South Sudan One Year On: From theWorld’s Newest State to Another

African Story

Mairi John Blackings, PhD

University of Strathclyde

A Paper Presented at St Antony’s College,

Oxford University,

Sudanese Programme,June 23rd, 2012.

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Abstract

There is an African saying that once a child has washed his or her hands, s/hecan eat with elders. This paper examines whether, a year on, the world‘s newestnation, South Sudan, not withstanding the numerous challenges of nationbuilding, has come of age. That is, has South Sudan since attaining indepen-dence, taken active steps towards strengthening her democratic institutions andcredentials, and has she embraced wholly the notion of the supremacy of therule of law, or has she, to put it mildly, become another sad African story? TheAfrican story, which is also, a postcolonial one, is the narrative of centralisedand erratic decision making mechanisms; the negation of social and politicalpluralism, where the harassment, intimidation and vilification of the oppositionparties, civil society and journalists are daily rituals; the clinging on to power,whether deserved or not, at all costs; the concentration of state power, whereparties are allowed, within either the upper echelons of the ruling party orexclusively in the hands of a single individual, usually the leader; the blurringof the distinction between the party and the state, and the subordination of thestate to the party of the leader; gross violations of human rights; the use of thenational army as a private militia to prop up the regime, and as an instrumentof repression; the creation of structures which allow individuals, especially theleadership and its cohorts to punitively abuse and misuse their office to reappersonal gains without being accountable to anyone.

One way of examining a nation‘s democratic credentials is by looking atthe nature of both the official and the unofficial discourses emanating fromthe leadership and its cadre. My focus, is therefore, on how the official andsemi-official discourses from the leadership in South Sudan and its cadre, canshed light on the design and performance of the government. I intend to arguein this paper that the failure of the ruling party in South Sudan, the SPLM/A,to transform itself successfully from a guerilla movement, where the armyhad absolute control and dominion over the party, the administration of the‘liberated’ areas and the judiciary, is at the centre of most of the governanceproblems facing South Sudan today. The modus operandi of running a guerillamovement, which might have served the SPLM/A well in the bush, I suggest, isunfortunately ill-suited for running a twenty-first century modern state, wherethe barking out of commands, no matter how loudly, is unlikely to yield thedesired effect. The failure to separate the state from the party and the attendantfailure to institute checks and balances within the various organs of the state lieat the centre of the general air of malaise suffocating and squeezing life out ofthe nascent nation state of South Sudan, a year on, I contend.

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.Contents

1 Introduction 41.1 “Let the People be the Judge" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.2 Post-Independence Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2 The State of Nation Progress Report through Local and International Lenses 62.1 Assessment by South Sudanese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2.1.1 National Poll on South Sudanese Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62.1.2 The Verdict from the Pulpit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2.2 Assessment by the International Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72.2.1 The US State Department Human Rights Report 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82.2.2 South Sudan 4th Failed State? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82.2.3 The Human Rights Watch Report 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92.2.4 The Reporters Without Border Report 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

3 The State, the Party and Sovereignty 103.1 The Use, Abuse and Misuse of Sovereign Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

3.1.1 Flag, Attention, Baton in Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113.1.2 Flag, Aim, Shoot in Juba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

3.2 Sub-nationalism in the Official and Sub-official Discourses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123.2.1 Liberation: The Bush Vs Town Dichotomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123.2.2 The "We liberated You" Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133.2.3 The Choice of Independence Day Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143.2.4 Partial Repayment in Exchange for Anonymity and Amnesty for Corrupt

Officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143.3 Sub-nationalism and Sovereign Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

3.3.1 The National Flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153.3.2 The National Currency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163.3.3 The National Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

3.4 The Judiciary and the Exercise of Executive Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

4 Attempting to Rationalise the African Story 184.1 African Leaders as Sole Winners in Post-independence Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184.2 Independence: An Opportunity to Get all that ‘Colonialism’ Denied Them . . . . . 194.3 Liberators Clearer About What they Want to End than the Way Forward . . . . . . 19

5 Concluding Reflections 20

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I. Introduction

1.1 “Let the People be the Judge"

Recently asked whether John Garangwould, should he come back to lifetoday, be happy with the state of af-fairs in the newly independent South

Sudan, the response of a senior member ofthe ruling party of South Sudan, the SudanPeoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM), wasunequivocal: "Let the people be the judge."1

This response, by any yardstick, falls short ofa ringing endorsement of the performance ofthe ruling party by one of its senior members.More importantly, it suggests that, we cannotand probably should not, rely wholly on theself assessment rendition of the SPLM on itsown “state of the nation” address.

The prerogative, for objective assessmentand reporting, the honourable member seemsto suggest, must lie with the “people" and notwith the party. I hope this personal reflection,on the state of the nation, a year on, falls withinthat category of the “people” being “the judge.”And more importantly, I pray and hope thatwhen the judgement of the “people” reveals tothe emperor the naked truth, that he is naked,the emperor would adorn himself with a newset of attire, and not respond by letting looseon the “people” the baying wolves desperatefor some glory and blood, nor respond by send-ing the ”people” to the gallows, for daring tospeak the truth, even when so solicited by thehonourable member!

Yet, the response also has a disturbing andchilling element to it, that of self-censorship.It seems that even the powerful and the well-heeled, unlike the proverbial child in Chris-tian Andersen’s story,2 are unwilling to, if notunable to, puncture the pretensions of the em-peror’s courtiers, who though individually andin private are aware of and do confess to a gen-

eral malaise, but collectively and in public, dopaint a picture of bliss. This culture of self-censorship, whether voluntary or imposed, isa worrying development, for the sake of thehealth, viability and stability of the new nation.Unless we can and do accept and encouragecriticism, no matter how unpalatable we find itto be, we cannot expect to be able to mend ourways, and make adjustments where we havestrayed from the well-beaten path of democ-racy.

The Republic of South Sudan became theworld’s newest nation on July 9th, 2011, follow-ing a referendum in which 98% of the regis-tered voters opted for secession from the Re-public of the Sudan. The referendum itself, wasone of the requirements of the ComprehensivePeace Agreement (CPA), signed between twoparties: the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Move-ment/Army (SPLM/A), representing largelySouth Sudan, and the National Congress Party,on behalf of the government of the Republicof the Sudan. The CPA brought to an endSudan’s second civil war which flared up in1983 pitying the largely black Christian Southagainst the predominantly Moslem and Arabi-cized North.

The aim of this paper is to examine the ex-tent to which, a year on, South Sudan, not with-standing the huge challenges of post-conflict re-construction, has weathered the teething prob-lems associated with governance and the build-ing a of new postwar nation. In this paper,I will be analysing the systems of thoughts,ideas, images and symbols employed by theleadership of South Sudan and its cadre to gaininsight into its modus operandi, focusing on theeffectiveness and the effect on the governed.

Admittedly and understandably, there maybe protestations that one year is too short aperiod to effectively gauge the performance ofa government. My response to this is simple.First, it is almost customary, if not fashionable

1BBC Africa Debate "South Sudan - Has independence met expectations?" broadcast live 29th June 2012, from Juba.2"The Emperor’s New Clothes" is a Danish fairy tale published 1837 by Christian Andersen.

