Soviet in Africa

8/12/2019 Soviet in Africa

1/18


2/18

The

Journal

of

Modern

African

Studies,

2,

3 (1984),

pp.

511 -527

The Soviet

Presence

in

Africa:

an

Analysis

of Goals

by

ROBERT

D. GREY*

IN

the middle

1970s,

scholars

and

politicians

agree,

the Soviet Union

began

a

major

effort to

penetrate

Africa.1 After

a

decade

of

relative

indifference

to African

developments,

Soviet arms and

advisers,

in

support of Cuban troops, poured into Angola and Ethiopia. Involve-

ment

in

these two countries

was

supplemented by

further

transfers

of

arms to

a

number of other African

regimes,2

and this

seemed

to

signal

a

dramatically heightened

interest in

the continent.

Data offer some

support

for this view. While the

Soviet Union

massively

accelerated

its

supply

of

arms

throughout

the world

in

the

last half of the

I970s,

the

increase to

Africa

was

especially

dramatic:

in

the decade

1967-76,

the

average

annual

value of such transfers

was

$2,200 million,

whereas

during

the

half-decade

1976-80

the

comparable

figure

was

$7,700

million,

a

multiple

of

3.5

- see Table i. The Third

World

in

general

received

a

higher

share

of this

vastly

increased flow

than

it had

earlier,

as

did

Africa

with

$400

million worth

of arms

annually during 1967-76,

as

against

$2,400

million

throughout

the

next

four

years,

a

multiple

of 6.

In

certain

senses,

the

Soviet Union had a

new African

policy.

The

Russians were

willing

to

supply

far

larger

quantities

of

arms to

Africa

than

they

had

previously,

including

such

sophisticated

weapons

as

Soviet Migs, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and Sam missiles. For

several

years

now there has

been a

major

debate

among

western

observers as

to

the

meaning

of

this thrust into Africa.

However,

it

is not

clear that

there was

a

policy

for

the

continent as

a

whole.

In

neither

period

did a

majority

of African

governments

receive

Soviet arms.

During

1976-80,

only 23

of

52

states

did

so,

a

mere

increase

of two over the

previous

decade

-

see

Table

2.

Moreover,

even

among

the

recipients

of Soviet

arms,

transfers

were

highly

concentrated.

* Associate Professorof Political Science, Grinnell College, Iowa.

1

Among

the

relevant works

are: David

Albright

(ed.),

Communism in

Africa

(Bloomington,

1980);

Milene

Charles,

The

Soviet

Unionand

Africa

(Washington,

D.C.,

1980);

Mark

Katz,

The

Third

World n Soviet

Military

Thought Baltimore,

1982);

and

Stephen

T.

Hosmer and

Thomas

W.

Wolfe,

Soviet

Policy

andPractice

Toward

Third World

Conflicts

Lexington,

Mass.,

I983).

2

See,

especially,

Bruce E.

Arlinghaus,

Arms

for

Africa

(Lexington,

Mass.,

1983).

fTs

MOA

22


3/18

ROBERT D.

GREY

TABLE I

Soviet Arms Transfers

by

Value,

I967-76

and

1976-80o

$

million

Recipient

1967-76

% of

World

1976-80

%

of World

World

22,053

38,600

Third World

I5,490

70 32,900 85

Africa

4,416

20

11,320

29

TABLE

2

Soviet

Military

Clients

in

Africa,

I967-80

$

million

Value

of Arms Transferred

by

Rank

Order

I967-76

1976-80

0o

years

5

years

I

Egypt

2,365

I

Libya

5,500

2

Libya

1

005

2

Ethiopia

I

,900

3

Algeria

315

3

Algeria

1,800

4 Angola

190

4 Angola 550

5

Somalia

181

5

Tanzania

320

6

Nigeria

70

6

Zambia

220

7

Sudan

65

7 Mozambique

I80

8

Uganda

65

8

Somalia

I50

9

Guinea

50

9 Mali

II0

Io

Tanzania

30

Io

Nigeria

90

II

Mali

25

II

Congo

60

12

Mozambique

I5

12

Madagascar

60

13

Congo

Io

I3 Cape

Verde

50

14

Morocco

Io

14

Guinea

50

15

Zambia

Io

15 Uganda

40

i6

Chad

5

I6

Guinea-Bissau

30

I7

Guinea-Bissau

5

I7

Benin

20

I8

Equatorial

Guinea

5

I8

Egypt

20

19

Benin

I

19

Burundi

Io

20

Central

African

R.

I

20

Equatorial

Guinea

I0

21I

Madagascar

I

21

Sudan

Io

22

Chad

5

23

Morocco

5

Total

4,424

II,90

1

Data

for this

and

subsequent

Tables

are

derived

from U.S.

Arms

Control and

Disarmament

Agency,

World

Military

Expenditures

ndArms

Transfers,

967-I976

(Washington,

D.C.,

1978),

pp.

I57-9,

and World

Military Expenditures

and

Arms

Transfers,

g976-i980

(Washington,

D.C.,

1983),

p.

I117.

5I

2


4/18

THE

SOVIET

PRESENCE

IN

AFRICA

Thus in

both

periods

the five

leading

recipients

received

over

go

per

cent of

all arms transfers

to

Africa,

while

the

remaining

states

obtained

only

very

small amounts.

The

Soviet

Union

supplied

arms neither

to

all African states nor to all of its clients equally. As shall be clear later,

it is

this

very

selectivity

which

makes

possible

an

assessment

of

Soviet

motives.

Analysts

have

offered

various

explanations

for

these

phenomena.

