[Skriv titlen på dokumentet] [Skriv undertitlen på dokumentet]

Grith [Skriv firmaets navn] [Vælg en dato]

Sources of workers´ power in the Cut-flower industry in Kenya

Grith Fouchard Sylvest Andersen

Student ID: 601500

MSc Labour, Social Movements and Development

School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)

Supervisor: Dr Matteo Rizzo

Submitted the 15th of September, 2014

Word count: 9989

1

Declaration

“I undertake that all material presented for examination is my own work and has not

been written for me, in whole or in part, by any other persons(s). I also undertake that

any quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person

has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for examination”.

Grith Fouchard Sylvest Andersen

2

Table of Content

Abstract .............................................................................................................................................................. 3

Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 4

Research questions ............................................................................................................................................. 8

Methodology ...................................................................................................................................................... 9

Global value chain analysis ............................................................................................................................... 11

The Structural Power of workers ...................................................................................................................... 12

Strand A, The Auction strand ........................................................................................................................... 13

Strand B, The Retail strand ............................................................................................................................... 14

Governance topologies in strand B ................................................................................................................... 16

The supplier capacity ........................................................................................................................................ 18

Power concentration at larger producers in the chain ........................................................................................ 19

The Captive value chain .................................................................................................................................... 20

The ability to codify and the complexity of product specifications .................................................................... 20

The structural power of the cut-flower workers ................................................................................................ 24

Employment levels ........................................................................................................................................... 24

Stricter quality demands raises skill level and number of permanent staff .......................................................... 24

Workplace bargaining power ............................................................................................................................. 25

The nature of the commodity ........................................................................................................................... 25

Just-in-time ordering systems ............................................................................................................................ 26

Codes and regulation as a platform to improve conditions ................................................................................ 26

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................... 27

Chapter 2, Associational power of the cut-flower workers ................................................................................ 28

Who are the main actors in KFI and how do they cooperate? ........................................................................... 29

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................... 37

Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................................... 40

Appendix 1 ....................................................................................................................................................... 46

Appendix 2 ....................................................................................................................................................... 54

Appendix 3 ....................................................................................................................................................... 55

Appendix 4 ....................................................................................................................................................... 56

Appendix 5 ....................................................................................................................................................... 57

Appendix 6 ....................................................................................................................................................... 60

3

Abstract

Exposure to pesticides, low wages, long working hours and forced overtime has

characterized the flower industry in Kenya for decades. Flowers from Kenya to Europe

are exported through global value chains and they end up in supermarkets such as Tesco

or Sainsbury´s through the Kenya-UK retail value chain. This thesis seeks to explore the

agency of flower workers by understanding the sources of power they possess. By

analyzing the Kenya-UK value chain it is argued that the historical developments in the

value chain architecture and governance structures has led to an increase in the structural

power of the flower workers. An analysis of the associational power of the flower

workers is carried out to assess the possibilities for the realization of the increased

structural power. It is argued that there is a good foundation for associational power in

the flower sector and a long history of cooperation between the many labour actors.

However, a recent decline in activities of civil society organization, tensions between

trade unions and NGOs and undemocratic practices weakens the associational power

and poses a threat to the realization of the increased structural power of the cut-flower

workers.

4

Introduction

Flowers are beautiful and can be given as a sign of love or to celebrate grand

achievements and happiness. The flower production however, does not reflect the same

love and happiness. The poor working conditions in the Kenyan flower industry (KFI)

has for the last twenty years caught the attention of trade unions, non-governmental

organization (NGO) especially human and labour rights organizations, but also

academics.

Flower farming (floriculture) is a discipline of horticulture1 and encompasses the

cultivation ornamental plans and flower arrangements (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2014)

The flower sector is a key sector in the Kenyan economy being the number one source

of foreign exchange (Doland et al. 2005: 11). Cut-flowers are exported through global

value chains linking the Kenyan producers with the European market.

The initial focus on the poor working conditions in the horticulture sector in Kenya

began in 1999 (Opondo 2006:5, ETI 2005). Workers Rights Alert (WRA) launched a

campaign, spearheaded by Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) and involving

trade unions and Community Society Organizations (CSO) against violations of workers’

rights at a pineapple plantation Cirio Delmonte (KHRC, 2002, Opondo 2006: 5).

Valentine’s Day 2002 was a culmination of civil society action for better working

conditions in the KFI (Opondo 2006). Campaigns like the “Blue rose” have been carried

out by different coalitions of Kenyan NGOs and trade unions supported by European

NGOs targeting UK retailers and consumers (Opondo 2006). Since then several studies

by NGOs and academics have documented heavy exposure to pesticides, low wages,

forced overtime, cases of sexual harassment of female workers, employment insecurity,

lack of freedom of association (War on Want 2007, English 2007, Doland et al. 2005,

Hale & Opondo 2005, Tallontire et al. 2005).

1 Horticulture encompasses the production of fresh fruits and vegetables.

5

Besides the campaigns NGOs have held conferences to facilitate transnational alliances

between UK and Kenya based NGOs and consumer organizations (Opondo 2006).

Following these UK retailers visited Kenyan flower farms in 2002 resulting in renewed

commitment to uphold and improve labour conditions through the Ethical Trading

Initiative (ETI 2005). Simultaneously a multi-stakeholder initiative (Horticulture Ethical

Business Initiative HEBI) was set up in Kenya as a way of dealing with the increasing

pressure on the industry (Opondo 2006).

The increased consumer awareness and pressure on retailers in Europe contributed to

the proliferation of voluntary codes of conduct in the 1990s as a company response to

consumer pressure (Doland et al. 2005, Riisgaard 2007: 7). The proliferation of codes as

a form of voluntary regulations is an attempt from retailers to manage their supply

chains closer and to differentiate their product to gain market advantages (Barrientos et

al. 2003: 1513, Riisgaard 2009a: 328). This is achieved by developing or adapting

standards that codify the knowledge necessary to meet quality specifications (Barrientos

et al. 2003: 1513). At the same time the proliferation of codes was prompted by a change

in the Kenyan Governments development strategy, which entailed a shifted towards less

statutory regulation of the sector in the 1990´s (Opondo 2006). These developments

have resulted in the Kenyan cut-flower industry being one of the most codified sectors

in the entire world (Dolan et al. 2005, Opondo 2006: 2, Riisgaard 2009b: 4-5).

Despite this, the elements of codes regulating workers conditions are a more recent

phenomenon (Barrientos et al. 2003:1518). Little attention was paid to the effectiveness

of these codes on improving the working conditions before 2005 (Hale & Opondo 2005:

307). Since then a central theme in the literature has been the effectiveness of codes of

conduct in improving the working conditions in African Horticulture sector (Tallontire

et al. 2005, Hale & Opondo 2005, Doland et al. 2005, Barrientos & Smith 2007,

Riisgaard 2007, Riisgaard 2009a). These studies are critical towards the potential of codes

6

to effectively improve working conditions. Lone Riisgaard points out that the potential

of the codes to fundamental challenge power structures in the cut-flower value chain is

severely limited (Riisgaard 2007: 47). Barrientos & Smith (2007) point to positive

outcomes of outcome standards (wage, health & safety etc.), but only limited progress in

process rights (such as freedoms of association). Several studies are still critical about

codes as the best means of regulation of company behavior, but points to the positive

potential in the codes and records improvements in some areas (Doland et al. 2005,

Opondo 2006, Riisgaard 2007, 2009a). This has led scholars to argue for multi-

stakeholder initiatives with participatory social auditing methods as a tool to improve

working conditions by having workers represented in the formulation, implementation

and monitoring of the codes (Hale & Opondo 2005, Doland et al. 2005, Tallontire et al.

2005).

The latter group of scholars has researched these issues from a gender perspective,

highlighting the gender specific needs of women not addressed in the codes and auditing

processes and the lack of protection of non-permanent workers2 in the sector. The

above mentioned studies are contributing to the debate on private/voluntary initiatives

in contrary to statutory regulations as the most effective tool to improve

conditions for workers in global value chain production (Riisgaard 2007: 10-11).

Another central theme drawn from the focus on voluntary codes are their role as part of

the governance structure of the Kenya-Europe flower value chain:

“The key role of standards in agricultural value chains is to facilitate their governance across space and

the coordination between firms by transmitting credible information on the nature of products and the

conditions under which they are produced, processed and transported” (Riisgaard 2009b: 6).

2 Non-permanent workers refer to seasonal workers, workers on short-term contracts without

entitlement to benefits, casual workers.

7

Although the codes are categorized as non-statutory forms of regulation, many of them

do build on statutory regulation (Hale & Opondo 2005: 307, Opondo 2006:7, Riisgaard

2009a: 335). Besides the voluntary codes of conduct, a range of different modes of

regulation apply to the KFI (Doland et al. 2005: Appendix 2: 69-70)3. In addition both

sectorial and a few company collective bargaining agreements (CBA) regulate the KFI.

In regards to regulating the labour market Kenya has a number of tripartite institutions

assuring labour representation (KHRC 2012). These elements make up the institutional

context within which the Kenya-UK cut-flower value chain operates.

The role of codes as a form of value chain governance in the Kenyan Horticulture sector

have been analyzed in several studies (Gereffi et al. 2005, Hale & Opondo 2005,

Tallontire et al. 2005, English 2007, War on Want 2007, Riisgaard 2007, 2008, 2009a,

2009b, Riisgaard & Hammer 2011, Andersen & Wambutsi 2013). Drawing on this

previous body of work and summarizing these findings the analysis in this Masters´

thesis will focus more exclusively on the Kenya-UK retail strand of the value chain. A

more detailed analysis of this strand will fill a void in the literature, and by using the

theoretical framework of structural and associational power, the analysis will add new

knowledge to the field of studies focusing on the agency of labour in global value chain

production (Silver 2003, Selwyn 2007, Riisgaard 2007, 2009a).The purpose of this

Masters´ thesis is to investigate the sources of power of the workers and their

organizations in order to understand the opportunities for labour agency in the Kenya-

UK cut-flower value chain.

3 For a detailed review of the impact and progress of national legislation on the KFI see KHRC (2012).

8

This informs the following problem statement

Problem statement

In which ways are the workers in the Cut-flower industry in Kenya able to make use of

their structural and associational power to improve their working conditions?

To help answer the problem statement are the following four research questions:

Research questions

Which are the sources of structural power of workers in the Kenya cut-flower industry?