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for governments to be assessed on their first100 days in office. If 100 days is acceptable,what about a whole year? Secondly, if one yearis too short, it is unlikely that, we would everfind an ideal moment, acceptable to and likelyto please everyone. Thirdly, we are not lookingfor grandiose road or building projects, tempt-ing as that may be. What we are looking for, areevidence of good governance, accountabilityand the observation of the rule of law: ingredi-ents we consider to be essential for laying thefoundation stones of a democratic nation.

1.2 Post-Independence Challenges

It is important that we start by acknowledgingand assessing the challenges South Sudan facesas it strives to lay the foundation stone for astrong, viable and democratic nation state. Thechallenges are immense, numerous and com-plex. The over fifty years of civil strife has leftbehind a nation divided, a people traumatisedand a country in need of reconciliation andrestoring of trust between the various commu-nities; a physical infrastructure that does notexist or is in need of total overhaul.

The new nation sate is sinking fast underthe weight of small arms in the hands of someof its citizens – both civilian and military – whouse it indiscriminately to settle old scores, cat-tle rustling and broad daylight robbery. Thenascent nation state is being asphyxiated bythe entrenched stranglehold of corruption andnepotism. The people of South Sudan are, asa result, crying out for an urgent non-partisandisarmament of civilians by an army that isnon-partisan and does not take the side of onegroup over the other, of one party over theother, or of one nationality over the other.

A government that will have the vision todiverge the economy from over-reliance on oil,to include agriculture, animal resources andforestry, would be an added item in the long,so far unchecked, shopping list of the long

suffering people of South Sudan.

The unresolved CPA issues like border de-marcation, nationality and citizenship, the pro-tocols relating to Abyei, Blue Nile and NubaMountains, are lethal weapons in the handsof anyone desperate to play mischief or scorecheap political points, especially in momentsof internal difficulties. In fact, the numerousskirmishes between the Sudan and South Su-dan, did erupt into an open warfare in April2012, resulting in the army of South Sudan,the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA),briefly occupying the oil rich region of Heglig,also known as Panthou, before withdrawing orbeing flushed out, depending on whose side ofthe story you wish to believe.

South Sudan, which relies totally on oil rev-enue (98%), has not made things easy for her-self by switching off the oil taps without thor-oughly thinking through or offering alterna-tive source of revenue, nor consulting with thepeople of South Sudan on such an importantdecision. There are talks of two new pipe linesbeing constructed, one to Lamu in Kenya theother to Djibouti, through Ethiopia, to replacethe one that runs through Sudan. This projectreferred to as the Lamu Port and Lamu SouthernSudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) orin short, the The Lamu Corridor, is estimated tocost over $23 billion3.

What is not transparent, so far, is howmuch the governments of Kenya, Ethiopia andDjibouti are going to charge per barrel, andwhether there are other taxes and hidden costs,that the people of South Sudan should knowabout, before the deals are signed and con-struction commences. The argument that Su-dan has been ”stealing our oil,” which has, inturn, been used to justify the turning off, ofthe oil taps, has been made loudly and con-sistently by the political leadership. What hasnot been done to the same gusto is the initi-ating of debates in parliament, the press and

3"Lamu port project launched for South Sudan and Ethiopia" BBC, March 2nd, 2012.

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public on how the Lamu Corridor comparesin economic rather than political terms withthe Khartoum pipeline. That is, how much,everything taken into account, will South Su-dan save per barrel following the constructionof the Lamu Corridor. Equally important isthe debate, should Lamu Corridor be the pre-ferred choice, on which of the three options isour best bet; pipeline, railway or roads. It isagainst this background of external and inter-nal factors that we seek to explore the progressSouth Sudan has made over the last one year,as a sovereign independent state.

II. The State of Nation Progress

Report through Local and

International Lenses

We start by briefly looking at the progress re-port issued on the health of democracy, gover-nance and human rights in South Sudan sincegaining her independence, a year ago. This willoffer us a framework and background againstwhich to gauge the performance of the gov-ernment. These are by local and internationalgroups.

2.1 Assessment by South Sudanese

We start with the local, by reflecting on thefindings of a national poll and a pastoral letterby two Primates of the Episcopal Church of theSudan and the Catholic Church.

2.1.1 National Poll on South Sudanese Ex-pectations

The first ever poll conducted nationwide inSouth Sudan by the International RepublicanInstitute (IRI), sampled 2,225 adults aged 18and over from all the 10 South Sudanese states.The poll suggests that the majority of SouthSudanese (82%) felt that the country was head-ing in the right direction. This poll, conducted

September 6th–27th, 2011, covered issues rang-ing from democracy and governance to gov-ernment priorities, voting behaviours and at-titudes toward democracy. The study was ad-ministered through face-to-face interviews, inthe language of the respondent’s choice. Theselanguages were: Dinka, Nuer, Juba or Classi-cal Arabic or English. The poll found out that67% of respondents reported being very satis-fied or satisfied with the performance of theSudan Peoples Liberation Movement. Moreimportantly, 59% felt that their overall securitysituation had improved.

This, no doubt, was a ringing endorsementof the SPLM and its leadership, two months af-ter crossing with the populace to the promisedland. It would, however, be interesting to see,if a year later, the statistics would hold up orfluctuate, and crucially in which direction: up-wards or downwards.

2.1.2 The Verdict from the Pulpit

In a joint pastoral letter entitled “AdvisoryMessage to the Citizens of South Sudan Dur-ing the First Independence Celebrations" thetwo primates of South Sudan: His GraceArchbishop Paulino Lukudu Loro, CatholicMetropolitan Archbishop of Juba, and TheMost Reverend Archbishop Daniel Deng Bul,Archbishop and Primate of Episcopal Churchof the Sudan and Bishop of ECS Diocese ofJuba, could not have been more clearer onwhere the government has fallen short. Thefourth paragraph of their pastoral letter dated9th July 2012, deplores how:

As we celebrate this first year of In-dependence, nevertheless we mustnote with sadness many of the prob-lems which have occurred withinthe new nation. It has been re-ported that a huge sum of moneyhas been stolen by high rankingofficials. We wonder how much

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more is yet to be uncovered in sub-sequent audit reports. Corruptionhas become endemic within certainclasses. This is unacceptable.

The two Primates also expressed their concernabout the increasing level of communal vio-lence in South Sudan and an equally disturbingcreeping in of Xenophobia:

Ethnic discontent is a constant dan-ger, both between communities atthe grassroots and also in percep-tions of the ethnic make-up ofgovernment institutions. Thereare reports of growing resentmentagainst citizens of our neighbour-ing countries which supportedus during our liberation struggle.Knowing how much we still needthe support of the East AfricanCommunity as a trading partner,we call for the cultivation of bet-ter relations with our neighbours,guided by the call of Christ to “loveyour neighbour as yourself.”

The other area of concern was in the deliv-ery of services, the composition of the Perma-nent Constitution production team, and thebehaviour of the security organs:

The delivery of basic infrastructureand services such as roads, health,education and water has not metthe high expectations of our peo-ple. The review process for the pro-duction of a new Permanent Con-stitution has not been as inclusiveas expected, and the Church hasnot been adequately represented.The security organs should be thefriends and servants of the people,but some within these organs havegone against this principle.

The need to provide protection to citizens, theirproperty and lives, one of the cardinal dutiesof the state was referred to:

While we thank God for the the rel-ative peace in Western Equatoriaand Western Bahr el Ghazal in theface of the Lord’s Resistance Armywhich has operated in those partsof the country, we call on all citi-zens to be vigilant and not to giveroom to destructive forces on ourland.

