some elaboration. Beginning with the notion that time

and chance, not some essential human nature, are central to individual and collective existence, Rorty explores the contingency of language, selfhood, and community. Traditional philosophic problems are more dissolved than solved and contact is made with some key ideas of some recent thinkers such as Nelson Goodman, Hillary Putnam, Donald Davidson, Jurgen Habermas, and John Rawls, and some figures from the past such as Freud, Wittgenstein, and Dewey, to name only a few. Using seminal thinkers to redescribe a utopian liberal culture that would be "poetized" rather than "scientized" or "rational-ized," Rorty does not seek "to replace religion with a philosophical account of a healing and unifying power which will do the work once done by God." Rather, he desires to construct a form of social life in which claims of universal validity are no longer plausible; he desires a society that gives democracy priority over philosophy.

The literal and figurative center of Rorty's book is his sketch of the ironist,

the person constantly looking for a better idea because socialization did not quite take hold. Contrasting the ironist to the metaphysician, someone who thinks there can be an ultimate vocab-ulary, the two groups ask different questions. Metaphysicians ask, "What is Truth?" Ironists ask, "What's the alternative?" It is this latter group that understands the value of a continual redescription of experience in and for a pluralistic and humane society. It is ironists who can turn to literature rather than Habermas's universalistic philos-ophy of intersubjective communication as a means of deepening concern for others.

Solidarity, the last of Rorty's con-cepts, deals with the desire and effort to become aware of and overcome the cruelty people inflict through social and individual practices. Turning to litera-ture to illuminate cruelty, the writings of Nabokov and Orwell are presented to show the depth and complexity of cruelty. Rorty's liberalism depends on a "loathing for cruelty—a sense that it is the worst thing we can do." This loathing for cruelty needs to be made

concrete to become a part of our ethical thinking and actual practice, and to move others from a "they" to a "we."

Rorty says much more and takes many side trips on his journey through contingency, irony, and solidarity. Obviously anyone who seeks to decon-struct metaphysics and epistemology will not be without critics. Rorty's critics include not only traditional philoso-phers and political theorists but also liberals and pragmatists, anti-Deweyians and Deweyians. Anyone who can get the attention of so many groups must be hitting the foundations of many different homes.

Reading Rorty is necessary for those who want to understand new types of cognitive dwellings and fascinating literary excursions. The trip he offers has edifying possibilities but is not for those who seek "the green, green grass of home" or fear "Road Warriors." It is for those who do not feel quite settled and value the search for alter-native ways; it is for those who desire a recreation vehicle and an open agenda. •

The Philosophy of `Flow' Timothy William Grogan Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience, by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (New York: Harper and Row, 1990) xii + 303 pp., $19.95, cloth.

ne of the purported horrors at- tendant to loss of faith in the Judeo-

Christian God is the loss of the "meaning of life." It is almost taken as a truism that the meaning of life is bound up in religious faith and those without such faith must pass their lives in despair and desperation. Fortunately, for humanists, atheists, and various other dissenters,

Timothy William Grogan is a graduate student in clinical psychology at Cleve-land University and vice president of the real-estate firm, T W. Grogan Company.

this problem is not nearly so intractable as the philosophical problems that are permanent fixtures of theism (such as the problem of evil). There have been several good books from an overall humanistic perspective on this subject including Ellis and Becker (1982), de Bono (1977), Russell (1930), and Kurtz (1985). Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi's book Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience is an excellent addition to this list and one that every person concerned with living the most fulfilling life possible (Who isn't?) should read.

As a person formerly of deep religious faith, I was unsatisfied with what I saw as the self-indulgent and shallow lifestyle of many of my peers who were not overtly religious. After I left the church, I lived this "Yuppie" lifestyle for a time

myself, but, by and large, I found it self-destructive and full of ennui. Unfortu-nately, for many of my contemporaries, the lifestyle they "fell into" was the psychological equivalent of the Marianas Trench. It is my opinion that my friends would have been better served by a little more conscious direction (as, for exam-ple, is supplied by Csikszentmihalyi's book) and a little less blind conformism.

What is "flow"? Basically, it is a newfangled expression for an activity that brings with it the most prized of human commodities: happiness. The term flow, is, I suppose, as good as any other to describe this experience, which has been called by many names. Perhaps the truth is a bit like soap: It needs repackaging for each generation (re-member, "love" was once called "char-ity"). It is something I experience when I write book reviews or poetry. Flow is associated with the focusing of attention outside the self and getting feedback that one is accomplishing something worth-while. A priori, this description rules out intoxication of the brain as leading to

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a state of flow—something my Yuppie friends would do well to take note of.