How are associational power created in the KFI?

To investigate the creation of associational power two sub-research questions are

needed:

Which actors are involved?

How are they cooperating?

9

Methodology

The first chapter on the structural power of the workers primary draws on journal

articles and NGO publications to investigate and analyze the developments in the cut-

flower value chain architecture and governance structure.

The second chapter investigates the associational power of the workers and using

academic articles to map the labour actors in the field. To update the landscape of these

actors and understand their relations and alliances the chapter draws on different

empirical data: reports published by NGOs, project documents and evaluations,

information from websites and reports published by other stakeholders or organizations.

To supplement the analysis of these data all the organizations mentioned has been

contacted and their responses used as empirical data.

Qualitative interviews have been conducted. One with project officer Marta Medusa

from Women Working Worldwide (WWW), this interview will be referenced as: Medusa

2014 and the page number of Appendix 1. The second interview is with two staff

members from the Kenyan Human Rights Commission it will be cited as: KHRC 2014

and indicate the minute when the information is given. Both organizations have been

instrumental for the fight for improvements of the conditions for the Kenyan cut-flower

workers.

However, it has not been possible to contact Kenya Plantation and Agricultural Workers

Union (KPAWU). The Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) was contacted

(Appendix 6), but did not respond. This presents a risk of misrepresenting or

inadequately acknowledging the activities of these organizations. To accommodate this,

10

information regarding these organizations is sought triangulated by different source, e.g.

journal publications and interviews.

War on Want was contacted about their relationship with KEWWO, but where not able

to supply the information (See Appendix 4). The information on War on Want draws on

their publication “Growing Pains” (War on Want 2007).

The study focuses on cut-flower workers, which is a heterogeneous group. The

theoretical framework of associational power of the working class draws on a Marxist

understanding of capitalist production as a social relation creating antagonistic class

relations (Wright 2000). Wright uses the concept of class in an abstract, simplified form

resulting in polarized distinction between capitalists and workers (Wright 2000: 961);

though acknowledging elsewhere the heterogeneity of the working class (Wright 1985,

1997 in Wright 2000).

It is acknowledged that the cut-flower workers are a heterogeneous group segmented by

gender, contract status etc. However, it is outside the scope of this thesis to go into

detail with differentiated opportunities of every sub-group of flower workers and a

certain level abstraction in terms of class homogeneity is assumed. Only limited

considerations about women and non-permanent workers are included.

11

Chapter 1: The Kenya-UK cut-flower value chain and structural power

The chapter will introduce the theoretical framework for value chain analysis and the

structural power of the working class. This is followed by a summary of the findings of

previous studies of the value chain architecture and analysis of the governance structures

of the Kenya-Europe cut-flower value chain. The Kenya-UK strand of the value chain

will be elaborated with the value chain framework and these findings will be analyzed

using the theoretical framework of the structural power of the working class.

Global value chain analysis

Gereffi & Korzeniewicz developed a theoretical framework to analyze the production

and governance processes in geographically disperse, but connected industries. The

Global Commodity Chain (GCC) framework from 1994 highlights two main findings:

the importance of coordination across different participating firms and the growing

importance of retailers in shaping the global and organizationally fragmented production

and distribution networks (Gereffi et al. 2005: 82). This initial framework had three main

dimension of analysis, the third being the governance structures (Gereffi 1994: 96-97).

Governance is defined as, “authority and power relationships that determine how financial, material

and human resources are allocated and flow within a chain” (Gereffi 1994: 97).

Gereffi framework has been revised with special attention paid to three variables that are

influential in determining the governance and restructuring of the Global Value Chain

(GVC) (Gereffi et al. 2005). The initial distinction in the governance structures between

a buyer-driven and producer-driven chain (Gereffi 1994: 97-99) is elaborated in the new

framework to five basic types of value chain governance (Gereffi et al. 2005: 83-84).

12

The five types of value chain governance are hierarchy, captive, relational, modular and

market4 (Gereffi et al. 2005: 83-84). The two focus areas for the governance analysis are:

the levels of explicit coordination and power asymmetry. Both are measured on a scale

ranging from high to low levels in the chronological order of the types mentioned above

(Gereffi et al. 2005: 89).

The GCC framework is historical in the sense that it enables an analysis of the changes

in the different economic actors in the commodity chain over time (Gereffi 1994: 104).

Drawing on the five typologies developed by Gereffi et al. (2005) the analysis of the

Kenya-UK cut-flower value chain will be analyzed to understand the level of explicit

coordination, the change in the governance structures and the inherent power relations.

This analysis will help to illuminate the structural power of the cut-flower workers. Ben

Selwyn (2007) argues that by making a distinction between the two types of sources of

power, it becomes possible to use the term structural power to investigate the changing

nature of production and production processes which workers can utilize to improve

wages, working and/or living conditions (Selwyn 2007: 528).

The Structural Power of workers

Erik Olin Wright (2000) developed the theoretical framework and distinguishes between

two types of power that the working class possess: structural and associational power

(Wright 2000: 962). Structural power of the working class is by Wright determined by

the different sources of power that can be derived from the location of the workers

within a certain economy system (Wright 2000: 962).

Beverly Silver points to Wights sub-division of structural power into two different

categories: marketplace bargaining power (power caused by tight labour markets) and

workplace bargaining power (Silver 2003: 13).

4 For elaboration on the characteristics of the five types and a visual illustration of the level of

coordination and power asymmetry see: (Gereffi et al. 2005: 83-89)

13

Summaries of previous studies on governance in the Kenya-Europe

cut-flower value chain

There is not only one flower supply chain from Kenya: there are several linking Kenya

with international markets (Hale & Opondo 2005: 306). Different scholars conclude that

the overall form of governance in the KFI is buyer-driven (Riisgaard 2007:19, Tallontire

et al. 2005: 560, Hale & Opondo 2005:302, 306). Buyer-driven chain analysis focuses on

the powerful role of retailers in to make key decisions regarding both actors and

activities without owning the manufacturing facilities (Tallontire et al. 2005: 560). The

control is exercised by developing codes to specify requirements which suppliers have to

adhere to (Andersen & Wambutsi 2013:38).

Overall the literature distinguishes between an auction strand and a retail strand

(Tallontire et al. 2005, Riisgaard 2007, Hale & Opondo 2005:306).

Strand A, The Auction strand

The auction strand accounts for 2/3 of the total cut-flower export (Tallorine et al. 2005:

560-561). This strand of the flower value chain represents the Kenya-Europe value

chain. The producers exporting through the auction have signed up for the Milieu

Programma Sierteelt (MPS) certification, which include the optional `social qualification´

(Riisgaard 2007:23, Tallorine et al. 2005: 561). This strand displays less explicit

coordination and the motive for introducing the code is to protect the reputation of the

action and it is used more like a management tool (Riisgaard 2007: 25).

14

The auction strand has four sub-strands:

a) Small + medium scale producers (up to 2 hectares land) →export through

middlemen, wholesales and large export growers→ auction (Doland et al. 2005:

16, KHRC 2012)

b) Farmers that form flower hubs and export as a group →auction (Chege 2012: 31)

c) Small + medium scale producers (up to 20 hectares land) →export directly to the

auction (Doland et al. 2005: 16)

d) Large scale producers (more than 20 hectares land) →export directly to the

auction (Doland et al. 2005: 16)

Strand B, The Retail strand

The retail strand accounts for 1/3 of the exports (Riisgaard 2007:19). In the strand

flowers are sourced directly from Kenya by UK retailers such as: Sainsbury, Tesco,

Waitrose and Marks & Spencer (Riisgaard 2007: 19). UK primary source of cut-flowers

is from the Netherlands (about 65%), though direct retail sales are growing (Kenya

Flower council webpage 2014). However these figures are misleading since flowers

sources from the Netherlands can be Kenyan flowers re-exported to UK through the

auction (War on Want 2007: 4). The UK supermarkets account for approximately 50 %

of cut-flower sales resulting in increased buying power in the value chains (Tallontire et

al. 2005: 560).

15

The codes that regulate the retail strand come from four different origins:

1) Individual company codes developed by the different UK retailers

2) Northern developed sectoral codes

3) Southern sectoral codes

4) Multi-stakeholder codes (Riisgaard 2007: 23, Dolan et al. 2005: 17).

Most UK retailers are members of the multi-stakeholder initiative The Ethical Trading

Initiative (ETI) which make members adopt the ETI base code and makes supplier

adhere to it. The base code developed by the southern driven donor-supported multi-

stakeholder HEBI also regulates the sector. HEBI is an independent non-profit making

organization and the directors are from both industry organizations; government and

civil society organizations (Omosa (unknown)). For an explanation of the evolutional

development and rational the four types of codes in the agro-food sector see (Gibbon &

Lazaro 2010).

The retail strand has three sub-strands:

A. Small + medium scale producers (up to 20 hectares land) → only limited

export directly to the retailers (Doland et al. 2005: 16, Chege 2012: 31)

B. Small + medium scale producers →larger export farms → export directly

to the retailers (KHRC 2012, Doland et al. 2005: 16)

C. Large scale producers → export directly to the retailers (Doland et al. 2005:

16)

16

Governance topologies in strand B

Andersen & Wambutsis´ (2013) analysis of the KFI value chains are the most recent and

they differ from previous studies by going beyond the buyer-driven form of governance

and applying Gereffi et al. (2005) five typologies of value chain governance to the

different strands and sub-strands mentioned above.

They point to an overall tendency of increased explicit coordination and power

asymmetry in the power relations in the KFI in the favor of retailers (Andersen &

Wambutsi 2013: 42-43). They argue that the need for increased coordination results in

an increase in the introduction of codes which according to Gereffi et al. (2005:89) is

accompanied by an increase in power asymmetry.

Andersen & Wambutsi argue that increasing levels of coordination and power

asymmetry is evident in different areas of the Kenya-Europe cut-flower value chain.

Their analysis show tendencies of the market governance generally in strand A, but

points to a captive type of governance in sub-strand a between small holder and larger

export growers (Andersen & Wambutsi 2013: 42).

For strand B, they argue for captive type of governance structure in sub-strand f

between small holder & medium producers and large scale producers. For sub-strand g

and the last part of the chain in sub-strand f the governance type is characterized by a

relational and captive form of governance in between large scale farmers and retailers

(Andersen & Wambutsi 2013:43-45).

