Sonypinto

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Contents

Preface i

Introduction iii

1. The Historical Background to the Founding of the Nguyen Dynasty, 1428-1802 1

2. Vietnam and the West, 1802-1858 13

3. The Franco-Spanish Invasion and the Treaty of Sai-gon, 1858-1862 39

4. The Hue Court and the Southern Nghia-Quan, 1862-1868 57

5. The Hue Court and Anti-Catholic Activism, 1862-1868 71

6. Hue's Policy of Peace and the "Francis Garnier Affair,"

1873-1874 89

Conclusion 121

Notes 125

Selected Bibliography 151

ii

Preface

The research for this book was carried out during 1983-1988 in Paris, France. During those years, I received generous support from the Fullbright-Hays Foundation; the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation; the Franco-American Commission for Educational Ex- change; the Social Science Research Council; and the Alliance Française de New York. I thank them for their aid. This support does not, of course, imply any responsibility on their parts for the finished product or any of the views expressed within. All scholars are indebted to their former professors. D. R. Sar Desai was always patient, professional, helpful, and inspirational. I also would like to thank also Professors Philip Huang, Edward Berenson, Robert Wohl, and E. Bradford Burns. I want to express my gratitude to the many Vietnamese who pa- tiently worked long hours in teaching me their language: the staff at the Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Section, especially Do Huu Hien and Nguyen Quy Vi; Hoai-Lien Le van; Nguyen Kim Duy; and Tran Thi Nguyet Hien. I wish also to express my appreciation to Father Anthony Brzoska, Dean of Liberal Arts at Loyola Marymount University, for approving the subsidization of one of the later drafts of this work during my service there in 1989-1990. Margaret Edwards of L. M. U. was a marvelous copy editor and word processor. I acknowledge the invaluable assistance provided me by my editors at Praeger, particularly Dan Eades and Alda Trabucchi. Finally, I thank my parents for their unflagging support throughout the entire project.

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Introduction

Historiographical essays by Milton Osborne and Jean Chesneaux have described the growth of a tradition of French scholarship on Vietnam that is characterized by a "Franco-centric bias." 1 This bias can be considered in terms of the values that inspire and permeate the historical study, the focus or primary subject of the work, and the selection of source material. The values of the French authors, especially those who treated the nineteenth century, were influenced by the prevalent, self-reinforcing colonial attitudes about European cultural superiority and the concomitant "civilizing mission" of France. Brilliant exceptions such as Charles Maybon and Leopold Cadière aside, the French soldiers, colonial administrators, and missionaries who initiated Western historical investigation of Vietnam generally made themselves the focus of their own histories. The dynamic force behind Vietnamese historical development was usually seen to be the activity of colonial enterprises and the functioning of colonial institutions, with the periodization often determined by the succession of gouverneurs-généraux.2 The Vietnamese people themselves enter these histories only insofar as they hinder or advance colonial policies, to be blamed or praised accordingly. Source materials deemed relevant were sought in the public and private archives and records of the colonial government and its officials and in the local and European press. These were French-language sources for the history of a "French Indochina," a discipline that Chesneaux states remained "the privileged domain of French historians" for almost eighty years, from the installation of the colonial regime until the emergence of two independent Vietnams in the 1950s.3 As in other recently decolonized countries, a renaissance of historical writing followed political independence in Vietnam. Although Vietnam's extended post-colonial political division produced two antagonistic historical schools, which may conveniently be termed those of "Ha-noi" and "Sai-gon," the new Vietnamese historians are unanimous in rejecting the "Franco-centric bias" that had dominated and still characterizes much French historical writing on Vietnam. These Vietnamese historians initiated a critical questioning of the

iv

colonial values of the early French authors; they emphasized an "Asia-centric" approach to Vietnamese history; and they based their research on indigenous as well as French sources. Some French and other Western scholars have followed the Vietnamese historians in this new orientation. In regard to the study of the colonial period, the new emphasis is described by Chesneaux as follows:

Today one conceives Vietnamese history, including the colonial period, in Vietnamese terms. It is considered also in its continuity and is thus linked at once to Vietnamese national history before the conquest and to post-colonial history. This by no means signifies that the colonial domination in all its political, economic, social and ideological repercussions should be neglected by the historian of modern Viet- nam. It merely means - and this is fundamental - that the colonial regime itself should be studied first of all in its relationship to the Viet- namese people.4

Western scholars who have produced "Asia-centric" modern Vietnamese histories based on indigenous documentation have generally focused on questions pertaining to the historical origins of the nationalist and communist move ments, an interest inspired by the continuing Indochina conflicts. Outstanding examples are David Marr's two studies, Vietnamese Anti-Colonialism, 1885-1925 , and Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945 , William Duiker The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam , and Alexander Woodside Community and Revo- lution in Modern Vietnam . The nineteenth century has received considerably less attention. For this period the three most important works are Marr Viet- namese Anti-Colonialism, 1885-1925 , Woodside Vietnam and the Chinese Mo- del , and Milton Osborne The French Presence in Cochin China and Cambodia: Rule and Response (1859-1905) . Marr's monograph treats the colonial conquest briefly, but his in-depth analysis begins with the Can vuong movement (that is, after the flight of Ham-nghi in July of 1885); the author emphasizes the changing political fortunes and turbulent intellectual currents of the nascent natio-nalism after the turn of the century. Woodside's work covers the reigns of the first three Nguyen emperors, Gia-long (1802-1820), Minh-menh (1820-1841), and Thieu-tri (1841-1848). The analytical focus is on their creative transfer of the "Chinese model" of political organization and Confucian civilization to the Vietnamese polity. The question of Vietnam's confrontation with French imperialism enters the work only peripherally. Osborne's book indeed covers the period of the conquest, but he concentrates on the interaction between the French-colonial administration and Viet namese society in the areas conquered by France. Western scholarship has yet to produce an "Asia-centric" work on the Tu-duc reign (October 29, 1848 to July 19, 1883) based on a detailed study of indigenous documentation. This lacuna has been decried by two eminent authorities: "The long reign of the Tu-duc emperor…has been neglected by scholars," Alexander Woodside remarks; and R . B. Smith has expressed wonder that, despite the "substantial volume of material relating to his reign," this monarch "has been remarkably neglected by Western scholars." 5 The historiographical conse-

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quences of this omission are substantial, for many of the essential questions relating to the French conquest of Vietnam have not been treated at all by Western historians, or they have been the exclusive domain of the colonial scholars whose works were influenced by the "Franco-centric bias" criticized by Osborne and Chesneaux. Summarizing the regnant themes among French authors who published works between 1860 and 1890 that treat the conquest, Chesneaux observed that:

the same postulates appear with some faint differences: that of the legitimacy of the conquest first of all…; that of "Asiatic treachery" which justifies beforehand all of the "preventative" violations of past agreements with the government of Hue, whether it be de la Gran- dière's occupation of western Cochinchina in 1867, Francis Garnier's attack on Tonking in 1873, or the Hue affair in 1885; and finally that of the episodic and illusory character of Vietnamese resistance.6

Chesneaux emphasizes that the influence of colonial values on historical interpretation has outlived the regime that nurtured them:

These postulates are equally adopted by the few general surveys of the conquest published rather later…This brings one back to the point that many of the problems relating to the conquest still await their historian.7

The present study seeks to provide a partial corrective for the problems of historical interpretation resulting from the neglect by modern Western scholars of this decisive period in Vietnamese history. The focus is the official Viet- namese response to French intervention during the years 1862-1874, that is, the period during which the French established a foothold in southern Vietnam (1862-1867) and extended their protectorate over the North and Center (1873-1874). The study counters the "Franco-centric bias" of French missionaries, colo nial officials and authors, and subsequent Western scholars by confronting their interpretations with evidence from primary Vietnamese documentation, most of which has yet to be utilized by Western resear chers for a history of this period. The works of two Vietnamese Catholic authors - Phan Phat Huon and Nicole-Dominique Le - are likewise to be criticized when it is evident that their reliance on the French missionary sources and/or their failure to critically evaluate them has led to a reiteration of the errors of the early French authors; this occurs most noticeably when they discuss the question of Hue's treatment of the Catholics after the signing of the 1862 treaty. The present work argues that, during the 1862-1874 period, the Hue court, consistent with a "policy of peace" that developed in response to the Franco-Spanish invasion of 1858-1862, faithfully executed the provisions of the 1862 treaty in the hope of obtaining a peaceful retrocession of the provinces seized by France in 1862 (and 1867). Chapter 1 summarizes the historical background to the founding of the Nguyen dynasty in 1802. Chapter 2 analyzes the relations between Vietnam and the West from 1802 until just before the Franco-Spanish invasion of 1858. Chapter 3 considers the reasons for which the Hue court offered France the

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concessions contained in the 1862 agreement, and it argues that the responsibility for this decision lay not only with Vietnamese emissaries Phan Thanh Gian and Lam Duy Hiep but also with the Tu-duc Emperor himself. The study then offers new interpretations of four related issues or events which are significant for understanding the Hue court's policy toward France during the 1862-1874 period: the relationship of the Hue court to the southern anti-French resistance, which is analyzed in Chapter 4; the reaction of the Hue court to anti-Catholic activities in the still-independent areas of Vietnam, which is the subject of Chapter 5; the reasons for the French attack of 1873 and the Hue court' s response to it, which are treated in Chapter 6. Emphasis for documentation is given to the official publications of the Nguyen dynasty, which were consulted in the romanized versions published in Ha-noi and Sai-gon after 1954. These documents require some introductory comments. Because of the Confucian conception of history as the repository of political experience, Sino-Vietnamese political elites cultivated a highly developed historical consciousness. The Nguyen dynasty, despite its relatively limited period of sovereignty compared with previous ruling houses such as the Ly (1010-1225), the Tran (1225-1428), and the Le (981-1010, 1428-1788), was by far the most prolific patron of historical research and publication, both as heir to the historical records of previous dynasties and in recording the events of its own age.8 Works published under official auspices were normally the responsibility of the Quoc su quan or National Historical Bureau, constructed inside the Forbidden City of Hue in 1821 under Minh-menh, to which additional buildings were added in 1824 under Thieu-tri, and to which a printing house was appended by Tu-duc in 1849. The main tasks of the National His- torical Bureau's staff were to assemble documentation for the writing of imperial histories that upon receiving imperial approbation, were cut into printing blocks.9 The principal compilations of the National Historical Bureau used in the present study are the Thanh che van tam tap (Collected Writings of His Majesty) , the Dai Nam thuc luc (Veritable Records of the Great South) , and the Quoc trieu chanh bien toat yeu (Summary Political Records of the National Court); the Summary Political Records are the compendium (one volume) of the more complete (thirty-eight volumes) Veritable Records . The Dai Nam thuc luc are the records of the daily administrative activity of the Hue court. The most important documents cited are excerpts from the chau ban , the documents (ban ) that passed between the emperor and his Noi cac (Grand Secretariat) . These documents were often marked with the emperor's comments written in the special minium ink (chau ) used only by him. The chau ban were of two sorts: the tau , reports from ministries or departments within Hue or from the provinces; the du and chi , the edicts or decrees that were issued in the emperor's name but were often drafted by the Noi cac . Two copies were made of each document: One was sent to the Quoc su quan to document official histories, the other to the ministry or official concerned. The original was retained by the Noi cac for its own archives. 10 The chau ban that were published in the Veritable Records and in the Summary Political Records contain detailed

vii

descriptions and analyses of the provincial economic, social, and political events as well as the responses of the emperors and their advisors. These histories further inform us of the details of imperial appointments, demotions, promo- tions, rewards, and punishments of officials, and of the emperors' daily activities and conversations. Yet these histories remain underexploited by Western scholars, who do not always appreciate their potential. For example, P. J. Honey dismisses the imperial histories with the following pejorative generalizations:

All of these Chanh su have certain grave defects as truthful and useful historical documents. Since all were written by order of a particular dynasty, one of the principal objects of the authors was to please - or at least avoid displeasing - the reigning dynasty… When these chanh su recorded contemporary happenings, they devoted too much space to the relatively unimportant court happenings and to the doings of the emperor, while glossing over or even omitting those happenings which might displease the emperor. These annals tell us very little of the actual conditions of the country, of the everyday life of the people, of trade and many other factors. 11

To be sure, the Quoc su quan historians' criteria for determining the relevance of historical happenings are not those of modern historians. It is nonetheless surprising that a scholar of Honey's status and influence would dismiss so lightly such an important source. Moreover, his comments are so general and so contrary to the contents of the Veritable Records and the Summary Political Records that one must wonder if he has consulted them carefully and extensively. Alexander Woodside, Western scholarship's greatest authority on indigenous Vietnamese documentation for the nineteenth century, offers a more informed, specific, and positive evaluation, describing the Veritable Records as:

the single most important source for early nineteenth-century Viet- namese history… In reading these records, the modern analyst need not tear extensive suppression of evidence. On the whole this was rare. The Veritable Records were propaganda. But they were propaganda of a particular kind, designed more for a small lineal audience of future courts than for a mass audience of the present. The key to the potency of historiographical propaganda in traditional Vietnam was not considered to be manipulation of factual content. Rather, it was considered to be demonstration of imperial form. Therefore, communications from the provinces which described every manner of social and political evil were faithfully recorded. The emperor was supposed to reveal his worth not by suppressing them but by publishing them, answering them, acting upon them and thus transcending them. 12

Tu-duc Thanh che van tam tap belongs to the category of Ngu che or imperial compositions. These included the questions and discussions that the emperor wrote for the civil service examinations, imperial edicts, poetry, and other literary forms. The Tu-duc Emperor has been described as " the most literate

8

and learned of the Nguyen kings," and, as such, his works have a special interest for the historian. The value of these works goes far beyond the sphere of intellectual history because, for example, the Tu-duc Emperor often used his prerogative as examiner and discussant to indoctrinate the civil service examination candidates in the merits of certain policies and the dangers of others. Imperial edicts were also, of course, a direct intervention in the social and political affairs of the land. This source is thus, in R. B. Smith's words, "one of the most important categories of books printed for the imperial library at Hue." 13 French primary sources of course remain essential for the study of the period of the conquest. The most interesting among these are the letters and reports of the French officers who served in Vietnam during the conquest and early colonial period. These were examined in Paris at the Archives Nationales, Section d'Outre-Mer during the years 1983-1985 (the collection has since been moved to Aix-en-Provence and is presently subject to reclassification). In addition, the present work utilizes a number of French-language studies (some of them by Vietnamese authors) that contain extensive citations of the same sort of original French materials. The most useful of these are the following: Vo Duc Hanh, La Place du Catholicisme dans les relations entre la France et le Viet- nam1851-1870 ; Nicole-Dominique Le, Les Missions-Etrangères et la pénétra- tion française au Viet-Nam ; Jean Marquet and Jean Norel, L'Occupation du Ton kin par la France (1873-1874) d'après des documents inédits and Le Drame Tonkinois (1873-1874): Deuxième étude d'après des documents inédits ; Adrien Balny d'Avricourt, L'Enseigne Balny et la conquête du Tonkin: Indochine 1873 . Also, the French sources translated into English and cited by Milton Osborne in his two studies, The French Presence in Cochin China and Cambodia: Rule and Presence (1859-1905) and River Road to China: The Mekong Exploration, 1866-1873 , were useful.

1

1

The Historical Background to the Founding of the Nguyen Dynasty,

1428 - 1802

This chapter reviews the long-term and the immediate historical background to the founding of the Nguyen dynasty in 1802. The specific cultural and institutional origins of the Vietnamese elite's attitudes toward the West and toward Catholicism are outlined. The indigenous Vietnamese as well as the international political context of early missionary penetration into Vietnam are considered. The discussion of the Vietnamese reunification struggle takes note of the European role but argues that the ultimate success of the Nguyen house was determined largely by indigenous factors. Finally, it is emphasized that any European contribution to Nguyen Phuc Anh's success in reunifying Vietnam was of a purely private character, placing the Nguyen founder under no obligation to any European state.

The Vietnamese state known as Dai Viet was ruled, at least nominally, by the princes of the Le family from the fifteenth until the late eighteenth century (1428-1787). This dynasty was founded by Le-loi, a courageous soldier and brilliant administrator who had liberated the country from the domination of the Chinese Ming dynasty. Under the early Le rulers Dai Viet was definitively removed from Chinese political domination, although the Vietnamese learned and retained much from the long years - from 111 B.C. until 39 A.D., from 42 until 186, from 226 until 540, from 603 until 939, and finally for twenty years beginning in 1407 - of Chinese domination, including political institutions, mili tary organization, language and literature of the elite, and intellectual training.1

The "Chinese model" that most influenced the Vietnamese elite at this time was Neo-Confucianism, which was solidly entrenched in China by the early fifteenth century. Under Le Thanh-tong (1460-1497), the Vietnamese elite made Neo- Confucianism the state ideology and began to institutionalize its teachings by establishing the Sinitic bureaucratic system and the Le legal code (Bo luat

2

Hong-duc). 2 The position of the Vietnamese monarch was reinforced by the Chinese political theories: The Vietnamese ruler was henceforth considered to be the Son of Heaven (thien-tu), the recipient of a Heavenly Mandate (thien-menh) to rule the people. This authority, it was believed, could be entrusted to officials who would then govern in the sovereign's name. 3 To disobey the monarch or his officials was to perpetrate an offense against Heaven as well as against Heaven's terrestrial proxy. 4 But a Vietnamese Neo-Confucian ruler also assumed a tremendous responsibility: He had first to insure the military defense and material prosperity of the country, after which he was to attend to the moral education of the people. 5

Non-Confucian doctrines such as Taoism and Buddhism progressively lost their official status and support; they began to be considered as "heterodox doctrines" (ta giao) in juxtaposition to the "orthodox way" (chinh dao) of Confucianism. 6 Confucianism would henceforth attempt to bring its moral vision to local Vietnamese society, which had previously maintained its own cultural patterns. 7 Many ancient and specifically Vietnamese customs came under attack by the official Confucians, who sought to replace them with the practices of the northern neighbor, considered by them to be the perfected customs of the "sages" and the "ancient kings." 8 The cult of the ancestors, however, was treated with greater deference by the Vietnamese Neo-Confucian elite. The worship of ancestors was widely practiced throughout Southeast Asia long before the arrival of foreign religions and political theories such as Budd- hism, Taoism, Islam, and Confucianism. Thus, in order to establish profound roots in Vietnam, Confucianism was obliged to accommodate itself to this indigenous cult, to integrate it, and to make its practice one with the rituals of Confucianism. 9 The manner in which this was to be accomplished was indicated in the Confucian classics themselves, which taught that the properly regulated worship of ancestors by the ruling elite was a means of training the people in the habits of filial piety (hieu), which was considered to be at the root of respect for the monarch and for social hierarchy in general. 10

The Le elite also adopted specifically Chinese attitudes about non-Sinicized peoples. These conceptions are succinctly expressed in the Sino-Viet namese formula, noi ha ngoai di (China at the center, barbarians on the outside). The historical roots of this notion were the Chinese elite's feelings of cultu ral superiority vis-à-vis the seemingly less-civilized peoples who surrounded the Chinese empires. To this way of thinking, the Chinese alone were truly civilized; surrounding peoples were designated as "barbaric," an appellation that was applied to the Vietnamese as well. Nevertheless, Vietnamese Confucians from the Le period onward considered themselves to be noi ha, those at the center of civilization, and they castigated outsiders, be they other Southeast Asians or Europeans, as man di or da man, "barbarians" or "savages."

The assumption was that the "barbarians" were to learn the customs of the "civilized" and not the reverse. 11

The enduring cultural and institutional achievements of the Le founders notwithstanding, the actual power of the Le monarchs had significantly eroded within 100 years after the reigns of Le Thanh-tong and his successor Le Hien-

3

tong. Charles Maybon attributes this loss of effective power by the Le monarchs to the series of incompetent rulers who followed Le Hien-tong. 12 As royal authority became more feeble, the temptation became great for factions to form and cabals to be plotted, particularly among the military-aristocratic families from Thanh-hoa province who had risen to power with Le-loi in 1428. From the 1500s until the late 1700s two such families dominated the political scene in Dai Viet: the Trinh and the Nguyen. After the exile from the capital city of Thang-long of Nguyen Hoang in 1558, a territorial division was established: The Trinh dominated Tonkin and thus controlled the Le court; while the Nguyen ruled the regions on the southern border, which they expanded. The southern borders of Dai.Viet in the early Le period extended only to modern Binh-dinh province, and further southward expansion by the Le or Trinh regimes was blocked by the Nguyen after 1858. It was thus the Nguyen chua (lords) who continued the "Southward March" (nam tien) that, at the expense of the Champa and Khmer kingdoms, carried the Vietnamese down to Ha-tien and Ca-mau on the Gulf of Thailand. 13 Each side justified its opposition to the other with reference to the legitimizing aura of the Le dynasty's authority: The Nguyen accused the Trinh of usurping the authority of the Le monarchs; the Trinh denounced the Nguyen for establishing a competing court and for plotting to overthrow the Le dynasty. 14 The Nguyen lords were reluctant to mount any overt challenge to the authority of the Le house and continued to govern the "Southern Region" (Dang Trong) under the authority of administrative titles previously granted by the Le. Not until 1702 would a Nguyenchua, Nguyen Phuc Chu, attempt - without success - to have his authority as an independent ruler consecrated by the Chinese emperor. In 1744 Nguyen Phuc Khoat shattered the fiction of Nguyen subordination to Le authority by declaring himself vuong (prince or king in lieu of the title of cong (duke) that his ancestors had carried. 15

It was during this period of de facto political division under the nominal authority of the Le dynasty that Catholicism was first propagated by European missionaries in Dai Viet. Before turning to the response of the Vietnamese elite, it would be useful to consider the international context within which the missionary enterprise functioned as well as some of the institutional forms which it assumed. According to the imperial records of the Le dynasty, a Western priest came to the province of Nam-dinh in 1533. The records of the Nguyen chua show that a Spanish priest named Di-e-go At-vac-to (Diego Adverte) proselytized for Christianity in Quang-nam province in 1596. From this time onward, a number of Spanish Dominicans from Manila and Por- tuguese and Italian Jesuits from Macao proselytized for Christianity in the Dang Trong as well as in the Dang Ngoai ("Northern Region"). The first Catholic Missions in Dai Viet were founded by Jesuits who had been expelled from Japan by the interdictions proclaimed by the Tokugawa authorities after 1612. Portuguese merchants trading with Dai Viet had suggested the Vietnamese states to the Jesuits of Malacca as possible alternatives to Japan for spreading Catholicism. 16

4

In 1493, Pope Alexander VI had attributed all territories east of the Azores meridian to Lisbon. By virtue of this ascription Portugal enjoyed an exclusive domain in Asia, spiritually as well as economically. All missionaries--from whatever country - leaving Europe for Asia had first to come to Lisbon to swear allegiance to the Portuguese monarch; then they were to travel in a Portuguese ship to Asia, where they were to work under the supervision of a Portuguese ecclesiastical superior. 17

It was thus under Portuguese religious authority that the first Catholic missions were founded in Dai Viet, that of Cochin China in 1615 and that of Tonkin in 1626. However, by the mid-seventeenth centuryPortugal's commercial hegemony among European powers in Asian waters was being successfully challenged by faster-developing powers: Holland, England, and France. In 1602 Holland formed an East India Company to compete with Portuguese trade in the East. By 1641 the Dutch had seized the Portuguese port at Malacca and had wrested from Portugal the mastery of the sea lanes of European-Asian trade. The English East India Company, founded in 1600, began trading with India and the Southeast Asian kingdoms. France established its own East India Company in 1664 and seized Madagascar and some parts of India, thus beginning a fierce rivalry with the English for trade in Eastern waters. 18 The realities of European commercial and military power in Asia had been transformed, and the Catholic Church's reliance on the once-powerful Portugal had become coun ter-productive.

A number of institutional innovations that would permit missionary Catholicism to divest itself of the dead hand of Portuguese patronage were propounded by Alexandre de Rhodes, a Jesuit from Avignon with a long history of missionary work in Asia and a remarkable facility for Asian languages. In Dai Viet, Rhodes had disdained to work through interpreters, emphasizing instead that the European missionary should speak the indigenous tongue. 19 To facilitate this, Rhodes systematized the existing approaches to transcribing Viet- namese with Latin characters, greatly reducing the time required by the Euro- pean missionaries to learn this language. In. 1615 he published in Rome the first Latin-Portuguese-Vietnamese dictionary and a Vietnamese grammar, both using his system of Latinized Vietnamese (known today as quoc ngu or "national language"). 20

In the same year he published the first quoc ngu catechism, Phep giang tam ngay cho ke muon chiu phep rua toi, ma beao dao thanh duc Chua bloi . Chua bloi, which remained the basic didactic text used by missionaries in Vietnam until the nineteenth century. 21 In his missionary work Rhodes' approach was markedly different from that of his Jesuit confrères . Rhodes sought to build a cadre of indigenous catechists, to be recruited and trained locally by the missionaries. The catechists, using the Phep giang tam ngay , would then undertake the bulk of the proselytizing among the population, bringing those ready to accept the faith to the European missionary for baptism. 22

It was thus Alexandre de Rhodes whom the Jesuit Fathers of Malacca selected to travel to Rome in 1649 to place before Pope Innocent X a plan that would permit the ordination of indigenous priests in Asian lands. Rhodes'

5

initiative was well received at the Vatican, which, perplexed by the anachronism of Portuguese patronage, had already begun to reestablish direct control of missionary activity. For this purpose it had established, in 1622, the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith. Following Rhodes' argumen- tation, the Holy See created, in 1659, Apostolic Vicars for the Asian missions. These Apostolic Vicars were directly under the authority of the Holy See; that is, they were not subordinated to the Portuguese authorities in Malacca and Macao. They were granted the authority to select candidates from the indigenous catechists for ordination to the priesthood. 23 Innocent X further approved, in 1665, of Rhodes' proposal to create, in France, an organization for the recruitment and training of secular priests, that is, priests who belonged to no independent religious order. They would serve as missionaries under the direct supervision of the Apostolic Vicars and, through them, the Vatican. 24 To this end the Société des Missions-Etrangères opened seminaries in Paris and Penang. This appointment of an ecclesiastical hierarchy composed of French bishops was a development of capital importance in the history of Franco-Vietnamese relations, for France had previously been absent from Dai Viet; from this time onward France, even when forcibly ejected from India by the British, would remain represented in Dai Viet by missionaries of the Société des Missions-Etrangères. By the late nineteenth century, missionary work in Vietnam was virtually the exclusive domain of these French priests. The only exceptions were a handful of surviving Portuguese Jesuits and the Spanish Dominicans who were, according to a settlement imposed by the Vatican in 1678, granted the Vicarate of Eastern Tonkin (comprising the provinces of Nam-dinh, Thai-bin Hai-duong, Hai-phong, and Bac-ninh) under the condition that they swear obedience to the French Fathers of the Société des Mis- sions-Etrangères. 25

The Vietnamese elite's response to missionary Catholicism during the secession period must be understood through reference to two opposing factors: The Vietnamese elite's attitudes toward non-Sinicized peoples and non-Confucian religions and philosophies; and the centuries-long antagonism between the Trinh and Nguyen seigneurial houses. The governing classes in the Dang Trong as well as in the Dang Ngoai were alarmed to observe that those who converted to the "Western Ocean Religion" (Dao Tay-duong) thereby rejected the doctrines and rituals that compromised the basis of the Vietnamese polity. The political structure of Dai Viet rested on the moral conceptions of Neo-Confucianism, which exalted the ruler as the Son of Heaven and therefore demanded that he receive absolute obedience. And each of the chua houses legitimized its power with reference to its supposed role as "protector" of the Le emperors. The Catholic missionaries attempted to remove their Vietnamese followers from the authority of the Nguyen and Trinh chua, protesting against and refusing to make contributions for the performance of rituals and the construction of temples that they regarded as "superstitious." 26 And within the Catholic communities themselves, the missionaries forbade their converts to practice the traditional rituals of ancestor worship and to make sacrifices to the village deities. They further forbade their followers from practicing polygamy,

6

which was recognized by Vietnamese custom and law. The implication of these protests, refusals, and prohibitions was manifest: To the missionaries the Christian God was the supreme deity in the universe, and all religions or doctrines that contradicted this were false; the missionaries were the earthly representatives of this divine being, and their authority over Vietnamese Catholics in matters defined as spiritual was therefore superior to that of mundane authorities who did not recognize the Christian God. 27 The ruling elite in both regions of Dai Viet feared that the unifying factor of a common belief among Christian Vietnamese, combined with their allegiance to foreign spiritual leaders, could facilitate the formation of opposition parties. The Vietnamese governments thus feared that the established order could be overthrown and a new state formed, perhaps with the support of European powers. 28 In both the Dang Trong and the Dang Ngoai, Christianity was immediately classified with Taoism and Buddhism as a "heterodox doctrine" (ta giao) and outlawed. But in practice the "edicts of interdiction of the religion of Catholicism" (du cam dao Gia-to) were applied only sporadically because both chua houses wanted to trade with the West in order to reinforce their military capacities; and the Catholic missionaries of this epoch often served as commercial agents for the European powers as a means of countering the anti-Catholic reactions of the indigenous authorities. 29 Of the two Vietnamese chua the Nguyen were more aware of the benefits of Western military technology and thus more eager to deal with Western merchants; they were, therefore, the more tolerant of the two chua vis-à-vis the missionaries. Because of this greater flexibility on the missionary question, the Nguyen chua learned from the Portuguese Western techniques for constructing ships and casting cannon. The Trinh house, for its part, rather sought, without conspicuous success, to enroll one of the Western powers as its direct supporter in the conflict. 30

Although the Trinh controlled four-fifths of the population, their continuing conflict with the Nguyen remained inconclusive for over 200 years. The Trinh armies were never able decisively to breach the defensive fortifications erected by the Nguyen at Dong-hoi (near the Seventeenth Parallel). 31 The Dang Trong's capacity to resist the Trinh onslaughts can partially be explained with reference to the Nguyen's more extensive use of European weaponry. However, according to Maybon, the more important reasons were the Nguyen lords' more efficient and humane administration, their successful presentation of themselves as the defenders of the Le dynasty, and the fact that, since they were usually on the defensive against Trinh attacks, the inhabitants of the Dang Trong felt that they were defending their homeland against invaders, albeit Vietnamese ones. 32

This equilibrium was broken by the eruption of a rebellion that began in the hamlet of Tay-son (Binh-dinh province) in 1772. By 1775 the Tay-son movement had developed into a politico-military force capable of challenging the hegemony of the Nguyen and Trinh lords. In 1777 the Tay-son overthrew the Nguyen authority in Central Vietnam. The only surviving prince of the Nguyen line, Nguyen Phuc Anh (also called Nguyen Phuoc Anh or Nguyen Anh), then seventeen years old, fled to the marshlands of Ca-mau in southern-

7

most Vietnam. 33 Subsequent efforts by Nguyen Phuc Anh to establish a durable base in the Gia-dinh region of southern Vietnam in cooperation with Thai forces were defeated by Tay-Son armies under Nguyen Hue in a series of brilliant campaigns between 1782 and 1785, after which Nguyen Phuc Anh fled to exile in Thailand. 34 Turning northward, the Tay-son armies destroyed the Trinh administration in 1786 and abolished the Le dynasty in 1787. 35 The Le family requested Chinese intervention to restore their throne, and Qing forces invaded Vietnam in 1788. Nguyen Hue, the most gifted of the Tay-son brothers, declared himself the Quang-trung Emperor and led a series of victorious campaigns against the Chinese armies, which thereupon withdrew. 36

While he was in exile in Thailand, Nguyen Phuc Anh decided to abandon the use of Thai forces in support of his cause; any military benefit derived from Thai support, he realized, was counterbalanced by the hostile reaction that a Thai presence evoked among the Vietnamese people. 37 In early 1787 he learned from his agents that the Tay-son brothers had begun to fight among themselves and that, consequently, the Tay-son commander in charge of the Gia-dinh garrison, Dang Van Tran, had moved his forces to Quy-nhon in support of Nguyen Lu, there under attack by Nguyen Nhac. The Gia-dinh region was thus exposed, and Nguyen Phuc Anh decided to attack it without Thai support. He assembled his forces abroad, notified his indigenous partisans, and, benefiting from the early surrender of a number of local Tay-son commanders with their troops, recaptured Sai-gon on September 7, 1788. 38

By early 1789 the entire Gia-dinh region was definitively under Nguyen Phuc Anh's control, giving him a secure base area in which he undertook agrarian reforms. The Gia-dinh region, underexploited because of its relatively recent occupation by the Vietnamese, was potentially one of the richest in the land. Its agricultural economy had deteriorated markedly during the long years of warfare, in the course of which it had changed hands many times. The basis of Nguyen Phuc Anh's agricultural reforms was the extension to the open lands of the South of a traditional organizational form for agricultural expansion, the don dien. This term was usually translated by the French authors as "colonie militaire," but this rendering does not do justice to the variety of forms that the don then were given by Nguyen Phuc Anh. The don dien were first used in Dai Viet during the reign of the Le Thanh-tong (1460-1497), and they played an important role in the southward expansion of the Vietnamese for almost three centuries. These early don dien were a militarized system of bringing new lands under cultivation. 39 The state supplied units of soldiers with agricultural tools and with grain for nourishment and planting. They were assigned lands that they were to clear, cultivate, and defend. After a given period of time had elapsed, they were required to remit portions of their harvests to the state's granaries. Since these lands were often seized from non-Vietnamese peoples, the military nature of the early don dien was essential to their success. After 1790 the militarized don dien were organized by Nguyen.Phuc Anh in Gia-dinh, but he also developed for use there a non-militarized form of don dien. In this second form people were organized into units that resembled the military don dien. But these settlers were not required to undertake military training or

8

to bear arms. They were granted uncultivated lands by the state, and they were lent the agricultural implements, beasts of burden, and grain required to work them. After several years they were required to pay a tax of grain. They remained civilians, and their don dien could easily be transformed later into ordinary villages. Candidates for these don dien were recruited from the inscribed villagers on the principle of voluntary participation. For example, an edict of 1790 stipulated that anyone recruiting ten persons to form a don dien would receive the title of cai trai or "camp commander" and would have his name erased from his village of origin's tax rolls. Coercion was used with Chinese immigrants, Cambodians, and other non-Vietnamese peoples resident in Gia-dinh, who were threatened with extensive corvée if they refused to "volunteer" to form don dien . 40 As a result of these measures large amounts of land were brought under cultivation and much previously abandoned land was recovered. Large surpluses of grain, taxable by the state, were thus generated. 41

The military implications of these measures were decisive. The productive agrarian system allowed Nguyen Phuc Anh to field an army of more than 30,000 men as well as a navy that could boast of more than 1,200 vessels in 1800, according to a European observer. 42 The grain surplus produced in Gia-dinh during this period was sold by the state to European and Asian traders to facilitate the importation of products of military necessity, especially iron, bronze, and sulfur. The state also purchased castor sugar from indigenous producers at the domestic market price and exchanged it for weapons from European producers. 43 Because of this agrarian surplus the Nguyen prince was able to manifest a particular concern for the moral and physical welfare of his soldiers as well as for that of the inhabitants of regions newly conquered by his armies. For example, surplus grain was stored in state granaries constructed along the route from Gia-dinh northward, following the advance of the victorious Nguyen troops. Thus, Nguyen Phuc Anh's troops could be adequately provisioned with grain produced in Gia-dinh itself, relieving them of the necessity of living off the land in conquered areas, which would have been detrimental to relations with the inhabitants. Furthermore, newly conquered territories were exempted from paying taxes by Nguyen Phuc Anh, and all Tay-son military and civil mandarins who surrendered were appointed to equivalent positions with equivalent remuneration in the Nguyen administration. 44

The Tay-son armies, torn by dissension and ineptly led by Quang-trung's heir, were defeated by Nguyen Phuc Anh's forces in Central Vietnam in 1799 and 1801. In 1802 Nguyen Phuc Anh conquered the North and declared himself the Gia-long Emperor, thereby founding the Nguyen dynasty, the first in Vietnamese history to rule a united empire extending from China to the Gulf of Thailand. 45

Although Europeans contributed to Nguyen Phuc Anh's victory over the Tay-son movement, the significance of their role should not be exaggerated. As noted above, Nguyen Phuc Anh fled to the Ca-mau peninsula in southern Vietnam after the Tay-son forces shattered Nguyen power in the Center in 1777. In Ha-tien he met Pigneau de Behaine, a representative of the Société des Missions-Étrangères who had been sent to Cambodia in 1765 . In 1774 he had

9

been consecrated Bishop of Adran and appointed as Apostolic Vicar for the missions of Tonkin, Cambodia, and Cochin China. 46 Pigneau de Behaine had long harbored the dream of building a Catholic empire in the East, and he reasoned that an eventual victory for Nguyen Phuc Anh in which he, the bishop, played a role could bring important advantages for the Catholic religion. 47 The pair met again in Thailand, to which Nguyen Phuc Anh had fled after the defeat of his Thai supporters in southern Vietnam by the Tay-son in May of 1785. There the Nguyen prince told the bishop of his plan to seek the support of a European power, perhaps the Dutch at Batavia. 48 Fearing that an alliance with a Protestant power would be detrimental to the interests of Catholicism, Pigneau de Behaine advised Nguyen Phuc Anh against seeking assistance from the Dutch, arguing that it would be more advantageous to approach France. 49 It was agreed that Nguyen Phuc Anh would grant Pigneau de Behaine the authority to negotiate with the French on his behalf, and Prince Canh, Nguyen Phuc Anh's young son, was entrusted to the prelate's care as a mark of confidence. 50

After more than a year of difficult negotiations with the French authorities in India, Pigneau de Behaine was permitted to travel to France to put the matter before Louis XVI. 51 Convinced that positions in Vietnam could reinforce France's strategic and commercial interests in Asia to the detriment of England, France's traditional rival, the French court gave Pigneau de Behaine assurance of support for Nguyen Phuc Anh's struggle. 52 On November 28, 1787, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Le Monmorin, and Pigneau de Behaine signed a ten-article treaty that stipulated that the French ruler would effectively aid Nguyen Phuc Anh to defeat his opponents in exchange for exclusive commercial freedom for the French, religious freedom for the Vietnamese Catholics and the missionaries, and a number of other territorial and commercial concessions. Pigneau de Behaine's negotiating mission left France on December 8, 1787 for Pondicherry, where the French intervention force was to be assembled. However, while the mission was waiting there, the French court, apparently having second thoughts, secretly instructed the Comte de Coway, Governor of Pondicherry, to decide on his own initiative how to proceed. In the context of the French state's fiscal crisis, De Coway judged that the cost of the operation was prohibitive, and he declined to undertake it. The French court announced in October, 1788 that it approved of his decision. France therefore refused to execute the terms agreed upon in negotiations with Nguyen Phuc Anh's representative, Bishop Pigneau de Behaine. 53

While Pigneau de Behaine was still in French India, he learned that Nguyen Phuc Anh had retaken the Gia-dinh region. The prelate decided that he would himself prepare an intervention force and return with it to Vietnam. Combining his own family resources, the contributions of French merchants in France and in the French Indian empire, and a sum provided by Nguyen Phuc Anh prior to the prelate's departure, Pigneau de Behaine purchased naval vessels and munitions. He also recruited a number of French and Portuguese naval officers and seamen to join him. He returned with them to Vietnam in July of 1789. 54

10

The European adventurers who arrived with Pigneau de Behaine at this time played no role in the rout of Tay-son forces in Gia-dinh, which was completed by early 1789 by Nguyen Phuc Anh's indigenous supporters. Nor did they contribute to the important agricultural reforms that Nguyen Phuc Anh had accomplished in the regions under his control. They did contribute to the military aspect of the conflict from July of 1789 until the definitive Nguyen victory was achieved in 1802. The missionaries and other Frenchmen with international contacts and linguistic skills acted as Nguyen Phuc Anh's agents in purchasing munitions and military-related supplies. 55 Among the French- men in Nguyen Phuc Anh's service, Olivier de Puymanel constructed a citadel in Sai-gon, blending Chinese and European styles. He also trained the Nguyen prince's troops in the fabrication and utilization of effective and mobile European-style artillery pieces, and he instructed them in European infantry formations and tactics. Jean-Marie Dayot supervised the construction of naval vessels protected by bronze plating. 56 But the impact of these European contributions relative to the efforts of Nguyen Phuc Anh and his Vietnamese supporters should not be overemphasized. The numbers of Europeans in Nguyen Phuc Anh's service remained low: four officers and eighty soldiers at their most numerous, according to Vannier. 57

It must be stressed also that Nguyen Phuc Anh did not entrust to them the decisive questions of strategic planning. Indeed, the European officers complained that the Nguyen prince did not heed their advice in regard to strategic questions. Chaigneau, for instance, reported that the European officers continually urged Nguyen Phuc Anh to launch bold, decisive strikes on Tay-son strongpoints, but the Nguyen prince preferred to proceed slowly, consolidating his gains in one region before attacking another. 58 Furthermore, Nguyen Phuc Anh gradually reduced the direct military role of his European collaborators during the course of the conflict. In the naval battle of Thi-nai, 1892, for instance, J. M. Dayot was in the forefront of the attack; whereas in the naval offensive of 1801 in the same area, the Nguyen fleet was led by the Nguyen Van Tuong, Vo Duy Nguy, and Le Van Duyet, with Chaigneau, Vannier, and de Forçans in supporting positions only. The overland attack on Quy-nhon (Binh-thuan province) in 1793 was conducted, according to Nguyen records, in cooperation with "Western soldiers" (Tay-duong binh); the same source tells us that, in 1801, Nguyen operations in the same region were commanded by Vietnamese generals, while Chaigneau and Vannier were left in charge of organi zing supply operations. 59 Finally, it is evident that the prerequisites for this European military aid to be effectively utilized were the capture of Gia-dinh and its transformation into a secure and productive base area, which had been accomplished by Nguyen Phuc Anh and his indigenous supporters. For these reasons, the final victory of the Nguyen cause should not be attributed in any significant measure to the contributions of Pigneau de Behaine and the European adventurers he brought with him into Nguyen Phuc Anh's service.

Although the European contribution was not significant in determining the outcome of the conflict, the question may nevertheless be posed about the international obligations that Nguyen Phuc Anh might have incurred in accep-

11

ting it. In this respect, it is important to observe that any aid that Nguyen Phuc Anh received due to Pigneau de Behaine's efforts was provided by the prelate acting as a private individual and not as an agent of the French state. This aid may have fulfilled several of the obligations that the treaty imposed on France, but it was not executed by the official agents of the French state and did not, therefore, bind Nguyen Phuc Anh to honor any of the compensatory provisions with regard to France. The Nguyen founder would later emphasize this distinction in a letter to the French ruler, thanking him for his good will, informing him of the failure of French officials in India to execute the treaty, and concluding that such aid was not, in the event, necessary. 60

To summarize, the discussion began with the observation that Vietnamese interactions with Europeans during the Le period were affected by two contradictory factors. The Vietnamese elite, steeped in Chinese Sung Neo-Confu cianism and influenced by the Chinese elite's self-image as the only truly civilized people, regarded the Westerners as dangerous "barbarians" and their religion as a subversive "heterodox doctrine." Conversely, the civil war between the Nguyen and the Trinh seigneurial houses provided a strong motivation for Vietnamese ruling elites to trade with the West. In practice, therefore, the Trinh house and particularly the Nguyen house were willing to receive Western merchants and even to tolerate the activities of Western missionaries when "reasons of state" and the imperatives of war so dictated. In a period when the Vietnamese rulers did not yet feel themselves to be seriously threatened by an aggressive European imperialism, such compromises with their Confucian principles did not seem particularly dangerous.

Nguyen Phuc Anh's relationship with the Europeans in his service should be understood as precisely this kind of expedient compromise. Nguyen Phuc Anh accepted the aid of Pigneau de Behaine and approved of the latter's sugges- tion to seek the support of France at a time when the fortunes of the Nguyen house were at their nadir. Pigneau de Behaine's efforts to enlist the French court of Louis XVI were ultimately unsuccessful, although he did mobilize some private aid. It was argued that this assistance was largely irrelevant to the final reunification of Vietnam under Nguyen hegemony. Furthermore, this aid, being wholly private in nature, in no way obligated the Nguyen founder or his successors to France. Nguyen Phuc Anh's exploitation of the Catholic connection, his attempt to secure the support of a European power, and his employ- ment of a number of European adventurers did not represent a political or cultural opening to the West.

13

2

Vietnam and the West,

The focus of this chapter is the period from the founding of the Nguyen dynasty in 1802 until just before the Franco attack on Da-nang harbor in 1858. The reasons for, and the forms of, French intervention are considered as well as the responses of the Nguyen monarchs from the Nguyen founder (who is hence forth designated with the name of his reign period, Gia-long) through Tu-duc. It is argued that the foreign policies of these Nguyen monarchs vis-à-vis the West (including missionary Catholicism) were highly consistent. Because of the founding of the Nguyen dynasty on Confucian principles by Gia-long and the increasing French pressures for commercial and diplomatic links, Gia-long and Minh-menh sought to limit and then to reduce the scope of Franco-Vietnamese contacts. Catholicism was tolerated during the Gia-long period, but subsequent sovereigns objected to its "heterodox" nature and to the propensity of the missionaries and their followers to support the uprisings of indigenous rebels and the interests of foreign states. Catholicism was first formally forbidden during the Minh-menh period, and the resulting "persecutions" provided a convenient rationalization for French intervention during the Thieu-tri and Tu-duc reigns. Faced with French armed interventions, Thieu-tri and Tu-duc fought back when absolutely necessary, increased their efforts to capture and execute Euro- pean missionaries, and prohibited all commercial and diplomatic intercourse with France.

