Somalia: U.S. Intervention andOperation Restore HopeVALERIE J. LOFLAND

On a bright, hot summer morning in July 2000, Lieutenant Colonel Rick Stevens

got up at dawn to get ready to head out for his new job working at the National Se-

curity Council (NSC). Just one month earlier, he had been a student at the Naval

War College and had graduated with honors. Rick was a C-141 pilot and had

flown humanitarian aid airlift missions into Kenya and parts of Somalia in 1992 in support

of Operation Provide Relief. The Air Force considered Rick a dynamic officer and following

his stint at the Naval War College, he was assigned to work at the National Security Council

in the African Affairs branch.

Over the last decade, Africa had become a continent rife with civil wars, extreme poverty

and immense human suffering. More recently, the Clinton administration had debated

sending humanitarian aid to Sierra Leone, and so Africa was on the NSC’s agenda again.

Rick’s new boss at the NSC, John Preston, was aware of Rick’s experience in Africa. He

asked Rick to prepare a comprehensive analysis concerning President Bush’s decision to

initiate Operation Restore Hope, the United States led U.N. intervention in Somalia in

December 1992.

Preston handed Rick numerous NSC files dating back to the early 1990s. Then he told

Rick “Look these over to get a good understanding of what transpired in 1991 and 1992.”

Then he gave Rick his take on the Operation Restore Hope. “You see Rick, Operation Re-

store Hope was a milestone in the history of the United States as well as the United Nations.

For the first time, the U.N. was involved in peace enforcement, that is the armed interven-

tion into a conflict without the prior consent of the state authorities involved in the hostili-

ties. Operation Restore Hope expanded the role of the United States as well as the U.N. in

the post Cold War era.”

With this backdrop, Rick began to read the old NSC files, which gave him a good founda-

tion to begin his analysis. Rick also dusted off a joint military operations paper he had writ-

ten at the Naval War College on the airlift operation in Somalia. In the early 1970s Somalia

had been a client state of the Soviet Union, but had switched over to the West during the

Ethiopia-Somalia conflict in 1977. During the 1980s, Somalia received large amounts of

military and economic aid from the United States. Somalia had strategic value during the

Cold War in maintaining open access to the Gulf’s oil fields. Located on the Horn of Africa,

Somalia was near the arc of the crisis of Middle Eastern oil fields and strategic sea-lanes.

After the Cold War and even more so after the Gulf War, Western access was available di-

rectly through the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) nations, and Somalia ceased to be of

geostrategic interest to the United States.

At this point in his research, Rick decided to visit an old friend who now worked at the

State Department. Jeff James, a retired Army colonel, had worked at the NSC from 1991 to

1993 and witnessed the Somalia crisis first hand. Jeff was now in the State Department’s

East Africa division. Jeff also arranged to have Sam Jameson, a former staff officer who had

worked at State during the Somalia crisis, at the meeting.

When Rick arrived at Jeff’s office, Jeff made introductions and then got down to business.

He began by describing events in 1991 and 1992 that eventually led to President Bush’s de-

cision to initiate Operation Restore Hope.

“In early 1991, the situation in Somalia deteriorated quickly after the overthrow of the

repressive dictator of twenty-one years, President Mohammed Siad Barre. Then the rebels

who expelled Barre started fighting among themselves. Violence and drought ensued and

brought on a terrible famine throughout the country. On 6 January 1991, the United States

vacated the embassy in Mogadishu, and United States officials and relief experts fled the

capital of Mogadishu. Without a presence in country, we miscalculated the severity of the

famine and United States intelligence was limited. We did not realize the degree of horror

the warring factions were creating as they ripped apart the country’s very fabric. Armed

clansmen took over food production and distribution, and the internal government ceased

to function. Nearly one million Somalis were forced into exile in neighboring countries and

an additional one million flocked to urban centers where NGOs (non-governmental organi-

zations) such as the International Red Cross and the Red Crescent Society attempted in vain

to stabilize the situation and provide food and other humanitarian assistance. The United

Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), through the work of Audrey Hepburn, publicized the

plight of the dying Somali children. As you may have seen on television, she worked with the

international media to build a global awareness of this immense human tragedy.