Andersen & Wambutsi (2013) conclude that the overall trend for the governance

structure of the Kenya-Europe cut-flower value chain represents a shift from a market

value chain type governance towards a combination of captive and relational value chain

governance structure (Andersen & Wambutsi 2013:42-45). They attribute this shift

17

mainly to a change in consumption patterns, the increase in the sales directly to retailers

and to the expansion in retailer signing up to codes to protect their image (Andersen &

Wambutsi 2013:45). Their analysis underlines the increased power of the retailers to

make decisions on products and process requirements through the codes in order for

producers to get market access.

Their analysis of the governance typologies was not aimed at pointing out a specific

typology that the KFI can be described by (Andersen & Wambutsi 2013:41). Despite

this, one of their findings point to the governance type in strand B as a combination of

the relational and captive governance. The following will critically engage with their

findings and elaborate on the type governance structures of the Kenya-UK strand,

investigating strand B and its sub-strands. The input-output structure of the chain and

the retailers ordering system will be examined to investigate the nature of the

commodity, production conditions and governance. The aim of the analysis is to

understand the control and coordination of these strands to uncover the power

asymmetry and opportunities for structural power of the workers.

The relational value chain

The relational governance types occur when it is not possible to codify product

specifications, by complex transactions and by high supply capability (Gereffi et al. 2005:

86).

When it is not possible to codify product specifications

When production specifications are too complex to codify the tactic knowledge

exchanged along the chain requires frequent face-to-face interaction.

18

A standard is codified knowledge on how to accomplish product and process quality

specifications and the KFI is one of the most codified in the world. There are currently

fifteen social and environmental standards simultaneously at work in the Kenyan cut-

flower industry (Riisgaard 2008: 13-14). In addition KFI has a long history of risk

management standards to ensure that the product is in compliance with defined

minimum product and/or process requirements (Riisgaard 2011: 437). The costs of

complying are transferred to the producers (Riisgaard 2007: 26), a phenomenon

common to buyer-driven global value chains (Gibbon & Lazaro 2010:1). In addition

many farms adhere to 5-10 different standards in order to diversify their export sources

and reduce dependency on one supplier (Riisgaard 2007: 21, 25). These factors indicate

good possibilities to codify the knowledge used in the product specifications of flowers

and deviates from the characterization of the relational value chain governance type.

The face-to-face interactions are limited to snapshot auditing (hence the argument for

more social participatory auditing). The mutual dependence is mainly regulated by ethics

in a code form developed as a response to labour and consumer pressure. The ordering

system in the KFI is characterized by impersonal contact implemented in the just-in-

time ordering e-mailed to larger farms daily (Riisgaard 2007: 21, 26). This deviates from

the characterization of the relational value chain governance type.

The retailers´ use of just-in-time ordering system and increased product differentiation

(in forms of social elements in codes) is an indication of the high complexity in the chain

(Gereffi et al. 2005: 84).

The supplier capacity

The supplier capacity in the sector shows a mixed picture and hence a mixed picture of

mutual dependence. The supplier capacity in strand B is high, increasing the motive of

out-sourcing for European producers.

19

The increased capacity is reflected in the contribution of the flower industry with 1, 29%

of the GDP of Kenya (Kenya Flower council webpage 2014). It is also reflected in

growth in export volume of Kenyan cut-flowers from 10,946 tons in 1988 to 124,858

tons in 2013 representing a value of 46.3 billion Kenyan Shillings (Kenya Flower council

webpage 2014). Kenya is the largest supplier of cut-flowers to Europe with an export

growth of 10%-15% annually (Riisgaard 2007: 18-19). Kenyan cut-flower export is the

second largest source of foreign exchange in agriculture, providing employment for

approximately 50,000 workers (Riisgaard 2007: 18).

Power concentration at larger producers in the chain

Retailers increased market share offers opportunity for market growth at supply level,

but the quality specification and image protection considerations are high, creating a

retail sourcing preference for larger farms (Riisgaard 2007:18). The picture also shows

capacity concentration among a few large scale producers where approximately 25 large

scale export farms account for 3/4 of the export supplied (Riisgaard 2007:19). The KFI

is dominated by approximately 50 farms cultivating around 2000 hectares and

accounting for about 83 % of the Kenyan flowers (Pollin et al. 2007: 116). Small holders

primarily use family labour and account for 5-10 % of exports, small – medium sized

producers employs 100 workers on average and account for 20-30 % of exports, and

large scale farms account for 60% of export employing between 250-6000 staff (Doland

et al. 2005:16). This illustrates the power concentration with the larger farms.

The picture of supplier capacity shows power concentration in the chain at the layer

representing the large export farms, confirming the analysis of Andersen & Wambutsi

(2013) in sub-strand f.

Increased supplier capacity can lead to less mutual dependency illustrated by the fact that

producers can adopt several codes (Riisgaard 2007: 21, 25, Opondo 2006:7). The cost of

compliance with codes and adherence to codes is not a buying guarantee (Tallontire et

al. 2005: 562).

20

Changing patterns of increased supplier capacity can also lead to increased pressure on

producers by the threat of buyers sourcing from other farms or geographical regions in

search for lower labour costs and less environmental regulations (War on Want 2007: 5).

The low supplier capacity in first part of sub-strand f deviates from the key determinants

of the relational value chain governance of high supplier capacity, but sub-strand e, the

latter part of sub-strand f and g are showing increased capacity to preform

complementary activities themselves.

The Captive value chain

Andersen & Wambutsi (2013) also characterize the governance type in strand B as

captive. This is evident both between Kenyan suppliers and international retailers and in

sub-strand e, g and between small holders and medium producers and large scale

producers in sub-strand f. Captive forms of value chain governance arise when the both

the ability to codify and the complexity of product specifications are high and supplier

capacity is low (Gereffi et al. 2005: 86).

The ability to codify and the complexity of product specifications

It has been shown above that the ability to codify the sector is high. The complexity of

transactions is high shown in the just-in-time ordering system and increased product

differentiation in the form of social elements in codes. This confirms the first two key

determinants in a captive type of governance.

21

Supplier capacity

Supplier capacity in the captive value chain governance type is low (Gereffi et al. 2005:

87). Strand B is regulated by a captive value chain governance type in the sense that the

retailers lock “in” producers with their codes dictating product and process

requirements, and the cost of non-compliance is loss of market access for all the sub-

strands in strand B. Jacob Chege points to previous studies describing the KFI as one of,

“increased product differentiation, more concentration of wholesale trading and vertical integration of

actors of the value chain” (Chege 2012:17). The power asymmetry between retailers and

larger farms is also illustrated in research showing larger farms increasingly dependency

on one buyer (Doland et al. 2005: 25, Hale & Opondo 2005: 306).

A sign of the power asymmetry in buyer-driven chains, and the captive value chain in

particular, is the tendency for retailers to push value-added activities down the chain

towards exporters (Riisgaard 2007:18). Chege (2012) maps the value added in the flower

sector in Kenya and highlights the power concentration at the larger scale farmers and

the captive governance relationship between small scale farmers and larger export

farmers (Chege 2012: 35-37). This is shown in the investments of larger farmers in pre-

cooling and cold storage facilities (such as refrigerated trucks) to be able to maintain the

high standards of their produce for export as required by the market.

Export activities also include airline bookings, customs clearance, inspection of flowers

and the transport from the warehouse to the airport. Last step is freight to the UK

(Chege 2012: 36). These last steps are done by freight forwarders and clearance agents.

These last value adding steps are increasingly being vertically integrated into the domain

of the large farms increasing their ability to control both the distribution and marketing

process (Riisgaard & Hammer 2011: 180-181). At the same time it enhances supply

management for retailers (Riisgaard & Hammer 2011: 181) and enforces the power

asymmetry by transferring these production costs to the producers confirming captive

22

value chain governance. This asymmetric power relationship is enhanced by a tendency

across Europe, but in the UK especially, of increasing market shares by retailers (Selwyn

2007: 532, Riisgaards 2007:19, War on Want 2007: 2).

Kenya Flower Council states that over 25% of the total export of flowers exported to

retailers have gone through all process activity representing a high value addition (Kenya

Flower council webpage, 2014). These investments are necessary due to the nature of

the commodity. Flowers have a perishable nature and can only survive storage for one to

three days (War on Want 2007:5). The commodity is a very time sensitive product and

demands an effective and uninterrupted cold chain and sales mechanisms (Riisgaard

2009a: 328).

The captive relationship between larger farms and small and medium farms is also

reflected in the dependency on larger farmers for seeds (Chege 2012: 34). Small and

medium farmers lack access to market information and credit, and are most affected by

the lack of infrastructure (Pollin et al. 2007: 118). Their exports go through their agents´

network (Chege 2012: 35). This restrict the value-added activities for small scale farmers

to processing activities such as sorting, cleaning and grading of flowers which is still

inspected to ensure they meet the standards (Chege 2012: 35).

It results in power asymmetry of the actors in the production mostly affecting the first

part of sub-strand f, and to a lesser extent sub-strand e and g. This confirms the analysis

of Andersen and Wambutsi (2013) especially in the first part of sub-strand f. Such a

development confirms the tendency of the restructuring of the global value chain

architecture supporting the thinning and shortening argument (Gibbon & Lazaro 2010:

12).

To sum up the analysis of the relational value chain governance structures in strand B

and it´s sub-strands displays several deviations from the characteristics, especially in

regards to a situation where product specifications cannot be codified, and the forms

23

that regulate the mutual dependence. In regards to supplier capacity the picture is mixed,

but it displays a concentration of power at the level of large scale producers.

Sub-strand g shows elements of modular chain governance due to the just-in-time

ordering systems (usually found in modular chain types). The high supplier capacity

results in several processing activities and the complementary activities carried out by the

large scale farms. It can be understood as elements of modular chain governance since

many producers can supply a finished product. This combined with the high level

complexity in the transactions and the high level of explicit coordination in the sector

show elements of modular chain governance (although not to the extent of the

producer-driven auto industry, which is normally characterized by the modular chain

governance type).