To understand the motivations behind Gia-long's foreign policy vis-à-vis the West after 1802, it is necessary to take note of the Sinicization that was the foundation of his domestic policy. Wanting to consolidate his authority as monarch, Gia-long relied on classical Chinese political thought. Considering Vietnam's long history of participation in the Chinese cultural universe, this choice was a natural one. Chinese classics, familiar to all educated Vietnamese, exalted the concept of centralized government headed by a morally superior

1802-1858

14

individual. Thus, the cause of the Chinese classics and that of a prospective Vietnamese dynast were one and the same.1

In the case of Gia-long, the need to present himself as a traditional Confu- cian monarch was particularly pressing because of the historical circumstances of his rise to power. The Nguyen founder faced the problem of winning the loyalty of the Contucian scholars in the North, who had for generations entered the service of the Le monarchs and the Trinh lords. Gia-long knew that descendants of the Le emperors had survived the regicidal violence of the Tay-son rebellion, and he feared that they could serve as a competitive focus of political loyalty. 2 Gia-long also worried that the Tay-son rebellion itself had had a pernicious effect on the morality and customs of the Vietnamese people, with all the evident problems that this could pose for the reassertion of centralized rule. 3 Finally, Gia-long's Confucianist apprehensions about the dangers for the Vietnamese polity posed by the "heterodox doctrine" of Catholicism had been enhanced by the activities of Pigneau de Behaine during the reunification struggle. The bishop had taken advantage of the toleration of Catholicism in territories controlled by Nguyen Phuc Anh in order to convert Prince Canh, Nguyen Phuc Anh's son and heir, as well as Tong Phuc Dam, a high official in Nguyen Phuc Anh's court. The court had been outraged when the newly converted Canh refused to perform the required rituals of ancestor worship. But Tong Phuc Dam's conversion was perhaps even more alarming than that of Canh, for the former was at the time of his conversion fifty-nine years old and an eminent Confucian scholar. Ton Phuc Dam had been charged with defending Dien-khanh against Tay-son attacks, an operation in which Pigneau de Behaine participated. After about ten months of intense discussions, the prelate converted Tong Phuc Dam to Catholicism. The latter even wrote a memorial to Nguyen Phuc Anh, asking that a number of court rituals considered "superstitious" according to the "Chinese rites" decision of the Vatican in 1742 be abandoned by Gia-long's court. Tong Phuc Dam died shortly afterward (of natural causes), but his passing did little to calm Nguyen Phuc Anh's concerns. Nguyen Phuc Anh had expressed his apprehension about high-level conversions to Pigneau de Behaine, explaining that, to the educated Confucian elite, the ritual of ancestor worship was not intended to nourish the soul of the departed, as the common people believed, but rather to manifest socially the respect and gratitude felt for one's forebears. 4 Nguyen Phuc Anh stressed to the bishop that the Catholic injunctions against ancestor worship were in contradiction to the most revered Vietnamese tratitions, traditions that were essential for the maintenance of social discipline and, ultimately, the authority of the monarchy:

I regard ancestor worship as one of the foundations of our education… The conduct of this ritual, desirable in all circumstances, becomes obligatory for those persons occupying positions of state authority. You have observed that, at prescribed intervals during the year, court etiquette requires a number of these ceremonies, which I myself am obliged to attend, accompanied by all of my officials. If

15

several of them were to accept the Catholic religion, I would be forced to conduct these ceremonies almost alone, thereby discrediting the majesty of the throne.5 The institutionalization of Chinese political theories during the Gia-long

reign was accomplished by the following means: The establishment of a centralized, Chinese-style bureaucracy, including the examination system based on the study of the Confucian classics; the promulgation of a comprehensive legal code based on the Chinese Qing code; and the monarch's practice of issuing didactic edicts for the propagation of Neo-Confucian principles among the people.

As part of his efforts to convince the Vietnamese people that he deserved to gain the throne, Nguyen Phuc Anh had maintained, from 1780 onward, an embryonic bureaucracy. Given the necessity of constant warfare, military officers were among the most important members of his coterie. Nguyen Phuc Anh's dependence on military men was reflected after 1802 in his initial reorganization of the country. 6 Power was essentially dispersed. The new emperor's authority was supreme only in the Center (from Binh-thuan in the South to Ninh-binh in the North), which he divided into provinces and administered directly from Hue through a centralized bureaucratic system. 7 The capital was moved to Phu-xuan (modern Hue) in Thua-thien prefecture, Quang-nam province. Here was housed the central administration under the control of the emperor, who was the highest civil and religious authority in the land. Under him were established the Luc Bo or "Six Ministries": Lai Bo, Ministry of Public Office; Ho Bo, Ministry of Finance; Le Bo, Ministry of Rites; Binh Bo, Ministry of War; Hinh Bo, Ministry of Justice; Cong Bo, Ministry of Public Works. In each of these, there were a minister, two vice ministers, and two or three advisors; each ministry was served by approximately seventy employees who were assigned to various specialized offices. The Grand Secretariat (Noi cac) was at once a supreme council and a chancellery: All important affairs were examined there in the presence of the monarch; officials' reports were read and discussed; decisions were made regarding them; and imperial edicts were drafted and issued in reply. The officials who participated in the deliberations of the Grand Secretariat were selected from among the high-level mandarins of the six ministries as well as from the academies. 8

The regions of Tonkin and Gia-dinh were handled delicately by Gia-long, who did not want to subject them to the shock of rapid centralization. For the thirteen northern provinces and the four southern ones, he appointed special "military protectors" who were known as tong-tran. From the citadels of Sai-gon and Ha-noi, they directly administered the military defense zones (tran) under their jurisdiction. 9 This permitted the Nguyen founder to reward his most faithful supporters by giving them positions of considerable power. They were granted almost unlimited authority in all ordinary administrative and judicial matters; this system endured until Minh-menh incorporated the northern zone (1831) and then the southern one (1832) into a uniform, centralized system of thirty-one provinces directly under the authority of the emperor at

Hue. 10 During his own reign, therefore, Gia-long compromised with regionalism and with the power of the military officers on whom he had relied to defeat the Tay-son. Since the post of tong-tran was not hereditary, it seems that Gia-long did not want to preclude the possibility of an eventual integration of the military Defense zones into Hue's centralized administration.

To train and select the officials for the expanding bureaucracy, Gia-long reestablished the civil service examination system based on the Confucian classics. In 1803, Gia-long founded at Hue a National Academy (Quoc Tu Giam), which was to educate in the classics the sons of officials as well as other deserving students. The following year edicts were issued to establish schools in the provinces, to regulate their personnel, and to fix their curriculum. To supervise instruction at the provincial level and to aid in the selection process for admit- tance to the Quoc Tu Giam, Directors of Education (quan doc hoc) were appointed, beginning in 1802; they were to be assisted by Subordinate and Assis- tant Directors (pho doc hoc, tro-giao).11 As Gia-long explained to his court in the thirteenth year of his reign, the goal was to create a cadre of classically educated, politically loyal administrators:

The schools are where men of talent can be found. Wanting to follow the example of the former kings, I have established schools in order that learned and talented men will arise and the state may thus employ them. 12 In 1807, Gia-long opened the Nguyen dynasty's first civil service examina-

tion at the regional level (khoa thi huong). From this date forward, the training and selection of the expanding mandarinate was accomplished largely through the examination system. Minh-menh would complete the construction of the competitive examination pyramid by holding in 1822 and 1829 the dynasty's first khoa thi hoi and khoa thi dinh - examinations at the capital city of Hue and, for the laureates, at the court itself.13 As in the Le period, the Chinese classical works that were required for the students' examination preparations were the ngu kinh tu thu, the "five classics and the four books," which were The Book of Changes, The Book of Rites, The Spring and Autumn Annals, The Book of Poetry, The Book of Mencius, The Great Learning, The Analects, and The Doctrine of the Mean, as well as the commentaries on the above by the Sung scholar, Chu Hsi. These were supplemented with works on Bac su or "northern history," that is, Chinese history from antiquity through the Sung period. More recent Chinese history was considered "contemporary" and thus of little interest; Vietnamese history itself had even less relevance for the examinations; and the history of the non-Sinitic world, including that of Western civilization, was thought completely irrelevant. The examination system thus reflected and reinforced the attitude of noi ha ngoai di, the elite's belief that only classical Chinese culture represented "civilization" and was thus deserving of emulation and, concomitantly, that Western countries were "barbaric" and unworthy of systematic study. 14

16

17

Gia-long's interest in founding the Nguyen dynasty on Confucian principles further manifested itself in the promulgation of a comprehensive penal code to replace that of the Hong-duc or Le code. In 1811 Gia-long ordered a group of scholars under Nguyen Van Thanh to prepare such a code. In 1815 the Hoang trieu luat le (Laws and Regulations of the Imperial Court), now more commonly known as the Bo luat Gia-long (Gia-long Code), was issued. 15 Gia-long explained to the Hue court that the code was a necessary response to the breakdown of social discipline resulting from the Tay-son rebellion:

The customs of the present age are different from those of former times, and so a new penal code is needed. The courts of the former kings each had their own legal codes. This was so until the time of the Tay-son rebellion, when rules and regulations were overthrown, injus- tice reigned, and the people completely forgot the responsibilities of their positions. In such a time of chaos, penal laws were inadequate, and punishments were no longer sufficient. 16 According to the Nguyen founder himself, the models for the Hoang trieu

luat le were the Vietnamese Le code and the Chinese Qing code. These, he wrote in a foreword to the 1815 compilation, were the "most complete" of all existing legal codes. The court scholars responsible for writing the Hoang trieu luat le had thus been instructed to "weigh carefully" the articles of these two exemplary codes and to select only those appropriate for the present age. 17 Despite Gia-long's insistence that the Hoang trieu luat le was partially derived from the Vietnamese Le code, most modern authorities argue that the Gia-long code was virtually a replication of the Chinese Qing document. 18 As such, many of the Hoang trieu luat le 's injunctions were contrary to the customs and traditions of the Vietnamese people, and they soon fell into disuse or remained dead letters. 19 This conflict between Vietnamese cultural patterns and the Sinitic Gia-long code remains an open subject for further research. Here it is only necessary to indicate that Nguyen founder Gia-long intended to promulgate a code that would consolidate the reinforced Confucian order after thirty years of rebellion.

In general, articles of the Hoang trieu luat le aimed at reinforcing the au-thority of the king, the mandarins, the family heads, and parents. In serious criminal cases and particularly those involving state security, the principle of collective familial responsibility was applied. For instance, for the crime of rebellion (muu dai nghich) the code specified that the criminal's grandfather, father, brother(s), son(s), an nephew(s) having sixteen or more years of age were to be executed; hose relations having fifteen or fewer years of age, along with the wife(ves), sister(s), daughter(s), and daughter(s)-in-law were to serve as unpaid laborers in the homes of the nobility; all family property was to be confiscated. Emphasis was also placed on encouraging, through rewards and punishments, those who knew of a crime to denounce the perpetrator(s). 20

The Gia-long code remained in force throughout the Nguyen period. How ever, Gia-long and subsequent Nguyen emperors had the authority to alter the code with their own edicts (du), which could explain, supplement, correct, or

18

eliminate specific articles. From 1812 to 1860, there were approximately 150 such edicts effecting changes in the penal law, and these were assembled into a supplementary code known as the Quoc trieu the le or "Regulations of the National Court." Throughout the Nguyen period the tendency was for penal laws to become more stringent and punishments more severe. The "edicts of interdiction of the Christian religion" (du cam dao Gia-to) dating from the Minh-menh period onward are examples of this practice of extending the penal code through imperial edicts. 21

Following the example of Le Thanh-tong, Gia-long reinstated the practice of issuing didactic edicts to be read in the villages each year in spring and on special occasions. In 1804, for example, he issued for the moral edification of the villagers his Dieu le huong dang or "Regulations for Village Life." The Nguyen founder's example was followed by Minh-menh, who published for the same purpose in 1834 a Huan dich thap dieu or "Ten Points of Moral Instruc- tion," the meaning of which was explained and expounded in a work of demotic character (chu nom) poetry by the Tu-duc Emperor entitled Thap dieu dien ca. 22 The essence of all these compositions was that only the practice of the primordial Confucian virtues (ngu thuong) enabled the human being to fulfill the obligations of the social relationships (ngu luan) upon which Vietnam's prosperity and order (thinh tri) depended. 23

In short, Gia-long's domestic policies of Sinicization were intended to reestablish the hegemony of Confucianism in Vietnam, which he saw as having been dangerously attenuated by the centuries of civil war and rebellion. He sought thereby to establish a hierarchical social stability and to valorize the concept of centralized rule by a monarch of exemplary morality. Emphasizing Confucian political theories, Gia-long was at once following the example of the early Le monarchs and establishing a precedent for subsequent Nguyen rulers. What were the implications of this consecration of Confucian principles for the conduct of Vietnamese foreign policy vis-à-vis the West in general and France in particular?

Gia-long's domestic policies of Sinicization were manifested in his foreign policy toward the West, the essence of which was the policy of be quan toa cang, or "closed country." The Nguyen founder feared that contact with the customs of the "barbarian" West could counter the effects of Sinicization by corroding the morals of the population, possibly leading to rebellion. In this, Gia-long was influenced by the Chinese concept of noi ha ngoai di (China at the center, bar-barians on the outside) that Vietnamese political elites, considering themselves to be at the center of Sinitic civilization, had adopted from the early Le period onward.24 It is significant that the Hue government - like its northern exemplar- had no ministry of foreign affairs. Furthermore, Gia-long believed that granting Western countries formal commercial or diplomatic relations would provide them with more opportunities for committing acts of subversion or aggression against Vietnam. 25 In forming this view, Gia-long was guided by his knowledge of contemporary Asian history, particularly the example of British expansion in India. 26 In refusing to consider an English request for the opening of a factory

19

at Tra-son in 1803, Gia-long emphasized to his court the strategic question: "The coasts are extremely vital regions of our country. How could we possibly allow foreigners to utilize them?"27 In 1804, explaining to the court why he had refused the request of the Roberts mission to establish a factory at Da-nang, Gia-long emphasized the "barbarian" characteristics of the English:

When the former kings governed the state, they did not let the civilized mingle with the barbarians. This is truly the concept expressed in the saying that urges "taking precautions before disaster arrives." The English are cunning and deceitful. They are not of our race, and so their minds are completely different from ours. They should not be allowed to reside here. 28 But it must be emphasized that the closure of Vietnam to the West was

never intended to be complete. The Gia-long court wanted to trade with the Europeans provided that it could control the terms of such trade without reference to commercial or diplomatic treaties. For Hue, this meant that all trade with the West was to be controlled by a Merchant Superintendency (Thuong Bac Ty ), which limited trade to a 2 few selected ports, inspected it thoroughly, and taxed it heavily. 29 The state reserved for itself the option of purchasing the commodities in question, after which the remaining merchandise might be sold to other indigenous buyers. Western merchants and seamen were not allowed to establish themselves on shore. Basic Vietnamese commodities were not to be exported. 30

Throughout his reign, Gia-long refused to receive English and French com mercial and diplomatic missions, whose repeated requests for treaties and factories he rebuffed with a variety of pretexts. French shipping in Asia was, of course, interrupted by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. England, the earliest beneficiary of the industrial revolution, was the foremost European commercial power in Asia by the time of the founding of the Ngu en dynasty in Vietnam; the English were thus the first to request and be refused formal commercial relations with Gia-long's empire. As noted above, English missions of 1803 and 1804 saw their requests for factories denied. Not until after the Restoration would France, under the impulsion given by the merchants of the great ports, attempt to regain a commercial foothold in Vietnam. In 1817 the French merchant ship La Paix came to trade in Vietnam, but, badly informed, it had brought inappropriate goods that could not be sold. Gia-long granted it an exemption from taxation. In the same year, two other French craft called, the merchant vessel Henii and the Cybèle of the French navy. Captain de Kergariou of the Cybèle requested an audience with the Vietnamese monarch to discuss Vietnam's alleged obligation to grant France the port of Da-nang and Con-lon island in accordance with the treaty of 1787. The audience was refused with the explanation that there was nothing to discuss, France having unilaterally abrogated the treaty prior to implementation. 31 The Henri returned to Vietnam with the Larose in 1819; they sold their merchandise and purchased Vietnamese tea and sugar. 32

20

In the case of Western or other vessels that were shipwrecked or in distress, Gia-long felt free to demonstrate his Confucian beneficence without incurring the risk of escalating obligations. This le nhu vien or "ritual of treating well those from afar" was practiced throughout the Nguyen period, and ships from Eng- land, France, the United States, Japan, Norway, Italy, Portugal, Siam, and China that found themselves in distress in Vietnamese waters were given thorough assistance according to need. Nevertheless, the court scrupulously avoided any hint of favoritism to the ships of any particular country. 33

Regarding the special case of those Frenchmen who had helped him during the 1790-1802 period, Gia-long was magnanimous without betraying his Confu cian commitment to avoiding formal diplomatic or commercial ties to a Euro- pean power. Four Frenchmen remained at Gia-long's court after 1802: Philippe Vannier, Jean-Baptist Chaigneau, de Forsans, and Despiau. The latter, a medical doctor, had done little to distinguish himself during the reunification struggle, but the first three had earned the title of truong-co, which placed them in the second class of second-degree military mandarins. These rankings were formalized at Hue where the three Frenchmen were named as grand mandarins of the court. They were released from the Vietnamese mandarins' obligation of five ceremonial prostrations and permitted to substitute five inclinations of the head. Each was granted a personal escort of fifty soldiers. 34 Gia-long had an evident interest in demonstrating that he knew how to recompense royally his faithful followers. But he was careful to emphasize that his gratitude was exclusively for those individual Frenchmen who had directly participated in his reunification struggle. As for the aid promised by France itself, he lost no opportunity to express his satisfaction that he had not received the assistance promised by Louis XVI in 1787 and therefore was under no obligation to grant France any concessions. 35

The final aspect of Gia-long's policy toward the West to be considered is that of his treatment of the Catholic missionaries. It was observed earlier that the Nguyen chua, like the Trinh, considered Catholicism to be a dangerous "heterodox doctrine." But the Nguyen had traditionally treated the Catholic missionaries with greater toleration than had the Trinh because of the Nguyen's greater appreciation of Western weaponry. Nguyen Phuc Anh's association with Pigneau de Behaine was thus consistent with the Nguyen practice of expedient toleration due to diplomatic necessity. During the reunification strug gle Nguyen Phuc Anh had accordingly granted the Catholic missionaries, the privilege of traveling and preaching freely in the lands under his authority. And, in recognition of the role that Pigneau de Behaine had played, Gia-long granted them the continued freedom to proselytize in his reunited empire. 36 Explaining why Gia-long granted the Catholic missionaries this unrestricted liberty, European historians, following Maybon, have emphasized the personal bonds of friendship and gratitude that Gia-long supposedly felt for the bishop. This view not only exaggerates the European influence on the outcome of the conflict but also underestimates the complexity of Gia-long's character and his profound sense of mission as a Confucian monarch. 37 It is far more probable

21

that Gia-long feared that an interdiction of Catholicism so soon after reunification would appear to be the case of an unworthy monarch betraying those who had helped him in difficult times; such an example would have discouraged loyalty among his subjects. Furthermore, the number of missionaries and Catholics then in the country was not high, and the Nguyen founder could have reasoned, perhaps with unwarranted optimism, that his programs emphasizing Confucian values would, in the long run, counteract the proselytism of the missionaries. 38 In the context of France's effacement in Asia during the wars spawned by the French Revolution, which spanned more than three-fourths of the Gia-long reign period, it may have seemed to the Nguyen founder that a tentative toleration of missionary activity would be relatively harmless. 39 In the same way that he compromised temporarily with regionalism and militarism while initiating enduring trends that would bring them under control, Gia-long probably saw no immediate need to prohibit missionary activity.

Christianity was tolerated in Vietnam during the reign of Gia-long. In- deed, Michel-Duc Chaigneau, the son of Jean-Baptist Chaigneau; wrote in his Souvenirs de Hue that, during the reign of the Nguyen founder, the Catholic religion was "not only tolerated but even respected." 40 However, while Gia-long did not persecute the missionaries or the Vietnamese Catholics, the antagonism between freedom of proselytism for the missionaries and Gia-long's commitment to building the Nguyen dynasty on Confucian principles manifested itself in at least three separate circumstances. The first was the missionary pressure and the monarch's refusal to exempt the Catholics from the religious obligations owed by all Vietnamese subjects to the state. The second was Gia-long's publication in 1804 of a didactic edict that explicitly included Catholicism among the "intoxicating doctrines" considered threatening to the people's morality. The third was the monarch's decision, opposed by the missionaries, to bypass the son of Nguyen Canh as his successor, selecting instead Chi-dam, the future Minh-menh, a prince known for his profound Confucianist opposition to Chris tianity.

It was argued above that Nguyen Phuc Anh's reunification struggle was successful largely through the efforts of the Nguyen prince and his indigenous adherents; Europeans, including Pigneau de Behaine and other missionaries, played a relatively minor role. But the missionaries, unable to call upon France to support their interests, utilized the argument of reunited Vietnam's debt to Pigneau de Behaine and, consequently, to the Catholic religion to justify their political and material demands on Gia-long. For the Nguyen founder such pretensions were exaggerated, and he soon became irritated by the missionaries' continual demands that Catholicism be granted a special status in his empire. 41 The manner in which such pressure was applied and the nature of Gia-long's response can be observed in a letter of Father Liot, dated May 1, 1804:

Last year in February, Father Véron, Father de Castorie and I, in a private audience with the king, presented His Majesty with a document in which we asked that the Christians of Tonkin and Cochin China be exempted from the superstitions that the pagans often seek to force

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them to practice. The king promised on the spot to grant our request. Then he repeatedly postponed it for almost a year. When he was finally pressed to make good his word, he asked the Grand Council to examine our request to see what action could be taken on it. The Grand Council decided that our request could not be granted, and the king raised no objection. 42 The "superstitions" that the "pagans" obliged the Christians to practice

were the ceremonial manifestations of communal solidarity in which all inhabitants of Vietnamese villages were required to participate. This sentiment was expressed in the communal worship of a titular deity. The ceremony also expressed the loyalty of the village to the emperor, who granted the village permission to worship a particular deity and determined a hierarchical ranking of the village deities. 43 Gia-long's position was delicate. Because of his previous commitments regarding religious freedom for the Catholics and his political need not to appear ungrateful to his erstwhile supporters, the emperor could neither outlaw Christianity nor directly refuse such a request that its followers be granted exemptions. Yet to grant such a request would be to institutionalize a form of religious pluralism that would have been in contradiction to his emphasis on Confucian values. With the subtle means described by Father Liot, Gia-long was able to resist the missionaries' pressure on him to grant Catho- licism a position of privilege in the empire.

Much the same approach can be seen in the didactic edict that Gia-long issued in the same year. As explained earlier the Nguyen monarchs, following the example of the early Le emperors, periodically issued edicts to instruct the population in Confucian principles. The edict began by emphasizing the duty of a legitimate ruler to "educate and civilize" (giao hoa) is people, building from the level of the village to that of the state as a whole. Citing the Confucian injunction that one should "worship the spirits, but keep them at a distance," the emperor did not forbid his subjects from worshiping the Buddha and from consulting sorcerers and geomancers. But he stressed that, practiced to an extreme degree, these customs degraded the morality of the villagers and, because of the expense involved, often placed them at the mercy of moneylenders and unscrupulous local notables. Regarding religious edifices, the edict specified that new Buddhist pagodas might not be constructed; any repairs on existing pagodas might only be undertaken with the permission of the local authorities. Christian churches were treated in a similar fashion: New structures were forbidden, and repairs of existing ones might only be made after having obtained the permission of the local authorities. The portion of the edict that specifically treated Catholicism reveals that Gia-long remained profoundly concerned about the dangers of a religion that he described in terms of its foreign origins, superstitious doctrines, and the "intoxicating" power that it exerted over converts:

As for the Catholic religion, it is a teaching that other countries have introduced into our land. They invented the doctrines of Heaven and Hell in order to stupefy the people, to make them behave as if insane.

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They are so impregnated with these notions that this becomes their habitual behavior. They become corrupted, and yet they are unaware of their corruption. 44 The 1804 edict did not call for a persecution of the Catholics, but it did

state the emperor's conception that it was a dangerous, foreign doctrine, and it subjected Catholic and Buddhist religious edifices to the same regulations.45

In terms of Vietnam's future relations with France, the most significant development of the Gia-long period was the Nguyen founder's choice of a successor. Ordinarily, upon the death of Gia-long, the throne would have gone to Prince My-dam, the eldest son of Nguyen Canh. But early in his reign Gia-long assembled the empire's notables at court and announced his decision that the youthful My-dam was not mature enough to handle the problems of a newly reunited empire. 46 Gia-long's choice was Prince Chi-dam, his own son by a concubine. Chi-dam was an excellent scholar of the Confucian classics, which he had studied from an early age with the finest Chinese teachers available. 47 And he was renowned for his profound Confucianist hostility to Catholicism. 48 The real reasons for Gia-long's choice cannot be ascertained. Perhaps he indeed feared that an immature ruler like May-dam would be easily influenced by powerful figures at court. 49 But a more probable explanation is suggested by Nicole-Dominique Le, who argues that the most important reason for Chi-dam's selection was his reputation as a Confucian hardliner on the religious question. According to this analysis, Gia-long considered Chi-dam to be the Nguyen prince best prepared to defend Vietnam's status as an independent Confucian civilization against an impending challenge from the European coun tries and from the European presence already in Vietnam, that is, the Catholic missionaries. 50

Gia-long's choice provoked the opposition of Le Van Duyet, the general whose support for the Nguyen cause during the reunification wars had won him the post of tong-tran (military protector) of Gia-dinh. 51 As the head of a region enjoying substantial autonomy, Le Van Duyet had good reason to prefer that the empire be ruled after Gia-long's death by an immature or malleable monarch. 52 The Catholic missionaries of the Gia-dinh region, who had for decades cultivated close relations with the powerful Le Van Duyet, supported him in this opposition. 53 The special relationship between Le Van Duyet and the Catholic missionaries dated from the time of Pigneau de Behaine. As a military man Le Van Duyet had a practical interest in maintaining an access to Western weapons; lacking a Confucian education, he was perhaps less shocked by Catholicism's "heterodox" practices than were the Confucian scholars and civil mandarins in the Nguyen founder's service. 54 Remembering the influence that Pigneau de Behaine had exerted over the young Nguyen Canh, the missionaries probably believed that an immature emperor from the Nguyen Canh line would be more amenable to their influence. And they had manifest reasons for fearing a strong emperor steeped in the Confucian classics and divested of Gia-long's obligation to manifest an apparent gratitude to his former supporters. The opposition of the Catholic Fathers did not go unnoticed by Gia-long,

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and it is possible that, as Pham Van Son suggests, the Nguyen founder left a secret testament to his successor, directing Chi-dam (reign period name: Minh-menh) to deal firmly with the missionaries as soon as an opportunity presented itself. 55

Minh-menh continued the policy of "closed country" initiated by Gia-long. Trade with the West was accepted under the restrictions imposed by Viet-namese regulations, but diplomatic initiatives and requests for commercial treaties were refused. For their part the French monarchs Louis XVIII, Charles X, and Louis Philippe demonstrated an active interest in establishing formal commercial relations with Vietnam. To this end, they sought to exploit the privileged positions of Gia-long's "French mandarins" and their descendants. After three years in France Jean-Baptist Chaigneau returned to Vietnam in 1821 with the title of Consul de France. He presented Minh-menh with a letter (in French) and ceremonial gifts from the French ruler, on whose behalf Chaigneau was to negotiate a commercial treaty with the Vietnamese monarch. 56 Minh-menh received Chaigneau honorably, but Minh-menh's letter of reply (in classical Chinese) to the French monarch stated that the gifts could not, because of procedural irregularities, be accepted. Since trade was open to all nations if conducted according to Vietnamese regulations, Minh-menh explained, there was no need for particular agreements between France and Vietnam:

The frontiers of our country are in the extreme south, and those of your noble country are in the extreme west. Our two lands are separated by many oceans and by thousands upon thousands of miles, and the people of our country do not often travel to yours. We have received the letter that your noble country sent us, asking for commercial relations, but we only partially understood its meaning. As for the ceremonial gifts that were offered, they are not mentioned in the letter. Regarding the question of commercial regulations, commerce is regulated by our laws, and people from the various countries who come here to trade all follow these laws. If your noble country wishes to come here for trading, you would also be asked to observe these regulations. 57 Commenting at court on his handling of the matter, Minh-menh em-

phasized that a commercial treaty would bring no benefits to Vietnam and that Chaigneau and the others had, in any case, already been richly rewarded for their support of Nguyen Phuc Anh. 58 In 1822 the French ship Cléopâtre entered Da-nang harbor. Captain Courson de la Ville Héllio asked Chaigneau to obtain permission for him to have an audience with Minh-menh, who refuse. In the same year the British representative Crawford was also refused a commercial treaty. 59 Perhaps sensing the changed mood at the Hue court, Chaigneau and Vannier, the last of Gia-long's European collaborators, departed definitively in August, 1924. After being reassured that their only reason for leaving was a natural desire to spend their remaining years in their homeland, Minh-menh granted them each travel expenses and 6,000 taels of silver. 60 In the spring of 1825 the French Captain Bougainville brought the Thetis and the Espérance to

25

Da-nang to request an audience with Minh-menh. At court Minh-menh again emphasized the necessity to avoid treating with European powers, a policy that he thought particularly appropriate in view of the intensifying political and commercial rivalry between France and England. 61 Since Vannier and Chaig- neau were no longer in Vietnam, Minh-menh was able to refuse Bougainville's request for an audience on the pretext that there was no one at court who could serve as interpreter. 62 Finally, the French government appointed Chaigneau's nephew (Eugène Chaigneau) to negotiate, as Consul de France, with the Hue court. He received from Hue the standard reply: Vietnam would continue to trade with French as well as other foreign ships according to the stipulated regulations. After Eugène Chaigneau's departure in 1829 France sent no more official missions for ten years. 63 Minh-menh thus continued Gia-long's policy of "closed country" with regard to formal diplomatic and commercial relations with the West.

Regarding the religious question, Minh-menh shared Gia-long's Confu- cian repugnance for Catholicism; indeed, as suggested above, this congruence of opinion may have been the reason for Minh-menh's selection as Gia-long's successor. Minh-menh's sensitivity, not to say allergy, to Catholicism was soon exacerbated by three factors, to be discussed below: A renaissance of missionary activity in Vietnam sponsored by the Société des Missions-Etrangères and facilitated by the illegal entry into Vietnam of many missionaries traveling on French ships; the emergence of Le Van Duyet, the military protector of Gia-dinh, as the missionaries' patron; and the support of the missionaries, many Vietnamese Catholics, and the Siamese ruler, Rama III, for a secessional revolt led by Le Van Duyet's adoptive son, Le Van Khoi. Before the rebellion broke out Minh-menh had already promulgated a number of edicts against the missionaries and the indigenous Catholics; after the rebellion was crushed, his edicts became increasingly comprehensive and severe. These du cam dao Gia-to or "edicts of interdiction of the Catholic religion" thus expressed both the Nguyen family's traditional Confucianist opposition to Christianity as a "heterodox doctrine" and Minh-menh's perception that the missionaries and the Vietnamese Catholics had supported and could again support indigenous rebellion as well as foreign intervention.

French missionary work in Asia had declined markedly during the Revo- lution and the Napoleonic Wars (1789-1815). Royal and noble patrons, formerly the most important sources of funds for evangelical endeavors, were no longer in a position to continue their support. Furthermore, the Revolution condemned the religious orders, closing their establishments and seizing their property, which interrupted the recruitment and training of missionary personnel and eliminated the remaining sources of wealth for financing foreign missions. 64 The directors of the Société des Missions-Etrangères were forced to flee France in 1792. Temporarily revived from 1805 until 1809, the Société was not definitively reestablished until 1820, its Parisian seminary remaining closed until 1823. 65 The Société des Missions-Etrangères was thereafter to benefit from what one historian described as "the ground swell of religious enthusiasm which

26

characterized Restoration France." 66 Louis XVIII reestablished the tradition of royal patronage for missionary work that the Revolution had interrupted. 67 To this lucrative source was added that of a remarkably successful operation for the solicitation of funds from more humble sectors of French society, the Oeuvre de la Propagation de la Foi, founded in Lyon in 1822. 68 With regard to the problem of transportation to Asia, the missionaries of the French Société relied on French merchant and naval vessels; once in Vietnamese waters, penetration of the long and vulnerable coastlines was a relatively simple matter. 69 The motivation of the French sea captains was pious, perhaps, in pan, but there were also political and commercial quae pro quibus: French missionaries had always known how to make themselves useful to French merchants and officials in Asia by providing needed information about the geography, language, customs, politics, and commerce of Asian lands. For these reasons, the Société des Mis- sions-Etrangères, after almost three decades of inactivity that coincided with Nguyen Phuc Anh/ Gia-long's reign, found itself, by the early years of the Minh-menh period, capable of supporting an aggressive evangelical enterprise in Vietnam. As chua and as emperor, the Nguyen founder had permitted a handful of resident missionaries to work undisturbed. He had never confronted a major effort at missionary infiltration, although it is evident that he was opposed to this in principle. 70 In contrast, Minh-menh was directly challenged early in is reign by French missionaries seeking entrance in numbers that were unprece- dented and with a persistence that was not easily deterred.

Minh-menh's first "edict of interdiction" was the result of one such infiltration, that of Father Regereau, who, in 1825, surreptitiously entered Viet- namese territory from the Thétis, then anchored in Da-nang harbor. 71 Minh-menh's edict emphasized the Confucian principle that it was a monarch's duty to protect the morals of his people from subversion, and it accused the West of complicity in this subversion:

The Westerner's perverse religion confuses the hearts of men. For a long time, many Western ships have come to trade with us and to introduce the Catholic missionaries into our country. These missionaries make the people's hearts crooked, thus destroying our beautiful customs. Truly, this is a great disaster for our land. Our purpose being to prevent our people from abandoning the orthodox way, we must accordingly completely eliminate these abuses. 72 Although the 1825 decree did not call into question the practice of permit-

ting regulated trade with the West, it reinforced inspections of Western vessels in order to prevent missionary infiltration, which was formally forbidden. It further decreed the mandatory closing of all Catholic churches. 73

The following year Minh-menh attempted to place the missionaries already in Vietnam under surveillance. Using the pretext that, following the departure of Vannier and Chaigneau, the court lacked competent translators, the emperor ordered all European priests to Hue. The missionaries who were as- sem bled there were given paid positions as government translators, but they

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were also placed under house arrest and prevented from contacting their followers or preaching. The order for the priests to assemble at Hue was disregarded by missionaries operating in Tonkin, who were concealed from Hue's officials by Catholic villagers; those of Gia-dinh initially complied but were released by 1828 due to the intervention of Le Van Duyet on their behalf. 74 The military protector of Gia-dinh humiliated Minh-menh before his court by accusing him of lacking gratitude for those who had helped place his father on the throne. Le Van Duyet thereafter refused to apply Hue's anti-Catholic edicts in Gia-dinh. 75 Despite his annoyance at this brazen disobedience to the laws of the empire by the missionaries, by the Vietnamese Catholics, and by the military governor of Gia-dinh, Minh-menh waited until after the death of Le Van Duyet in 1831 before issuing, in 1833, a general edict proscribing the practice as well as the preaching of Catholicism in Vietnam.

The 1833 edict proscribed the practice of Catholicism by the Vietnamese people themselves, calling for severe punishments such as exile, imprisonment, and execution for Vietnamese Catholics who refused to renounce their religion. 76 In an explanatory directive sent to the Ministry of Justice, Minh-menh emphasized that the Vietnamese Catholics were, for the most part, merely the unsuspecting victims of a seductive and superstitious foreign doctrine. Never- theless, their crimes were serious ones: Vietnamese followers of Catholicism, Minh-menh asserted, plucked out the eyes of invalids, corrupted the morals of young girls, abandoned the worship of Vietnamese spirits and of their own ancestors, and established distinct religious organizations that assembled large numbers of people. All of these acts, the emperor explained, were "contrary to morality, damaging to customs, and in violation of the law." Minh-menh's principle for dealing with the Vietnamese Catholics was the following: "first we must educate; only afterward do we punish" (truoc hay giao duc sau moi dung den hinh phat). Accordingly, officials were first to "advise and instruct" (khuyen hoa) the Catholics so that they would "awaken" (tinh ngo) and "repent" (hoi) their crimes. Those willing to demonstrate the sincerity of their repentance by walking on a cross would receive an imperial pardon. Only if they refused to repent, or if an ostensible repentance was insincere and the believer was subsequently discovered to have returned surreptitiously to Catholic worship, were they to be subjected to severe punishments. But repentance or no repentance, all Catholic objects of worship, books, and buildings were to be destroyed.77

In issuing the 1833 edict Minh-menh was primarily concerned that the indigenous believers, because of Catholicism's "superstitious," "perverse," and "heterodox" nature, violated the proper customs of the Vietnamese people and the laws of the state. After the Le Van Khoi rebellion, 1833-1835, the question of Catholic support for internal rebellion and foreign intervention would be added to this concern, provoking Minh-menh and his successors, Thieu-tri and Tu-duc, to issue supplementary anti-Catholic edicts that would eventually provide the pretext for a French invasion. John F. Cady is thus incorrect to assert that it was only in 1835 that, as a result of the Le Van Khoi rebellion, the

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Hue court's anti-Catholic edicts were directed against indigenous believers as well as European priests. "Persecution," Cady writes, "was extended to native Christians after 1835, when a French priest, Marchand, was executed for alleged implication in a revolt engineered by a high official in Sai-gon."78 This is not merely to quibble about chronology, for the interdiction applied to indigenous Catholics early in 1833 may help explain their support for Le Van Khoi's rebellion later that year.

The underlying cause of the revolt in Gia-dinh was the unresolved conflict between Hue's centralized administration and the system of "military defense zones" established at reunification. When he ascended the throne in 1820, Minh-menh gradually began to increase the center's supervision of the "military defense zones" and to reduce the independent authority of the military protectors. For example, in 1826, when Le Van Duyet attempted to retain a regional official who had been recalled by Hue, he was harshly criticized by Minh-menh, who insisted in an imperial proclamation that appointment and promo- tion of all officials were imperial prerogatives. 79 In 1827 Le Van Duyet executed condemned criminals without first notifying Hue. Again Minh-menh issued a critical edict, informing the military protector of Gia-dinh that "the ultimate authority to decide questions of life and death belongs to the court." 80 It was described above how Le Van Duyet refused to apply Minh-menh's anti-Catholic edicts in Gia-dinh, and how he was able to stymie the central authority in this regard. Minh-menh nevertheless continued to reduce the independent authority of the tong-tran until Le Van Duyet's death in 1831, when the Gia-dinh region was definitively incorporated under imperial authority. The tong-tran of Tonkin was abolished in 1832. 81

The newly appointed imperial officials who began to arrive in Gia-dinh shortly after the death of Le Van Duyet began the task of incorporating the region into Hue's centralized administration. They initiated a thorough investigation of the late Le Van Duyet's years in power, uncovering, they claimed, evidence of widespread corruption and abuse of power by the military protector and his subordinates. 82 The investigating official, Bach Xuan Nguyen, called for the posthumous humiliation of Le Van Duyet (that is, the desecration of is tomb), the execution of sixteen of his family members, and the arrest of many of his subordinates. 83 Whether or not there was any truth in the charges against Le Van Duyet and his entourage remains an open question. They were possibly provoked rather by Le Van Duyet's opposition to Minh-menh's ascension to the throne and by Le Van Duyet's protection of the Catholics, two issues about which Minh-menh was extremely sensitive. Be this as it may, many of the regional officials who had served under Le Van Duyet, outraged at the indignities inflicted, their patron's tomb and fearful that their own positions a security would be threatened by the expanding central power, banded together under the leadership of the late general's adoptive son, Le Van Khoi. 84

On the night of May 18, 1833 the rebellious officials seized the citadel of Sai-gon (Thanh Phien-an) and executed Bach Xuan Nguyen and his subordinates. They then performed a torch-lit ceremony at Le Van Duyet's tomb

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during which Le Van Khoi solemnly announced his rejection of Minh-menh's authority and declared his support for the remaining son of Nguyen Canh, An-hoa, as pretender to the throne. 85 The same night, they assassinated Nguyen Van Que, the governor-general (tong-doc) whom Hue had appointed to supervise the incorporation of the tran of Gia-dinh into the empire-wide provincial system. Surprise attacks were launched against poorly prepared imperial troops in nearby Bien-hoa, Dinh-tuong, An-giang, Ha-tien, and Vinh-long provinces. Within three days, the entire luc tinh or "Six Provinces" of southernmost Vietnam were in the hands of the rebels. Hue's officials at the provincial, prefectural, and subprefectural (tinh, phu, huyen) levels had all either fled or had been put to death. 86 To reinforce his defense of the luc tinh, Le Van Khoi invited the Siamese ruler, Rama III, to assist him in the coming conflict with Hue's troops. Rama III accepted, sending three Siamese armies to attack Vietnamese imperial forces in Laos, Cambodia, and in the Vietnamese provinces of Ha-tien and An-giang. Not until the summer of 1834 was the Siamese invasion force beaten back. The rebels defending the citadel of Sai-gon held out against imperial troops until September, 1835. 87

Le Van Khoi's choice of An-hoa as pretender was calculated to gain for the rebellion the support of the Catholic missionaries and, through them, the Vietnamese Catholics. The missionaries, as stated earlier, had supported Le Van Duyet in favoring the Nguyen Canh line. Le Van Khoi further wooed the missionaries by promising that Catholicism would continue to be protected in the South, and he invited them to place themselves under his protection in the citadel of Sai-gon.88 Although no precise documentation has been found to demonstrate that the Catholic missionaries themselves participated in Le Van Khoi's rebellion, the circumstantial evidence for such an involvement is substantial and internally consistent. The presence of Father Marchand (known in the imperial records as Ma-song and in modern Vietnamese as Co Du) in the Sai-gon citadel at the time of its capture by imperial forces is suggestive, as is the fact that among the 499 persons found there then were sixty-six indigenous Catholics.89 To communicate with the Siamese king and with Monsignor Taberd in Siam, Le Van Khoi used Vietnamese Catholic couriers, a number of whom were intercepted by imperial Vietnam's naval patrols in the Gulf of Thailand.90 Finally, Vietnamese Catholic units numbering 2,000 men, under the direct leadership of a Vietnamese Catholic priest, Nguyen Van Tam, participated in the Siamese invasion repelled by General Truong Minh Giang in the summer of 1834. 91 In view of the fact that indigenous priests were subordinated to the authority of European missionaries in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, it is unlikely that Nguyen Van Tam would have taken such an initiative or that it would have been so widely followed had not the approval of the missionaries been obtained in advance. The involvement of the missionaries as well as indigenous Catholics in support of Le Van Khoi's uprising in 1833-1835 is there fore undeniable.

Catholic and pro-Catholic writers, among them Phan Phat Huon and Georges Taboulet, argue that Marchand was held prisoner by Le Van Khoi. Yet

there is no evidence for this thesis besides the declarations of Marchand himself. Nor is this contention congruent with the manifest Vietnamese Catholic support for Le Van Khoi's project: Would not a hostile act such as imprisoning Father Marchand have rather provoked the wrath of the Vietnamese Catholics? Nicole-Dominique Le, for her part, argues that the evident Vietnamese Catholic support for the rebellion was in violation of the missionaries' orders to remain neutral. Regarding the involvement of Marchand, she defers judgment due to the lack of documentary evidence: "Did he or did he not take part in Khoi's revolt? No one has been able to say in an objective fashion, in part because of the lack of precise documents ."92 Some Vietnamese Marxist authors have pushed the argument to the opposite extreme: The missionaries, these authors contend, were the real organizational force behind the uprising of 1833-1835. In this analysis Le Van Khoi was merely a pawn in the missionaries' plot to found, with Siamese support, a Catholic state in Gia-dinh. 93

At the Hue court there was no doubt that the missionaries and the indigenous Catholics had cooperated with a rebellion against Minh-menh's authority, a rebellion that had enlisted the support of a powerful foreign power, Viet- nam's traditional rival, Siam. This view is expressed in a memorial written by Phan Ba Dat, a high ranking official from the censorial bureau. Emphasizing the role of the foreign priests in corrupting the Vietnamese people and pushing them to depravity and rebellion, Phan Ba Dat asked the court in 1835 to reinforce its efforts at finding and executing the missionaries:

The Western heterodox religion intoxicates the hearts of men, making it truly the most dangerous of all superstitions. We have repeatedly instructed and warned the people in the most detailed fashion. We have abolished their churches and forbidden them to assemble for worship. There are some who, by error, followed this religion for a time but have since sincerely repented and changed their ways… Then, in the fourteenth year of Minh-menh, there was an uprising in the citadel of Phien-an, and a Western priest, Ma-song, took the side of the rebel Khoi, secretly communicating with the Siamese enemy and assembling a party of the Catholics. They opposed our troops and officials for as long as three years… It has long been known that the followers of the Western heterodox religion steal people's eyes. Furthermore, they have the practice of enclosing a young man and wo-man together in a small house with a wall inside to separate them. After many days, the feelings of passion mount. Then they are killed, and their bodies are crushed in order to concoct sacred wafers. Whenever Catholicism is preached, these wafers are given to everyone. Eating them enchants the people to the point that they cannot abandon this religion… How can we fail to take decisive action to destroy this religion and to punish those who spread it? Previously, the Western priests used Chinese ships to enter our country, hiding themselves locally as did the rebellious Ma-song. Probably there are many more of them who remain concealed. In every region that they inhabit, they propagate the heterodox religion in order to bewitch the people, and the effects on the people's customs are considerable. 94

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Minh-menh issued further anti-Catholic edicts, the most important of which appeared in 1836 and 1838. The emphasis was on finding and executing missionaries. Officials in whose jurisdictions missionaries were concealed as well as the Vietnamese who concealed them were to be punished. Previously established punishments for Vietnamese Catholics remained in force, as did the possibility of a pardon for those willing to apostatize. Although there is not adequate documentation to understand the edicts' impact on the Vietnamese Catholics, the post-rebellion edicts were rather effective in bringing missionaries before Vietnamese imperial justice; in the two years 1836-1837 alone, six missionaries were executed by Vietnamese authorities: Ignace Delgado, Domi- nico Henarès, Cornay, Fernandez, Jaccard, and Bishop Borie. 95

What effect did the First Opium War, 1839-1842, in which British naval forces ravished Chinese coastal provinces and assaulted Nanking, have on Vietnamese foreign policy? In the words of Paul Mus, the events of 1839 "gave Minh-menh a new perspective on the dark dangers which came from the West, on account of, in particular, the heavy artillery carried by these giant - for the period - vessels." 96 Accordingly, Minh-menh sent, in 1840, diplomatic missions to London, Batavia, and Paris, hoping to learn more about the capacities and intentions of the Westerners.97 Some historians have seen these diplomatic missions as representing a potential turning point in Hue's policy toward the West. Le Thanh Khoi, for instance, writes that Minh-menh sent the missions in order to gather information "with the intention of changing his foreign policy." 98 Yet it is doubtful that significant changes in the traditional Confucian policies for dealing with the "barbarians" were being considered by the second Nguyen emperor. A discourse given by Minh-menh at court in 1840 reveals that he still thought that the problems caused by the West could be handled by strictly regulating Western contacts with the Vietnamese and by reinforcing coastal defenses. The mistake of the Qing court, Minh-menh complacently explained, was that Chinese officials, blinded by the prospect of profits from trade with the "barbarians," had failed to take the requisite precautions. Vietnam, the emperor told his court, would make no such miscalculation:

There has always been a strategy for halting the advances of barbarians. If we take the proper precautions, then there cannot be any basis for hostilities to break out. The Qing saw only the immediate benefits of the revenues to be realized by tariffs on trade. Thus they opened thirteen ports where Westerners might come ashore for trading. Such a policy was doomed to failure. Recently, because of the demand for opium… local Qing authorities invented a story, telling the Westerners that if they turned over the opium, they would be paid in silver for it. But the Qing officials did not pay, and the Westerners, facing the loss of their investment, seized this pretext, assembled warships, and provoked a conflict. If we examine the cause of these hostilities, it becomes evident that the Qing court itself is to blame. Our own court deals with the Westerners according to the following principles. If they come here, we do not oppose them; if they leave, we do not chase them; we

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simply treat them like barbarians. If their vessels come to trade, we only permit them to anchor at Tra-son. When exchanges are finished, they must depart. We do not let them remain ashore for long, and we do not allow the local people to trade directly with them. Such a policy of acting on a problem while it is still small is truly circumspect. Thus, even if they are cunning and deceitful, there will be no openings of which they can take advantage in order to cause troubles…Thus, our coastal defenses are fearsome and cannot be penetrated. When the foreigners see that we have reorganized our defenses, they will abandon their avarice. 99 Therefore, it is an error to suppose that the Vietnamese diplomatic mis-

sions of 1839 are evidence that Minh-menh was considering major foreign policy changes. In any case, the French ruler, Louis Philippe, yielding to the protestations of the Vatican and the Société des Missions-Etrangères, refused to receive the Vietnamese emissaries. The response in the other European capitals was also negative. By the time the Vietnamese diplomats returned to Vietnam, Minh-menh had died (January 21, 1841). 100

Minh-menh's successor, Thieu-tri, did not change the basic features of his predecessors' policies. He continued to accept trade with the Western countries if they would agree to follow the established Vietnamese regulations. And he persisted in his precursors' refusal to negotiate special diplomatic or commercial treaties with any Western power. However, in view of the recent success of Western arms in China, Thieu-tri sought to avoid provoking the West. Accor- dingly, while Thieu-tri maintained Minh-menh's anti-Catholic edicts, he initially manifested leniency for the missionaries. Indigenous priests and believers who refused to recant could still be executed under Thieu-tri, but foreign missionaries apprehended for illegally entering or residing in Vietnam were imprisoned or merely compelled to leave the country. It is thus necessary once again to criticize the view of Cady, who writes as follows in regard to the policy of Thieu-tri toward France and the French missionaries:

The relations between French missionaries and the anti-foreign King Thieu-tri were uniformly hostile. Most of the missionaries were obliged to go into hiding on pain of suffering imprisonment or death. The ruler's vindictive mood was aggravated by the periodic French naval forays at Tourane harbor.101 In fact, under Thieu-tri, French missionaries were expelled or imprisoned

- but not executed - prior to the March, 1847 incident at Da-nang, that is, Tou- rane; only after and, in part, as a result of this French attack were missionaries again executed by the Vietnamese state.