“Meanwhile, within the Bush administration in early 1992, there were growing calls for

some form of humanitarian intervention into Somalia, but nothing really got off the

ground. Andrew Natsios, the assistant administrator of the U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID), spoke bluntly to the House Select Committee on Hunger. Natsios

claimed Somalia was the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. He told the committee that

mass starvation and violence against civilians had been going on since the fall of 1991.

Natsios was quoted as saying ‘the real tragedy was that of the starving Somali children where

up to ninety percent of the children under age five were malnourished.’ Natsios praised the

work of the NGOs such as the International Red Cross, International Medical Corps, Save

the Children, and Doctors Without Borders, but he admitted they alone could not get food

to the starving people.”1

At this point in the discussion, Sam Jameson added an important note. “As convincing as

Natsios’ statements were, I’m afraid in the pecking order of agencies, the USAID was not

54 Somalia: U.S. Intervention and Operation Restore Hope

one of the more prominent foreign policy players in Washington. In case you haven’t heard

of the USAID, it is a rather small agency that used to be independent but has since been

placed under the policy supervision of the secretary of state. USAID runs the United States

foreign aid program and our foreign disaster relief program. USAID is often the main

source in the United States government of information about humanitarian crises. It gets a

lot of its information from its field officers, those USAID representatives in country.”

Jameson continued, “At the time of the Somalia crisis, my boss Herman Cohen was the

assistant secretary of state for African affairs, and I can tell you it was hard to get the secre-

tary and the department as a whole to focus on the tragedy. After all, Somalia was just not as

important to United States national interests as it once was. We fought tooth and nail to

gain the attention of Secretary of State James Baker III, but with no success.2 One of the

problems with State was that after we closed the embassy in Mogadishu, the foreign service

officers working in Somalia were reassigned to other posts. Therefore, the pressure that

they would have normally kept on Washington from the in-country team ceased to exist.3

Foreign service officers are our eyes and ears around the world and we’ve cut back substan-

tially on funding embassies since the end of the Cold War.

“I’d also have to admit that throughout 1992, Secretary of State Baker was also heavily in-

volved in the reelection campaign for President Bush, his good friend. I don’t believe Soma-

lia was on his radarscope all that much. As a matter of fact, later on that year on 14 August,

he left his post as secretary of state to head up the troubled presidential reelection cam-

paign. Larry Eagleburger became acting secretary of state then. Eagleburger had been the

deputy secretary of state.”

Jameson then cleared his throat and raised a crucial point. “You could say that as far as

the Bush administration was concerned, Somalia represented a house divided. While cer-

tain agencies such as the USAID were vocal in support of Somalia, other advisors cautioned

the president against embarking on a massive peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The Assis-

tant Secretary of State John Bolton warned U.N. officials of the administration’s opposition

to footing large peacekeeping bills for Somalia, due to perceived voter and congressional

objections to expensive peacekeeping bills in an election year.4

“By the fall of 1992, during Bush’s last few months as president, certain key advisors

within the administration became much more vocal about intervention and that’s when

things really began to change. We’ll go over this portion of the decision at length with you

later, but let’s first back up and we’ll give you a more detailed overview as to how things pro-

gressed throughout 1992.

“On the international scene, Boutros Boutros-Ghali became the secretary-general of the

U.N. in January 1992. Boutros-Ghali, an Egyptian by birth, was very concerned with events

in Africa, particularly in Somalia. He was also more of an activist than his predecessor Javier

Perez de Cuellar who was from Peru. The Egyptian embassy had stayed open in Somalia,

and Boutros-Ghali was getting accurate information on the devastation due to the famine.

On 23 January 1992, shortly after he came to the U.N., the U.N. Security Council voted

Lofland 55

unanimously to increase humanitarian aid United Nations Security Council Resolution

(UNSCR) 733 to Somalia. Then the U.N. augmented aid in April 1992, with UNSCR 751,

which authorized a fifty man UNOSOM (U.N. Operation Somalia) mission for food distri-

bution. You could say things were starting to happen on a global scale but much too slowly.

