SouthChinaSeaSouthChinaSea

Emerging Security Architecture 

IPCS Special ReportIPCS Special Report 132

Institute of Peace and Conflict StudiesInstitute of Peace and Conflict Studies 

B‐7/3, Safdarjung Enclave 

New Delhi 110029 

91‐11‐4100 1900 

www.ipcs.org 

August 2012 

Teshu Singh 

SOUTHEAST ASIA RESEARCH PROGRAMME (SEARP) 

 

© 2012, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS)  The  Institute  of  Peace  and  Conflict Studies is not responsible for the facts, views  or  opinion  expressed  by  the author.  The  Institute  of  Peace  and  Conflict Studies  (IPCS),  established  in  August 1996,  is  an  independent  think  tank devoted  to  research  on  peace  and security  from  a  South  Asian perspective.   Its aim  is to develop a comprehensive and  alternative  framework  for  peace and  security  in  the  region  catering  to the  changing  demands  of  national, regional and global security. 

 Address: B 7/3 Lower Ground Floor Safdarjung Enclave New Delhi 110029 INDIA  Tel: 91‐11‐4100 1900, 4165 2556, 4165 2557,  4165 2558, 4165 2559   Fax: (91‐11) 4165 2560    

Email: officemail@ipcs.org Web: www.ipcs.org 

 

 

About the Author 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Teshu Singh

Teshu  is  a  Research  Officer  at  the  China  Research Programme,  IPCS. She  is also pursuing her PhD on China and the Geopolitics of Indian Ocean from the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi.  Her research interests also include  Maritime Security and Chinese Foreign Policy.     About "Inside Southeast Asia" Series  The Southeast Asia Research Program (SEARP) within the  Institute,  as  a  part  of  its  activities,  undertake research and organise events under "Inside Southeast Asia,"  aimed  at  exploring  issues  and  challenges  in contemporary  Southeast  Asia  covering  economic issues,  inter‐State  relations,  political  developments and  emerging  social  tensions  and  fault  lines.  This essay was a part of the first annual conference held in December 2011. 

The South China Sea (SCS) dispute hasbecome a flash point in Southeast Asia. Thedispute is between the five countries ofSoutheast Asia, China and Taiwan. In theprocess of strengthening their claims, thesecountries are strengthening their civil andmilitarycapacities.

Theaimof thisessay is tohighlight thegeo‐strategic importance of the SCS and attemptto comprehend the basis of these claims.Thesemultiple claims in the regionhave ledto the emergence of a new securityarchitecture in the region leading to acomplexdispute.

ISTRATEGICSIGNIFICANCEOFSOUTH

CHINASEA

Sovereignty and territorial integrity is thebase concern of any state. Territorial claimsare, by nature, very complex and claims tomaritime territory are particularly diverse.TheSCSisonesuchareawhichiscategorizedbydiverseandoverlappingclaims.

The sea is an important source of oil andnatural gas. A Russian survey in 1995estimatedthat6billionbarrelsofoilmightbelocatedintheSpratlyIslandofwhichseventypercent would be natural gas. Chinesespecialistshaveassertedthatitcouldcontainas much as 150 billion barrels of oil andnatural gas and the Chinese media hasreferredtoitasthesecond‘PersianGulf’.Itis

one of the world's busiest international sealanes. More than half of the world'ssupertanker traffic passes through theregion's waters. Over half of the world'smerchant fleet (by tonnage) sails through it(Rosenberg).

As compared to the Suez Canal, three timesmore oil and LiquefiedNatural Gas (LNG) istransportedthroughtheSCSandfifteentimesmore than that of Panama Canal. Themajority of this crude oil comes from thePersian Gulf and is bound for Japan, SouthKorea and Taiwan. Moreover, the region isalsoanimportantsupplierofLNG.Abouttwothirds of South Korean and sixty percent ofJapanese and Taiwanese LNG supplies flowthrough this critical region.Most of theLNGsuppliedbyIndonesiaandtheSCSproducers,with Middle Eastern shipments from AbuDhabi and Qatar also passes through theregion.(Kreil, 2002:44). Nicholas Spykmanonce described it as the ‘AsiaticMediterranean.’ More recently, it has beendubbed the ‘ChineseCaribbean.’And, just asRome and the United States have soughtcontrol over the Mediterranean andCaribbean,Chinanowseeksdominanceoverthe SCS. It can be said that oil and LNG arethe catalysts in the dispute. All nationscontestinginthedisputearetryingtheirbesttoincreasetheirpositionandinfluenceintheregion.