Some have

focused on Soviet

geo-political

competition

with

the

western

world for

strategic

sites

and/or

vital raw

materials,1

while

others

have

suggested

a Soviet

desire

for

political

influence.2

Although

it has

been

unfashionable

in recent

years

to

treat

seriously

Soviet

claims

that

their

behaviour is

based on

Marxism-Leninism,

there are

those who

regard

an

ideological

commitment

as

explaining,

at

least in

part,

Soviet

activities.3

A

final

possibility

is that a

major

component

of

the

Kremlin's

policy may

be

the somewhat

'unsocialist'

desire to

make

money,

particularly

hard

currency,

out of a

very

profitable

arms

trade.4

THE

WORLD

STRUGGLE

WITH

THE

UNITED

STATES

Most

important

as

a

motive

for

the

Soviet

presence,

so

assert a

majority of western analysts, is the effort to increase the

strength

of the

Soviet

Union

and

its

allies,

while

weakening

both

the

N.A.T.O.

alliance

and

China.5

At

its

crudest,

such

an

analysis

sees

Africa

merely

as

a

geographical

space

on

the

globe,

which

happens

to

block

western

access

to

the oil

of

the

Persian

gulf.

From

this

perspective,

Africa

can

provide

or

deny

ports

and/or

airfields

from

which

the

major

powers

can

protect

or

attack

the

oil-shipping

lanes.

Thus the

Soviet

military

presence

is

seen

purely

as an

effort

to

acquire

effective

bases

for

cutting

off the

flow

of

oil to Europe and North America.

A

recent

addition

to the

geo-political

argument

is

the

contention

that

1

An

emphasis,

for

instance,

of

W.

Scott

Thompson,

'African-American

Nexus

in

Soviet

Strategy',

in

Albright

(ed.),

op.

cit.

pp.

2

I5-18,

or

Robert

Legvold,

'The

Soviet

Union's

Strategic

Stake in

Africa',

inJennifer

Seymour

Whitaker

(ed.),

Africa

and

the

United

States

(New

York,

1978),

pp.

I53--86.

2

A

major

proponent

of

this

view is

Christopher

Stevens,

The

Soviet

Union

and

Black

Africa

(London,

1976).

t?

Among

others,

see

Crawford

Young,

Ideology

and

Development

in

Africa

(New

Haven

and

London,

1982),

pp.

253-96;

David F.

Albright,

'Moscow's

African

Policy

of

the

1970's',

in

Albright

(ed.),

op.

cit.

pp.

42-6;

and

Seth

Singleton,

'Soviet

Policy

and

Socialist

Expansion

in

Asia and

Africa',

in ArmedForces and

Society (Cabin

John,

Md.),

6,

Spring,

I980,

pp.

342-8.

4

The

C.I.A. is

somewhat

sensitive to

this

dimension

of

Soviet

motivation.

Cf.

National

Foreign

Assessment

Center,

Central

Intelligence

Agency,

Communist

Aid

Activities

in

NJon-CommunistLess

Developed

Countries,

1979

and

i954-i979

(Washington,

D.C.,

I980),

pp.

I-5.

Also

see

Andrew

J. Pierre,

The

Global

Politics

of

Arms

Sales

(Princeton,

I982),

pp.

72-83.

1

See

Adam

B.

Ulam,

Dangerous

Relations:

the

Soviet

Union

in

worldpolitics,

I970-1982

(New

York

and

Oxford,

1983),

pp.

145-208.

5I3


5/18

ROBERT

D. GREY

the

nations of the

West

in

general,

and the United

States

in

particular,

are

becoming increasingly

dependent upon

raw materials which can

only

be

acquired

in Africa. This

vulnerability

provides

a

motive,

it is

claimed,

for the Soviets to utilise their

military

presence

to

attempt

to

deny

these resources to

the

West.1 The obverse of this

argument

holds

that the

Soviet

Union,

previously

considered

self-sufficient

in

natural

resources,

is

covetous

of access

to Africa's

mineral wealth

because,

like

the

West,

it is

likely

to run

short of

certain

crucial

stocks.2

More

typical

is

the

political explanation

for Russian

involvement

in

the

continent;3

namely,

that the Soviet Union seeks friends and

allies,

and

conversely

aims to undermine the

links established with

African

states by the West and/or by China, particularly those considered

'important'.

While

this

general

policy

is not tied

narrowly

or

directly

to such concrete

goals

as access

to

bases

or mineral

wealth,

it

could,

of

course,

in

the

long

run,

promote

such a

strategy.

IDEOLOGY

AND SOVIET

ARMS

TRANSFERS

Communist

leaders tend

to see the world

in

fairly

subtle terms.

Countries are classified

according

to the

nature of their

ruling

class,

and

by

their

progress

along

what is seen

as an

inevitable,

albeit

gradual, path

towards

socialism,

as well

as

by

their attitudes

towards the

capitalist

states and

the

socialist

bloc,

respectively.4

While Soviet

ideologists

have

been

sympathetic

to most

of

the

political

leaders

of

the Third World

since the decolonisation

movement

began

to accelerate

in

the

late

I950s,

they

have been under

few illusions

that these

'revolutionary

democrats'

were

interested

in,

or

likely

to

successfully promote,

socialism

as

understood

from

a Marxist-Leninist

perspective.

Nevertheless

they

assumed that these new nations might be hostile to their former

colonisers,

and somewhat

friendly

to

the

socialist

world.

They

were

willing

to make

this more

likely

by

military

assistance

and

economic

1

Geoffrey Kemp,

'U.S.

Strategic

Interests

and

Military

Options

in Sub-Saharan

Africa',

in

Whitaker

(ed.), op.

cit.

pp.

120-52,

stresses

America's

stakes.

2

Christopher

Croker

argues

that for the Soviet

Union,

and even more

so

for

its

eastern

bloc

allies,

Africa is

a

potential

source of vital

resources that

are

getting

scarce

in their own territories.

'Adventurism

and

Pragmatism:

the Soviet

Union,

Comecon,

and

relations

with

African

states',

in International

Affairs

(London),

57,

4,

Autumn,

I98I,

pp.

6I8-33.

3

David E.

Albright,

'Soviet

Policy',

in Problems

of

Communism

(Washington,

D.C.),

xxviI,

I,

January-February

I978,

pp.

20-39,

and Colin Legum, 'The African Environment', in ibid. pp.