It can be sen that corruption, xenophobia,the harassment of nationals by the securityforces, the unrepresentative nature of the com-mittee on the review of the Permanent Consti-tution are high up in the minds of the clergy.For these two senior clergy to put pen to paperon these issues means that they deserve to beaddressed, as a matter of urgency.

The composition of the constitution bodyshould reflect all shades of opinions: religious,political, civil society, professionals, and others.It should not be partisan. A lot of resources,time and energy was spent on the Draft Con-stitution, which was not necessary, as the CPAconstitution had inbuilt mechanisms to caterfor the separation of South Sudan. The onlything it achieved was to give the president pow-ers to relieve, among others, governors who areelected by the people! This in itself, seems to bea retrogressive rather than a progressive step.

2.2 Assessment by the InternationalCommunity

The two sets of assessments differ fundamen-tally. The poll assessment from the South Su-danese was soon after the independence beforethe euphoria has died down and was in form offace to face interviews. In a setting where theculture of free expression is not well cultivated,people tend to state what the powers-that-bewishes to hear, rather than what they really

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feel like saying. Public adorations have to betaken with a pinch of salt. We have all seenhow today’s adulation can turn to tomorrow’svilification, once the regime folds. Venerationis a survival strategy that the populace haslearnt to adapt, under repressive regimes.

The assessment by the international com-munity, we will be looking at include theUS, State Department’s Human Rights Report2012, the Failed States’ Index 2012, the HumanRight’s Watch, and the Reporters Without Bor-ders Report. These reports were compiled atleast nine months after South Sudan got herindependence. The difference in time, shouldallow for a more sombre and reflected look atthe situation on the ground. It is also possibleto argue that, at this point, new factors like theoil tap shut down might have cropped into theequation to influence judgements.

2.2.1 The US State Department HumanRights Report 2012

According to the US, State Department’s, Coun-try Human Rights Reports 2012, on South Su-dan:

The most serious human rightsproblems in the country includedextrajudicial killings, torture, rape,and other inhumane treatment ofcivilians as a result of conflict be-tween the SPLA and SAF, RMGattacks on SAF and SPLA secu-rity forces, government counter-attacks, clashes between securityforces and civilians, interethnic andinter-communal conflict, and civil-ian clashes related to cattle rustling.

This conflict, according the US State De-partment, resulted in approximately 250,000internally displaced persons (IDPs) during theyear. The other human rights abuses they listedincluded:

Politically motivated abductions byethnic groups; harsh prison con-ditions; arbitrary arrest and de-tention, including prolonged pre-trial detention; and an inefficientand corrupt judiciary. The govern-ment restricted freedoms of privacy,speech, press, assembly, and asso-ciation. Displaced persons wereabused and harassed. Official cor-ruption was pervasive.

The government is further accused of:

Restricting the movement ofnon-governmental organizations(NGOs), and NGO workers wereattacked and harassed. Violenceand discrimination against womenwere widespread. Violence againstchildren included child abuse, childabduction, and harmful traditionalpractices such as “girl compensa-tion.” Police recruited child sol-diers prior to independence in July,and RMGs recruited child soldiersthroughout the year. Traffickingin persons; discrimination and vio-lence against ethnic minorities andhomosexuals; governmental incite-ment of tribal violence; and childlabor, including forced labor, wereproblems.

"The government seldom," we are re-minded, "took steps to punish officials whocommitted abuses, and impunity was a majorproblem."

2.2.2 South Sudan 4th Failed State?

In a report published, June 19th, 2012, the Re-public of Sudan, was named as the third on thelist of the world’s failed states, after the Demo-cratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somaliarespectively. The report was contained in thelatest edition of the Failed States Index (FSI).

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The Republic of South Sudan, which at-tained independence less than a year agowould have been ranked ‘approximately fourth’behind Sudan, according to Fund For Peace(FFP), due to ’its “fragile” infrastructure, se-vere poverty, weak government, fraught rela-tions with Sudan and heavy reliance on oilrevenues.’

South Sudan, is therefore, already regardedas a failed state in some analysis.

2.2.3 The Human Rights Watch Report 2012

In a 105 page report entitled ’Prison Is Not forMe: Arbitrary Detention in South Sudan,’ re-leased on June 21st, 2012 the Human RightsWatch, characterised the South Sudan judicialsystem as being characterised by "flawed pro-cesses, unlawful detentions, and dire condi-tions," which they argue "reflect the urgentneed to improve the new nation’s fledgling jus-tice system." The report catalogues patternsof wrongful deprivation of liberty, harsh andunacceptable prison conditions in which de-tainees live. The research conducted in 12 ofthe Country’s 79 prisons was carried out dur-ing a 10-month period before and after SouthSudan‘s independence, on July 9, 2011.

According to the report, a “third of SouthSudan’s prison population of approximately6,000" consist of people who have not been“convicted of any offence" or in some caseseven charged with one, but are detained, oftenfor long periods, “waiting for police, prosecu-tors, and judges to process their cases.” Judges,we are told, often pass “long sentences andeven condemn to death people who, withoutlegal assistance, were unable to understand thenature of charges against them or to call andprepare witnesses in their defence,“ HumanRights Watch found.

More disturbingly, the prisoners have re-ported that “prison officers routinely beat themwith sticks, canes, or whips for disciplinary in-fractions.” There are reports of some inmates

being “permanently chained in heavy shack-les’, which violates domestic and internationalstandards for the use of restraints." The issueof “prohibited cruel, inhuman, and degradingpunishment”, are ripe, according to the report.“In all the prisons,” Human Rights Watch con-clude, “children are detained alongside adultsand are not offered rehabilitation programs orsufficient educational opportunities," a prac-tice which runs contrary to the South Sudan’sChild Act, the report maintains.

The level of progress a nation has made,is best measured by the way she treats hermost vulnerable and powerless people: chil-dren, women, the disabled, the incarcerated,and the sick. South Sudan seems to have fairedrather badly in this respect.

2.2.4 The Reporters Without Border Report2012

A report entitled "South Sudan: World‘syoungest country yet to embark on road to civilliberties," was released on 3rd July, 2012, by theReporters Without Borders. The report focusedprimarily on the state of freedom of informa-tion in South Sudan. They ranked South Sudan111th out of 179 countries on press freedom in-dex. The report, compiled in Juba from 9th to15th May, 2012, states that “independence hasbrought no significant improvement in mediafreedom in South Sudan.” It also highlights agrowing and disturbing tendency of journaliststo censor themselves, and stresses the need forlaws regulating the media to be enacted.

On a slightly positive note, the report notes“South Sudan is not currently prey to concertedand systematic harassment of its media." Thereport, however, notes that “there has been adisturbing accumulation of incidents and iso-lated acts of repression or intimidation thatend up undermining the climate in which jour-nalists and media operate."

It is important, in my view, that we studythese reports carefully and see what lessons

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we can learn from them. Where there are areasof concern we should strive to address them,and make sure that when the next round ofreports come out, we are not where we are oreven worse. The worst we can do, as a nation,is to dismiss them outright as not being “ob-jective” or as being “bias." Neither is it enoughto be issuing excuses that “we’re a new nationstarting from scratch."