Strand B and all its sub-strands display a captive form of value chain governance due to

the high complexity and high ability to codify and the requirement to adhere to them to

get market access. However, the degree on being “locked in” depends on the level of the

capacity of the producer to perform all the complementary activities and diversify their

exports by adhering to more codes at the same time. This confirms the analysis of

Andersen and Wambutsi (2013) and result in high levels of explicit coordination and

power asymmetry in strand B between exporters and buyers. The analysis deviates from

those of the later by pointing to the high supplier capacity in the captive form of

governance and in the identification of a combination of three types of value chain

governance evident in strand B: relational, elements of modular and captive respectively.

The question is what does this mean for the structural power of the cut-flower workers?

24

The structural power of the cut-flower workers

Analysis of the structural power in the Kenya-UK cut-flower value chain is divided into

two sub-categories: Market place bargaining power and Work place bargaining power.

The analysis draws on the findings of the governance structures and input-output

element of the Cut-flower value chain analyzed above.

Market place bargaining power

The market place bargaining power manifests itself in a variety of forms: possession of

scare skills highly demanded by employers, high employment levels or opportunities for

alternative employment and incomes activities (Silver 2003: 13, 14, Selwyn 2007: 549).

Employment levels

Kenya has an average annual GDP growth rate of 4.78% (Trading Economics website

2014) indicating job creation. On the other hand the unemployment rate for Kenya is

reported at 40% in the period from 2011-2012 (Trading Economics website 2014). This

indicates a “slack” labour market in Kenya weakening the marketplace bargaining power

of the workers.

Stricter quality demands raises skill level and number of permanent staff

Higher skill level due to the strict product (less strict) process requirements imposed by

the codes is evident in the KFI. Studies point to a positive connection between the

adaptation of codes and an increase in the permanent workforce due to the need for a

more skilled and trained workforce to carry out the more value adding activities such

bunching and mixing bouquets, sleeving and labelling (Doland et al. 2005: 40-41,

25

Tallontire et al. 2005: 565). Recent studies on labour retention on 11 large scale farms in

Kenya show percentage of permanent workers of total number of workers ranging from

66,6% to 100% (Gibbon & Riisgaard 2014: 110). In addition they found the mean length

of current employment to be 5,8 years (Gibbon & Riisgaard 2014: 110).

An increase in skills does mostly favor males in functions such as: “spraymen, storemen,

irrigators, scouts and health and safety officers (e.g., fire wardens)” (Doland et al. 2005: 40-41).

The study of 11 large scale farms documents differentiated training budgets, but lists a

range of training activities are carried out on all farms (Gibbon & Riisgaard 2014: 107).

Despite this the results also show that the training is mostly related to meeting product

requirements with limited opportunities for brush-up training and learning new tasks

(Gibbon & Riisgaard 2014: 108). The increase in skill level, however limited it might be,

does increase the market place bargaining power of the workers.

Workplace bargaining power

The workplace bargaining power refers to the power that can be utilized from the

strategic location of a certain group of workers in a key industrial sector (Silver 2003: 13-

15). In other words it can be understood as the power of workers granted by their

position in the production system and the ability to disrupt this system (Selwyn 2007:

549).

The nature of the commodity

The nature of the commodity itself and the production cycle for flowers, going through

different stages (mentioned above), and the tight quality control in the form of product

inspection at several stages of the production indicate the strategic position of workers at

the production site.

26

The perishable nature of flowers results in tight logistical management and heavy

investments by the large scale producers. The workers can take advantage of the

modular governance elements found in the especially sub-strand f and g to disrupt the

production process at production level, but also in the different stages of the

complementary activities.

Just-in-time ordering systems

The just-in-time ordering system used by the retailers indicates high sensitivity which

enforces this power to disrupt the production and shipment process. Again this is most

evident for the larger farms, but it increases the structural power of the workers in the

small and medium farms in the cases where the larger farms source flowers from them

to meet orders. Demand for flowers changes and peaks around Valentines´ Day,

Mothers´ Day and other holidays (Riisgaard 2009b: 5). This increases the workplace

bargaining power since these times are extra sensitive to disruptions.

Codes and regulation as a platform to improve conditions

Codes indirectly led to increased workplace bargaining power due to the reasons listed

above. This enables workers to identify power nodes in the production process and ways

to disrupt it.

The codes contribute to a thinning and shortening of the chain hereby increasing the

mutual dependence between producers and buyers as seen in the captive value chain

type. This increases the opportunity to disrupt processes.

27

Conclusion

The chapter has shown that the historical developments of the governance structures in

the Kenya-UK value chain represent a shift from a market based governance type

towards more captive and relational, but also elements of modular type of governance

structures. The restructuring of governance structures as well as production architecture

has led to a more vertical integration of tasks and captive governance resulting in an

increase in the structural power of the cut-flower workers.

These developments coupled with the perishable nature of the commodity, the just-in-

time ordering system, seasonality, increased skill level and the social dimension of codes

have led to increased workplace and market place bargaining of the workers. This shows

that increasing power asymmetry between retailers and supplier can paradoxically led to

an increase in the structural power of workers.

The mix of governance structures in the Kenya-UK chain do not strictly limit the

workers it also opens for arrays of resistance although different according the

employment status, sex and the type of farm. The elements of captive governance type

offer an opportunity for workers on smaller farms in sub-strand f to take advantage of

the opportunities to strike because that will impact the larger farms´ ability to meet the

daily order. The elements of modular chain governance found on larger farms offers an

opportunity for workers on these farms and the following processing stages to take

advantage of captive relationship between the farm and the retailer by obstructing the

process of delivery of a finished product.

The elements of relational governance structure illustrate the mutual dependency and the

high cost of switching suppliers which contributes to the increase in workplace

bargaining power.

28

Despite the increase in workplace bargaining power, using it to change the underlying

power dynamics further up the chain is severely limited (Riisgaard 2007: 47). To

challenge these structures it needs a change of the ordering practices of the retailers

(Hale & Opondo 2005: 318, 320-321) and increased representation of labour further up

the chain which the multi-stakeholder initiatives especially HEBI is a good example of.

However, the structural power of workers is realized through the associational power of

workers which is why the next chapter will investigate the associational power of the cut-

flower workers.

Chapter 2, Associational power of the cut-flower workers

This chapter will investigate the associational power of the cut-flower workers.

Associational power refers to the different types of power which can be said to result

from the formation of collective organizations of workers (Wright 2000: 962). Unions

and parties are examples of workers associational power, but it also includes other

bodies or form of institutional representation of workers like workers councils or

representation on the board (Wright 2000: 962). In this thesis associational power is

extended to include power which is derived from the creation of alliances between

associations and/or networks that work to promote the interests of the cut-flower

workers.

This chapter investigates how association power in KFI is created, which actors are

involved, how they cooperate to address the ways in which the cut-flower workers are

able to utilize the associational power.

Previous studies of workers organization and representation have focus on the

relationship between voluntary standards in KFI and the opportunities of trade unions

and NGO´s to use them to improve the conditions for workers (Riisgaard 2007, 2008,

2009a, Andersen and Wambutsi 2013).

29

Joel Mwanzia (2007) explores the relationship between Kenyan trade unions and NGO´s

efforts to organize workers in three different sectors in Kenya. This chapter adds new

knowledge by pointing to the international alliances created and using the framework of

associational power to highlight the relations between the actors and point to the

potential and obstacles for improvement of the conditions in the KFI.

The chapter will not go into concrete obstacles of organizing workers at farm level, e.g.

women or casual workers, for experiences with that on flower farms in East Africa see

Brahic et al. (2011). For more general reading on organizing informal workers and their

creation of alliances in Africa see (Prag 2010, Lindell 2010, Mitullah 2010) and for

specific challenges and success of membership based organizations see Martha Chen et

al. (2007).

Who are the main actors in KFI and how do they cooperate?

The traditional industrial relations system encompasses the government, the employer

organization Agricultural Employers Association (AEA) and the Kenya Plantation and

Agricultural Workers Union (KPAWU) and Central Organization of Trade Unions

(COTU) (Riisggard 2007, KHEC 2012: 27). KPAWU is an affiliate of the (COTU

website 2014) representing over 100,000 members, 1/5 of the members of COTU in

2009 (Fashoyin 2010: 22). Alliances with International trade unions include IndustriAll,

ITUC and IUF/Unite the three sitting on the ETI board (ETI website 2014).

They strengths of the trade unions are their democratic nature ensuring representation

and internal accountability, and their long-term perspective in the fight for workers´

rights (Rissgaard 2007). The statutory and institutional context (primarily the Labour

relations act 2007 and industrial relations charter 1980) is the foundation on which

unions claim their legal mandate as the only labour actor representing workers through

30

the CBA and in different tripartite institutions including labour disputes in the industrial

court (KHRC 2012: 26-27, Atwoli 2008, Mwanzia 2007).

The official stand of the union leadership is to refuse participation in the formulation

and monitoring of the codes unless certain criteria’s are fulfilled (Riisggard 2007:40). In

practice that means the union only officially engages with Max Havelaar standard and

COTU has refused to take their seats in the HEBI due to the participation of NGO´s

(Riisggard 2007). If branch or shop-floor level KPAWU officials wants to engage with

NGO´s in regards to the codes it needs to be cleared at the national level (Riisggard

2007: 40). The opinion of branch and shop-floor level deviates from the national level in

regards to working with the NGO (Mwanzia 2007) and using the codes as a tool

(Riisggard 2007). WWW confirms that the tensions are very much rooted in the

leadership of KPAWU (Medusa 2014: 53). Both WWW and KHRC confirm that the

union officials and NGOs do corporate at the branch and shop-floor level (Medusa

2014: 53, KHRC 2014: 45:05-45:22). This represents an opportunity for the creation and

strengthening of associational power at branch and farm level both in regards to the

creation of associational power inside the union structures and for alliances between the

union and the NGOs.

The union has used the codes by integrating some parts of the standards into the CBA

and has successfully used the codes to pressure for unionization and CBA (Riisggard

2007: 40, 44). The standards have also been used as evidence to win cases in the

industrial court (Riisggard 2007:40). Even if the standpoint of the national level is to

reject to engaging with a majority of the codes the way they utilize them in practice does

present an opportunity to create and strengthen the associational power at the shop-

floor level.

The role of the NGO´s in the sector differs according to their vision, mission, approach,

and financial capital. The Kenyan organizations identified are KHRC, Kenyan Women

31

Worker Organization (KEWWO), C4, Workers Rights Watch (WRW) and the Labour

Awareness and Research Center (LARC) (Riisggard 2007, Mwanzia 2007). All have been

a member of WRA and active in the previous mentioned campaigns. WRA have been a

key actor in setting up the HEBI in Kenya (Waweru, Appendix 5).

