Soil Conservation in Transition Countries: the Role of Institutions

Soil Conservation in Transition Countries: the Roleof Institutions

Katrin Prager,1* Jaroslav Prazan2 and Ivan Penov31The James Hutton Institute, Aberdeen, UK

2Institute of Agricultural Economics and Information, Czech Republic3Agricultural University Plovdiv, Bulgaria

ABSTRACTDegradation of agricultural soils is a serious concern in transition countries in the EU. Weinvestigate similarities and differences between the soil conservation policy frameworks ofBulgaria, the Czech Republic and the former German Democratic Republic and theirimplementation. Our focus is on the differences in institutional arrangements, i.e. formallyexisting policies, property rights, informal institutions and governance structures. We con-ducted comparative case studies based on a framework of institutional analysis, using literaturesurvey, document analysis and in-depth stakeholder interviews. Results show that among thedetermining factors for policy effectiveness are property rights regimes and land-use rights, tra-ditions in the provision of advisory services, farmers’ previous experience with soil conservationpractices and policies, perceived threat of enforcement, and trust in administrative authorities.We conclude that the existence of similar legislation and a common policy framework does notguarantee similar outcomes because institutional arrangements and their evolution play amajorrole in the effectiveness of agricultural soil conservation policies. Copyright© 2011 JohnWiley &Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

Received 14 July 2010; revised 20 September 2011; accepted 24 September 2011

Keywords: agricultural soil conservation; institutional analysis; policy implementation; sustainable land use; transition countries

Introduction

SOIL IS A NATURAL NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE PROVIDING RENEWABLE SERVICES (WINPENNY, 1991). THE MAJORITY OF LAND

in countries of the European Union (EU) is under agricultural use. For protection of soils it is therefore piv-otal to consider the influence of agricultural practices on soil quality. Soil carries many functions and pro-vides ecosystem services, such as the production of food and fibre. At the same time, soil degradation

related to agricultural intensification and abandonment of soil protection measures leading to a depletion of nutri-ents, erosion and acidification are among the major rural environmental problems in post-socialist Central andEastern Europe (OECD, 1999; World Bank, 2000). Soil degradation is also a concern in Europe more widely.The impact assessment for the Thematic Strategy for Soil Protection (European Commission, 2006) found that

*Correspondence to: Katrin Prager, The James Hutton Institute, Craigiebuckler, Aberdeen AB15 8QH, Scotland, UK. E-mail: [email protected]

Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

Environmental Policy and GovernanceEnv. Pol. Gov. 22, 55–73 (2012)Published online 2 November 2011 in Wiley Online Library(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/eet.592

an estimated 12% of Europe’s total land area is affected by water erosion, and around 45% of soils in Europe have alow or very low organic matter content (0–2% organic carbon).

Against this background, policies for soil protection in general or for agricultural soil conservation in particularwere established at European and national levels over the last two decades. Examples are national soil protectionlaws, codes of good agricultural practice, soil conservation measures supported by agri-environmental schemes,the Cross Compliance Regulation and efforts to develop a Soil Framework Directive at European level. Previousresearch on convergence and Europeanization (Knill and Lenschow, 2005; Liefferink and Jordan, 2005) found thatsome elements of national policy converge more rapidly than others and identified domestic and policy-specificfactors preventing convergence of environmental policy in Europe. We complement this research by investigatingsoil policy as one aspect of environmental policy. But rather than focusing on the impact of European policy onnational policy we follow a different approach in that we conceptualize ‘implementation’ as reaching the local actors(local administrations and farmers) who are ultimately the conduit for a policy to become effective. We are taking astep further by linking different types of policies (mandatory and voluntary, incentive-based) to the problem –degradation of agricultural soil – and to the actors these policies are trying to address. In addition, we expand theliterature on the transition of post-socialist countries (Andreev, 2009; Scrieciu and Stringer, 2008) and theirstruggle to implement sustainable development policy (Sedlačko, 2007) by looking at soil as one particularenvironmental policy area.

Previous research found that institutions that regulate resource management are likely to influence policyoutcomes (Agrawal, 2001; Ostrom, 1990). Following an institutional economics understanding – which differsfrom political science – ‘institutions’ are understood as the formal and informal rules that govern human behaviourand interaction. In the case of soil conservation, institutions constitute the framework for farmers’ decision-making(Bizer, 2005). Institutional arrangements comprise both institutions (rules) and governance structures. Governancestructures are in place to implement and enforce rules, so they become ‘rules-in-use’.