During the Thieu-tri period, 1841-1848, France had not yet determined to undertake a policy of colonial aggression in Vietnam. But France's role in nearby China was, from 1840 onward, an increasingly important one. In this mid-century imperialist competition to penetrate the markets of China, France was a relative newcomer behind England. The first "opium war" prompted

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French strategists to realize the necessity of maintaining a presence in China seas, both to protect existing French interests and to prevent other Western powers from obtaining any exclusive privileges from Asian states. Accordingly, the French naval presence was reinforced from 1840, with French warships calling regularly at the ports of Manila, Batavia, Singapore, Macao, and Hong-kong. Because of this enhanced naval power the French were able to join the Americans and the English in forcing the Qing court to sign yet another conces- sionary agreement, the Treaty of Whampoa, 1844, thereby securing privileges including trading rights and the promise of protection for missionaries. Firmly implanted in the Central Kingdom, France was then confronted with the necessity of securing points d'appui in surrounding waters and regions. French Foreign Minister Guizot publicly stated that maintaining a French presence in China required naval bases in China waters and a colony close to South China. 102 Nevertheless, the July Monarchy of Louis Philippe did not resolve to act on these imperatives before it was toppled in the Revolution of 1848, which interrupted French activity in Asia until the establishment of the Second Empire under Napoleon III in 1852. But for reasons of domestic politics, namely, to placate the Catholics, Louis Philippe had authorized, in 1843, the chiefs of French naval divisions in China waters to protect French missionaries from violence or execution at the hands of Asian monarchs, provided that they could do so without provoking hostilities. The discretion thereby granted these officers brought the unpredictable "local factor" into play. 103 The naval officers in question naturally sought to expand their role - and thus their importance -as much as possible. 104 The interventions of the French naval officers and the resulting hostilities finally provoked Thieu-tri to renew executions of foreign priests, to issue more severe punishments for indigenous Catholics, and to definitively close his ports to all French ships.

The first of these interventions occurred in March 1843 when the Héroine under Favin Léveque arrived in Da-nang harbor to demand the release of five missionaries imprisoned at nearby Hue. Thieu-tri complied, releasing into Léveque's custody Miche, Duclos, Galey, Berneux, and Charrier. 105 In June 1845 the Alemène under Fornier Duplan entered Da-nang harbor to demand the release of another French missionary, Lefèbre. The latter was released into the custody of the French officer, who transported him to Singapore. But Lefèbre again illegally entered Vietnam, and he was arrested by Vietnamese officials in Sai-gon in June 1846. He was again released by the Vietnamese authorities, this time into British custody. The following year, he again illegally returned to the Gia-dinh region. 106

In March 1847 the Gloire under Lapierre and the Victorieuse under Ri- gault de Genouilly entered Da-nang harbor. Fully aware that Hue had already released all of the imprisoned missionaries, the French officers demanded instead that Thieu-tri grant complete liberty to the missionaries and indigenous Catholics. They also asked Thieu-tri to end the commercial restrictions with which the Vietnamese controlled trade with French merchants. 107 According to the Dai Nam thuc luc account of the events, the French officers' comport-

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ment was aggressive from the beginning. Having come ashore with twenty armed men, Lapierre verbally abused the local mandarin, Ly Van Phuc, insulting him and insisting that he deliver an official letter from the French officer to the Vietnamese ruler. Since accepting such an epistle would have implied political parity between Vietnam and France, Ly Van Phuc could only refuse. When he did so, Lapierre left the letter with Ly Van Phuc and departed. Certain that he would be punished regardless of which course he took, the unfortunate official sent the letter to the Hue court. During the delay French sailors moved freely about on shore, entering coastal villages and meeting with five or six Catholic priests who supplied them with intelligence. The Hue court was finally goaded to act when the French ships confiscated the sails and riggings of five of the Vietnamese navy's bronze-plated ships. Incapable of movement, Hue's armored craft were, in effect, hostages with which the French officers sought to extort a favorable settlement. In response, Hue moved other warships into the harbor and placed coastal defense forts on alert. 108 Had Emperor Thieu-tri decided on a preventative strike to put an end to these violations of Vietnamese sovereignty? The monarch was instead attempting to prevent the French from entering the coastal villages and communicating with the Catholics. Further- more, the Emperor believed that the French would not have sent only two ships if an attack were planned; therefore, a display of Vietnam's defensive capacities was considered adequate to make the French ships withdraw or negotiate a resolution to the crisis. 109 Although the court believed that the matter could be settled peacefully, Emperor Thieu-tri refused any compromise on the fundamental principles of his foreign policy with the West. He reiterated his position to the dignitaries of his Privy Council, the Co Mat Vien: Only commerce conducted according to Vietnamese regulations was permitted, and the "heterodox religion" of Catholicism, "injurious" to the people, could not be tolerated.110

Thus, the Hue court refused to negotiate the points demanded by the French officers, but it nevertheless hoped to end the conflict without resort to force. Accordingly, the Vietnamese commanders were ordered not to strike first but only to respond if the French "initiated hostilities" (sinh chuyen truoc):

If the Westerners respect our position and do not continue to impose themselves by aggression, then we should not use force. But in case they initiate hostilities, we immediately order all of our citadels, towers, boats and soldiers to attack in a coordinated fashion to destroy them completely. All along the coast, we must defend tightly, not letting them enter the hamlets. And we must absolutely forbid the Catholic people from going back and forth and supplying them with information. 111 At this point the unpredictable reaction of the "man on the spot" came into

play. On April 14, 1847 the French officers detected movement among the Vietnamese coastal installations and observed the entrance into Da-nang harbor of Vietnamese warships. Wrongly thinking that an attack was imminent, they opened fire, destroying coastal fortifications and sinking all five armored ships. The French bombardment lasted about one hour. Lapierre did not attempt to land any troops, and the French withdrew the following day. 112

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The attack confirmed Thieu-tri's Confucian conception of the "barbaric" nature of the French and increased his awareness of the potential dangers that they presented for Vietnam. He issued an edict calling for reinforced coastal defense and specifying that French military or commercial craft were no longer to call at Vietnamese ports:

The French are truly a gang of barbarians. Their crimes cannot be pardoned. Any commercial or military ship of theirs coming to our shores should be chased away and not permitted to land… Provincial officials must examine the geographical configurations and erect more fortifications and artillery of all kinds in order to tighten coastal defenses. 113 Emperor Thieu-tri was also alarmed by reports that Vietnamese Chris-

tians, including a sergeant (suat doi ) in the imperial army, had communicated with the French force while the latter were ashore prior to the cannonade of April 14, 1847.114 For Thieu-tri, this indicated that the seductive power of Catho licism was even greater than he had feared. For this incident - and the recent discovery of at least one other elite conversion, that of prefectural mandarin Tran Quang Dao - proved that even the classically educated elite could be converted to Catholicism and suggested that conversion was inevitably followed by rebellious activity in the political and social spheres. Thieu-tri warned the mandarinate of this in an edict of 1847:

The Catholic religion is a heterodox religion that deeply enchants the hearts of men. It not only tempts the stupid people; even among officials, there are those who become so bewitched that they do not awaken. Recently, during the Da-nang affair in Quang-nam province, sergeant Vu Van Diem, because of his conversion to the Western religion, surreptitiously passed military secrets to the enemy and held back his troops. Furthermore, there is the case of Tran Quang Dao in Son-tay province, who, secretly a follower of the heterodox religion, did not observe mourning for his mother's death. There are many such people, and we cannot allow their numbers to increase continually. 115 Accordingly, Thieu-tri called for increased vigilance by his officials in

enforcing existing anti-Catholic edicts, and he decreed that any European arrested inside the country should be immediately executed. 116

Thieu-tri died late in 1847. During his brief reign, he had maintained the Confucian-influenced foreign policy of his precursors, Gia-long and Minh-menh. He continued the latter's anti-Catholic measures although he imprisoned or expelled foreign missionaries rather than executing them. This was probably an attempt to reduce tensions with the West, which had shown its power in attacks on China. This attempt at reducing tensions was not reciprocated on the French side. As the case of Lefèbre illustrates, released missionaries did not hesitate to return to Vietnam to preach Catholicism. And when there were no more imprisoned missionaries whose release could be sought, the French officers, while continuing to pressure Hue for commercial privileges, escalated

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their religious demands to include complete freedom for the Catholics. In April 1847 French officers Lapierre and Rigault de Genouilly opened fire on Viet- namese ships and shore installations. This induced an exasperated Thieu-tri to refuse to receive any more French ships, commercial or military, tighten coastal defenses, threaten with immediate execution any European arrested in the coun try, and call for a more rigorous enforcement of existing anti-Catholic edicts.

The ascension of Nguyen Phuc Hong-nham (reign period name: Tu-duc) to the Vietnamese throne on March 26, 1848 brought no significant change in the Hue court's policy vis-à-vis the Europeans. Like his precursors Minh-menh and Thieu-tri, the Tu-duc Emperor was an accomplished Confucian scholar who considered the Chinese classics to be the ultimate repository of political wisdom. Despite the mounting evidence of the West's technological accomplishments and military prowess, the Vietnamese Confucian political elite conti nued to perceive the Westerners as the equivalent of the "barbarian" tribes that had plagued the Chinese Tang and Sung dynasties. 117 Although the Tu-duc Emperor and his advisors were well aware of the rise of European power in Asia - this is confirmed by the mandarinal memorials to the monarch - they had not seriously considered the possibility that an effective means for combating Wes- tern aggression could be found by studying Western civilization itself. 118 The Tu-duc court therefore implemented the traditional policy of the Nguyen monarchs, as defined by Thieu-tri in the aftermath of the April, 1847 bombardment of Da-nang: "Closed country," meaning that limited and regulated trade was the only form of contact permitted Western countries with the exception of France, which was denied this privilege. From the inception of his reign, Tu-duc refused to entertain American, English, Spanish, and French requests for commercial and political relations. 119

Regarding the Catholic religion, Tu-duc reinforced the interdictions of his predecessors as a practical response to the Western threat and because he believed that the Catholic religion was contrary to morality and social discipline.120 Immediately upon assuming the throne, Tu-duc issued an edict stating that European missionaries arrested by Vietnamese mandarins were to be immediately interrogated and then executed by drowning. Indigenous priests and believers were also to be interrogated. Those who could demonstrate a sincere apostasy by walking on a cross were to be pardoned and released. Vietnamese priests who refused to renounce their faith were to be executed. Ordinary believers who refused to apostatize were to have the characters ta dao (heterodox religion) tattooed into their faces before they were released; the tattoos could be removed if the Catholics agreed to repudiate their beliefs.121 Subsequent, more severe edicts were issued whenever Tu-duc was confronted with evidence that the Catholic missionaries or the indigenous Catholics were involved in internal rebellions or were in league with a foreign power.

One such instance was an abortive coup d'état in the spring of 1851, led by a frustrated Nguyen prince named Hong-bao. Although Hong-bao was the oldest of the late Emperor Thieu-tri's forty-seven children, he had been by- passed in the selection process by Hong-nham because Hong-bao was the son

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of a secondary wife and because he was said to lack the requisite moral qualities. Although Hong-bao's plans were discovered before they could be put into operation, Tu-duc was alarmed by evidence of contact between Hong-bao and the indigenous Catholics, whom he had allegedly promised freedom of worship in return for political support. There is no solid evidence that Hong-bao's overtures were favorably received by any Vietnamese Catholics or European missionaries although the overtures themselves are confirmed by a letter of Father Pellerin, dated February 23, 1857. Nevertheless, the historical record of Catholic support for such rebellions (that is, the 1833 uprising in Gia-dinh) certainly gave Tu-duc sufficient cause to suspect the worst. 122

Another incident that provoked reinforced anti-Catholic edicts was the Montigny mission of 1856-1857. In 1855 De Montigny was appointed as a special envoy for negotiating commercial treaties with Asian states. He was warmly received in Thailand and planned to rendezvous with three escorting warships en route to Da-nang, where he hoped to negotiate a commercial treaty with the Tu-duc court. But De Montigny was delayed by negotiations for a peace treaty with the Cambodian ruler. His escort, led by the Catinat under Le Lieur, arrived at Da-nang on September 17, 1856, well before De Montigny did. Le Lieur, feeling threatened by Vietnamese coastal fortifications and frustrated by his fruitless exchanges with local mandarins, opened fire with his shipboard guns and destroyed a number of artillery emplacements in Da-nang harbor. By the time De Montigny finally arrived in January of 1857, the deed had been done, and there was no chance, if indeed there had ever been one, of his being received by the Hue court. 123 In Tu-duc's eyes the Catholics were associated with the mission and its violence because Father Pellerin, a French missionary who had surreptitiously left Vietnam aboard the Capricieuse in October, 1856, was De Montigny's interpreter and advisor during the latter's meetings with local Viet- namese officials. 124

During the early years of the Tu-duc reign period, therefore, the Viet- namese state continued to refuse commercial and political intercourse with France. This was the result of the belief that Europeans were a "barbarian" people, and it was also a practical response to continued French attacks on Vietnamese coastal installations. Tu-duc also maintained and expanded upon Thieu-tri's anti-Catholic edicts. This was because he believed that Catholicism was a "heterodox doctrine," contrary to morality and social discipline, and because the Vietnamese Catholics and/or their missionaries were discovered to have maintained contacts with hostile or rebellious elements inside and outside the country. The Tu-duc Emperor's anti-Catholic edicts, insofar as they affected the European missionaries, were of capital importance for Franco-Vietnamese relations. Between 1847 and 1856 the Vietnamese state executed two missionaries, Jean-Louis Bonnard and Augustin Schoeffler, thereby providing France with the pretext it needed for the launching of the 1858 invasion.

To summarize, the discussion of the 1802-1858 period emphasized the consistency of the Nguyen emperors' policies regarding the West. Because of the Confucian principles reconsecrated in Vietnam by Gia-long, the Nguyen

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monarchs regarded the Westerners as "barbarians" and Catholicism as a "heterodox religion." Gia-long limited the scope and regulated the practice of Western trade with Vietnam, and he refused all requests for diplomatic relations. Because of the highly visible if largely inconsequential role that the Catholic priests had played in the reunification struggle, the Nguyen founder felt compelled to tolerate the activities of missionaries during his reign. But he was careful not to grant Catholicism a privileged position in the Vietnamese polity. And Gia-long, through his emphasis on Confucian principles and his selection of the anti-Catholic Chi-dam as his successor, manifested his fundamental opposition to the presence of Catholicism in Vietnam. His successors, Minh-menh and Thieu-tri, reacted to increasing missionary infiltration and to an evident support by the missionaries and the indigenous Catholics for internal rebellion and for foreign intervention by issuing progressively more severe and comprehensive prohibitions of Catholicism. When confronted with French military interventions, the reaction of Thieu-tri and Tu-duc was to respond with military force if necessary, to close off the possibility of continuing commercial and diplomatic intercourse, and to increase further the severity of prohibitions of Catholicism. The following chapter, focusing on the period of the Franco-Spanish intervention of 1858-1862, tries to understand why, by 1862, Tu-duc was compelled to break with this pattern of response to French intervention.

1

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3

The Franco-Spanish Invasion and the Treaty of Sai-gon,

1858-1862

The previous two chapters developed the concept that, during the 1802-

1858 period, the Nguyen emperors practiced a consistent pattern of response to Western - most often, French - intervention. This pattern may be summarized as follows: The Nguyen emperors resisted French pressure by limiting commercial and diplomatic contacts, trying to purge Vietnam of the Catholic missionaries and to prohibit the religion they taught, and by responding in kind to French military aggression. This chapter attempts to explain why, by spring of 1862, the Tu-duc Emperor was compelled to abandon these traditional responses to French intervention. The first topic to be addressed is France's changing policy regarding Vietnam. Specifically, the following question is to be explored: Why, in 1857, did French Emperor Napoleon III decide to order an invasion of Vietnam? This is followed by a consideration of the objective military situation during the 1858-1862 war, after which the scope of the official elite's subjective responses to this situation are outlined. The discussion of the 1858-1862 period closes with an intervention in the debate among modern Vietnamese historians of the Sai-gon school about the position of the Tu-duc Emperor regarding the 1862 accords. Specifically, the question of the relative responsibility of Tu-duc and Vietnamese negotiator Phan Thanh Gian for the 1862 document, which granted France substantial territorial, commercial, political, and religious privileges in Vietnam, is addressed. It is argued that Emperor Tu-duc himself, in order to escape from what had become a desperate military situation, approved of Phan Thanh Gian's signing of the Treaty of Sai-gon, which therefore represents a significant historical break with the traditional Nguyen response to French intervention.

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From the inception of his reign in 1852, Emperor Napoleon III had been pressured by a variety of groups to take a harder line with the Vietnamese state. Church representatives had long advocated an activist foreign policy in support of their interests in Vietnam. Indeed, the most determined and persistent of the pro-interventionist militants were undoubtedly the missionaries of the Société des Mission-Etrangères, particularly Pellerin, Retord, Libois, and Huc. 1 The Church groups' arguments were echoed, with differences in nuance, by the Ministry of the Navy, where bitter regrets over the loss of France's American empire in the eighteenth century were giving birth to exaggerated hopes for a new and greater nineteenth-century empire in Asia.2 French naval officers active in China waters, among them Cécille, Rocquemaurel, Jaurès, Fourichon, and Maison-neuve, were the first to propose a conquest of Vietnam to the French emperor. Many of the French diplomats stationed at Macao, such as Forth, Rouen, De Courcy, and Bourboulon, joined their voices to this colonialist cacophony. 3

In April 1857 Napoleon III appointed a special committee - La Commis sion de la Cochinchine - to investigate the question of intervention. 4 The committee members - Baron Brennier, its chairman; Admiral Fourichon; Ship's Captain Jaurès; and Count Fleury, who represented the French Ministry of Com merce and Agriculture - met from May 3, 1857 until August 10, 1858. 5 Many missionaries were called to testify, among them Huc and Pellerin. The latter did not limit his testimony to the religious aspect. He emphasized also the necessity for France to act quickly to obtain strategic and commercial bases in this part of the world, bases to which, he claimed, France was entitled according to the terms of the 1787 treaty. Pellerin further emphasized the relative ease with which the operation could be accomplished, given the massive support that he alleged the indigenous Catholics would bring to their French "liberators." He urged the French government to occupy Vietnam and to capture the Viet- namese monarch, who, Pellerin supposed, would die in the process. This, the prelate continued, would leave the French free to govern the country through a successor of their own choosing and with an administration built upon a "spinal column" of Vietnamese Catholics. 6 The members of the commission were obliged to admit that the 1787 treaty had not been implemented by Louis XVI's government. Nevertheless, the commission's members insisted that France had a moral right to compensation since French officers had helped Nguyen Phuc Anh to win the Vietnamese throne. They concluded that the time had come for France to join in "the movement of progress, civilization, and commercial expansion of which China was going to be the theater." The commission urged that the issue of religious persecution in Vietnam be put to good use as the justification for the establishment of a solid French presence in the Far East. To this end they recommended that France obtain a protectorate over the territory of Vietnam. 7

In approving the recommendations of La Commission de la Cochinchine, Napoleon III's motivations were several. The question of France's opposition to the "persecution" of Catholic missionaries in Vietnam was significant primarily

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in domestic political terms. Napoleon III could not have established and maintained his regime without the support of the French Catholics; the protection of missionaries in distant lands was a relatively inexpensive quid pro quo. 8 But the religious factor alone was not sufficient to stir the French government to intervene. In the words of Milton Osborne, the additional elements of "imperial ambition and commercial opportunity" were also necessary before Napoleon III could be convinced of the desirability of mounting an expedition against Vietnam. 9 The French emperor found it expedient to support the interests of manufacturing and exporting groups in their pursuit of markets for their goods and raw materials for their factories. Another important domestic consideration was what may be termed the "prestige factor" of colonies, that is, the domestic political benefits that a European government could hope to derive from imperialistic adventures. This factor was particularly active in France because Napoleon III was intent on creating an overseas empire as a manifestation of his imperial legitimacy and his ability to advance perceived French interests in competition with other European powers. As long as they were successfully undertaken and not too costly, such adventures were popular with the masses and assured his regime the support of military officers. 10 The latter were, of course, especially concerned with the strategic advantages vis-à-vis competing European powers - particularly England - that successful colonization could bring. French intervention in Vietnam was, of course, legitimized in the name of opposition to the "persecution" of Catholic missionaries by the Hue court, but the above considerations indicate that the question of "persecution" was merely a screen behind which were concealed more mundane considerations - domestic politics, dynastic prestige, economics, and international competition.

A combined Franco-Spanish expeditionary force assembled in Da-nang harbor on August 31, 1858. The French component was 2,500 troops and thirteen warships; Spanish forces from the Philippines contributed one warship and 450 colonial troops. 11 The French commander, Rigault de Genouilly, planned to destroy the Vietnamese defenses at Da-nang harbor with lightning speed, after which an overland attack on Hue was to be launched. Once the imperial capital fell, it was believed, the will to resist of the entire country would be broken. 12 The European assault began on September 1, 1858 but was soon halted by the defensive tactics of the Vietnamese commander, Nguyen Tri Phuong, who sealed off the invaders by constructing an elaborate system of trenches and walls. Local geography facilitated defense, for the region's rivers were too shallow to permit the heavy European craft to penetrate the interior to support the troops in the planned assault on Hue. 13 After five months of fierce combat, the Franco-Spanish forces controlled little more than an uninhabited stretch of shore. The contest seemed to be a stalemate, and all hopes for dealing the Hue court a coup de grâce from Da-nang were abandoned by the European officers. 14 The deadlock was a costly one for the invaders because cholera had broken out among the Franco-Spanish soldiers. 15

Rigault de Genouilly decided to take advantage of the mobile firepower of his fleet in order to shift the brunt of his attack to southernmost Vietnam,

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known to contemporary Vietnamese as the luc tinh or "Six Provinces." 16 From the point of view of the French commander, the luc tinh offered numerous advantages. Hue's dependence on southern rice raised the possibility of a blockade. 17 The region's deep and penetrating rivers would permit his troops to attack Vietnamese strongpoints under the cover of his shipboard guns. Once entrenched in the luc tinh, the French commander could hope to counter British influence in Thailand, while persuading Thailand itself and Cambodia to oppose Vietnam. 18 Furthermore, the luc tinh were intrinsically more desirable a target than was Da-nang to the French commander, for the region around Sai-gon was already an important trade center. 19

Leaving one-third of his soldiers in defensive positions at Da-nang, de Ge- nouilly sent the remaining two-thirds on his fourteen warships to the luc tinh. Their offensive opened on February 10, 1859 with a bombardment of Vung Tau. Within six days the European ships had destroyed twelve Vietnamese fortresses and three river barriers, which permitted them to attack the citadel of Gia-dinh with their shipboard guns at point-blank range. 20 The citadel fell after only two days, and the retreating Vietnamese forces left behind large stores of grain, munitions, and silver. Informed that the small Franco-Spanish holding force at Da-nang was in serious danger of being overrun, de Genouilly left a small contingent in the luc tinh and returned to Da-nang, where he was able to force the Vietnamese troops to retreat. 21 De Genouilly then offered the Hue court a negotiated settlement along the lines of the "unequal treaties" that had been extorted from the Chinese Qing court, but there was no clear response before he fell ill and was replaced by Admiral Page. Page continued to press Hue for such a settlement. 22

At this point a substantial portion of the French force in Vietnam was withdrawn to participate in the operations being conducted by Admiral Char- ner in cooperation with the British navy against China. The Franco-Spanish positions at Da-nang were abandoned and a reduced force of 1,000 men was left in the luc tinh under the command of Colonel d'Ariès. 23 The Hue court dispatched Nguyen Tri Phuong and Pham The Hien to take command of the Viet- namese armies in the luc tinh. They constructed a defensive system at Ky-hoa (known in French texts as Chi-hoa), which the Franco-Spanish troops unsuc- cessfully attempted to breach on several occasions. 24

In the spring of 1861 the Franco-British expedition was successfully completed in China, releasing an important French force (seventy vessels, 3,500 troops) under Admiral Charner for action against Vietnam.25 On February 23, 1861 the reinforced Franco-Spanish troops launched their attack on the Ky-hoa defensive complex, which the overran after two days of bloody fighting. After the fall of Ky-hoa the Hue court's regular forces were no longer able to stand up to the European onslaught, and the provincial citadels and strongpoints of the luc tinh were successively overpowered: The prefecture of Tan-binh fell on February 28, 1861; the citadel of Dinh-tuong on April 12, 1861; and the citadel of Vinh-long on February 23, 1862. 26 With the decline in the capacity of the Vietnamese regular forces in the South, the bulk of the fighting was assumed by

PHAN THANH GIAN

43

irregular forces. These irregulars harassed Franco-Spanish units in rural zones where the latter were thinly spread but were incapable of challenging them in the captured citadels and administrative centers. 27

What was the role of the Vietnamese Catholics during the Franco-Spanish invasion? The question deserves a separate monograph, but here it may be worthwhile to respond briefly to the arguments of a number of modern historians who have affirmed that the Vietnamese Catholics did not support or join with the Franco-Spanish troops at Da-nang in 1858-1859.28 In fact, French archival sources show clearly that, as early as September 1858, groups of Ton- kinese Catholics began to reach the embattled European armies. Rigault de Genouilly formed the men into two indigenous detachments and trained them at a camp that he established for this purpose at Tien-cha. One of these detachments fought alongside the Franco-Spanish soldiers at Da-nang; the other went southward to participate in the invasion of the luc tinh and fought in the battle of Ky-hoa. 29 After the battle of Ky-hoa, the indigenous Catholic militiamen who entered the service of the Europeans at Da-nang continued to serve the French in the occupied south as soldiers, interpreters, coolies, and guides.30 They were rewarded for their services by Admiral-Governor de la Grandière, who granted them concessions of land in the Sai-gon area. 31

That the number of Vietnamese Catholics who fought for the Europeans at Da-nang was not greater is probably due to the fact that the Franco-Spanish units, because of missionary misinformation and their own strategic stupidity, found themselves isolated on the central coastline, cut off by Vietnamese troops from all but naval communication. Geographical factors contributed to this isolation: Most rivers in central Vietnam were too shallow to be penetrated by the heavy European warships. Furthermore, missionary Catholicism in Viet- nam had historically had more success in obtaining conversions in the North and the South than in the center. Thus, the European armies were searching for indigenous allies in the very region in which they were least likely to find them. Nevertheless, since the Franco-Spanish invaders found enough Vietnamese Ca- tholic fighters at Da-nang to form two detachments, the arguments that a number of modern historians have made for a lack of Catholic support for the invasion of Da-nang stand in need of revision.

During the Franco-Spanish invasion of 1858-1862, the Tu-duc Emperor's interdictions of Catholicism grew increasingly severe and comprehensive. This was primarily because the Hue court believed that the Vietnamese Catholics supported the invading armies. The wartime edicts were thus largely directed to the problem of preventing the Vietnamese Catholics from communicating with the Franco-Spanish forces. An edict of May 1859, for example, stated that, upon hearing of the fall of the Sai-gon citadel, the Vietnamese Catholics of the South were taking advantage of the situation in order to terrorize the luong or "good" (that is, non-Catholic) people and to serve as "lackeys and spies for the Westerners [tay sai va mat tham cho Tay-duong]." The edict ordered that the relatives of any Catholic who was working for the invaders be taken as hostages until the culpable party surrendered to Vietnamese authorities. Catholics sus-

44

pected of having contacts with the Westerners were to be imprisoned as a preventative measure. Catholics who displayed a "wait and see attitude [vo van, trong ngong]" regarding the invaders were to be placed under the surveillance of non-Catholic villages. 32 An edict of 1861 specified that imprisoned Catholics were to be executed if the prison in which they were held was in danger of being seized by the Europeans. Another edict in the same year ordered that incarce- rated Catholics who refused to recant were to be executed by choking. 33 As for those Catholics who remained in their villages, the court ordered that their taxes be doubled in order to pay for military expenses. 34 The severity of these wartime edicts was justified, in the emperor's opinion, because the Catholics had "brought the Westerners into the country." 35

Despite the seeming severity and comprehensiveness of these measures, scholars have pointed out the existence of what may be termed a "persecution gap" or difference between the letter of the edicts and their implementation at the local level. This observation is applicable to the period before the 1858-1862 war as well. To cite a few instances, in 1848 the Xa-doai seminary in Nghe-an province was still operating openly; Bishop Gauthier invited Nguyen Truong To, the great Catholic scholar and reformist, there to teach. 36 And in 1861 the Tu-duc Emperor degraded in rank and transferred two high-level officials in Quang-binh province - Nguyen Van Ung and Ta Huu Khue - when it was discovered that they had permitted two Vietnamese Catholics to move freely about the province in exchange for the preparation of medicines for use by the officials' families. 37 Conversely, an official in Nam-dinh province claimed in 1862 that 4,800 Catholics had been executed by imperial officials there in the previous year alone. 38 In the absence of more precise, reliable, and comprehensive documentation, judgment must be withheld regarding the actual impact of official anti-Catholicism both before and during the 1858-1862 conflict. With the existing documentation it can only be concluded that the imperial court believed that the Catholics were aiding the French and Spanish troops and that the court was not entirely wrong in this perception. Accordingly, the Tu-duc Emperor's wartime anti-Catholic edicts reached new extremes of severity prima rily in order to keep the indigenous Catholics from linking with the invading forces. Despite the emperor's intention to deal severely with the Catholics, the inclinations of local officials determined the manner in which the court's edicts were implemented; the severity of the edicts was thus in some cases mitigated.

How can the Franco-Spanish military success be explained? Most historians have emphasized two objective factors: the technical superiority of Euro- pean arms, particularly the naval superiority that permitted the French to blockade central Vietnam; and the northern rebellion of a Catholic Le pretender to the Vietnamese throne, Pierre Le Duy Phung. It would be useful briefly to consider the nature and impact of these two factors.

The Europeans who fought against the Vietnamese imperial forces at Da-nang and in the "Six Provinces" during the 1858-1862 conflict were, generally speaking, favorably impressed with the martial and organizational qualities of their opponents. 39 Hue's regular forces did, after all, keep the Franco-Spanish

45

invaders at bay for more than three and one-half years. The Vietnamese army obstructed the intended advance upon the imperial capital of Hue and eventually forced its opponents to withdraw altogether from Da-nang. Nevertheless, the disparity between the technical levels of the European and indigenous forces was significant. Of the 32,000 troops in the Vietnamese army, only 5,000 were equipped with rifles, the rest employing only spears or sharpened staves. 40 In addition, these rifles were muzzle-loaders with a maximum range of only 300 meters. Loading and firing such weapons was a complicated, time-consuming, and uncertain endeavor. 41 And it was an unfamiliar one: Each of the Viet- namese riflemen was only permitted to practice shooting once in a year's time and was allowed only six projectiles for use in battle. 42 By comparison, the European breech-loaders were practical, easily operated, and reliable. The Viet- namese army had at its disposal 200 artillery pieces, but these were cumber- some, exceedingly heavy, and prohibitively difficult to transport to the theater of battle or to manipulate after arrival. They were laboriously loaded from the muzzle, and their inaccuracy was such that it was not unusual for them to fire ten rounds without even once hitting their target. European artillery pieces were relatively light and mobile breech-loaders capable of placing their exploding shells with great accuracy. 43 This disparity in firepower, accuracy, and rapidity of fire was so great as to counterbalance the numerical superiority of the Viet- namese army. Indeed, by mid-1859, Nguyen Tri Phuong informed Emperor Tu-duc from the southern front that so many Vietnamese troops were required to defend against attack that no men could be spared for offensive operations.44

At sea the European technical advantage was even greater. The Vietnamese navy had only seven steamships among its fifty large craft. Suited only to patrolling rivers or to coastal defense against a traditional enemy, Hue's sailing ships were technologically incapable of tacking against the wind, and its sailors were utterly inexperienced in maneuvering on the open sea. 45 The combined European naval force that attacked Da-nang in September 1858 was only fourteen warships, but by February 1861 (that is, after the successful conclusion of the Anglo-Frencn expedition in China) the Franco-Spanish force had seventy vessels at its disposal. 46 These were steam-powered warships equally at ease in coastal waters, the deep rivers of the luc tinh, or the open sea. 47 As Nguyen Tri Phuong was forced to concede, the Europeans coordinated naval and terrestrial maneuvers effectively, but the Vietnamese defenders could not possibly carry the war out to sea. 48 This uncontested naval superiority allowed the French to blockade central Vietnam, the specific circumstances of which are now to be examined.

The French navy's blockade of central Vietnam significantly reduced the flow of rice to the grain-deficient central provinces during the final years of the war. Indeed, the prospect of isolating the ; Hue court from the produce of southern Vietnam's rich rice fields was one of the main reasons that had motivated de Genouilly to shift southward the brunt of his attack. From the inception of the attack on Gia-dinh, French naval vessels had been systematically attacking Vietnamese transport, fishing, and commercial craft all along

46

the coast. They also regularly terrorized peasants and razed villages in the central provinces of Quang-nam and Khanh-hoa. 49 But after the conclusion of the Anglo-French expedition in China, the French forces under Admiral Charner in Vietnam had a sufficient number of vessels to permit them to patrol the coastal waters and deep rivers of southern Vietnam in order to intercept ship- ments of rice from the luc tinh to Hue. 50 The French strategy in blockading Hue was summarized in a letter from Minister of the Navy and Colonies Chasseloup-Laubat to Admiral Charner in July 1861, which further ordered that the blockade be tightened by intercepting Vietnamese vessels traveling from Tonkin to Hue as well. The document reads:

I can only give my complete approval to the order by which you have establised a blockade on the various routes used for the exportation of rice from the territories of Sai-gon and My-tho. Obviously, we will only obtain the peace and the concessions that we desire by making the Hue court understand that it would be better for it to abandon to us our conquests - while continuing to come there for trade - than to plunge into a struggle that will reduce those who remain under Hue's authority to misery and perhaps to famine. The blockade must therefore be effective and severe. We should not limit it to the rivers of Cambodia and Sai-gon; if possible, it should prevent ships carrying foodstuffs to Hue from entering the river of that city. It is not only from the provinces of Sai-gon and My-tho that the Hue court must draw the necessary foodstuffs; it must also have them from Tonkin. 51 While precise statistics with which to measure the impact of these mea-

sures are lacking, there are several indications that the population was indeed adversely affected and that this was a source of concern for the court. In the spring of 1860 Do doc Bui Quy, responsible for Binh-thuan and Phu-yen, reported to Hue that "the sea routes are perturbed, very little rice reaches us from the South, and the price of rice is higher each day." 52 The impact of the blockade - and the failure of efforts to circumvent it - are further discussed in a funeral oration for Phan Thanh Gian written in late 1867 by Pham Phu Thu, a native of Quang-nam province who had held a ministerial post at Hue and had traveled to France as a member of Phan Thanh Gian's negotiating team. According to this document the deprivations caused by the blockade coincided with an unfortuitous period of drought. The drought and the blockade "drained the treasury and exhausted the state." According to Pham Phu Thu, this situation made the emperor "worried and miserable," while the military and civil mandarins were "ashamed" of their inability to provide a solution. Alternative means for transportation of foodstuffs were attempted but to no avail: "We constructed trails in the mountains and changed river transportation routes, but this had no effect on supply. Money and provisions were lacking, and the people went hungry." 53

The French officers were therefore aware of the fact that the Vietnamese capital at Hue and its surrounding provinces were dependent on the rice-exporting northern and southern extremities of the country, and they sought to

47

employ their superior naval forces to block the transportation of grain from these areas. The goal, as Chasseloup-Laubat stated, was to demonstrate to the Hue court that continued resistance would bring widespread "misery" and possibly "famine" for central Vietnamese. Through their blockade, attacks on transport, commercial, and fishing vessels, and attacks on coastal settlements far from the battlefields of Nam-ky, the French navy was successful in increasing the human cost of the conflict for the Vietnamese.

Perhaps the most important factor in rendering Hue's continued resistance to the Franco-Spanish invaders increasingly problematic was the rebellion of the Catholic Le pretender, Pierre Le Duy Phung. What factors made the Tonkin area fertile ground for such a rebellion, and how did this movement affect the Hue court's ability to resist the Europeans?

It was described earlier how, in 1802, Gia-long divided his empire for admi nistrative purposes into three zones: a central zone of provinces (tinh or doanh) administered by centrally appointed officials; and southern and northern military defense zones (tran) administered under the authority of relatively auto nomous military protectors (tong-tran). Minh-menh's centralization of the early 1830s provoked a regional rebellion in Gia-dinh during the years 1833-1835. Nor was the administrative incorporation of Tonkin a simple matter, for the traditional Tonkinese fondness for the Le dynastic house as well as the strong Catholic presence in the region provided powerful mobilizing elements for regional rebellion. The socio-cultural roots of the Tonkinese sympathy for the Le dynastic house have never been thoroughly studied, but it may be suggested that these sentiments were due in part to an idealized memory of the magnificent political and cultural achievements of the early Le monarchs in the fifteenth century. This image of the early Le period as a "golden age" would not necessarily have been tarnished by the pusillanimity of subsequent Le rulers, for the northern people apparently blamed the feuding Trinh and Nguyen chua houses for the Le family's captivity as well as for their own suffering during the long civil war that culminated in the 1802 reunification. Partly out of respect for these sentiments, Gia-long had treated the region gingerly after reunification: Its tax quotas were lower than those of the center; and the military protectors installed by the Nguyen founder were careful to leave local social and political structures undisturbed. When Minh-menh's centralization brought higher taxes and the more uniform system of authority imposed by Hue's bureaucrats, local discontent often took the form of movements to install an alleged descendant of the Le emperors on the Vietnamese throne. By the time of the Franco-Spanish invasion of 1858, Hue's forces had already suppressed, with little difficulty, a number of such movements, among them that of Le Duy Luong during the reign of Minh-menh and that of Le Duy Cu under Tu-duc in 1854. But the most murderous and politically significant of all the Le-inspired northern regional rebellions against the Nguyen dynasty's authority was started in Tonkin in 1861 by a Catholic Le pretender named Pierre Le Duy Phung. 54

Little is known about Pierre Le Duy Phung's background except that he was, from an early age, the protégé the Catholic missionaries, who took him to

48

their seminary in Penang where he was baptized and raised a Catholic. 55 Proba- bly at the instigation of his protectors he had requested, in 1855, French support for an anti-Nguyen rebellion, in return for which he had offered broad concessions. 56 Unable to secure the needed assistance, Pierre Le Duy Phung bade his time until August 1858 when the Franco-Spanish expedition landed at Da-nang. Thanks to the intercession of Father Legrand de la Lyraye, Pierre Le Duy Phung was engaged (under the name of Ta Van Phung) as a mercenary with the invaders, whom he served as a translator. 57 But the pretender apparently devoted more effort to propagandizing his own cause among the French officers and their Vietnamese collaborators at Da-nang than to his translation duties. Pierre Le Duy Phung's dynastic preoccupations were not appreciated by the French commander, Rigault de Genouilly, who, by 1859, had his sights set on Sai-gon and would not hear of the pretender's proposals for a tripartite (that is, Franco-Spanish-Le) northern expedition. Confronted with the adamant refusal of the French officer, Pierre Le Duy Phung left the service of the Euro- peans. 58 Pierre Le Duy Phung reappeared in 1861 in Tonkin where, under the name of Le Duy Minh, he headed a movement of rebellion against Nguyen authority. Advocating pro-Catholic and Le-legitimist programs, Pierre Le Duy Phung assembled under his banner a motley alliance of Tonkinese Catholics, Le dynastic partisans, and Chinese and Vietnamese coastal pirates. 59 The support of the latter groups was particularly useful, for they supplied him with munitions in exchange for local products and plunder, and they protected him from Hue's navy, which was, in any case, restricted in its movement by French patrols. 60 According to one French observer, Charles Duval, Pierre Le Duy Phung commanded at the pinnacle of his success an army of approximately 20,000 soldiers who dominated regions - primarily the Tonkinese litoral provinces of Quang-yen, Hai-duong, and Nam-dinh, their capitals excepted -containing from 150,000 to 200,000 inhabitants. 61 At the instigation of the missionaries, Pierre Le Duy Phung sent early in 1862 an ambassador to Sai-gon to request yet another time the aid of the French, in return for which he promised to establish after victory a "theocratic kingdom" under the protection of France. Spanish commander Palanca looked favorably upon the pretender's proposition but was overruled by Admiral Bonard, who considered Pierre Le Duy Phung to be an illegitimate claimant and an unreliable potential ally. 62

In any event Bonard was able to derive the full benefit of the diversion created by the "second front" of the Tonkinese rebellion without having to commit any resources to its support. In May 1862 (that is, at the very moment during which Vietnamese emissaries Phan Thanh Gian and Lam Duy Hiep were arriving at Sai-gon to begin negotiations) Pierre Le Duy Phung was mounting his forces for a decisive attack on the former Le capital at Ke-cho (known as Thang-long in Le times; modern Ha-noi) that would have severed the Hue court's administrative ties to Tonkin. It is improbable that the imperial forces could have repelled the pretender's armies without bringing reinforcements from the southern front - which would have been impossible without a negotiated settlement of the war with the Europeans. 63 According to Paulin Vial, a participant in the Sai-gon negotiations, the European officers at Sai-gon

49

were kept well informed by Tonkinese Catholics of Hue's northern predicament. 64 Only in 1864, after the full weight of the imperial military machine led by Hue's finest generals had been brought to bear on the Le claimant's troops, was the rebellion finally suppressed. 65 But the second front created by Pierre Le Duy Phung's Catholic-supported Tonkinese rebellion makes it an important objective factor that rendered more difficult Hue's continued resistance to the invading European armies.

How was the Franco-Spanish onslaught perceived by the Vietnamese elite, and what responses did they propose? From the inception of the attack on Da-nang, the Hue court was split into two factions that are designated in Vietnamese as chu chien and chu hoa. These terms may be rendered in English as, respectively, "advocates of war" and "advocates of peace," and their positions may be briefly described as follows.

The advocates of war were represented at court by Nguyen Tri Phuong, Hoang Dieu, Hoang Ta Viem, and Ton That Thuyet. Their advocacy of continued resistance to Franco-Spanish arms was based on the Confucian conception that the righteous man is obligated to fulfill his duty regardless of the consequences as well as upon the traditional tenacity of the Vietnamese, who often preferred death to servitude. 66 The Confucian hard-liners who composed the chu chien group at court were among the most unyielding of the mandarins on the Catholic question, insisting that Hue's interdictions of Christianity be maintained and extended, often going as far as to demand that the Vietnamese Catholics be completely eliminated. 67 In regard to strategy and tactics the chu chien group, facing a technologically superior enemy and unable or unwilling to envision the possibility of a mass resistance, was compelled to advocate a continued reliance on defensive measures such as building walls, digging trenches, and holding fortresses against European attacks. Despite their obvious physical courage, the chu chien officials lacked confidence and a resolute will to victory. Their actions were thus often based less on working toward eventual success than on sacrificing themselves as a means of retaining their moral purity (tiet nghia), as the example of Vu Duy Ninh, who committed suicide rather than surrender the Gia-dinh citadel to the invaders, illustrates. 68

In terms of evaluating the enemy's intentions, the arguments of the chu chien officials were more penetrating than those of the advocates of peace. While the latter denied that territorial aggrandizement was a long-range goal for the invaders, the advocates of war argued that French activities in the South were a clear sign that they indeed harbored territorial ambitions. For example, Nguyen Tri Phuong protested to the emperor as early as the fall of 1860 that French plans were revealed by their implantation of an administrative and fiscal system in the South, by the extensive cartographical work that the French navy had conducted on the southern river communications system, and by their efforts to establish commercial and political relations with Gia-dinh's large Chinese population. 69 The astute Nguyen Tri Phuong also foresaw that any plans that the advocates of peace at court may have had for peaceful relations

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with an occupying authority in the South would run aground on the southern population's refusal to accept the new regime. 70

The advocates of peace were represented at court by Phan Thanh Gian, Nguyen Ba Nghi, Truong Dang Que, and Lam Duy Hiep. Their position in favor of a negotiated settlement with the invaders was based on an empirical recognition of the superiority of European weapons and a Confucian compassion for the sufferings that continued resistance would bring the Vietnamese people. 71 The terrible effectiveness of European weaponry was described in the following fashion by Nguyen Ba Nghi, sent by the Tu-duc Emperor in 1861, that is, after the fall of Sai-gon and Dinh-tuong, to investigate the situation in the South:

Previously, I had heard that the Western ships move so fast that they seem to be flying, that their guns can penetrate walls of stone, that they can strike from a distance of tens of miles, but I could not believe it possible. In the seventh year of Thieu-tri when the Western ships sank five of our bronze-plated ships in the wink of an eye, I held the post of chief mandarin of the military bureau of Quang-nam. I was thus able to witness these events with my own eyes. Only then did I believe what I had heard about the military prowess of the Westerners. At present it is evident that our people did not properly take stock of our own strength when we set out to resist them for so long a period; because of this error, we must now suffer defeat. I have come to Bien-hoa, and I observe that the situation on all fronts is extremely dangerous and pressing for us. In truth, my humble opinion is that we can neither attack nor resist, and only by making peace can we hope to stabilize the overall situation. 72 For the proponents of peace the superiority of Franco-Spanish weapons

rendered the invaders' victory inevitable; to continue the struggle would needlessly prolong the misery of the population. Thus, chu hoa arguments for a negotiated peace made constant reference to the necessity of gaining for the common people a respite from the war's destruction and an opportunity to return to agricultural pursuits. 73

In part the arguments of the advocates of peace were based on an erroneous assessment of French interests. These officials believed that the physical distance of France from Vietnam and the predominantly commercial orientations of the French meant that territorial gain was not a long-range goal for the invaders. 74 This interpretation of Western intentions was, for chu hoa mandarins, confirmed by the example of the recent Western aggressions in China. There the Westerners did not consummate their coups de force by taking possession of large portions of Chinese territory; rather, they seemed content to extort political, religious, and commercial concessions from the Qing court. 75 Furthermore, these officials argued, if the mighty Central Kingdom had been humbled by Western arms, how could tiny Vietnam hope to defy such invaders? 76 Finally, the proponents of peace were less uncompromising on the religious question. Phan Thanh Gian illustrates well this aspect of the chu hoa position.