Strategically, this region has been ofenormoussignificance.TheJapaneseinvasion

South China Sea Emerging Security Architecture

Teshu Singh

IPCS Special Report 132,  August 2012  

Banks are less controversial and relativelyunimportant because the values of two arelimited(Chi,1989).It is thedisputeovertheSpratly and Paracels that has drawnattention.

Whoclaimswhat?

The question of who owns the reefs andislands of the SCS was largely ignored untilthe 1970s. At that time, the area became apossible target for exploration by themultinational oil companies. In addition, thelikelihood of conflict has increased due tocodification of International Maritime Lawsfollowing World War II. Motivated by thedesire to extend control over sea basedresources,neighboringstatesintheareahaveincreasingly come into verbal conflict andeven military confrontation over thesovereignty,sovereignrightsjurisdictionandarms control efforts in the SCS. During the1980sand1990s,mostofthedisputingstateshavefoundthemselvesinracetobolstertheirclaims to sovereignty by occupation of theislandthatcansupportaphysicalpresenceor

of the Southeast Asian States of Malaysia,Indonesia, and the Philippines was throughthis sea. Itwasalsoutilizedby theU.S.navyin itsoperationduringtheVietnamWarandrecently in its ‘Operation Desert Storm’against Iraq (Ali, 1992). This region iscontiguous to the strategic Cam Ranh Baywhich is supposed to be one of the bestnatural deep water harbors in South EastAsia. It isstrategically located,close to thesedisputed islands and the disputed waters.The Russians took it over when theAmericans left Vietnam and leased it fortwentyyears,finally leavingit in2002.Sincethen, the base has been lying fallow. TheVietnamese navy has a small base therenevertheless and last year Vietnam's PrimeMinister announced plans to open up thebasetoforeignnaviesonacommercialbasis.It further plans to lease out the base todifferentnaviesratherthanone.

IIUNDERSTANDINGTHEGENESISOFTHE

CLASHES

To comprehend the current clashes it isusefultounderstandthebasisoftheclashes.The key difference between the SCS as ageographicalareainthemodernnation‐statesystem and other disputed areas whosesovereignty isalsocontested, is that there isno permanent population inhabiting any ofthese islets. The only group of humanpopulation that crisscrosses the SCS watersonadailybasis isthe fishermen.Sincethereis a dispute in the region, much of the arearemainsunregulated.

This region consists of more than twohundred islands but the four main islandsaroundwhichtheentiredisputerevolvesaretheParacelIsland,theSpratly,thePratas,andthe Macclesfield Banks. The issues ofsovereigntyoverPratasandtheMacclesfield

South China Sea 

SuperTankerMovementintheSouthChinaSea

Source:http://www.southchinasea.org/files/2011/08/Shipping‐Routes‐Map.jpg

byestablishingmarkersontheislandswherephysical occupation is not feasible. In somecases, claimants have built structures. TheracefortheSpratlyIslandshasincreasedthelikelihood of international conflict, resultinginthreecasesinrecentyears1988,1992and1995(Snyder,1996).

Today, seven parties are involved in acomplex set of historically based territorialdisputesinthesea‐‐Brunei,China,Malaysia,Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan andVietnam.China'sclaimsarethebroadestandcover all of the Spratly and Paracel islandsandmostoftheSCS.

BRUNEI:Bruneiclaimstwoareas,theLouisaReef (claimed by Malaysia) and Rifleman

Bank. By claiming the Louisa Reef Brunei isextendingitsEEZ.

