boeing CompanyARTUR MAGER, ConsultantWALTER B. OLSTAD, Director, Strategic Planning, Lockheed-California

CompanyJAMES T. ROSE, Director, Electrophoresis Operations in Space,McDonnell-Douglas Astronautics Company

ALTON D. SLAY, Slay Enterprises, Inc.CLARENCE A. SYVERTSON, ConsultantBYRON D. TAPLEY, Clare Cockrell Williams Chair of Engineering,Department of Aerospace Engineering, University of Texas

Additional Participants

DAVID CRISWELL, CalSpace InstituteALLEN S. HILL, Boeing Aerospace CompanyCHARLES MATHEWS, ConsultantGEORGE B. MERRICK, Rockwell InternationalROBERT MORRA, Martin Marietta AerospaceROBERT M. POWELL, Lockheed Missiles and Space CompanyS. M. REDELSHEIMER, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics CompanyREGINALD M. RHUE, The Johns Hopkins University Applied PhysicsLaboratory

ARTHUR R. THOMSON, Cleveland State University

NASA Presenters and Participants

MARK ALSPAUG, NASA Johnson Space CenterDAVID BATES, NASA Johnson Space CenterMILT CONTELLA, NASA Johnson Space CenterBRYANT CRAMER, NASA HeadquartersAL HOLT, NASA Johnson Space CenterTHOMAS KLOVES, NASA Johnson Space Center

111

ALLEN LOUVIERE, NASA Johnson Space CenterMARION PRINGLE, NASA Johnson Space CenterJOSEPH TALBOT, NASA Johnson Space CenterRICHARD THORSON, NASA Johnson Space Center

NASA Liaison Representatives

RICHARD F. CARLISLE, Deputy Director, Engineering Division, SpaceStation Office

JAMES M. ROMERO, Assistant Director for Space Station Technology,Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology

ASEB Staff

BERNARD MAGGIN, Project ManagerJULIE A. FERGUSON, Project Assistant

IV

Ad hoc Committee on Space StationEngineering and Technology Development

Members

JOSEPH F. SHEA (Chairman), Senior Vice-President, Engineering,Raytheon Company

LAWRENCE R. GREENWOOD, Vice-President, Strategic Operations,Ball Aerospace Systems Division

JOHN V. HARRINGTON, ConsultantDONALD P. HEARTH, Director of Space Sciences and Technology,

University of ColoradoRICHARD W. HESSELBACHER, Manager, Division Advanced Development and

Information Systems, Space System Division, and President,Management and Technical Services Company, General Electric Company

KENNETH F. HOLTBY, Senior Vice-President, The Boeing CompanyARTUR MAGER, ConsultantSIDNEY METZGER, Sidney Metzger and Associates, Engineering ConsultantsWALTER B. OLSTAD, Director, Strategic Planning, Lockheed-California

CompanyJAMES T. ROSE, Director, Electrophoresis Operations in Space,

McDonnell-Douglas Astronautics CompanyALTON D. SLAY, Slay Enterprises, Inc.CLARENCE A. SYVERTSON, ConsultantBYRON D. TAPLEY, Clare Cockrell Williams Chair of Engineering,Department of Aerospace Engineering, University of Texas

LAURENCE R. YOUNG, Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Massachusetts Institute of Technology

ASEB Staff

BERNARD MAGGIN, Project ManagerJULIE A. FERGUSON, Project Assistant

Aeronautics and Space Engineering BoardMembers

JOSEPH F. SHEA (Chairman), Senior Vice-President, Engineering,Raytheon Company

MAX E. BLECK, President and Chief Executive Officer, Piper AircraftCorporation

BERNARD BUDIANSKY, Professor of Structural Mechanics,Harvard University

W. BOWMAN CUTTER III, Coopers and LybrandR. RICHARD HEPPE, President, Lockheed-California CompanyRICHARD W. HESSELBACHER, Manager, Division Advanced Development and

Information Systems, Space System Division, and President,Management and Technical Services Company, General Electric Company

KENNETH F. HOLTBY, Senior Vice-President, The Boeing CompanyJAMES J. KRAMER, Manager, Advanced Technology Programs, General

Electric CompanyPETER W. LIKINS, President, Lehigh UniversityDONALD J. LLOYD-JONES, ConsultantSTEPHEN F. LUNDSTROM, Associate Professor in Electrical Engineering(Research), Center for Integrated Systems, Stanford University

ARTUR MAGER, ConsultantSTANLEY MARTIN, JR., Vice-President, V-22 Engineering, BellHelicopter Textron

JOHN F. MCCARTHY, JR., Northrop CorporationJOHN L. McLUCAS, Communications Satellite CorporationIRWIN MENDELSON, President, Engineering Division, Pratt and WhitneyAircraft Group

JAN ROSKAM, Ackers Distinguished Professor of Aerospace Engineeringand Director, Flight Research Laboratory, University of Kansas

ROGER D. SCHAUFELE, Vice-President, Engineering, Douglas AircraftCompany, McDonnell Douglas Corporation

RICHARD S. SHEVELL, Professor, Department of Aeronautics andAstronautics, Stanford University

ROBERT E. SKELTON, Professor of Aeronautics Engineering,Purdue University

ALTON D. SLAY, Slay Enterprises, Inc.MORRIS A. STEINBERG, Vice-President, Science, Lockheed CorporationLAURENCE R. YOUNG, Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Executive Staff

ROBERT H. KORKEGI, Executive DirectorJOANN CLAYTON, Senior Professional AssociateA. J. EVANS, Senior Professional AssociateBERNARD MAGGIN, Senior Professional AssociateLAURA D'SA, Administrative SecretaryANNA L. FARRAR, Administrative AssistantJULIE A. FERGUSON, Senior Secretary

vi

Preface

In 1984, at the request of the National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration (NASA), the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board(ASEB) undertook a study of NASA's space station program. The resultsof this study by the ASEB's ad hoc Committee on Space StationEngineering and Technology Development were published in February1985. NASA found the study useful and asked the ASEB to continueexamination of the evolving space station program through a series ofmore specific studies on:

maintainability,research and technology in space,solar thermodynamics research and technology,program performance,onboard command and control, andresearch and technology road maps.

The subjects of maintainability, research and technology in space,and solar thermodynamics research and technology have already been thesubjects of committee roundtable and workshop panel meetings. Thesubjects of space station program performance and onboard missioncontrol, addressed in a roundtable forum by another committee panelare reported here in the form of meeting proceedings. It was theintent of this meeting to provide NASA with an insight into non-NASAexperience that has the potential for improving space station systemprogram performance from cost and mission operations considerations.

The panel consisted of selected members of the ASEB ad hoc spacestation committee and representatives from industry with specialknowledge and experience in the areas of program performance andmission command and control. In the roundtable, individual panelmembers discussed their views on these matters and NASA representativespresented summaries of related space station program activity. Thepanel, in light of discussions with NASA representatives and furtherdeliberations within the panel, developed summary statements offindings.