In fact, as a new nation, we should be start-ing with a new and cleaner slate, unpolluted bypast experiences, and not the other way round!Being a new nation should be an advantageand not a handicap. We have all the experi-ences of other nations around us to learn from.We should know what works and what doesnot, from the experience of others. We should,therefore, not be re-inventing the wheel. Onequestion the people of South Sudan are prob-ably dying to have an answer to is, as a newnation, how come we have been able to copyall the vices but none of the virtues of ourneighbours?

III. The State, the Party and

Sovereignty

The history of political parties in Africa showsthat their origins can be traced outside of elec-toral and parliamentary traditions. Their emer-gence from a “non-democratic setting," as Salih(2003:2) has rightly observed, has to a largeextent come to inform “their practice duringindependence." Thus, while it may be arguedthat the genesis of Western political partiescould be traced to the need for the extensionof universal suffrage and democracy, Africanpolitical parties, grew out of the need of mem-bers “to group themselves according to whatthey share in common, so as to act in concert"(Salih, 2003:2). This was mainly to enable themmount opposition to colonialism, and at times,to counter other ethnic groups. The result hasoften been the emergence of “numerous eth-

nically based parties" in opposition to “otherethnic parties" (Salih, 2003:2).

On attaining independence, these politicalparties, in the views of Salih (2002:2), can be ar-gued to have abandoned the goal of “nationalunity, the very goal that gave birth to their polit-ical ambitions, and fell back to sub-nationalistspolitics." The fruits of sub-nationalisms has, inAfrica, been “civil wars of liberation from whatsome in the marginalised and ethnic-minoritypolitical elite conceive as a form of internalcolonialism exacted by the ‘ruling ethnicity’ "(Salih 2003:2).

A clear distinction between the state andthe government, in the sense that the state isbroader, larger and more permanent than theparty, is essential in running modern govern-ment. I want to suggest that within the narra-tive of the African story, where political partieshave not been banned, the ruling party and itsinsignia are often elevated above the state. Thestate, in effect, becomes a subset of the party,rather than the party being subservient to thestate. And herein, lies the root causes of mostof our woes: the absence of clear boundaries.

In this section, I intend to briefly look at twothings. First, the extent to which, the SudanPeoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM), whichis the ruling party in South Sudan has tran-scended the slippery trap of “sub-nationalisticpolitics.” Secondly, I seek to examine the ex-tent to which, the ruling party, SPLM, has notjust managed to keep a distinction between theparty and the state, but whether, the supremacyof the state over the party has been maintained.

My focus will be in the use to which theruling party uses sovereign symbols like thenational flag, the national currency, and thenational army, the SPLA, to forge an inclusiveidentity. I will also be looking at excerpts fromspeeches delivered by the leadership, in viewof establishing whether they transcend or sub-scribe to “sub-nationalist politics.”

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3.1 The Use, Abuse and Misuse ofSovereign Symbols

We start by looking at the use, abuse and mis-use of the national flag, a symbol of sovereignty,by the state apparatus, the army and the police.We will look at two examples. One from Kenyaand the other one from South Sudan to betterunderstand the concept and how the Africanstory manifests itself.

3.1.1 Flag, Attention, Baton in Kenya

An incident reported in a Kenyan newspaper,The Standard, of February 8th 1990, vividly il-lustrates the difficulty of the governed in inter-preting “the various signals which constitutethe official discourse.” The incident involves acouple and the police, representatives and en-forcers of the official discourse, which is aboutthe national flag in this case:

A woman from Busia was recentlyexposed to an agonising experienceas she helplessly watched the policebeat her husband with their batons.As she wept and pleaded with thepolice to spare her husband, the po-lice ordered the couple to take offtheir shoes. According to the police,the man was punished for failingto stand to attention while the na-tional flag was being lowered. Theincident took place last Thursday ata road block on the Kisumu-Busiaroad. The couple explained theydid not know that it was necessaryto stand to attention. The womanand her husband were sitting on theside of the road waiting for trans-port to take them back to Busia.

The couple’s explanation that they did notknow it was necessary to stand to attention

highlights the twin difficulty of the populacein decoding the official discourse and in howto respond to it. The equally confusing signalsthe police in turn transmit by beating the hus-band only does not help to make the confusionany clearer; whether only men are to salute thenational flag or everyone.

3.1.2 Flag, Aim, Shoot in Juba

Our next example is a tragic incident that oc-curred in Juba on 12th May 2012. This incidenttoo helps illustrate the dilemma faced by thepopulace in decoding official discourse, againcentering around a national flag, at the handsof the army, this time:

A Kenyan teacher in South Sudanwas on Saturday 12th May 2012evening shot dead by police in Jubaas she was being driven back to aschool owned by former PresidentJohn Garang’s wife. 24-year-oldMulekye Musangi, a teacher at JohnGarang International School wasshot in the head and later roughedup by police because the driver didnot stop when the flag at the latePresident’s mausoleum was beinglowered. Former President JohnGarang’s son Majok Garang4 whoaccompanied the body to Nairobiyesterday afternoon could not with-hold tears at the Lee Funeral Homewhere the body is being preserved.- Daily Star (Kenya)

There are a few things about this tragic in-cident, worth reflecting upon. First, there is nosign put up to say all traffic has to stop whenthe flag is being lowered, nor do they institutea road block at that time.5 The populace isexpected to magically know and stop. These

4I understand that there is no son of Garang by this name. Possibly an error on the part of the journalist.5Some sources suggest that a whistle is blown.

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two tragic incidences point to the painful real-ity that what the enforces of official discourseand the leadership they represent perceive asa threat to their power is often the incidentaland innocent activities of the individuals. Thesending of conflicting signals, often results ingenerating conflict between the leadership andthe populace, as the latter is put in an impos-sible position and expected to still decode theofficial narrative, accurately. The price of fail-ure is often too high, and may even cause youyour life.

There are some who will argue that theseare isolated cases and not government policiersor that the police do kill in developed anddemocratic countries like the United Kingdom,the USA and Canada, as well. Yes, the policedo kill in all countries. So do members of fami-lies kill each other in all countries. Does thatmake it okay then for our police or army tokill? Each case has to be seen within its ownlocal context. Not easy to make a generalisa-tion, except to point out that, any killing, nomatter who by, is wrong and must not be con-doned. What we are referring to here, however,are murders committed in the name of defend-ing a national symbol: the flag. Such soldiers,would, we assume, have been given clear in-structions on protocols of behaviour when theflag is being lowered or hoisted. Our problemis that these protocols are not made known tothe ordinary citizen. Is it too much to ask or aclear sign-posting?

3.2 Sub-nationalism in the Officialand Sub-official Discourses

In this section we look at two excerpts to deter-mine the extent to which the official and semi-official discourse of the regime subscribe toor transcends the culture of “sub-nationalisticpolitics,” essential for laying the the buildingfoundations of a solid nation state.

3.2.1 Liberation: The Bush Vs Town Di-chotomy

We start by a speech widely circulated onthe net and attributed to John Garang, of-ten quoted mostly to impress upon doubtersGarang’s supposed separatists credentials.Whether the speech does furnish that or not, isnot the subject of the present discourse, whichis about how far the speech shows the partytranscending “sub-nationalist” tendencies.