“Unfortunately, the UNOSOM mission could not overcome the vast food distribution

problems imposed by the warring factions. During the summer months of 1992, interna-

tional pressure from NGOs, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab

States as well as the U.N. secretary-general was growing for the Western powers and the

Bush administration to do something. Then on 24 July, Boutros-Ghali chastised the U.N.

for a European tilt, while people starved in Somalia. He accused Western leadership of be-

ing racist, and this really shook up quite a few people.”

Jameson then added, “In addition, in July, the United States ambassador to Kenya,

Smith Hempstone, Jr. wrote a dramatic State Department cable on the suffering in Somalia

entitled “A Day in Hell” that caught President Bush’s attention.5 Ambassador Hempstone

said the USAID estimated that 25 percent of Somali children under age 5 were already

dead. Hempstone concluded that the UNOSOM mission as a military operation had been

largely ineffectual and something drastic needed to be done.

Jameson continued “Especially significant at the same time, appeared to have been an

assessment trip to Somalia led by Jim Kunder, the director of the Office of U.S. Foreign Di-

saster Assistance (OFDA), which is within the USAID. This trip coincided with the cable re-

ceived from Ambassador Hempstone, and both are believed to have greatly influenced

President Bush, as reported later by Andrew Natsios at congressional testimonies on 16

September.”6

Rick then decided to see where Congress fit in with all the action. “I know the summer

months can be quiet in Washington D.C., but what was happening on the Hill?”

Jeff chimed in because he had worked the interface with the congressional staffers on the

Somalia crises. “Congress picked up the tempo over the summer months and things really

started heating up. The International Committee of the Red Cross declared that one-third

of all Somalis, or about 1.5–2 million people were in imminent danger of dying from starva-

tion. Senator Nancy Kassenbaum (R-KS) had visited Somalia in July and testified to the

House Select Committee on Hunger on the urgent need for stepped up aid. Both Senators

Kassenbaum and Paul Simon (D-IL), as members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Re-

lations, sponsored resolutions demanding urgent action. As you know, these resolutions are

not binding. In fact, during the 1991-92 time frame, there were more congressional hear-

ings, bills, resolutions and floor statement about Somalia, than any other country.

“Also during the early summer months, the media increased their reporting of events in

Somalia. The Washington Post and the New York Times began reporting on the tragic suffer-

ing and death of the Somalis. The networks were showing photos of starving children. Pun-

dits called this the CNN factor because it wasn’t until the nightly news reporters began their

vivid portrayal of events on the news, that the American people seemed to take notice.

56 Somalia: U.S. Intervention and Operation Restore Hope

That’s the way the American public and the media work—it’s a chicken and egg kind of

thing. You’re never sure which comes first—the activity in Washington that creates the me-

dia feeding frenzy or the media that creates the wake up call. In my opinion, the national

media followed the action in Congress and there was plenty of it concerning Somalia.7

“Then in July 1992, the New York Times published a story by Jane Perlez about how the

current airlift efforts were failing to feed the starving Somalis.8 Her story made an impres-

sion at the White House as President Bush read her piece and was very upset by the reports.9

He wanted something done and gave the crisis increased focus. He also instructed the State

Department to be forward leaning on Somalia and told the national security advisor, Brent

Scowcroft to begin exploring an enhanced airlift effort. At about the same time, I started at-

tending NSC interagency meetings and it soon seemed apparent to me that a consensus on

an airlift effort was not going to happen. When the president found out the interagency

working group process was not cutting it through reports from the national security advisor,

he decided to get a food airlift operation going despite the haggling.