1-19,

agree

on

the

multiplicity

and

high political

salience

of

Soviet

goals,

as

well

as the

need

to

analyse

the interaction

of

these

goals

and

capabilities

with

African

realities.

4

For an

extended eastern

bloc

analysis

of these

trends,

see

Oriental Institute

in

Academia,

The

Most

Recent

Tendencies

n the Socialist

Orientations

of

Various

African

and

Arab Countries

(Prague, 1979).

5I4


6/18

THE

SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFRICA

515

aid

to such

politically

significant

countries

as

Egypt,

India,

Indonesia,

and,

in

sub-Saharan

Africa, Ghana,

Guinea,

and

Mali.

In

1961, however,

Cuba

promulgated

a Marxist-Leninist

political

system

and,

by

doing

so,

suggested

that the Soviet Union had been

unduly pessimistic

about the

possibilities

for an

expansion

of

the

socialist

world.

In

the

I970S

in

Africa a

number of other countries

also

opted

for

Marxist-Leninism.1 While Soviet thinkers

have been

quite

sceptical

of the

validity

of

these

claims,

they

have

created a

new

ideological

pigeonhole

for

'states of socialist

orientation',2

in

the

hope

that

they

might

eventually

become full

members of the socialist

commonwealth,

as

did Cuba.

During

the

I970s,

Marxist

analysts

considered that

Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Benin, Congo, and Somalia belonged

to this

category.

To the extent that the

Soviets

considered

it

important

to

protect

the world-wide

gains

of

socialism,

they

were

anxious

to

provide

assistance,

especially

arms,

against

the

possible

enemies,

internal

or

external,

of these

revolutions.

To

argue

that

there

may

well have

been such an

ideological

component

to the

presence

of

the Soviets in

Africa is

not to

insist that

this was their

only

motivation.

Support

for

the states of

socialist

orientation

may

not

have been

prompted solely by ideological goals.

Nevertheless,

the

consistent

supply

of

arms,

especially

in

large

quantities,

for

such

regimes

would

imply

that

ideology

has

some

weight

in

Soviet

decision-making,

while the

absence of such

assistance would

justify

those

who see

Soviet

policy

as

dominated

by

the

geo-political struggle

with

the

United States.

THE

SOVIET

UNION

AND

AFRICA

S

WEALTH

Although the Soviet Union may wish to derive economic benefit from

its

activities

in

Africa,

the direct

utilisation

of

the continent's

minerals

will

not be the

sole

source

of

profit.

A

rather

more

complicated

process

seems to

be

at

work.

A

number of African

states that

have

sold

oil

and

other natural

assets

to the

West have

spent

a

substantial

portion

of that

wealth

buying

Soviet arms.

From

such

sales,

the

Soviet

Union

has

1

For an

analysis

and

evaluation of

this

phenomenon,

see

Young,

op.

cit.;

Carl

G.

Rosberg

and

Thomas M.

Callaghy,

Socialism in

Sub-Saharan

Africa:

a

new

assessment

(Berkeley,

1979);

and

David

and

Marina

Ottaway, Afrocommunism

New

York

and

London,

1981).

2

Unfortunately, the U.S.S.R. has never published a definitive list of which countries are 'of

socialist

orientation'. A

perusal

of The Most

Recent

Tendencies in

the Socialist

Orientation

of

Various

African

and Arab

Countries

makes it clear that

it is

a

very

amorphous

concept.

Nevertheless,

in

Africa,

Angola,

Benin,

Congo,

Ethiopia,

Mozambique,

and

until

its

split

with

the

U.S.S.R. in

1978,

Somalia,

most

clearly

fell into

this

category.


7/18

acquired

'hard

currency'

in

order to

buy

western

grain,

technology,

and

other

products.

Soviet

policy

may,

then,

be motivated to some

extent

by

economic

gains,

and hence

relatively

indifferent to

ideological

or

political

goals.1

As

already suggested,

there

is

nothing

exclusive about

these

hypo-

thetical

goals,

since

the Soviet

Union

has

undoubtedly

tried to

promote

a mix of some or all of

them

in

a

particular

situation.

Nevertheless,

it

would

be useful to determine which

were

primary

or

secondary,

as well

as which

they

pursued

aggressively

and which were

attractive 'side

benefits'.

METHODOLOGY

There is

a

belief,

among

some

analysts,

that the Soviet

Union

is

a

'rational

actor',

with

a

single

set of

goals,

agreed

upon

by

all its

leaders,

and

pursued

vigorously

through

the vicissitudes of international politics.2

A

modified

variant of this

perspective

holds

that,

while

the aims are

shared,

there

are

disagreements

as to the most

effective or

appropriate

means to secure their achievement.3

I

would

go

a further

step

and

assume

a lack of

unanimity

even

about

goals.

Thus,

to

pose

the

question,

what

does the

U.S.S.R. want of

Africa? is to ask what

perspectives

do

various

individuals,

groups,

or

institutions

have

in

or about

Africa?

Unfortunately, my

basic

assumption

cannot be

tested,

nor

can this

central

question

be

easily

answered. The

inevitable differences

of

opinion

among

the

Soviet leaders

are not

openly

articulated

in

the

Russian

media,

important

documents

are not leaked to

the

press,

and

few

revealing

memoirs

are

published

by

those who

have

retired.

Kremlinologists

have

fascinating techniques

for

discovering

who

has

power, and who is climbing and falling in the Soviet hierarchy, but they

are

not

very good

at

gaining

real

insights

into internal

disagreements,

especially

when

the

policies

involved

are

as

relatively

unimportant

as

arms

transfers

to

Africa.4

1

The relative character

of

that indifference

should,

of

course,

be

emphasised.

In

its relations

with

any

other

country,

the

U.S.S.R.

presumably

attempts

to maximise a

number

of

goals.

2

Ulam,

op.

cit.

is

particularly

guilty

of

this,

as are

most of

those who

have been labelled

'globalists'

by

Henry

Bienen;

'Perspectives

on

Soviet Intervention

in

Africa',

in Political Science

Quarterly

(New

York),

95,

I,

Spring

I980.