I and those who joined me in thebush and fought for more thantwenty years, have brought to youCPA in a golden plate. Our mis-sion is accomplished. It is now yourturn, especially those who did nothave a chance to experience bushlife. When time comes to vote at ref-erendum, it is your golden choiceto determine your fate. Would youlike to vote to be second class cit-izens in your own country? It isabsolutely your choice.– Rumbek, May 15, 2005

There are a number of things in this speechwhich make it a classical case of a sub-nationalist speech. While exaggerating therole of the party, it downplays the role of oth-ers completely in a number of ways. First,the speech suggests that there is a “we” who’‘fought” and a “you” who did not fight for thefreedom of his or her people. Secondly, it sug-gests that the fighting for freedom was done bya “we” who was in the bushes of South Sudan,and by implication suffering, while the “you”was in town, enjoying life. Thirdly, it moreworryingly suggests that the act of liberationis a “mission” that can be and has been “ac-complished” by the silencing of the guns ora by the scribbling of a few marks on a pieceof paper. The act of liberation is a process. Ittakes time and generations to “accomplish," ifat all it is possible to.

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There are some, who see behind the deroga-tive way in which our fellow citizens, who tookrefuge in the north, and suffered immenselyfor the same cause, are referred to as nuswanjallaba meaning “pimps of Arabs," this townversus bush dichotomy. These individual arebeing victimised and discriminated in the jobmarket today, and are being made to feel as sec-ond class citizens in the only place they knowand call home, simply for having crossed north,rather than elsewhere. The treatment of theseindividuals, makes a mockery of our claim tohave four for equality and human dignity. Theaim of our leaders should be to build bridges.

Another unfortunate dimension to this isthe negation of all other forms of resistance,except that which has been accomplishedthrough the barrel of the gun. The role ofthe Diaspora in raising public awareness intheir host countries cannot just be labelled lesssignificant than that of the AK47 wielding com-rades, because they “did not have a chance toexperience bush life."

The contribution of the Diaspora throughthe letters they wrote to their MPs and Sena-tors; the marches they organised and partici-pated in; the bills they paid for the woundedarmed kin’s medical treatment; the school feesthey have been paying for the children of theirbrothers fighting in the bush, or those that havefallen; all these are valuable contribution to thewar effort, that should not be slighted. Unless,the leadership takes the lead role and starts toacknowledge that, it was not only the AK47,or the individuals in the bushes who deliveredthe CPA, the nascent state would be built on afalse, shaky and unrepresentative foundation.

The contribution of each and every indi-vidual, group, nationality, region be acknowl-edged, and none more than the other. In postconflict Nigeria, as a reconciliation gesture,they adopted the slogan, "No Victor. No Van-quished." It allowed them to weather, at least,the teething problems of reconciliation. Thegovernment needs to take a lead role in this.

3.2.2 The "We liberated You" Doctrine

Let’s for the moment turn our attention toan equally disturbing semi-official narrative,which has almost gained the notoriety of beingthe creed of the SPLM/A party. This is the doc-trine of “we liberated you” which has become aby-word for excusing all sorts of activities rang-ing from entitlements – deserved or not – tomisdemeanours ranging from extorting bribesat road blocks to justification for being at thehelm of power. Must we, the people, not be theones to acknowledge your role and reward youaccordingly, and as we deem fit? Surely, we arenot that ungrateful, or are we? Must the priceof our indebtedness to you, our liberators, beservitude to you, for ever? At the end of theday, can we still, call ourselves free men andwomen, of this new nation, or have we simplyreplaced the colour of the boot on our neck?Can you see the fallacy of your argument, ifpushed to its logical conclusion?

We can only speculate on who the “we” is.Let’s settle for the “we” being SPLM/A, andthe “you” being South Sudanese, who are non-SPLM/A members. If this assumption is true,then this doctrine too is another example of theparty falling back on “sub-nationalistic poli-tics.” There are a number of problems with tak-ing the “we” to be the SPLM/A. First, it riskseclipsing the role played by others. This maybe: other non SPLM/A combatants; South Su-danese who subscribe to other political partiesor South Sudanese who are non party mem-bers; non-south Sudanese who have lobbiedtheir MPs, senators and Churches. This is notto deny the lead role SPLM/A played in theindependence struggle.

Secondly, the SPLM/A fought not on theticket of separatism, but of a New Sudan. Oth-ers would say this was a strategy. May be. ButWhen some within the SPLM/A boasts that thefirst bullets they fired in the bush was againstseparatists, and you are shown the graves ofavowed separatists felled by the bullets of New

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Sudan, we are hard pressed to buy into that.Thirdly, the CPA partners both signed up to

work towards “making unity attractive." Thiswas a task for both the SPLM and the NCP, andnot just one side. How SPLM was going to de-liver that, is yet to be explained. I want to sug-gest that when the people of the South votedoverwhelmingly in a referendum to opt forseparation, both the NCP and the SPLM havefailed to deliver. Probably, if anything, whatthe SPLM/A delivered on a “golden plate” is,if you wish, the CPA, but not freedom. Thetwo are different things. The people of SouthSudan, were not liberated by any other party,to the total exclusion of others. Fourthly, therewas no outright military victory by any side.Neither the NCP nor the SPLA won on thebattlefield. There was strictly speaking a stale-mate. In sporting analogy, a draw. So howcan we attribute the liberation act to SPLM/Aalone?

True liberators do not fight for paybacks.Neither do they demand it. It is for purelyaltruistic reasons and principles that they joinliberation movements, expecting no personalfavours in return. On the contrary, they puttheir lives on line for others. They give up theirtoday so that others may have a better tomor-row. Only mercenaries fight and expect to berewarded. Not liberators.

3.2.3 The Choice of Independence Day Im-plications

The choice of July, 9th may be a clear indicationof how we arrived where we are: an indepen-dent nation. There are a number of dates wecould have chosen as our independence day.First, we could have chosen August 18th, theday of the Torit mutiny. This was when the firstbullets were fired in Torit by Southern soldiersof the Equatoria Corps. This gave birth to theAnyanya who reached an agreement, the Ad-dis Ababa Agreement with General Nimeiri‘sgovernment in 1972. This day, however, was

not chosen as the independence day.The second date that could have been cho-

sen was May 16th, marking the Bor mutiny.This led to the formation of the SPLM/A, whosigned the CPA, under the auspices of IGAAD.That the SPLM did not choose this date asthe independence day may be a good indicatorwithin certain circles of the party that the creditis not solely theirs. The third choice could havebeen the dates between January 9th -15th, theReferendum Day. This was when 98% of thepopulation voted to chart their own destiny.Must their superiority not have been acknowl-edged by choosing this date as independenceday? Well, it was not to be.

Finally, the ruling party in Juba settled forJuly 9th, when the CPA, brokered by the inter-national community officially ceases to exist.Is this a recognition of the role played by theInternational community in the liberation ofSouth Sudan? May be. May be not. May bethe choice of July 9th is a recognition that thereis no a “we” who liberated a “you.” That inliberation there is no a “we” who liberates a“you.” Liberation is an individual act. It is acollective effort. In this case, the list includeshelping hands from, but not limited to, theSPLM/A, the other South Sudanese, membersof the IGAAD, the Troika, the internationalcommunity, the American Christian Right, andmany others.

3.2.4 Partial Repayment in Exchange forAnonymity and Amnesty for CorruptOfficials

In a letter dated 3rd May, 2012, addressed to75 serving and former top government offi-cials, the President of South Sudan, Salva Kirr,wrote:

We fought for freedom, justice andequality. Many of our friends diedto achieve these objectives. Yet oncewe got to power, we forgot what we

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fought for and began to enrich our-selves at the expense of our people.