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Although he had no sympathy for the Catholic religion or its followers, he maintained that the severe interdictions of Nguyen times had no precedent in Le or Tran times, concluding that the issue should not constitute an obstacle to peace negotiations. 77

From its inception as a minority faction at court, the chu hoa group gradually grew larger and more influential. By the spring of 1862 the advocates of peace had become dominant at court and ad won the support of Tu-duc. 78 The emperor accordingly acceded to the Franco-Spanish demands that the Hue court send plenipotentiaries to negotiate a treaty of "peace and friendship" with the European representatives in a region of Vietnam occupied by Franco-Spanish forces. He further accepted the Franco-Spanish demands that Hue pay the sum of 10,000 ligatures as an initial payment for a "compensation" clause to be negotiated as part of a comprehensive settlement.79 On May 16, 1862 Em- peror Tu-duc appointed two supporters of the chu hoa tendency, Phan Manh Gian and Lam Duy Hiep, to represent Vietnam in negotiations with the triumphant invaders. 80 The emissaries arrived in Sai-gon on May 24, 1862 with an entourage of 133 persons, and negotiations began two days later. 81 By June 5, 1862 they had signed the "unequal treaty" that in Vietnamese is known as the Hoa-uoc Nham-tuat (Treaty of the year of Nham-tuat) and in English as the Treaty of 1862 or as the Treaty of Sai-gon. 82

If there is general agreement among Vietnam specialists on the factors that motivated the Tu-duc Emperor and the chu hoa mandarins to agree to negotiate an "unequal treaty" with France and Spain, the question of the emperor's precise position regarding the scope and nature of the concessions to be granted has yet to be definitively answered. Nguyen The Anh and Pham Van Son have suggested that Phan Thanh Gian and Lam Duy Hiep exceeded their instructions, going beyond what the Tu-duc Emperor had in mind when they granted France the religious and territorial concessions contained in the 1862 accords.83 Evi- dence for such an argument can be found in the Vietnamese imperial records, which indicate that on the eve of departure to join negotiations in Sai-gon the Vietnamese emissaries were formally directed by the emperor to grant most of the commercial and diplomatic concessions demanded by the Europeans. But on the questions of religious freedom and territorial cessions, the emperor was apparently adamant: "Territory must absolutely not be granted; freedom to preach the heretical religion must absolutely not be granted." 84

Yet the Vietnamese negotiators granted major concessions in both these areas: Article II of the 1862 treaty specified that the Catholic religion could be freely followed throughout Vietnam; article III granted France governmental authority in the three eastern provinces of southern Vietnam - Gia-dinh, Dinh-tuong, and Bien-hoa; article X forbade the Hue court to send any military matériel into these three provinces.85 When the news of these stipulations reached Hue, the two ambassadors were severely criticized by Tu-duc Emperor, who declared: "These two officials are not only criminals with regard to the present court, but they are also criminals with regard to one thousand generations."86

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Did the Vietnamese emissaries actually exceed their instructions in granting the territorial and religious concessions stipulated in articles II and III of the Treaty of Sai-gon? Is it not possible that the emperor, resigned to ending the war at all costs, secretly authorized his emissaries to make the necessary concessions, taking care that other officials - including the imperial historians - would remain ignorant of these instructions? If this were the case, then the emperor's criticisms at court were merely an exercise in scapegoating.

While neither French nor Vietnamese sources permit a clear resolution of the problem, this hypothesis is supported by the fact that Emperor Tu-duc, late in 1862, refused to endorse a proposal at court that the actions of his emissaries actually be condemned as criminal, sarcastically asking the assembled dignitaries if there were enough "talented and virtuous [hien tai]" officials among them to replace Phan Thanh Gian and Lam Duy Hiep in their functions. 87 Phan Thanh Gian retained his position as Minister of Public Office (Thuong thu Bo Lai) as well as his membership in the emperor's Privy Council (Co mat vien); he was further granted the post of Viceroy and Provincial Adjoint for the Southern Region (Pho su kinh luoc Nam-ky) as well as the posts of chief mandarin for Gia-dinh (Tuan phu Gia-dinh) and Resident Grand Dignitary and Plenipotentiary (Chanh su toan quyen dai than). 88 And Lam Duy Hiep was appointed chief mandarin (Tuan phu) for the Thuan-khanh region. In the words of the emperor these positions would bring Phan Thanh Gian and Lam Duy Hiep into constant contact with French officials in the occupied South, thereby permitting the two mandarins "to make amends for their crimes [chuoc toi]" by negotiating the rescission of the offensive articles. 89

Emperor Tu-duc's reaction to the signing of the 1862 treaty by Phan Thanh Gian and Lam Duy Hiep may thus be summarized as follows: He insulted the emissaries at court, yet he refused to endorse the criminal procedures called for at that time by the chu chien mandarins; he did not repudiate the agreements that his ambassadors had made; and he appointed them to positions that allowed them to continue negotiations with French officials at Gia-dinh and elsewhere.

The emperor's reaction to Phan Thanh Gian's surrender of three additional southern provinces and concomitant suicide in 1867 was consistent with this precedent of insulting the emissaries while refusing to repudiate the concessions they had made. After Phan Thanh Gian's suicide and Lam Duy Hiep's death (of natural causes), Tu-duc joined chu chien officials at court in taking revenge on the two ambassadors. A commission of thirty-two dignitaries found Phan Thanh Gian and other officials involved in the loss of the six provinces guilty of negligence in assuming the responsibilities inherent in their positions. In light of Phan Thanh Gian's suicide the dignitaries urged that he be spared the punishment of posthumous decapitation (tram hau).90 For the emperor this verdict was not severe enough, and he issued an edict in accordance with which Phan Thanh Gian and Lam Duy Hiep's titles, positions, and grades were re- voked, their names removed from the monument for civil service examination

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degree-holders, and their bodies exhumed for decapitation. Tu-duc explained the reasons behind such a severe judgment:

Phan Thanh Gian, in the capacity of Viceroy, and Lam Duy Hiep disregarded their responsibilities in the peace negotiations, complacently giving away the three provinces of Gia-dinh, Bien-hoa, and Dinh-tuong; Phan Thanh Gian accepted a royal commission to go on a mission as ambassador, and yet nothing was accomplished; then, again assuming the post of Viceroy, he lost the three provinces of Vinh-long, An-giang, and Ha-tien. Both crimes are serious, and, although his death followed, it is not enough to atone for them. Although Phan Thanh Gian and Lam Duy Hiep are dead, they are both to suffer posthumous revocation of titles, positions, and grades; their names are to be chiseled from the stele of the tien si degree-holders; and we leave for one thousand generations the sentence of tram hau. Thus we execute those who are already dead in order to warn those who are still living. 91 But the "warning" for the living and the message for subsequent genera-

tions were ambiguous at best. Tran Quoc Giam, a participant in the scholarly discussion of Phan Thanh Gian's historical role organized by the editors of Sai-gon's Su dia (History and Geography), apparently accepts the emperor's decla- ration at face value. He finds the document to be a moving statement of chu chien resolution to resist foreign encroachment, and he asserts that Tu-duc's contemporaries found it so as well:

The judgment was satisfying to the hearts of the patriots, for the king's assertion still criticized the weakness of the Hue court and the pacifism of Phan Thanh Gian. Furthermore, the judgment was an admonition for those who were close to France, who favored peace. The judgment implicitly confirmed the Hue court's will to rely on its own means and to expend every effort. Because of this, the spirit of resolution and combativeness among the troops and people were nourished and enhanced. 92 But the author fails to cite any evidence that the "advocates of war" indeed

found these proceedings encouraging. In the absence of any such proof, it is more logical to assume that seasoned political observers at court and elsewhere were more impressed by the fact that, as in 1862, Emperor Tu-duc did not authorize military actions to counter the French advances yielded to by Phan Thanh Gian and the other responsible authorities. He refused, until 1874, to sign any agreement acknowledging France's de facto control of Vinh-long, An-giang, and Ha-tien.

If Tu-duc's machinations at the expense of the Vietnamese negotiators of the 1862 treaty have thus escaped the notice of modern historians, they did not completely elude the criticism of nineteenth-century participants. Phan Thanh Gian's role in the negotiation of the 1862 treaty is discussed in the funeral oration for Phan Thanh Gian written in late 1867 by Phan Phu Thu:

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The other year, when the peace treaty was settled, you accepted the role of the culprit in order to bring some repose during a difficult period…The surrender of territory must, in the final analysis, be decided by the king. Everyone considers you to have been in error, but how many people know the true situation in our country? 93 For obvious reasons, Phan Phu Thu did not give precise details to sub-

stantiate his charges. But the text implies that the decision was made by the Tu-duc Emperor himself, presumably in advance, while Phan Thanh Gian "accepted the role of the culprit [ngai da chap nhan vai tro pham-nhan]." In a possible reference to the deceptions arranged by the emperor, Pham Phu Thu rhetorically asked how many people truly understood the reality of the situation, suggesting that those who blamed Phan Thanh Gian for the settlement of 1862 did so in ignorance and error.

In view of the above considerations it is not reasonable to suppose that the Vietnamese officials who conceded to France and Spain the religious and territorial stipulations of the 1862 treaty did so without the prior knowledge and approval of the Tu-duc Emperor. Likewise, Phan Thanh Gian's decision not to resist the French in 1867 must have had the emperor's approval. The monarch evidently saw no alternative to the actions taken by his emissaries in yielding these concessions. The Tu-duc Emperor as well as his chu hoa advisors were therefore responsible for agreeing to sign the Treaty of Sai-gon and for allowing France to seize three additional provinces with impunity in 1867. But the monarch evidently wished his loyal ministers to bear as much of the resulting stigma as possible. 94

After the signing of the 1862 accords, Phan Thanh Gian conducted negotiations with the French aimed at obtaining a reversal of what was for the Viet- namese the most obnoxious of the treaty's articles, the territorial concession. The territorial question was considered paramount because the Gia-dinh area was the most productive agricultural region of the empire, the historical base for the rise of Nguyen power, and the native region of the Tu-duc Emperor's mother. 95 The possibility of the return of the three provinces in exchange for more extensive financial, economic, and political concessions was the basis of the proposed 1864 agreement, eventually refused by France. 96 With the collapse of the court's hopes for a rapid revision of the territorial provisions of the 1862 accords, Hue's long-term strategy became to obtain the eventual peaceful return of the three provinces through strict compliance with the terms of the treaty. In the words of Phan Thanh Gian, fulfillment of the commercial and religious articles was necessary "to show good will [de to y tot]" in order to keep open the possibility of a territorial retrocession. 97 As indicated earlier, the proponents of chu hoa believed that France harbored no long-range territorial interests in Vietnam. After the signing of the Treaty of Sai-gon, these officials were encouraged in this interpretation by the example of the English in China, who had returned the administration of Kwangtung province to Chinese hands after an indemnity was met. 98 When the French returned the province of Vinh-long--the French occupation of which had remained unrecognized by treaty - to

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Vietnamese authority in 1863 after the ratification of the 1862 agreement by the Tu-duc Emperor, the chu hoa group imagined that this proved the efficacy of the peace policy.99 This belief became so deeply held that even the renewed French aggressions of 1867 and 1873 were not sufficient to shake their faith in the policy of trading concessions in other domains against the eventuality of territorial retrocession.

To summarize, the reasons for France's more aggressive policy vis-à-vis Vietnam from 1858 onward were examined. It was argued that France's opposition to the Vietnamese monarchs' "persecution" of Catholic missionaries was not the basic cause of French intervention. Economic and political factors were fundamental; the protection of Catholicism provided a convenient screen behind which these factors could operate. Turning to the 1858-1862 conflict itself, it was observed that the Vietnamese Catholics indeed brought their aid to the besieged Franco-Spanish forces at Da-nang, and it was described how such Catholic support of the invaders motivated the Tu-duc Emperor to increase the severity of his anti-Catholic edicts. It was further argued that the objective military situation became an increasingly difficult one for the Hue court as the war progressed. Hue's forces, although numerically superior, were far inferior in terms of weaponry and firepower and were hopelessly outmatched at sea. Because of these technological advantages the Franco-Spanish forces were able to destroy the major Vietnamese troop concentrations, fortresses, and strongpoints in the South. Solidly entrenched there, the Europeans blockaded central Vietnam, bringing severe hardships and the threat of famine to the inhabitants. The situation was rendered all the more difficult by the rebellion of the Catholic Le pretender, Pierre Le Duy Phung. To suppress this uprising, the Hue court desperately needed to move northward troops that were occupied fighting the Europeans in the South. These challenges split the official elite: The advocates of war regarded any compromise with the invaders as unwise and immoral; the proponents of peace favored a negotiated settlement because they believed that continued conflict would only bring needless suffering.

Finally, the attempt was made to assess the relative responsibility of the Tu-duc Emperor and Vietnamese emissary Phan Thanh Gian in the signing of the Treaty of Sai-gon. Vietnamese historians have suggest that Phan Thanh Gian exceeded his authority in granting the Europeans the considerable concessions contained in the 1862 accords, but the evidence examined here indicates that by 1862 the Tu-duc Emperor had decided that Vietnam needed peace at any price and probably instructed his emissaries to grant France and Spain the substantial privileges stipulated therein. In so doing the Tu-duc Emperor initiated a historical break with the traditional Nguyen policies for responding to Western intervention.

But was this "turning point" genuine or merely apparent? Many French and some Vietnamese scholars have argued that Hue's policy in the years after the 1862 treaty did not really change. The purpose of the following chapters is to demonstrate that Hue's policy for responding to French intervention during the 1862-1874 period was fundamentally different than it had been during the

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period 1802-1862. It will be argued that Hue's policy vis-à-vis France - for Spain had, under French pressure, relinquished all claims to territorial compensation at the expense of Vietnam - was to maintain the peace while pursuing the return of the alienated territories by means of fulfilling the Treaty of Sai-gon's stipulations and by granting additional privileges when necessary to avoid or terminate further armed conflict with France.

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4

The Hue Court and the Southern Nghia-Quan,

1862-1868

This chapter addresses the question of Hue's political comportment vis-à-

vis those Vietnamese who continued - after the signing of the 1862 treaty - to resist the French occupation of the three southern provinces of Dinh-tuong, Gia-dinh, and Bien-hoa. The Hue court was obliged by the terms of the treaty to respect French authority in those provinces. But the French admiral-gover nors in Sai-gon - the capital of "La Cochinchine française" - claimed that the Vietnamese government encouraged armed resistance to France's authority in the French-held territories after the signing of the treaty. Using this allegation as a pretext, the French seized three more southern provinces - Vinh-long, Ha-tien, and An-giang - in 1867. The accusations of the French officers have been accepted as established facts by Western historians, fostering the thesis that "Asiatic treachery," to use the phrase of Chesneaux, provoked the seizure of Vietnamese territory by the French in 1867. There is nothing fantastic about the argument that Hue was behind these movements of resistance: Truong Dinh, one of the guerrilla chieftains, even claimed that his authority in the resistance had been granted him by the Tu-duc Emperor. Here the exploration of Vietnamese sources and the distinction between official and unofficial activities are useful. It is to be argued that, before the 1862 treaty, anti-French guerrilla resistance in the South was official, that is, undertaken with the authorization of the Hue court. Vietnamese sources reveal that, in conformity with the treaty, the Vietnamese government ceased to support southern resistance. Although Emperor Tu-due admired the "righteous spirit" of the anti-French resistants, he exerted considerable effort to terminate their activities lest they provoke the

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French to greater intransigence in negotiations or to further seizures of territory.

Immediately after the fall of the citadel of Gia-dinh on February 17, 1859 the Hue court authorized the southern people to form volunteer militia units to supplement the imperial armies and to engage the Europeans on their own initiative.1 Southern villages were encouraged to fabricate weapons and to organize for defense. 2 Villages that contributed materially to the struggle might receive plaques inscribed with the words "devotion to righteousness worthy of emulation[hieu-nghia kha-phong]."3Individuals who organized resistance were awarded official titles and funding in accordance with the number of fighters they recruited.4As the situation became more critical, rewards became more sub stantial. In mid-1861 the court issued edicts encouraging cantonal and communal authorities to impose taxation and to recruit able-bodied men from their areas. Those who could retake and hold a prefecture (phu) or a subprefecture (huyen) were to be promoted to an administrative position there; those who defeated a European detachment or retook a citadel were to receive hereditary honors and appointments. Rank-and-file militiamen who demonstrated exceptional courage were to be granted military positions, and a recruit who fulfilled his duty in an acceptable fashion was to be exempted from taxation for life. 5 The purpose of the edicts, the Tu-due Emperor explained, was:

to have them oppose the invaders with all their hearts, with risings in all regions. They should sometimes materialize to fight, sometimes con ceal themselves, now striking by surprise, now engaging in set battles, not allowing the invaders a moment's rest. Thus, the invaders will know no tranquility while they remain on our lands. 6

The response of the southern population was enthusiastic. Under the leader ship of local notables and former officials, a number of resistance movements was established. These groups collected contributions in men, foodstuffs, and matériel from the population for guerrilla attacks on the invading soldiers and their indigenous collaborators throughout the disputed territories. The existing documentation relating to the leadership and activities of these groups is limited, and so it is only possible to give a brief outline of the development of the guerrilla movements. is sketch covers the events of the 1862-1868 period (approximately) and emphasizes the role of Truong Dinh (also known as Truong Cong Dinh and Qua Dinh), the most important and celebrated of the southern guerrilla chieftains. The analysis then turns directly to the question of the Hue court's policy toward the guerrillas after the Treaty of Sai-gon was signed.

Truong Dinh was born in central Vietnam in 1820 or 1821. His father, Truong Cam, held the rank of colonel (lanh binh) in the imperial arm When his father was transferred to Gia-dinh, Truong Dinh movey*there with him. Even as a youngster Truong Ding enjoyed a local reputation for his martial skills and knowledge of military texts. When he matured he married the daughter of a wealthy resident of Dinh-tuong province, to which he moved after his father's

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death. Early in the Tu-due period Truong Dinh utilized the financial resources with which his marriage provided him to recruit a group of impoverished people whom he organized for the clearing of land and the establishment of a "military colony" (don dien). In recognition of this the Hue court granted him a commission as a "deputy regimental commander" (pho quan co; it is by reference to this title that Truong Dinh is often known as Quan Dinh). His success in this enterprise was due to an acute organizational sense as well as to a genuine concern for those under his protection. 7

When the citadel of Gia-dinh fell to the Europeans in 1859, the citadel's commander, Vo Duy Ninh, committed suicide, and the imperial troops fled in disarray. Truong Dinh organized a guerrilla force from among his plantation clients. This initial force of approximately 500 armed men operated out of Thuan-kien. Early in 1861 imperial armies were defeated by French forces at Phu-tho, and they retreated toward Bien-hoa. Accordingly, Truong Dinh moved his troops to Tan-hoa subprefecture where he began to incorporate into his ranks soldiers from the defeated imperial armies. With the cooperation of imperial officers Truong Dinh began to stockpile foodstuffs, to manufacture weapons, and to recruit soldiers from the general population. His forces grew to 1,000 men, and they began to inflict severe damage on the Franco-Spanish troops, largely because of the resistants' perfect knowledge of the terrain and their skill in guerilla tactics. Hearing of Truong Dinh's achievements as a militia leader, the Hue court granted him the position of "deputy troop commander" (pho lanh binh) for the entire Gia-dinh area. later in 1861 imperial regulars were defeated by the Eurapeans at Bien-hoa, and the responsible Vietnamese officers were reprimanded by the court, which ordered them to meet with Truong Dinh at Tan-hoa in order to develop a plan for retaking Bien-hoa. At this time Truong Dinh had just retaken Quy-son from the invaders, and the number ot troops under his direct command had risen to 6,000. 8

Truong Dinh's continued success as a guerrilla leader was due in part to the discipline and organization that he instilled in his troops, qualities that were lacking in most of the other southern resistance groups. Early in 1862 the Hue court granted Truong Dinh the command of all the southern nghia-quan or "righteous soldiers." 9 His base of operations at this time was Go-thuong, in the subprefecture of Tan-hoa, from which he led deadly raids on the European troops. The European officers who fought against Truong Dinh's "righteous soldiers" were compelled to recognize that they faced a worthy adversary. Léo- pold Pallu de la Barriére, a French officer who defended the posts at Go-cong against attacks by Truong Dinh's men, thus expressed his admiration for the determination of the southern resistants:

The attack on Go-cong by a group of armed, skillfully led men sur- prised everyone. We thought that the Annamites were still submerged in fear, that the masses were enslaved, cowardly, the dregs of empire… incapable of undertaking any act of resistance. But one must recognize the existence of a spirit of national independence among the An- namese, whom we have always thought ready to accept and indeed

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worshir any master who would allow them to plant and harvest their rice. 10 The same author also recognized the popular character of Truong Dinh's

resistance movement, which he described in the following words: The fact is that the center of resistance was everywhere, infinitely sub- divided, almost as many times as there were Annamites. It would be more accurate to consider each peasant harvesting rice to be a center of resistance." 11 Leopold Pallu de la Barriére further expressed the frustration of the Euro-

pean officers at their inability to crush an "invisible enemy" who seemed at once to be "everywhere and nowhere," against whom the only effective tactic would be the impossible one of "assigning a French soldier to follow every defeated Annamese fighter." 12

The European officers originally hoped that the signing of the 1862 treaty by the Hue court's emissaries would terminate the southern resistance. One of the French officers, Paulin Vial, expressed in the following way their disappoint ment upon learning of the resistants' refusal to lay down their arms:

We had the news of the peace urgently carried to the most dangerously threatened areas of our territory, intending thereby to stop the fighting immediately. Contrary to our hopes, the rebels' leaders did not want to submit to the new regime; nor did they want to return to Annamese lands. They stayed in our territory, collecting taxes, plundering and des troying our transport groups, and, upon every favorable opportunity, attacking isolated Europeans. On the borders of Tan-hoa subprefecture, Truong Dinh's stronghold, they even shot rifles and mortars at our emissaries who were bringing news of peace. 13 Despite the peace treaty, Truong Dinh had decided to initiate what is now

termed a "protracted resistance." He stationed his men at Go-cong, the roads of approach to which were blocked by fortified positions. His artillery was stationed on all the river routes of entry into the subprefecture of Tan-hoa. From this stronghold Truong Dinh appealed to all Vietnamese in the occupied territories to rise against the French authorities. By December of 1862 Colonel H. de Poyen, a French naval artillery officer, wrote, "the insurrection had broken out and was rapidly spreading throughout the colony." 14

The position of the nghia-quan was fundamentally weakened by the Hue court's signing of the 1862 treaty. Truong Dinh's forces had previously fought in cooperation with Vietnamese regular troops. In military terms the withdrawal of the latter was detrimental to the resistance in at least two ways: It de- prived them of the logistical support that only a regular army could provide; and it permitted the French to concentrate their efforts against a single antagonist. In political terms the treaty provided - for those Vietnamese who needed one - a legal basis for collaboration with the French in the territories ceded to France. The French officers were henceforth more easily able to recruit

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militia and administrative personnel among Vietnamese who, before the treaty, had been too frightened or too ashamed to work openly for the invader. 15 Psychologically, the devastating effect on the morale of the resistants provoked by the Hue court's capitulation and the activities of increasing numbers of indigenous collaborationists can be easily imagined.

In February 1863 Admiral Bonard finally succeeded in encircling Truong Dinh in his stronghold at Go-cong, from which the guerrilla chieftain fled after taking heavy casualties and abandoning a considerable amount of weaponry. Truong Dinh retreated into the marshes of Bien-hoa, where he attempted to reorganize his forces. On August 19 Truong Dinh, his remaining soldiers facing serious supply problems and suffer' from hunger, was betrayed by a former resistant and ambushetty the French. Wounded and facing imminent capture, he took his own life. 16

A number of other guerrilla movements attempted to carry on Truong Dinh's struggle tor the liberation of the southern provinces. Ambushes were carried out with relative success in the region of Chau-doe throughout 1867, and Nguyen Trung Truc successfully attacked the fort of Kien-giang in Rach-gia in mid-1868, killing the French-appointed province chief and thirty enemy soldiers. But French forces soon retook the fort and captured Nguyen Trung Truc, executing him on October 27, 1868. 17 Even at the height of Truong Dinh's insurrection France's hold on the southern provinces had never been seriously threatened by the resistants. The resistance did, however, provide the French with a justification for their seizure of three more provinces in 1867, and it is to this question that the analysis now turns.

For the purpose of understanding the dynamics of the Hue court's policy toward France after the signing of the 1862 treaty, the relationship between the court and the southern resistance after 1862 must be defined more exactly than has been possible for authors dependent on French sources. In classical guerrilla fashion the southern rebels often took advantage of the proximity of independent Vietnamese territory in order to escape the pursuit of French forces and to replenish their human and material resources. French commanders naturally saw in this the helping hand of the neighboring Vietnamese provincial officials, whom they accused of turning the border provinces into sanctuaries for rebellion against French authority. The insurgent leaders for their part inadvertently encouraged the French officers in their suspicions that the Hue court was directing the resistance. Truong Dinh, for example, claimed that his continuing resistance was legitimized by an imperial edict. The French officers never produced any definitive proof either of Hue's support for the southern rebels or of the connivance of the mandarins in the provinces bordering French-occupied territory. But this lack of evidence did not prevent them from repeatedly asserting and finally acting upon these premises. Admiral Bonard, for example, informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs on January 14, 1863 of his conviction that the Hue court and its officials were violating the 1862 agreement by fomenting southern resistance:

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The last campaign of 1861, in taking the principal fortresses from the king or Annam, in leading to the destruction of his regular armies as well as to the signing of a treaty, completely changed the face of the war, for there is no disguising the fact that the peace stipulated by the treaty has never been faithfully executed by the Hue court. Seeing that it could not withstand a conventional war, the Annamite government organized, openly before the peace, clandestinely and underhandedly afterward, in the region of Cochin China, a permanent insurrection, which has been driven back everywhere but mastered nowhere, due to insufficient means. If we continue to employ no more than half-way measures, our ruin is at hand… Quan Dinh, head of the insurrection at Go-cong, although publicly disavowed by the viceroy of Vinh-long, who has called on him several times to withdraw in order that the peace treaty be executed, has absolutely refused to do so. He is therefore, in appearance, in a state or rebellion, but the government of Hue, which has publicly given him orders that he has disobeyed, supports him clandestinely and supplies him with arms, munitions, and even titles and seals. 18 This putative aid from Vietnamese officials - and the supposition that such

actions were supported by the Hue court - were the rationalizations used by the French officers for their seizure in 1867 of three additional provinces in southern Vietnam.

The writings of contemporary French authors sympathetic to the colonial cause reiterated the admirals' assertions about the reputed nexus between the Hue court and the southern nghia quan. For example, Colonel H. de Poyen, a naval artillery officer who served in the occupied south in the 1860s, thus described the relationship between Hue and Truong Dinh:

If the insurrection had been pushed back in the final weeks of December 1862, it was far from being discouraged; anyway, it was ceaselessly excited and supported by emissaries from Hue, who traveled throughout the country. The center of the insurrection in Lower Cochin China was Go-cong, and it was from there that the emissaries disseminated proclamations to stimulate revolt in all the provinces. An influential mandarin in Go-cong, Quan Dinh, had openly taken the title of chief of the general insurrection, a title that he claimed, rightly or wrongly, to have received officially from the Hue court. 19 Subsequent Western histories based on French sources could come no clo-

ser to proving or disproving the court's complicity. Milton Osborne, while cau- tiously noting the incomplete and contradictory character of the evidence from the French sources, nevertheless asserts that the admirals' accusations were not without verisimilitude:

The scale of the risings in December 1862 certainly suggests an organized concerted effort, backed by Hue. This judgment, however, is based on inference, not on certain fact. After the failure of the 1862

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risings, Hue had little active part in the repeated risings in the South… Noninvolvement in practical ways did not mean the end of interest, and there seems some reason.to accept the French allegations that the sporadic risings against their control of Cochinchina received the clan- destine approval of Hue for many years. 20 The question remains, and its resolution is essential to any meaningful

attempt to assess the depth of the Hue court's commitment to the Treaty of Sai-gon.

The Vietnamese imperial records, written communications between Phan Thanh Gian and Truong Dinh, and an account of the southern resistance com- piled by Nguyen Thong, a close collaborator of Truong Dinh's, permit a closer view of the relationship between the Hue court and southern resistance in the 1860s.

According to the Vietnamese imperial records, the Tu-due Emperor, fearful that the southern resistants would provoke the French to further aggression that could jeopardize his hopes for territorial retrocession, ordered the insurgents to disband immediately upon the signing of the 1862 treaty. He subsequently forbade officials in regions bordering French possessions to permit recalcitrant resistants to enter the independent Vietnamese territories. In the border provinces officials at the subprefectural and prefectural levels were to capture any resistants who entered areas under their jurisdiction and turn them in to their superiors at the provincial level. These orders were elucidated by the emperor at court as follows:

The French want us to abandon our people. Knowing that our people are discontented and refuse to accept the new situation, we have repeatedly sent secret orders admonishing them. There are several elements among the people who have not heeded our words and have been active. They cause the French to be suspecting, therefore bringing harm to the people. Thus, the French can use this as a pretext for conflict with us, and the prospects for the three western provinces would not be bright. 21 Judging from the emperor's comments to his court, the mission of the

emissaries traveling from Hue into the occupied South was the opposite of what the French officers assumed it to have been: Rather than inciting anti-French rebellion, the imperial messengers "admonished [phu uy]" the resistants.

According to the Dai Nam thuc luc, the Hue court also endeavored to terminate southern resistance by settling in the North former resistants who had abandoned the struggle and left French-occupied territory. Since French officials accused Vietnamese mandarins in the border provinces of covertly cooperating with the nghia quan and of supplying them for forays into the French-held zones, the document is worth citing extensively:

Previously, France sent us a letter stating that the mandarins of Binh-thuan province protect the brigands along the border, using the pretext

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of establishing a plantation. The letter asked the court to consider this matter carefully in order to avoid adverse consequences. The mandarins of the Privy Council memorialized the emperor as follows: "The plantation of Binh-thuan has started to assemble more than 500 people, all of whom are the righteous recruits from the southern region as well as the remaining refugees from the three provinces. The French see only the surface and become suspecting, which is understandable. But the essential is that the Binh-thuan mandarins did not want those people to be near an area controlled by the French…To leave them there would surely lead to an unfortunate incident. We ask that Phan Tr-ung be sent immediately to take the well-known chieftains to uncultivated lands in Khanh-hoa, Binh-dinh, and Phu-yen provinces, where they can clear and cultivate land." 22 Realizing that the French felt threatened by this concentration of former

fighters and refugees in Binh-thuan province, the Tu-duc Emperor decided to move them to uninhabited areas of northern provinces, far from the turbulent frontiers of "la Cochinchine francaise." In so doing, he sought to counter French charges that his officials were supplying the insurgents for attacks in French zones. The emperor's action physically removed these former resistants and refugees from proximity to the contested provinces, thus preventing their return to battle as well as protecting them from French reprisals. 23 The document does not eliminate the possibility that officials in the border provinces were supporting the southern struggle, but it does demonstrate the Tu-duc Empe- ror's determination to prevent the southern insurgents from providing the French with an excuse for further aggression. And it suggests that there is another ossible explanation for contacts between Hue's mandarins and the insurgents than that provided by the French officers and authors: Rather than plotting to further the insurgency, these Vietnamese officials may have been trying to reduce tension by providing former resistants and refugees with a means of subsistence and a place of settlement outside the French-held provinces.

Regarding the specific case of Truong Dinh, the Vietnamese imperial records indicate that Truong Dinh's position as head of the post-1862 southern resistance was granted him by local resistants rather than by the Hue court. And they record the unsuccessful efforts of imperial emissaries, among them Phan Thanh Gian, to persuade Truong Dinh to renounce the resistance and to return to his previous administrative post. According to the Quoc trieu chanh bien Truong Dinh refused and was thus stripped of his function and its perquisites:

From the time that the peace treaty was settled, edicts were sent to the South, ordering them to end hostilities. When, in the provinces of Gia-dinh, Dinh-tuong, and Bien-hoa, the righteous men encouraged each other and appointed Truong Dinh as their supreme chief, the court notables stated as follows: "At present in the North, the situation is urgent, and there is not yet any good opportunity in the South. There- fore, we request that Phan Thanh Gian be sent to order Truong Dinh to desist." But, for a long time, Truong Dinh has refused to return to

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the exercise of his function, and he is accordingly removed from that function with loss of honorific titles. 24 Analysis of the letters exchanged between Phan Thanh Gian and Truong

Dinh further reinforces the argument that the Hue court opposed southern resis tance after the signing of the 1862 treaty. These letters indicate that the divergence of views between the court and the southern resistance head was pronounced; this antagonism derived from the emperor's policy of faithfully following the 1862 treaty and the insurgent chieftaids refusal to do so. Imperial envoy Phan Thanh Gian's communications to Truong Dinh argued that, since the court had ordered an end to hostilities, further resistance to France was both futile and disloyal:

Since the court has signed the peace treaty, you should cease hostilities and should not violate the king's orders. Kingly loyalty is a noble quality, but it must have a limit. One cannot exceed this limit and still be faithful and pious. Too much is just as bad as not enough; when a snake begins to have legs, it is no longer a snake… At resent, the regular forces of the court have all been withdrawn, and the mandarins commanding troops hiding in the mountains and forests have all disbanded their forces. If you alone are to lead your soldiers to the attack, can you be certain of victory? If you retreat, can you hold securely? Certainly not! 25 Truong Dinh's letter of reply to the imperial emissary demonstrated a clear

understanding of the illegality of the resistance both in terms of the Hue court's treaty obligations to the French as well as in relation to the resistants' duty to obey the Vietnamese emperor and his officials. Truong Dinh nevertheless persisted in his refusal to discontinue his struggle, justifying this disobedience by arguing that his authority as chief of the southern movement had been granted him not by the emperor but by the inhabitants of the occupied territories themselves. Therefore, Truong Dinh asserted, he had no choice but to continue to lead their battle for a return to the status quo antebellum:

The people of the three provinces, wanting to return to their former status, designated me their leader. Therefore, we cannot take any course but the present one. Thus, we have prepared a resistance, and, in the east as well as in the west, we will resist, we will fight, and in the end, we will overcome the invader's strength. If Your Excellency still says that the arrangements with the invaders must be preserved, then we will oppose the commands of the court, and it is certain that there can no longer be any peace or truce between us and Your Excellency.26 Explicit in Phan Thanh Gian's admonition and Truong Dinh's rebuttal is

their mutual understanding that the Tu-duc Emperor, hoping to "preserve arrangements with the invaders," that is, to honor the 1862 treaty, was opposed to further armed struggle. Phan Thanh Gian perceived Truong Dinh's continued resistance to France as the manifestation of an exaggerated loyalty to the emperor. However admirable such fidelity might be in principle, in the present

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instance it threatened to compromise the emperor's policy of appeasement of France, thereby increasing the risk of further unequal combat with France and additional losses of territory. Truong Dinh, for his part, was fully cognizant of the emperor's opposition to continued resistance, but he insisted that the support of the southern people gave him the moral authority to disobey his sovereign.

Therefore, the positions expressed by the court's emissary Phan Thanh Gian and the resistant chieftain himself are consistent with the documents cited from the Vietnamese imperial records. Each source supports the thesis that the Tu-duc court changed its position in regard to southern resistance upon making peace with France and Spain in 1862.

These sources are confirmed by an account of the southern resistance authored by Nguyen Thong, a close collaborator of Truong Dinh's who also corres ponded with most of the other important southern insurgent leaders. Accor- ding to Nguyen Thong's work on the southern struggle, Ky xuyen van sao, Truong Dinh's continued involvement in southern resistance after the peace treaty was signed resulted from local initiatives that were contrary to Hue's explicit orders. When imperial edicts of 1862 directed the nghia quan to end hostilities and their leaders to assume their previous administrative posts, Truong Dinh was beseeched by his subordinates to continue the struggle:

The Westerners were forced by our people to retreat many times, and now that the court has granted them peace, it is certain that they will kill us. Furthermore, the Westerners have bullied us into signing for peace, but they are not sincere. Since the court has made peace with them, where are we to look for support? In this situation, why do we not unite to strike back at them in order to take for ourselves a portion of land on which we may protect our lives?27 According to the Ky xuyen van sao, Truong Dinh was persuaded by this

appeal, and he set upon organizing the material and human resources for an independent anti-French movement. Although he was violating the emperor's orders, Truong Dinh appealed for popular support in the name of loyalty to the court:

Dinh gave himself the title of Great General for the Pacification of the Westerners…Then he sent a letter to all the righteous men, encouraging them in the name of loyalty to the court to rise and destroy the invaders. They all agreed to follow his orders; from the prefectures and subprefectures came money and grain. 28 Nguyen Thong's account further reveals that the imperial edicts suppor-

ting Truong Dinh's resistance after the 1862 treaty - cited by the French officers and pro-colonial authors as justifications for subsequent aggressions - were spu rious. When Admiral Bonard threatened to seize the Tan-hoa region unless Phan Thanh Gian could persuade Truong Dinh to desist, Truong Dinh himself, realizing that a French attack was imminent, mobilized support by issuing a bogus imperial edict:

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Phan Thanh Gian replied to Bonard that he had relayed the message to the court, and he asked Bonard to wait until the court acted. At that time Truong Dinh issued a fake imperial edict that was sent everywhere in order to launch propaganda among the people. The admiral, suspecting that the court had really issued the edict, sent troops to attack Quy-son. 29 In the context of the continuing relevance for the southern Vietnamese of

the monarch as a focal point for political loyalty and as a symbol of Vietnamese independence and unity, such a forgery could have been expected to stimulate further efforts by the people of the occupied territories. 30 But from the point of view of the insurgents, it also had the detrimental effect of providing the French colonial authorities with a convenient pretext for further intervention. In any case, Nguyen Thong Ky xuyen van sao complements the Vietnamese imperial records and the letters exchanged by Phan Thanh Gian and Truong Dinh in demonstrating that French suspicions that the Tu-duc Emperor continued to support southern resistance in violation of the 1862 treaty were groundless.

There remains the possibility that southern resistance was linked to the court through the covert activities of the "advocates of war" at Hue; these officials might have supplied the insurgents with resources, instructions, and moral support without the knowledge of the emperor or the "peace party" mandarins. If this were the case, then the claims of the French officers that rebellions in the area occupied by them were supported by Vietnamese officials could have been accurate in this sense. This explanation was propounded by Admiral Ohier, and the present state of documentation in French and Viet- namese does not permit its clear demonstration or refutation. 31

The Hue court considered French charges that Hue was behind the insurgents to be fabrications intended to legitimize conquest. In connection with the posthumous judgment of Phan Thanh Gian for his role in the loss of the three provinces in 1867, a council of dignitaries investigated the question of these French accusations, concluding as follows:

In the Nineteenth Year of Tu-duc greed grew in the hearts of the Western officers, and so they demanded that we cede to them three provinces. Many times, our Foreign Office sent letters in response, criticizing their actions and telling them that they should observe the treaty, yet they always falsely accused us of recruiting the righteous soldiers, and they refuse to abandon their avarice. In the first month of last year, the Foreign Office itself sent them a letter of reply, and yet in more than four months no response was received by us; they would not consent to reply. Seeing this, one understands for how long their plot to steal the three provinces has been brewing! 32 This report, conducted in order to establish the degree of guilt to be attri-

buted to the late Phan Thanh Gian and others involved in the loss of the three additional provinces, was intended for only the most restricted circulation. Therefore, the speaker's use of the verb vu cao (to accuse falsely) in reference to

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the French charges against Hue - and his implicit assumption that this assertion did not need to be demonstrated, that Hue's innocence was something known to everyone at the court - is very probably a truthful representation of the Hue court's view of the French accusations. In short, for the Vietnamese mandarins of the Hue court, the French admirals' charges of Vietnamese imperial instigation for the southern insurrections were only one component of a larger conspiracy to occupy additional Vietnamese territory.

If the Tu-duc court definitely opposed a continued southern resistance, the emperor himself did not hold this position without grave misgivings. Although Tu-duc considered the southern insurgents to have violated his direct orders by their continued combat, he retained a strong sympathy for the righteous spirit by which he believed they were motivated. He consistently refused to apply the terminology of rebellion to those connected with the resistance in the South. For example, when prefectural officials from Thuan-khanh province reported in 1866 that Truong Dinh's son, Truong Tue, was plotting to launch a rebellion (muu dai nghich) from the highlands, Tu-duc sharply disagreed with this interpretation of Truong Tue's intentions. Stating that Truong Tue was more probably motivated by "indignation [long cong phan]," he ordered his officials to capture him "only to please France [de cho vui long nuoc Phap ma thoi]." To execute subjects with such an "admirable, unyielding nature [khi khai dang khen]" in the face of foreign invasion would be "regrettable [dang tiec]." The emperor confided to his Privy Council that he was "troubled [long tram van ay nay]" by the treaty-imposed necessity of opposing the resistants because he feared that, to the uninformed, his opposition to the southern struggle would appear to be the action of an unworthy emperor betraying his most faithful subjects. 33

The Tu-duc Emperor's palliative for the "troubling" contradiction between officially supported values and the exigencies of perceived political necessity was sometimes to praise the "righteousness" of the resistants while omitting any reference to the fact that their anti-French exploits had been opposed by his court after the signing of the Treaty of Sai-gon. For example, the emperor composed the following poem to honor Nguyen Trung Truc, executed by the French in 1868:

How fearsome was that fisherman! His great talent is admired by all! Burning the French ship at Nhat-tao village, Leveling the French ramparts at Kien-giang, Opposing the common enemies of people and king. Having sworn to risk his life for the country, His memory will be rewarded for one thousand years. 34. What an example of our righteous and faithful people.

Tu-duc here elegantly praises Nguyen Trung Truc as an example of the "righteous and faithful" Vietnamese who sacrificed themselves for "king and

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country" in the struggle against a "common enemy." Curiously absent is any refe rence to the fact that, after the 1862 treaty, Nguyen Trung Truc's righteous resistance violated the general policy and specific commands of the Tu-duc court.

The emperor's ambivalence for the southern resistance apparently infected some of the imperial historians as well. The Dai Nam thuc luc entry that explains why in 1874 the Tu-duc Emperor granted a monthly allowance in cash and grain to Truong Dinh's widow reads as follows:

Previously, when the French seized provinces in the South, Truong Dinh recruited soldiers for resistance. After defeat, he died, and his son Tue also died because of military matters. Dinh's wife, Le Thi Thuong, with no one to support her, returned to her native village, Tu Cung, in Binh-son subprefecture, Quang-ngai province. The mandarins of that province, thinking that Dinh was a man whose righteous, indomitable character is deserving of praise, yet whose wife is now alone, poor, sick, and miserable, were moved by compassion to petition for help. They were directed to present her each month with twenty quan of cash and two phuong of rice. 35 As in the poem cited above, the "righteous, indomitable character" of a

southern resistant is recognized and admired while the historical fact of official opposition to such acts of resistance is conveniently overlooked.

In conclusion, the discussion of the Hue court's relationship to the anti-French resistance movements in the occupied South demonstrated that the court changed its policy in accordance with the stipulations of the 1862 treaty. The Hue court had encouraged a popular resistance in the South to supplement its regular forces during the 1858-1862 war against France and Spain, but it reversed itself upon signing the treaty, ordering the insurgents to disband and their leaders to return to the mandarinate whence most of them came. Those who continued armed resistance did so on their own initiative, contrary to the court's explicit orders. Measures were taken to terminate this unofficial resistance. Imperial emissaries repeatedly contacted the rebel chieftains and admonished them, demanding that they renounce their resistance, usually without success. Officials in provinces bordering the French zone were instructed to refuse to aid the rebellion and to capture the rebels if possible. The court even resettled former resistants and refugees from the southern struggle, moving them to northern provinces where they could no longer endanger the court's plans for a pacific territorial retrocession.

How, then, can the persistence in Western scholarship of the notion that the Hue court continued to support southern resistance in violation of the Treaty of Sai-gon be explained? The French officers had their own reasons -frustration at their inability to quash Vietnamese resistance, the need for legitimization of further conquest - for accusing the Hue court of supporting the continuing southern struggle after the 1862 treaty. Subsequent Western writers, relying on the documents left by the French officers, naturally reiterated this interpretation of the Hue court's actions. The germane Vietnamese sources-

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-the Hue court's Dai Nam thuc luc and Quoc trieu chanh bien, Nguyen Thong Ky xuyen van sao, and the letters exchanged between Phan Thanh Gian and Truong Dinh - do not negate the possibility that chu chien officials from Hue surreptitiously supported the rebellion in the occupied South or that some Viet- namese mandarins in the border provinces offered the insurgents sanctuaries and supplies. But the Vietnamese sources do establish that the official policy of Hue was one of opposition to further resistance in the South after the signing of the Treaty of Sai-gon.