“On August 12th, the president met quietly with Secretary of State Baker, Secretary of De-

fense Dick Cheney, and Brent Scowcroft to hammer out the details of Operation Provide

Relief. President Bush had finally decided to shore up the current UNOSOM mission and

authorized humanitarian relief airlift missions. This announcement occurred on a Friday,

14 August, just days before the Republican National Convention in Houston was to begin

on 17 August. As you might have guessed, certain Democratic members of Congress

thought Bush’s decision was pure election year politics. But I sincerely believe the adminis-

tration wanted to help but did not want to get involved in a huge peacekeeping effort in Af-

rica at least at this stage in the game. The airlift missions that Operation Provide Relief

promised was the next logical step. Hence, direct involvement in the Somali crisis began on

28 August when the airlift of relief supplies into Somalia was launched from bases provided

by the Kenyan government.”

Rick then wondered where the military stood on the increased taskings coming from the

White House. “What was the position of the Pentagon on all this?”

Jeff continued, “From the military standpoint, we were spread pretty thin at that time

and bogged down providing humanitarian relief to the Kurds in northern Iraq. We were

also working numerous issues with Haiti and there were concerns over the refugee camps at

Guantanamo Bay. On top of that, the military units were busy cleaning up the damage from

Hurricane Andrew in August 1992 which destroyed portions of Florida and the east coast.

You could also say, there was a pervasive sentiment that if we got involved in Somalia, it

could lead to a quagmire, similar to what Lebanon had been in 1983 when 241 marines died

in Beirut during the Reagan administration. All you heard from NSC staffers was the follow-

ing phrase, ‘if you liked Beirut, you’ll love Mogadishu.’10

“The Pentagon’s reluctance was echoed by Stephen J. Hadley, the assistant secretary of

defense for international security policy. He really summed up the potential hazard with

Somalia and said United States forces would become the object of attack and of a guerrilla

Lofland 57

war that could have no end.11 Hadley and the Pentagon’s fear resulted from the confusion

about the military’s humanitarian and combatant roles in Lebanon, where United States

troops were placed in a fight without giving them the means to control its outcome. Another

concern of the Pentagon with humanitarian missions was not just the confusion of roles but

that the small size of the relief missions did not give troops an overwhelming advantage of

forces. This was what the Powell doctrine was all about.”

Rick had learned a lot about the Powell doctrine at the Naval War College, a product to

guide the proper use of military forces in the future due to the protracted Vietnam War and

the Lebanon fiasco. The doctrine supported the use of military ground troops only when vi-

tal interests were threatened. In addition, it recommended using an overwhelming number

of troops to maintain a distinct advantage. Lastly, the doctrine mandated clear objectives

and an exit strategy.

Then Rick asked Jameson, “Where was the support from our allies in Europe on this

issue?”

Jameson knew this was coming. “Western European countries were as preoccupied as we

were with the breakup of the Soviet Union which occurred in late 1991 and the disintegra-

tion of the former Yugoslavia, maybe even more so. After all, Eastern Europe and Russia

were a lot closer to our western European allies than Africa was. Things were beginning to

erupt in the former Yugoslavia with the breaking down of sovereign authority and contin-

ued ethnic cleansing. We were hearing a lot about Bosnia-Herzegovina then if you recall.”

Rick interrupted and asked, “So why did we pick Somalia and ignore Bosnia at the time?”

Jeff replied, “That’s another story but most analysts believe the Bush administration ulti-

mately found Bosnia too hard to grapple with or maybe the administration felt that Bosnia

was a problem that Europe could and should handle. I also believe President Bush wrestled

with the role of the United States in the post Cold War world, the supposed New World or-

der that he spoke about so often. I think he was worried about the role of moral concerns in

United States foreign policy and of course, the administration’s own place in history. Soma-

lia played heavily in this respect. We on the NSC staff also believed we could get in and get

out of Somalia in a relatively short period of time. That is, feed the starving masses, work to

stabilize the situation, and then exit. We did not think that we could get out of Bosnia as

quickly.