VII

These proceedings contain synopses of the panel's discussion andNASA's presentations as well as the panel's observations for furtherconsideration by NASA's space station program management. Severalmatters are addressed in these proceedings that warrant specificconsideration by space station program management:

• Focusing on improving cost estimates to allow identification ofcost drivers and to assist in program descoping, if descoping isrequired.

• Developing top-level directives that explicitly identify programphilosophy, technical guidelines, and performance and costconstraints to provide a firm base for program definition,development, and support activity.

• Reviewing management lines of authority, responsibility, andstaffing to assure single lines of direction and action; adequatestaffing of critical functions, i.e., system operations; and bestuse of staff, i.e., interface management.

• Reserving bridge-type command and control operation for the spacestation and routine, daily, and long-term planning and operationssupport for the ground to allow appropriate use of the space crew.

• Making the program and contractor management fully aware of andsensitive to the matters of cost reduction and cost and schedulecontrol to help hold program technical and cost factors withincommitments.

JOSEPH F. SHEAChairman, Panel on Program Performance

and Onboard Mission Control

Vlll

Acknowledgments

The panel appreciates the time, effort, and candor of the NASArepresentatives who provided information and engaged in opendiscussion during deliberations.

As with the other technical subjects reviewed in this series ofroundtables and workshops on the evolving space station program, thepanel recognizes that the program is in the concept developmentstage. Within a matter of not too many months, program managementwill have to firm up specifications and guidelines for the start ofpreliminary design. It is in this context that the panel makes itsobservations with a view to assisting NASA in accomplishing itsdifficult task.

IX

Contents

1. INTRODUCTIONBackground, 1The Panel on Program Performance andOnboard Mission Control, 2

2. PANEL DELIBERATIONS 4Introduction, 4Program Performance, 5Mission Command and Control, 18

3. SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS 24Introduction, 24Program Performance, 24Mission Command and Control, 27

APPENDIXESA. Meeting Agenda, 29B. Briefing Graphics—Cost Methodology, 31C. Subpanels Membership, 49D. Briefing Graphics—Ground Operations Support

Function, 51 '

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED

XI

PAGE

1Introduction

BACKGROUND

In 1984 the ad hoc Committee on Space Station Engineering andTechnology Development of the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board(ASEB) conducted a review of the National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration's (NASA's) space station program planning. The reviewaddressed the initial operating configuration (IOC) of the station.The committee's study was released in February 1985. NASA factoredthe results of the study into its Phase B (concept and preliminarydesign) request for proposals issued to industry in September 1984 andawarded in April 1985.

As a result of the committee's work, NASA asked the ASEB toreconstitute the ad hoc committee to address:

• onboard maintainability and repair,• in-space research and technology program and facility plans,• solar thermodynamic research and technology development program

planning,• program performance (cost estimating, management, and cost

avoidance),• onboard versus ground-based mission control, and• technology development road maps from IOC to the growth station.

The objective of these new assignments is to provide NASA with adviceon ways and means for improving the content, performance, and/oreffectiveness of these elements of the space station program.

In response, the ASEB reconstituted the ad hoc committee. Thecommittee established panels to address each subject. Theparticipants of the panels come from the committee, industry, anduniversities, providing each panel with individuals experienced in thesubject of special interest.

In view of NASA's interest in program definition and development, itwas decided that the subjects of maintainability, program performance,

and onboard mission control would be addressed in roundtable forumsfocusing on concepts, system design, and organization.

It was decided that the subjects of research and technology inspace, solar thermodynamic research and technology development, andtechnology development road maps would be addressed in workshops thatfocus on NASA program activity and plans.

To expedite the documentation and dissemination of the information,the deliberations of the panels are being reported as proceedings.The proceedings of the Panel on Maintainability were published in May1985 and those of the Panel on In-Space Engineering Research andTechnology Development, in August 1985. The proceedings of the Panelon Solar Thermodynamics Research and Technology Development are underfinal review. The proceedings of the Panel on Program Performance andOnboard Mission Control are presented in this report. No date hasbeen set for the technology development road maps workshop.

THE PANEL ON PROGRAM PERFORMANCE ANDONBOARD MISSION CONTROL

The task statement for the Panel on Program Performance and OnboardMission Control set forth that:

NASA will explain the background of the roundtable andpresent an overview of the program, but not the programapproach [in any detail]. It is not intended for the panel tocritique the program. ... It is expected that a majorbenefit of the round table will come from the real timeexchange of ideas among the panel and the NASA participants.

Possible discussion subjects for the meeting are:

• approaches to cost reduction and elimination throughengineering design, development, production, test andevaluation, and operations

• management concepts for control of costs: design reviews,change control, and cost tracking

• contracting techniques to encourage the achievement andholding of low costs, schedules, and performance

• advantages and disadvantages of onboard versus ground-basedspace station command and control

• appropriate split of roles for the initial operatingconfiguration and for the evolving (growth) station

• the relative roles of redundancy, automation, and remoteexpert advice

• design and development philosophy and implications

Specific points of interest are:

• non-NASA techniques for system design and documentationrequirements and their potential cost impacts

possible reductions in NASA programmatic proceduresapplication of non-NASA standardsalternate approaches to program reviewsalternate approaches to configuration managementalternate approaches to verification testsalternate approaches to cost estimatingsuggestions for alternative deliverable data

The proceedings reported herein cover the panel's meeting at theNASA Johnson Space Center on August 6-7, 1985. The meeting agenda ispresented in Appendix A. The list of panel members and participantsis presented on pages iii-iv.

The panel was briefed by NASA representatives; panel participantsdiscussed their views on program performance and mission command andcontrol; the panel engaged in general discussion; and then the panelorganized into three subpanels. Two subpanels addressed the costmodel and cost containment aspects of program performance; the thirdaddressed mission command and control. The observations of thesubpanels were reviewed with the full panel and NASA space stationprogram representatives.

This proceedings report presents the results of this process in twoparts. The first part deals with program performance, the second partwith mission control. A final section presents the panel's summaryobservation^. Comments and observations are presented withoutattribution.

Panel Deliberations

INTRODUCTION

The chairman, Joseph Shea, and the NASA liaison representative fromthe Office of Space Station, Richard Carlisle, reviewed the backgroundand objectives of the meeting, including the past activity of theASEB's ad hoc Committee on Space Station Engineering and TechnologyDevelopment.

The panel took up its two subjects, program performance and missioncommand and control, in separate roundtable discussions. Subpanelswere formed to comment on and develop their observations on eachsubject. Mr. Carlisle's introductory comments and panel deliberationson the two subjects of the meeting are presented in this chapter. Thefollowing chapter summarizes the panel's observations.