Hue's policy vis-à-vis the southern insurgents was nevertheless a contradictory one, for Emperor Tu-duc detested the French presence in the South and admired the spirit of resistance manifested by the rebels. These feelings did not change with the signing of the treaty. He retained this profound admiration for the southern resistants and worried that the spirit of righteousness among his people would be diminished by the example of their emperor's opposition to the activities of subjects whom even he continued to describe as "righteous recruits [cac nguoi mo nghia]."

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5

The Hue Court and Anti-Catholic Activism,

1862-1868

This chapter attempts to demonstrate that, after the signing of the Treaty

of Sai-gon, the policy of the Hue court was one of opposition to further official and unofficial violence against and harassment of Catholics. This argument for such a radical transformation in the religious policy of the Hue court contradicts the thesis of a recent monograph on Catholicism in Vietnam, Nicole-Dominique Le Les Missions-Étrangères et la pénétration française au Vietnam. The author summarized as follows her interpretation of the post-1862 religious policy of the Vietnamese government:

Because the French and the Spanish had come officially in order to save the Christians, it is evident that the treaty of 1862, signed under duress, did not mark any pause in the persecutions suffered by the Vietnamese Catholic community, persecutions characterized by a masked brutality from which the missionaries were not exempted… Up to the point of the great massacres that consecrated the peace treaties, the complaints were always of the same order: complicity of the court and injuries and threats against the Christians.1 Nicole-Dominique Le's insistence that the 1862 treaty did not change the

Hue court's treatment of the Vietnamese Catholics and their missionaries results from her reliance on French-language sources and her reluctance to question critically the truthfulness of the continuing missionary complaints against Hue. Thus Le's argument for post-1862 persecution is profoundly influenced at the level of documentation as well as that of interpretation by the accounts of missionaries.2 Yet the missionaries were strongly motivated to exag-

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gerate and/or fabricate incidents of official anti-Catholicism, for they consistently attempted to cite Hue's alleged violations in order to dupe the French admiral-governors at Sai-gon into adopting a more aggressive policy aimed at extorting additional privileges and exemptions for the Catholics from the humbled Hue court.3

The imperial records of the Nguyen dynasty tell a story vastly different from that of the missionaries and the historian cited above. While all sources are subject to particular prejudices, it should be recalled that the imperial records were not intended for Western eyes. There is no reason to suppose that the Hue court exaggerated or fabricated these accounts of its efforts on behalf of the Catholics in order to demonstrate its compliance with the treaty. Furthermore, the protection of Catholicism was not something that the court would have wished to emphasize in its records, for this was an unpopular policy of which not even the emperor approved in principle. The picture presented therein is probably an accurate record of the reports received from the provinces and of the court's reaction. Based on this source and on the writings of some of the anti-Catholic activists themselves, it can be demonstrated that, far from continuing "persecution" or surreptitiously supporting anti-Catholic activity on the part of its officials or the scholars, the Hue court attempted to protect the missionaries and the Vietnamese Catholics in the regions still subject to imperial authority.

Before turning to the reactions provoked by the transformation of Hue's religious policy, the legal status of Catholicism in the empire after the 1862 treaty should be explicated. Immediately after the signing of the treaty, the emperor proclaimed by edict: "With the peace treaty settled, the prohibition of Catholicism is therefore abandoned."4 The edict also stated that only those Viet- namese Catholics who had had a demonstrable relation with the invading forces could be considered culpable, and all other Catholics were pardoned for the crime of conversion to and/or refusal to abandon a formerly illegal religion.5 Imperial envoys were sent to troublesome areas to proclaim and explain the free doms to which the Catholics were henceforth entitled. For example, Le Tuan, a tien-si degree-holder from Ha-tinh province, was dispatched for this purpose to the Nghe-tinh region.6

The missionaries were granted permission to travel and to preach throughout the country subject only to the following specific regulations: They were required to register with local authorities wherever they traveled; they were permitted to travel only in a hammock or with a single horse and were forbidden the sedan chairs and parasols that symbolized Vietnamese authority; they might not be escorted by more than ten people; they might not surround their resi- dences with trenches or fortifications; and they might not assemble for religious purposes more than one hundred people.7 After a long period of anti-Catholic edicts and war that had spawned mutual hatreds and recriminations, such regulations can hardly be considered draconian, and they cannot be cited as evidence of continuing persecution.8 In 1868 Vietnamese regulations were changed so that corporal punishment might not be applied to members of the

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Catholic ecclesiastical hierarchy. 9 As the process of abandonment of special regulations for the Vietnamese Catholics continued, the increased rates of taxation imposed on them during the 1858-1862 war were removed, bringing them into a position of equality with the ordinary Vietnamese regarding the performance of corvée, military service, and the payment of head and land taxes; and they were entitled to imperial relief in case of disaster according to the same criteria applied to the unconverted subjects. 10 In 1866 the court abandoned in official documents the use of pejorative appellations in designa- ting the Vietnamese Catholics and in distinguishing them from the unconverted Vietnamese. Such appellations were naturally considered offensive by the Catholic Missionaries. The latter lodged their complaints with French colonial authorities, who presented the case to Vietnamese officials. Henceforth the Catholics and the unconverted were officially designated as giao dan (the people of religion) and binh dan (the ordinary people). 11

The Hue court's determination to compel its officials and subjects to follow the new regulations protecting Catholicism is demonstrated by its response to the multitude of anti-Catholic incidents that occurred in the years following the 1862 treaty. The general picture that emerges from the Vietnamese documents is the following. Many scholars and officials manifested their opposition to the French occupation of the southern provinces - and their linkage of the religious to the political question - by demonstrating against, harassing, and sometimes physically attacking Vietnamese Catholics and missionaries. In so doing they elicited the firm opposition of the Hue court. The patriotic rage of these scholars and officials met with the patent refusal of Hue, solid evidence of a reversal of policy. The following discussion of selected anti-Catholic incidents recorded in Vietnamese documents for the years 1862-1868 is therefore intended to demonstrate the Hue court's opposition to continued anti-Catholicism after the signing of the 1862 treaty.

The first major anti-Catholic movement after the treaty was signed was an insurrection manquée at the imperial citadel of Hue that was to be launched in conjunction with uprisings in the provincial capitals. On the occasion of the regional civil service examinations held late in 1864, candidates at the examination fields of Ha-noi, Thua-thien, and Nam-dinh manifested their opposition to the court's policies of peace and Catholic protection by sending petitions to the emperor, by refusing to take the examinations, and by rioting.

The examination field riots were suppressed by imperial troops. However, an official inquiry revealed that the scholars' demonstrations were not as sponta neous as they first appeared. The investigators uncovered a plot, supported by a number of officials at court and even by members of the royal family, to take advantage of the agitation at the examination fields, which they had instigated, in order to launch a coup d'état in the imperial citadel itself. According to investigators Pham Phu Thu and Le Ba Than, the principal plotters were Prince Hong-tap, Prince Hong-tu, Pho Ma Truong Van Chat, and Nguyen Van Vien. When Nguyen Van Vien and Truong Van Chat heard of the provisions of the 1862 treaty, they sent memorials to Emperor Tu-duc, urging him to eliminate

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the Vietnamese Catholics and suggesting strategies for attacking the French. When their petitions were rejected by the monarch, they decided to realize their objectives without imperial approbation. 12 The two plotters won the support of many "advocates of war" among the scholars and officials; with their concur- rence they planned to launch demonstrations at the examinations fields. For the plotters the purpose of the examination field demonstrations was two-fold: They could show a broad base of support for their proposals of resistance to France and anti-Catholicism among the country's scholars; and they could take advantage of the resulting confusion in order to take control of the imperial citadel. Their plans called for the immediate execution of "peace party" mandarins at court, including Phan Thanh Gian. With the advocates of peace eliminated, the rebels would be free to form volunteer groups of "righteous soldiers" who would attack Catholic villages in the vicinity of the capital. The Vietnamese Catholics were to be eliminated from the central and northern provinces. Then the partisans of the coup planned to attack the French in the South. The Tu-duc Emperor was to be offered the choice of supporting the movement's anti-Catholic and anti-French program or yielding the throne to another Nguyen prince, probably Hong-tap. The rising was to take place on August 8, 1864, but the rebels were unable to penetrate the heavily guarded imperial citadel, and their plans were discovered shortly thereafter. The leading members of the group were arrested and severely punished, but most of the rank and file, who were merely scholars with little political experience, were treated with leniency. 13

The insurrectionists' anti-Catholicism and its relation to their larger struggle against the French occupation can be observed in a petition sent by one of their supporters to the emperor during the time of the demonstrations. The petition was authored by Le Khac Can, a tien-si degree-holder and prefect (Xuan Thuong prefecture, Nam-dinh province) who served as a liaison between the plotters at the imperial citadel at Hue and the rioting examination candidates at Nam-dinh. The document reads as follows:

There can be no coexistence of orthodox and heterodox doctrines. Where one prospers, the other declines; when one develops, the other is blocked. Furthermore, these scoundrels have used perfidious plots to usurp our rights, and we are tormented day and night by their oppression. Our country has not yet determined to eliminate them, but if they are left with complete liberty, how can we have peace? Ever since the Catholic religion entered our country, they have concealed themselves in the isolated villages in order to carry out their seductions surreptitiously. Yet if their intentions were only to preach religion, why would they have crossed the boundless oceans and violated our kingdom's prohibitions of Catholicism? The invaders did not succeed through these artful schemes, and so they tried to use force to threaten us; force did not complete the job for them, and so they asked for a peace treaty. From the North to the South, we were confused, and the emperor did not have the heart to let our people suffer, and so he

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granted them a temporary peace. But this so-called peace was only a component of the invaders' strategy. If this were truly peace, then they should stay in their own country, or, if absolutely necessary, they can appoint ambassadors to visit but not to reside here. Why, then, do they make never-ending demands, having no respect for any interests besides their own? They do not even ask us for our opinions. Indeed, it is as though we are no longer the masters in our own land. Recently, we have heard that in the peace treaty the invaders demanded reparations in silver, and we took silver from our treasury to pay them. They demanded the right to establish churches, and we granted this as well, abandoning the prohibitions on this religion...The court has had long experience in dealing with the bad elements who follow the heterodox religion. In former times, Catholicism was prohibited. It is truly regrettable that such a well-reasoned policy, practiced for hundreds of years, should be so quickly abandoned! 14 For the purpose of evaluating the Hue court's policy vis-à-vis the Catholics,

the examination field demonstrations and the related plotting are revealing in two respects. First, it must be emphasized that the position of the scholars and officials was opposition to the peace policy, including toleration of Catholicism. These officials and scholars, with their intimate knowledge of village and official life, were convinced that the Hue court had complied with the Treaty of Sai-gon and ceased its persecution of the Catholics. The scholars' and officials' petitions, one of which was cited above, thus constitute an eloquent refutation of the argument that the Vietnamese government continued to persecute the Catho- lics after 1862. Second, the actions of the Tu-duc Emperor in suppressing the examination field demonstrations and in arresting and punishing the leading anti-Catholic"advocates of war" behind the attempted coup d'état at the imperial citadel are evidence of his opposition to this tendency. The emperor was willing to arrest high officials and even members of the royal family who attempted to implement anti-Catholic programs by force.

A similar incident, known in Vietnamese as the Cuoc khoi loan o kinh thanh Hue (Imperial Citadel Uprising), took place in 1866. Once again members of the imperial family, supported by officials, attempted to overthrow the Tu-duc Emperor, whom they criticized for his tolerance of Catholicism and for his acceptance of the French occupation of the southern provinces. The events of the 1866 movement may be summarized as follows. The organizer of the rebellion was Doan Huu Trung, a native of Thua-thien province (An-truyen village, Phu-vang prefecture). Although he was of a rather humble background, his Confucian learning and scholarship had earned him a considerable local reputation. 15 He founded in his region of origin a poetry group known as the Son-dong thi-hoi (Eastern Mountain Poetry Society) that was frequented by his younger brothers Doan Huu Ai and Doan Huu Truc and by Truong Trong Hoa and Pham Luong. The group was drawn together by its opposition to the Hue court's policies of peace with France and Catholic toleration, and they began to plot the overthrow of the Tu-duc Emperor. They obtained the support of

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soldiers and laborers in the area as well as that of several imperial officials and members of the royal family. 16 At that time the Tu-duc Emperor was in the process of constructing his own sepulchre (known during his lifetime as Van Nien Co and after his death as Khiem Lang) in the vicinity of the imperial citadel. Having judged Huong-thuy and Huong-tra prefectures (southwest of the capital) to be auspicious from the geomantic perspective, Tu-duc forced residents to abandon their villages and lands in order to make way for the construction project. The labor was performed primarily by soldiers working under harsh discipline. These conditions were rendered all the more difficult by the fact that the area was suffering from drought and famine. 17 The situation was so unbearable that a popular proverb has it that the sepulchre of Tu-duc has "walls made from bones and trenches filled with blood." 18 The conditions of the soldiers and the displaced villagers at and around the construction site thus provided the members of the Son-dong thi hoi with a social base for putting their plans into action. They attracted the support of many of the displaced villagers and soldiers by promising improvements in their material conditions and a restoration of their lands. 19

The plotters still faced the problem of securing entrance into the imperial citadel. This they resolved by presenting themselves to interested parties as supporters of Dinh-dao as the rightful emperor of Vietnam. As was described earlier, Prince Hong-bao had attempted to launch a coup d'état against Tu-duc. When his plans were discovered, Hong-bao was imprisoned, and he subsequently committed suicide. As an act of clemency Tu-duc did not fully apply the principle of collective familial responsibility to Hong-bao's eldest son, who was spared execution on the condition that he adopt his mother's family name, thereby formally precluding the possibility of ascending the throne. Despite the change in family name, some court dignitaries thought that Dinh-dao deserved to be emperor because he was the oldest son of Hong-bao. 20 Dinh-dao himself responded favorably to the overtures of the Son-dong thi hoi as did Ton That Cuc, who, as a high-ranking military mandarin and a member of the royal family, proposed to gain entrance for the rebels into the imperial citadel. 21

Using a nearby Buddhist pagoda known as Phap-van and the construction site itself as bases of operations, the plotters planned to launch their rising on the eighth day of the eighth lunar month, the day on which Ton That Cuc was scheduled to have an audience with the emperor. Although the soldiers and villagers recruited at the construction site numbered 1,000 men, they were poorly armed and badly organized. They lost their courage when confronted with the determined opposition of a smaller number of imperial guards led by Ho-Oai. Refusing to let himself be intimidated, the latter startled the rebellious soldiers by telling them bluntly that their actions constituted treason. Taking advantage of their hesitation, Ho-Oai leapt forward and stabbed Doan Huu Truc. Both the injured Doan Huu Truc and Doan Huu Trung were captured in the ensuing mêlée, and the groups of rebels held in reserve at the Phap-van pagoda and at the construction site chose to flee rather than to confront the alerted imperial guardsmen. The area around the citadel was sealed off, and the

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leaders of the insurrectionists were all apprehended. Under interrogation Doan Huu Trung revealed the involvement of Dinh-dao, who was also arrested. Dinh-dao was executed by strangulation, Ton That Cuc committed suicide, and the rest of the plotters were punished according to the degree of their involvement22

Although the leaders of the Imperial Citadel Uprising used the bait of material improvements and support for Dinh-dao as pretender to the throne to attract the support of soldiers, displaced villagers, and members of the royal family, these were not their ultimate goals of the movement. Their primary intentions can only be known by examining a long poem (498 lines in the luc bat or "six-eight" style) entitled Trung nghia ca or "Ode to Fidelity" composed by the movement's leader, Doan Huu Trung, while he was imprisoned after the failure of the insurrection. 23 According to the Trung nghia ca, the plotters of the Son-dong thi hoi were moved primarily by their opposition to the Hue court's acceptance of a French presence in the South and tolerance of Catholicism. The effects of the Franco-Spanish invasion are described as follows by Doan Huu Trung: "The smoking Western ships attacked us everywhere. They withdrew from Da-nang but reappeared at Can-gio. They spread conster- nation among the 100 families. The rains toppled the incense vase, and the winds tilted the ancestral altar." 24 The incense vase and ancestral altar represent the practice of ancestor worship, a subtle blending of indigenous and Confucian rituals practiced in nearly all Vietnamese families. By linking the "wind and rain" of Western invasion with the "toppling and tilting" of these ceremonial objects, the author asserts that the most profound Vietnamese values were threatened by the Western invasion. Any compromise with the invaders was thus out of the question. The court's policy of peace was criticized as a betrayal of the Vietnamese heritage as an independent empire: "The character 'peace' binds us like a thick rope…How regrettable that the accomplishments of our ancestors are threatened in this way. Who can restore to us the three citadels that we have lost?" 25 The "three citadels" represented the three provinces of Gia-dinh, Dinh-tuong, and Bien-hoa whose seizure by Franco-Spanish arms was formally accepted by the Hue court's signing of the Treaty of Sai-gon. By comparing the word "peace" to a "thick rope" the author suggests that the Vietnamese people were capable of defeating the invaders if they were not constrained by the court's peace policy.

Much of the Trung nghia ca praises the "advocates of war," particularly Nguyen Tri Phuong and Truong Dinh, and criticizes supporters of the peace policy, especially Le Ba Than and Truong Dang Que. The document asserts that the insurrection's immediate goal was to execute leading members of the "peace party" at court. Tu-duc is criticized for his failure to eliminate the influence of the advocates of peace, but the rebels' plans for the emperor are less clear. 26 Tran Trong Kim asserts that they planned to execute the Tu-duc Emperor as well, but this is not confirmed by the imperial records or the Trung nghia ca. 27 The latter document rather suggests that the leader of the "Imperial Citadel Uprising" intended to place Dinh-dao on the throne and to relegate Tu-duc to

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a purely ceremonial role as Thai-thuong hoang, but this was only a means to the end of reversing the court's policy of peace. 28

In regard to the religious question, Doan Huu Trung's views were those of the "advocates of war." He considered the Vietnamese Catholics both as "heretics [ta dao]" and as "fifth columnists [noi ung]." As the following lines indicate, the Trung nghia ca is highly critical of the role played by the Vietnamese Catholics during the Franco-Spanish invasion: "The Catholics' behavior was treasonous: Every day they supplied the enemy with provisions!" 29 Doan Huu Trung was outraged that the Hue court did not punish the Catholics for their role in the 1858-1862 conflict, that is, that the court did not continue its anti-Catholic programs after the conclusion of the Treaty of Sai-gon. He believed, for example, that the taxes of the non-Catholic Vietnamese were increased every year in order to pay reparations to the French, while the Catholic Vietnamese were free to enjoy the fruits of the French victory: "Every year, our taxes in gold augment. We must pay without complaint while the Catholics are free to eat and laugh at our expense." 30 In another possible reference to the protected status of the Catholics after 1862, Doan Huu Trung expressed his indignation that the Catholic seminaries were bustling with activity, an activity that in his opinion was incompatible with the interests of Vietnam: "There is a bustle of activity among the priests at the seminaries. No one there is concerned for the well-being of our country." 31 Therefore, in Doan Huu Trung's view, the presence of the Vietnamese Catholics in northern and central Vietnam was inextricably related to the French occupation of the South, an occupation that the Catholics had helped to install and from which they benefited; only the Hue court's adherence to the Treaty of Sai-gon was preventing the leaders of the Imperial Citadel Uprising and other “advocates of war" from exterminating the Vietnamese Catholics and expelling the French. This was the ultimate goal of the Imperial Citadel Uprising. In the words of the author of the Trung nghia ca: "Internally, we will completely eliminate the Catholics. Externally, we will give the Western invaders a determined battle." 32

For the purpose of evaluating the Hue court's policy in regard to Catho- licism after the signing of the Treaty of Sai-gon, the Imperial Citadel Uprising of 1866 is interesting in several respects. Doan Huu Trung's complaints about the protected status of Catholicism after 1862 is an additional refutation of the argument that official anti-Catholicism continued after 1862. The rebels of 1866 believed that the overthrow of the Tu-duc Emperor and the elimination of the dominant "peace party" at Hue was necessary before the anti-Catholic program could be implemented. In other words, the Hue court represented for them an impediment to the implementation of the anti-French and anti-Catholic chu chien program. And the punishment of those involved in the rising again demonstrates that the Tu-duc Emperor was opposed to this program. The emperor's authority was not again so directly called into question by the other anti-Catholic incidents that necessitated his active intervention.

An incident that illustrates the conflict between Hue's new policies in regard to Catholicism and an enduring anti-Catholicism at the local level occur-

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red in Nghe-Tinh in 1866. According to the Dai Nam thuc luc, a subprefectural assistant named Tran Tan and an assistant canton head named Phan Dien reacted to a rash of conversions to Catholicism in the hamlets of Ban Thach and Mac Vinh by sending laborers to burn down a seminary and to block further proselytization. The resulting investigation by officials sent from Hue impli- cated a host of provincial officials: Hoang Ta Vien, Nguyen Uy, Ton That Triet, Tran Van Thieu, Nguyen Dinh Thi, Do De, and Nguyen Tu Gian. They were found guilty of surreptitiously supporting the anti-Catholic actions of the lower officials and the local scholars; based on the degree of involvement, they were punished by reductions in rank, loss of administrative position, transfer, and exile. 33

A court official summarized the predicament of the provincial mandarins who were caught between anti-Catholic underlings and the court's new policies protecting the Catholics:

The two sides, Catholic and non-Catholic, harbor prejudices against one another. In Nghe-an and Ha-tinh provinces, they are not yet at peace. Bishop Gauthier recently sent his followers to proselytize for Catholicism, and therefore the communal and cantonal authorities and the learned men openly committed arson. The regional mandarins could not avoid secretly taking the lead in order to gain fame for themselves. 34 This document reveals much about the dynamics of Catholic protection in

the years after the 1862 treaty. Local officials and scholars continued to react violently to Catholic proselytization. The Nghe-tinh provincial officials knew that the court would punish them if their support for these activities was discovered, but they also knew that a leadership role in such a movement could make them local heroes. This is evident from the official's comments: "The regional mandarins could not avoid secretly taking the lead in order to gain fame for themselves [Quan dia phuong khong khoi ngam ngam lam chu de cau lay danh du]." In Nghe-tinh anti-Catholic activities could not be avoided by an official seeking a local reputation, but such activities had to be concealed from the court since they would bring certain punishment. The fact that the Nghe-tinh officials considered it necessary to cover their anti-Catholic actions from the court's view indicates that the Tu-duc Emperor's administrators knew full well - even if the missionaries did not - that imperial support for anti-Catholi cism had ended with the signing of the Treaty of Sai-gon in 1862.

In 1868 scholars in the subprefecture of Thanh-ha in Ha-tinh province took umbrage at the growing number of Catholic churches and the large gatherings of worshipers in their region. Rather than directly employing violence, the scholars informed Vietnamese seminary students of their intention to commit arson, allowing rumor and the resulting panic to do the rest. The incident is described as follows in the Veritable Records:

A group of tu-tai degree-holders in Ha-tinh, Nguyen Huy Dien, Bien Van Vy, and Am thu cuu pham Dang Van Anh were of the opinion

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that in the villages of Ha Hoang, Huong Boc, Phuong My, and Thuong Loi… Catholic churches were becoming more numerous each day, and the gatherings of worshipers were crowded. They informed seminary students in the subprefecture of their intention to burn and destroy these edifices. The Catholics were frightened, and they pulled down their buildings themselves before the scholars could act. 35 The Hue court punished the scholars with beatings, forced labor, and the

removal of their names from the record books. Regional officials, including an inspector of education, were reduced in rank because they had failed to exercise the requisite influence and watchfulness over the educated people in their jurisdictions. 36

In the same year provincial mandarins in Nam-dinh received a petition signed by more than 300 scholars, among them a retired fiscal administrator named Bui Duy Ky, a cu-nhan degree-holder named Vo Huy Sy, a tu-tai degree-holder named Pham Duc Tram, and a local notable named Vo Cong Thu. The petitioners stated that the Catholic priests of Nam-dinh were "exceeding the limitations of their sphere [dao truong tiem vuot]" while their followers were "making propaganda for a rebellion [dan theo dao co dong lam loan]." The scholars asked permission to organize a militia for the capture and execution of the alleged offenders. 37

When the provincial mandarins reported this to the emperor, he ordered an inquiry. The report read as follows:

Naturally the rage of the scholars has not developed overnight. It was stimulated by the village notables - the models for all in the villages. The do not yet understand the court's will and have thus reacted their own fashion. We recommend that the imperial envoy follow previous edicts in order to resolve this matter correctly. In regard to the Catho- lics who do not behave correctly, we should advise the priests that they must always follow the law if they wish to avoid further problems. 38 In approving the investigator's recommendations the emperor ordered

that the chiefs of groups of violators be swiftly punished "without discrimi nating between the Catholics and the others [khong ke dan luong dan dao]." Subsequent reports from local officials stated that the situation had been paci- fied as a result of confiscation of weapons and granting of restitution to those whose homes and property had been damaged in the conflict. This had been accomplished, the memorialist assured the emperor, without regard for the religious orientations of the individuals concerned. 39

Although the specifics given by the Dai Nam thuc luc account are of a less than satisfying completeness, the document contains several points relevant to the consideration of the Hue court's reactions to regional anti-Catholicism. First, the widespread nature of anti-Catholic sentiment is shown by the large number of petitioners. Their administrative, academic, and honorific titles reveal that they were among the most highly respected individuals in local society; as the imperial investigator indicated, they were the "models for all in

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the villages." Second, the imperial investigation of this potential anti-Catholic outbreak found that the cause of the scholars' anger was their failure to understand the court's will. These pillars of local society were thus criticized for maintaining the spirit of anti-Catholicism after the court's policy had changed because they did not understand this change. Third, the emperor's insistence that the matter be resolved without reference to the religious adherence of the individuals indicates that, in the emotionally charged atmosphere after the 1862 treaty, he could not take for granted that this imperial policy would be faithfully applied by all officials.

Anti-Catholic feeling was so widespread and so easily aroused that the Tu-duc Emperor was frequently forced to calm popular passions and to counter his officials' propensities to act first and clarify matters second when Catholicism was concerned. In 1868 an apparent death by poisoning in the capital provoked rumors that the Catholics were attempting to poison the inhabitants, and a general panic ensued. The emperor acted swiftly to defuse the situation. Stating that "false, groundless rumors should not be heeded," he instructed his officials to assemble the people and to order them not to exaggerate the matter and not to regard each other with suspicion. 40

Afterwards a village chief from La Chu village in Thua-thien province turned in to the prefectural seat a packet of poison and four persons whom he accused of the murder. The prefectural mandarin's examination convinced him that the leader of the group, Bach Van Phuc, had been hired by a missionary to concoct poisons. Tu-duc declared this conclusion incorrect and ordered the release of the accused villagers. The village chief, condemned for "arresting people based on suspicion," was punished by flogging; the pretectural official, cul-pable of "creating an atmosphere of fear," was reduced two grades of rank. 41

The incident reveals that many imperial officials remained suspicious of the Catholics and - in the emperor's view - showed a disturbing tendency to act precipitously when they detected the involvement of missionaries in criminal activity. The Tu-duc Emperor acted quickly to protect the Catholics by stifling a potential popular outburst and by reversing what he judged to be ill-consi dered official actions.

It would be impractical to attempt to examine the Hue court's response in every case of anti-Catholic activity during the 1862-1874 period. But for the purpose of refuting Nicole-Dominique Le's argument for continued official persecution after the treaty - a modern version of the missionaries' nineteenth-century complaint - the cases discussed above are sufficient. They demonstrate that the authors of anti-Catholic activities and movements after the signing of the Treaty of Sai-gon were usually fully aware of the court's opposition to their actions. Accordingly such anti-Catholic activities were most often undertaken surreptitiously - they were concealed from the Tu-duc Emperor - or overtly as a challenge to the emperor's authority. In the context of the Hue court's transformed riligious policy after the 1862 treaty, all of these actions were unofficial and illegal. And their perpetrators were punished accordingly.

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The argument above has demonstrated that the religious policy of the Hue court changed as a result of the Treaty of Sai-gon, turning from persecution to protection of Catholicism. Two Vietnamese historians who have recognized this change - the Marxist Tran Van Giau and the Catholic Phan Phat Huon -have posed the question of whether or not these changes in official religious policy were accompanied by mutations in the Tu-duc Emperor's attitudes regarding the Vietnamese Catholics in the years after 1862. Both historians have concluded that the emperor's attitude softened in the years following the treaty. Yet neither argument is convincingly documented. This is not surprising, for the Tu-duc Emperor wrote little on Catholicism after 1862, and most of his post-bellum writings dealing with Catholicism have a conciliatory tone reflec- ting his interest in counteracting the anti-Catholic propensities of his administrators. Nevertheless several imperial edicts issued during and immediately after the 1874 "scholars' rebellion" (Van than noi loan) in the Nghe-tinh area furnish conclusive evidence that the Tu-duc Emperor's attitude toward the Catholics did not change significantly between 1862 and 1875. The arguments of Tran Van Giau and Phan Phat Huon are considered first, followed by the discussion of these imperial edicts.

Based on analysis of the court's post-treaty political comportment and of the directives issued to Vietnamese officials, Tran Van Giau concludes not only that the court's abandonment of the interdictions was genuine but also that Emperor Tu-duc changed his thinking in regard to the Catholic Vietnamese. He cites an edict issued by Tu-duc that criticized a canton chief in Ninh-binh province who persisted in harrying the Catholic Vietnamese under his authority after the rescission of the edicts of interdiction in 1862: "The followers of Catholicism are also the children of the court, and if we abandon them or kill them all, then this will only cause hatred. This is not the way to bring peace to the people." 42 For Tran Van Giau this represented a change in Tu-duc's attitude regarding Catholicism and not merely an acceptance of the political necessity of toleration imposed by the treaty: "This recognition was partially based on reason and was not only because the court was persuaded by the sound of French artillery." 43

Tran Van Giau is not sufficiently aware that Tu-duc's directives to officials were conciliatory toward the Catholics for the simple reason that, after the signing of the 1862 document, he wanted to prevent anti-Catholic actions by his officials because they endangered his hopes for a territorial retrocession. The document cited by Tran Van Giau is certainly authentic, but it must be emphasized that the historical situation gave the emperor every reason to be less than candid when addressing these officials. The contrast between the Tu-duc of the interdiction years and that of the edict cited by the author can therefore be explained by the emperor's fidelity to the treaty. It does not necessarily indicate a change in his attitudes vis-à-vis the Catholics themselves.

Phan Phat Huon goes much further, arguing that the Tu-duc Emperor's thinking about the Catholic question underwent a profound transformation in the several years following the 1862 treaty. In about 1865, the author asserts,

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Tu-duc issued an edict in which he declared his admiration for the Vietnamese Catholics' fidelity both to their religion and to the Vietnamese state. The emperor further acknowledged therein that his former policies of interdiction of Catholicism had been based on his own ignorance of the reality of Catholic behavior during the war years. 44 On the first of these points Phan Phat Huon's citation of the alleged edict reads as follows:

As for the Catholics I must admit that, although they were faced with an extremely difficult situation, their fidelity both to their religion and to the laws of the country has earned my boundless admiration. 45 In regard to the issue of Catholic collaboration with the Franco-Spanish

forces during the 1858-1862 war, Phan Phat Huon's citation of the Tu-duc Emperor would seem to constitute a frank recognition on the part of the emperor that he had been the dupe of the anti-Catholic mandarins:

Several years ago when France and Spain seized our territory, we were all forced to endure sufferings in order to resist them, and the mandarins petitioned me as follows: "It is the Catholics who, prevented from practicing their religion, have called those two countries to their aid." These officials thus argued that the Catholics should be separated from the rest of the people and imprisoned in order to avoid great harm. Because of this uncertain information, which was in full contradiction with the reality of the situation, I did not know to whom I should listen, and my highest officials and I applied severe measures. 46 Were this document a veritable imperial edict, it would constitute conclu-

sive proof of Phan Phat Huon's assertion that the Tu-duc Emperor's attitude toward the Vietnamese Catholics underwent a profound transformation during the years following the 1862 treaty. Yet the authenticity of the document is questionable. The ideas expressed therein are uncharacteristic of the Tu-duc Emperor's attitudes as they can be seen in pre-war and wartime documents of his certain authorship, which obliges Phan Phat Huon to meet a heavy burden of proof. This he does not do; he cites no source for the document, and the only date indicated is the imprecise "after the discovery of the scholars' plot," by which he perhaps means the examination field rebellions of 1864. 47 Several linguistic anomalies and cultural incongruities further render the document suspect. To treat only the most striking, the document's author refers to Catho- licism as cong giao and to the Vietnamese Catholics as nguoi cong giao, the connotations of which must be examined.

Cong can be translated as "common," "public," "official," or "open to all." It is used by modern Vietnamese Catholics to designate the doctrine (giao) of Catholicism because, as an international proselytizing religion, it is not particular to any cultural group or nation. This meaning stands in contradiction with the nineteenth-century official Vietnamese perception of Catholicism, which considered it to be "a heterodox doctrine" culturally specific to Western countries and inextricably associated with their military aggression against Vietnam. On the philosophical level a Vietnamese emperor of the nineteenth century

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could not call Catholicism a cong giao without recognizing the principle of religious pluralism. To do so would have meant negating the inseparability of Confucian ethics and political authority, the political principle on which the imperial state was based. On the historical level for a nineteenth-century Viet- namese ruler to call Catholicism a cong giao would be to deny the perceived historical linkage of missionary Catholicism with European military aggression. Therefore, cong giao is a modern self-appellation employed by Vietnamese Catholics and those sympathetic to them; in the mouth of a nineteenth-century Vietnamese emperor the term is an absurd anachronism.

Since Phan Phat Huon provides no source citation or precise date, his readers are left to discover for themselves whence came this curious document. A possible answer is that it is the author's own translation into Vietnamese of an alleged imperial edict published in French translation in the Annals de la Propagation de la Foi, volume XXXVIII, 1865. The document published there was reproduced from a letter of Father Bernard to Monsignor Sohier in Sep- tember 1864. Father Bernard did not supply a precise date or copy of the original for comparison with his translation. 48 In any case, it would be dangerous to place much credence in the genuineness of the Vietnamese-language document presented by Phan Phat Huon as an edict authored by Emperor Tu-duc.

Several imperial documents of certain authenticity issued in relation to the Nghe-tinh rising of 1874 supply conclusive evidence that even the more nuanced argument of Tran Van Giau for a subtle change in Tu-duc's attitude is untenable. Since the purpose of citing these documents is only to refute the argument that there was a change in Tu-duc's attitude toward the Catholics, the particulars of this movement - which differed little from those described earlier in its anti-French and anti-Catholic overtones and its opposition to the Hue court's policies of peace and toleration - need not be elaborated here.

The first document, an edict of the Tu-duc Emperor ordering the leaders of the 1874 movement to cease their anti-Catholic violence, contains a frank historical discussion of the emperor's previous policies prohibiting Catholicism as well as the emperor's perception of the role of the Vietnamese Catholics in the Franco-Spanish invasion. The document reveals that the emperor continued to view the Vietnamese Catholics as unrepentant heretics who had abandoned the ways of their land and had called for the intervention of a foreign power in their behalf. After praising the efforts of his ancestors in "opposing false doctrines and blocking heterodox teachings [chong thuyet ta, ngan dao ta]," the emperor explained that the root cause of the religious differences among his subjects was the "stupidity [ngu den toi]" of the Catholics in abandoning the traditional teachings of the Vietnamese people:

When I succeeded to the throne, I reverently followed the practices of my sagacious predecessors, and I thought of those stupid people who were born in our country but who do not follow the teachings of our country. The teachings of our country are righteousness and humanity

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while their teachings are Heaven and magical water; the teachings of our country are those of Confucius… while theirs are of Jesus and the Lord. 49 The document demonstrates that the emperor's belief in the politically

dangerous effects of heterodox doctrines such as Catholicism was intact in 1874, for he observes therein that the teachings of Catholicism "coaxed [dỗ dành]" the Catholic Vietnamese to commit acts of increasing wickedness. The emperor further indicated his opinion that his subjects, once converted to Catholicism, never returned to the path of orthodoxy. The severe measures of the interdiction years were thus not repudiated in principle, but their ineffectiveness in the face of the Catholic threat was admitted:

They were coaxed into committing wicked acts that daily grew more heinous. Because of this the punishment of walking on the cross was implemented, and the regulations dispersing them to many different locations were clarified. Despite these measures we never saw anyone repent his errors, awaken, and return to the orthodox path. In approximately the twentieth year of my reign, the court dignitaries asked for the execution of all the Catholics, but I could not dare to order this…Only then did I order the interdictions to be applied with the utmost severity and for dispersal of the Catholics to be emphasized. My intention was that all the regions and provinces of our country would follow the same customs and habits. The accomplishment of this would bring brightness to heaven and earth…I did not suspect that the patient had been ill for so long that the medicine was rejected. This is because they were so inhuman and hateful, and.the great disorder was caused by this…The six provinces of Gia-dinh were lost to the court, and the civil and military mandarins did nothing…I have considered this matter carefully, and the court dignitaries have discussed it. Peace is the policy of our country. 50 In the emperor's view, the harsh methods of the interdiction years had

been ineffective against the Vietnamese Catholics. Yet he did not reject the principle of forcing the Catholics to follow Confucian customs and practices. Tu-duc was compelled by the Treaty of Saigon to tolerate the Vietnamese Catholics, and he accepted the political necessity of doing so. But his belief that they were dangerous heretics was unaltered, and his Confucian vision of a Viet- nam with unified customs and practices was unrenounced.

The second document relevant to the question of the Tu-duc Emperor's view of the Catholics was issued in 1875 in the context of the court's reaction to French pressure to compensate the Catholics for losses suffered during the rebellion of the previous year. Part of this edict directly addresses the Viet- namese Catholics:

Although you follow a different teaching, your nature does not differ from that of my other subjects in being capable of maintaining the Way of the human being. If for a moment you do not maintain proper

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comportment, how then can you realize your human nature? …Why must you seek advantages and harbor ambitions that cannot be realized? This is merely the result of the fact that you stupidly follow these religious teachings; thus you are unwilling to reflect. Impartial and without rancor, I want to prevent any of my subjects from falling into error. I thus educate all without exception. If you do not repent your errors, even the French chargé d'affaires will tire of you. This is because those who lack fidelity and righteousness for their own country will not be employed even if they go to another land. This situation can be compared to that of a young maiden who, having lost her virginity, is naturally abandoned by everyone…In the future when you are punished by your superiors, even the French chargé d'affaires will not be able to protect the indecent, and you will only increase the hatred felt for you. 51 Based on this document, it is evident that for the Tu-duc Emperor the

vagaries of political events had done nothing to alter the timeless truth that only the practice of the primordial Confucian virtues enabled the human being to carry out the social relationships upon which any country's prosperity and order depended. This is the meaning behind his statement that all Vietnamese have the same "nature [bản tính]" that is capable of observing the proper Confucian customs that alone permit them to realize this nature and act as human beings. In comparing the case of the Vietnamese Catholics to that of a maiden who had lost her virginity, Tu-duc meant that the Catholics had failed to maintain their loyalty to their ancestral homeland. This in the emperor's view had earned them the hatred of all Vietnamese.

Also evident here is the Confucian assumption about the politically pernicious effects of heterodox creeds. The edict stated that the Catholics' lack of loyalty and righteousness in regard to their country was the inevitable consequence of their religious beliefs. The Tu-duc Emperor continued to perceive a causal relationship between heterodoxy of religious practice and political rebellion. Therefore, the frame of reference from which Tu-duc continued to perceive the Catholic Vietnamese was that of the heterodoxy of Catholicism vis-à-vis the orthodoxy of Confucianism. Yet the political comportment of the Hue court in regard to the Catholics did change during this period because the 1862 treaty called for a policy of toleration. The edict cited above affords some insight into the emperor's feelings about this policy, suggesting that his vigor in executing it derived not from his belief in the justice of the Catholic cause but from his recognition of the political necessity of avoiding further conflict with the French. The repeated references to the French chargé d'affaires seem indicative of the emperor's frustration at being unable to apply the laws of the empire to the Catholic Vietnamese because of the French intervention, that is, because of the Treaty of Sai-gon. 52 The evidence from these two imperial edicts indicates that the events of the years between the 1862 and 1874 treaties did not produce significant change in the Tu-duc Emperor's attitude toward Catho- licism.

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In conclusion, the Hue court's commitment to the 1862 treaty has been further demonstrated in this chapter through the analysis of primary Viet- namese documentation relevant to the Hue court's response to the continuing opposition to the Catholic presence in northern and central Vietnam. Nicole-Dominique Le's argument was criticized for its reliance on missionary sources and for its uncritical reiteration of the missionary thesis regarding continued persecution by the Hue court. The Vietnamese documents revealed that the policy of the Hue court after the 1862 treaty was one of opposition to further official and unofficial violence against and harassment of Catholics. The anti-Catholic activities that took place after the treaty were not ordered or executed by the Hue court and its officials acting in their official capacities. They were rather enacted by examination candidates, scholars, members of the royal family, former officials, and officers in function but acting contrary to their orders. These anti-Catholic activists were generally fully cognizant of the fact that their actions were contrary to the policy of the Hue court, for these actions were either undertaken surreptitiously, that is, concealed from the Tu-duc Emperor, or openly as a challenge to his authority. In compliance with the 1862 treaty, the Hue court condemned these actions as illegal and their perpetrators as criminals. Far from continuing persecution, the Hue court was compelled by the logic of its acceptance of the 1862 treaty to take the side of the Vietnamese Catholics, defending them against and punishing their opponents, the intran- sigent advocates of war. The findings here parallel the results of the investigation of the Hue court's relationship to the southern anti-French insurgents after the signing of the Treaty of Sai-gon. Hue had encouraged a guerrilla resistance as a supplement to its regular forces during the 1858-1862 conflict, but it reversed itself after the signing of the 1862 treaty. The anti-French activities of the southern insurgents were thus, it was concluded, unofficial and illegal after the signing of the 1862 treaty, just as were the anti-Catholic activities of the advocates of war in the independent Vietnamese territories after that event.

The analysis then turned to the question of the emperor's attitude in regard to the Vietnamese Catholics after the signing of the 1862 treaty. Contrary to the arguments of Vietnamese historians Tran Van Giau and Phan Phat Huon, the changes in the Hue court's religious policy were not accompanied by a softening in the Tu-duc Emperor's attitude in regard to the Vietnamese Catholics. Phan Phat Huon's contention that there was a radical change in the monarch's views was rejected because his supporting evidence could not withstand critical examination. Tran Van Giau's thesis of a subtle change was no more convincing because it failed to account for the political motivation that impelled Emperor Tu-duc to urge moderation upon his administrators. The two edicts issued by the Tu-duc Emperor in 1874-1875 are decisive in answering this question. The ideas expressed therein are consistent with those expressed by the emperor about Catholicism before the 1862 treaty, which leads to the conclusion that there was no significant change in his perception of the Vietnamese Catholics during the period between the 1862 and 1874 treaties. The Tu-duc Emperor thus shared the Confucian repugnance for the "heterodox religion" that motivated the anti-Catholic advocates of war during the years between the two

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treaties even though he was compelled by the logic of his acceptance of the 1862 treaty to suppress them.

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6

Hue's Policy of Peace and the "Francis Garnier Affair,"

1873-1874

This chapter attempts a reinterpretation of the French invasion of Tonkin

usually known as the "Francis Garnier Affair." The argument is that Admiral Dupré and Captain Garnier planned to intimidate Hue into giving France commercial concessions in the North - perhaps even a protectorate. In pursuance of this scheme they contacted the Catholic missionaries of Tonkin who - with the exception of most of the Spanish Dominicans - responded with enthusiastic encouragement and promises of support. Contrary to the interpretations of many contemporary French authors, the Catholics brought substantial and significant support to the French forces in their short-lived occupation of Tonkin. In short, it is to be demonstrated that an incident that has long been interpreted as an example - to employ the term of Chesneaux - of "Asiatic treachery" was in fact a case of premeditated aggression by France, an aggression facilitated by the local influence of the Catholic missionaries.

The analysis then turns to the question of Hue's response. It is to be argued that, these aggressions notwithstanding, the Hue court did not deviate from the policy of appeasement that it had followed since the signing of the Treaty of Sai-gon. French provocations were met by Hue's official representatives with verbal protest, passive resistance, or merely preparatory and defensive measures. The successful counterattack led by Luu Vinh Phuc (Liu Yung-fu) was probably arranged by local Vietnamese commanders acting contrary to the wishes of the Tu-duc Emperor. The emperor himself recoiled before the specter of tactical victory in the Tonkin Delta, disavowing Luu Vinh Phuc's actions with as much

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insistence - and less hypocrisy - as Admiral Dupré in repudiating Garnier's coup de force. Hue granted France yet another concessive peace treaty, which the Tu-duc Emperor attempted to justify by purporting to accept Dupré's claim that Garnier had overstepped his authority. Tu-duc used the withdrawal of the French force as a demonstration that the "peace policy" was an effective means of dealing with the French. Through imperial edicts and civil service examinations, Tu-duc presented the Garnier affair as a diplomatic triumph for Vietnam. The episode, Tu-duc argued, vindicated the peace policy since the "good will" of the French was presumably demonstrated by the return of the four northern provinces seized by Garnier. The return of these northern provinces, the emperor argued, augured well for the future return of the six southern ones. Far from provoking a reassessment of policy, the Garnier affair prompted the Tu-duc Emperor to launch a “propaganda offensive" in order to indoctrinate the present as well as the rising generation of Vietnamese officials in the virtues of pacific diplomacy with France.

The introduction of French military force in Tonkin in the mid-1870s developed from France's continuing quest for access to the markets of the China trade. The concept of a "quest for markets" as the basic motivation for European colonial aggression in Southeast Asia during the second half of the nineteenth century can not be expressed by deterministic formulas equating metropolitan economics and colonial acquisitions. A more subtle explanation of the relationship can be found in D. R. Sar Desai British Trade and Expansion in Southeast Asia, 1830-1914. According to this thesis the economic drive for expansion is often manifested by local agents who exceed the letter of metropolitan authority. 1 Considered in this framework, Dupré and Garnier's attack on Tonkin was the logical development of a commercial impetus for access to the China trade that had focused first on the Mekong River.