Those countries that joined the EU in the last 20 years adopted existing EU agri-environmental policies but alsohave various national provisions concerning soil protection. In spite of the common policy framework in the EU thepolicies differ significantly, as does the institutional context in which policies are implemented. European policiesare new to transition countries and the mechanisms for their transposition and implementation (such as nationallaws and enforcing agencies) have been established only recently. Implementation difficulties can be expected as‘the mismatch between the old hierarchical institutions developed under socialism and the new decentralizedinstitutions introduced during the transformation process still persists’ (Kluvánková-Oravská et al., 2009: 193).The current institutions in transition countries are to some extent a legacy of the socialist era, reflected for examplein property rights (Prazan et al., 2005; Ratinger et al., 2004) or distrust in public institutions (Uslaner, 2003; Wolzet al., 2004). Slangen et al. (2003) provide insights into the determinants of trust in transition countries.

Our aim here was to investigate the institutional arrangements surrounding agricultural soil conservation inEuropean transition countries. We explore how the way in which policies are implemented regionally and locallyaffects their effectiveness. This includes a description of soil conservation policies, property rights and governancestructures influencing the adoption and adaptation of soil conservation practices.

We use comparative analysis of three cases [with study sites situated in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and theformer German Democratic Republic (hereafter East Germany)] to identify which institutional arrangementssupport or impede effective soil conservation by farmers. Based on the assumption that a different institutionalcontext leads to differences in the effectiveness of soil conservation policies, we aimed to select countries where landreforms had evolved in different way. Each country entered the EU at a different time, which allowed us to assess theinstitutional arrangements at different stages of the process of Europeanization: East Germany in 1990, the CzechRepublic in 2004 and Bulgaria in 2007. All three countries were characterized by a centrally planned economicsystem, a high degree of state control and top-down decision-making. East Germany experienced rapid institutionalreforms due to the merger of many formal institutions and organisations with West Germany and a comparativelysmooth integration into the EU, while in Bulgaria agrarian and political reforms have met severe impediments(Andreev, 2009; Sikor, 2004). The Czech Republic is situated between these two extremes and has implementedreforms rapidly.

In each country the case study area was selected to assess the implementation of soil conservation policies at theregional level by interviewing policy-makers and a range of other relevant stakeholders. The case study areas were

56 K. Prager et al.

Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment Env. Pol. Gov. 22, 55–73 (2012)DOI: 10.1002/eet

the village of Belozem, Plovdiv province, in Bulgaria; the Svratka river basin, covering South Moravia and the VysočinaHighlands in the Czech Republic; and the Uckermark district, Brandenburg state, in Germany (Figure 1). Theselection was guided by the aim to choose areas which experienced soil degradation issues typical of the countryand where a suitable database (especially on soil, land use and farming systems) existed from previous researchundertaken in the area. The different sizes of case study areas followed from previous research but this was not anobstacle to institutional analysis, which was set up to be cross-level.

Methodology

Policies do not directly impact on farming practices or soil status. Instead, policies create or change an institution(rule) or an instrument (incentive scheme). Institutions and instruments are then implemented via governancestructures to become rules-in-use (see Implementation and Governance Structures), thus influencing farmers’choice of soil conservation measures and farming practices (Prager et al., 2011b). Formal and informal institutions(Ostrom, 1990; Slangen et al., 2008) and governance structures play a role in influencing farmer land managementdecisions. A farmer can change his/her farming practices due to external pressure by policies but the change mayalso be based on an intrinsic motivation for protecting soils (as the production resource or as part of the naturalenvironment) after having observed damaging effects on soil.

Figure 1. Location of case study areas (Source: The James Hutton Institute; map not to scale.)

57Soil Conservation in Transition Countries


We based our analysis of soil conservation policies and their implementation on an analytical framework ofinstitutional analysis developed by Hagedorn (2008) and adjusted to the soil conservation context by Prager(2010). This allowed us to determine the relevant elements that need to be considered:

(1) actors’ characteristics (in our case farmers and policy actors, and their perceptions);(2) formal institutions (policies, property rights to land and tenure) and informal institutions (trust, knowledge,

traditions, peer pressure, norms of behaviour);(3) governance structures (authorities and agencies, contracts, advice) to implement policies; and(4) soil-related transactions (how farming practices impact on soils).

