Some doubts about in vitro eugenicsas a human enhancement technologyAndrew W Siegel

Robert Sparrow highlights the possibilitythat future success in deriving gametes fromhuman pluripotent stem cells could forge apath to the creation of multiple generationsof embryos in vitro, ultimately allowing forselective breeding of embryos as a means ofproducing humans with ‘enhanced’genomes.1 Sparrow refers to this iterativeuse of gametogenesis as ‘in vitro eugenics’,and argues that proponents of enhance-ments have a ‘strong moral reason’ toembrace it. He also speculates that currentbarriers to research on this technology willbe lifted to permit the advances in vitrogametogenesis research promises in addres-sing infertility. One might thus expect thepossibility of in vitro eugenics to stoke thehopes and fears of those with competingviews about human enhancement.However, as I argue below, such reactionswould be misplaced in the context of thistechnology both because we should antici-pate very little, if any, demand for it as ameans of creating children, and because,contra Sparrow, even proponents ofenhancements can plausibly deny that thereexist strong moral grounds for employingthis technology. These considerations willfurther suggest that some substantial ethicaland regulatory barriers to research on invitro eugenics are likely to remain.

Let us suppose researchers succeed inusing in vitro gametogenesis to breedembryos with genetically enhancedgenomes and that there are no unusual risksin using these embryos to create children.There is good reason to think it unlikelythat persons wishing to have children wouldhave much interest in acquiring theseembryos. Selective breeding has long beentechnologically feasible, but it has nevergained much traction. Some early eugeni-cists, like Hermann Muller, promoted aeugenic revolution through (voluntary) arti-ficial insemination with the seed of excep-tional men. Their hope was that peoplewould be willing to sever the traditional linkbetween biological and social fatherhoodfor the sake of bettering humankind. Thepossibilities for selective breeding haveexpanded with the advent of in vitro fertil-isation (IVF), which allows for creating chil-dren with both donor eggs and donor

sperm. But while artificial insemination andIVF are widely used as assisted reproductivetechnologies, and while those who use themoften seek gamete donors with ‘desirable’traits, what has driven the use of these tech-nologies is not a desire to improve thegenetic profile of offspring. Rather, thesetechnologies are employed in order toproduce as strong a genetic tie as possiblebetween parents and children. Prospectiveparents typically wish that their childrenwill possess a large set of advantageoustraits, but rare is the individual who wouldsacrifice genetic ties to achieve this. Thelonging for direct descendants is an ancientone, and it has proven itself more potentthan the interest in creating the best childrenpossible. Given that in vitro eugenics wouldeliminate or at least significantly attenuatethe genetic link between parents and chil-dren, we should expect little or no demandfor it as a means of having children.But even if we are disposed to privilege

genetic ties over genetic enhancement, arethere moral grounds for reversing our pri-orities? Sparrow argues that those whoadvance welfare-based arguments forenhancements should be committed to pro-moting in vitro eugenics: “[I]f our reasonsfor enhancement concern the welfare offuture individuals then, given that in vitroeugenics might produce individuals withsignificantly ‘enhanced’ genomes, it seemsthat advocates of enhancement shouldargue that parents have strong moralreasons to choose to have children createdby this means”.1 The first thing to note inresponse to this argument is that (a) thewelfarist need not hold that any particularindividual has an obligation to have chil-dren and (b) many prospective parentsmight wish to bring a child into the worldonly where he or she is their direct descend-ant. Now, where individuals would elect tohave a child only where that child would betheir genetic offspring, the failure to have agenetically enhanced but unrelated (or dis-tantly related) child arguably does notentail a failure to maximise the welfare offuture individuals, since in such instances,there would be no child whose welfare is anissue in the absence of genetic parenthood.But even assuming one would violate a dutyto maximise welfare by choosing geneticparenthood, that does not establish groundsto have a child through in vitro eugenics,for it could well be that the net increase in

welfare produced by adopting an existingchild whose prospects are otherwise bleakwould exceed that produced by having agenetically enhanced child.

Given that the pursuit of in vitro eugen-ics as a means of breeding enhancedhumans appears to have questionable socialand moral value, it is not clear that in vitroeugenics research that has this specificagenda would or should be approved byinstitutional stem cell and human subjectsresearch oversight committees. First, it isdoubtful that a compelling rationale for cre-ating and destroying embryos exists wherethe clinical application the research ultim-ately aims at is both morally controversialand unlikely to generate much demand.Second, while Sparrow correctly observesthat the issues about safety and risk intesting in vitro eugenics with human sub-jects are similar to those that arose intesting IVF with humans, it does not followthat we should view the risks as equallyacceptable in both cases. To imposeresearch risks on human subjects, the risksmust be reasonable in relation to the antici-pated benefits. In the case of testingwhether IVF could produce healthy humanchildren, the risks were deemed reasonablein relation to the anticipated benefit of aneffective infertility treatment. In the case ofclinical testing of in vitro eugenics, it ismuch less clear that a favourable risk–benefit ratio would exist given the limitedvalue we can expect persons to attach tothis technology (not to mention the greatdisvalue some would ascribe to it). Ofcourse, attitudes could change over time,with the desire for human enhancementoverriding the desire for genetic ties. But atpresent in vitro eugenics lacks a robustraison d’etre as a reproductive technology.

Competing interests None.

Provenance and peer review Commissioned;internally peer reviewed.

To cite Siegel AW. J Med Ethics Published OnlineFirst: [please include Day Month Year] doi:10.1136/medethics-2013-101511

Received 22 June 2013Accepted 23 July 2013

▸ http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2012-101200

J Med Ethics 2013;0:1.doi:10.1136/medethics-2013-101511

REFERENCE1 Sparrow R. In vitro eugenics. J Med Ethics. Published

Online First: 4 Apr 2013. doi:10.1136/medethics-2012-101200

Correspondence to Dr Andrew W Siegel, BermanInstitute of Bioethics, Johns Hopkins University,Baltimore, MD, USA; asiegel@jhu.edu

Siegel AW. J Med Ethics Month 2013 Vol 0 No 0 1

Commentary JME Online First, published on August 28, 2013 as 10.1136/medethics-2013-101511

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