For the intellectual

difficulties inherent in the

rational

actor

model,

see Graham

T.

Allison,

Essence

of

Decision

(Boston,

1971).

3

For a

discussion

of

disagreements

within

the Soviet

leadership,

see

Peter

Vanneman

and

MartinJames,

'Shaping

Soviet African

Policy',

in

Africa

Insight (Pretoria),

0o,

I,

1980,

pp.

4-10,

and

Jiri

Valenta,

'Soviet

Decision-Making

on

the Intervention

in

Angola',

in

Albright

(ed.), op.

cit.

pp.

93-I

117

4

It

must be

remembered

that of all

Soviet

arms transfers

from

I976

to

1980,

only

10

per

cent

went

to sub-Saharan

Africa,

of which

90

per

cent

was received

by

five countries.

516

ROBERT

D.

GREY


8/18

THE

SOVIET PRESENCE IN

AFRICA

It is useful

to examine

whatever has been

published, particularly,

in

this

case,

military

documents. But

they

tend

to

consist

of

arguments by

specialists

designed

to

influence,

among

others,

the

generalists

in

the

Politburo who make the decisions, and

give

us no clue as to whether

or not

they

have been

accepted by

the

key

leaders.

Moreover,

much

of the

published

material tends to

emphasise

ideological categories,

a

convention

in

Soviet

writing,

but

not

necessarily

in Soviet

decision-

making.

In

the

absence of more

satisfactory

data,

I

have

been forced to

rely

on

a

search for

patterns

in

Soviet arms assistance to African

countries,

hoping

that

they

would reveal

something

about the

'package'

of

Soviet

motives. Obviously, given this method, I will not be able either to

specify

the

identity

of Soviet

participants

in

the debate over

African

policy,

or to characterise

their

goals

or

perspectives.

That

is,

the

method

seems

predicated

on a

'

rational

actor'

model of Soviet

behaviour. While

I

conceptualise

Soviet

relations with African

states as the

compromise

policies

which have

emerged

out of

disagreements

inside the

Kremlin,

I

can

neither

prove

this nor

discuss the

nature of the conflict.

Hopefully

we

can

discern the

'winning goals'.

SOVIET

ARMS TO

AFRICA

The

clearest

pattern

in

Soviet arms

transfers to Africa

is what

may

be

classified as the

Middle-East/North-African

nexus.1

Between

I974

and

I979,

some

75

per

cent

of

total

Soviet

military

aid to

the Third

World went

to

countries

in

the line

from Mauritania

to Iran.

The

shipment

of

weapons

to the three

North African

states,

Algeria,

Libya,

and until

1976,

Egypt,

with

minor

assistance to

Morocco,

seem

part

of

a Middle Eastern rather than an African strategy, so I have omitted

these

states and

Tunisia from

the

following analysis.

In

sub-Saharan

Africa,

I

have

attempted

to

ascertain

the

weight

of

the

various

goals

identified above.

Thus,

to

determine

if

geo-political

considerations

figured

heavily

in

Soviet

thinking,

I

examined the

differential arms

transfers to

African

states

with

ports,

in

contrast

to

those that

are

land-locked.

While

there are

other

aspects

of

any

geo-political

strategy,

access

to

docking

facilities is

generally

the most

important.

When the

data

are

examined,

there

seems

to be

very

limited

support

for

the

contention that

the

U.S.S.R. is

seeking

such

bases

-

see

Table

3.

Thus

15

per

cent of

African

nations with

ports

received

high

quantitites

($150

million

worth,

or

more)

of

Soviet

arms,

as

against

only

1

C.I.A.,

op.

cit.

pp. 27-33-

5

I

7


9/18

ROBERT

D.

GREY

TABLE

3

African

Ports and Soviet

Military

Transfers

by

Value,

I976-80

High

Moderate Low

($I50m.

+)

($50-149m.) ($5-49m.)

None

Total

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N N

States

with

ports

15

5

15

5

I2

4

58

I9

33

States

without

ports

7

I

7

I

21

3 64

9

14

Total

6

6

7

28

47

a

Data calculated for

47

sub-Saharan

and island

states,

as also for Tables

4-6.

7

per

cent of those without such assets.

Similarly, 15 per

cent of the

former received moderate

amounts

($50

to

$I49 million),

while

only

7

per

cent of the

latter did so. The Soviet Union

did concentrate

its

transfers to some extent on the

littoral

states,

as those who

push

the

geo-political

case would

argue.

However,

the

relationship

is

clearly very

weak.

I

similarly

tested 'the

political

argument'

by

examining

the relation-

ship

between

the Soviet arms transfers and

(i)

the

population

size

of

African

countries,

and

(2)

their G.N.P. While both measures have

drawbacks

as indicators of

political

importance, they

seem to be the

most

useful,

albeit

crude,

indicators of

that

amorphous quality.

As the

figures

in Table

4

make

clear,

there is

only

a

slight relationship

between

size of

population

and the

quantity

of arms received.

While

3

of

the

I

3

biggest

sub-Saharan states with 8 million or more

inhabitants

received

large quantities

of

arms,

none

of the

I

9

smallest

states did

so;

moreover,

46

per

cent

of

the

former,

as

against

79

per

cent of

the

latter,

received

no

Soviet arms. Here again, the data support this argument, but weakly.'

The same

is true

if

G.D.P. is used as

the measure

of

importance2

-

see

1

Given the

small number

of

recipients

of Soviet

arms,

the use of more

sophisticated

statistical

techniques

to

analyse

these data seemed

inappropriate.

2

While

evidence

for this

proposition

is

weak,

it is nevertheless

important

to note that there

is

some

support

for it.

In

the

only

earlier

study

I

can find that

also

tries

to

determin's

Soviet motivations

empirically,

Abbot A.

Brayton,

'Soviet Involvement

in

Africa',

in The

Journal

of

Modern

African

Studies

(Cambridge),

17,

2,

June

1979,

pp.

