Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968 by Jiri ValentaReview by: John C. CampbellForeign Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Winter, 1979), p. 430Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20040467 .

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430 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Succinct and stimulating essays by writers of established authority in their

respective fields. The volume achieves unity through concentration on the elements of continuity in the historical experience of the Czech and Slovak

peoples, which also was the theme of the final work of the late Josef Korbel, to whose memory the book is dedicated.

PASSIVE REVOLUTION: POLITICS AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK WORKING CLASS, 1945-1948. By Jon Bloomfield. New York: St. Martin's,

1979, 290 pp. $22.50. The revolution of 1948 which brought the communists to power in Prague

was "passive" in the sense that the groups on the Left which helped it to

succeed (socialists, trade unions and rank-and-file communists) had no real

part in determining its aims, strategy, or the shape of the regime which

followed, for the key factors were the few top leaders of the Communist Party and their links to Moscow. Bloomfield adds a good deal of information to that

provided by earlier books on these critical years.

THE SLOVAK AUTONOMY MOVEMENT, 1935-1939. By Dorothea H. El Mallakh. Boulder (Colo.): East European Quarterly, 1979, 260 pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, distributor, $16.00).

The underlying theme of this monograph is the continuity and constancy of the Slovak demand for autonomy, represented during these years principally but not solely by the Hlinka party. Prague badly underestimated it and Hitler

easily exploited it. The book is enriched by the use of archival material from

Prague, surprisingly provided by the post-1968 government.

SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1968. By Jiri Val enta. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1979, 208 pp. $12.95.

Probably the best-grounded study yet done on the Soviet handling of the Czechoslovak affair of 1968 and an excellent case study on Soviet decision

making in general. Valenta brings forward a mass of diverse evidence and uses it skillfully?while recognizing where the gaps are?to show how the issues were seen by the Soviet leadership, what the factions were, and how

and when the key decisions were made. The decision for invasion, which came

very late (August 17), was the climax of a long internal controversy and search for consensus.

YUGOSLAVIA: SELF-MANAGEMENT SOCIALISM AND THE CHAL LENGES OF DEVELOPMENT. By Martin Schrenk, Cyrus Ardalan and

Nawal A. El Tatawy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for the World Bank), 1979, 392 pp. $25.00 (Paper, $9.50)

A report on the Yugoslav economy, sequel to an earlier 1974 volume also

prepared by a World Bank team. Rather bland in its treatment and judgments

(all Bank country reports are published subject to the agreement of the

governments concerned), but it contains valuable statistical material and

professional analysis.

DIE BALTISCHE KRISE 1938-1941. By Seppo Myllyniemi. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1979, 167 pp.

Congratulations are due the author of this revealing, well-researched chron

icle of the last years of the three Baltic Republics as they were absorbed in

two stages into the U.S.S.R., then engulfed by Hitler's offensive. He shows

how the drama was played out against the background of shifting Soviet

German relations and of the fate of Finland in the storm of war.

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