This paper draws heavily on the case studies by Penov et al. (2008), Prazan and Dumbrovsky (2008) and Prageret al. (2008) which were carried out as part of the European project ‘Sustainable Agriculture and Soil Conservation(SoCo)’ (http://soco.jrc.ec.europa.eu/). The project’s overall objectives were (1) to improve understanding of soilconservation practices in agriculture and their links with other environmental objectives, and (2) to analyse howfarmers can be encouraged, through appropriate policy measures, to adopt soil conservation practices (Gay et al.,2009).

It is important to note that although the investigation of farmers and farming practices focused on the case studyareas, we also analysed how the case is embedded in institutions at the regional and national levels. Therefore,reference to the whole of Germany is made when policies apply at the national level although the study focuseson an East German case study area. The case studies were used to relate the investigation to a particular regionalsituation but conclusions are drawn based on the entirety of data.

All three case studies followed the same methods of data collection, including semi-structured interviewsand a review of literature, documents (legislation and policies in the selected countries), and a review ofprevious studies. Interviews were carried out with farmers and key informants at national, regional and casestudy level dealing with soil conservation, agricultural and environmental policies in 2008 (Table 1). Theinterviewees were selected from government, administration, environmental and agricultural agencies, as wellas non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and advisory services, given their role or position indicatedinvolvement or competency in soil conservation. A number of key informants were contacted after being sug-gested by interviewees (snowballing approach). Additional interviews with soil scientists and farming practiceexperts were conducted to supplement the data, for example to clarify the impact and costs associated withcertain farming practices.

The questions in the interviews focused on the perception of soil degradation and farming practices, theidentification of important actors in soil conservation policy, factors impeding the adoption of soil conserva-tion practices, and assessment of the effectiveness of practices and policies. The interviews were conductedface-to-face or by telephone, and typically lasted for an hour. Notes were taken. Where numbers allowed,data were statistically analysed (farmers in Belozem), but in other cases the data were analysed qualitativelyand coded to emergent topics. For example, all assessments on one policy were grouped together or all bar-riers to adoption of a certain farming practice were collated. In a last step, results were translated and casescompared by sharing and discussing material between researchers from the respective countries. Commonalitiesand differences were noted as part of an iterative cycle of comparing and searching for missing information inthe data and literature.

Case study area Farmers/farmingactors

Government andadministrative actors

Non-governmental/civilsociety actors

Total

Belozem (Bulgaria) 18 9 3 30Svratka river basin(Czech Republic)

8 11 10 29

Uckermark (Germany) 6 10 10 26

Table 1. Semi-structured interviews conducted in the case study areas

58 K. Prager et al.


http://soco.jrc.ec.europa.eu/

Case study areas

Institutional and Political Settings in Transition Countries

The present institutional context is a result of historical development. Changes in the political system play a centralrole in explaining the present rules-in-use. The Czech Republic and Bulgaria are transition countries that becamemembers of the EU during the two latest accessions to the EU, in 2004 and 2007, respectively. East Germany,which was reunified with West Germany in 1990 and is classified as a transition country, has had more time toadjust to EU regulation as compared with the EU-12 Member States, and was integrated into West Germany’sexisting political and administrative system.

The case study selection includes a federal state – Germany – and two unitary states. The central government inunitary states may have devolved more or less political power to lower levels. The Czech Republic and Bulgaria haveremained as more centralized systems.

The Czech case study is particularly suited to afford a comparison of its soil conservation policy with that of EastGermany. The Czech Republic is comparable with East Germany with respect to natural conditions and farmstructures, but went through a different process of institutional, political and administrative reform. Nevertheless,the Czech Republic seems to have adjusted smoothly to EU requirements. Bulgaria, by contrast, experienced severeproblems in changing its political and administrative system and has less well-developed implementation capacitiesthan the Czech Republic.