253-69, wrongly

concludes

that the U.S.S.R. had a

policy

of

deliberately attempting

to

penetrate poor,

weak

states.

The author

can have come to

this

conclusion

only by ignoring

certain Soviet

clients,

whom he

labels,

on

grounds

that are never

clear,

as 'colonial

penetrations',

and

'leverage

states'.

He focuses

entirely

on

what

he

calls

'targeted

states'

-

Benin,

Congo, Ethiopia,

Mali,

Somalia,

Sudan,

and

Uganda

-

and thus deals

with

seven rather

than

my

19

states.

If all Soviet clients

in

sub-Saharan

Africa are

compared

to

those

regimes

not in this

category,

and

if

aggregate,

rather

thanper

capita,

data

are

used,

it becomes

apparent

that the

U.S.S.R. somewhat

disproportionately

supplies

arms to

relatively 'large'

and

'high

G.D.P.'

states,

rather

than those that

are

'poor'.

5i8


10/18

THE SOVIET PRESENCE

IN

AFRICA

TABLE

4

Population

and

Soviet

Military

Transfer

by

Value,

I976-8o1

High

Moderate Low

($I 50m.+)

($50-149m.)

($5-49m-)

None Total

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

N

States with

large

population

(8m.

+)

23

3

15

2

15

2

46

6

13

States

with

moderate

population

(3-8m.)

20

3

I3

2 20

3

47

7

15

States

with low

population (-3m-)

o

o

I

2 I

I

2

79

I5

19

Total 6 6

7

28

47

TABLE

5

G.D.P.

and Soviet

Military

Transfers

by

Value,

I976-80o2

High

Moderate

Low

($150om.

+) ($50-

49m.

)

($5-49m-.)

None Total

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

N

States with high

G.D.P.

($2,500m.

+) 3I

5

6

I

13

2

50

8

16

States

with

moderate

G.D.P.

($50o-2,499m-)

o

0

25

4 13

2

63

Io

i6

States with low

G.D.P.

($-500) 7

I

7

I

20

3

67

IO

15

Total

6 6

7

28

47

Table

5.

Of

those I6 countries

with

'large'

($2,500

million or

more)

economies, five received high quantitites of Soviet arms, as against only

one

with

less

than

$500

million.

The

utility

of

this

measure is

qualified,

however,

by

the fact

that,

for

the

most

part,

the Soviet

Union

requires

that

its customers

pay

either

immediately,

or

through

taking

out

long-term

loans,

for

the

arms

they

receive.

While there

is some

assurance

that

the

'wealthiest'

governments

can

meet

these

terms,

the

likelihood

is

great

that the

poorest

cannot.

Thus,

for a

state as

poor

as

Somalia,

whose

G.D.P.

in

I975

was

only $492

million,

to be

provided

with

the

vast quantity of arms ($I50 million worth) it obtained from 1976 to

1978,

when

it

broke

with

the

Russians,

is

highly

unusual.

By way

of

contrast the

data

provide

far

stronger

support

for

the

1

Source:

U.NJ.

Demographic

Yearbook,

1981

(New

York,

I98I),

p. I83.

2

Source:

U.NJ.Statistical

Yearbook,

1979/80

(New

York,

1981),

pp.

693-4.

5I9


11/18

ROBERT

D. GREY

TABLE 6

Ideology

and Soviet

Military

Transfers

by

Value,

1976-80

High

Moderate

Low

($I5om.

+) ($50-I49m.) ($5-49m-)

None Total

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

N

Marxist-Leninist

67 4 17

I

17

I 0

0

6

states

Socialist statesb

20

2

40 4

20

2

20 2

IO

Other

states

o

o

3

I

I3 4

84

26

31

Total

6 6

7

28

47

a

Angola,

Benin,

Congo,

Ethiopia, Mozambique,

Somalia.

b

Cape

Verde,

Equatorial

Guinea, Guinea,

Guinea-Bissau,

Madagascar,

Mali,

Sao

Tome,

Tanzania,

Zambia,

Zimbabwe.

ideological

argument

-

see Table

6. If

we

take the six states

which,

by

the

late

I970s,

described

themselves

as Marxist-Leninist

and

seemed

to

be

accepted

by

the U.S.S.R. as

'states

of socialist

orientation

',

we

find

that

they

had been

supplied

with arms

during

the

five-year

period

1976-80

to the

following

value:

Ethiopia

(about

$2,000

million),

Angola

($500

million),

Mozambique ($i80

million),

Somalia

($I50

million),

Congo

($60

million),

and Benin

($20

million).

In

other

words,

the

Soviet Union

poured

in

military equipment

to these

ideologically

sympathetic

regimes.

A

second

group

of

African states

also describe

themselves

as

'socialist',

namely:

Cape

Verde,

Equatorial

Guinea,

Guinea,

Guinea-Bissau,

Madagascar,

Mali,

Sao

Tome,

Tanzania,

Zambia,

and

Zimbabwe.2

These

ten,

while

less

clearly

or

consistently

in

ideological

harmony

with

the Soviet

Union,

are

certainly

'anti-

imperialist', at least rhetorically, in approach to international politics:

six

of

them

received

Soviet arms

to the

value

of

$50

million

or more

from

1976

to

I980,

while

the

only

two with no

transfers

recorded

during

these

years

were

Zimbabwe

(not

yet

independent)

and Sao

Tome

(too

small?).

Of the

remaining

31

non-socialist

states,

26

or

84

per

cent

received

no Soviet

arms.

In

short,

the differences

among

Marxist-

Leninist,

socialist,

and

non-socialist

regimes

are

quite

sharp,

far more

so

than

comparable

differences

reflecting

and

testing

the

strategic

and

G.D.P. arguments.

1

See The Most

Recent

Tendencies

n the

Socialist

Orientation

f

Various

frican

ndArab

Countries,

nd

Sylvia

W.