The French admirals at Saigon were tantalized by the prospect of attaining an exclusive riverine access to the hundreds of millions of producers and consumers who populated the remote southern provinces of China and Tibet. 2 The admirals viewed southern Chinese markets as the prize in an imperialist competition waged with increasing energy by France's traditional rival, Great Britain. In 1862, Admiral Bonard's political advisor, Captain Aubaut, warned him of the "British peril" in the following terms:

England moves ever closer to China; the recent treaty with the King of Burma is considered at Calcutta as the first step toward Yunnan. It should be France that maintains influence over the Indochinese Penin- sula…washed by a river that originates in Tibet and whose mouth is in our possession. 3 The French explorers who finally dashed the traders' and admirals' hopes

for the Mekong were sponsored by the privately-endowed Paris Geographical Society at the head of which was a vocal advocate of trading interests, Chasse- loup-Laubat, concurrently Minister of the Navy and Colonies. 4 Led by Doudart de Lagrée, the explorers traveled during 1866-1867 from the mouth of the

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Mekong (i.e., Sai-gon), into Yunnan, but they found the journey difficult, peri- lous, and expensive. Commercial navigation, the explorers concluded, would be impeded by the many gorges and cascades all along the upper Mekong. The Mekong River was thus demonstrated unsuitable as the intended economic artery. 5 But French interest in southern China's markets was not diminished by these findings; it was diverted from the Mekong and Sai-gon and focused intensely on the Red River and Ha-noi. 6

The young second-in-command, Francis Garnier, was an advocate of an aggressive French colonial policy calculated to enhance the economic interests and political influence of France in Asia. During the Mekong exploration he hatched a grandiose scheme to limit British and Thai influence on the Indo- chinese Peninsula while developing and redirecting through Vietnamese ports the commerce of Laos, Cambodia, and southern China. Garnier proposed the following measures for the realization of the Red River's economic potential:

To impose upon Hue commercial conditions that will permit the introduction of our merchandise through Hue itself into Middle Laos and through Tonkin into South China;…to have the course of the Red River carefully explored;…to obtain from the Chinese government all of the facilities and all of the protection desirable for the commercial and metallurgical exploitation of Yunnan; to improve the roads of southern China; to remove the previously established prohibitions that have maintained the Celestial Empire in a state of absolute isolation and that today are outdated. 7 For Garnier and others who propounded an aggressive colonial policy, poli

tical action was a sine qua non for the survival and prosperity of French trade in Asia:

These various measures can certainly obtain for our industry in a relatively short time markets equivalent to approximately fifty million consumers. This would be the point of departure for a fruitful competition in this immense Chinese market with merchandise coming from the English that presently threatens to invade and destroy rival industries in an impossible battle. 8 Garnier concluded that France's position in Cochin China if properly deve

loped could be the base for a commercial and political influence in Indochina and southern China with the potential to become "the exact counterweight to that of England in India." 9 This was Garnier's consistent conception of the sufficient political program for the economic development of the Indochinese Peninsula and southern China for the benefit of French trade and commerce with particular attention to the opportunities that the Red River could provide to the French entrepreneur for access to southern Chinese markets and minerals.

The French Governor at Sai-gon, Admiral Dupré, was a partisan of the aggressive colonial policy advocated by Gamier. Dupré had long sought to obtain from the Vietnamese government a treaty that would recognize French

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sovereignty in Vinh-long, An-giang, and Ha-tien provinces, occupied by France since 1867. Dupré was also concerned about the possibility that a rival European power would preempt France in northern and central Vietnam. He sought to foreclose this possibility by means of the desired treaty with Hue by including in it an engagement on the Hue court's part not to cede to any foreign power any part of Vietnam without the consent of France. But the Hue court, reluctant to formalize France's recent seizures of Vietnamese territory for fear that this recognition would become an impediment to an eventual retrocession of all six occupied provinces, had refused to negotiate such a treaty. Nor was Hue willing to negotiate away its sovereignty in the North and center. 10 Dupré found Hue's refusal frustrating and yearned to launch direct military action against independent Vietnam in order to increase the pressure on Tu-duc for a settlement. In seeking to persuade the French Minister of the Navy and Colonies that armed intervention was imperative, Dupré argued that the endemic rebellion in the French-held southern territories derived from the Vietnamese population's belief that the French presence was temporary. And he raised the specter of "foreign" – German - involvement in Tonkin. "Lower Cochinchina," he wrote on December 22, 1872,

is always agitated by surreptitious schemers who seek to excite troubles. The prolongation of this situation is due to the ambiguous state of our relations with Hue. Calm will only be reestablished after the conclusion of a definitive treaty before which the Hue government has recoiled for three years. The time for negotiations has passed, and firm pressure is indispensable…The means of execution would be the occupation of Ha-noi, the capital of Tonkin, and the mouths of the Red River, the principal river of the region. Undoubtedly it would be desirable to postpone the occupation until the consolidation of our establishment in Cochinchina, but the occupation must occur because it is indispensable for the future tranquility of our colony that we have no immediate European neighbor. Siam, which separates us from the English of Burma, will develop and endure, in contrast to the Empire of Annam, which is in rapid decadence and will finish by falling either into our establishment or into that of a foreign power that will seize Tonkin. For the Germans have designs there. 11 But the Franco-Prussian War and the resulting domestic crisis and defeat-

ist mood in France meant that Dupré could not obtain authorization from the metropole for armed intervention.12 When Jean Dupuis, a French arms merchant and adventurer-of-fortune, conclusively showed in 1871 the practicality of the Red River route by transporting minerals from South China to Ha-noi in nine days, the English papers gave the story even more attention than the French. It seemed to many French officers in Sai-gon that British commercial and colonial interests were less encumbered by official handicaps; the British, in fact, were actively seeking to secure the connection from their Indian Empire through Burma to China. 13 Dupré resolved to take independent action, and he

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envisioned Jean Dupuis as the means for circumventing the Parisian pros- cription of direct intervention.

French governmental support in general and Admiral Dupré's assistance in specific for Dupuis will probably never be precisely known. According to Milton Osborne, author of the most extensively documented recent work on the Mekong expedition, Dupuis first learned of the Red River's economic potential through a chance meeting in 1868 with members of the Mekong mission in Hangchow. When he subsequently proved the validity of the explorers' suppositions in 1871 by a successful navigation, Dupuis reported his findings to the Ministry of the Navy and Colonies, proposing to them his scheme to supply arms to the Chinese governor of Yunnan by traveling up the Red River into southern China. While firm official backing for his plans was not forthcoming, he was given help in transportation and was authorized to purchase cannon for his Chinese client. 14 Dupuis was also provided with a recon- naissance vessel, the Bourayne, under Captain Senez. Senez was to rendezvous with Dupuis at Cua Cam, introduce him to the appropriate Vietnamese authorities, and recommend that they look with favor upon his request to travel up the Red River into China.15 Osborne seems justified in assessing Dupuis' relationship with the Ministry as follows:

The arrangement fell into that shadowy world where officials give "semi-official" support to risky projects. With success there can be a ringing affirmation of association, while failure brings a bland denial of knowledge. 16 Dupuis was even more successful with the naval officers he met in Sai-gon

in May 1872. Many of them were chafing at the restraints imposed by Paris, and they were delighted to offer covert support to a resourceful Frenchman about to launch himself on a potentially profitable and possibly explosive undertaking in Tonkin. 17 Dupré arranged for Dupuis a loan of 30,000 piastres. Captain Senez provided the arms merchant with foodstuffs and wines when the Bou- rayne rendezvoused with Dupuis' ships in Tonkinese waters. 18 And he assigned to Dupuis his Vietnamese-language interpreter from Sai-gon, officially attached to the Bourayne.19

Most French authors who treated the matter of Dupuis' reception by Viet- namese authorities emphasized the reasonableness and legality of Dupuis' venture and the obstinate and arbitrary handling of the matter by the indigenous officials. 20 These authors base their arguments almost entirely on French sources. In contrast, most Vietnamese authors base their arguments on original Vietnamese documentation to supplement French sources, and they argue that Dupuis provoked Vietnamese local officials with his arrogant attitude and illegal activities. 21

The modern Vietnamese historians' perspectives are supported by the imperial records of the Nguyen dynasty. Although Dupuis' actions placed Hue's officials in an impossible position both in regard to their internal administrative procedures and in terms of their political relations with China, the Hue court

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was prepared to protect Dupuis from the wrath of its local officials, who were more willing than the central authority to respond to Dupuis' provocations. Un- willing to risk a conflict with the French, the Tu-duc Emperor ultimately chose to ask the French authorities at Sai-gon for assistance.

According to the Dai Nam thuc luc the initial instrument of dissuasion utilized by Vietnamese officials was verbal: " Dupuis' craft went from Hai-duong and arrived in Bac-ninh and then Ha-noi. The provincial civil and military officials argued with him several times. telling him that he might not proceed, but he would not listen."22 When Dupuis penetrated deep into Vietnamese territory, the emperor ordered that he not be received or assisted in the hope that without indigenous aid the Frenchman would realize the impossibility of proceeding with his venture and would abandon it. Vietnamese officials were ordered not to provoke an incident:

The king ordered the provincial and military officials at Ha-noi and north of Ha-noi to reflect and to respond appropriately; they should neither receive nor guide Dupuis in the hope that wherever he goes he will himself realize the difficulty of proceeding and will withdraw on his own account…Officials must report immediately on his movements and activities so that an official response can be repared; but do not act on your own initiative to provoke im first lest we lose the appropriate moment for action. 23 The Quoc trieu chanh bien's account of a "negotiation" between Dupuis

and Vietnamese officials contrasts sharply with the views of Dupuis and his French apologists regarding the putative harassment Dupuis and practiced by the Hue court. 24 These documents reveal that Dupuis refused to meet in Ha-noi with imperial officials as they requested, instead sending subordinates, and he declined to declare the status of his crew. The primary concern of the Hue court to avoid a conflict in dealing with the Frenchman is revealed by the Tu-duc Emperor's criticism of Nguyen Tri Phuong for permitting Ha-noi officials to offend Dupuis, thereby increasing the risk of a conflict:

Nguyen Tri Phuong delegated Vo-Dang to invite Dupuis to come to the council at the officials' bureau. Dupuis was absent and Ly Ngoc Tri was ill. Several members of the boat's crew replaced them in meeting with the council. Vo-Dang told them: "Regulations require that all military material be left behind, and you gentlemen must declare the members of the expedition in order to facilitate inspection." Dupuis' group was displeased with this. The matter came to the king's attention, and he criticized the envoy, telling him that it was not permitted to provoke an incident. 25 Concerned that his officials might initiate a conflict, the Tu-duc Emperor

ordered that officials who maneuvered troops in such a way that they might appear threatening to Dupuis would be punished; Nguyen Du Dat and Ton That Phien of Hung-yen province were reduced one grade of rank for transgres- sing these directives.26Informed that Dupuis had seized private and imperial

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vessels, pillaged the local population, and attacked and killed Vietnamese soldiers while passing through the subprefecture of Ha-hoa in Son-tay province, the emperor continued to order that Vietnamese officials prepare to defend themselves without allowing Dupuis to observe them and thus to take um- brage27

The Hue court and its local officials considered Dupuis' presence in Ton- kin to be in violation of the 1862 treaty's commercial provisions, according to which only three Vietnamese ports were opened to French and Spanish commerce. These were Da-nang, Ba-Lat, and Quang-yen, where French and Span- ish merchants were to pay established duties in conformity with a most-favored-nation stipulation. 28 Furthermore, Vietnamese officials saw in Dupuis' acts of plunder, piracy, and murder violations of Vietnamese law. Nevertheless, the sources consulted above indicate that the Vietnamese government did its utmost to exercise restraint in order to avoid possible conflict with France. The documents suggest that local officials were prepared to take stronger action than was the court in dealing with Dupuis, but mandarins revealing this tendency were criticized and/or punished. True to the policy of appeasement that he had followed since the signing of the 1862 treaty, the Tu-duc Emperor preferred to resolve the problem diplomatically by calling upon French authorities in Sai-gon. 29 Explaining his decision at court, Tu-duc emphasized the legality of the Vietnamese position according to the Treaty of Sai-gon:

If the matter has gone as far as this, order the mandarin charged with external relations to write to the French admiral to have him force a withdrawal. He should explain that this is not a trading port as stipulated in the treaty, and so it is not permitted to come here to cause problems. 30 In thus presenting the case to Admiral Dupré, the Tu-duc Emperor was in

effect appealing to the good faith of the French government in adhering to the terms of the 1862 accords, which did not authorize French traders to operate in Tonkin. For the emperor the 1862 document provided the legal basis for the resolution of the Dupuis matter. The Vietnamese government's request did not include an offer to negotiate a treaty regarding the commercial opening of the Red River or any other matter outstanding between the two powers.

In October of 1873, Admiral Dupré responded by dispatching Francis Gar- nier with formal written instructions directing him to adjudicate the Dupuis dispute and to negotiate the commercial opening of the Red River. 31 By including the question of commercial liberty on the Red River in Garnier's written instructions, Dupré already exceeded the Vietnamese government's request for expelling Dupuis based on the 1862 treaty. Furthermore, it is likely that Garnier's written orders reveal only a part of Dupré's actual instructions. Milton Osborne has suggested that in private verbal instructions Dupré went further than this, directing Garnier to open the Red River to European commerce by any means possible; in case of failure Dupré could deny that he had authorized aggression. 32 The hypothesis that Dupré gave Garnier supplementary secret in-

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structions in regard to the means to be employed is a reasonable one. However, Dupré's private and official correspondence during October indicates that Osborne perhaps underestimates the ends sought by Dupré. Dupré desired a commercial treaty, but, as a letter to the French Minister at Peking reveals, he also wanted Garnier to dictate personnel changes to the Hue court:

If the Hue court obstinately retains in the king's councils and at the head of the affairs of Tonkin men known for their systematic opposition to the French alliance and for their inveterate hatred of the Christians, he must abstain from all intervention, let destiny work itself out, and reserve for us a complete freedom of action. 33 Furthermore, in a personal letter of October 19, 1873, Dupré envisioned

the establishment of a protectorate over Tonkin and Annam, and he did not preclude the overthrow of the Nguyen dynasty itself:

The occupation of a military position in the heart of Tonkin will very probably be a necessary step toward the conclusion of the treaty, which must be equivalent to the protectorate of France over the entire kingdom. If the Hue court stubbornly maintains its stupid pride and rejects our protection, it will suffice to call upon all the malcontents of Tonkin in order to chase away all the mandarins. We would only have the problem of choosing among the more or less legitimate pretenders to the sovereignty of Tonkin. Either the country submits to a new head invested by us, or it remains under Annamite authority. Our obligations and expenses will remain the same, but the latter case is the most probable outcome. In either case our protectorate would not be a vain word. To make it effective we shall need a significant naval force to remain in the country until its complete pacification…I cannot yet specify the figure, but I believe that it would not be adventuresome to declare that it would remain beneath that of the forces we presently maintain in Lower Cochin China. We will find [in Tonkin] more and better organizational elements than we found [in Lower Cochin China], and we will not be forced as we were [in Lower Cochin China] to substitute our administration for the indigenous one. A resident and several inspectors would suffice to ensure that the population be honestly and benevolently administered. 34 Dupré therefore intended - and probably instructed Captain Garnier - to

extort from Hue at the minimum the commercial concession of navigation on the Red River, which the admiral had long sought in vain. But a formal protectorate to be obtained through an agreement with, or by the overthrow of, the Nguyen dynasty was also envisaged. It is probable that Dupré had shared these considerations with Garnier. Garnier evidently understood that he was to exercise considerable freedom in terms of means as well as ends, for he wrote as follows to his brother shortly before leaving Sai-gon: "As for instructions, carte blanche! The admiral is relying on me! Forward then for our beloved France!"35

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Finally, Garnier's behavior upon arrival in Ha-noi demonstrates that from the beginning he intended to intimidate the Hue court or, failing this, to provoke a conflict. Whereas Vietnamese officials received Garnier honorably, he refused to discuss the Dupuis case with them. 36 Garnier had no intention of "adjudicating" the Dupuis dispute if the term is understood in the sense of impartially deciding a dispute. This assertion is based on a letter that Garnier had composed en route and dispatched upon arrival by Catholic couriers to Du- puis. In a communication that would appear compromisingly cordial between a judge and a party to a case supposedly yet to be decided, Garnier explained that, although the necessity of maintaining appearances dictated that a certain distance initially be maintained between them, Dupuis' economic interests would be protected, his political counsel valued:

I can assure you in the most positive fashion that the admiral does not intend to abandon any of the engaged commercial interests. He has elsewhere given you the most unequivocal proofs of his lively sympathy for your enterprise. I shall soon e in Ha-noi, where we can meet to discuss the political situation. 37 Instead of consulting Hue's officials regarding the Dupuis case, Garnier

circulated the rumor that "something dangerous [viec nguy hiem]" would hap- pen if the Hue court did not negotiate a satisfactory commercial treaty. 38 When his full contingent arrived, Garnier began to act as though he - representing France - were the sovereign authority in Tonkin. He interfered in a matter of indigenous military discipline, demanding the release of an imprisoned Viet- namese soldier who had been punished for permitting French troops to enter Nguyen Tri Phuong's residence. 39 Garnier then proclaimed that the Chinese merchants and residents of Tonkin should come to him with their grievances regarding the behavior of Hue's officials. 40 Finally the Frenchman issued an ultimatum demanding that the Ha-noi citadel be disarmed, that the Vietnamese authorities in Ha-noi order the provincial authorities to comply with Garnier's demands for the opening and regulation of commerce on the Red River, and that Dupuis be allowed to continue his transactions with Yunnan. 41 The Viet- namese government was also to award Dupuis an indemnity for losses suffered because of Hue's alleged interference in his commercial dealings. If these demands were not met, an imminent assault on the Ha-noi citadel was threatened. 42 In response Vietnamese officials insisted that as sovereign power having a legal relationship with France established by the Treaty of Sai-gon, the Vietnamese government had asked Admiral Dupré to send a mission to expel Dupuis, who had violated Vietnamese laws as well as the 1862 treaty. On this basis they maintained that Garnier's only legitimate purpose in Tonkin was to exhort and if necessary to compel Dupuis to depart. Seeing that Garnier had no intention either of fulfilling the requested task of expelling Dupuis or of negotiating to resolve the crisis that he, Garnier, had created, Vietnamese commander Nguyen Tri Phuong gave orders for the Ha-noi citadel to prepare its defenses. Garnier's forces attacked the citadel on November 20, 1873, easily overpowering the Vietnamese defenders. This attack on Ha-noi, premeditated

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by Dupré and Garnier, could only have been prevented by Hue's complete capitulation to Garnier's commercial and political demands, the sum of which would have been equivalent to the surrender of Vietnamese sovereignty in Ton- kin. 43

The preceding discussion comprises the economic and political background to the French occupation of the Tonkin Delta. It remains to be demonstrated that Dupré intended to exploit for these imperialist ends the presence of missionaries and indigenous Christians, protected under the 1862 treaty, on independent Vietnamese soil.

The ministerial correspondence of the admirals at Sai-gon shows that these officials were well aware of the fact that the French missionaries had never been satisfied with the privileges procured them by the 1862 treaty. According to Admiral Bonard, for example, the missionaries concealed neither their con- tempt for the treaty nor their projects to expand their status and influence at the expense of the Hue court. Rather than patronizing an aggressive proselytization, the admirals were preoccupied with protecting France's commercial and political advantages in Vietnam by restraining missionaries when the latter, in Bonard's words, "did everything in their power to move the government along the fateful path they travel to the overthrow of King Tu-duc." 44 Between the signing of the 1862 treaty and the eve of Garnier's Tonkin adventure, therefore, the admirals were primarily concerned that the missionaries of northern and central Vietnam would engage in activities and place demands that would push the Hue government to terminate a relationship that, if hardly ideal from the colonial point of view, at least provided a break on anti-French activity and formally recognized some of the French seizures of Vietnamese territory. It is to be argued that Dupré planned to exploit the aggressive potential of the mis-sionaries and the Vietnamese Christians - a calculated divergence from this practice.

As noted earlier Dupré was careful to reserve for himself the freedom to deny that he had ordered Garnier to threaten or attack the indigenous authorities in Tonkin. Dupré's written instructions to Garnier in regard to the Catho- lics are similarly characterized by an equivocalness that makes it difficult to determine with certainty what were his precise intentions for the Catholics' role in support of the Garnier mission. On the subject of the Catholic role, Dupré's instructions to Garnier read as follows:

I have officially notified the bishops about the mission you are about to undertake. And I have asked them to lend you all their assistance…You will recommend to them that they preach to their Chris- tians patience, a temporary, complete submission to the authorities, that they oppose any blustering, any premature reaction, anything, in a word, that could be used against me when I reclaim for them the whole of their rights. You will find in the Catholic Missions a useful source of information of every kind. 45

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The most probable hypothesis is that Dupré hoped that the mere presence of the French force would frighten Tu-duc into granting the French demands, in which case the Catholics were to remain submissive to indigenous authority. Therefore, a "temporary, complete submission" to Vietnamese authorities was recommended, for a "premature reaction" by the Catholics would needlessly complicate matters. Such a choice of words hardly precludes the possibility of a more active role if the Hue court were to prove recalcitrant. In this eventuality, Dupré probably wanted the missionaries to direct their Christians to bring a substantial assistance in the form of supplies, manpower, and military support to Garnier's small force. This interpretation is supported by Dupré's letter of July 28, 1873 to the Minister of the Navy and Colonies. Dupré expressed therein his hopes that the Garnier mission would benefit from missionary intelligence and from the "active assistance" of large numbers of Vietnamese Catholics:

I remind you of the 500,000 Christians, representing about one-twentieth of the total population, of whom the bishops promise us the active assistance…We can also usefully employ the profound knowledge of the missionaries and the bishops, who have lived there for long years and travel there freely since they have been protected from violent persecution. 46 In asking for the northern Catholic Missions' support for the Garnier

expedition, Dupré appealed to the missionaries' conceptions of their interests in two ways: At the minimum he promised that Garnier would hear sympa- thetically the missionaries' specific grievances against Vietnamese officials; at the maximum he implied the possibility of the overthrow of the Nguyen dynasty. Dupré's circular letter of October 6, 1873 to the missionaries of the Tonkin Delta maintained the fiction that Dupuis was merely an "adventurer" but nevertheless asked, in effect, that the Catholic Missions offer Garnier their support for an attempt to intimidate or overthrow the Vietnamese government:

The Annamite government is threatened with the imminent loss of Tonkin, and its very existence will be in danger if this rich and populous province escapes its control. A band of adventurers holds it in check…and the government's incapacity to enforce its laws is now manifest…It can only achieve this if it asks our aid, which will impose serious efforts on us. If we accept, what compensation is Hue prepared to offer us and what guarantees against a return to its previous bad dispositions? I am ready to formulate them when the Hue court deci- des to negotiate on this basis and to give its ambassadors the requisite powers…Monsieur Garnier is to ask Monsieur Dupuis to renounce temporarily his enterprise - to take it up again under more official conditions - and to compel his compliance if necessary. Then Garnier will provisionally open the Red River to Annamite, French, and Chinese vessels on the condition that they pay moderate dues, and he will see that the particular stipulations regarding the Christians are respected…If, completely misunderstanding my truly Christian intentions, the Hue court persists in its blindness, causing difficulties,

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searching for pretexts to avoid its commitments, we shall withdraw the friendly hand that we offer, and the Hue court's destiny will be sealed without our being forced to hasten the process by violence. I do not doubt that I shall have the sincere assistance of Your Grace and all of your venerable confrères in the plan I propose. 47 Captain Garnier followed his superior closely in taking care to enroll the

Catholic communities and their spiritual heads on the French side for the coming conflict. Arriving at Cua Cam on October 23, 1873 Gamier installed himself at the Dominican Mission at Ke-mot in Hai-duong province and sent by Catholic couriers the following message to Bishop Puginier on October 26, 1873. Emphasizing the commercial goals of his mission, Gamier offered the missionaries the bait of "complete satisfaction of grievances" and "the making good of all legitimate reclamations." The document reads as follows:

Sent by the Admiral-Governor of Cochinchina to study the situation in Tonkin and to negotiate a commercial and political modus vivendi satisfactory both to the country's interests and to those of foreign commerce, I hasten to enter into relations with Your Grandeur, whose experience can be such a great help to me…I need hardly add that one of my duties will be to hear and to make good all the legitimate reclamations that the Tonkin Missions have to formulate against the Anna- mite authorities. Above all the admiral is resolved to attain by whatever means necessary the pacification of this beautiful and rich country and its opening to foreign commerce. While remaining outside of the religious question, he could not be indifferent to giving complete satisfaction to the grievances of a religion that has so many adherents in Ton- kin. 48 A subsequent letter to the French Missions written after the seizure of the

Ha-noi citadel stated that the missionaries were henceforth under French autho rity, and it asked them to gather intelligence on behalf of the French force and the commercial interests that it represented:

I have the honor of informing you of the decisions that have placed all foreign residents under the protection of France and that opened to commerce the Red River from the sea to the borders of Yunnan on the condition of a two per cent ad valorem duty payable at Ha-noi. The entire province is now administered under my direction. I have informed the mandarins of these measures and informed them that I consider enemies all who oppose this. In the contrary case I am disposed to maintain with them relations of friendship. I would be pleased if Your Grandeur, who, along with the Spanish priests, now finds Himself under French authority, would keep me informed as to the dispositions of the authorities of Hai-duong, Quang-yen, and Bac-ninh and would report to me any hostile measures taken by them in regard to Your Grandeur and the foreign merchants. This intormation will allow me to render the protection that I owe them more effective and certain.49

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The missionaries of the Missions-Etrangres de Paris had long endeavored to entice imperialistic intervention with the prerequisite that it be powerful, permanent, and that the resulting political arrangements benefit the Catholic Missions. Puginier, Càzon, and Gauthier continued the Missions-Etrangères tradition of encouragement of, and cooperation with, French aggression against Vietnam. Their responses to Dupér and Garnier's allusions to satisfactions of grievances and the Nguyen's possible loss of Tonkin were enthusiastically affirmative. Writing on December 13, 1873, Puginier promised Dupré the assistance of the Tonkinese Christians for what he prayed would be a vigorous and permanent French intervention:

I believe that I can assure you that you will find in me, in my missionaries, in the Christians, and I dare to say even in the pagan element a generous assistance in the accomplishment of your noble intentions. Monsieur Garnier …will have the honor of keeping you up-to-date on developments here. For my part, Admiral, permit me to address you the following prayer, which is also that of all those who henceforth place themselves under your protection: Let the influence of France extend itself over Tonkin in a very special fashion; we ask that it always be powerful and permanent. The French government in granting such a legitimate wish need not wait long, I hope, to receive the fruit of its sacrifice. 50 Monsignor Gauthier was no less ardent in pledging Garnier every assis-

tance. Writing on November 7, 1873, he expressed his conviction that the only viable method was violence:

The news of your arrival has brought us the greatest pleasure, and it has given birth to the hope of a better future for this Poor people, so worthy of interest, that now leads such a miserable existence because of the stupidity of its rulers. The admiral…seems to think that the Hue court would be able to give him sufficient pledges of good faith. For my part, instructed by experience, I can affirm that this court is totally incapable of any kind of good faith and that force alone can make it accept and honor obligations. Furthermore, Tu-duc is not as powerful as one might think. Monsieur Dupuis was able with such feeble means to force the court into the position of begging the admiral for assistance. I hope to have the pleasure of meeting you soon and of offering you all of the services that are within my power to render. 51 As the Tonkin Delta's Sino-Vaubanesque citadels successively succumbed

to Garnier's troops, the missionaries' communications continued to offer him the military and political support required for pacification and occupation. On December 18, 1873 Monsignor Cézon wrote to Garnier at the citadel of Ninh-binh, addressing him as "the very venerable French mandarin, Governor of the citadel of Ninh-binh" and demonstrating his support by supplying intelligence on the activities of nearby Vietnamese officials. Cézon did not hesitate to men-

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tion that capable Christians were available to assume the administrative posts from which the French troops had removed Hue's officials.

I report to you all these facts so that you can take measures to save the people, for not only the Christians but also the non-Christians come to ask that the French governor select prefects and subprefects so that the people can live in security…If the governor has need in one manner or another of my influence, I would be disposed to bring you pay support…If you need someone for military and civil affairs, there is no lack of capable people in my Mission. 52 The responses of the Spanish Dominicans to Dupré's and Garnier's appeals

form a striking contrast to the replies of the representatives of the Missions-Etrangères. The Dominicans had long been subordinated to the French order according to the settlement of 1687, but suspicion and competition remained. 53 Dominicans were no strangers to political intrigue, but they suspected that the imperialistic adventures of the French state did not necessarily coincide with the interests of the Spanish Missions. When they were approached by Dupré and Garnier, the Dominican missionaries made it clear that they felt obliged to receive Gamier in the context of a peaceful diplomatic mission, but they were determined not to facilitate French aggression that might disrupt a "tranquil" and "harmonious" relationship between the Dominicans and the indigenous authorities. Their initial responses to Dupré and Garnier revealed their fear that a "regrettable" incident might result from the French captain's dealings with Hue's officials. Monsignor Colomer of the Dominican Vicarate of Eastern Tonkin wrote as follows to Dupré on November 17, 1873:

Nothing could be more regrettable than if either from some impru- dence on the Hue court's part or through some other cause one were to have recourse to violence. In such a case Your Excellency will permit me to state that, the sole purpose of our Mission being the preaching of the Catholic religion outside of all political questions, our duty would be to keep strictly within the limits of this stated objective in order to avoid compromising the interests of religion. 54 Writing to Garnier from Son-tay province on November 18, 1873, Colo-

mer reiterated that the Spanish Missions would not support the French force in the event of a conflict between France and Vietnam:

I formulate this reservation so that in the eventuality of a clash between the two nations it will be known that it would not be permitted in any manner to compromise my sacred ministry for reasons that are clearly political. 55 The contrast with the responses of the representatives of the Missions-

Etrangères is striking, and the divergency grew greater after the French troops began to attack the provincial citadels, forcefully removing any illusions that the missionaries could have maintained about Garnier's professed pacific intentions. Writing from Ke-ne on November 26, 1873, Colomer refused to be seduced by Garnier's invitations to associate the Spanish Missions with his

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adventure, denying the Frenchman's assertion that the primary purpose of the operation was to restore order:

I release you from the special protection that you believe your duty requires you to offer to my humble person and to the other Spanish missionaries in the event of threats to our persons or offenses to our sacred ministry…Until the present we enjoy tranquility, thanks be to God, and we have no fear that his tranquility will be altered in the near future. 56 When Garnier's lieutenants pushed their conquests into the East Bank of

the Red River, taking the citadel of Bac-ninh, Colomer wrote a letter of protest, accusing him of attacking the Vietnamese authorities without provocation.

The religious peace has been troubled not by the Annamite mandarins but by other causes…Ever since the allied nations, France and Spain, signed treaties with Annam, the Spanish missionaries have lived in perfect harmony with the Annamite mandarins, who have occasionally shown as much affection for the Catholic religion and for our persons as the governments of European nations. If there have been several exceptions, it has only been necessary to notify the higher authorities to resolve the matter…These acts of hostility against the Annamites, Monsieur le Commandant, are by themselves highly significant, and since I fear that they are only the beginning of more important events, I take the liberty to tell you that such occurrences seriously degrade the religion and the name of the European in this land. 57 Although several exceptions can be found, the reports of the French

officers throughout the affair indicate that the Dominicans acted according to their words, maintaining their distance from the French forces. For example, Ensign Balny characterized the Dominican Mission in Hai-duong as "hostile" to the French occupation. 58 In a letter to Francis Garnier written in December 1873, Balny complained that Colomer attempted to dissuade him from attacking the Hai-duong citadel, refused him support, and protested vigorously against the French intervention. 59 The Dominican Mission in Hai-duong even served as a refuge for the fleeing Vietnamese officials. 60 The respective reactions of the two religious orders vis-à-vis the French intrusion are perhaps best summarized by a post mortem on the Garnier affair written by Lieutenant Balézeaux in Ha-noi on January 4, 1874:

The bishop and the French missionaries, reserved at first, openly pronounced themselves for us as soon as they were convinced that we really wanted to take possession of the area. The Spanish bishop and his clergy, who had good relations with the Annamite mandarins, showed themselves more prudent, even protesting in Spain's name against what happened here. 61 For the purpose of evaluating the responsibility of the missionaries for

their support of the invaders, the reticence of the Dominicans demonstrates that the occupation of Tonkin by French troops did not necessarily compromise the

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missionaries and the Catholic Vietnamese. The presence of French troops presented all the missionaries of Tonkin with difficult choices. Most of the Dominicans decided not to facilitate the French invasion, but the missionaries of the Missions-Etrangères - led to believe that the French presence would be "powerful and permanent" - compromised themselves and their followers through collaboration, the significance of which is now to be examined.

After he captured the Ha-noi citadel, Francis Garnier installed his admi-nistration there and dispatched his gunboats to negotiate with the Vietnamese provincial authorities and military commanders throughout the Tonkin Delta. 62 The Vietnamese officials were to remove all fortifications and obstructions to riverine communications, and they were to proclaim their acceptance of the stipulated commercial "freedoms." If the Vietnamese officials refused, Garnier's lieutenants were to overthrow them and to install an administration more amenable to the French demands. 63 It may be useful at this point to sketch briefly the French penetration of the delta. Ha-noi, seized by Francis Garnier on November 20, 1873, is located about 100 kilometers from the sea. The land between Ha-noi and the sea is crossed by hundreds of rivers, streams, and canals, the major points of communication among which were defended by the Hue court's Sino-Vaubanesque fortresses. Ensign Bain de la Coquerie seized the fort of Phu-hoai, west of Ha-noi, on November 21, 1873; on November 22, 1873 the Espingole under Balny and Tretinian took Hung-yen on the Red River and Phu-ly on the Day River near the Catholic Mission at Ke-mot. To secure riverine communication with the supply point at Cua Cam, the capital of Hai-duong, located on the Thai-binh River between Ha-noi and Cua Cam, was taken by assault December 4, 1873. The delta's commercial emporium, Nam-dinh, fell on December 10, 1873, and a medical doctor serving in the French force, Jules Harmand, was placed in charge of the province. French expansion was completed several days later with Marc Hautefeuille's seizure of Ninh-binh on the Day River, a point of control for north-south communications. 64

Many contemporary French authors, finding their national pride flattered, were profoundly impressed with Garnier's coup de force, which brought so large a population and so expansive a territory so rapidly under the shadow of French power. 65 But Marquet and Norel have criticized this view. The French advance, they argue, was as spectacular as it was shallow; the French force merely seized a number of strollpoints, removed Hue's officials from them, and replaced these officials with others of their own choosing. 66 The validity of the point is undeniable, but the contrast with Genouilly's fiasco of 1858 remains striking. Although Catholic collaboration with the European troops who landed at Da-nang in that year was more important than has generally been recognized, the Franco-Spanish forces there did remain relatively isolated from local support. Their sequestration was the result of poor planning that landed them on the central coast, which was far from potential supporters and which lacked an extensive deep-water riverine communications network. The problem of relative isolation from internal support that retarded the invaders at Da-nang in 1858 was solved before the event of the 1873 attack on Tonkin by Dupré's

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circumspection in arranging matters with the Catholic missionaries of the region. He also provided Garnier with heavily armed, lightweight, flat-bot tomed steamships powered either by coal or wood. These ships were well adap- ted to riverine operations, and they thus insured a powerful penetration into the Tonkin Delta that facilitated communication with the potential local supporters contacted in advance by Dupré. 67

What was the nature and extent of the assistance that the Catholics brought to the French expedition? The question was hotly debated by contemporaries, but a clear case has yet to be made, and the question remains one of the unresolved issues of the Tonkin affair. In regard to the religious compo- sition of the militia forces recruited by Garnier, one contemporary author, Romanet du Caillaud, argued that Garnier made no special appeal to the Vietnamese Catholics, who, he further argues, compromised a minority of the pro-French militiamen. Commenting on a proclamation that Gamier issued upon his seizure of the Ha-noi citadel, Romanet du Caillaud writes:

Did Monsieur Garnier ask for the support of the indigenous Chris- tians? Not at all. He merely declared that he would accept the services of men capable of governing. For the rest, it must be admitted that if Monsieur Gamier did make a special request for the support of the Christians, they did not respond with much more enthusiasm than did the pagans, for, among the six-thousand volunteers enrolled under our flag, five-thousand were pagans, and only one-thousand belonged to the Christian religion. 68 The author denies the predominantly Catholic character of the support for

the French in Tonkin, describing the pro-French soldiers as "volunteers" seeking protection from unstable conditions:

In the very province of Ha-noi, the scholars sought to rouse the people against the French, and bands of brigands, profiting from the general disorder, went through the villages, pillaging at will. As I have already stated, several thousand volunteers without distinction of religion - pagans and Christians - offered themselves to Monsieur Garnier. They were given arms found in the citadel. With their help he reestablished tranquility. 69 Romanet du Caillaud insists that the French found broad support among

non-Catholic Vietnamese of the delta, compared to which Catholic support was insignificant. This view is untenable. It is derived from the politically motivated missionary claim that Christian and non-Christian villagers, suffering under the yoke of Hue's administration, regarded the French expeditionaries as liberators. As has been demonstrated above, Romanet du Caillaud errs in asserting that Dupré and Garnier did not make "a special request" for Catholic support. On the contrary, they astutely did so in advance through direct written communications with the missionaries. Furthermore, he considers as having helped the French only those Catholics formally employed by Garnier as militiamen or administrators--only those who were "enrolled under our flag."70

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The scope of the investigation must be broadened, for membership in a formal administrative or military corps is not a useful measure of Catholic complicity. The correspondence and reports of Balny and Harmand, who were dispatched by Garnier to obtain the submission of many of the provincial citadels and strongpoints of the delta, reveal patterns of significant Catholic assistance that included - but was not limited to - formal administrative and militia duty. These sources further reveal a pattern of mutual manipulation by French officers and Catholic missionaries in which the "volunteers" often had as much or more to gain from the relationship as did the French officers.

A discussion of the association of Catholic elements with the capture and administration of Tonkin's provincial citadels is particularly appropriate historiographically in light of the recent work by Adrien Balny d'Avricourt entitled L'Enseigne Balny et la conquête du Tonkin: Indochine 1873. Published in 1973--the one-hundredth anniversary of the affair--and introduced by Georges Taboulet, the study is an unabashed attempt to revalorize the French colonial heritage. 71 Basing his study on French colonial records and familial archives (the author is the grand-nephew of Ensign Balny d'Avricourt), the author seeks to resuscitate the themes of the perfidy of the Vietnamese officials in dealing with Garnier and his lieutenants, the isolated and heroic struggle of the French officers in a hostile environment, and the superior morality of the Europeans in the midst of the "barbarism" practiced by the "Annamites." 72

In order to counter these themes, it is useful to consider Balny's actions at Phu-ly and Hai-duong and Harmand's at Nam-dinh with an emphasis on the relationship between the Catholic Missions and the French force. The analysis reveals that the French were far from alone in their attacks on the loci of Vietnamese authority because the invaders received a significant level of support from the missionaries and the Vietnamese Catholics. Moreover, the methods of the French officers and their Catholic collaborators could hardly be considered as evidence of a superior morality even by their own contemporary standards, for the Catholics Missions exchanged labor, resources, and information in return for French assistance in perpetuating summary executions, desecrations of Buddhist religious edifices, burnings of non-Catholic villages, and pillaging of imperial citadels. This Catholic collaboration with French im-perialism has not been adequately recognized by historians, but it was a significant contributing factor to the French success in Tonkin.

The supply point linking the French expeditionaries to Sai-gon was at Cua Cam; the supplies needed were munitions, foodstuffs, and coal for their steam-powered gunships. Yet the rapidity and depth of their penetration of the delta moved the French ships far away from easy access to these products and made an alternate source of supply necessary. One source of munitions, foodstuffs, and specie was the looting of the fallen imperial citadels. Yet a problem remained to haunt the French commanders: the necessity of procuring vast amounts of wood to power their gunships, the mobility and accurate firepower of which meant the difference between victory and defeat in confrontations with Vietnamese forces. The problem was not a simple one, for suitable wood

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was scarce in the delta, and its transportation from the mountains and its preparation for use as fuel were onerous tasks that the handful of Frenchmen could hardly have contemplated undertaking. Balny explained his concern in a letter of November 28, 1873: "Wood is very scarce here…I have the greatest difficulty in procuring it…At Phu-ly I have promised the world in order that as much wood as possible be brought here and cut…"73 But the solution was not far to seek. At the order of the missionaries wood was purchased by Vietnamese Catholics throughout the delta and transported to the French-held citadel of Phu-ly, where a workshop was established. Catholic laborers there cut and prepared the purchased wood and whatever lumber could be found in the citadel itself:

Ultimately, I have been able to obtain almost all the wood I need. It is meant for construction and is slightly green and hard, but it is the best available. I have given the order that it be cut and piled at the marketplace so that it can be delivered to our door when we need it. What remains of the wood from the citadel will also be cut and prepared. I have also asked the Mission to set up a workshop to be placed at our disposition. The Mission will be fully reimbursed for this. I have promised half a ligature per day of woodcutting, but the lack of cutters and of cutting implements has raised the price of labor. . . . Further, two days ago ninety men arrived at the citadel, sent by the Mission in order to perform corvée in the citadel. We have installed them in several houses, and they are reimbursed at my order. Each day they receive a ration and a number of sapeques at the rate of two ligatures per month. 74 Thus, the close cooperation of the Catholic Missions with the French

expedition provided the latter with a resource necessary for the occupation and provided it in such a way that the limited manpower of the French force was not depleted.

Communications among the French units and between the French officers and their Vietnamese opponents and allies were made possible largely through the use of Catholic interpreters, translators, and couriers. All of the French officers were ignorant of the Vietnamese language, and they were therefore heavily dependent on the translators and interpreters furnished by the Mis- sions. For example, Harmand described his interpreter in the following terms:

I have as an interpreter an Annamite priest named Paulus Trinh, who speaks Latin, Annamite, Chinese, French, and who reads Chinese characters very well. This invaluable man, who has rendered the greatest services, is one of the most intelligent Annamites I have ever met. 75 The superficial nature of the occupation and the limited number of French

troops meant that French manpower could not be spared to secure land communications among the scattered French units. Therefore, as Balny explained to Francis Garnier in a letter from Phu-ly on November 28, 1873, written communications among the French officers were insured by the dispatch of two

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copies of each message: One was carried by the still-operative but hardly secure imperial courier network (tram); the other was delivered by Vietnamese Ca- tholic couriers provided by the Missions. 76

Much of the freedom of movement that enabled the French to concentrate overwhelming force at vital points was facilitated by Catholic collaboration, for the Catholics performed many tasks for which Frenchmen could not be spared. For example, Balny's men did not need to spend their efforts pursuing the fleeing Vietnamese mandarins because the chore was undertaken by the Ca- tholic Vietnamese. 77 Nor did the French officers need to waste much time researching the local situation and organizinig the new administrations for the areas under the jurisdiction of the fallen citadels. 78 For example, the night after Balny's men took the citadel of Phu-ly, they were met by French missionaries who explained the local customs and governing systems to them. The missionaries further presented the French officers with a group of educated Catholic Vietnamese to serve as administrative cadre. 79 Finally, the crack French troops did not need to prolong their occupations of specific points. The could leave this for the Vietnamese Catholics. For instance, shortly after Balny's men conquered the citadel of Phu-ly, they were relieved by an armed Vietnamese Catholic force composed of 600 men sent by Garnier. 80 With the Catholic occupation force in place, the Frenchmen departed from Phu-ly the following Morning. 81

It is regrettable that the sources do not permit a more precise or complete accounting of the benefits that the French expedition derived from Catholic collaboration. But the documentation cited above demonstrates the untena- bility of the pro-colonial vision of French units fighting in heroic isolation, and it leaves little doubt that French success in the Tonkin Delta was in no small measure due to the assistance provided by the Catholic Missions. 82

In regard to the question of whether or not the French force exhibited a superior morality, a consideration of the manner in which the French officers repaid the Catholic Missions for their services reveals that this was not the case. The missionaries had high hopes that a forceful and durable French occupation of Tonkin would improve the position of the Catholic religion vis-à-vis indigenous political authority. But this long-term goal did not preclude an immediate and material quid pro quo; nor did the Catholics hesitate to use the pre- eminent military position of the French force as a springboard for local aggressions.

From the beginning the French officers were prepared to pay the Catholics handsomely for their support. And the looted treasuries of the fallen imperial citadels provided them ample means to do so. Harmand reported as follows in December 1873:

As for money, the treasury contained 17,000 ligatures, which gives me the means to pay everyone. Monsieur Garnier told me in parting: "Throw money around both hands full." I have not, of course, followed

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this literally, but I have always been generous in paying salaries, recom penses, and indemnities of all kinds. 83 Another form of payment was the windfall opportunity to join the French

troops in plundering the conquered citadels. Writing to Garnier from Phu-ly, Balny implied that such was their due: "Thirty Christians have been sent to serve us. They are abandoning themselves to a real pillage in the citadel, but one must not dream of interfering." 84

The French officers further rewarded their Catholic supporters by allowing the Missions to call upon French military forces when needed. Catholic aggression at the local level was facilitated by the general inclination of the French commanders to accept uncritically missionary denunciations of "bandits" and "rebels." At Phu-ly, for example, Balny allowed missionaries to select targets for summary execution:

A letter from Father Dervaux announces that he has taken twelve bandits near his residence and asks me to come to take charge of them. It is too far for me to think of it at this time, but I will do my utmost to have them taken to me so that the chiefs can be shot. 85 In another such instance Balny dispatched French troops to villages that

the Catholics claimed harbored "brigands." Their orders were to seize and destroy any weapons found; anyone resisting or fleeing with weapon in hand was to be shot. 86 The. Catholics were thus able to benefit from France's presence by using French forces to strike at their opponents in local society.