Panel Objectives

Mr. Carlisle noted that through analyses, NASA has found a widedisparity between cost estimates for unmanned and manned space systemhardware, software, and support. This disparity has caused concernabout the ability to project costs for a new system, such as the spacestation. This concern has been amplified by wide differences inindustry cost estimates for similar hardware elements. Specificcomparisons of system manufacturer, Department of Defense, and NASAcosts for similar subsystems show difference ratios of 1 to 10. Thissituation does not result in a comfortable feeling that the $8 billioncost target for the initial operating configuration (IOC) spacestation will be realized.

As reported later by David Bates (p. 10), early cost estimates forthe baseline program indicated costs higher than the $8 billion target.Present IOC cost estimates indicate that holding to the $8 billioncost target may not result in an acceptable program. Operations costs(ground and space) are of equal concern. If cost estimates cannot berelied on, it will be difficult to make meaningful trade-off analysesand system selections.

NASA has these basic questions: Why do NASA manned space systemscost more than unmanned space systems? Can costs be held down? Cancosts be controlled?

Mr. Carlisle noted that he hoped the panel would discuss these andrelated matters openly to allow NASA representatives to gain from thepanel's experience. Thoughts on methods of cost estimating are ofspecial interest in view of the importance of cost estimates to programdefinition. He viewed this kind of discussion as more productive thana critique of what NASA is doing.

It is recognized that, ideally, cultural changes in the organiza-tion and/or management techniques may be indicated. However, to berealistic, the proposed changes have to be the type that can beaccommodated by the agency.

The charge to the panel is to concentrate on space stationengineering related to system analysis, design, operations, andprogram performance; therefore, there is a need to give attention tothe differences between the projected space station program andearlier NASA programs.

PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

Panel Discussion

It is recognized that the space station is different from othermanned space flight programs in that earlier missions (Mercury,Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Shuttle) were more specifically definedand did not have specific funding constraints. The space stationmission has a cost target (IOC, $8 billion), but the system isrelatively undefined. Under these circumstances, it is difficult toestimate costs even if costs could be reasonably identified, which isnot the case.

The panel's comments related to cost modeling and confidence andcost containment follow in the form of summary statements. Thesesummary statements are followed by a synopsis of NASA costing activityand panel observations on program performance.

Cost Modeling and Confidence

With regard to cost modeling and confidence, basic questions were:What type of cost modeling might be appropriate? How might confidencein the estimates be improved? The panel's comments are summarizedhere.

Top Level Directives It was suggested that top-level programmanagement, Level A, provide program guidance through a directive toset firm, top-level program philosophy, constraints, and cost targetsand to instill design guides and cost consciousness in the program.

Establishing a Cost Base Definition of system capability andperformance (top down) is key to delineating production and operationsactivities and to establishing a cost base. It may be necessary tobring a team (including contractors) together for this purpose becauseof the many interfaces and the need for good communications. Thecontractors selected should understand the process and its importanceand have had experience with this type of estimating activity.

Cost Targets NASA needs to be explicit about IOC program costs. Forexample, NASA should note specifically that the amount is $8 billion,not $12 billion, or $10 billion, not $14 billion. There should be nouncertainty. Firm selection of a cost constraint should be done earlyto anchor the program. Leaving open the issues of program definitionand costs reduces management focus and motivation for cost control.What is to be procured? What does the $8 billion covei—design,development, IOC operations, NASA manpower?

Forcing Cost Analyses It is important to have cost targets to forcecost analyses. Existing technology should be used to define the basesystem. Every subsystem cost beyond those of the base subsystemsshould be treated as an increment of cost that can be reduced.

Reduction of Program Content The representative baseline programcosts assessed by NASA from in-house analyses are too high. Anapproach to reducing cost is to reduce program content and notnecessarily to take an average cost reduction in all program segments.

Cost Estimate Improvement The program costs (contracted hardware andsupport) that have been developed were not derived in a consistentmanner. NASA believes that the cost estimates will become morebelievable as the preliminary design phase of the program, the secondpart of Phase B, evolves.

Fitting Models to Hardware Good cost modeling is important ifhigh-cost items are to be identified and costs reduced. Historicaldata can be used to build cost models, but the systems have to besimilar in performance and content and in design, development, andtesting if the cost models are to be relevant.

NASA Cost Estimating The panel needs a better understanding of NASAcost-estimating activity. (See page 10.)

Use of Common/Standard Hardware The space station is a new type ofsystem for NASA because it will be designed for long life throughrepairability and maintainability. NASA experience, including costestimating, does not include this class of hardware. For the spacestation, NASA should reexamine the matter of common/standard hardware(the same hardware used in more than one system) that it had oncepursued as an approach to reduce program costs .

Cost Containment

With regard to cost containment, the basic question is: How cancosts be contained or reduced once a program is defined and costsestimated? The subpanel's comments are summarized in the followingparagraphs that deal with matters ranging from cost targets tointerface documentation to the use of NASA in-house staff, contractordirection, and type of contracting.

Cost Targets Design-to-cost targets are needed early, down to atleast the major subsystem level. Development of these cost targetswill assist in cost trade analyses between design, development, test,and operations considering both IOC and growth. These cost targetsneed to communicated to all levels of the program. However, it shouldbe recognized that arbitrary cost constraints can adversely affect theproject through the curtailment or elimination of required work.

Responding to Payload Requirements System design requirements areresponsive to projected payload programs that have not and may not befunded. Therefore, requirements and costs may be overstated. Theneed to support overstated requirements may be conditioned by thebelief that such responsiveness is required to retain a constituency.However, this, in part, may be the reason the science community isreluctant to support fully the space station. They may be concernedthat costs will not be controlled and that large costs will have anadverse impact on funds available for science.

Design Constraints If cost is to be a serious program driver, designand development constraints must be mandated; one such constraint maybe use of existing technology. An issue explored was: Is the spacestation program to be used to accelerate technology development or isthe space station to use existing technology? Design specificationsand cost considerations are affected by the selection of thisconstraint. It is the panel's view that, in general, availabletechnology should be used to help hold costs and schedules.

Technology Development Both the use of technology not ready forapplication and changes in technology adversely affect schedules andcosts. Early definition and development of critical technologiesminimizes these adverse effects. Selective support and application ofsuccessful technology developments are important to enhancing spacestation performance and controlling costs.

Program Structure It is important to structure the program so that itcan be reduced in size and/or scope through reduction and/or removalof program elements while retaining an acceptable, viable program.For example, incremental reductions in electric power generation forIOC and increased subsystem specification flexibility to allowadjustment of performance margins in response to system performanceadjustments and/or cost constraints should be considered.

Two-Stage Design It may be possible to treat the design of the spacestation like that of a large commercial airplane. In the first time

8

through, focus on the design process, with concentration ondesign-to-function; in the second, concentrate on lowering costs.