Edgington,

'The State of Socialist

Orientation

as Soviet

Development

Politics',

Annual

Meeting

of

the

American

Political

Science

Association,

Washington,

D.C.,

1980.

2

Young,

op.

cit.

pp.

97-182,

labels these

as

'populist

socialist' states.

Zimbabwe

declared itself

a

Marxist-Leninist

state

in

September

1984,

much too

late,

of

course,

to be

considered

n

this

study.

520


12/18

THE

SOVIET

PRESENCE IN

AFRICA

521

A final

argument

is

untestable,

viz. that

the Soviet Union

distributes

arms

because these

are its best or

perhaps

its

only

quality

export.

In

part,

this is so because

data are

not

readily

available

on whether

such

transfers are

paid

for

immediately,

thereby

suggesting

a strong economic

motive,

or

by

a

'free'

grant

or a 'soft'

loan,

with

the

implication

of

at

least

some non-economic benefits.

The fact that

Libya

and

Algeria

are

two of the three

largest

African customers for Soviet

arms

and

can,

as

wealthy

oil-producing

states,

pay

for

them,

is

suggestive.

Of the

$

1

I,300

million

in

arms

provided

to all

of Africa from

I976

to

I980,

these two

states

bought 65

per

cent,

namely

$7,300

million of

hard

currency

for

the

Soviet

economy.'

My

analysis

up-to-now

has

been

based on

the

flawed

methodological

assumption

that the

leaders of the

U.S.S.R.

have first

determined

what

objectives they

wished to

promote

in

Africa and

have then

decided,

in

pursuit

of these

goals,

to which

states

they

wished

to

offer

arms,

as

well

as what

types

and

values.

I

have

further

taken it

for

granted

that

the

U.S.S.R.

could

then make

these

'target

states'

such

attractive

offers that

they

could

not,

or

would

not,

refuse them. If

these

assumptions

were

true,

then

the

method

I

have

used so far

would

provide

a

reasonable

test of

Soviet

motivations,

in

the

absence

of

better

data.

Unfortunately,

these

assumptions

are not

true.2

The

U.S.S.R.,

as one

of

the few

large

arms

suppliers

in

the

world,

can

and

does

make

its

exports

as

attractive

as

possible

to

potential

buyers

by

offering

high

quality

weapons

at

reasonable

prices.3

Yet,

to

borrow

from the

language

of

micro-economics,

the

Russians lack

'goodwill'

for

many

possible

customers.

A

large

number of

African

states,

long-term

recipients

of

British, French, American, or West German arms, would not think of

acquiring

weapons

from

the

East,

and there

is no

deal

that

could

be

offered from

that

direction which

they

'could

not

refuse'.

Thus,

the

Soviets can

realistically

provide

arms

only

to

those who

seek

or

are

ideologically

prepared

to

accept

arms

from

them,

and

almost

the

only

states which

do

so

are

Marxist-Leninist or

socialist.

Thus,

in

the

years

from

1976

to

1980,

of

the

19

sub-Saharan

states

which

acquired

Soviet

arms,

only

five

were

not

socialist,

and,

of

these,

only one received large quantities. Other than this case, only Burundi

1

As

trade with the

West

has

increased,

Soviet

needs for

hard

currency

to

finance that

trade

have

risen

commnensurately.

ee

Pierre,

op.

cit.

pp.

72-83.

2

Brayton,

loc. cit. is

guilty

of the

same

false

assumptions.

3

C.I.A.,

op.

cit.

pp.

4-6.


13/18

ROBERT D.

GREY

($

o

million),

Chad

($5 million),

the Sudan

($Io million),

and

Uganda

($40

million,

a

relationship

which

ended

with Amin's

overthrow

in

1979)

were

non-socialist

recipients

of

Soviet arms.

Given the limited

pool

of

potential

customers,

it

might

still be

possible

to discover

the

motives

of the Russians

if

we

knew

(i)

whom

they

offered

arms

to,

and

(ii)

who

requested

arms from

them,

including

what

types

and amounts.

By adding

the former to

positive

decisions

on the

latter,

we

would

really

know

those African countries

in

which the Soviets

wished

to

establish

a

presence

and

the

magnitude

of that desire.

Although

it

is

impossible

to

get

such

information,

the

resulting

difficulties

need

not

be

insuperable.

If

certain

assumptions

are

accepted,

it

may

be feasible to use available data to crudely determine Moscow's motives.

Thus,

I have

assumed

(i)

that the Soviet

Union

made no offers

of arms

which were

rejected,

(2)

that

in

their

negotiations

with the Soviet

leaders

those

requesting

arms

were

able to

set

the

minimum

(but

not

the

maximum)

acceptable

level and

types

of

weapons,

(3)

that

the flow

or

lack thereof of hard

currency payments

did not exercise much

weight

in

the

Soviet

decision-making process,

and

(4)

that

the

value of arms

transferred

-

or,

particularly,

any

increases

-

can therefore be con-

sidered

as a

crude indicator of the

importance

to the U.S.S.R. of its

presence

in a client

country.

Table

7

lists

all

20

sub-Saharan

states that received

arms from

the

Soviet

Union

at

any

time between

1967

and

I980,

rank ordered

by

the

amount of increases

from

1967-76

to

I976-80.

Thus

Ethiopia,

which

had

acquired

no Soviet

arms

in

the first

period

and

$I,900

million

in

the

latter,

heads the

list,

while

Equatorial

Guinea,

which

jumped

from

$5

million

to

$Io

million,

is at

the

bottom

of those states which had

increases.

Chad

and Guinea received

equal

amounts

during

the two

periods, while the Sudan fell sharply from $65 million to $io million

and the Central

African

Republic

from

$I

million

to zero.

Ethiopia

alone absorbed

56

per

cent of

the

increase

in

arms

shipped

to black

Africa,

while

the

top

five states

received 86

per

cent of the total

increase.