The question for us, no doubt is, who is the“we” that fought for the “freedom, justice andequality” of South Sudanese, and is now enrich-ing itself “at the expense” of South Sudanese.It is difficult to resist the temptation of con-cluding that the ’‘we” refers to the SPLM/A.While it is true that the bulk of the corrupt in-dividuals pledge allegiance to the ruling party,there is no doubt that these thieves are to befound in most, if not all the parties that haveparticipated in the government, so far.

The use of the first person plural “we”raises lots of questions. One of which is, if thepresident can be included among those whohave fought for the freedom of South Sudanese,how can we, by the same token, exclude himfrom the people who have misappropriatedpublic funds? Unless of course, we want to saythe President was using pluralis majestatis.

Equally disturbing about the letter is theguarantee of amnesty and anonymity to theconcerned officials on return of, not the wholestolen amount, but just ‘’part" of the lootedmoney. This seems to be an act of rewardingthe corrupt, on the side of the president, bywriting off such ill-gotten wealth. Possibly, thebulk of the corrupt officials are from the rul-ing party, and any punishment, will wipe off agood portion, if not the entire leadership eche-lon of SPLM. Is this then calculated to save theparty, at the expense of the nation? Which isgreater: the party or the nation? Whose interestshould be paramount at such moments?

The combating of corruption through thecreation of anti-corruption commissions is theleast effective way. A more robust approachwould be the strengthening of institutions likethe police, the judiciary, the legislative, themedia and ensuring their independency, es-pecially from interference by the executive.Whether an anti-corruption commission hasprosecutorial powers or not will make little

difference if accounts books are not closed.More importantly as John Gitongo, the Kenyananti-corruption czar, maintains, the key to tack-ling corruption is political commitment fromthe leadership. Where the leadership is deter-mined, it can be rooted out, fast and effectively.

If the government’s austerity measures, isto be effective some hard decisions need tobe taken. For example, the government is toolarge, unwieldy and is draining the meagreresources of the country. The national cabinetcould benefit from the abolition of deputy min-isterial positions and the slashing of ministerialposition by two-thirds, at least. Anything morethan 17 is too unwieldy. The need for the cur-rent unelected upper house is questionable. Wecould do without it. The nation, with its cur-rent population, cannot afford ten states. Threewould be in place, if there is need. The expan-sion of counties must be tied to population, notdished out as political favours.

3.3 Sub-nationalism and SovereignSymbols

In this section we look at the extent to whichsub-nationalistic politics has infiltrated or hasbeen kept out of sovereign symbols: the flag,the currency and the army.

3.3.1 The National Flag

There is no doubt that in the minds of mostSouth Sudanese, the raising of the flag of SouthSudan on July 9th, was the happiest momentof their lives. The flag raising was a momentof great pride. A flag is the most visible signof nationhood. Now that the dust has settled,it may be appropriate to look at the history ofthis symbol of nationhood and reflect on howrepresentative it is.

The national flag of South Sudan originallybelonged to the ruling party, the SPLM and itsmilitary wing, the SPLA. This flag has been im-posed upon the nation, without any meaning-

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ful consultation as the national flag. In adapt-ing a flag belonging to a party, as a sovereignsymbol of the new state, the party runs therisk of accusations of making itself synony-mous with the state. In pledging allegiance tothis flag, the perception, rightly or wrongly, isthat you are as well as pledging loyalty to theparty. Another likely charge is of attempting topresent a rather skewed image of the history ofSouth Sudan as a nation. The impression given,by the imposition of the flag, is that South Su-dan, as a nation, started with the founding ofthe SPLM in 1983. Nothing, however can befarther from the truth than such a perception.Yet, perceptions are important in such issues.

In nations emerging from fractious wars,magnanimity in victory is a virtue worth em-bracing. The problem is compounded by theunwritten demand for members of the party,especially those who hail from “wrong" quar-ters or have crossed over from other parties,to continuously and ritually prove their loy-alty by appearing in public with the flag of theparty on one breast pocket and the picture ofJohn Garang on the other. This use to whichthe flag has been put, suggests more than any-thing else, that this is really a party flag ratherthan a national one.

During the elections, a senior member ofthe party, made a fiery speech asking "Inde-pendent" candidates to refrain from wrappingthemselves up in the party flag. We are told,the red colour in the flag symbolises, “mar-tyrs." There has not been any definition of mar-tyrdom that I have seen. Does it involve every-one who fell, regardless of which side of thegreat divide they were on? Or to qualify, doyou need to be on a particular side? This is oneof the debates that the people of South Sudanneed to engage with. A national flag, in myview, should be something everyone identifieswith. Put simply, non-partisan. A choice ofanother flag, should the nation feel the needfor, would in no way diminish the role playedby SPLM/A in the liberation of South Sudan.

In fact, it would cement the parties historicalrole and win it a few more admirers.

3.3.2 The National Currency

All the denominations of the national cur-rency, which is the South Sudanese Pound,are adorned with the photograph of the partyfounder, John Garang. If the aim is to acknowl-edge the role played by Garang, which no onecan begrudge him, and which he deserves,surely the role of others from past movementsneed to be noted too. Otherwise, there is ev-ery reason to believe that the party, is engagedin ‘sub-nationalist politics’ and is seriously re-writing a skewed history of South Sudan, in itsfavour.

There were other freedom fighters whohave paid the ultimate price too. Is it too muchto ask them to share the podium with Garang?There are people like Buth Diu, Fr Saturnino,Ali Gbatala, Benedito Mou, Chief Pacifico Lo-lik, Clement Mboro, who all deserve to be hon-oured, no less. There must also be a graceperiod, after the death of a person before theirheads can adorn the national currency, I sug-gest. Twenty to thirty years, if not more, wouldbe an ideal length of time for revisiting historyand rewarding the deserving.

There is nothing unusual, I must add, withhaving heads on national currencies, as longas it reflects the local history impartially. Inthe United Kingdom, I am told, it is the headof the Queen. The truth be told, she reignsbut does not rule. That is, she is not the headof the government or a political party. She isjust the head of state: non-partisan. I am notsure what the reaction would be like if, DavidCameron, was for example, to have his photoor suggest Margaret Thatcher’s picture, bothof whom belong to the Conservative Party. Onthe United States dollar, for example, you haveassortment of statesmen from various politicalparties, and inventors.

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3.3.3 The National Army

The army is one of the symbols of nationalsovereignty. Is there still any reason to referto the army of an independent South Sudan,as SPLA? Is it the army of the ruling party orof the state of South Sudan? Who is the armysupposed to be protecting: the party or thestate? What the nation needs is a professionalnon-partisan army whose task it is to protect,not the powers that be, or a political party, butthe territorial integrity of the nation.

Closely linked to this is the issue of politicsand khaki. In democratic societies, should youwish to dabble in politics, as a man or womanof khaki, you need to be defrocked first. Dur-ing the last election, it was clear that, to run forpublic office, you have to remove your khaki. Ihope we still have that on the statute books.