Low Volume Production "Single"-item procurement causes high costsbecause costs cannot be reduced through knowledge gained throughexperience. There are ways around this: use of available and commonhardware; accurate statements of requirements; and holding specifica-tions to needs. Stringent safety requirements will increase costs.Safety and other design requirements should be reviewed forappropriateness.

Manufacturing/Test Options A way to contain costs is to have designteams explore more than one approach to manufacture and test and tolook hard at simplification of interfaces.

Repairable/Maintainable Design DOD and NASA missions have beendesigned to provide essentially 100 percent operational capabilityeven when a component fails. There is no general need for a "100percent operational" design philosophy for a repairable andmaintainable space station.

Interface Documentation and Control Good interface documentation andcontrol (to minimize errors and reduce costs) is required in view ofthe number of contractors and NASA centers involved in the program.It would be desirable to define and organize this activity early withcontractor input.

Computei—Aided Design and Manufacturing CAD-CAM can help controlinterfaces through easy access to common specification, design, andfabrication data bases. These techniques can also help assure aconsistent tie between systems and structures, allow concurrent designand development activity, and assist in rapid, accurate change control.

Change Control A tight, quick change-control process can reducecosts. Although fast action is desirable, care should be taken in thesystem to avoid adverse change impacts and redundant change actions.Early setting of design specifications and change-control ground ruleswill help minimize rework and costs. Once specifications are set,they should be followed, with change implemented only due to asignificant reason.

Out-of-Specification Flexibility Systems engineering decisions mustbe flexible enough to accommodate what is "out-of-specification butacceptable" to avoid rework costs.

Test Procedures To help minimize cost, articles should be obtainedand tested early. Test requirements should not be imposed without areal need. Instead of repeating tests at higher levels of build-up,test and operational procedures should be established that build upand build on test activity, thereby minimizing inspection andcheck-out. It is better not to test to destruction. The same and/orsimilar evaluation equipment should be used through ground and flightoperation.

Design and development changes can be expected in the "one-of-a-kind" space station program. Development test procedures can reduceequipment needs, changes, and adjustments. Consideration should begiven to procedures such as subcritical testing and burn-in operationof equipment versus destructive testing, as well as to the use ofbuilt-in testing versus special test equipment.

Manned System Testing A review of acceptance testing (some one-thirdof manned system program costs) appears appropriate. NASA's mannedsystems have required greater levels of testing than have unmannedNASA and DOD systems.

Services and Support Space station costs appear to be 20 percent forhardware and 80 percent for other services and support. Unmannedspacecraft systems have an 80 percent/20 percent split. The "80percent" space station activity needs to be examined for validity.

Standard/Common Parts High reliability and lower costs are enhancedthrough actions that provide parts control, standardization, andcommonality.

Standards and Procedures Some standards, procedures, and operations(e.g., soldering specifications) may not represent the beststate-of-the-art and can cause costs to rise. Standards andprocedures should be reviewed for currency and applicability.

Ground and Space Control A hard, early look should be undertaken aton-ground support to hold down costs. It is recognized that theon-orbit control and management system will evolve through the periodof build-up to IOC operation. In this period, it is anticipated thatground-based support will decrease and onboard mission command andcontrol will become more self contained. It is also anticipated thatthe ground-support staffing will be reduced in time through automationof routine activity and special functions such as fault detection,isolation, and repair identification. These transitions need to beplanned, recognizing that they will be based, to a degree, onoperational experience.

Use of Crew Crew time in space, a valuable commodity, should beconserved. The crew should be used for mission work to the degreepossible. The IOC should remain simple, and major diagnostics andplanning for station rework, etc. should be done on the ground. Itshould be less costly to do mission control support work on theground. An approach to maximizing crew time for payload work would beto restrict the crew to work required to keep the system operationallysafe and useful between shuttle service (90-day) flights.

Use of In-house Staff NASA in-house staff could be used for in-lineprogram support, as part of the design team, e.g., as the hardware andsoftware test, acceptance, and/or integration team. This would putNASA in a strong technical position with respect to knowing thesystems and would assist in reducing the contractor work force as theprogram matures.

10

Management Overview Non-hardware program costs can be high due tomanagement overview and review. Compared to nongovernment civilprograms, government management costs are two to three times as great,possibly greater. An analysis is needed of the kind, number, andcontent of reviews with action directed at reducing them.

Responsibilities of Managers In support of fast, knowledgeabledecision making, NASA subsystem managers should be responsible for thetechnical, schedule, and cost aspects of their programs. Thesefunctions shoulcl not be separated as appears to be the general case.

Funding Stability Funding instability will cause cost escalation. Anattempt should be made to eliminate unplanned fluctuations in actualbudgets although such fluctuations are difficult to control.

Contractor Direction It is important that NASA avoid telling people(contractors) "how-to-do." NASA should direct attention to"what-to-do" and allow contractors more freedom to pursue highperformance at low cost.

Type of Contracting Several factors may create high costs: the typeof contracting selected (unnecessarily restrictive and no incentives),the differences between planned and actual work, and planned andactual deliverables. System specifications need to be pragmatic andcost targets set to provide a framework for controlling and tradingcost and product.

NASA Costing Activity

Following the roundtable discussion, David Bates of the NASAJohnson Space Center (JSC) Space Station Program Management Office,management Level B, presented a brief overview of the cost-estimatingmethodology used by Level B. The graphics he used are presented inAppendix B. After panel discussion of this overview, Allen Louviereof JSC commented on Level B's costing responsibilities.

Cost Estimating Methodology—David Bates, JSC(Briefing Graphics—Appendix B)

Both prime and non-prime contract cost elements are used to developthe total space station program cost estimates. The major programhardware elements (station, platforms, attached payload accommodations,and other costs called wrap—those costs not associated with thehardware but with program support activity) make up the prime costs.The non-prime costs include fee, reserve, and program definitionactivity.

It is estimated that of the 100 percent prime development costs,60 percent pays for hardware and 40 percent pays for wraps. Non-primeprogram costs are estimated to be about 35 percent of the program's

11

development costs and include program reserves. NASA's manpower andrelated overhead costs are not included in the prime and non-primecosts.

Early cost estimates for the baseline program revealed costs higherthan the $8 billion target. Present IOC cost estimates indicate thatholding to the $8 billion cost target may not result in an acceptableprogram.

The early cost estimates for the reference space station configura-tion were refined through reexamination of assumptions, upgrading ofcost models, use of contractor estimates, and inclusion of programelements originally overlooked. The soundness of the estimates are inquestion due to several factors: the broad variation in estimatesfrom different sources for similar program elements; the difference incost-estimating procedures and models used by the different workpackage teams; the use of weight and complexity factors as a simpleway to modify existing models; a mix of data from manned and unmannedsystems; and assumptions related to cost savings associated with theapplication of protoflighting and commonality. In addition, wraps andother cost factors are best guesses because of the open state ofprogram definition.