“By mid-November, despite enhanced airlift efforts from Operation Provide Relief, mas-

sive distribution problems on the ground still remained. The clans were hoarding the hu-

manitarian supplies and there was extensive looting once supplies left the ports. The clans

were using food as a weapon and as a result, there was widespread violence. NSC staff mem-

bers knew something else was going to have to be done. The Pentagon, for example, typi-

cally opposes humanitarian intervention because of tight budgets. There are no readily

available accounts to pay for such crises as Somalia.12 In addition, the military was downsiz-

ing and the brass was not looking for another mission.

58 Somalia: U.S. Intervention and Operation Restore Hope

“Nonetheless, President Bush was determined to exit his presidency in glory when it

came to the Somali. Politically, he was somewhat depressed due to the loss of his reelection

campaign. Plus the death of his mother in November that year must have touched an inner

cord. Perhaps Somalia was a way to leave a legacy and feed the starving masses.

“Inevitably, as the problems in Somalia continued despite the airlift and UNOSOM, the

idea to intervene with a massive force started gaining momentum. By mid-November, cer-

tain civilian advisors were becoming more amenable to some sort of plan to have a massive

force distribute food and supplies. At one of the first Deputies Committee meetings that

month, Paul Wolfowitz, the undersecretary of defense for policy and planning, suggested

using United States ground troops, but the JCS were noncommittal.

“Then at a second Deputies Committee meeting on 21 November, Admiral Jeremiah,

the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff startled the group by suggesting the ground

forces might be able to do the job.13 Admiral Jeremiah wanted to use a large force—a divi-

sion level of United States troops at least twenty thousand strong. His suggestion was also

consistent with the Powell doctrine, in that United States troops should not be placed in a

risky situation unless their numbers were overwhelming.

“Apparently, a sea change had occurred at the Pentagon. General Powell, the chairman

of the Joint Chiefs supported deploying United States troops. Powell had visited Somalia in

October and his influence affected senior Pentagon leadership. The brass began to believe

Somalia was ‘doable’ on the ground and much less risky than Bosnia. The terrain in Somalia

was relatively flat, unlike Bosnia, where thick woods and mountains would cause new chal-

lenges. Some in the Pentagon felt that Somalia was the lesser of the two evils, and by taking

on Somalia, we might shake Bosnia off our backs. Eventually, the Pentagon came up with

three plans to offer up to the NSC for the Somalia effort.

“The first option was to continue the status quo and stay with the existing U.N. plan to

deliver food and supplies by air and sea, but at the same time also enhance the U.N. security

presence. The United States contribution would involve transportation and financial sup-

port, but no United States ground forces in country. There were not many strong advocates

for this position, because the status quo was not working. Then a Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA) report made it clear that this option would not work since Somali warlords

could easily massacre the lightly armed U.N. forces.

“Next, a bolder option was offered by Undersecretary of State for International Security

Affairs Frank Wisner. He recommended the United States organize a coalition of interna-

tional forces under a United Nations command. The United States would provide logistical,

airlift, sealift and communications requirements and United States forces could be based off

shore if an additional threat surfaced. By operating under a U.N. command, the U.N.

would be bolstered with the troops into a larger role in the post Cold-War.14

“While Wisner and the State Department argued for more United States action, they did

not argue for a direct United States military intervention, nor for the use of United States

ground troops, fearing the Pentagon would be staunchly opposed to this route.

Lofland 59

“At the same time, Brent Scowcroft believed that only the United States could provide

the international community with the leadership it needed with regards to Somalia and

other humanitarian tragedies. Scowcroft hinted at the idea of using ground troops directly

and thus began plans for a third option for a United States led U.N. ground operation. If

United States troops were to be used, General Powell wanted to retain United States com-

mand and control over the U.N. forces, and also determine the appropriate size of the

force.”15

Jeff remembered working the three plans during Thanksgiving week. “Politically, things

were pretty quiet in Washington during the week before Thanksgiving, with Congress in re-

cess and Washington winding down. The presidential race was over on 2 November, but the

White House was busier than a beehive working on the three Somalia options.