CHINA:Chinabasesitsclaimtotheislandonhistorical grounds. According to the officialstandpoint, these Islands were taken fromChina by the then superpowers throughunequal treaties. It is stated that the SpratlyIslands have been an integral part of Chinafornearlytwothousandyears.Theargumentisfurtherstrengthenedbycitingtheexampleof the ancient manuscript claiming theSpratly Islands and the remains of Chinesepottery and coins. The naval expeditions totheSpratlyIslandsbytheHanDynastyin110AD and the Ming Dynasty from 1403‐1433A.D further strengthens their case. In thenineteenth and early twentieth centuries,China asserted claims to the Spratly andParacel Islands. During World War II, theislands were claimed by the Japanese. In1947, China produced a map with elevenundefineddottedlines,andclaimedalloftheislands within those lines. These elevendottedlineswererevisedto9byZhouEnlai.These nine dotted lines of the SCS indicatethesovereigntyofChinaintheregion.

In 1974, China enforced its claim upon theParacel Islands by seizing them fromVietnam. Chinarefers to theParacel Islandsas the Xisha Islands, and included them aspart of its Hainan Island province in 1988.Recently,thePRCsynthesizeditsclaimsonceagain in 1992, by passing the Law on theTerritorial Waters and their ContiguousAreasKnownas the ‘Territorial SeaLaw’. In1996BeijingpublishedalistofbaselinesthatconnectedtheParacelIslandsbutnomentionwasmadeof theSpratly Islands, stating thatit would resolve the matter at a later time(Valencia, 1997:25). No further clarificationofthemaphassincebeenoffered.Moreover,China is using the justification ofdevelopmentsinthisregionforadvancingitsmilitary. As one Chinese military expertstated, ‘Once the Taiwan front is closed, we

CompetingClaims

Source:JoeBurgess,"TerritorialClaimsintheSouthChinaSea,"NewYorkTimes,May31,2012

IPCS Special Report 132,  August 2012  

The Indian Civil Nuclear Programme: Issues, Concerns, Opportunities 

cooperatewithotherclaimantstatestoavoida conflict (Cheng 1997:325). Taiwan’s claimintheSCSisbasicallysimilartothatofChina.It has control over the Itu Aba Island (freshwater island) and is included in Kaohsiung.The Island is also claimed by China, thePhilippinesandVietnam(Djalal,2000).

VIETNAM: It claims the island on historicalground and on continental shelf principle inaccordance with the provision of UNCLOS.Vietnam claims the entire Spratly Islandchains as an offshore district of Khanh HoaProvince. Vietnam continues to claim theParacelIslands,despitetheirseizurebyChinain1976.Inadditiontothemilitarypresence,the Vietnamese have undertaken extensiveconstruction inandaround theSCS. In1989Vietnambuilt a small airstrip on the SpratlyIslandsandartificial structuresonVanguardReef,PrinceConsortBankandGraingerBank.Its claim have often been contested becausethese geographic features are submerged inseveral feet of water. But at present, Hanoicontinues to have a dispute with Beijingregardingtheterritory(Rowman,2005:427).

IIINEWSECURITYSTRUCTURE

The regionhasbecomea sourceof renewedinterstate rivalries because the issue hasbecome closely associated with interrelatedissues of energy, territorial, maritime andmilitary security. Every claimant in the SCS

mayturntotheSCS’(Smith,2002:12).

INDONESIA: It does assert a 200‐mile EEZunder the provision of UNCLOS. However,Chinese and Taiwanese claims in the SCSextend into Indonesia’s EEZ and continentalshelf, including Indonesia’s Natuna gas field(Rowman,2005).