Level B recognizes that the development of good cost estimates ishampered by additional factors: the number of system elements,interface uncertainties, lack of test and development plans, failureof the cost models to be truly applicable, and strategic over- orundei—costing. Level B also recognizes that system weight is not agood cost function for many of the systems being costed even with theapplication of correction factors to adjust the models for complexity.

Comments and observations made during the overview briefing arenoted here.

• NASA space station staffing (some 2,000 people) is significant,approaching a cost of $840 million for the 7 years leading to IOC.

• Hardware versus support costs are targeted for 65/35, exclusive ofNASA in-house manpower and overhead costs.

• To help hold costs to the $8 billion target, it is assumed that theorbital maneuvering unit (OMU) will be funded by the Shuttleprogram and procurred from that program by the space stationprogram.

• Support costs for foreign systems have not been factored into thecost estimates.

• Level B is pursuing the development of independent cost estimatesto provide a basis for evaluating contractor estimates.

12

• NASA's manned and unmanned system cost models have different costtrends with increasing weight, with the manned systems costing moreper pound. The cause (or causes) of the differences is beingexamined, keeping in mind that parameters other than weight have tobe considered.

• As a rule it is necessary to find systems as close as possible tothe ones being costed and scale them if reasonable estimates are tobe attained. Most of the models illustrated appear to be too farremoved from the new systems being considered. Some systems arenot necessarily weight related in the classical sense, i.e.,software, electronic controls, and data systems.

• The Shuttle itself imposes costs due to packing and performancelimits for both IOC and operations support. To reduce logisticcosts, NASA should examine, if it is not already doing so, theability to improve Shuttle load factors and performance.

• The ground control center will not be an initial area for reducedoperations and, therefore, cost savings. But, in the longer term,it should be possible to simplify and reduce those operations andcosts.

Costing Responsibilities—Allen Louviere, JSC

Allen Louviere, of the JSC Systems Engineering and IntegrationOffice, discussed the office's program cost-estimating responsi-bilities. The office is sensitive to the problems of fullyrepresenting and costing the space station program and is coveringmatters other than major hardware: maintainability and redundancy,commonality and spares, growth and scaring (preparing for additions).Some cost matters have not been addressed adequately: on-orbitassembly; spare part requirements; launches (estimated at 12 to 15 forIOC); verification, fault detection, and checkout; interface andcustomer support requirements; and payload servicing. It is recognizedthat improvement in space transportation capability needs attention;it can beneficially affect design and support costs.

The office fully intends to address IOC versus operational versusgrowth costs to optimize life-cycle costs. The office is sensitive tothe need to examine other cost models (military and NASA in-house) toimprove the models used for space station costing and plans to examinemilitary and in-house hardware and manufacturing specifications tosimplify, standardize, reduce, and contain costs.

Panel Observations on Program Performance

The panel organized into two subpanels (Appendix C) to address thebroad subject of program performance. One subpanel addressed costmodeling and confidence and the other cost containment. The subpanelsmade the following observations.

13

Cost Modeling and Confidence Subpanel

In general, the subpanel concluded that the present cost models,based almost exclusively on weight, are not acceptable. To make themuseful for estimating costs will require considerable work and acareful look at and an understanding of the factors that affectcosts. Weight is not a good single parameter for extrapolatingcosts. It is probable that no single factor will suffice. In theprocess of estimating costs a corollary action should be taken—exploring ways to reduce costs.

One reason NASA is not in a position to fix dollar targets forprogram elements is that program guidance has been so general. Tohelp implement design-to-cost, the program should be explicitlydefined before the second part of Phase B (preliminary design) getsunder way.

Specific subpanel observations follow on cost modeling related toflaws, improvements, utility, and next steps.

Cost Model Flaws

• Present modeling, like most, has many flaws. It lacks consistencyin assumptions, data bases, and application. The hardware systemsused to structure the models do not always reflect the character ofthe systems under study.

• The selection of weight as the principal variable is often anoversimplification and not the correct variable.

• The wraps are not complete and are arrived at by rule-of-thumb, noton the basis of program content.

• Model limitations are not stated or understood regardingapplicability, range of uncertainty, or level of credibility.

• Estimates of operating or life-cycle costs do not appear to havebeen made.

Model Improvement

• Detailed analyses or educated best guesses should be provided byexperienced design and development groups where applicable data arenot available to upgrade the space station cost models.

• The work breakdown structure should be set down and used as theframework for cost build-up. A range of costs should be providedfor activities that are uncertain or not fully definable.

14

• U.S. Air Force models should be exercised but comparability withprojected space station systems should be assured. Differencesbetween manned and unmanned systems must be understood andcharacterized.

• Important parameters, other than weight, need to be examined andapplied appropriately to adjust cost models.

• Models should be tested for reasonableness of cost estimates. Inmost instances this does not appear to have been done.

• A more in-depth base for establishing wrap costs needs to bedeveloped and a costing philosophy identified. This action is alsoneeded for operations and life-cycle costs.

• Whatever the cost-estimating system, its limitations and theirimplications to allow assessment of credibility need to beunderstood.

Current Model Utility

• The present models could be used for gross estimation of the orderof cost for the baseline system, grossly scoping the "$8 billionprogram" and grossly identifying large cost drivers. However, themodels are too gross to use to descope a baseline system and/or toset subsystem cost targets.

Next Steps

• Effort should be directed to making the best cost estimates and notto developing the best cost-estimating technique.

• Cost assessments need to be built up from top-down statements ofwork using bottoms-up estimating.

• Such data should be used to refine in-house cost estimates. Forcomparison, other groups experienced in costing should make baseprogram cost assessments.

• To reduce uncertainties, it is necessary to refine and calibratethe estimating system continuously.

• Cost targets need to be developed for program elements based on thesteps noted above.

• Cost drivers at the subsystem level, subsystem by subsystem, needto be identified.

In summary, the subpanel believes that the present effort isdirected at improvement of modeling and that it would be more prudentto direct effort and attention to making the best estimates and not to

15

developing the best methodology. It is believed that a good model fora unique system requires engineering attention, i.e., bottoms-upstructuring from specifications to production to test and operations.The capability of assessing costs with reasonable confidence is neededat the time major configuration trades are made. Cost is a key and,to a degree, controlling parameter.

Cost Containment Subpanel

The cost containment subpanel was concerned that the space stationprogram was not more explicitly defined in terms of performance andcosts to provide a firm framework for the concept development part ofthe Phase B contracted activity and, more particularly, for thepreliminary design part of Phase B. Another point of concern was thelack of clear, direct lines of management responsibility from programmanagement levels C directly to B directly to A. A simple line ofallegiance and command is needed to allow rapid and directcommunication, decision making, and direction. This managementscheme, in principle, is illustrated in Figure 1.