Common activities of these organizations include research into the conditions of the

flower workers. KEWWO broke out of COTU to be able to strengthen the

organization, education and advocacy of women workers (Dey & Westendorff 1996:15-

16, Owino 2013: vi). KEWWO has carried out advocacy activities and research on the

women issues and working condition for multiple projects and organizations among

them are: KHRC (KHRC 2014: 8:32-11:30), Women Working Worldwide (English

2007), ETI (2005) and War on Want (War on Want 2007).

KHRC and Worker Rights Watch both apply a rights based approach (KHRC 2004-

2008, WRW webpage 2014a). KHRC was founded in 1991 (KHRC 2014-2018: 13) and

is the leading actor of the NGO´s operating in the sector (Riisgaard 2007: 42) KHRC

cooperate with a range of local CSO and has a wide network (KHRC 2014: 47:14-47:39).

KHRC have published a long list of reports exposing the human rights violations of

workers some specifically targeting the KFI. WRW partner with KHRC (KHRC 2014:

31:12) and have carried out research on wages in the flower sector (WRW webpage

2014b). WRW have engaged with the voluntary standards, but are critical towards

auditing without the participatory auditing offered by the HEBI (Waweru 2014:

Appendix 5). WRW is a member of the HEBI board and observes audits, and has

cooperated KEWWO by sharing those findings (Waweru 2014: Appendix 5). KHRC

and LARC have offered legal assistance to flower workers in Labour disputes (KHRC

2014: 29:54-31:45, Mwnazia 2007: 25). KHRC argues for a strengthening of monitoring

of codes through workers participation and more participatory auditing of codes in the

sector (KHRC 2012: 65).

32

Women Working Worldwide (WWW) and War on Want are UK based organizations

involved in advocacy and research activities. Both organizations have partnered with

KEWWO to carry out research on the working conditions on Kenyan flower farms and

mapping of value chain architecture (War on Want 2007, English 2007). War on Want

got involved as part of their ongoing campaign for corporate accountability (War on

Want 2007: 1). WWW have carried out projects to research working conditions in Kenya

and do action research and capacity building of cut-flower workers in East Africa

(English 2007). WWW membership of the ETI has been instrumental to push retailers

to take responsibility for the working condition along the value chain (Medusa 2014: 51-

52). WWW and partners research also stretch into the realm of academia witch journal

articles such as Hale & Opondo (2005) and Brahic et al. (2011). WWW are highly critical

towards the potential of codes and note that the social content of the codes are not very

specific and hard to use as a tool to bring actors to the negotiation table (Medusa 2014:

51-52). However the research findings have been instrumental tool to get stakeholder to

negotiate around the issue of codes (Medusa 2014: 51-52).

The institutional framework for NGO´s operation is covered in the NGO coordination

act of 1990. This law has no statutory provision of NGO to represent labour (Mwanzia

2007). KHRC argues that several of the labour institutions operate through a tripartite

plus arrangement, granting Civil society a key role in ensuring the realization of

compliance with the labour laws (KHRC 2012: 23). NGO´s have also used the slogan

“labour rights as human rights” to widen their mandate to advocate for social and

economic rights on behalf of the Kenyan workers (Mwanzia 2007: 20). The legal

framework does outline a clear division of tasks between the mandate of the NGO´s and

the mandate of trade unions when it comes to representing workers.

What is common for the NGOs in the sector is their ability to make alliances including

transnational alliances that assist them with advocacy, funding and represent workers

needs in international fora like ETI. These alliances strengthen the associational power

33

of the workers by connection workers and consumers in UK. They also help to expose

and communicate the problems of Kenyan workers to different stakeholders and to

push retailers to the negotiation table by presenting research findings in multi-

stakeholder initiatives like ETI and HEBI. The NGO´s do critically engage with the

codes participating in company codes audits and multi-stakeholder codes through the

HEBI (Riisgaard 2007). Similar opportunities exist in the form of multi-stakeholder

initiatives around trade policy where NGO´s are involved (Opondo 2013).

However the audits are not the main activities of the NGO´s. Most of their activities

focus on a strengthening of workers at the farms level using a bottom up approach,

focusing empowerment through training, education and service provision. Action

methods have been applied to investigate the needs of women and acknowledging their

voices. These activities extend the creation of associational power to the farm level by

promoting union or workers council participation or membership of private established

welfare organizations.

What is common for all the NGO´s is their acknowledgement and support of the role of

the trade unions in the sector (War on Want 2007, KHRC 2012, KHRC 2014: 32:08-

32:24, Medusa 2014). Statements from both KHRC and LARC suggest that their

activities aim at educating workers to decide for themselves, but that unions should

focus on organization at the farm level and push improvements through CBA and then

let the NGO focus on advocating for workers´ rights (Mwanzia 2007). Some farms have

reported union membership increase from 3400 in 2001 (Riisggard 2009a: 333) to 15000

in 2004 due to the trainings carried out by the NGOs (Mwanzia 2007). This indicates an

opportunity for cooperation and divisions of tasks in representing workers for

improvement of their conditions, which rests on the legal mandate and utilizes the

individual strengths of both types of actors.

34

Obstacles for the creation of associational power of the flower workers

The above have shown a good foundation for associational power of KFI workers

reflected in the history of broad national labour campaign coalitions, training and

capacity building at farm level, the many labour actors in the field and transnational

alliances.

Despite these opportunities there are also several areas of tension between the trade

union and the NGOs (Pinto2008) which impede the creation of associational power.

The first is the difference in approaches to the make use of the codes resulting in

tensions and delegitimizing the role of the NGO´s in this process (Riisgaard 2007).

Another element that hinders the creation of associational power is a decline in CSO

activity within the labour movement (KHRC 2012). This is attributed to the downscaling

of the operation of Labour Awareness Resource Centre (LARC) (KHRC 2012: 40) and

the closure of KEWWO in 2010 (Owino 2013: vi, 78-79, Opondo, Appendix 3). Neither

KHRC or WRW are aware of the reasons to why KEWWO was closed down (KHRC

2014: 15:06-15:59, Waweru 2014 Appendix 5).

WWW has not had projects or supported the horticulture sector in Kenya since 2007

and have only just recently begun work in Kenya partnering with Workers Rights Watch

(Medusa 2014, 46, 52-53). However financial and human resources of WWW is limited

with only one full time staff and one part time (Medusa 2014: 47). The money

fundraised by WWW has to cover project costs and at the same time administration and

running costs of WWW (Medusa 2014: 49). These developments puts serious constrains

on the activities and capacity of WWW.

War on Want operates in Kenya, but their current focus is on the informal economy and

food sovereignty (War on Want webpage 2014a,b), resulting in a decline in the

international dimension of the advocacy activities in the cut-flower sector.

35

These developments confirm the critique directed at NGOs from COTU (Atwoli 2008)

and the problems identified by KHRC in working with CSO. NGOs are donor

dependent and their efforts are short-term (in the sense of specific project

activities)(Riisgaard 2007, KHRC 2014: 2:49-4:44). These factors present an obstacle to

the creation of sustainable associational power of the workers. Considering this critique

it has to be noted that much of the activities of the NGOs have a long term perspective

in terms of empowerment and education on workers and civil rights. These activities do

promote associational power at the farm level. The sustainability of these efforts can

again be questioned if one consider the weak marketplace bargaining power (due the

“slack” labour market in Kenya) and the lack of employment security which forces

workers to relocate (KHRC 2014: 4:04-4:44).

Besides the contestation on the issues of codes and the decline of NGO activity in the

sector, the NGO have questioning the trade unions´ ability to adequately represent and

understand workers´ needs. The associational power rets on an assumption that the

organizations are democratic in nature and this is a criterion that many NGOs do not

live up resulting in problems of accountability of their broad constituencies.

This shortcoming does not only apply to NGO´s, but several factors point to trade

unions being undemocratic (Riisgaard 2007:37, KHRC 2012). These include

undemocratic election practices (KHRC 2012), no term limited in the union

constitution, not reporting labour disputes to the Ministry of Labour and intimidations

of branch union officials for working with NGOs (Mwanzia 2007). This is partly

ascribed to the cooptation of COTU to government interests since 1984 (Mwanzia 2007)

and the only recent move (in 1992) towards independence from the ruling party

(Riisgaard 2007: 36-37).

36

Undemocratic procedures in trade union constitutions have resulted in a lack of

democratic representation and accountability of the trade unions, which has contributed

to the interference of NGOs in Kenyan labour relations (Mwanzia (2007, KHRC 2014:

28:53-29:54). KHRC express in a personal conversation that historically the trade

unions: “”have been more in touch with government than it is in with workers” (KHRC 2014:

25:08-25:25). Lack of democratic representation of workers is weakening the

associational power of the workers.

The creation of KEWWO from a break out of COTU and KEWWOs extensive

involvement in labour agitation and research is another area of tension, which questions

the strengths of the unions in representing women interests. Women make up 70% of

the flower workforce, but this is not reflected in the KPAWU leadership (Mwanzia

2007). Historically women’s´ representation in trade unions have been highly

problematic (Brahic et al. 2011) and the KHCR have partnered with KEWWO

previously to research why: “trade unions did not seem to be a very comfortable place for womens´

membership “ (KHRC 2014: 11:02-10:08). WWW relationship with KPAWU is not easy,

due to frictions from earlier research exposing the poor conditions and indirectly

critiquing the work of KPAWU (Medusa 2014: 52). These factors weaken the

associational power of the flower workers.

To improve the representation and accountability of KPAWU KHRC recommend an

independent union for flower workers (KHRC 2012: 64). The registration of the Kenya

Export Floriculture Horticulture and Allied Workers Union (KFHAWU) (not

exclusively for cut-flower workers) have been registered, but it poses a threat to

KPAWU because it will “eat on their constituency” (Medusa 2014: 53).

KFHAWU is active, but KPAWU have appeal the registration in the industrial court.

KPAWU appeal was: “granted the status quo by the industrial court, but the new union has moved

to court of appeal to challenge the decision” (Waweru 2014, Appendix 5).

37

This shows the vested interest of KPAWU and presents a severe hindrance for the

creation of associational power at the farms level and between the trade unions

internally.