The concept of happiness is discussed in detail in the first part of the book, followed by an explication of the concept of flow and its manifestations in various human activities. Much of the research that Csikszentmihalyi relies on for his descriptions of flow come from the science of experimental social psychol-ogy, where Csikszentmihalyi is a leading expert. The book contains much psy-chology, but as might be expected, it also has a decided philosophical emphasis. The book is peppered with references to Bertrand Russell, Democritus, J. S. Mill, Plato, and Marcus Aurelius, all cited favorably on the subject of happiness.

The philosophical stance taken by Csikszentmihalyi throughout is tho-roughly humanistic. There is not even a hint that traditional religions have anything to offer to most well-educated persons:

I shall argue that the primary reason it is so difficult to achieve happiness centers on the fact that, contrary to the myths mankind has developed to reassure itself, the universe was not created to answer our needs. (p. 7)

The universe is not hostile, nor yet is it friendly. It is simply indifferent. (p• 9) It is true that life has no meaning, if

by that we mean a supreme goal built into the fabric of nature and human experience, a goal that is valid for every individual. (p. 215)

Csikszentmihalyi's assumption that faith is not a credible option for educated people may be true in his intellectual salons at the University of Chicago. The general findings of most polls (taken outside the U of C) show that, at least for most of the professional classes in this country, belief in a benevolent God still is the majority view, even among people who Csikszentmihalyi and myself would agree ought to know better. Although these persons do not practice, by and large, their childhood faith, for these educated semi-Judeo-Christians God functions as deus ex machina to give meaning to life in spite of their overall alienation from most traditional forms of religious belief and practice.

From a psychological perspective, it is exciting to see a convergence between what philosophy has said about human happiness and what social psychological research has discovered empirically. For years psychotherapists like Albert Ellis have said that the discovery by the individual of a "vital absorbing interest" is the via regia to personal happiness.

One weakness of Flow is the attempt by Csikszentmihalyi to make the book

more "user friendly." The result is, in my opinion, to make it less so. It may be just an intensely personal idiosyn-crasy, but I happen to like footnotes. Apart from this debatable defect and an offhand reference to that elusive shaman Don Juan, I have no other specific criticisms.

In an era of New Age mysticism and crystal power, when so many have given up control of their lives to the stars, to some guru, or the latest wares of the street pharmacologist, it is refreshing to see a forthright statement on the poten-tial of human beings to order their experiences toward a maximization of enjoyment without recourse to what I call "outside solutions." That the power exists within ourselves to order con-sciousness and thus attain the best that life has to offer is something that needs restatement with each new generation. In this book we have a merging of philosophical verities and scientific evidence—perfect for the 1990s.

References

De Bono, E. 1977. The Happiness Purpose. New York: Penguin Books.

Ellis, A., and I. Becker. 1982. A Guide to Personal Happiness. Hollywood: Wilshire Book Company.

Kurtz, P. 1985. Exuberance. Buffalo: Prometheus Books.

Russell, B. 1930. The Conquest of Happiness. New York: Liveright Publishing Company. •

The Road Too Traveled Tom Flynn A Question of Values: Six Ways We Make the Personal Choices that Shape Our Lives, by Hunter Lewis (New York: Harper and Row, 1990) xi + 282 pp., indexed, cloth, $17.95.

M Scott Peck's "road less tray- • eled" is getting crowded.

Almost everyone knows Peck's book, The Road Less Traveled, became the most durable nonfiction best-seller in recent memory. Contemporary Ameri-cans awash in value conflicts welcomed Peck's seductive underlying message: We can enjoy the benefits of secular modern-

Summer 1991

ity without giving up our Christian beliefs after all.

Peck's road could scarcely stay empty for long. Commentator Hunter Lewis has loosed a cast of thousands upon it.

Lewis has concocted a bubbly, read-able, but surprisingly empty book. But A Question of Values powerfully illus-trates how the new "mainstream accom-modationist" writers hope to restore Christianity to public life under cover of confusion.

Lewis begins by making quick work of a question that has plagued philos-ophers since time immemorial: How

ought values to be categorized? He sets forth an audacious six-element taxon-omy of values and asserts that all human value systems ultimately proceed from authority, deductive logic, sense expe-rience, emotion, intuition, or science. Since all subsequent discussion will supposedly build on this taxonomy, I expected a greater effort to lay concep-tual foundations and counter objections. Instead, Lewis rushes to demonstrate how his system works. Eager for an exemplar whose value system is based on emotion, he chooses Obi-Wan Kenobi, the Alec Guinness character from Star Wars ("Trust your feelings, Luke'). Then he spells the character's name wrong in three places.

Clearly, popular appeal and expos-itory momentum, rather than rigor, are

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