The subpanel's cost containment broad and specific observations,not prioritized, are listed here.

Broad Comments

Program Strategy NASA should establish and communicate a firmphilosophical position on program strategy given the $8 billion (oranother specific target) budget. Is the program strategy one oftechnology push—advanced technology carried in the space station—ortechnology pull—advanced technology applied to the station? In thefirst case, the station is a ready means, using state-of-the-arttechnology, for working in space. In the latter case, the spacestation, itself, drives and uses advanced technology to provide theability to work in space and can be expected to result in a morecostly program in the near term.

Available Hardware NASA should use off-the-shelf availablehardware if, as is assumed, costs are a real program constraint forthe baseline space station. There should be a "no" to almost alltechnology alternatives, even "low-risk," for IOC. Exceptions to the"no" would have clear high benefits in the near term as well as thelonger term.

Designed-in Payload Support In the interest of lower costs andflexibility, a harder position should be taken on limiting designed-inpayload support capability. The space station should accommodate abroad spectrum of user requirements, especially for IOC, but shouldnot be tailored to specific needs through built-in capability.

Growth and Operations The program office should select aconfiguration that constrains IOC costs (within the selected budget)but will accommodate growth, fully considering growth and operational

16

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costs. Configuration and cost decisions cannot be made withoutaccounting for all of these cost factors.

Cost a Constraint NASA should fix program design, cost, andstrategy with costs as a real constraint; in addition, they shouldidentify the concept and its capabilities to the user and fundingcommunities. A constrained program could cause adverse user reaction,but a position needs to be taken to preserve long-term programintegrity and support. High early program costs and/or schedulestretches may have a greater adverse impact on the program in the longterm than a constrained IOC program. Administration and Congressionalsupport could be reduced and/or withdrawn.

Program Guidance Definitive program guidance should be communicatedto all active program participants. This is important whatever thefinal disposition of the matters addressed in the preceding paragraphs.

Single Chain of Command It is important that NASA minimize andfocus organizational interfaces and responsibility through a singleprogrammatic chain of command with top-down budget, technical,schedule, and performance management and control (Figure 1). Further,the project office (Level B) should obtain fixed-price and technicalperformance and schedule commitments from Level C. Level A must bethe czar of the Level B and Level C effort.

Specific Comments

Wraps Review wraps for content and overlap. It is not clear thatall major elements are accounted for or that some elements are notcovered more than once between "prime" and "non-prime."

Expendables Reduce expendables to hold resupply requirements down.Judicious use of advanced technology will help.

Management Assignments Assign dollar targets for program elementsdown to the lowest possible levels of management. Assign to lower andupper levels of management integrated performance, schedule, and costresponsibilities.

Data Base Establish a common data base for the total programcovering both technical and management matters. Communicate the database to all program levels.

Minimize Documentation Tailor all documentation and oversightactivity—specifications, practices, and reviews—to impose minimumrequirements. This will require concerted, dedicated effort.

Change Control Define and establish change control proceduresearly. Make the system effective and its response fast. Defineinterfaces and performance boundaries as broadly as possible tominimize the need for change. This process (except for major changesthat impact basic program performance, schedule and/or factors that

18

require Level A review and approval) should be overviewed and managedby the Level B systems engineering and integration group.

Use of NASA Personnel Use NASA personnel for in-line programactivity; do more, watch less. For example, NASA personnel could workinterface control, check-out, and test. This hands-on activity wouldkeep NASA actively informed and integrated into the engineeringdevelopment, assist in reducing contractor staff loads toward the endof development and test activity, and reduce program costs.

Commonality Reduce new work and duplication of activity throughuse of common parts and components. Use common specifications andmake quantity buys, carefully monitoring production lines forperformance and quality of articles produced.

Shuttle Optimization Optimize the performance and the loads forthe Shuttle for space station application. This is a significant costitem for IOC, follow-on operations, and growth.

Engineering and Costs Involve engineering in the estimation andreduction of costs through early definition of design, development,and test activity; design to hold down costs; and analyses to help setcost targets and control and reduce costs.

MISSION COMMAND AND CONTROL

The Level B approach to mission command and control, ground andspace-born, was reviewed for the panel by Richard Thorson of the JSCSpace Station Office. The graphics used for his discussion arepresented in Appendix D. A summary of his comments and related panelobservations follow.

Overview—Richard Thorson, JSC(Briefing Graphics—Appendix D)

The people in mission control, often referred to as the "marchingarmy," equate to a large cost item. A number of concepts for reducedground-based support are being examined. No single approach has beenselected. Of special concern is the user interface with space stationmission control.

The level and depth of support required for mission command andcontrol are being examined by the involved centers: JSC, stationsupport; Goddard Space Flight Center, platform support; and KennedySpace Center, logistics and prelaunch support.

The space station information system is projected to be adistributed system that will integrate required data at a commandlevel. The system will serve all elements: ground support, station,platforms, and users. Information and system management interfacesare critical design areas.

19

The split of command and control functions between the ground andthe space station is still to be resolved. Consideration is beinggiven to allowing payload managers direct remote payload control anddata retrieval. This requires careful consideration of such mattersas space station operations, control, servicing, and safety. Thereare serious questions about the degree of freedom-of-access that userscan have on a system of the nature of the space station.

With regard to platforms, there is no plan to allow direct accessto data by payload managers. However, this is being examined. Atpresent, the plan is to have all data transmitted through the spacecommunications network to a central station on the ground.

Mission control will be treated in phases because requirements willchange with space station build-up and with operational experience.But, interfaces need to be addressed and designed into the system toaccommodate growth.

It is reasonably clear that mission planning and control will haveto be handled on a daily as well as a long-term basis. The dailyplanning of operations may well be, in all probability will be, anonboard function.

Mission control studies include guidelines calling for low hardwaredevelopment and operating costs. The contractors are to considereconomic trades, use of existing facilities and equipment, and onboardautonomy. Identification and examination of needed ground supportfunctions are in process. It is be assumed that there will be a numberof years of verification activity after IOC, that ground operationswill move from verification to a reduced operations support mode, andthat on-board command and control activity will grow.

Of particular concern is maintenance and operation of the spacestation itself and its payloads. Studies have not progressed to wheredecisions can be made on the appropriate split of command and controlbetween the ground and the station. One area under study is onboarduser payload verification.

It is probable, in the longer term, that the space station willhave control over local traffic. The matters of launch, recovery, andplatform movement can be expected to be the responsibility of groundcontrol. It is also probable that maintenance and logistics planningand support will be a ground function iterated with the stationcommand.

Spares and maintenance will be significant cost items. Some ofthese costs, even for IOC, are considered outside the original$8 billion target program. Such IOC requirements will have to befactored into the program early. Providing spares later will beexpensive in time and money. However, no clear identification ofneeds or costs have been made.