The opportunity for associational power of the workers created by HEBI is in practice

no longer available since the initiative has collapsed resulting in limited participation

from CSOs (KHRC 2012: 34). Eunice Waweru from WRW writes regarding the status

of HEBI: “We are still board member but HEBI is not active any more, what we have now is another

loose coalition called workers’ rights and environmental network-WERN” (Waweru 2014:

Appendix 5).

Conclusion

The history of labour engagement in the agricultural sector in Kenya show strong ties

between the trade unions and NGO´s and a good foundation on which to build

associational power of the cut-flower workers. Many different NGOs have worked to

improve the conditions of workers through their concrete activities of education the

workers of their rights, engaging with the codes and raising the number of union

members in the sector. The alliances between Kenyan NGOs and the transnational

alliances created are promising for an increase in the associational power and

improvements in the working conditions through different channels involving

consumers and holding companies accountable.

Trade unions have been selective and highly critical in their use of the codes as a tool to

improve workers conditions, but they have used it successfully to push for CBA and

integrated code content in the CBA, which presents an opportunity of creation of

associational power at the shop-floor level. The potential for increased associational

power needs to be seen in relation to the lack of market place bargaining power in terms

of the “slack” labour market and the lack of employment security in Kenya. This poses a

38

serious challenge to the creation of associational power at the shop-floor level. However,

the evidence of constructive cooperation between NGO´s and KPAWU members at the

farm and branch level shows union membership increase and progress for the creation

of associational power in the sector.

A more general challenge is the donor dependency of the NGO´s and the short-term

interventions of their projects. The organizations landscape has changed over the last

fifteen years since the first labour campaigns and it has seen a decline in CSO activity

within the sector, especially in relation to the international NGO´s engagement.

The engagement of the latter seems to have shifted towards more concrete project

implementation and less research and advocacy. The collapse of the HEBI and the

dispute on the legal status of KFHAWU represents obvious obstacles for the realization

of the potential of associational power in the sector.

The undemocratic nature of the NGOs and the democratic deficit in the trade unions

represented in the break out of KEWWO, the undemocratic electoral practices and close

tie with government. These factors challenge the representation of workers interests, the

internal accountability and lastly the ability to secure real improvements for workers.

However, the creation of the KFHAWU and the creation of the new network WERN

represent new forms of labour agency and opportunities for new alliances and

improvements for workers.

The tense relationship between the NGOs and the trade unions and the critique outlined

represent serious challenge to the creation of fruitful cooperation including a clear

division of tasks between the different actors. At the same time this impacts negatively

on the opportunities for labour to utilize the increase in the structural power. If the

negative environment does not improve it will be difficult to utilize the marketplace

bargaining power and the workplace bargaining power identified. It needs associational

power to utilize the increased skill level, to take advantage of the perishable nature of the

39

commodity and the tightly controlled growing and transport processes. Associational

power is the foundation that will allow workers to utilize the tendency towards more

captive governance, relational and elements of modular governance structures in the

Kenya-UK strand of the chain.

The changes in the organizational landscape over time show a decline in the

associational power of workers and real tensions between the major labour actors in

Kenya, which poses a real risk that the increases in the structural power of the workers

will not be effectively utilized in the future to the benefit of the cut-flower workers.

40

Bibliography

Andersen, Kristian Bruun & Wambutsi, Selina Omwaka (2013) ` The challenges and opportunities for organising labour in the Kenyan flower industry´ Project paper submitted to the Department of Society and Globalisation, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Available from: http://rudar.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/13855/1/The%20challenges%20and%20opportuni

ties%20for%20organising%20labour%20in%20the%20Kenyan%20flower%20industry%

20by%20Kristian%20B.A%20and%20Selina.O.W.pdf [Assessed: the 15th of August

2014]

Atwoli, Francis (2008)`Kenya: Unions Have Lived Up to Their Calling´ Daily Nation on

the Web, 10th of May 2008, Avaliable from:

http://allafrica.com/stories/200805120151.html [Assessed: the 6th of August 2014]

Barrientos, Stephanie, Dolan, Catharine, and Tallontire, Anne (2003) ‘A Gendered Value Chain Approach to Codes of Conduct in African Horticulture’, World Development 31, 9: 1511-1526

Barrientos, Stephanie & Smith, Sally (2007) `Do workers benefit from ethical trade?´ Assessing codes of labour practice in global production systems. Third World Quarterly 28, 4: 713–729 Bénédicte Brahic, Marta Medusa Olaiya, Susie Jabcobs, Rachel English (2011)

`Organising Women Workers in the agribusiness Sector: Case studies from East Africa´

Labour, Capital and Society 44:1: 70-97

Chege, Jacob (2012) `Value Addition in Coffee Industry in Kenya: Lessons from Cut Flower Sector´, ICBE-RF Research Report No. 21/12, Investment Climate and Business Environment Research Fund, Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), Nairobi, Kenya Available from: http://trustafrica.net/documents/USE%20THIS%20Chege%20Final%20research%20report-2.pdf [Assessed: the 15th of September 2014]

Chen, Martha, R. Jhabvala, R. Kanbur & C. Richards (eds.)(2007) `Membership-based

organisations of the poor: concepts, experiences and policy´, in: Chen, Martha, R.

Jhabvala, R. Kanbur & C. Richards (eds.) Membership-Based Organizations of the Poor.

Routledge Studies in Development Economics, Chapter 1, pp. 3-21 Routledge, New York

41

Dey, Krishno & Westendorff, David (1996) `Their choice or yours, Global forces or

local voices´ UNRISD Discussion Paper 79, United Nations Research Institute for

Social Development, Geneva, Switzerland, Available from:

http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/httpNetITFramePDF?ReadForm&paren

tunid=BF53D70DCEBC01DA80256B6500503758&parentdoctype=paper&netitpath=8

0256B3C005BCCF9/%28httpAuxPages%29/BF53D70DCEBC01DA80256B65005037

58/$file/dp79.pdf [Assessed: the 14th of September 2014]

Dolan, Catharine, Opondo, Maggie and S. Smith (2005) Gender, Rights and Participation in the Kenya Cut Flower Industry, Report No. 2768. Chatham: Natural Resources Institute

English, Rachel (2007) `Promoting Women Workers’ Rights in African Horticulture, Overview of research into conditions on horticulture farms in Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania

and Uganda´ Women Working Worldwide, Manchester

Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) (2005) ‘Addressing Labour Practices on Kenyan Flower

Farms’, Report of ETI Involvement 2002-2004 Ethical Trading Initiative, London

Fashoyin, Tayo (2010) `Collective bargaining and employment relations in Kenya´

Working Paper No. 13, International Labour Office, Geneva

Gereffi, Gary (1994) ‘The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains: How U.S. Retailers Shape Overseas Production Networks’, in Gary Gereffi and M. Korzeniewicz (eds), Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism,Westport: Praeger, Chapter 5, pp. 95–122. Gereffi, Gary, Humphrey John, Sturgeon Timothy (2005) ‘The governance of global value chains’, Review of International Political Economy 12:1: 78-104 Gibbon, Peter and Lazaro, Evelyne (2010) ` Agro-foods standards and Africa: an

introduction` in P. Gibbon, E. Lazaro and S. Ponte, eds. Global trade and agro-food

standards: challenges for Africa. London: Palgrave, Chapter 1, pp. 1-20

Gibbon, Peter & Riisgaard, Lone (2014) `A new system of labour management in African Large-scale Agriculture?´Journal of Agrarian Change 14: 1: 94–128

42

Hale, Angela & Opondo Maggie (2005) `Humanising the Cut Flower Chain: Confronting the Realities of Flower Production for Workers in Kenya´, Antipode 37: 301-323

Jordhus-Lier, David Christoffer (2010): `Moments of resistance: the struggle against informalization in Cape Town´ , in Lindell, Ilda: `Africa’s informal workers, Collective agency, Allicances and Transnational organising in Urban Africa´, Zed Books, New York, Chapter 6, pp. 115-129

Kenya Human Rights Commission (2002) `Exposing the soft belly on the multinational

beast: The struggle for workers´ rights at Del Monte Kenya´. Nairobi, Kenya Human

Rights Commission

Kenya Human Rights Commission (2008) ‘Vision 2012 Towards Enhancing

Community-Driven Human Rights-centered governance: Strategic Plan 2004-2008,

Nairobi, Kenya Human Rights Commission

Kenya Human Rights Commission (2012) ‘Wilting in Bloom: The Irony of Women

Labour Rights in the Cut-flower Sector in Kenya’, Nairobi, Kenya Human Rights

Commission

Kenya Human Rights Commission (2014) ‘Goal-Enhanced Human Rights-Centred Government at all levels: Strategic Plan 2014-2018, Nairobi, Kenya Human Rights Commission

Lindell, Ilda (2010) ` Introduction: the changing politics of informality- collective

organizing, alliances and scale of engagement´, in in Lindell, Ilda: `Africa’s informal

workers, Collective agency, Allicances and Transnational organising in Urban Africa´, Zed Books,

New York, Chapter 1, pp. 1-33

Mitullah, Winnie (2010) ` Informal workers in Kenya and transnational organising:

networking and leveraging recourses ´ in: Lindell, Ilda Africa’s informal workers, Collective

agency, Allicances and Transnational organising in Urban Africa, Zed Books, New York,

Chapter 10, pp.184-225

Morser, Anna and McRae, Simon (2007) `Growing Pains, The human costs of the cut-flowers in the British Supermarkets´ War On Want, London. Available at: http://www.waronwant.org/attachments/Growing%20Pains.pdf [Assessed: the 20th of August 2014]

43

Mwanzia, Joel Nthei (2007) `Exploring NGOs partnership with Trade unions: The case

of Commercial, Plantation and Textile Unions in Kenya´, In partial fulfilment of the

requirements for obtaining the degree of Masters of Arts in Development Studies,

Specialization: Human Resources and Employment (HRE), Institute of Social Studies,

The Hague, The Netherlands, Available from: http://thesis.eur.nl/pub/8246/

[Assessed: the 14th of September 2014]

Omosa, Mary, Mike Morris, Adrienne Martin, Ben Mwarania, Valerie Nelson

(Unknown) Briefing Paper No.2: `Assessing the Social Impact of Codes of Practice in

the Kenyan Cut Flower Industry´ Natural Ressource Institute. Available from:

http://projects.nri.org/nret/final_kenya_briefing_paper.pdf [Assessed: the 14th of

September 2014]

Opondo, Maggie (2006) Emerging Corporate Social Responsibility in Kenya’s Cut Flower Industry Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press. Available from: http://www.unisa.ac.za/contents/colleges/col_econ_man_science/ccc/docs/Opondo.pdf [Assessed: the 15th of September 2014] Opondo, Mary Magdalene (2013) `Trade policy in the cut flower industry in Kenya´ Working Paper, University of Nairobi, Available from: http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke:8080/xmlui/handle/11295/40111?show=full [Assessed: the 9th of September 2014].