MALAYSIA: Malaysia entered the Spratlystakes in August 1983 when it sent abouttwentycommandostotheislandofTerumbaLayang Lang. It claims that Vietnamese heldAmboya Coywhich is only fortymiles awayfrom the island. It has consistently used theContinental Shelf Act of 1966 to justify itsclaims in the region. However Valencia andVanDykeandLudwigareoftheopinionthatKualaLumpur’sclaimsaredubious(Valencia,1997:37). AlthoughMalaysiahasneverusedviolencetoassertitsclaimintheregion,itdidbriefly detain 43 Filipino fishermen in thespring of 1995 for violating Malaysia’s EEZ(Rowman, 2005: 421). It has alreadyoccupiedthreeislandsthatitconsiderstobewithinitscontinentalshelf.

PHILIPPINES: The Philippines claim eightisletsof theSpratly Islandchain,butnot thelandmass itself. Philippines bases its claimsofsovereigntyovertheSpratlyontheissueofRes Nullius and Geography (Rowman,2005:421).

TAIWAN :Overall,Taipei’s theSCSpolicy isguided by five principles, embodied in the1993 “SCS Policy Guidelines”: insist onTaiwan’s sovereign claim over the Spratly,support any action to settle the disputepeacefully, oppose any provocative move inthe region that would trigger new conflict,support the ideaof temporarily shelving thesovereignty dispute in order to exploitresource jointly, continue to activelyparticipate in the Workshop on ManagingPotential Conflicts in the SCS and otherrelated international conference to fully

EveryclaimantintheSCShasstartedstrengtheningtheircivilianandmilitarypresenceintheiroccupiedareastoestablishtheirpresenceandtherebystrengthentheirsovereignclaims.Claimantshavealsoincreasedbuildinginfrastructuretoaffirmtheirclaims.

South China Sea 

IPCS Special Report 114,  February 2012  

has started strengthening their civilian andmilitary presence in their occupied areas toestablish their presence and therebystrengthen their sovereign claims. Claimantshave also increased building infrastructureand other developments in their occupiedareas to affirm their claims. Cumulatively,these factors have augmented the maritimedilemmaofpowersinvolvedinthedispute.

Recently, there have been massive defenseacquisitionsbytheSoutheastAsiancountries.Vietnam,whichishardlyknownforitsnavalprowess,talkedaboutitsmaritimetraditions.During the fiftiethanniversaryof theHoChiMihn Trail they talked about theirmaritimetradition. They also displayed models ofvesselspurchasedfromRussiaalongwiththeromanticized poster depicting a steely‐eyedsailor with a bayonet poised to defend theSpratlys (Economic Times, 2011). It alreadyhas 2 Gepard class frigates from Russia. InOctober 2009Malaysia acquired 2 ScorpeneClasssubmarinestostrengthen itscapabilityto guard its waters (Defence Industry Daily,2012).Indonesiaisalsoplanningtoconstruct12 additional submarines by 2024 andconsidering the Chanbogo Class submarinesfrom South Korea or Kilo Class submarinesfromRussia.UnlikeMalaysiaorVietnam,thePhilippinesmilitarydoesnotpossessanyrealcapability to fight in the disputed area. The

Philippines relies on the Mutual DefenseTreaty with the US to protect Filipinointerestsinthearea(Snyder,2004).

These nations are no equivalent to China’smilitary power. The maritime forcesthroughout Southeast Asia are small ormedium in size in regard to both capabilityand total number of ships and aircraft. Themain task of these forces has been that ofpolicing the EEZ and dealing with low levelnon‐traditionalthreats(Synder,2004).

Thishasfurtherencouragedmajorplayerstoreact. Australia which is not party to thedispute,hasbeendrawnintotheSCSissue.In2009, the Defense White Paper stated, thatChina’s military might is a serious regionalsecurity concern. It supported the US inreiteratingitslongstandingpositionthatthesecurity situation in the SCS is vital for thefreedom of navigation. It held joint navalexerciseswithJapanandtheUSintheSCS.ItsentaclearmessagetoChinaandASEANthatitsupportsAmerica’s‘pushback’policyvis‐avisChinaandthat it willsupportAmerica ifChina“pushesback”inturn(Babbage,2011).