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Because of the distributed nature of hardware responsibilities,including foreign participation, a centralized control of interfaceswill be needed. Appropriate interlocks and/or interfaces will berequired as will a unified system of command for mission planning andoperations both daily and longer term. A bridge-type operation, as ona ship, is indicated. The bridge could be on the ground but morelikely, especially for daily operations, it will be on the spacestation.

Mission command and control are possibly the most complex tasks ofthe whole space station effort. The tasks are receiving serious,in-depth attention by program management.

Mission command and control costs, both development and recurring,are under study. The costs associated with user activity areconsidered outside of the $8 billion program and are expected to befunded by the users. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory is working todevelop a model of user recurring activity. One concern is thatnear-term activity and costs will be pushed downstream to reduce earlybudget requirements. Such action could cause the neai—term program tobe underfunded and adversely affect out-year budgets, causing laterproblems.

Some issues important to the definition of mission command andcontrol need to be resolved soon. One issue relates to theresponsibility for the design and development of support and servicingequipment for payloads, including data handling. At present, it isassumed that such special needs will be the responsibility of theuser, but what of general support, servicing requirements, and datahandling on board and data transmission to the ground?

The space data transmission system, operating in the K-band, willhandle 300 megabits of information. This capability will dictate theneed for rapid data processing at the ground receiver site.

Subpanel on Mission Command and Control

After discussion, the subpanel (Appendix C) developed the followingfindings related to on-ground and in-space mission command and control.

Level of Attention The command and control responsibilities appear tobe given appropriate, serious attention including balancing on-groundand in-space responsibilities and functions for station assembly,check-out, and growth.

Commonality Special attention must be given to connectors if as isindicated space station operations will be monitored by the crew andwill be based on on-condition maintenance at the subsystem (card)rather than element level. This includes consideration of commonalityand functional check-out to minimize kinds and numbers of parts andcosts.

21

Crew Performance The crew's health should be monitored and attendedto by a doctor on the station rather than through the use of monitoringdevices worn by crew members and remote counsel. This will providethe best possible immediate care (with appropriate ground consultationif required) and help assure high levels of crew performance.

Commander's Role The commander must have ultimate authority over spacestation control and safety functions. He must also have interventioncapability over all space station operational activities. This meansthat all critical operational data must be available to him and thathe has the equivalent of a ship's bridge and associated responsibilityand authority. There must be no ambiguity and clear lines of authorityin management of the space station to assure safety of crew andpreservation of the space station and its payloads , probably in thisorder of priority.

Traffic Control Operations in the space station and in the generalvicinity of the station (about 20 miles) should be under the controlof the station. Transport operations otherwise should be controlledfrom the ground. Although general command and control would be fromthe ground the crew on the station would be in the best position tojudge and react to station and nearby traffic situations requiringprompt action.

Mission Planning Central planning and general scheduling ofday-to-day functions should be managed from the ground. This wouldinclude general operations and routine housekeeping. It should beless expensive of space station crew and time to do routine planningand support work on the ground.

Operations Planning Operations is a difficult activity; for unmannedsystems it generally represents about one-third of the program costs.The operations definition and development effort requires a managerresponsible for, among other matters, the control center, protocols,space system control, communications, and data processing. It doesnot appear that Level B is staffed appropriately to handle the degreeof design and development activity required. Consideration should begiven to bringing a NASA center or a contractor into the activity toprovide appropriate levels of technical and management support.

Operations Requirements Operational system planning should start withthe development of a requirements baseline. The baseline should definesuch things as data rates and buffering as opposed to planning forbroad mechanization. Emphasis on requirements and concepts appears tobe missing. Building the system up from a more restrictive require-ments basis versus a broad mechanization basis should be less costlyand quicker.

User Operational Access User data streams appear to be complex. Inview of the 300-megabit data handling capability, a data processingcenter attached to the ground station will be required. Is there areal need/requirement for real time interaction between distributedusers and onboard payloads? If this is the case, the way this would

22

be accomplished was not evident. Because of safety and operationalcondition-matching requirements, it may not be reasonable to allow theuser free access to experiments. This obviously will requirecase-by-case examination.

Data Archiving Archiving user data has been a significant problem.It can be expected to be a substantial growing issue for the spacestation program. The users should be responsible for archiving theirown data. If space station operations and safety information is partof the data flow, consideration should be given to stripping andindependently handling these data.

Automation The level and degree of automation will vary with time. Aplan that defines the changing system and its implementation should bein development. The Shuttle could be used to develop automationcapability. Automation is a large issue in itself. It should beapplied where truly effective in reducing routine and/or performingdifficult tasks for the crew. Criteria should be formulated to helpdirect the space station automation development.

Assembly Planning Assembly of the space station may be the mostdangerous phase of the program. It will involve extra vehicularactivity and control of individual and partially assembled elements ofthe station with the Shuttle present. A comprehensive assembly andcheck out plan is required for this activity.

The subpanel considered the listing of selected technology issuesand implications shown in Table 1. The technical issues listedrepresent desirable space station features and to a degree are beingaddressed. Achievement of these features will require carefulattention to matters such as fault-tolerant and standard networkarchitecture, high-reliability parts, and standard hardware andsoftware modules. Another important consideration will be built-intest capability at the major component and at the built-up systemlevels to simplify both ground and flight validation of function andto validate repair and maintenance work done in space.

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TABLE 1 Critical Technology Issues: Space StationCommand and Control

Issue Implication

Natural space environment

Long mission life

Test

Reliability

Performance(initial and growth)

Growth and technology upgrade

Low risk and cost

Autonomy

Fault-tolerant architectureRadiation hardened components

Fault-tolerant architectureHigh reliability partsGood built-in-test

Good built-in-test capabilityTestability designed-in, not addedUse of good design tools

(Engineering CAD)

Fault-tolerant architectureHigh reliability parts

Modular distributed architectureDedicated special function modules(e.g., image processing)

Fiber optic internal communicationnetwork

Standard network architecture(interface and protocols)

Modular distributed architectureStandard network architecture

(interface and protocols)

Standard hardware and softwaremodules

Standard network architecture(interface and protocols)

Standard high order languageApplication generators used for

software module developmentUse of good design tools(Engineering CAD)

Modular distributed architectureFault-tolerant architecture

Summary Observations

INTRODUCTION

The panel on program performance and mission command and controlbelieves that NASA is fully aware of the kinds of matters that need tobe addressed to assess and control costs associated with space stationdesign and development and mission command and control.

The panel believes that there are some program performance andmission command and control matters that with further attention couldimprove the success of the space station program. Selected topicsdiscussed in the text of these proceedings, as they relate to programperformance and mission command and control, are summarized in thefollowing paragraphs.

PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

Management Directives

The matter of program performance focuses on program costs. Thefact that NASA has chosen not to fix the IOC costs of the spacestation keeps the in-house and contracted activity relativelyunfocused for too long a period of time. The panel believes that aLevel A directive fixing program philosophy, providing designguidance, and setting cost targets would be very helpful in quicklydriving activity toward practical performance and design choices andcontaining costs.