Thus,

what

at first

glance

-

e.g.

in

Table

i

-

might

appear

a

generalised

commitment

of

the

U.S.S.R. to

extend

and

deepen

its

presence

in

Africa

through

massive increases

in

arms

transfers,

now

appears

limited to

the

North

African littoral

and to the five

sub-Saharan

states of Ethiopia, Angola, Tanzania, Zambia, and Mozambique.

Increases

in

the

provision

of arms

to these

preferred

clients was

offset

by,

and,

perhaps

in

part,

motivated

by,

the loss of

other

clients.

Egypt

had

been

the

Soviet

Union's

largest

and most

important

African

purchaser

of

arms from

1967

to

1975,

acquiring

as

such as

$2,400

million

522


14/18

523

HE

SOVIET PRESENCE

IN

AFRICA

TABLE

7

Recipients

of

Soviet

Arms,

I967-801

$

million

Increases

in

Value of Arms

Transferred

by

Rank Order

from

States

with...

Port(s)

Populationa

G.D.Pb

IdeologyC 1967-76

to

I976-80

Ethiopia

+ + +

+

+ ++

1,900

I

Angola

+

+

+ +

++

360

2

Tanzania

+

+ + +

+

+

290

3

Zambia

-+ ++

+

2IO

4

Mozambique

+ + + + + + +

I65

5

Mali

+ +

+

85

6

Madagascar

+

+ + + +

59

7

Cape

Verde

+

- -

+

50

8

Congo

+

-

+ +

50 9

Guinea-Bissau +

- -

+

25

10

Nigeria

+

+

-

+

-

20

II

Benin

+ +

+

+

+

I9

12

Burundi

-+

4-

-

0

13

Equatorial

Guinea

+

-

-

+

5

14

Chad

-+

- -

o

I5

Guinea + + + + o i6

Central

African

R.

+

-I

17

Uganda

+ + + +

-

-25

8

Somalia

+ +

-

++

-3I

19

Sudan

+

+ + ++

-

-55

20

a

+

+

=

8 million or

more,

+

=

3-8

million,

-

=

below

3

million.

b

+ +

=

$2,500

million or

more;

+

=

$500

to

$2,499

million;

-

=

below

$500

million.

c

+

+

=

'states of socialist

orientation';

+

=

other socialist

states;

-

=

non-socialist states.

worth in

that

period,

but this

relationship

with

the U.S.S.R. was

ended

in

I976.

Somalia had ranked fifth

among

Soviet clients in Africa

during

the first

decade,

and

continued to receive

large quantities

of arms until

I978,

when

it also fell out

with the Soviet Union.

The

Sudan tied

with

Uganda

for seventh

position,

and then both broke with the U.S.S.R.

in the late

I970s.

Certain

patterns

leap

out of the data

immediately.

Foremost,

again,

is the

ideological

impact.

Of

the

five sub-Saharan

regimes

which

received the

largest

increases

in

arms

(72

per

cent),

Ethiopia,

Angola,

and Mozambique are all declared Marxist-Leninist states. However,

and

this is

equally striking,

the Soviet

Union,

in

providing

such massive

1

Sources: U.S.

Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency,

World

Military

Expenditures

nd

Arms

Transfers, I967-76, pp.

I57-9,

and

i976-ig80,

p. 117.


15/18

supplies

of

weaponry

to

these

ideological

sympathisers,

did not

have to

sacrifice other

possibly important goals,

since

all

three had

ports,

and

were

among

the

larger

and

strategically

most

significant

states of Africa.

In

sharp

contrast are the

shipments

of arms to Tanzania and

Zambia,

since

Julius Nyerere

has

gone

to

great lengths

to

distinguish

his

country's

variant of

African

socialism from

Marxist-Leninism,

while

the

African

humanism

of

Kenneth

Kaunda

is even further removed from

orthodox

'socialist

orientation'. Not

only

are these two states somewhat

ideologically

distant

from

the

U.S.S.R.,

but the

presence

of

the

Soviets

there

does

little

to

promote

their

geo-political goals,

at least

as

understood

in

this

analysis

so

far. Zambia is

land-locked,

and

although

Tanzania has the major port of Dar es Salaam, Nyerere, as a leader

of the

non-aligned

movement,

has made

it

quite

clear

that

this will be

unavailable

to

any

power.

Political

goals

make

more sense. The leaders

of

both

Tanzania

and

Zambia

are still

influential

in

the

Third

World,

and both countries

can

act

as

important

Soviet

'friends'

in

Africa,

perhaps

more

effectively

for

not

being

part

of the

Marxist-Leninist

camp.

They

can be

legitimately

portrayed

as 'disinterested'

sympathisers

with

the Soviet Union.

ALTERNATIVE

EXPLANATIONS

Two

other

possible

interpretations

of Soviet

behaviour

have been

offered

by

scholars.

The

'crisis' school

regards

the U.S.S.R.

as,

to

use

an

African

image,

a

hyena,

eager

to take

advantage

of

the troubles

of

others.1

Thus,

these

analysts

hold

that

the

frequency

of

coups,

civil

wars,

and

external

invasions

provide

occasions

for Soviet

involvement.

The

frequent

increase

in desire for

arms

which

such

incidents

provoke,

combined with the willingness to supply sophisticated weapons, raises

the

likelihood of

a

growing

Soviet

presence.

The second

school,

related

to the

first,

emphasises

that the

U.S.S.R.

has interests in certain

crucial

areas

of

the continent

which

it

pursues

vigorously,

notably

in the

Horn

of

Africa

and

Southern

Africa.

Crises

in

the

continent

may,

indeed,

increase demands

for

arms

by

African

leaders,

and,

to the

extent

that the Soviet

Union

is

willing

to

supply

them

and

the

West is

not,

they

will be

bought

from

the

U.S.S.R.

1

Emphasising

this

'hyena-like'

behaviour of the U.S.S.R. are Colin

Legum,

'Communal

Conflict and

International

Intervention

in

Africa',

in

Legum,

I.

William

Zartman,

Steven

Langdon,

and

Lynn

K.

Mytelka,

Africa

n the

I980's:

a

continent

n crisis

(New

York,

1979),

pp.