The US has national interests in freedom ofnavigation, open access to Asia’s maritimecommonsandrespectforinternationallawintheSCS.TheUShasalsocalledforunfetteredaccesstotheareathatChinaclaimsasitsownand has accused Beijing of adopting anincreasingly aggressive stance on the highSea.TheUSmilitaryhasplanstopositionitsmilitaryreachintoSoutheastAsiainnorthernAustralia from 2012. Further substantiatingPresident Barack Obama Asian ‘Pivot’strategy in the Asia Pacific, the US DefenseSecretary Leon Panetta announced at theannual Shangri‐La Security Dialogue inSingapore in early June 2012 that thePentagon will reposition 60 per cent of itsnaval capacity in the Asia‐Pacific Theater(Panetta, 2012). The Russian Navy is evenassisting Vietnam in the reconstruction of

ThemaritimeforcesthroughoutSoutheastAsiaaresmallormediuminsizeinregardstobothcapabilityandtotalnumberofshipsandaircraft.ThemaintaskoftheseforceshasbeenthatofpolicingtheEEZanddealingwiththelowlevelnon‐traditionalthreats.

IPCS Special Report 132,  August 2012  

Cam Ranh Bay as a naval base and this cansupporttheactivitiesofRussianPacificFleet.The region is also important to Japaneseshipping in its trade with Southeast Asia,South Asia, Africa, the Middle East andEurope.More than eighty percent of Japan’soil imports are transported through thesewaterways.TheUKispartytotheFivePowerDefense Arrangements (PDFA‐1971) whichalso involve Malaysia, Singapore, Australia,andNewZealand.Thisdefensepactisnotanalliance, but if hostilities break out in theSouthChinaSea,BritainwouldbeobligedtohelpMalaysiaandhasan interest inkeepingthe sea lanes free for trade (UK DefenseForum:2003).

IndiaconsidersitselfasanintegralpartoftheSCS development as fifty‐five percent of itstradepasses through this region.The IndianAmbassador to Vietnam has stated “Thedispute should be resolved as perinternational laws. The South China Sea isvery important and there should be safetyand security of international ships so thatimports andexports arenot affected". Chinahas been asking India to refrain fromdisputed area to ensure peace in the region.In 2006, ONGC Videsh Limited had signed acontract with Petro Vietnam to jointlyexploresector127and128inthePhuKhanhBasin. Later in September 2011, it signedthreedeals to jointlyexploreoil andnaturalgas in these blocks. These two blocks havebeen at the centre of a diplomatic uproarbetweenIndia,ChinaandVietnam.

ChinafeelsthatIndiaistryingtoimpingeonits area of influence. However, according totheUNCLOSguidelines, theblocks liewithinVietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone andContinental Shelf. The Indian officialspokespersonofMEA,VishnuPrakashstated“Our cooperation with Vietnam or anycountryforthatmatterintheworldisalwaysas per the international law, norms andconventions”. Since then, New Delhi has

maintained theposition that itsexplorationsin the SCS were purely commercial. OVLrelinquished block 127 after it encountereddry wells. By giving up exploration in thesetwoblocks,IndiahasextracteditselffromtheSCSdispute.

Apartfromthesetwoblocks,OVLhadalreadysigned a gas exploration contract withVietnam in 1988. This gives access to LanTrayandLanDo fields inBlock06.1,off thecoast of Vietnam in the SCS. India wouldcontinuetoengageintheNamConSonbasin(close to the Natuna Sea) that OVL wasawarded as a goodwill gesture to India.Currently, OVL has a 45 per cent stake intheseblocks.Theblockswhere India isnowinvolved are not part of the dispute.(Singh,2012).Therefore,whiletheUSwillbepushing for a more rigid architecture ofsecuritycooperation in theregion, Indiawillplay a wait and watch game for the timebeing(Bagchi,2011).

IVCHINA’SNAVALDEVELOPMENTANDTHE

SOUTHCHINASEA

Against thesedevelopments,China’smotivesinthisregionarenosurprise.Energysecurity

thecurrentdevelopmentofChina’smilitarycapabilitiesisbecomingmoreandmoremaritimeinorientationwiththerapidexpansionofitsblue‐waternavycapability.Chinahasalreadydevelopedacapabilitytodefendtheseislandchains.