The freezing of mission performance capability to what can be donepractically within budget and technical constraints is important. Theusers will be able to focus on what is possible and will adapt torealistic program constraints. Present planning is attempting toaccommodate uncertain payload requirements from scientific andtechnical as well as funding considerations. Thus, there is slowclosure on design specifics and cost estimates.

24

25

Technology Application

In the opinion of the panel, the program should use availabletechnology to hold down costs. The program should be technicallyconservative unless associated performance and/or operationalconstraints are unacceptable. It is believed to be more importantthat the station serve as a facility to broaden our knowledge and useof space than to have the station itself serve as a driver oftechnology development.

Design and Performance Margins

In the area of systems engineering, costs can be reduced withattention to the following kinds of matters through provision for:broad design and system performance margins; adjustments to design andperformance specifications during acceptance testing; tight interfacecontrol; and increased levels of redundancy. The adequacy of NASAin-house staff and the mix between in-house and contractor personnelshould be reviewed. It may be necessary to increase support throughthe use of NASA center or contractor personnel.

Use of CAD and CAM

NASA is exploring the use of computer-aided design (CAD) andcomputer-aided manufacturing (CAM) not only to assist in design andmanufacture, but also to establish a common data base among programelements and for interface control. This perspective is stronglyendorsed by the panel. Special attention through these mechanismsshould be given to establishing and controlling standard parts,systems, and modules for the program.

Management Culture

Past management practices are not necessarily appropriate for thespace station program if performance, schedules, and costs are to becontained. Management changes may well require "cultural" changeswithin NASA.

These are some examples of change that should be considered:reducing reviews and reporting and related levels of documentation fordesign and fabrication; using screening tests to get high reliabilityparts; building spares concurrent with first articles; making onlyblock changes; integrating testing and testing only to qualify notthrough destruction; using test articles for flight and/or spares;reducing the number of redundant checks; providing a system of rapidchange control with short information loops; making articles work, notchanging them for incremental improvement; using built-in tests aspart of prelaunch checkout; using in-house staff for selected in-linedesign/development (possibly interface test and control) as a means ofkeeping staff technically in-the-program and helping to reduce

26

contractor support requirements; standardizing, simplifying, andtailoring specifications for consistency among center activities; andproviding less "how-to-do" and more "what-to-do" directives tocontractors.

NASA's system and subsystem managers should be made responsible fortechnical performance, schedules, and costs. This approach forcescomplete awareness of and responsibility for program needs,constraints, and performance.

Design-to-Cost

The approach to design-to-cost requires system definition and costtargets. It appears that this matter is not being pursued adequately.Life-cycle cost considerations are not evident. These costs need tobe examined to allow sensible choices between IOC and growth. Thereis a need to be willing to trade system performance and schedules forcost.

To help contain program costs, it is important to enter preliminarydesign with a cost model and target costs. It is also important toenter into final design with cost margins so that trades and scopechanges can be made.

Cost Modeling

Current cost estimating is not sufficiently refined to inspire orcreate confidence in the estimates. One concern is to understand thelarge differences between costs of manned and unmanned space flightsystems. Although it may be of long-term value to improve the model,the desired improvements may not be adequate or come in time to beuseful. It is believed that the effort might be best spent developingcost estimates from an engineering analysis of work to be done andtime required plus procurement of hardware and equipment and supportingcost estimates. This bottoms-up approach would provide a sound basefor follow-on space station cost modeling.

Contractor Sensitivity

An integral part of the process of cost awareness is contractorattitude, approach, and performance. The contractors need to have astrong incentive to deliver on schedule, within cost, and toperformance and technical specifications. The contractors also needto know that there are penalties if commitments are not met. Thesematters need to be addressed in NASA's contracts.

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MISSION COMMAND AND CONTROL

Onboard Control

The degree of onboard command and control should be dictated bybest use of crew from crew safety and space station and payload systemoperational considerations. It is clear to the panel that the spacestation must have a commander operating from a "bridge," in the senseof a bridge on a ship, with ultimate authority for control and safetyof the crew, station, and payloads.

The station should have control of activity in its vicinity, suchas the Shuttle, and other transport vehicle approaches, dockings, anddepartures. Other activity should be ground controlled.

Ground Control

It appears reasonable to assume that most routine mission managementwork can be accomplished on the ground, leaving the crew to concentrateon the demanding on-site tasks.

Planning

The levels of planning for assembly and automation need to beincreased. Assembly may well be the most exacting and dangerous partof the program. A comprehensive assembly and check-out plan iswarranted to assure a thorough review and assessment of options andthe final choice of plan and its implementation. Automation can beexpected to evolve with specific needs and experience. However,definitive planning for the kinds and level of IOC automated activityis needed. Growth planning at present will in all probability belimited to general accommodations and interfaces.

Urgency

Because most of the matters addressed here affect the second partof the contracted Phase B effort (preliminary design), there is someurgency in developing a position on each. The more explicit thebetter.

Explicit direction for preliminary design will help focus thePhase B technical peforraance, design, schedule, and cost effort forPhases C and D guidance.

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Staffing

The level of NASA staffing for the mission command and controlfunction does not appear to be adequate for the importance and size ofthe task. Contractor or NASA center help to provide the level oftechnical and management support appropriate to the subject isindicated.

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APPENDIX A

Meeting Agenda

SPACE STATION ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENTPanel on Program Performance and Onboard Mission Control

AGENDA

August 6-7, 1985NASA Johnson Space Center

Houston, Texas

Tuesday, August 6

Introduction J. Shea, Chairman

NASA Comments R. Carlisle, NASA HQ—Concerns, Questions, Issues

Related Comments Panel

General Discussion Panel

Organization of Subpanels J. SheaProgram Performance TBDOnboard Mission Control K. Holtby

Individual Subpanel Meetings SubpanelsDiscussionDrafting of Position Statements

Wednesday, August 7

Individual Subpanel Meetings (cont.) SubpanelsDiscussionDrafting of Position Statements

Review of Statements Panel

31

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49

APPENDIX C

Subpanel Membership

Subpanel on Cost Modeling

W. Olstad, ChairmanD. CriswellG. MerrickS. RedelsheimerR. RhueA. SlayC. SyvertsonB. Tapley

Subpanel on Cost Containment

R. Hesselbacher, ChairmanL. GreenwoodA. HillK. HoltbyA. MagerR. MorraR. PowellA. Thomson

Subpanel on Mission Command and Control

K. Holtby, ChairmanD. CriswellL. GreenwoodA. HillA. MagerG. MerrickR. MorraR. PowellS. RedelsheimerR. RhueA. SlayC. SyvertsonA. Thomson

51

APPENDIX D

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