3.4 The Judiciary and the Exerciseof Executive Power

The blurring of the distinction between the roleof the judiciary and the exercising of executivepower is often an indication of the erosion ofthe independence of the judiciary and a drifttowards trampling of individual rights. Let’sillustrate this with the unfortunate experienceof a journalist in South Sudan. According tothe Sudan Tribune:

On Wednesday 2 November, NgorAguot Garang, a journalist at SudanTribune, was taken into custody bySouth Sudan’s security services fol-lowing the publication of an opin-ion piece criticising South Sudan’spresident Salva Kiir in The Destiny,a newspaper which Ngor edits inJuba. In the article, published in TheDestiny‘s first edition on 26 October,its author Gengdit Ayok, who isalso the newspaper’s deputy editor

in chief, said that that Kiir shouldnot have allowed his daughter tomarry someone from outside SouthSudan, claiming it was unpatriotic.

Let‘s start by saying and accepting thepremise that, like any other citizen, the presi-dent‘s daughter has the right to marry a personof her choice, alien or national. Let’s also, fromthe onset, acknowledge that this is not a stateaffair. It is strictly an issue between the twofamilies: the president’s and the groom’s. Inshort, a private matter, which the journalist inquestion, let’s agree, had no right to thrushinto public domain, in the manner he did.

What is of interest to us here is the responseof the state machinery following the publi-cation. It is not clear why the state securityshould have been involved in what is, if any-thing, a clear case of civil suit, to be handled bythe legal teams of the president on one handand the journalist in question and his newspa-per, on the other hand. The involvement of thestate security organs raises serious issues aboutestablishing clear boundaries between the per-sonal and the public, state affairs and familyaffairs, adherence to the rule of law and tram-pling individual’s constitutional rights. Thereis no evidence at all, as far as one can estab-lish, that the security of the state was at risk,as a result of the publication, to warrant theinvolvement of the state security organs.

More interestingly is the emerging se-quence of events following the arrest and re-lease of the journalist. On release, it hasemerged that, the journalist was invited alongwith elders from his community for a lunchat the Presidency6 If this option, of a peacefuland, I dare suggest, traditional problem resolv-ing mechanism was available, why was it notinvoked as the first port of call? Is it to senda lesson to others on, among others, who is incontrol? This is an example of how, in post-colony, the distinction between the judicial and

6It is understood that the family of the journalist and the president have known each other for a long time.

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the executive is often blurred.The mixed messages – of the involvement of

the security and the invitation to a meal – doesnot help clear up things, especially the move-ment from the inhospitable to the hospitable,whose only role is to keep the populace on itsfeet, guessing. The difficulties in decoding thesignals sent by the state power can be gleamedfrom Robert Serumaga‘s testimony to Soyinkaon the dilemma of the populace in Ugandaunder Amin. The conversation is reported bySoyinka in the introduction to his play, A Playof Giants (pg, px).

“At the start,” Serumaga, said:“You more or less knew what to doand what to avoid it you wanted tostay alive. You knew when to speak,when to shut up and what to say ornot to say. Now there are no longerany rules. What saved you yes-terday turns out to be your death-warrant today. I have no friends, nocolleagues left. They are all dead,or escaped. But mostly dead." (pg,px)

The testimony is a clear example of what Mbe-mbe (1992:5) refers to as the “chaotically plu-ralistic"nature of the message that despoticregimes transmit. The creation of a single per-manently stable system out of all the signs,images symbols that the regime transmits isthe problem which confronts the populace andit is what gives rise to the conflict betweenthem and the leadership.

Today, it is almost a death warrant to be inpossession of and using a basic item like cam-era around the airport, Juba Bridge or in thestreets of any of the towns. There are no sign-posts to warn you against, for example, takingphotographs at the airport. The only warningyou get is, a slap if you are lucky. Your cameramay be confiscated or thrashed. Should youprotest, then you are in for proper beating up.The logic is difficult to understand. It surely

cannot be on security grounds, can it, espe-cially in Google era, when I can sit in Londonand zoom on to Juba from my laptop? Do Ineed to be physically in Juba to collect such anintelligence, really? Our security system needto grow up and embrace modern way of doingthings. In a country like Britain, even if you arebeing arrested for a heinous crime, deferenceis shown to you. Is that too much to ask, of oursecurity system? Do they need to use physicalforce?

The other underbelly of using state secu-rity forces is that they are often not uniformed,faceless and and to all purpose and intention,one could say masked. They do not identifythemselves. They simply order you to accom-pany them. They do not tell you where to. Nordo they tell your next of kin where you arebeing taken to. You end up in the dreadedghost houses, which are nothing short of tor-ture chambers. They do not come with searchwarrants nor arrest warrants. Once they havetaken you, there is no way to trace where youhave been taken to. You will be lucky to getout of there alive. This environment allows thestate to feign ignorance should they kill youand blame it on ’wrong’ elements.

IV. Attempting to Rationalise the

African Story

There are a number of theories which attemptto account for the phenomenon I refer to asthe African Story. I will briefly look at twoof them. Before that, it may be important todigress slightly and look at the winners andlosers in post-independence Africa.

4.1 African Leaders as Sole Winnersin Post-independence Africa

The populace remained largely either unaf-fected or their plight even worsened in somecases. Ade Ajayi (1982:6), for example, notesthat:

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The most fundamental aspect ofpost-independence Africa has beenthe elusiveness of development. Inmany ways the quality of life iseven worse than on the eve of in-dependence. In particular, manyAfrican countries now find it dif-ficult to provide for their popula-tion sufficient food and energy re-sources for the basic necessities oflife. Most of the new states haveyet to evolve stable political struc-tures. The uneven development be-tween different regions of the samecountry and between cities and ru-ral areas of the same region per-sists. The inequities of income dis-tribution that characterised colonialrule. The State of African Leader-ship have tended to widen. As aresult, there have been civil wars,and there is generally less securityfor life and property.

This is not, however, to suggest that indepen-dence was a bad thing. Nor that people do re-gret it. But rather that the quality of leadershipis essential, if the dividends of independence isto be enjoyed by all, and not just the privilegedfew, who the accident of history has placed atthe helm.

4.2 Independence: An Opportunityto Get all that ‘Colonialism’ De-nied Them

The first is a class theory espoused by writ-ers like Lazarus (1990), who holds the ‘mid-dle class“ for the current malaise. Lazarus(1990:11) holds the intellectuals and politicians,who both hail from the same upper echelonsof society, as being responsible for the presentstate of affairs in Africa. “Under colonial rule,”Lazarus (1990:11) explains:

“The national middle class had

inevitably felt its freedom ofmovement and action restricted.Its boundless ambition had beencapped. Independence, thereforewas experienced by this class aschanging everything for the better.Everything that colonialism hadbarred to this class, independenceseemed to unchain. Everything thatcolonialism had outlawed and keptout of reach, independence broughtwithin the bounds of legality andplaced within easy grasp. Indepen-dence made perfectly possible ev-erything that colonialism had ren-dered impossible."

In short, independence let loose the nationalbourgeoisie to behave as it would, like anybourgeoisie. Political independence has in thehands of the elite become an opportunity tomortgage whole nations. The result is that po-litical independence has failed as an act of na-tional liberation. Any casual glance at the wayin which the leadership in Juba is behaving,tends to lend credence to this theory. The lav-ish lifestyles, the cars they drive in, the salaryand allowances they have allotted themselves,all point to scrambling for what they perceivedas their right’s which ‘colonialism’ had deniedthem. Some even go as far as equating thenumber of cars on the roads of Juba as devel-opment.