“Two more NSC Deputies Committee meetings occurred on the Monday and Tuesday,

23 and 24 November before Thanksgiving; however no consensus was reached as to which

of the three options would be best. Also on 24 November, Boutros Boutros-Ghali sent a let-

ter to all members of the U.N. Security Council once again requesting help with the Somalia

crisis. President Bush read the letter and I believe it pushed the president to the final deci-

sion to intervene.16

“In addition, media pictures of starving children were again all over the network broad-

casts and the reports from Somalia were dire. Here we were in the United States getting

ready to celebrate Thanksgiving with all the food and bounty the holiday conveys and the

starving masses in Somalia were dying by the hundreds each day. These images connected

with President Bush’s past experience when he witnessed the Sahelian famine in the Sudan

during a visit in 1985. Andrew Natsios, mentioned this event in his book:”

In December 1992 I sat through a discussion between President Bush and Phil Johnson,

president of CARE who was then acting as the director of humanitarian operations in So-

malia, in which Bush described his visit with the First Lady and Johnson to a CARE feed-

ing center for starving children during the Sahelian famine. He said that he and his wife

would never forget the scenes of death, a memory, he said, that had clearly affected his

decision to send troops into Somalia.17

Jeff continued, “The next morning, on the Wednesday before Thanksgiving, President

Bush held a National Security Council meeting to hash out the options for Somalia. Most of

the NSC players supported a United States led U.N. peacekeeping force by this point in the

game. To sell option three to the U.N., the United States had to provide the vast majority of

the forces. Once agreed upon, Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger was dis-

patched to New York later that day to discuss the plan with the secretary-general. Boutros

Boutros-Ghali worked hard to get the U.N. Security Council to swiftly approve the massive

United States led U.N. coalition, an operation that the United States defense officials called

Restore Hope (U.N. Security Council Resolution 794). The Council approved the resolu-

tion on 3 December. Finally on 4 December, President Bush announced in a speech to the

nation, the details dealing with the United States involvement and support of Operation

60 Somalia: U.S. Intervention and Operation Restore Hope

Restore Hope. The first U.S. Marines landed on Mogadishu beaches on 9 December. Presi-

dent Bush’s final days in the White House were ones of great achievement concerning hu-

manitarian efforts.”

Rick suddenly looked at his watch and realized he had been at Jeff’s office for over two

hours. He thanked Jeff and Sam for their assistance, as he knew their first hand experience

gleaned from Operation Restore Hope would greatly enhance his final analysis. Jameson

had to be going as well to get back to a symposium at Georgetown University.

Before the three parted company, Jameson hesitated and remarked: “Rick, make sure

you address these questions before you write your final analysis:

• Just how did the dynamics of the State Department, the DoD and the White House

staff affect the final decision on Somalia?

• Do you think the decision to support Operation Restore Hope would have happened

without the media sensationalism?”

Then as he walked out the door, Jameson added one final comment. “As you recall our

stated aim of Operation Restore Hope was that of humanitarian intervention. Do you also

think Somalia might have represented a new robust era of multilateral cooperation and

thus an expanded role for the U.N. as well as the United States as the only superpower in

the post Cold War era?”

As Rick headed for the Metro entrance at Foggy Bottom, he wondered just what Jameson

had meant with his last remark.

Lofland 61

62 Somalia: U.S. Intervention and Operation Restore Hope

CHRONOLOGY

Feb 88 Civil war erupts in Somalia among

rival clans.

Jan 91 President Mohammed Siad Barre

overthrown, NEO commences for

diplomatic personnel and United

States citizens (six days prior to

start of Desert Storm).

Nov 91 Atrocities and starvation in Soma-

lia spark international concern.

Dec 91 Senators Simon and Kassenbaum

demand urgent action, including

use of troops.

Jan 92 Boutros Boutros-Ghali becomes

secretary-general of the U.N..

U.N. Security Council votes unani-

mously for increase in humanitar-

ian aid (UNSCR 733).

Mar 92 U.N. brokered cease-fire agree-

ment signed in Mogadishu by clan

leaders, Ali Mahdi Mohammed

and Mohammed Farah Aidid.

UNSCR 746 urges compliance.

Apr 92 UNSCR 751 authorizes 50-man

UNOSOM mission.