Owino, Joseph Ogutu (2013)`The life and times of Kathini Maloba-Caines: 1952-´

M.A. project paper submitted to the Department of History and Archaeology in partial

fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Masters of Arts Degree in History,

University of Nairobi, Available from:

http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/63441/OGUTU%20JOSEPH

%20OWINO%20FINAL%20PROJECT.pdf?sequence=3 [Assessed: the 6th of August

2014]

Pinto, Cabral (2008)`Kenya: Labour Movement Needs Urgent Fundamental Reforms´ Opinion, Daily Nation on the Web, 3rd of May 2008, Available from: http://allafrica.com/stories/200805020939.html [Assessed: the 6th of August 2014]

Pollin, Robert, Mwangi wa Githinji, James Heintz (2007) `An Employment-Targeted

Economic Program for Kenya´, Political Economy research Institute (PERI), USA

44

Prag, Ebbe (2010) `Women leaders and the sense of power: clientelism and citizenship at

the Dankopa market in Cotonou, Benin´ in in Lindell, Ilda: `Africa’s informal workers,

Collective agency, Allicances and Transnational organising in Urban Africa´, Zed Books, New

York, Chapter 3, pp. 65-85

Riisgaard, Lone (2007) What’s in it for Labour? Private social standards in the cut flower

industries of Kenya and Tanzania. DIIS Working Paper 2007:16. Copenhagen: Danish

Institute for International Studies.

Riisgaard, Lone (2008) `Localizing Private social Standards: Standard initiatives in Kenya cut Flowers´ DIIS Working Paper 2008: 20 Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Riisgaard, L., 2009a. ‘Global Value Chains, Labour Organization and Private Social Standards: Lessons from East African Cut Flower Industries’. World Development 37, 2: 326–40

Riisgaard, Lone (2009b)`How the market for standards shapes the market for goods: sustainability standards and value chain governance in the cut flower industry´. DIIS Working Paper 2009:07. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Riisgaard, Lone (2011) ‘Towards More Stringent Sustainability Standards? Trends in the Cut Flower Industry’. Review of African Political Economy, 38,129: 435–53. Riisgaard, Lone and Hammer, Nikolaus (2011) ‘Prospects for Labour in Global Value Chains: Labour Standards in the Cut Flower and Banana Industries’ British Journal of Industrial Relations 49,1: 168–190 Selwyn, Ben (2007). ‘Labour Process and Workers' Bargaining Power in Export Grape Production, North East Brazil’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 7,4: 526 – 553. Silver, Beverly (2003) Forces of Labour: Workers Movements and Globalization Since 1870, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Tallontire Anne, Barrientos Stephanie, Dolan Catharine, Smith, Sally (2005) `Reaching the Marginalised? Gender Value Chains and ethical Trade in African Horticulture´, Development in practice 15, 3: 559-571

Wright, Erik Olin (2000) `Working-Class Power, Capitalist-Class Interests, and Class Compromise´American Journal of Sociology 105, 4: 957-1002

45

Internet sources

Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) website (2014) Affiliates. Available from: http://cotu-kenya.org/affiliates/ [Assessed: the 14th of September 2014]

Encyclopædia Britannica (2014) Available from: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/210795/floriculture [Assessed: the 9th of September 2014].

ETI website (2014) About ETI, Available from: http://www.ethicaltrade.org/eti-board-members [Assess: 13th of August 2014]

Kenya Flower council webpage (2014) Available from: http://www.kenyaflowercouncil.org/index.php/89-the-flower-industry-in-kenya, [Assessed: the 7th of September 2014] Trading Economics website (2014) Kenya Economic Indicators. Available from: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/kenya/indicators [Assessed: the 8th of September 2014] War on Want webpage (2014a) Overseas work, Food Sovereignty. Family Farmers in Kenya. Available from: http://www.waronwant.org/overseas-work/food-sovereignty/farmers-in-kenya [Assessed: the 14th of September 2014] War on Want webpage (2014b) Overseas work, Informal economy, Street vendors in Kenya. Available from: http://www.waronwant.org/overseas-work/informal-economy/street-vendors-in-kenya [Assessed: the 14th of September 2014]

Workers´ Rights Watch webpage (2014a) About us. Available from: http://www.workersrightwatch.org/index.php/about-us/3-vision [Assessed: the 15th of September 2014] Workers´ Rights Watch webpage (2014b) Research. Available from: http://www.workersrightwatch.org/index.php/research [Assessed: the 15th of

September 2014]

46

Appendix 1

Interview transcription of the interview with Marta Medusa Olaiya

Development Officer, Women Working Worldwide

E-mail: marta.women-w@mmu.ac.uk

The Interview was conducted the 27th August, 2014

Interviewer is: Grith Andersen, master student at School of African and Oriental studies,

in MSc Labour, Social Movements and Development.

Interviewer is abbreviated: G

Interviewee Marta Medusa, abbreviated: M

Only the section used in the thesis are transcribed as part of the documentation of the

empirical data collected for this thesis entitled: Sources of Workers´ power in the Cut-

flower industry in Kenya. The audio file is attached as full documentation.

Interview

M: 00:55: I have been with WWW for the past 4 ½ years so some of the questions that

you raised I do not really know the answer to, particularly the KEWWO questions

because I was not there yet. My understanding is that there have been some financial

problems with KEWWO, with the project which I think was funded by Comic Relife.

And that is why we are not really kind of working with them much anymore (1.31).

M: 1.31: but we are working with another labour rights organization which is called

Workers Rights Watch (hereafter abbreviated WRW).

G: I know WRW, I have heard about them, but is it a coalition of NGOs or it is one?

M: 1:55: No, it is one organization, but basically there is a loose coalition of Human

Rights and Labour rights organizations in Kenya, and WRW is part of it. And in a way

this kind of informal coalition has been encouraged by HIVOS as well. By this Dutch

47

organization that has a strong presence in East Africa. But any details on that I will be

more than happy to put you in contact directly with Eunice who has a tremendous

experience she has been working in this field for a very long time; I mean the

organizations is relatively young, but she has worked previously with other strong labour

rights organizations like Kenya Human Rights Commission, so she might be able to give

you quite strong insight into some of these issues that you are interested in.

G: 3:25: I was wondering because I know these things go terribly fast and I will ask you

permission if it is okay that I record the interview?

M: 3:35: That is okay.

G: So the interview will be recorded and it is for the purpose of research for my

masters´ thesis, my Masters in Labour, Social Movement and Development at SOAS

University.

G:4.33: I have just a few questions about WWW, what are the number of staff?

M: 4:41: At the moment there are two members of staff. Julie is on a full time basis she

manages the project on living wage which is which is funded by a Dutch trade union

federation, which is called FMB. She is also involved in fundraising, in the development

of fundraising proposals.

Then it is my self, Marta, and I work with WRW and partially with GHOWERN which

is a regional network of trade unions and labour rights organizations which work in the

horticulture sector. And I work part time. And then there are two other people who are

collaborating one is an admin person and one is a finance worker.

G: 5:40: Can I ask you a question just related to that regional network in the horticulture

sector?

M: 5:45: sure

G: 5:46: that is in East Africa?

M: 5:49: Yes that is right, it is in East Africa. That was created several years ago with the

support from Oxfam and pulls together previous project partners from Ethiopia, Kenya,

Tanzania, Uganda. And basically, initially it has been a sort of platform for sharing

learning from projects and you know so coordinator and project teams and

representatives I think from women’s committees in some cases (6:23). Anyway it was a

platform for these people to come together to sort of discuss challenges and exchange

48

good practices. (6:35) and now it sort of expanded a bit and it is also taken on some

advocacy functions. Advocating regional campaign and researching regional industry

stakeholder and actually government stakeholders too on behalf on the single members

as one voice (7:00). It has been a bit difficult to the governing members to meet on a

regular basis because you know these meetings are quite expensive and the internet

connection has not been tremendously good so skype has not really been an alternative

yet. (7:20) but at least the GHOWERN women’s committee which is a kind of sub-

committee has managed over the last couple of years to meet quite regularly.

G: 7:32: I was informed, because I did a small interview with a scholar from Denmark,

who has been working on the horticulture sector in Kenya and she was actually

mentioning this kind of network, but she was not sure whether it came out of the

project that women working Worldwide funded, the `Promotion of women workers

rights in the African Horticulture sector´

M: 8:02: yes, it came out of that project, that’s right. (8:06) I think of the second project.

The one that was funded by Oxfam, not the Comic Relife, and that ended in 2011.

Yes, as I mentioned the project had opportunities for the members to come together

and discuss issues and then there was a strong kind of push, a drive both from the

members and from the funders to actually in a way institutionalized these meetings and

create a network. And what I get from members themselves is that the kind of national

level advocacy targeting governments or industry stakeholder depending on what is

actually the case could be strengthen significantly if there was an additional pressure at

the regional, (9:05)meaning East African level. And that is what GHOWERN is trying to

fulfill.

G: I am very happy to know that this regional network exists and that it came out of a

project.

M: 10:29: What I could do is also to put you in contact with Flavia, who is GHOWERN

women’s committee coordinator. Basically her and the chair of the network are the two

really active members of the organization. She would be able to brief you on some of the

activities that they have been involved in.

M: 11.40: The other thing that I could do is send you a report. There is a report from

one of the activities that was done as GHOWERN women’s committee last year. Which

was sort of a coalition building trip to gather support by different stakeholders for the

support of GHOWERNs work on sexual harassment at the workplace.

49

M: 12: 22: Then the other two activities that the network has been involved in, again it is

on sexual harassment, has been two advocacy meetings one in Arusha and one in Kenya.

In the case of Arusha the target was both the industry stakeholder and East African

community. And these activities revolved around the petition.