23-58;

Timothy

M.

Shaw,

'Africa

in

the World

System:

towards more

uneven

development?',

in Shaw

and 'Sola

Ojo (eds.),

Africa

andtheInternational

olitical

System Washington,

D.C.,

1982),

pp.

104-38;

and Hosmer

and

Wolfe,

op.

cit.

524

ROBERT

D.

GREY


16/18


17/18

ROBERT D.

GREY

CONCLUSIONS

How

can

we

explain

the

large

increase

in

arms

transfers

to Africa

during

the late

I97os?

Certainly,

the motives

can

only

be understood

in

the

light

of both the context and the constraints

operating during

this

period.

The Soviet

Union

had for

a

number of

years

been

expanding

its arms

production,

and

by

the middle

1970s

began

to

export

sophisticated

and

expensive

military equipment,

such as

jet fighters,

tanks,

and armoured

personnel

carriers.

Arms, however,

were

virtually

the

only

products

sold

by

the Russians outside

the communist bloc.

Moreover,

although

they

did

provide

economic

assistance to other

countries in various forms, the number of recipients and quantity of

money

involved

were

limited.

Thus,

the

transfer of arms became

the

major

foreign

policy

tool

available to the U.S.S.R.

At

the same

time,

western

leaders,

particularly

President Carter of

the

United

States,

became

somewhat more hesistant

to act as

an

arms

supplier

to the world.

Thus,

at

a time

when demand

for

arms

was

rising,

the

Soviet Union

was

put

in

an

extremely

advantageous

sales

position.

Nevertheless,

the

Soviet

Union was

severely

constrained

in its

ability

to use this tool

of

foreign policy.1

First of

all,

a

substantial

number of

countries did

not

want

arms

(or,

at

least,

in

only very

small

quantities).

Secondly,

others

strongly

preferred

to have

their

needs

satisfied

by

the

West,

including

some

governments

who so

distrusted the Russians

that

they

would

never

ask for such assistance.

The Soviet

Union

could

only

supply

arms to those countries

which

requested

them

and/or

which

were

ideologically

and

politically willing

to have them so

supplied.

The middle

and

late

I970S

saw

a

new

development

in

Africa,

the

emergence

of a number

of

Marxist-Leninist

states.

The Soviet

Union

played

a

significant

role in the

triumph

of the M.P.L.A. in

Angola,

and

since the Afro-Communists

in

Mozambique,

Ethiopia,

Benin,

and the

Congo

saw

the Russians

as their

natural

protectors,

their

regimes

turned

to them

for

arms. The Kremlin

seems

to have viewed

this

largely

as

a

positive

phenomenon,

although

to

the extent

that it was then

the

responsibility

of

the Soviet

Union,

and its Cuban

ally,

to

protect

these

states,

it

became

something

of

a burden as well.

Nevertheless,

the

extensive

Soviet

presence

in

Ethiopia,

Angola,

and

Mozambique

1

See

Edward

J.

Laurence,

'Soviet

Arms

Transfer in

the

ig80's:

declining

influence

in

Sub-Saharan

Africa',

in

Arlinghaus

(ed.),

op.

cit.

pp.

39-77;

Singleton,

loc.

cit.;

RobertJ.

Lilley,

'Constraints

on

Superpower

Intervention

in

Sub-Saharan

Africa',

in

Parameters

(Carlisle

Barracks,

Pennsylvania),

xII,

3, September

1982,

pp.

63-75;

and Zaki

Leidi,

'Les Limites

de la

penetration

sovietique

en

Afrique',

in

Defense

nationale

(Paris), 34,

December

1978,

pp.

I9-23.

526


18/18

THE

SOVIET PRESENCE IN

AFRICA

527

maximised

a number of

important

goals,

notably

the

spread

of

inter-

national

socialism,

as well as

potential

access to bases and

influential

political

friends.

The

unwillingness

of the West to

compete

in

supplying

arms was

instrumental

both

in

Ethiopia's

transition

to

Marxism-Leninism

and

in

its

becoming

a Soviet client.'

That same

reluctance

led Tanzania and

Zambia

to turn

to the

U.S.S.R.

for

arms,

if

not for

ideological

brotherhood.

Arms

sales to

these two countries

may

have won

the

Soviet

Union

little

in the short

run,

but

has established

for it

a

strong presence

in

Southern

Africa.

In the late

I970s,

the Soviet

Union made

very large

military

transfers

to Libya and Algeria in North Africa, as well as to Ethiopia, Angola,

Mozambique,

Zambia,

and

Tanzania. It also

supplied

small

quantities

of

arms to an additional

14

sub-Saharan

states,

as

a low-cost

way

of

promoting

its

multiple

objectives.

Although

these

policies

reflect no

simple

commitment

to one

over-arching goal,

the evidence

of

this

study

indicates

that the

main aim of the

Soviet

presence

in

Africa has been

to

help

defend the

threatened

'states of socialist orientation'.

1

The literature

on Soviet

intervention

in

this

part

of

the continent

is substantial.

For a

sampling,

see Marina Ottaway, Sovietand Americannfluence

n the Horn

of Africa(New York,

1982);

Robert

Gorman,

Political

Conflict

n

the

Horn

of Africa (New

York,

1981);

Colin

Legum

and Bill

Lee,

The

Horn

of

Africa

n

Continuing

risis

New

York,

979);

Bereket Habte

Selassie,

Conflict

nd

Intervention

in the

Horn

of Africa

(New

York,

I980).

Robert

D.

Grey, 'Dependency

-

A

Political

Economy

Model:

post-imperial

foreign policy',

in Robert

Hess

(ed.),

Proceedings f

the

Fifth

International

Conferencef

Ethiopian

tudies,

Session

B.

(Chicago,

1980),

stresses the

unwillingness

of the

United

States

to meet

the

growing

needs

of

Ethiopia,

and hence

that

regime's

somewhat

reluctant

turn

to the

U.S.S.R.

Documents

Soviet in Africa