South China Sea 

hascompelledBeijingtocastanxiouseyesonthese sea lines of communication. China’sactive defense strategy has a maritimecomponent that aligns with the PRC’s 1982naval maritime plan. The naval strategydemarcates three stages, in the first stage,from 2000 to 2010, China was to establishcontrolofwaterswithinthefirstislandchainthat links Okinawa prefecture, Taiwan andthe Philippines. In the second stage from2010 to2020,Chinawouldseek toestablishcontrol of waters within the second islandchain that links the Ogasawara island chain,Guamand Indonesia. In the final stage, from2020until 2040, Chinawouldput an end toUS military dominance in the Pacific andIndianOceans,usingaircraftcarriesasakeycomponent of their military force (Ronald,2012).

In fact, the current development of China’smilitary capabilities is becoming more andmoremaritime in orientationwith the rapidexpansion of its blue‐water navy capability.China has already developed a capability todefend these island chains with a totalacquisition of modern submarines, frigates,corvettes, andpatrol ships, among others aswellasdevelopmentofanaircraftcarrierandeven a stealth fighter. It has also recentlyadopted a “Far SeaDefense” strategy,whichcan challenge the freedomof actionofothermajorpowersbeyondthe islandchains. (FarSea Defense strategy means continuing to

dispatchthefullrangeofdiplomaticassets‐‐including highest‐ranking officials,developmentexperts,interagencyteams,andpermanent assets ‐‐ to every country andcorner of the Asia‐Pacific region.) China hasincreased its naval presence in the SCS bydeploying several ships in the area. On 10March 2009, China deployed its largest andmost modern naval ship, Yuzheng 311, topatrol China's exclusive economic zone andstrengthenfisheryadministration intheSCS.The existence of China's new undergroundnuclear submarine base on the southern tipof Hainan Island, close to vital sea lanes ofnavigation in SoutheastAsia, has also raisedenormousregionalanxieties.

China is ASEAN’s largest trading partner;trade value between them in 2011wasUSD292.78whichis37.5percentfromlastyear.China’stopthreetradepartnersareMalaysia,ThailandandSingapore(Xinhua2011).TradeandeconomictiesbetweenASEANandChinahave been growing rapidly over the pastyears, especially after the signing of theFramework Agreement on ComprehensiveEconomicCooperation inNovember2002 toestablish the ACFTA. Prior to the realisationofACFTAon1January2010,TradeinGoods(TIG)Agreement,TradeinServiceAgreementand the Investment Agreement under theFramework Agreement of ComprehensiveEconomic Cooperation have been concludedandsignedon29November2004,14January2007 and 15 August 2009, respectively.Subsequently, the Economic Ministers fromASEANandChinaattheir10thConsultationsin August 2011 in Manado, Indonesia,endorsed the establishment of the ASEAN‐ChinaFTAJointCommittee.ASEANandChinacontinued to enhance their close andstrategic partnership through regulardialogue and consultations, which includeSummits, ministerial meetings, seniorofficials and experts meetings(ASEAN‐ChinaDialogueRelations,2012).

ChinaneedsSoutheastAsianresourcesandmarket.Itneedsastableandpeacefulregionalenvironmentforitsmodernizationpurpose.BeijingisalsomindfulthatanadverserelationshipwithASEANcouldforcethemtohavecloseralignmentwithChina’scompetitorsJapanandtheU.S.

IPCS Special Report 132,  August 2012  

How China engages Southeast Asia may tellusmuch about the nature of China’s rise. Inthe view of one analyst, ‘... with regard toAsia, China seeks to promote an image ofbeingabletohandleitsgreatereconomicandstrategic clout responsibly ... Chinawants toplayaconstructiveroleinregionaleconomicand political affairs, perhaps with a view tobuilding a stable foundation for greaterinfluenceinthefuture’(Vatikiotis,2003).