4.3 Liberators Clearer About Whatthey Want to End than the WayForward

One of the main reasons for the African storyis lack of vision on the part of the so-calledliberators. The fault, Ajayi (1982:6) believes,rests with the nationalists who were:

Much clearer about what theywanted to end than about what theywanted to put in its place. They

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wanted to throw off the imperial-ist yoke, and end discriminationand the exploitation of man by man;they wanted freedom, and respectfor the dignity of the black man. Be-yond that, however, they had littleconception of the kind of societythey were striving to build outsideof vague concepts of Europeanisa-tion and modernisation.

The same may be said of South Sudan. Wewere probably better at articulating what wedid not want: Arab domination. But were lessclear of what we wanted to replace it with be-yond vague and ambiguous labels like "NewSudan." We have yet to articulate clearly whatit means to be a South Sudanese; what SouthSudanese nationalism is. We have come todefine South Sudanese nationalism negatively,with north-bashing. Those of use who barkanti-north sentiments loudest, are deemed themost nationalistic. Anyone who does not joinin the pantomime, is labelled as being in thepockets of the north. We cannot keep on whip-ping up anti-north fervour forever, especiallyon those occasions when things are far fromgood, as a cry to rally the troops, or as a shieldto hide behind.

V. Concluding Reflections

Archbishop Desmond Tutu, one of the fewAfrican statesmen with the moral authority tospeak on any issue African best sums up themood in South Sudan. In a press conference inJuba, his verdict was : "A year ago we joinedthe rest of the world in celebrating the birth ofthe new nation of South Sudan. Today in Juba,my mood is rather more somber." 7 This mood,I must add, must be the feeling of most, if notall South Sudanese.

A casual look, similarly, at the US State De-partment Country Report, the Reporters With-

out Borders report, the Human Rights Watchreport, the joint pastoral epistle of the South Su-danese primates, all suggest that one year on,the world‘s newest nation, South Sudan, hasnot lived up to the expectation of neither itsown people nor that of the international com-munity. Yet, the expectations of the people ofSouth Sudan, contrary to what one would ex-pect, was neither unrealistic nor unmanageable.Apart from the overriding desire of wantingto be free from northern domination, the onlyother wish of the people of South Sudan, afteryears of suffering the indignity of strife, was tolive in peace and dignity. It is on these crucialhurdle that they feel their government has letthem down. This is not to suggest that theydid not wish to see the provision of serviceslike education and health or the improvementof the infrastructure. They did, but they alsoknew that these other demands would taketime. They were prepared to be patient.

The dignity promised them, during the waris still to be delivered, a year later on. The citythat they were promised, would be deliveredto every village, to save them from travellingto the towns and creating slums, has long beenovertaken by talk of the government planningto build itself a multibillion new capital in Ram-ciel. The people have to wait longer for theirown villages to become cities. So much for theunfulfilled promises.

In the meantime, the people of South Su-dan have ben reduced to another sad Africanstory, dependent on relief while their leadersdrive in expensive four wheel vehicles andhave all, without any significant exception, be-come multi-millionaires over night. This, I haveargued, is partly due to the failure of the rulingparty in South Sudan, the SPLM/A, to trans-form itself successfully from a guerilla move-ment /army, where the army had total controland dominion over the party, the administra-tion of the ‘liberated’ areas and the judiciary.

7"Archbishop Tutu tells Kiir to step up anti-corruption crusade," Sudan Tribune, 6th July 2012

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This practice, unfortunately, when carried overinto the running of the modern nation state,has clogged the government machinery, send-ing it spiralling into a near halt. The failureto separate the party from the state and the at-tendant failure to institute checks and balanceswithin the various organs of the state lie at thecentre of the general air of malaise suffocatingand crippling the new nation state of SouthSudan, I have tried to argue.

Living standards are slipping fast, and in-flation is running as high as 80% and more insome place; the nascent nation is groaning andsinking under the weight of corruption, crony-ism, and the politicising and filling of the civilservice with party cadres with little regard toability or qualification. Communal violence isfast eroding state authority, especially in stateslike Jonglei. The use of state machinery to ma-nipulate elections, intimidate the oppositionand silence them to the point of non-existence,and the deploying of state intelligence and thearmy to partisan purposes do not bode wellfor democracy.

Where a people have just emerged from adivisive war, fences need to be mended, trustrebuilt, confidence instilled. Unless all SouthSudanese from all walks of life, political par-ties, religious groups feel that they are stake-holders in the new nation, it will erode theirconfidence in the government. It is in this re-spect that, we say, the biggest achievement ofthe government in Juba, is possibly the accom-modation, though some would say neutrali-sation, of what is referred to in the literatureas Other Armed Groups (OAG). The govern-ment’s record in this area was encouraging, ifnot commendable, until of course, one comesacross the tragic and mysterious circumstanceunder which, the renegade General GeorgeAthor8 was killed. His death must surely haveeroded confidence of other dissidents in theability of the government of South Sudan to

continue absorbing dissidents peacefully.Corruption is ripe in South Sudan, The

world’s newest nation, South Sudan, has a lotto offer to the world on how one can publiclyown up to the misappropriation and embezzle-ment of public funds in excess of $4.5 billion,and still be firmly in the saddle, unfazed, un-ruffled and least remorseful; and still enjoythe adulation of the electorate while pattingthe self on the back for a job well done, withno firing of culprits, no heads rolling and noinitiation of court proceedings.

Reference

Ajayi, Ade. 1982. Expectations of Independence.Daedalus.

Blackings, Mairi. 2012. The Big Men of Africa.Anomaly of African Leadership in WoleSoyinka’s Plays. CASAS, South Africa.

Chazan, Naomi, Robert Mortimer, et al. 1988.Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa.Macmillan, London.

De La Boetie, Etienne. 2008. The Politics ofObedience: The Discourse of Voluntary servi-tude. Auburn, Alabama.

Lokudu, Archbishop Paulino, and Arch-bishop Daniel Deng. 2012. “AdvisoryMessage to the Citizens of South SudanDuring the First Independence Celebra-tions." Unpublished joint pastoral letter.July 9th 2012.

Mbembe, Achilles. 1992. "Provisional Noteson Postcolony". The African Post, 1.1

Salih, M. A. Mohamed. 2003. “The Evolutionof African Political Parties." in Salih, M.A.Mohamed. African Political Parties. PlutoPress, London.

8Government of Sudan sources claim he was killed on December 19th 2011 while trying to re-enter South Sudan in aclash with border guards. His supporters believed he was killed inside Uganda.

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Soyinka, Wole. 1984. A Play of Giants.Methuen, London.

Wrong, Michelle. 2009. It’s Our Turn toEat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle Blower.Fourth Estate, London.

http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2011%20December%2005%20Survey%20of%20South%20Sudan%20Public%20Opinion%2C%20September%206-27%2C%202011.pdf.retrieved 24th June, 2012.

http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/21/south-sudan-arbitrary-detentions-dire-prison-conditions. retrieved 24th June, 2012

http://en.rsf.org/soudan-du-sud-report-world-s-youngest-country-03-07-2012,42933.html. Retrieved July 3rd,2012.

About the author

The author is a Postdoctoral Fellow. His pub-lications include: A Grammar of Ma’di Mou-ton 2003; Narrating Our Future: The Practices,Rituals and Customs of the Ma’di of Uganda andSouth Sudan CASAS 2011; The Big Men of Africa:Anomy of African Leadership in Wole Soyinka’sPlays CASAS 2012; Ma’di Dictionary Lincom2000; Acholi Dictionary Lincom 2010.

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