The three cases have in common that institutions for soil protection (formal policies) were poorly developedduring the communist era. The Czech Republic, for example, had no soil protection law although a regulatorymeasure existed that obliged organizations to re-cultivate some already damaged land (e.g. after mining) incompensation for utilizing quality land (e.g. for construction).

Soil Degradation Issues and Land Use

Soil degradation processes are not experienced uniformly. This is because the nature and extent of a degradationprocess is typically influenced by the interaction of the physical and environmental conditions with the farmingpractices adopted. The former predetermines the susceptibility of agricultural soils to certain degradation processes.Slope, soil type and climate influence the type of degradation problems, which can be exacerbated by the type of landuse (Tables 2 and 3). The Czech and East German cases are similar in their relief and climate, while Bulgaria has amuch drier climate and the village is situated on a plain. All three countries have continental climates, with adominant Mediterranean influence in Bulgaria.

In addition to spatial and natural characteristics, land use and farming practices determine the type and degree ofsoil degradation. Most land around Belozem is used for arable farming. Crops include cereals, forage crops andvegetables with some irrigation. In the study area, 1200 ha remain uncultivated due to salinization (Table 3). TheSvratka river basin has more than twice as much arable land as grassland, with winter wheat, corn as forage andbarley as the main crops. Livestock densities are low. The Uckermark region is characterized by arable farming; onlya small share of the Utilized Agricultural Area is grassland. Farmers grow winter wheat, winter rapeseed and winterbarley. Livestock includes cattle, pigs and poultry.

Case study area Total area (km2) Soil types Landscape and topography

Belozem 42 Haplic Luvisols, Vertisols, Eutric Planosolsand Fluvisols

Agricultural plains

Svratka river basin 1729 Mostly Cambisol Hilly with slopes, partly plainsUckermark 3058 Glacial tillage soils (Haplic Luvisol) Undulating landscape

Table 2. Spatial and natural characteristics of the case study areasSource: Penov et al. (2008), Prazan and Dumbrovsky (2008), Prager et al. (2008).



Soils suffer from degradation in all three case study areas. The main degradation issues are detailed in Table 4.The issues in the Czech and German case areas are similar with erosion being the most severe problem, followed bysoil compaction and a decline in soil organic matter. The latter two are also of relevance in the Bulgarian case, butsalinization is considered the most serious degradation issue.

The Impact of Farming Practices and Soil Conservation Measures

Farming practices vary between places and over time, and also in relation to their suitability for the soils beingmanaged. The interaction between environmental conditions and farming practices means that a practice can becarried out in one locality with limited impact but in another it may have major consequences, either positive ornegative. This means that farming practices are not ‘good’ or ‘bad’ per se but much depends on when and how theyare applied.

Nevertheless, certain farming practices and cropping regimes are identified within the case study areas asexacerbating the risks of particular soil degradation processes (Table 5). Practices that are common in all case studyareas and are repeatedly highlighted as leading to soil degradation include conventional approaches to tillage, theuse of heavy machinery and, more broadly, a failure to match crop rotation to environmental conditions.

In the same way, there are farming practices that mitigate soil degradation. These are also referred to as soilconservation measures. In addition, there are specific soil conservation measures that are not farming practices

Case studyarea

UAA in ha(% of total case study area)

Land use as a% of UAA

Farming system and main crops Number and size of farms

Belozem 3300 (79%) 90% arable, 10%pasture, 1200hanot cultivated

Cereals, forage crops, vegetables;irrigated agriculture; livestocksystems

722 farms cultivating 50% of UAA,largely small subsistence farms;few large farms

Svratka riverbasin

71 010 (41%) 71% arable, 31%grassland

Winter wheat, corn as forage,barley; extensive livestockproduction: cattle, poultry

Number of farms not available;large farms and cooperativesdominate

Uckermark 176 956 (58%) 84% arable, 26%grassland

Winter wheat, winter rapeseed,winter barley; some livestock:cattle, pigs, poultry

581 farms; many large cooperatives,with a few small farms

Table 3. Agricultural land use in the case study areasUAA, Utilized Agricultural Area.Source: Penov et al. (2008), Prazan and Dumbrovsky (2008), Prager et al. (2008).