An occasional breaking effect on Catholic aggression was applied by the French officers, who had only a limited number of French troops at their disposal and sought to avoid unnecessary combat. Attempting to exercise discretion in the dispatching of French troops, Harmand grew wary of the Catholics' pre-dilection for hyperbole:

It was, above all, the Christians who came, presenting demands for assistance with an exaggeration that knew no bounds, reporting three thousand brigands when there were only fifty…I am careful not to believe these stories, and I send no one unless I have first had the situation explored by a trusted, well-paid spy. 87 Harmand was occasionally forced to intervene more actively in order to

counter Catholic aggression: Once it was an Annamite minister who burned down, without provocation, a pagoda. Another time it was a French missionary who was simple enough to have placed himself at the head of a real band of brigands composed of 300 men making war on his own account. I hold the former in the citadel, and I summoned the latter and gave him some friendly advice, showing him how detrimental to religion his conduct was…and how it would perpetuate agitation in an area that it was necessary, above all, to pacify. 88

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The missionaries were able to play upon the invader's ignorance of the local scene, but such attempts to manipulate the French presence for their own ends were not appreciated by the French officers. This is revealed by Harmand's report from Nam-dinh in January 1874, which describes such an instance and expresses his determination that it not recur. The citation also reveals that despite their protests and refusals to aid the French expedition, the Dominicans occasionally joined their French confrères in maneuvering the eyeless expeditionaries to terrorize local rivals:

[U]pon receipt of an urgent letter from Monsignor Cruzon, bishop of the Dominicans several leagues away, I sent him Quartermaster Boilève with two armed men in the three large junks armed with mortars along with 150 of General Ba's men. Sent without interpreters, they were led as though in triumph through a series of villages, and despite my formal orders and their desire to obey them, they were not able to return to Nam-dinh until three days later. At the Mission they were sent at the head of the entire Catholic population to seize and burn down a village of pirates or armed scholars. They killed ten men, among them the chief of the band, but then the wounded were shamelessly martyrized, lacerated or burned alive, the pagodas destroyed…I promised myself that henceforth I would never again allow a gun to be fired outside of my presence in order to oppose myself to these barbarous scenes, that only villages the guilt of which was well established would be attacked. In this way we can hope to avoid the fanatical and cruel reprisals that would follow in the event that we should suffer defeat or that our policy should change. 89 It would be worthwhile to close the discussion of the relationship between

the Catholics and the French forces during the French occupation of the delta with an examination of several more citations from Harmand's journal, for the historiographical implications of his conclusions are several. Milton Osborne has described Harmand as an "ecstatic" believer in the expedition as it swept from victory to victory but a "harsh" critic of the enterprise after Garnier's death and the French withdrawal. 90 This assessment is neither fair to Harmand nor congruent with the record of his criticisms before Garnier's death, particularly with reference to his evaluation of the expedition's "too exclusive" reliance on Catholic support. 91 Furthermore, Harmand's journal contradicts Romanet du Caillaud and others who have maintained that Catholic support for the operation was insignificant in the context of widespread support for the French intervention by the general population of the Tonkin Delta.

Harmand found that the Vietnamese Catholics were indeed more enthusiastic and numerous in their support of the French occupation than were their unconverted compatriots. However, Harmand considered that the Catholics' aggressive covetousness, vengeful vituperation, and administrative incompe- tence meant that the French risked much in employing them. As "governor" of Nam-dinh, Harmand found himself besieged by solicitors forming a long line outside his office from morning until night:

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some demanding aid and protection, others, having assembled men, asking for arms to equip them and for brevets of authority to obtain command. Others - and this was the majority - came to propose their services as scholars, functionaries of all categories, asking even the favor of being named prefects or subprefects. All of them, or practically all, were Catholics who had come from the neighboring province of Ninh-binh, sent by their priests. The Catholics have revealed, in these difficult circumstances, an indecent covetousness, as imprudent as it is egotistical. I want to appoint, insofar as possible, more pagans than Christians, primarily to avoid exciting the discontentment natural to this country, secondarily because the Christians, held aside by the Annamite government, are not familiar with affairs, are absolutely inexperienced in administration, and are very rarely scholars, being almost always of low extraction. All of these factors would clash sharply with the Annamite customs. 92 For Harmand, Catholic collaboration was a sine qua non for French suc-

cess. He nonetheless deplored the Catholic propensity for using the French presence as a political pretext and a military buttress for sectarian aggression. The Catholics' predilection for punishing their local opponents interfered with what Harmand saw as the purely economic goals of the expedition. Harmand believed that the initial violence needed to eliminate the political impediments to the commercial opening of the Red River should quickly be superseded by pacification and the return to stable conditions that would facilitate commercial intercourse:

It is certain that the Christians have performed for us great services; in my particular case they have greatly facilitated the task Monsieur Garnier set for me. But they have also caused a multitude of difficulties…They have considered our arrival as signaling the hour of revenge and reprisals, and the missionaries, for their part, should have strictly forbidden this from the beginning…I have repeated to them ten times daily: "Do you think that we are here to launch a religious war? We are here with a purely commercial goal; be you Christians, pagans, or Chinese, it is of little consequence to us. We would always be happy, doubtless, to render service to the Christians, and our offices are open to all the oppressed. But make no mistake; if we place Christians in important positions this is only because it is indispensable in the interest of the country and of public security that these positions not remain vacant, and it happens that we have the Chris- tians readily available. But if the former mandarins would come to us, we shall be happy to prove to them our sympathies and our love of justice." 93 The harshest and the most persistent critic of the expedition's reliance on

Catholic collaboration, Harmand did not suppose that the French force could have acted otherwise without compromising the success of the mission. He clearly indicates that the administrative vacuum left by the flight of the Viet-

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namese officials could not be filled by the "pagans." This suggests that the general population's hostility to the French presence was great. In such an environment the French officers had little choice but to turn to the Catholics despite the numerous dangers and difficulties that this entailed. "I estimate," Harmand concluded in January 1874, "that if we have relied too exclusively on the Christians, perhaps we could not have done otherwise." 94

The discussion now turns to a consideration of the political status of the Vietnamese counterattack that took Garnier's life. The notion that the central authorities at Hue ordered the Black Flags' fatal attack has been a popular one ever since the event. This is because it seems to fulfill preconceived ideas of Oriental treachery and thus to justify a policy of aggression. For example, Adrien Balny d'Avricourt - writing in 1973! - described the Black Flags as "pirates covertly urged on by the Hue court, which had never failed to apply on every occasion a policy of duplicity." 95

The Vietnamese sources relevant to the Garnier affair reveal that the Tu-duc Emperor never envisioned any alternative to a negotiated settlement. From the time of the fall of Ha-noi, the emperor's primary concern was to regain formal control of the citadel(s) by offering broad political concessions in the context of a negotiated settlement. Luu Vinh Phuc's counterattack was instigated by provincial officials favorable to the position of the "advocates of war." It was probably launched without the knowledge and against the wishes of the Tu-duc Emperor, perhaps as part of a plan to involve Hue in a wider war against the French in the South. Tu-duc's refusal to consider this option and the interpretation that he subsequently gave to the French intervention in Tonkin shows that the Garnier affair did not move the Vietnamese emperor to abandon his policy of peace through concessions with France. Tu-duc presented the seizure of the four provincial capitals as an unfortunate misunderstanding and their return as evidence of the good will of the French and of the efficacy of his policy of pacific diplomacy.

According to official Vietnamese documents, the Tu-duc Emperor and his advisors were well aware of the fact that the terror spread by Garnier in the North was related to the blocked negotiations with Dupré in the South. They concluded that the only way to dislodge Garnier's force was to make concessions in Sai-gon. This position was propounded in a meeting of the Quan Thuong Bac or Foreign Relations Bureau held immediately after the fall of the citadel of Ha-noi:

Ever since his arrival, their admiral regularly sends a plenipotentiary to ask us to sign a treaty, but we have not consented to act rapidly. We have always asked for the return of the three provinces, Vinh-long, An-giang, and Ha-tien, or one or two of them before we would consent to sign. Therefore, we have not yet distributed the requisite emblems of authority to a plenipotentiary. Thus, in appearance Dupré receives us politely, but in reality he creates problems to harry us. If we now desire to put an end to

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Garnier's disruptive violence, to resolve rapidly the northern imbroglio, there is no better means than to accede to Admiral Dupré's wishes. 96 The primary obstacle to a new treaty - Vietnamese reluctance to ratify the

1867 French seizure of An-giang, Vinh-long, and Ha-tien - was removed by the threat to Vietnamese administrative control of the Tonkin Delta posed by France's seizure of the provincial citadels. Le Tuan was granted plenipotentiary authority with Nguyen Van Tuong to assist him in negotiations with the French in Sai-gon. The only remaining bar to the complete success of Dupré's ploy was the complex situation in Tonkin. The Dai Nam thuc luc describes as follows the results of the negotiations at Sai-gon:

Our delegation explained that this new treaty could be settled. How- ever, since at present the situation in the North is of decisive importance, we asked that Dupré help settle it soon, and then the time will be right for a treaty. The admiral was certain that since he could now deal with a plenipotentiary, the treaty could be settled quickly. He therefore wrote to Garnier, telling him to withdraw in order to allow our officials to enter the capital in order to conduct business. 97 But on December 20, 1873, a Sino-Vietnamese militia group known as the

Quan co den or Black Flags led by Luu Vinh Phuc attacked the French at the Ha-noi citadel itself and drew Garnier into a fatal ambush. Was this attack ordered by the Tu-duc Emperor as most contemporary French writers have argued? Once again the Vietnamese documents permit a rebuttal. According to the Dai Nam thuc luc, the emperor and his advisors at court were willing to make new concessions to resolve the crisis, but they were not convinced that the French could be trusted to return the citadels. The emperor therefore gave reluctant permission to imperial commanders Hoang Ta Viem and Ton That Thuyet to prepare for military action against Garnier while the court's emissaries negotiated concurrently. 98 The entry of the Black Flags into the struggle was initiated by these local commanders and not by the central authorities. The Dai Nam thuc luc account reads as follows:

Previously, Hoang Ta Viem and Ton That Thuyet memorialized from Ha-noi, asking that troops be sent there to await an opportunity to attack. Hearing of the loss of the four provincial citadels, their hearts became recalcitrant, and the carelessly acted on their own initiative to bring Luu Vinh Phuc's troops to the spot in order to use them. Vinh Phuc volunteered to do his utmost in order to display his sense of gratitude to the king…On the second day of that month, Luu's troops moved to the citadel's walls and challenged the French to fight. Garnier was meeting with Tran Dinh Tuc at the camp, but they had yet to initiate negotiations when they were suddenly informed of the attacking troops. As Garnier immediately returned to the citadel and took his men outside the walls to intercept his opponents, the latter pre- tended to flee in fear. Garnier spurred his horse on, chasing them as far as the Cau Giay where Vinh Phuc's men attacked and killed him.99

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Since the Dai Nam thuc luc were published for internal circulation only, it is probable that the empirical aspects of this account are largely accurate. The involvement of Luu Vinh Phuc's Black Flags and the fatal attack on the Ha-noi citadel were thus the initiatives of Hoang Ta Viem and Ton That Thuyet, who clearly exceeded their authority in so doing. However, the imperial historians' interpretation of the emotional state of the two commanders at the time that they initiated the attack is problematic. Was the action of Ton That Thuyet and Hoang Ta Viem in involving Luu Vinh Phuc really a case of careless officials making errors of judgment in highly emotional circumstances? It is possible that Hoang Ta Viem and Ton That Thuyet, both of whom were associated with the "advocates of war," were acting with deliberate calculation when they secured Luu Vinh Phuc's cooperation and encouraged him to launch the attack. Their motivation would have been their interest in driving the French from the Tonkin Delta before imperial negotiators could grant further concessions in a new treaty. This would have violated imperial policy, which perhaps explains the court historians' reference to the "careless" and emotional nature of their actions; such an interpretation would rationalize the disturbing possibility that these officials had attempted to make policy decisions on their own authority. Hoang Ta Viem's initial refusal to remove his troops from the Ha-noi area after Garnier's death supports the interpretation that their decision to push Luu Vinh Phuc to attack was not a careless one. Hoang Ta Viem's reputation as a military leader who preferred ruse to confrontation and who often disregarded imperial commands - practices for which he had previously been criticized by Tu-duc -supports this interpretation. 100 The Tu-duc Emperor himself was convinced that he had been deceived by the two commanders, for he criticized their handling of the matter in an imperial edict issued in 1876:

In regard to military matters on the frontiers, you two have not yet fulfilled your responsibilities…Your words and your deeds are not in accord with each other. For his part, Hoang Ta Viem tries to shift the blame for the matter of Tuyen-Quang; you, Ton That Thuyet, try to place the blame back on him for the affair of Luu Vinh Phuc's troops … In sum, your guilt is inescapable. 101 What was the Tu-duc Emperor's immediate reaction to the Black Flags'

successful ambush, which left the French commander dead and his troops in disarray? As stated by the Dai Nam thuc luc, the emperor hastened to emphasize to this court that this blow against the invaders was merely the result of a "stratagem" that could neither alter the fundamental imbalance of forces nor signal a change in the court's policy of peace through concessions as a response to French intervention. The document reads:

When that matter was reported, the king stated that the deception and killing of Garnier by the troops under Luu were only the results of a stratagem. If we oppose them in a large conventional conflict it would be difficult to hold them at bay for long. At present, with the negotiations taking shape, we must take an overall view for resolving the entire

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situation, and naturally we cannot rely on this unit of troops to finish things. 102 To facilitate the negotiations with the French, the Tu-duc Emperor pur-

ported to accept Admiral Dupré's assertions that Garnier's actions had been in violation of his instructions. And Hue's negotiators sought to calm the rage of their French counterparts by explaining that the death of Garnier had been the result of local circumstances unrelated to the policies of the Vietnamese government. Garnier's death took place while the Nguyen Van Tuong-Philastre mission was steaming northward. The French envoy regarded Luu Vinh Phuc's attack as cause for postponing negotiations, but Nguyen Van Tuong persuaded him to continue by comparing Garnier's attack on Ha-noi, which caused the death of the Vietnamese commander, Nguyen Tri Phuong, to Luu Vinh Phuc's ambush, which took Garnier's life. Neither of these unfortunate events, the Vietnamese negotiator concluded, should be interpreted as representing hostility on the part of either government, and they should not interfere with the return of the citadels and the signing of a new treaty. The Dai Nam thuc luc account reads as follows:

Just as your admiral has stated that he did not order the seizure of the four provinces, our count did not conflict with yours. Therefore, neither side is in the wrong. Garnier's death was caused either by bands of robbers or by enraged scholars; this is not yet clear. Far more important are the order of your admiral to obtain a new treaty and the order of my country to obtain the return of the citadels. As for the death of Garnier, it was unpremeditated as was Garnier's killing of Nguyen Tri Phuong. 103 In regard to the situation in the Tonkin Delta itself, the Tu-duc Emperor

ordered that the attack against the encircled French units be discontinued. The Black Flags were told to return to the highlands, and the troops under Hoan Ta Viem and Ton That Thuyet were to withdraw from the Ha-noi area. These instructions were received with scant enthusiasm by the field commanders. The officials who relayed these orders to Hoang Ta Viem were first bluntly told by him that the duty of a commander in the field was to destroy the enemy - not to worry about peace treaties. Only when two high-level imperial representatives, Nguyen Trong Hop and Truong Gia Hoi, intervened did Hoan Ta Viem agree to desist. 104 Luu Vinh Phuc was even more reluctant. According to his reminiscences, the Black Flag commander initially refused to follow orders and angrily rebuked Hue's officials in the following terms:

I have already wasted a lot of effort on this affair. We are determined to climb the ramparts and attack them by surprise in order to exterminate that miserable bunch. The advance combatants have all prepared for the assault. Peace or no peace, we can finish this battle, and it will still not be too late to negotiate. 105

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Nevertheless, Luu Vinh Phuc eventually agreed to withdraw, and he permitted Hue's representatives to confiscate his soldiers' assault ladders to ensure that the intended offensive could not be launched. 106

It is evident that many officials strongly resented the court's countermanding of this attack, which was seen as being certain of success given the disarray that reigned in the French ranks after the death of the expedition's leader. This is the view expressed in an anonymous poem entitled Nhac Nhi bi giet chet (The Death of Gamier), probably the work of a village scholar or lower official. Describing the fatal ambush, the poem reads:

The arrogant General Garnier, Following his advantage, moved westward. His horse had just crossed the Cau Giay, When a firecracker gave the signal, And the men waiting in ambush advanced. General Luu Ba Anh was in the lead, His dancing sword bringing death. The invaders lost their souls in fear, And they fled like pigeons. Gamier fell, dead. The Great Warrior cut off his head, And carried it away. What a great battle that was! It made the soldiers all the more eager To attack the invaders! 107

The contrast with the Dai Nam thuc luc account of the incident is striking. The author of Nhac Nhi bi giet chet is effusive in his praise of the Black Flag leaders and the masterful manner in which they duped the French commander and drew him to his doom. author's description of the condition of the French force after Luu Vinh Phuc's intervention implies a conclusion radically different from that of the Tu-duc Emperor; the movements of the French soldiers are compared to the frightened flight of birds while the hearts of the combatants on the Vietnamese side are seen as full of enthusiasm for further conflict. 108

In order to counter this kind of criticism of his handling of the Garnier affair, the Tu-duc Emperor exerted considerable effort to propagate the unin- tentional seizure thesis; ironically, this was a Vietnamese version of Dupré's disclaimer of Gamier's aggressions in Tonkin. Taking advantage of the imperial prerogative of writing the civil service examination questions, Tu-duc actively sought to convince the candidates that the conflict in Tonkin had been the result of unfortunate misunderstandings, the resolution of which demonstrated the wisdom of his policies of peace through concessions. For example, the examination topic for the tien-si degree in 1877 took the form of a long essay in which the emperor presented his view of the affair and its implications:

That affair was only the result of a minor misunderstanding about the letters that were exchanged. We wanted to return to our previous good

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relations, but there was the obstacle of our languages and characters, which are not mutually understandable. Therefore, the pearl of good intentions could not easily be displayed…But because this carelessness did not reflect a desire to seize anyone's territory - meaning that they value affection and think nothing of winning or losing - they cannot commit a wrong action with is peaceful heart. To them a promise is worth a thousand pieces of gold, and so they have turned to us the four provinces. If they act in htis way with regard to these four provinces, then the future of the six provinces can be known. Everyone in their country, from the king to his subjects, has this kind of benevolence. 109 Imperial officials were also encouraged to understand the Garnier affair in

this fashion. Officials who handled relations with the French were harangued shortly after the signing of the 1874 treaty by an edict stressing the fact that the Garnier affair had done nothing to change the principle of "mutual benefit" that had always been at the core of the Franco-Vietnamese relations:

In all that they do their goal is to share mutual advantages and hap- piness with us in order to enhance opulence and renown in the eyes of other countries. Therefore, when their envoy recently threw caution to the winds and seized the four provinces, it required only a word from us, and the French returned them with no regrets. 110 The emperor reiterated that the return of the four provinces that Garnier

had taken in Tonkin could represent a precedent for the return of the southern territories:

We continue to hope that not only in this matter but also in the future in regard to whatever else they have seized, all will be gradually returned to us. This would mean that they know that one must not take the possessions of others for one's own advantage, that one must rather take righteousness as one's advantage. 111 To encourage the French in these civilized sentiments, Vietnamese offi-

cials charged with foreign relations were to do all in their power to treat French officials "like members of one's own family." In the emperor's opinion this would create an emotional atmosphere that would move French officials to respond in a like manner. 112

These imperial interpretations of the Garnier affair were intended to reinforce the emperor's peace policy in the minds of his present and future administrators. Saying nothing about the additional commercial, religious, and political privileges that the 1874 agreement brought France, the emperor presented Dupré's and Garnier's premeditated aggression as a simple misunderstanding caused by linguistic differences. 113 The return of the northern provinces was, the emperor argued, an example of France's good will and sense of justice. Tu-duc wanted present and future mandarins to view the entire affair as a brilliant success for the policy of peace through concessions, a success that promised well for the future return of the six southern provinces remaining under the shadow of French power. Since imperial examination questions and edicts were

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not to be seen by the French, it is evident that the emperor was really trying to indoctrinate his present and future officials in the precepts of peace through concessions. The Garnier affair had obviously not changed Tu-duc's mind about the political necessity of avoiding further conflict with France. That he went to such a ridiculous extreme in praising a putative French probity and in purporting to perceive in the Garnier affair the promise of an eventual return of the southern provinces is probably indicative of the fact that he knew that his countermanding of Luu Vinh Phuc's attack and the resulting negotiated settlement of the conflict would provoke an an angry reaction from the "advocates of war." The emperor therefore felt compelled to counter possible criticism by providing an official interpretation of the events of 1873-1874.

In conclusion, the interpretation of the Garnier affair presented above differs from that which is usual among Western historians in three respects. Most of the Western authors treating the affair have been able to uncover the linkage between Dupré, Dupuis, and Garnier. The argument that Dupré covertly arranged for Dupuis' and Garnier's intimidation of and/or aggression against the Hue court is thus not entirely new. However, none of the authors has clearly shown that Dupré's appeals to the Catholic missionaries were an integral component of his plot to extort concessions from Hue. By examining in detail the correspondence among Dupré, Garnier, and the missionaries, it was shown that Dupré had arranged for Catholic support for Garnier's aggressions before the fact.

The examination of the writings of the French officers under Garnier -particularly the report of Jules Harmand - revealed that Catholic support for the expedition was significant. This counters the interpretations of many contemporary as well as modern historians of the affair. According to Harmand, Ca- tholic collaboration was an essential factor in the success of the French occupation because the majority of the Vietnamese population was hostile to the French intrusion. The Catholics, however, were eager to bring their aid to the French force - for a price.

Finally, the Western authors who have treated the affair have only used French documentation. They have therefore been reduced to guessing at the response of the Hue court. As with the questions of Hue's relationship to the southern anti-French resistance and to anti-Catholic activities in northern and central Vietnam during the 1860s, the result of this reliance on French sources is that Western writers have usually repeated the views of the colonialists. The Vietnamese sources reveal that the Black Flags' attack was not ordered by the central authorities at Hue but rather by imperial military commanders who took matters into their own hands. The counterattack on the Ha-noi citadel that took Garnier's life thus should not be cited as an example of Hue's "duplicity" or "treachery" in dealing with the French. Furthermore, it was shown that the Tu-duc Emperor attempted to interpret the Garnier affair as a justification of his policy of peace through concessions. He purported to accept Dupré's disclaimer of Garnier's deeds. For Vietnamese students and officials, the "politically correct" interpretation of the Garnier affair was that the French

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aggression was merely a minor misunderstanding between Vietnamese officials and one of Dupré's overeager subordinates. The return of the four northern provinces became, in this view, a proof of the efficacy of the peace policy and a promise for the future return of the Vietnamese territories occupied by the French in the South.

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Conclusion

The subject of this study has been the policy of the Tu-duc court vis-à-vis French intervention between the years 1862-1874. The purpose of the study was to refute the interpretations made by the French colonial authors regarding the political behavior of the Hue court during this initial period of conquest. As Chesneaux and Osborne have observed, the colonial authors created a number of fundamentally biased but historiographically potent interpretations of the Hue court's reaction to French intervention. These interpretations have outlived the colonial period, and in some cases they remain the standard interpretations in works published in our own day. For Chesneaux the thrust of these arguments may be expressed by the term "Asiatic treachery." The colonial authors and their historiographical heirs have maintained that the Hue court betrayed its obligations to France's as imposed by the Treaty of Sai-gon. The manifestations of this alleged perfidy were said to be various. Accordingly, in this study four issues or events were selected in order to put these interpretations to the test of a critical analysis based on information derived from previously unexplored or underexploited Vietnamese sources. These four topics were the following: the Hue court's alleged support for southern resistance after the 1862 treaty; the court's putative persecution of the Catholics after the 1862 treaty; the French aggression; and the Vietnamese court's reactions to French aggression during the Francis Garnier affair of 1873-1874. The findings of the study may be summarized as follows.

After introductory sections treating the relevant long-term historical and cultural background and a summary of the political relations between Vietnam and the West during the 1802-1858 period, the analysis focused on the 1858-1862 war and the question of responsibility for granting France the concessions contained in the 1862 treaty. It was argued that two factors forced the Tu-duc Emperor to grant the invaders a negotiated settlement: the overwhelming technical superiority of European arms; and the northern rebellion led by the Ca-

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tholic Le pretender, Pierre Le Duy Phung. In regard to the Treaty of Sai-gon itself, two Vietnamese historians have suggested that Tu-duc did not authorize Phan Thanh Gian to yield the territorial and religious concessions contained therein. But the analysis showed that, in all probability, the emperor indeed instructed Phan Thanh Gian to make these sacrifices although the ruler seems to have been unwilling to acknowledge his responsibility in this regard. There- fore, Phan Thanh Gian has been wrongly accused of exceeding his authority and yielding to Franco-Spanish pressures during the negotiations that led to the signing of the treaty. The Treaty of 1862 and the "peace policy" that it represented were thus shown to have been at their inception the official policy of Hue supported by the Tu-duc Emperor. This policy sought first to end the war of 1858-1862 by granting major concessions in the commercial, territorial, political, and religious domains and then to maintain the peace while seeking a territorial retrocession through continued conformity with the treaty's provisions and through the granting of additional concessions when necessary.

The Hue court's response to the continued anti-French resistance conducted by the southern insurgents during the period 1862-1868 was then examined. Hue's policy in regard to continued anti-Catholic activities in areas of independent Vietnam during the same period was also considered. Both of these manifestations of the chu chien or "war party" spirit have been used by pro-colonial and/or pro-Catholic writers in the nineteenth century and in our own time to illustrate their arguments that the Hue court failed to live up to its commitments in these vital spheres of the Franco-Vietnamese relationship. The present investigation in each case demonstrated that these charges are groundless.

After the signing of the 1862 treaty the Hue court attempted to terminate armed resistance in the areas ceded to France. Tu-duc accordingly sent emissaries to admonish the leaders of the resistance and to demand that they return to their former posts. Those who disobeyed were striped of their positions, honors, and titles. The court further order that mandarins in the provinces bordering the French-held zones oppose the insurgents. The court even settled refugees and former resistants on agricultural lands far from the provinces under French control. The court's opposition to this resistance was demonstrated with documents from the Vietnamese imperial records and was confirmed by the correspondence of Phan Thanh Gian and Truong Dinh as well as the writings of Nguyen Thong. In light of this new evidence it can no longer be maintained that the Hue court supported this continuing resistance to the French after 1862 and that such a mendacious policy was responsible for the French aggressions of 1867.

The question of Hue's continued "persecution" of Christians has also been used to support the argument that the Hue court regarded lightly the commitments it had made in 1862. There were, of course, a great many anti-Catholic incidents in the independent areas of Vietnam in the years following the treaty. Who was responsible? The acts were directly carried out by the people, the local scholars and notables, and former or active officials. The missionaries claimed that the Hue court surreptitiously supported many of these actions. The present

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analysis demonstrated the falseness of such accusations with evidence from the Vietnamese imperial records, Emperor Tu-duc's edicts, and the writings of the anti-Catholic activists themselves. These sources show that the Hue court not only ceased to persecute the Catholics but devoted considerable effort to protecting them from the unofficial persecution of the groups mentioned above. It may therefore be concluded that Emperor Tu-duc's policy in these two domains was consistent with his peace policy and the Treaty of Sai-gon.

The French intervention of 1873 in Tonkin was then examined. It was argued that this instance of imperialist aggression could best be understood through D. R. Sar Desai's model. According to this thesis, colonial expansion in Southeast Asia was often motivated by economic factors that are manifested by a local agent who may exceed the limits of the formal policy of the home government. In the case under consideration, French archival documentation as well as published correspondence were used to demonstrate that Dupré an Garnier plotted to enroll the missionaries of Tonkin in their scheme to extort further concessions from the Hue court. These sources revealed that the commercial opening of the Red River was only the minimal goal of the expedition; the establishment of a protectorate and even the overthrow of the Nguyen dynasty itself were also envisaged. The journals and correspondence of the officers under Francis Garnier's command revealed that the response of the missionaries was a positive one. Their participation, as well as that of the Vietnamese Catholics under their spiritual authority, was a significant factor in French success there. It was thus demonstrated that it was the French who - contrary to the treaty of 1862 - sought to expand their privileges and influence by inter- vening in the Tonkin Delta in 1873.

For the response of the Hue court to this "Occidental treachery," the Nguyen records, the edicts and examination questions of the Tu-duc Emperor, and other Vietnamese sources were explored. These documents showed that the Hue court sought to avoid antagonizing Dupuis and Garnier and that the court reacted passively or defensively to French provocations. The counterattack launched by Luu Vinh Phuc has long been considered as an act of "duplicity" on the part of the Hue court. The Vietnamese sources showed that it was arranged by Vietnamese commanders who were probably acting without the knowledge and against the wishes of the emperor. Tu-duc himself did not seriously consider any resolution of the Tonkinese imbroglio but the pacific one of securing a French withdrawal by granting France additional concessions. Furthermore, his edicts and examination questions following the French withdrawal were calculated to portray the affair as a demonstration of the efficacy of the peace policy in dealing with the French. Rather than provoking a serious reexamination of the peace policy as a means of countering the continuing French aggressions, the Garnier affair prompted the Tu-duc Emperor to undertake a "propaganda offensive" among his present and future administrators. Tu-duc sought to convince them that the Garnier affair was the result of an unfortunate misunderstanding and was not a premeditated aggression. And he argued that the return of the four northern provinces that Garnier had seized

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was a reliable indication that the captured southern provinces would eventually be returned as well.

Based on the sources consulted in the process of this research, it may be concluded that the Tu-duc Emperor himself supported the signing of the Treaty of Sai-gon, and he did not support any alternative to the peaceful conciliation of French interests in the 1862-1874 period. With the wisdom of historical hindsight, it may be observed that Tu-duc's policy during this period was ill-considered in at least two respects: It underestimated the ever-increasing acquisitiveness of French imperialism; and it failed adequately to account for the Vietnamese people's spirit of resistance both to direct foreign intervention and to the propagation of missionary Christianity. Erroneous though his premises may have been, the historical record of the Tu-duc Emperor's persistence and constancy in applying his policy demonstrates that the pro-colonial interpretations of the Hue court's allegedly mendacious political behavior during the years 1862-1874 are no longer tenable.

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Notes

In citing works in the notes, short titles have generally been used. Works frequently cited have been identified by the following abbreviations:

ANSOM, Paris Archives Nationales, Section d'Outre-Mer NCLS Nghien Cuu Lich Su DNTL Dai Nam thuc luc QTCB Quoc trieu chanh bien

INTRODUCTION

1. Milton Osborne, "Truong Vinh Ky and Phan Thanh Gian: The Problem of a Nationalist Interpretation of Nineteenth-Century Vietnamese History," Journal of Asian Studies 30, no.1 (November 1970):81.

2. Jean Chesneaux, "French Historiography and the Evolution of Colonial Viet nam," in D. G. E. Hall, ed., Historians of Southeast Asia (London: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1961), 233.

3. Jean Chesneaux, "Présentation," in Jean Chesneaux, ed., Tradition et révo- lution au Vietnam (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1971), 13.

4. Ibid., 14. 5. David Steinberg, ed., In Search of Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger,

1971), 130; R. B. Smith, "Sino-Vietnamese Sources for the Nguyen Period: An Introduction," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 30, no. 3 (1967): 613.

6. Chesneaux, "French Historiography," 233. 7. Ibid.

126

8. Tran Van Giau, Su phat trien cua tu tuong o Viet Nam tu the ky XIX den Cach Mang Thang Tam, 2 vols. (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Xa Hoi,1973-75), 1, 176.

9. Huynh Khac Dung, Su lieu Viet Nam (Sai-gon: Nha Van Hoa Bo Quoc Gia Giao Duc, 1959).

10. Smith, "Sino-Vietnamese Sources," 614-615. 11. P.J. Honey,"Modern Vietnamese Historiography," in D.G.E.Hall,ed.,

Histori- ans of Southeast Asia, 95-96. 12. Alexander Barton Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model (Cam-

bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 323-324. 13. Smith, "Sino-Vietnamese Sources," 611-613.

1. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE FOUNDING OF THE NGUYEN DYNASTY, 1428-1802

1. Charles Maybon, Histoire moderne du Pays d'Annam, 1592-1820 (Paris: Plon, 1920),1-2, 10.

2. John K. Whitmore, "Social Organization and Confucian Thought in Viet nam," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 15, no.2 (September 1984): 296-298.

3. Nguyen The Anh, Kinh te va xa hoi duoi cac vua trieu Nguyen (Sai-gon: Lua Thieng, 1970), 75.

4. E. Luro, Le Pays d'Annam: Etude sur l'organization politique et sociale des Annamites (Paris: E. Leroux, 1878), 90-92.

5. Manh-tu, Manh-tu Chu-Hy tap-chu, 2 vols. (Sai-gon: Trung Tam Hoc-Lieu Bo Giao Duc, 1972), 1:72.

6. Tran Van Giau, Su phat trien 1:74. 7. Whitmore, "Social Organization," 298. 8. Tran Van Giau, Su phat trien cua tu tuong o Viet Nam tu the ky XIX den

Cach Mang Thang Tam, 2 vols. (Ha-Noi: Nha Xuat Ban Xa Hoi, 1973-1975), 1:72. 9. Nicole-Dominique Le, Les Missions-Etrangères et la pénétration française

au Viet-Nam (Paris: Mouton, 1975), 61-66. 10. Truong Van Trinh, Nho-giao khai-tam: Nhan va le trong Dao Khong (Ha-

noi: Nha Xuat Ban Van Hoa, 1948), 12-13. 11. Tran Van Giau, Su phat trien 1:378-379. 12. Maybon, Histoire moderne, 1-2. 13. Dao Duy Anh, Viet Nam van hoa su cuong (Paris: Sudestasie, 1985), 33-

35. 14. Phan Khoang, Viet su: Xu dang trong, 1558-1777, 2 vols. (Sai-gon: Nha

Sach Khai-tri, 1970), 1:317. 15. Nguyen Thanh Nha, Tableau économique du Vietnam aux XVIIè et

XVIIIè siècles (Paris: Editions Cujas, 1970), 26.

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16. Phan Huy Le et al., Lich su che do phong kien Viet Nam, 3 vols. (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Giao Duc, 1960), 3:496.

17. Hoang Van Lan and Dang Huy Van, "Muu do chinh tri cua A-Lech-Xang Do Rot (A. de Rhodes) va van de chu quoc ngu,"NCLS, no.63 (June 1964): 15-16.

18. Nguyen Cong Binh et al., Lich su Viet Nam, 2 vols. (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1985), 1:302.

19. Alexandre de Rhodes, Divers voyages de la Chine et autre royaumes de l'Orient (Paris, 1681), 69.

20. Do Quang Chinh, Lich su chu quoc ngu, 1620-1659 (Paris: Duong Moi, 1985), 84-86.

21. Nguyen Khac Xuyen, "Giao si Dac-lo voi cong viec xuat ban," Viet Nam Khao Co Tap San, no. 2 (1961): 189.

22. Le Ngoc Tru, "Chu quoc ngu tu the ky XVII den XIX," Viet Nam Khao Co Tap San, no. 2 (1961): 118.

23. Armand Olichon, Les Missions: Histoire de l'expansion du Catholicisme dans le monde (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1936), 247-249.

24. Ibid. 25. The Hung, "L'Eglise catholique et la colonisation française," Etudes

Vietnamiennes, no. 53 (1978): 17; Georg Schurhammer, "Nen van chuong cong-giao ve Phanxico Xavie tai Viet Nam," Viet Nam Khao Co Tap San, no. 2 (1961): 154-157, 160-161.

26. Ta-Chi Dai-Truong, Lich su noi chien Viet Nam tu 1771 den 1802 (Sai-gon: Van Su Hoc Xuat Ban, 1973), 292-295.

27. The Hung, "Dao thien chua o Viet Nam," Hoc Tap, no. 70 (November 1961): 35.

28. Le Thanh Khoi, Histoire du Viet Nam des origins à 1858 (Paris: Sudestasie, 1981), 298.

29. Henri Chappoulie, Aux Origins d'une eglise, Rome et les missions d'Indo- chine au XVIIé siécle, 2 vols. (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1943), 1:168-169.

30. Hoang Cao Khai, Viet su yeu ( Sai-gon: Phu Quoc Vu Khanh Dac Trach Van Hoa, 1971), 458-459.

31. Phan Khoang, Xu dang trong 1:317. 32. Maybon, Histoire moderne, 13-14, 18-19, 24-25. 33. Pham Van Son, Viet su toan thu (Sai-gon: Khai-tri, 1960) 522-527. 34. Tran Trong Kim, Viet Nam su luoc, 2 vols. ( Sai-gon: Bo Giao Duc Trung

Tam Hoc Lieu Xuat Ban, 1971), 2:108-111. 35. Nguyen Phuong, "Ai da thong nhat Viet Nam: Nguyen Hue hay Nguyen

Anh?" Bach Khoa, no. 148 (March 1963): 20. 36. Alexander Barton Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model (Cam-

bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 3.

128

37. DNTL, 38 vols. (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Xa Hoi, Nha Xuat Ban Su Hoc, Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc, 1962-78), 2:57.

38.QTCB (Sai-gon: Nhom Nghien Cuu Su Dia Xuat Ban, 1971- 1972),13-17. 39. Vuong Hong Sen, Sai-gon ngay xua (Sai-gon: Khai-tri, 1960), 15-16. 40. Vu Huy Phuc, "Cac loai don dien," in Nguyen Dong Chi et al., eds., Nong

thon Viet Nam trong lich su (Ha-noi: Uy Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1977), 137-140. 41. Tran Trong Kim, Viet Nam su luoc 2:149-150. 42. Le Thanh Khoi, Histoire du Viet Nam, 344; Georges Taboulet, La Geste

française en Indochine, 2 vols. (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1955-56), 1:256. 43.Tran Trong Kim, Viet Nam su luoc 2:149-150. 44. Le Thanh Khoi, Histoire du Viet Nam, 340. 45. Dao Duy Anh, Viet Nam van hoa su cuong, 35-36. 46. John F. Cady,Roots of French Colonialism in Eastern Asia (Ithaca, New

York: Cornell University Press, 1954), 12-13. 47. Le Thanh Khoi, Histoire du Viet Nam, 316. 48. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su (Sai-gon: Phu Quoc Vu Khanh

Dac Trach Van Hoa, 1971), 56. 49. Nicole-Dominique Le, Les Missions-Etrangères, 24-25. 50. QTCB, 12-13. 51. Phan Khoang,Viet Nam Phap thuoc su, 60. 52. Pham Van Son,Viet su toan thu, 565-566. 53. Phan Khoang,Viet Nam Phap thuoc su, 62-72. 54. Ibid., 73. 55.Ta-Chi Dai-Truong, Lich su noi chien, 353-354. The most important sup-

plier were English merchants from India and Portuguese ones from Malacca, but Gia-dinh also had commercial intercourse with Spanish merchants from the Phi- lippines and with the ubiquitous Chinese. Nguyen Phuc Anh evidently sought to maintain his independence vis à vis the Europeans by diversifying his sources of arms and supplies.

56. Le Thanh Khoi, Histoire du Viet Nam, 337. 57. Ibid. 58. Maybon, Histoire moderne, 281-282. 59. Ta Chi Dai-Truong, Lich su noi chien, 355-356. This stratagem was cha-

racteristic of the manner in which Nguyen Phuc Anh handled potential disputes with his subordinates and collaborators. He often maneuvered with great patience and subtlety so that a situation would gradually evolve in his favor instead of risking an explosive confrontation.

60. Maybon, Histoire moderne, 388-389.

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2. VIETNAM AND THE WEST, 1802-1858

1. Alexander Barton Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, (Cam- bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 18.

2. Tran Van Giau, Su phat tyien cua tu tuong o Viet Nam tu the Ky XIX den Cach Mang Thang Tam, 2 vols. (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Xa Hoi, 1973- 1975). 1:92-93.

3. Phan Huy Le et al., Lich su che do phong kien Viet Nam, 3 vols. (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Giao Duc, 1960), 3:410.

4. Ta-Chi Dai-Truong, Lich su noi chien Viet Nam tu 1771 den 1802 (Sai-gon: Van Su Hoc Xuat Ban, 1973), 294-296.

5. Henri Bernard, Le Conflit de la religion annamite avec la religion d'Occi- dent à la cour de Gia-long (Ha-noi: Trung-Bac Tan-Van, 1941), 10-11. The Catholic prince, Nguyen Canh, died in 1801 of natural causes, leaving two sons. See Nguyen Cong Binh et al., Lich su Viet Nam, 2 vols. (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1985), 2:31. Bishop Pigneau de Behaine had died in 1799 of natural causes. He was given a magnificent state funeral and posthumous honors by Nguyen Phuc Anh. See Charles Maybon, Histoire moderne du pays d'Annam, 1592-1820 (Paris: Plon, 1920), 327-329.

6. Alexander Woodside, "Some Features of the Vietnamese Bureaucracy under the Early Nguyen Dynasty," Papers on China, no.19 (December 1965): 7.

7. Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, 18. 8. Philippe Langlet,"Essai sur les institutions du pouvoir central au Viet Nam

au milieu du XIXé siécle," Cahiers d'Etudes Vietnamiennes, no. 6 (1983/ 1984): 18-19.The Noi Cac was modeled on the Grand Secretariat of the Chinese Ming dynasty (1368-1628). In 1834, Minh-menh replaced the Noi Cac with a Co Mat Vien, or Privy Council, which he derived from Chinese Sung institutional models. It was staffed by four civil and four military mandarins from the eighth-level ranking and above who were selected by the monarch himself. Pham Van Son, Viet su tan bien, 5 vols. (Sai-gon: Tran Huu, 1958- 1959), 4:323.

9. Milton Osborne, Region of Revolt. Focus on Southeast Asia (Rushcutters Bay: Pernamon Press, 1970), 29-30.

10. Dinh Gia Trinh et al., So thao lich su nha nuoc va phap quyen Viet Nam (Ha-noi: Uy Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi Viet Nam, 1968), 252-254, 259.

11. Maybon, Histoire moderne, 58. 12. Tran Van Giau, Su phat trien 1:44. 13. Phan Huy Le et al., Lich su che do phong kien 3:460. 14. Tran Van Giau, Su phat trien 1:102-106. 15. Tran Trong Kim, Viet Nam su luoc, 2 vols. (Sai-gon: Bo Giao Duc, Trung

Tam Hoc Lieu Xuat Ban, 1971), 2:177. 16. Phan Huy Le et al., Lich su che do phong kien 3:410. 17. Ibid.

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18. Tran Trong Kim, Viet Nam su luoc 2:177. 19. Nguyen Cong Binh et al., Lich su Viet Nam 2:23. 20. Dinh Gia Trinh et al., So thao lich su,279-280. 21. Ibid., 276. 22. DNTL, 38 vols. (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Xa Hoi, Nha Xuat Ban Su Hoc,

Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc, 1962- 1978), 3:162-169. 23. In Sino-Vietnamese, the five cardinal virtues are: nhan, nghia, le, tri, tin

(bene volence, righteousness, civility, wisdom, loyalty). The five relationships are: quan-than, phu-tu, phu-phu, huynh-de, bang-huu (king-minister, father-son, husband-wife, older brother-younger brother, friend-friend). See Ha Ngoc Xuyen, Khong-Dao tinh-hoa toat-yeu (Sai-gon: Phu Quoc Vu Trach Van Hoa, 1970), 24-60.

24. Tran Van Giau, Su phat trien 1:378-379. 25. Phan Huy Le et al., Lich su che do phong kien 3:457-459. 26. Le Thanh Khoi, Histoire du Viet Nam des origins à 1858 (Paris: Sudestasie,

1981), 336. 27. Phan Huy Le et al., Lich su che do phong kien 3:458. 28. DNTL 3:193. 29. Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, 264-265. 30. Phan Huy Le et al., Lich su che do phong kien 3:458. 31. Tran Trong Kim, Viet Nam su luoc 2:181. 32. Le Thanh Khoi, Histoire du Viet Nam,367. 33. Phan Huy Le et al., Lich su che do phong kien 3:458. 34. Maybon, Histoire moderne,387. Chaigneau sailed for France on the Henri

in 1819. He returned to Vietnam in 1821 after the death of Gia-long. As Consul de France, he had instructions to obtain a Franco-Vietnamese commercial treaty. Le Thanh Khoi, Histoire du Viet Nam,367.

35. Maybon, Histoire moderne,398. 36. Nicole-Dominique Le, Les Missions-Etrangères et la pénétration française

au Viet-Nam, (Paris: Mouton, 1975), 38. 37. Pham Van Son has criticized the notion that Gia-long was emotionally

attached to the Europeans who contributed to Vietnamese reunification, arguing instead that Gia-long, a master of realpolitik, viewed his European collaborators as nothing more than the means to the desired end of reunification. Viet su tan bien 4:300-301.

38. During the Gia-long reign, the number of missionaries active in the northern region of the country was six in 1812; there were four missionaries in the southern region in 1813. Georg Schurhammer, "Nen van chuong cong-giao ve Phanxico Xavie tai Viet Nam," Viet Nam Khao Co Tap San, no. 2 (1961): 160-161. Due to lack of reliable sources, important empirical questions about the size of the nineteenth-century Vietnamese population, the percentage of Catholics

131

within that population, and the scale of Catholic deaths caused by the mid-century anti-Catholic edits cannot be answered with accuracy. Neither the Vietnamese court nor the French colonial regime had the administrative capacity or the political will for carrying out an accurate census. Therefore, any popu lation figures cited for nineteenth-century Vietnam are of dubious validity. An American sea captain, John White, estimated the Vietnamese population to be between six and fourteen million people in 1820; Michel-Duc Chaigneau, the son of Jean-Baptiste Chaigneau, thought it to be between twenty and twenty-five million; E. Luro, a French officer who served in the occupied South, suggested a figure of twenty million. "But these men," Woodside reminds us, "were merely guessing." See Woodside, "Some Features,"2. For the question of Catholic converts and that of the number of deaths caused by Hue's anti-Catholic edicts, the only available figures are derived from those originally supplied by the Catholic missionaries. Yet the missionaries could hardly be termed objective observers. Indeed, they had manifest personal and political interests in exagge- rating their own success in conversion and in magnifying the magnitude of their followers' sacrifices for the faith. The French administrators and authors generally based their own figures on missionary sources, or they made their own guesses without independent investigation. The resulting figures have no necessary or verifiable relation to historical reality, and most serious historians have little confidence in them.

39. Bernard B. Fall, Les Deux Viet Nam (Paris: Payot, 1967), 33. 40. Michael-Duc Chaigneau, Souvenirs de Hue (Paris: Imprimerie Impé riale,

1867), 222. 41. Nicole-Dominique Le, Les Missions-Etrangéres, 37. 42. Ibid., 39. 43. Le Thi Nham Tuyet, "Nghien cuu ve hoi lang o Viet Nam va vi tri lich su

cua hoi lang,"Tap Chi Dan Toc Hoc, no.1 (1976): 48-59. 44. DNTL 3:162-169. 45. Ibid. 46. Le Van Phat, Ta quan thuong cong Nam-ky tong-tran Le Van Duyet, (Sai-

gon: Imprimerie de l'Union Nguyen Van Cua, 1924), 12-13. 47. Pham Van Son, Viet su tan bien 4:322. 48. Nicole-Dominique Le, Les Missions-Etrangères, 39-40. 49. Pham Van Son, Viet su tan bien 4:321. 50. Nicole-Dominique Le, Les Missions-Etrangères,41. 51. Dao Dang Vy, Nguyen Tri Phuong ( Sai-gon: Nha Van Hoa, Bo Van Hoa

Giao Duc va Thanh Nien, 1974), 45. 52. Milton Osborne, Region of Revolt, 29. 53. Nguyen Cong Binh et al., Lich su Viet Nam 2:31. 54. Ta-Chi Dai-Truong, Lich su noi chien,361-362.