Jul 92 Senator Kassenbaum visits

Somalia.

Aug 92 President Bush announces Opera-

tion Provide Relief airlift opera-

tion just prior to Republican

National Convention. UNSCR 775

authorizes 3,500 additional troops.

Nov 92 Bill Clinton wins election. Series of

NSC Deputies Committee meet-

ings on Somalia.

Dec 92 President Bush decides to take ac-

tion with United States led inter-

vention of U.N. forces. Announces

Operation Restore Hope.

Lofland 63

SOMALIA MAP

64 Somalia: U.S. Intervention and Operation Restore Hope

Notes

1. House, Humanitarian Tragedy in Somalia:Hearing Before the Select Committee on Hunger,102nd Cong., 2d sess, report serial No.

102–20, 30 January 1992, 5.

2. John G. Sommer, Hope Restored? Humanitar-ian Aid in Somalia 1990–1994, Refugee Pol-

icy Group, Center for Policy Analysis and

Research on Refugee Issues, November

1994, 22.

3. Maryann K. Cusimano, Operation RestoreHope: The Bush Administration’s Decision to In-tervene in Somalia, Pew Case Studies in Inter-

national Affairs, Institute for the Study of

Diplomacy Publications, School of Foreign

Service, Georgetown University, Washing-

ton DC, 1995, 4.

4. Ibid, 13.

5. Ambassador Smith Hempstone, “Dispatch

From a Place Near Hell,” Washington Post,23 August 1992, C1, 2.

6. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-

committee on Africa, The Crisis and Chaos inSomalia: Hearing Before the Committee on For-eign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, 102d

Cong, 2d sess, 16 September 1992, 22.

7. Jonathan Mermin, “Television News and

American Intervention in Somalia: The

Myth of a Media Driven Foreign Policy,”

Political Science Quarterly, Volume 112, No 3,

1997, 386.

8. Jane Perlez, “U.S. Says Airlift Fail Somali

Needy,” New York Times, 31 July 1992, A9.

9. Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. Took Slow Ap-

proach,” Washington Post, 6 December 1992,

A13.

10. Ken Menkhaus and Louis Ortomayer, KeyDecisions in the Somalia Intervention, Pew

Case Studies in International Affairs, Insti-

tute for the Study of Diplomacy

Publications, School of Foreign Service,

Georgetown University, Washington D.C.,

1995, 5.

11. Barton Gellman, “U.S. Military Fears Bal-

kan Intervention: Dual Combat, Relief Role

Seen Unworkable,” Washington Post, 12 Au-

gust, 1992, A24.

12. Andrew Natsios, “Illusions of Influence:

The CNN Effect in Complex Emergencies,”

in From Massacres to Genocide, The Media,Public Policy and Humanitarian Crises by Rob-

ert I. Rotberg and Thomas G. Weiss (Wash-

ington DC: The Brookings Institute, 1996),

161.

13. Don Oberdorfer, “The Path to Interven-

tion,” Washington Post, 6 December 1992,

A36.

14. Michael R. Gordon, “Somali Aid Plan is

Called More Ambitious Option,” New YorkTimes, 19 November, 1992, A27.

15. Maryann K. Cusimano, Operation RestoreHope: The Bush Administration’s Decision to In-tervene in Somalia, Pew Case Studies in Inter-

national Affairs, Institute for the Study of

Diplomacy Publications, School of Foreign

Service, Georgetown University, Washing-

ton DC, 1995, 11.

16. Andrew Natsios, “Illusions of Influence:

The CNN Effect in Complex Emergencies,”

in From Massacres to Genocide, The Media,Public Policy and Humanitarian Crises by

Robert I. Rotberg and Thomas G. Weiss,

(Washington DC: The Brookings Institute,

1996), 168.

17. Andrew Natsios, U.S. Foreign Policy and theFour Horsemen of the Apocalypse, Humanitar-ian Relief in Complex Emergencies, (The Cen-

ter For Strategic and International Studies:

Washington, DC 1997), 178.

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