China needs Southeast Asian resources andmarkets. It needs a stable and peacefulregionalenvironmentinitsneighborhoodforthepurposeofmodernization.Beijing isalsomindful that an adverse relationship withASEAN could force them to have closeralignment with China’s competitors JapanandtheU.S.Itisalsoconcernedaboutthepro‐U.S. defense orientation of many ASEANcountries(Acharya,2010:239).Ithasplanneda kind of ‘Chinese Monroe Doctrine’ forSoutheastAsia.SuchastrategywouldseektoexpelanycompetitivemilitarypresencefromtheregionandcreateastrategicenvironmentinwhichSoutheastAsiangovernmentswouldunderstand that they cannot take majordecisions affecting Chinese interest withoutconsulting Beijing. However, S.D.Muni hasargued that China’s close relations with thenew ASEAN members enable it to ‘projectitself as a stabilizing force and a maturepower in the Asia Pacific region’. But it has‘all the characteristics of a centre‐peripheryrelationship’(Acharya,2010:240).

The region is currently tense because ofunresolved maritime claims. But the majorsourceofthedilemmaistheriseofChina.SoitremainstobeseenhowmuchmagnanimityChina will show towards its neighboringcountries. With an impending leadershipsuccession preoccupying the CommunistParty it will categorically try to avoid anymajordiplomaticfriction.Chinaclaimsthatitalways stands for negotiated settlement ofinternational disputes through peaceful

means. This position also applies to the SCSIslands. It is committed toworkingwith thecountriesconcernedforpropersettlementofthe disputes related to the SCS throughpeacefulnegotiations inaccordancewith theuniversally‐recognized international lawandthe contemporary law of the sea, includingthefundamentalprinciplesandlegalregimesset forth in the1982U.N.ConventionontheLawoftheSea.ThisisclearlyseenintheJointStatement issued at the China‐ASEANinformal summit in 1997, the proposition of‘shelving disputes and going in for jointdevelopment’ and the 2002 Declaration ontheConductofthePartiesintheSCSbetweenthe ASEAN and China. However, in recenttimestherehavebeendiscrepanciesbetweenChina’s declared position and actualintensionsandpractices.

VCONCLUSION

Thecurrentstateofaffairs intheSCSregionis characterized by a multinational disputeoveritsterritorialdelimitation.Traditionally,theregionwasnotasourceofconflict.Itwasonly after the Second World War that thearea started gaining strategic importance.China insists that it has rightful claims tothese territories and that its neighbors havetaken advantage of its military weakness toinfringe on its sovereignty. Taking intoaccount the contemporary developments inthe region there can be a few plausiblescenarios.

ScenarioI

China’sstrategyontheissueappearstobeacombination of ambiguity, and selective useofforceandtacticaltiming.Chinaisadamanton solving the issue bilaterally and opposesany multilateral solution. ASEAN countriesare reluctant to solve the issue bilaterallybecause the end result may be in Beijing’sfavordue to itspoliticalandeconomicclout.

South China Sea 

The Chinese leadership is aware of thechallenges this dispute can pose to its risebecause the oceans and seas of the worldprovidevitalenergyandstrategicroute/linksneededforaglobalizingeconomy.Furtherasa fast growing economy China offers animmense economic growth potential to theASEAN states. Subsequently, inexplicableclaimsfromChinawillfurthercomplicatethesituationmakingitazoneofanarchy.

ScenarioII

Opposing the Chinese stance, the ASEANclaimants counter‐ argue that non claimantsarelegitimatestakeholderswhenitcomestobroader issues affecting the stability andsecurityintheSea.Thiswasfirmlysupportedin the ASEAN‐India Summit November2011.SoutheastAsianstatesmightnotliketoantagonizeeitherChinaoranymajorexternalpower (especially the U.S.) in the regionwhichcouldleadtoastalemate.

Itcanbeinferredthattherewillbenomajorupheaval. Theremaybepolitical disorder inthe worst case scenario. A negotiatedcompromise may be difficult to reach buttherearemanypoliticalanddiplomatictoolstoavertanyanomalyintheregion.

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