132

55. Pham Van Son, Viet su tan bien 4:302. 56. Tran Trong Kim, Viet Nam su luoc 2:223-224. 57. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su, (Sai-gon: Phu Quoc Vu Khanh

Dac Trach Van Hoa, 1971), 87. 58. Ibid. 59. Tran Trong Kim, Viet Nam su luoc 2:224. 60. DNTL 7:79. 61. Ibid., 101. 62. Tran Trong Kim, Viet Nam su luoc 2:224. 63. Pham Van Son, Viet su toan thu, (Sai-gon: Khai-tri, 1960), 605. 64. Armand Olichon, Les Missions: Histoire de l'expansion du Catholicisme

dans le monde ( Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1936), 303-304. 65. John F. Cady, Roots of French Colonialism in Eastern Asia (Ithaca, New

York: Cornell University Press, 1954), 15. 66. Ibid., 18. 67. Ibid., 19. 68. Olichon, Les Missions, 334. 69. L.E. Louvet, La Cochinchine religieuse, 2 vols. (Paris: Challamel ainé,

1885), 1:44. 70. This assertion is based on a letter written by Monsignor Bartette, who,

discussing the practice of surreptitiously infiltrating missionaries on merchant ships during the Minh-menh reign, observed that during the Gia-long period Pigneau de Behaine,

71. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su,84. 72. Nguyen The Anh, Kinh te va xa hoi duoi cac vua trieu Nguyen (Sai-gon:

Lua Thieng, 1970), 297. 73. Ibid. 74. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su,84. 75. Le Van Phat, Le Van Duyet,16. 76. Nguyen The Anh, Kinh te va xa hoi,298. 77. DNTL 6:235-236. 78. Cady, French Colonialism, 16. 79. Dinh Gia Trinh et al., So thao lich su,261-262. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid. The tong-tran of Tonkin was abolished the following year. 82. Kieu Oanh Mau, Ban trieu ban nghich liet truyen ( Sai-gon: Bo Quoc Gia

Giao Duc, 1963), 61-63. 83. Pham Van Son, Viet su tan bien 4:350-351.

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84. QTCB, (Sai-gon: Nhom Nghien Cuu Su Dia Xuat Ban, 1871- 1872), 158. 85. Kieu Oanh Mau, Ban trieu,61-63; QTCB, 158. 86. Kieu Oanh Mau, Ban trieu,61-63. 87. Dao Duy Anh, Dat nuoc Viet Nam qua cac doi: nghien cuu dia ly lich su

Viet Nam (Paris: Dong Nam A, 1984), 202. 88. Nicole-Dominique Le, Les Missions-Etrangères,89-90. 89. Taboulet, La Geste française en Indochine, 2 vols.(Paris: Adrien-Maison-

neuve), 1:331-332. After capture by Vietnamese imperial forces, Marchand was executed by dissection at Tho-duc, the of the largest Catholic community in the vicinity of Hue. See Pham Van Son, Viet su tan bien 4:363.

90. Le Thanh Khoi, Histoire du Viet Nam,369. 91. Pham Van Son, Viet su tan bien 4:365-367. 92. Nicole-Dominique Le, Les Missions-Etrangçres,92. 93. Nguyen Phan Quang, "Them may diem ve cuoc bao dong Le Van Khoi,

1833-1835," NCLS, no. 147 (November-December 1972): 42. 94. DNTL 8:243-244. 95. Nguyen The Anh, Kinh te va xa hoi,299-300. 96. Paul Mus, Ho Chi Minh, le Vietnam, l'Asie, edited by Annie Nguyen

Nguyet Ho (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1971), 66. 97. Phan Huy Le et al., Lich su che do phong kien 3:500. 98. Le Thanh Khoi, Histoire du Viet Nam,370. 99. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su,98-99. 100. Phan Huy Le et al., Lich su che do phong kien 3:500. 101. Cady, French Colonialism, 73. 102. Ibid., 501. 103. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su,96. 104. Cady, French Colonialism, 29. 105. Phan Huy Le et al., Lich su che do phong kien 3:504. 106. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su,97. 107. Le Thanh Canh, "Notes pour servir à l'établissement du protectorat

franéais en Annam," Bulletin des Amis du Vieux Hue 15, no. 3 (July-September 1928): 181-182.

108. DNTL 26:243-244. 109. Compare Le Thanh Canh, "Notes,"184. 110. DNTL 26:257-258. 111. Ibid., 245. 112. As D. R. Sar Desai has pointed out, Western accounts of the Vietnamese

casualties inflicted by the French bombardment of Da-nang harbor have been "grossly exaggerated." French archival sources cited by Georges Taboulet give a

134

figure of 10,000 deaths among the Vietnamese defenders. Yet the Hue government's records include the following description of the French cannonade: "The following day at noon, the Frenchmen suddenly and clamorously opened fire, concentrating their shells on the boats carrying our officials. Our forces could not intervene in time. The five bronze-plated ships were penetrated and went down in the flash of an eye. Lanh Binh Nguyen Duc Chung and Hiep Quan Ly Dien were both killed on the scene. Among the officers and soldiers, there were more than forty killed, ninety wounded, and 104 who were carried away by the current and whose status cannot be determined." D. R. Sar Desai, Southeast Asia: Past and Present (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1983), 188; DAN TL 26:255-257.

113. DANTL 26:255-257. 114. Nguyen Cong Binh et al., Lich su Viet Nam 2:33. 115. Tran Van Giau, Su phat trien 1:338. 116. Nguyen The Anh, Viet Nam thoi Phap do-ho (Sai-gon: Lua Thieng,

1970), 17-18. 117. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su, 106. 118. Nguyen The Anh, Viet Nam thoi Phap do-ho, 18-19. 119. Tran Trong Kim, Viet Nam su luoc 2:242. 120. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su, 106. 121. DNTL 27:111. 122. Pham Van Son, Viet su toan thu, 622. 123. Nguyen The Anh, Viet Nam thoi Phap do-ho, 21. 124. The Hung, "L'Eglise catholique et la colonisation française," Etudes

Vietnamiennes, no. 53 (1978): 74.

3. THE FRANCO-SPANISH INVASION AND THE TREATY OF SAI-GON1858-1862

1. Nguyen Cong Binh et al., Lich su Viet Nam, 2 vols. (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1985), 2:33.

2. Milton Osborne, The French Presence in Cochin China and Cambodia: Rule and Response (1859- 1905) (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univ. Press, 1969), 27.

3. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su (Sai-gon: Phu Quoc Vu Khanh Dac Trach Van Hoa, 1971), 115-116.

4. "Cochinchine" had two meanings in contemporary French. It was used in juxtaposition to Tonkin to indicate, respectively, the regions known in Viet- namese as the Dang Trong and the Dang Ngoai, that is, the regions formerly under the authority of the Nguyen and Trinh lords. But Cochinchine was also used, as here, to indicate all of Vietnam.

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5. Nicole-Dominique Le, Les Missions-Etrangères et la pénétration française au Viet-Nam (Paris: Mouton, 1975), 103.

6. Pellerin, testimony before La Commission de la Cochinchine, May 16, 1857, ANSOM, Paris, AP8 (Bonault).

7. R.Stanley Thomson, "The Diplomacy of Imperialism: France and Spain in Cochin China, 1858-1863," Journal of Modern History, no. 12 (1940): 336.

8. Nicole-Dominique Le, Les Missions-Etrangères, 103. 9. Milton Osborne, The French Presence, 27. 10. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su, 114-115. 11.Sallet, "Campagne franco-espagnole du Centre-Annam: Prise de Tourane

(1858-1859)," Bulletin des Amis du Vieux Hue 15, no. 3 (1928): 171. The small Spanish force ostensibly participated because Spanish missionaries had been executed by the Vietnamese state. After intensive diplomatic maneuvering, France denied Spain any territorial aggrandizement at Vietnam's expense. See Thomson, "The Diplomacy of Imperialism,"334-356.

12. Georges Taboulet, La Geste français en Indochine, 2 vols. (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1955- 1956), 2:35.

13.Nguyen Thien Lau, "Khao su: Viec giu Cua Han vao nam Mau-ngo (1858)," Bach Khoa, no. 40 (January 1958): 22-23.

14. Prosper Cultru, Histoire de la Cochinchine (Paris: Augustin Challamel, 1910), 67.

15. Tran Trong Kim, Viet Nam su luoc, 2 vols. (Sai-gon: Bo Giao Duc, Trung Tam Hoc Lieu Xuat Ban, 1971), 2:225.

16. The southernmost region of Vietnam had been known to the Vietnamese as Gia-dinh Thanh during the Gia-long reign. After the region was incorporated by Minh-menh into the empire-wide bureaucratic structure, it was usually called the Six Provinces or luc tinh in Vietnamese. The six provinces in question were Gia-dinh, Dinh-tuong, Vinh-long, An-giang, Bien-hoa, and Ha-tien. See Dao Duy Anh, Dat nuoc Viet Nam qua cac doi: nghien cuu dia ly lich su Viet Nam (Paris: Dong Nam A, 1984), 170-172.

17. Thomson, "The Diplomacy of Imperialism,"338. 18. Nguyen Cong Binh et al., Lich su Viet Nam 2:36. 19. Milton Osborne, The French Presence, 29. 20. Nguyen Cong Binh et al., Lich su Viet Nam 2:37. 21. Tran Trong Kim, Viet Nam su luoc 2:256. 22. Ibid., 257. 23. Ibid., 258. 24. Ibid., 259. 25. Ibid. 26. Nguyen Cong Binh et al., Lich su Viet Nam 2:41.

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27. Prud'homme, Souvenir de l'expédition de la Cochinchine (1861-1862) (Paris: Librarie du Petit Journal, 1865), 165.

28. Compare David G. Marr, Vietnamese Anti-Colonialism, 1885-1925 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 26-27; John F. Cady, Roots of French Colonialism in Eastern Asia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1954), 211-213; Osborne, The French Presence, 29; Milton E. Osborne, River Road to China: The Mekong Exploration, 1866-1873 (New York: Live- right, 1975), 24-25.

29. Vo Duc Hanh, La Place du Catholicisme dan les relations entre la France et le Vietnam, 1851-1870, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969), 1:225-226. Compare Tran Huy Lieu, Lich su tam muoi nam chong Phap, 2 vols. (Ha-noi: Van Su Dia, 1957), 1:33-34; Paulin Vial, Les Premières années de la Cochinchine, colonie française, 2 vols. (Paris: Challamel Ainé, 1874), 1:83-84.

30. L'Annuaire de la Cochinchine, in Jean Bouchot, Documents pour servir à l'histoire de Sai-gon, 1859 à 1865 (Sai-gon: A. Portail, 1927), 69-73.

31. Admiral de la Grandière to Monsignor Lefèvre, May 29, 1863, ANSOM, Paris, AP8 (Bonault).

32. DNTL, 38 vols. (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Xa Hoi, Nha Xuat Ban Su Hoc, Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc, 1962- 1978), 24:35-36.

33. Ibid., 255. 34. Ibid., 193. 35. Ibid., 74. 36. Tran Van Giau, Su phat trien cua tu tuong o Viet Nam tu the ky XIX den

Cach Mang Thang Tam, 2 vols. (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Xa Hoi, 1973- 1975), 1:339-340.

37. DNTL 24:236-237. 38. Ibid., 318. 39. César de Bazencourt, Les Expéditions de Chine et de Cochinchine d'après

les documents officiels, 2 vols. (Paris: Aymot, 1861-62), 285-287. The French officers were almost unanimous in charging that the martial qualities of the Vietnamese people and the organizational capacities of their civil and military leaders had been misrepresented to the French government by the Catholic missionaries. See Nguyen The Anh, Viet Nam thoi Phap do-ho (Sai-gon: Lua Thieng, 1970), 27.

40. Truong Buu Lam, Patterns of Vietnamese Response to Foreign Interven- tion, 1858-1900 (New Haven: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University Mono- graph Series, 1967), 6.

41. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su, 133-134. 42. Tran Trong Kim, Viet Nam su luoc 2:242. 43. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su, 133. 44. DNTL 24:79-80.

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45. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phan thuoc su, 134. 46. Tran Trong Kim, Viet Nam su luoc 2:259. 47. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su, 134. 48. DNTL 24:80. 49. Ibid., 57. 50. Nguyen Cong Binh et al., Lich su Viet Nam 2:36-37. 51. Chasseloup-Laubat to Charner, July 10, 1861, ANSOM, Paris, AP8

(Bonault). Emphasis added. 52. DNTL 24:105-106. 53. Nguyen Duy Oanh, Chan dung Phan Thanh Gian (Sai-gon: Bo Van Hoa

Giao Duc va Thanh Nien, 1974), 285-292. 54. Bui Quang Tung, Nuoc Viet Nam tren con duong suy vong (Hoi Nghien

Cuu Lien Lac Van Hoa A-Chau Xuat Ban, 1958), 12. 55. Phan Phat Huon, Viet Nam giao su, 2 vols. (Sai-gon: Cuu-the Tung-thu,

1962), 1:446. 56. Vo Duc Hanh, La Place du Catholicisme 1:226. 57. Ibid. 58. Philippe Devillers, "Au Sud Vietnam, il y a cent ans …" France-Asie/Asia

20, no. 185 (Spring 1966): 328. 59. Bui Quang Tung, Nuoc Viet Nam tren con duong suy vong, 12. 60. Devillers, "Au Sud Vietnam,"328-329. 61. Charles Duval, Souvenirs militaires et financiers (Paris: Nouvelle Librarie

Parisienne, 1900), 53-54. 62. Phan Phat Huon, Viet Nam giao su 1:446. 63. Pham Trong Nhan, "Nha ngoai giao Phan Thanh Gian," Bach Khoa, no.

154 (January 1963): 13-14. 64. Vial, Les Premières années 1:55. 65. Pham Trong Nhan, "Nha ngoai giao,"13-14. 66. Tran Huy Lieu, Lich su tam muoi nam chong Phap 1:24. 67. DNTL 24:141. 68. Bui Quang Tung, Nuoc Viet Nam tren con duong suy vong, 14-15. 69. DNTL 24:129-130. 70. Tran Huy Lieu, Lich su tam muoi nam chong Phap 1:31. 71. Bui Quang Tung, Nuoc Viet Nam tren con duong suy vong, 14. 72. Tran Thanh Mai, ed., So thao lich su van hoc Viet Nam, giai doan nua

cuoi the ky XIX (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Van Hoc, 1964), 18.The "seventh year of Thieu-tri" was 1846, and the events described by Nguyen Ba Nghi for that date were the bombardments of Da-nang harbor in April of that year. Nguyen Ba

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Nghi's remark that only peace would allow Vietnam "to stabilize the overall situation" is a reference to the rebellion led by Pierre Le Duy Phung.

73. DNTL 24:40. 74. Ibid., 38. 75. Ibid. 30:22-23. 76. Pham Van Son, "Chung quanh cai chet va trach nhiem cua Phan Thanh

Gian truoc cac bien co cua Nam-ky cuoi the ky XIX," Su Dia, no. 7-8 (July-December 1967): 84.

77. QTCB (Sai-gon: Nhom Nghien Cuu Su Dia Xuat Ban,1971-1972), 309-310. Phan Thanh Gian's reference to the fact that the Tran emperors (1226-1413) did not severely prohibit Catholicism was anachronistic because Catholi- cism did not enter Vietnam until the subsequent dynastic period, that of the Le (1428-1788). For Phan Thanh Gian's position on the religious question, see Tran Van Giau,Su phat trien 1:340.

78. Dang Huy Van, "Ve cuoc dau tranh cua nhung nguoi si phu yeu nuoc chu chien chon trieu dinh dau hang xam luoc o cuoi the ky XIX," NCLS, no. 112 (July 1968): 33.

79. Lucien de Grammont, Onze mois de sous-préfecture en Basse-Cochin chine (Napoléon-Vendée: J. Sory, Imprimeur-Editeur, 1863), 307-308.

80. Nguyen Cong Binh et al., Lich su Viet Nam 2:43. 81. Grammont, Onze mois, 308. 82. Nguyen Cong Binh et al., Lich su Viet Nam 2:43. 83. Nguyen The Anh, Viet Nam thoi Phap do-ho, 36; Pham Van Son , "Cai

chet va trach nhiem cua Phan Thanh Gian," 91. 84. DNTL 24:301. 85. Tran Trong Kim, Viet Nam su luoc 2:261. 86. DNTL 24:302. 87. Ibid., 305. 88. Pham Van Son, "Cai chet va trach nhiem cua Phan Tranh Gian,"91. 89. DNTL 24:302. 90. Tran Quoc Giam, "Thai do cua trieu dinh Hue doi voi Phan Thanh Gian

tu vua Tu-duc den vua Dong-khanh," Su Dia, no. 7-8 (July-December 1967): 154-155.

91. Nguyen Duy Oanh, Chan dung Phan Thanh Gian, 323. 92. Tran Quoc Giam, "Thai do cua trieu dinh Hue,"161. 93. Pham Phu Thu, Bai dieu Phan Thanh Gian, in Nguyen Duy Oanh , Chan

dung Phan Thanh Gian, 290. 94. Nguyen Anh, "Y kien trao doi ve nhan vat lich su Phan Thanh Gian,"

NCLS, no. 50 (May 1963): 31. 95. Tran Trong Kim, Viet Nam su luoc 2:262.

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96. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su, 179-181. 97. DNTL 30:86. 98. Nguyen The Anh, Viet Nam thoi Phap do-ho, 37. 99. Editors of NCLS, "Tai lieu ve cuoc khang chien cua Truong Dinh," NCLS,

no. 78 (September 1965): 50-1. Vinh-long was retaken by the French in 1867 and formally granted to France in 1874.

4. THE HUE COURT AND THE SOUTHERN NGHIA-QUAN,1862-1868

1. Duong Kinh Quoc, Viet Nam: nhung su kien lich su (1858-1945), 2 vols. (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1981-82), 13.

2. Ibid. 3. QTCB (Sai-gon: Nhom Nghien Cuu Su Dia Xuat Ban, 1971- 1972), 309. 4. Ibid. 5. DNTL, 38 vols. (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Xa Hoi, Nha Xuat Ban Su Hoc, Nha

Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc, 1962- 1978), 24:257. 6. These sources contradict the Vietnamese Marxist argument that the Hue

Court consistently refused to rely on popular mobilization because of its fear of social revolution. For example, the authors of a biography on Truong Dinh concluded as follows their evaluation of the Hue court's attitude toward popular resistance to France: "It is clear that, right from the beginning [ngay tu luc dau] the Hue court did not want to rely on the people in order to protect the country. The court feared that once the people had finished wit the French, they would turn and overthrow the corrupt feudal regime." To Minh Trung and Nguyen Xuan Huy, Binh Tay dai nguyen soai Truong Dinh (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1965), 8. Emphasis added. The evidence for the court's early encouragement of popular resistance in the South reveals that such arguments are simplistic in their failure to distinguish between the court's policies before and after the 1862 accords.

7. Editors of NCLS, "Tai lieu ve cuoc khang chien cua Truong Dinh," NCLS, no. 77 (August 1965): 44.

8. Ibid., 44-45. 9. Ibid., 45. 10. Léopold Pallu de la Barrière, Histoire de l'expédition de Cochinchine en

1861 (Paris: Hachette, 1864), 226. 11. Ibid., 225. 12. Ibid. 13. Vial, Les Premières années 1:162. 14. Henri de Poyen, Notice sur l'artillerie de la marine en Cochinchine (Paris:

Imprimerie Nationale, 1893), 79.

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15. Editors of NCLS, "Tai lieu ve cuoc khang chien cua Truong Dinh," NCLS, no. 77 (August 1965): 51-52.

16. Tran Van Giap, "Tai lieu moi ve Truong Cong Dinh (1820-1864), anh hung dan toc," NCLS, no. 51 (June 1963): 56.

17. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su (Sai-gon: Phu Quoc Vu Dac Trach Van Hoa, 1971), 195.

18. The text is my translation of the French text of the letter reproduced in full in Nguyen Duy Oanh, Chan dung Phan Thanh Gian (Sai-gon: Bo Van Hoa Glao Duc va Thanh Nien, 1974), 160-162. The "viceroy of Vinh-long" to whom Bonard alludes was Phan Thanh Gian himself.

19. Poyen, Notice, 83. Colonel de Poyen's account is somewhat atypical of the early French writers in that he had the intellectual honesty to recognize that the evidence was inconclusive in regard to the alleged royal edict in support of Truong Dinh's position.

20. Milton Osborne, The French Presence in Cochin China and Cambodia: Rule and Response (1859-1905) (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1969), 60. Although Osborne utilized some Vietnamese sources in the preparation of his important work, his discussion of the relations between the Hue court and southern resistance in the 1860s is based on French archival sources as well as on the works of Pallu de la Barrière, Paulin Vial, and Lucien de Grammont.

21. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su, 183. 22. DNTL 31:61. 23. Ibid. 24. QTCB, 321. 25. To Minh Truong and Nguyen Xuan Huy, Truong Dinh, 28. 26. Editors of NCLS, "Tai lieu ve cuoc khang chien cua Truong Dinh," NCLS,

77 (August 1965): 45. 27. Nguyen Thong, Ky xuyen van sao, in Nguyen Thong, Tho van Nguyen

Thong, edited by Le Thuoc et al. (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Van Hoa, 1962), 194. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30.The fact that the leaders of the insurgents could draw upon a vast reservoir

of sympathy among the southern population for the ancien régime contradicts the missionaries' thesis--adopted by many of the colonialists and preserved in an altogether different ideological context by modern Marxists -that the southern people considered themselves exploited and repressed by Hue officials. Not all of the French officers held this view, however. The southerners' opinion of the Nguyen dynasty's officials was independently evaluated by Admiral Charner, who summarized his results as follows in a letter dated August 28, 1861: "We generally believed that the mandarins were detested tyrants and that the natives yearned to be rid of their yoke. This notion was erroneous. I had Ship's Lieutenant Aubaret, Inspector of Native Affairs, as well as various other people

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who can speak the Annamese language perfectly interrogate thousands of Annamites, and these Annamites constantly responded that their mandarins were just and that their administration had been mild."Charner to Minister, August 28, 1861, ANSOM, Paris, AP8 (Bonault).

31. Ohier to Minister of Foreign Affairs, November 6, 1868, ANSOM, Paris, AP8 (Bonault).

32. Nguyen Duy Oanh, Chan dung Phan Thanh Gian, 315. Before 1862, imperial Vietnam had no ministry of foreign affairs in the modern sense of the institution. Not until after the Treaty of Sai-gon would Tu-duc establish two offices, the Binh-Chuan-Ti and the Thuong-Bac-Vien, to regulate the commercial and diplomatic intercourse required by the 1862 agreement. It is thus to the latter office that the Council of Dignitaries' report referred. See Tran Trong Kim , Viet Nam su luoc, 2 vols. (Sai-gon: Bo Giao Duc, Trung Tam Hoc Lieu Xuat Ban, 1971), 2:242.

33. DNTL 31:49. 34. Dong-Ho, "Tham dao Phu Quoc," Nam Phong, no. 124 Dec 1929): 543. 35. DNTL 33:134.

5. THE HUE COURT AND ANTI-CATHOLIC ACTIVISM, 1862-1868

1. Nicole-Dominique Le, Les Missions-Etrangères et la pénétration française au Viet-Nam (Paris: Mouton, 1975), 111-112.

2. Ibid., 112. 3. This was Admiral Bonard's interpretation. See Bonard, letter to Minister of

the Navy and Colonies, July 24, 1862, ANSOM, Paris, AP8 (Bonault). 4. Tran Van Giau, Su phat trien cua tu tuong o Viet Nam tu the Ky XIX den

Cach Mang Thang Tam, 2 vols. (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Xa Hoi, 1973- 1975), 1:347.

5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. DNTL, 38 vols. (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Xa Hoi, Nha Xuat Ban Su Hoc, Nha

Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc, 1962- 1978), 24:209. Most of these travel restrictions were to be abolished by the terms of the 1874 treaty. According to Vietnamese records, the missionaries had systematically violated these provisions. In a sense, therefore, the 1874 treaty simply sanctioned their practice of disregarding these Vietnamese laws. See Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su, (Sai-gon: Phu Quoc Vu Khanh Dac Trach Van Hoa, 1971), 232; DNTL 30:75-76; DNTL 31:182.

8. Tran Van Giau, Su phat trien 1:350. 9. DNTL 31:210. 10. Ibid., 260. 11. Ibid., 31:240; 33:122-123.

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12. Dang Huy Van, "Ve cuoc dau tranh cua nhung nguoi si phu yeu nuoc chu chien chong trieu dinh dau hang xam luoc cuoi the Ky XIX," NCLS, no. 112 (July 1968): 533-34.

13. Ibid., 35. 14. Dieu tran cua cac tu-tai va si phu truong thi Nam-dinh, in Hoi Van Hoc

Ha Nam Ninh, Van hoc yeu nuoc va cach mang Ha Nam Ninh (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1981), 245-246.

15. Dinh Xuan Lam and Trieu Duong, "Cuoc khoi nghia nam 1866 o kinh thanh Hue, duoi anh sang cua mot su lieu moi: Bai Trung nghia ca do chinh thu linh Doan Huu Trung viet," NCLS, no. 9 (November 1959): 58.

16. QTCB, 343. 17. Dinh Xuan Lam and Trieu Duong, "Cuoc khoi nghia,"58-59. 18. Doan Huu Trung, Trung nghia ca, in Dinh Xuan Lam and Trieu Duong,

"Cuoc knoi nghia,"60. 19. Ibid., 70-71. 20. Dinh Xuan Lam and Trieu Duong, "Cuoc khoi nghia,"66. 21. Buu-ke, "Tu viec Hong-Bao bi truat den viec phan nghich o kinh thanh," Dai Hoc, no. 6 (November 1958):21. 22.QTCB, 343-344. 23. Dinh Xuan Lam and Trieu Duong, "Cuoc khoi nghia,"88-89. 24. Doan Huu Trung, Trung nghia ca, in Dinh Xuan Lam and Trieu Duong,

"Cuoc khoi nghia,"60. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid., 62. 27. Tran Trong Kim, Viet Nam su luoc, 2 vols. (Sai-gon: Bo Giao Duc, Trung

Tam Hoc Lieu Xuat Ban, 1971), 2:272. 28. Doan Huu Trung, Trung nghia ca, in Dinh Xuan Lam and Trieu Duong,

"Cuoc khoi nghia,"63-64. 29. Doan Huu Trung, Trung nghia ca, in Nguyen The Anh, Kinh te va xa hoi

duoi cac vua trieu Nguyen (Sai-gon: Lua Thieng, 1970), 303. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Doan Huu Trung, Trung nghia ca, in Dinh Xuan Lam and Trieu Duong,

"Cuoc khoi nghia," 70. 33. DNTL 31:22-23. 34. Ibid., 22. 35. DNTL 31:206. Am Thu Cuu Pham is a ninth-degree mandarinal ranking

awarded without examination to a son in recognition of his father's exceptional merit.

143

36. DNTL 31:206. 37. Ibid., 192. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid., 208. 41. Ibid. 42.Tran Van Giau, Su phat trien 1:348; DNTL 30:29-30. 43.Tran Van Giau, Su phat trien 1:348. 44. Phan Phat Huon, Viet Nam giao su, 2 vols. (Sai-gon: Cuu-the Tung-thu,

1962), 1:513. 45. Ibid., 512. 46. Ibid., 511. 47. Ibid., 510. 48. The French-language document is reproduced without commentary in Vo

Duc Hanh, La Place du Catholicisme dans les relations entre la France et le Viet- nam, 1851-1870, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969), 2:330-336.

49. Tu-duc, Chieu Tu-duc du van tan, in Chu Thien, Dang Huy Van et al., eds. Hop tuyen tho van yeu nuoc: tho van yeu nuoc nua sau the ky XIX (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Van Hoc, 1970), 416.

50. Ibid., 416-417. 51. Tu-duc, Bai du: khien trach vien thuong-bac va vien Thua-thien phu, in

Tu-duc, Thanh che van tam tap, 2 vols. Edited by Bui Tan Nien and Tran Tuan Khai (Sai-gon: Phu Quoc Vu Khanh Dac Trach Van Hoa Xuat Ban, 1971), 45-46.

52.In the Vietnamese text of the edict, the French Chargé d'Affaires is designated by the term Vien Phu-Su. In accordance with Article XX of the 1874 treaty, a French Chargé d'Affaires was stationed at Hue to oversee the implen- tation of the accords. It was from this official that any complaints lodged by the missionaries regarding the treatment of the Vietnamese Catholics were received by Vietnamese authorities. The emperor's reference to this official was thus a meta- phor for French power protecting Vietnamese Catholicism. See Tran Trong Kim, Viet Nam su luoc 2:287.

6. HUE'S POLICY OF PEACE AND THE "FRANCIS GARNIER AFFAIR"1873-1874

1. See D. R. SarDesai, British Trade and Expansion in Southeast Asia, 1830-1914 (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1977), 278-280.

2. Georges Taboulet, "Le Voyage d'exploration du Mekong (1866-1868): Dou- dart de Lagre et Francis Garnier," Revue Francaise d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer, no. 62 (1970): 17-18.

3. Ibid., 18.

144

4. Jean-Pierre Gomane, "Introduction," in Francis Garnier, Voyage d'exploration en Indochine ( Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1985), 10.

5. Nguyen The Anh, Viet Nam thoi Phap do-ho ( Sai-gon: Lua Thieng, 1970), 79-80.

6. Stephen H. Roberts, The History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925, 2 vols. (London: P. S. King, 1929), 1:442.

7.Francis Garnier, untitled manuscript, ANSOM, Paris, PA17, Carton 2, 1866. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Dupré to Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 27, 1893, ANSOM, Paris,

AP8 (Bonault). 11. Dupré to Minister, December 22, 1872, ANSOM, Paris, AP8 (Bonault). 12. Virginia Thompson, French Indochina (London: Allen & Unwin, 1927),

62-63. 13. Roberts, French Colonial Policy, 1:425. 14. Milton Osborne, River Road to China: The Mekong Exploration, 1866-

1873 (New York: Liveright, 1975), 195. 15. Francis Garnier, La Question du Tonkin, ANSOM, Paris, PA17, Carton 1. 16. Osborne, River Road to China, 195-196. 17. Ibid., 203-204. 18. Fredéric Degenaer to Dupré, January 25, 1875, ANSOM, Paris, AP8 (Bo-

nault). Degenaer was a private Hong-kong merchant who claimed to have furnished Captain Senez with wine and foodstuffs on credit to replace those that Senez had given to Dupuis. In order to convince Degenaer that the purchase was an official one, Senez had described to Degenaer the purpose of his mission and the nature of the relationship between Dupré and Dupuis. In denying his sponsorship of Dupuis' mission, Dupré apparently felt that the French government in Sai-gon was thereby relieved of any obligation to reimburse the mission's suppliers; the debt was never paid.

19. Senez to Dupré, September 1872, ANSOM, Paris, AP8 (Bonault). 20. Romanet du Caillaud, La France au Tonkin (Paris: Imprimerie de Talitout,

Questroy et Cie., 1874), 5. 21. See Phan Van Son, Viet su toan thu (Sai-gon: Khai-tri, 1960), 647-648;

Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su (Sai-gon: Phu Quoc Vu Khanh Dac Trach Van Hoa, 1971), 208-209; Tran Huy Lieu, Lich su thu do Ha-noi (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Su Hoc, 1960), 92.

22. DNTL, 38 vols. ( Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Xa Hoi, Nha Xuat Ban Su Hoc, Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc, 1962- 1978), 32:225.

23. Ibid. 24. Jean Dupuis, Le Tonkin de 1872 à 1886 (Paris: Augustin Challamel,

Editeur, 1910), 33-34.

145

25. QTCB (Sai-gon: Nhom Nghien Cuu Su Dia Xuat Ban, 1971-1972), 368-369.

26. DNTL 32:258. 27. Ibid., 328. 28. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su, 170-172. 29. It is possible that the mission of Captain Senez of the Bourayne in October

of 1872 included contacts with the Catholic missionaries of Tonkin in view of organizing their support for the upcoming intervention. In an official letter dated January 6, 1872, Vietnamese authorities protested to Admiral Dupré that Senez's claim to have authorization from Sai-gon to visit the Tonkinese Catholic Mis- sions was contrary to established procedure, which required advance notification by French authorities. According to the author of the letter of protest, Senez had lied about the movements of his ship in Vietnamese coastal waters and rivers and was unable to account for the time he spent in these areas. Vietnamese officials also expressed their bewilderment as to why Bishop Gauthier as well as the Vietnamese interpreter from the Bourayne--a native of Gia-dinh--were to be found in Dupuis' entourage. The Vietnamese evidently suspected a conspiracy involving Dupré, the French government at Sai-gon, and the Catholic missionaries of Tonkin. Minister of Commerce and Foreign Relations to the Governor and Commander-in-Chief, January 6, 1873, ANSOM, Paris, Indochine AF A60, Carton 1.

30. DNTL 32:306. 31. Dupré to Garnier, October 10, 1873, ANSOM, Paris, AP8 (Bonault). 32. Osborne, River Road to China, 206. 33. Dupré to French Minister at Peking, Oct 1873, ANSOM, Paris, AP8

(Bonault). 34. Dupré, Oct 19, 1873, ANSOM, Paris, Indochine AF A60 (1), Carton 24. 35. Osborne, River Road to China, 206. 36. Tran Trong Kim, Viet Nam su luoc, 2 vols. (Sai-gon: Bo Giao Duc, Trung

Tam Hoc Lieu Xuat Ban, 1971), 2:281-282. 37. Jean Marquet and Jean Norel, L'Occupation du Tonkin par la France (1873

-1874) d'aprés des documents inédits (Sai-gon, 1936), 42-43. 38. DNTL 32:330-331. 39. Garnier, Expedition du Tonkin, ANSOM, Paris, PA17 (Garnier). 40. Ibid. 41. Paulin Vial, Nos Premières années au Tonkin, 2 vols. (Paris: Voirin, 1889),

1:58. 42. Marquet and Norel, L'Occupation du Tonkin, 44. 43. Nguyen The Anh, Viet Nam thoi Phap do-ho, 85-86. 44. Bonard to Minister, July 1862, ANSOM, Paris, AP8 (Bonault). 45. Dupré to Garnier, October 10, 1873, ANSOM, Paris, AP8 (Bonault).

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46. Dupré to Minister, July 28, 1873, ANSOM, Paris, Indochine AF A30, Carton 12, Dossier 18.

47. Dupré to Sohier, October 6, 1873, ANSOM, Paris, AP8 (Bonault). 48. Marquet and Norel, Le Drame Tonkinois (1873-1874): Deuxième étude

d'aprés des documents inédits (Ha-noi: Imprimerie-d'Extrême-Orient, 1938), 47. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid., 57. 51. Ibid., 48. 52. Ibid., 56-57. 53. Schurhammer, "Nen van chuong cong giao,"154. 54. Marquet and Norel, Le Drame Tonkinois, 49-50. 55. Ibid., 51. 56. Ibid., 51-52. 57. Ibid., 52-54. 58. Ibid., 85. 59. Adrien Balny d'Avricourt, L'Enseigne Balny et la conquête du Tonkin:

Indochine 1873 (Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1973), 253. 60. Henry McAleavy, Black Flags in Vietnam: The Story of a Chinese Inter-

vention; The Tonkin War of 1884-1885 (New York: MacMillan, 1968), 142-143. 61. Marquet and Norel, L'Occupation du Tonkin, 153-154. 62. André Masson, Hanoi Pendent la périod héroique 1873-1888 (Paris:

Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1929), 35-36. 63. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su, 219-221. 64. Marquet and Norel, L'Occupation du Tonkin, 48-49. 65. E. Luro, Le Pays dannam: Etude sur l'organization politique et sociale des

Annamites (Paris: E. Leroux, 1878), 11-12. 66. Marquet and Norel, L'Occupation du Tonkin, 11-12. 67. Avricourt, L Enseigne Balny, 181. 68. Romanet du Caillaud, La France au Tonkin, 11. 69. Ibid., 12. 70. This manner of posing the question of Catholic collaboration was the

standard argument of the pro-Catholic apologists. Louvet, a nineteenth-century author, presented--without any mention of their source--figures of 2,000 Catho- lic soldiers within a total pro-French militia force of 14,000 men; Phan Phat Huon, a twentieth-century writer, uncritically reiterates these figures. The problem is that there are no surviving), records from which such figures could be derived, and it is therefore meaningless to cite them. Furthermore, the pro-Catholic authors do not address the possibility that there were other forms of Catholic aid to Garnier's expedition besides formal enrollment as a militiaman or administrator. See E. Louvet, Vie de Msgr. Puginier (Ha-noi: Schneider, 1894),

147

225; Phan Phat Huon, Viet Nam giao su, 2 vols. (Sai-gon: Cuu-the Tung-thu, 1962), 1:520-521.

71. One is reminded of the observations made by Chesneaux and Osborne regarding the historiographical potency retained by nineteenth-century ideals. See Milton E. Osborne, "Truong Vinh Ky and Phan Thanh Gian: The Problem of a Nationalist Interpretation of Nineteenth-Century Vietnamese History," Jour nal of Asian Studies 30, no. 1 (November 1970): 81; Jean Chesneaux, "French Historiography and the Evolution of Colonial Vietnam," in D. G. E. Hall , ed., Historians of Southeast Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 233.

72. To illustrate his conception of the Europeans' superior morality, the author juxtaposes two contemporary photographs, one showing the French use of wooden cangues to restrain Vietnamese prisoners, the other Vietnamese soldiers holding severed heads. "Prisoners in the cangue utilized by the French," the author notes under the former; "No prisoners taken among the Annamites. Decapi- tation was the minimum…" is his comment on the latter. The implication is that the Europeans--the French soldiers and the French and Spanish missionaries--conducted themselves with greater humanity than their Vietnamese counterparts. The photos and commentary are presented hors texte between pages 256 and 257 of Avricourt, L'Enseigne Balny.

73. Baln to Garnier, November 28, 1873, ANSOM, Paris, PA 17 (Garnier), Carton 1.

74. Balny to Garnier, November 29, 1873, ANSOM, Paris, PA 17 (Garnier), Carton 1.

75. Harmand, Report, January 1874, ANSOM, Paris, Indochine AF AOO (10), Carton 1.

76. Balny, Report, undated, ANSOM, Paris, PA 17, Carton 1. 77. Balny to Garnier, November 1873, ANSOM, Paris, PA 17, Carton 1. 78. Avricourt, L'Enseigne Balny, 226-227. 79. Ibid., 230-231. 80. Ibid., 231. 81. Ibid., 238-239. 82. Marquet and Norel have suggested that Garnier suppressed -155- 83. Harmand, Report, December 1873, ANSOM, Paris, Indochine AF A00

(10) Carton 1. 84. Balny to Garnier, November 1873, ANSOM, Paris, PA 17 ( Garnier),

Carton 1. 85. Balny, Notes, November 29, 1873, ANSOM, Paris, PA 17 (Garnier),

Carton 1. 86. Marquet and Norel, Le Drame Tonkinois, 68.

148

87. Harmand, Report, January 1874, ANSOM, Paris, Indochine AF A00 (10), Carton 1.

88. Ibid. 89. Ibid. 90. Osborne, River Road to China, 213. 91. Harmand, Report, January 1874, ANSOM, Paris, Indochine AF A00 (10),

Carton 1. 92. Ibid. 93. Ibid. 94. Ibid. 95. Avricourt, L'Enseigne Balny, 260-261. 96. DNTL 32:342. 97. Ibid. 98.Ibid., 338. 99. Ibid. Recent research by Vietnamese scholars has clarified several per-

plexing problems in regard to the origins of Luu Vinh Phuc's Black Flags and their political relationship with the Hue court. A native of China's Kwangsi province, Luu Phuc was not a Tai-ping general as is often stated. His Black Flags were loosely associated with the Heaven and Earth Society. Although his Black Flags occasionally cooperated with Tai-ping forces, they retained their organizational and ideological independence. After the destruction of the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace, Chinese imperial forces attacked the Black Flags and forced them to flee southward into Vietnam in approximately 1867. In the highlands of northern Vietnam, the Black Flags made themselves useful to the Hue court by extirpating a number of rival Sino-Vietnamese military bands. Luu Vinh Phuc was rewarded by the Hue court with the title of That Pham Thien Ho, a seventh-level military mandarin's ranking, and the position of Bao-Thang Phong-Ngu Su, or royal defensive envoy. As such, he was permitted to levy taxes on his own initiative and was generally allowed a free hand in the isolated regions of Lao-cai and Yen-bai where imperial authority was feeble. See Chuong Thau and Minh-Hong, "Luu Vinh Phuc trong cuoc khang Phap cua nhan dan Viet Nam," NCLS, no. 36 (March 1962): 9-11.

100.Tu-duc, Bai du: khuyen sue quan Hiep Doc Ton That Thuyet va quan Thong Doc Hoang Ta Viem, in Tu-duc, Thanh che van tam tap, 2 vols. Edited by Bui Tan Mien and Tran Tuan Khai (Sai-gon: Phu Quoc Vu Khanh Dac Trach Van Hoa Xuat Ban, 1971), 62.

101. Ibid., 66. 102. DNTL 32:338. 103. Ibid., 342. 104. Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su, 225.

149

105. Luu Vinh Phuc, Lich su chi thao, in Chuong Thau and Minh-Hong, "Luu Vinh Phuc,"10.

106. Chuong Thau and Minh-Hong, "Luu Vinh Phuc,"10. 107. Chu Thien et al., Hop tuyen tho van yeu nuoc: Tho van yeu nuoc nua sau

the Ky XIX ( Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Van Hoc, 1970), 402. 108. The viewpoint of the author of Nhac Nhi bi giet chet--that the psycho-

logical and organizational state of the French troops in Tonkin after the Black Flags's attack presented the Vietnamese with a golden opportunity to inflict on France a humiliating defeat-- became a favorite theme with the advocates of war. For example, in 1883, Nguyen Xuan On, a provincial military mandarin whose career had encountered numerous setbacks because of his outspoken anti-Catholicism, sent Tu-duc the following evaluation of opportunities lost during the Tonkin episode: "In the course of the Ha-noi incident, Garnier was killed, leaving their troops without a leader. We should have taken advantage of their confusion and driven them away; it could have been done without difficulty. Yet we offered them peace in order to spare them the shame of defeat, and we even offered them land. By no means can it be said that their victories were entirely caused by their great ability." Nguyen Xuan On, Tho van Nguyen Xuan On, edited by Nguyen Duc Van et al. (Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Van Hoa, 1962), 276.

109. Tu-duc, Bai che sach phuc thi khoa thi-hoi nam dinh-suu, in Tu-duc, Thanh che van tam tap, 254-256.

110. Tu-duc, Bai du: khien trach vien Thuong-Bac va Thua-Thien-Phu, in ibid., 44.

111. Ibid. 112. Ibid. 113. The 1874 treaty included among its provisions the following stipulations.

Articles II and III declared that Vietnam was not a dependency of any country but was not to change its foreign policy without the approval of France. Article V granted France full governmental authority in all of the occupied southern territories. Article IX reiterated, clarified, and enhanced the privileges of the Ca- tholics. The Hue court agreed to abandon restrictions on the number of Catholic worshipers who might assemble in a single place. Missionaries were henceforth required only to secure the approval of the French authorities in Sai-gon and the agreement either of the Vietnamese Minister of Rites or a provincial mandarin in order to travel anywhere in Vietnam; they were no longer required to report their movements and verify their credentials with local Vietnamese officials. The Vietnamese government was obliged to reiterate its repeal of the edicts of persecution and to declare by imperial edict its supposed acknowledgment that the Catholic religion taught the people to perform good acts. Catholics were to be permitted to hold any administrative position to which their talents qualified them, and they might not be forced to commit any act contrary to their religion. Vietnamese priests were excluded from corporal punishment in the event of infractions of Vietnamese law, and they were to be allowed to own land and rent land and buildings for religious purposes. Articles XI and XII forced Vietnam to

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open ports at Thi-nai in Binh-dinh province and at Binh-hai in Hai-duong province. The Red River was opened to commerce from China to the sea, including the port of Ha-noi. Frenchmen and Vietnamese with French nationality were allowed full commercial liberties in these zones. According to Article XX a French official was to reside in Vietnamese territory to oversee the fulfillment of the treaty. See Phan Khoang, Viet Nam Phap thuoc su, 230-239; Tran Trong Kim, Viet Nam su luoc 2:286-287.

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Selected Bibliography

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-----. Viet Nam van hoa su cuong. Paris: Sudestasie, 1985. Descours-Gatin, Chantal, and Hugues Villiers. Guide de recherches sur le Vietnam. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1983. Dinh Gia Trinh et al., eds. So thao lich su nha nuoc va phap quyen Viet Nan. Ha-noi: Uy Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi Viet Nam, 1968. Do Quang Trinh. Lich su chu quoc ngu, 1620-1659. Paris: Duong Moi, 1985. Duong Kinh Quoc. Viet Nam: Nhung su Kien lich su (1858-1945). 2 vols. Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1981- 1982. Duval Charles. Souvenirs militaires et financiers. Paris: Nouvelle Librarie Pari- sienne, 1900. Garnier Francis. Voyage d'exploration en Indochine. Paris: Editions La Décou- verte, 1985. Grammont Lucien de. Onze mois de sous-préfecture en Basse-Cochinchine. Napoléon-Vendée: J. Sory, Imprimeur-Editeur, 1863. Hall D. G. E. Historians of Southeast Asia. London: Oxford University Press, 1961. Hoi Van Hoc Ha Nam Ninh. Van hoc yeu nuoc va cach mang Ha Nam Ninh. Ha-noi: Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1981. Huynh Khac Dung. Su lieu Viet Nam. Sai-gon: Nha Van Hoa Bo Quoc Gia Giao Duc, 1959. Kieu Oanh Mau. Ban trieu ban nghich liet truyen. Sai-gon: Bo Quoc Gia Giao Duc, 1963. Le Nicole-Dominique. Les Missions-Etrangères et la pénétration française au Viet-Nam. Paris: Mouton, 1975. Le Thanh Khoi. Histoire du Viet Nam: Des origins a 1858. Paris: Sudestasie, 1981. Le Van Phat. Ta quan thuong cong Nam-ky tong-tran Le Van Duyet. Sai-gon: Imprimerie de 1'Union Nguyen Van Cua, 1924. Luro E. Le Pays dannam: Etude sur l'organization politique et sociale des Annamites. Paris: E. Leroux, 1878. Marquet Jean, and Jean Norel. L'Occupation du Tonkin par la France (1873-1874) d'après des documents inédits. Sai-gon, 1936. -----. Le Drame Tonkinois (1873-1874); Deuxième étude d'après des documents inddits. Ha-noi: Imprimerie-d'Extrême-Orient, 1938. Marr David G. Vietnamese Anti-Colonialism, 1885-1925. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. Maybon Charles. Histoire moderne du Pays d'Annam, 1592-1820. Paris: Plon, 1920.

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