M: 13: 07: So there was this petition that calls on different stakeholders to do a number

of actions and this has been presented to the stakeholders. And in the next 6 months we

need to follow up with the stakeholders and find out what has happened and what is not

happening.

M: 13:27: But there is also a stream of work which that have done independently of

women working worldwide, which they have done again with HIVOS. Which revolves

around the review of the legislation in the four countries Ethiopia, Kenya,Tanzania and

Uganda on sexual harassment. They have hired these professors to go through the

legislative framework and identify the gaps and make some suggestions. So now there is

a set of validation meetings in all these four countries to get these stakeholders together

and look at these recommendations and sort of validate these documents. The plan is

that there is going to be a regional advocacy dimension of this work (14:19).

M: 14: 32: So basically just to say that the bulk of work of GHOWERN at the moment

has been around this campaign on sexual harassment. Based on research they have

conducted in 2012. That looked at the magnitude of the problems on a sample of farms.

It was really based on interviews with workers and shop stewards. Trying to understand

what are the factors that responsible, that are contributing to sexual harassment

continuing to be such a big problem despite the fact that previous projects also focused

on this issue (15:18). So what the outstanding challenges are. So they have complied the

findings from the four countries and they have started to mobilize important

stakeholders about the situation and ask what are we going to do about that? (15:39).

G: 16:06: I am not really sure about the funding of WWW. Because you do projects and

they are funded by individual donors, but who funds the actual running of your

organization?

M: 16:20: Well that is a very big challenge at the moment. Because in the past we were

able to access project funding and sort of a restricted funding which helped us going, but

that has proved to be increasingly challenging. This is why the organizations have many

less staff now and less programs than in the past. So basically running costs is coved by

the project funding. So obviously they are kept to a very, very low level.

50

M: 17:10: The relationship with HIVOS is a little bit of a complex one. Basically HIVOS

has a number of programs. One program is funding the sexual harassment project.

M: 17:40: Then there is another program that funds partners directly bypassing WWW

and that is the women at work campaign. And that is the budget that has funded their

legal review that I mentioned to you before. (18:00) GHOWERN has worked on sexual

harassment on two different issues one is on the workplace policy, which is the part they

have worked on with WWW through this kind of project and then this kind of work

around the actual law and that is funded by HIVOS directly.

M: 18:59: Not quite. We have a project, there was a project that we proposed to HIVOS

which we received money for, and we receive support both WWW and partners. And

then there is another stream of activities that we have though through with project

partners, but the project was not able to fund. And therefore partners have approached

HIVOS and they were happy to fund it.

G: 20:06: Just to come back to the funding of WWW, primarily your projects have a

small component that funds administration and similar costs and that is how you are

operating at the moment through the different funding that you have.

M: 20:28: That is right.

G: Is explaining what she has research so far about the relationship between WWW and

KEWWO

G: 21:55: Do you have any additional information or anything you can add?

M: 22:05: Not really, as far as I know Angela Hale was actively involved in Kenya and

the research findings fed into a very very big campaign both in the UK and in Kenya.

Basically they exposed retailers and they exposed the nasty conditions that workers

where working in on those farms (22.26). And they know that this has pushed, that

information has been shared with retailers and that pushed retailers to go and actually

organize a trip to Kenya to verify themselves what the conditions where. And as a result

of this an organization was set up in Kenya that is called HEBI. And there was a base

code and it was a kind of forum for participatory social auditing in the horticulture

sector (23:00). Which obviously was a multi-stakeholder initiative (23:05). And then

HEBI has collapsed. Now how much of this was strictly a project and how much was it

part of our general campaign I would not be able to tell you, I am sorry.

51

G: 23:07: It has been verified from other sources, especially the KHRC that HEBI has

collapsed. So you don´t know the reasons to why HEBI has collapsed?

M: 23:41: I think, have a word with Eunice about that, she has very strong views about

why it went wrong. She was a very active supporter of this initiative. She found that the

base code that was developed was properly one of the most comprehensive.

G: 24:02: Could you assist me, Eunice is?

M: 24:06: Eunice is the person I mentioned before. Is the coordinator of Workers Rights

Watch. Which I can, which I will put you in contact with.

G: 26:50: I was wondering if you could tell me, just briefly tell me WWW and your stand

on the private social standards as a tool to improve these workers conditions just in

general.

M: 27:40: When you say private social standards do you mean base codes, social codes,

codes of conduct and all the rest.

G: 27:49: Exactly

M: 27:50: Now you might have read, WWW have published a lot of very skeptical

literature around codes of conduct not be tremendously effective in addressing womens

concerns at work. (28:16) the work that we do with project partners do not really use

base codes very much as a tool to get key stakeholders on the negotiation table (28:28).

The way it has been operating has been much more about workers empowerment by

means of training and by means of research especially. So using research to raise

awareness on the severity of the issues on the farms, and using this relationship with

WWW to say look, this information has been shared with your buyers, your retailers and

that has sort of been and strong push to get, especially suppliers to the negotiation table

(29:09). And key improvements has been made, there has been a lot of progress in terms

of increasing wages, and in the reduction in the casualization of labour, and on many

different parameters. (29:34). With big challenges yet, still, one additional aspect, in the

case of Kenya in particularly. What is, what seems to have impacted about it, yet the

process is not over we are just in the beginning, that the research was been instrumental

to also raise awareness among the certifications, certifications bodies and in this way we

got them on the table (30:10) and they are playing a significant role in the kind of dialog

with suppliers about how to address the issues that were identified in the research. So

one particular piece of work that all of these stakeholder are working on together is the

development of a kind of model, workplace policy (30:38) which would be adopted by

52

the industry. Which seeks to address the vary issues that workers have raised, regarding

sexual harassment. The work is sort of narrowly focusing on sexual harassment. And in

that sense certification has proven to be an important entry point to get suppliers

engaged, because there would be multiple sources of pressure on them.

M: 31:18: Back to your original question on the codes themselves, from my little

knowledge, it has not really been a very strong instrument if anything because they seem

not to be tremendously specific, so you see what I mean. So it has been difficult to

engage them on that. But certainly the fact that we have been part of the ethical trading

initiative has been very important (31.50). Because that creates an opportunity for

organizations like us to have meeting with the buyers, with supermarkets that source

from partner countries. To share with them the research findings and discuss with them

strategies to try to address the concerns that where raised by workers (32:23). So in a

sense it is not necessarily the codes itself, but it is their membership to the Ethical

trading initiative and that the membership entails that some basic labour rights have to

be adhered too. (32:49) But overall, perhaps things will change over time, but the bulk of

change, the big change, drive for change has been very much in more in the partnering

countries much more than within the Ethical Trading Initiative, I mean in a way – that is

my opinion, not really the opinion of the WWW (33: 13). (33:14) but the biggest in terms

of evaluations, projects or past projects what has proved to be a big drive for change has

been the strength of the partners and their effective use of the research findings to build

political commitment. Commitment on the part of suppliers to address the kind of

labour rights violations that where researched (33:49).

G: 34:56: I just have a couple of more questions, I don´t know if you can answer them,

because they are more related to the reasons why WWW are not directly partnering with

trade unions in the African horticulture industry, in Kenya in particular?

M; 35:36: Yeah, the reason is that, I mean the relationship with Kenya Plantation and

Agricultural Workers Union (KPAWU) has been quite complex. And the labour rights

organizations relationship with KAPWU itself is not super easy yet. (36:34) So that is

why basically we are working with labour rights organizations. I think in the past when

Angela Hale (former director of WWW) worked with Kenya Women Workers

Organizations (KEWWO) and revealed conditions for the women in the farms, I think

this displaced KPAWU quite significantly because in a way it was a kind of indirect

critique of KPAWU and it´s own ability to actually negotiate improvement on behalf on

the workers. So since then the relationship has not been very very good (36:49). With

COTU I don´t think that there is has been that problem at all, but in general terms over

53

the last couple of projects WWW has not worked in Kenya. (37:08) and we are now

working again in Kenya and we are trying to build again a relationship with KPAWU. In

fact the relationship on the shop floor level is very good. You know, KPAWU shop

floors, branch secretaries and shop stewards have been involved in the training program

that Workers Rights Watch has delivered, but at the leadership level know you still a lot

more needs to be done. So there has been attempts to engage more systematically with

the leadership with KPAWU, but it is not yet very satisfactory.

G: 37:50: Yeah, I think you just confirmed the research that I have been doing.

M: 38:18: My understanding is that it is not necessarily between the trade unions and the

labour rights organizations, but it is very much the leader Athole (38:31) who has a

strong reluctance to operate with labour rights organizations, which actually feels like

these organizations are a bit stepping on, you see what I mean? These general tensions

which have never been resolved (32:50), but again as mentioned my understanding is

that actually at the shop floor level it has been good, with some NGO´s it does not really

represent any problem.

M: 39:23: Yeah, you might also be aware that there is a new union, a union that is

supposed to organize flower workers. Has trying to get registered, it was registered and

then I think KPAWU appealed to it. So the tribunal, the industrial tribunal has to make a

final decision on that. (39:44) so if the new union comes into existence that would

change quite dramatically the balance of power because this new unions actually comes

out of a general civil society movement and it has very good relationship with NGO´s.

KPAWU would be challenged because of course the purpose of the new union would

be very much to eat on their (KPAWU) constituency (40:30).

The rest of the interview regards requests for publications and additional reports and

contact details and steps to contact the people mentioned in the interview.

54

Appendix 2

Questions send to Dr. Maggi Opondo

55

Appendix 3

Response from Dr. Maggi Opondo, the 21st of August, 2014

56

Appendix 4

Response from Martin Gemezell the 13th of August, 2014

Senior International Programmes Officer (Sweatshops and Plantations), War on Want

57

Appendix 5

Questions and response from Eunice M. Waweru, the 29th of August, 2014

Program Co-ordinator / General Secretary

Workers Rights Watch

Tel +254 20 260 5660 / +254 775 216 853 / +254 735 809 614

Skype: eunice.waweru4

58

59

Appendix 5

Questions and response from Eunice M. Waweru, the 29th of August, 2014

Program Co-ordinator / General Secretary

Workers Rights Watch

Tel +254 20 260 5660 / +254 775 216 853 / +254 735 809 614

Skype: eunice.waweru4

60

Appendix 6

Questions send to COTU, the 29th of August, 2014