Case study area

Soil degradation issues

Soil erosion Decline inorganic matter

Diffuse soilcontamination

Soil compaction Salinization Other issues

Belozem 1 3 1–2 3 5 AcidificationSvratka river basin 5 3 1 3–4 0Uckermark 4 3 2 4 0

Table 4. Overview of main soil degradation issues in the case study areasNote: The numbers indicate the relevance of the main soil degradation issues (threats) for the case study area, with the level being5 = severe to 0 = not relevant. The shading highlights the three most severe soil degradation problems with dark grey being the mostsevere, medium grey the second severe and light grey being the third severe problem. Assessment for case study areas is based onjudgement of soil experts involved in the SoCo Project.

60 K. Prager et al.


(e.g. tree strips, shelter belts, retention ponds). An extensive analysis of soil-related transactions is documented inthe case studies by Penov et al. (2008), Prazan and Dumbrovsky (2008) and Prager et al. (2008).

To effectively mitigate salinization in Bulgaria, experts suggest effective drainage management, altering croprotations to plants better suited to the prevailing conditions, irrigating with lower-salinity water, planting tree stripsand undertaking chemical amelioration. Farmers in the Belozem area are familiar with chemical ameliorationbut irrigation and drainage management has seriously deteriorated over the past two decades (Penov et al.,2008; Theesfeld, 2008).

With the degradation issues and conditions quite similar in the Czech Republic and Germany, experts suggest:

(1) for reducing erosion: reduced tillage, including non-inverting soil tillage and mulch tillage, soil cover, no tillageor direct drilling, grass buffer strips and shelter belts;

(2) for slowing the decline of organic matter: intercropping with ‘green manures’, simultaneously growing the maincrop in proximity to and interspaced with species such as lupines (Lupines), mustard (Sinapsis) and clover(Trifolium); undersown crops; and alternating humus-producing and humus-depleting crops within the rotation;

(3) for reducing soil compaction: adjusted wheel size and pressure; and controlled traffic tramlines.

Practices often have multiple benefits; for example, a measure reducing soil erosion will often help to reduceorganic matter decline, and a measure to mitigate soil compaction positively influences erosion rates. Furthermore,practices benefiting soils often have positive effects on other environmental attributes (Cowie et al., 2007).

Institutions

The previous section outlined land use and farming practices and how they influence soil degradation in the casestudy areas. Below we describe the characteristics and perceptions of actors involved in farming, and the existinginformal and formal institutions.

Farmers’ Perceptions and Awareness

Farmers in all three case study areas were aware of the soil degradation problems. Their estimates of the severity ofsoil degradation are slightly less than or match that of expert judgements (Table 4). Farmers were also aware of theimpact of farming practices. There was less extensive knowledge on special conservation measures. Some measures

Soil degradationprocess

Farming practices which exacerbate soil degradation Case studies area(s) wheredegrading practices are observed

Water erosion of soils Conventional tillage practices resulting in bare soils Svratka river basin, UckermarkCultivation of row crops, i.e. potatoes, maize, sugarbeet especially on slopes

Uckermark

Soil compaction Use of heavy machinery in wet weather conditions Belozem, Svratka river basin,Uckermark

Intensive land management practices including highstocking densities, grazing in the wetter seasons

Belozem

Decline in organic matter Removal of straw and other crop residues from the field BelozemInappropriate crop rotations with a lack of humus-producing

crops leading to degradation of the soil’s nutrient reservesBelozem, Uckermark, Svratkariver basin

Soil salinization Excessive use of irrigation water in summer months BelozemUse of inappropriate waters for irrigation and reliance onold and degraded infrastructure

Belozem

Table 5. Farming practices which exacerbate soil degradation in the case study areasSource: Adapted from summary report by Gay et al. (2009).



were perceived to be not feasible because they would require costly equipment and training on how to use it(e.g. reduced tillage, controlled traffic tramlines), high costs for establishing and/or maintaining (shelterbelts, irrigation and drainage infrastructure management), because they were not appropriate to the climaticconditions (e.g. not enough soil moisture to grow intercrops before main crop) or were less profitable (themarket did not provide incentives for varied crop rotation patterns). Further detail and data are reportedin Penov et al. (2008), Prazan and Dumbrovsky (2008) and Prager et al. (2008).

In the German case study, farmers reported that neighbouring farmers and local residents requested fields to bekept in ‘proper condition’. Such peer pressure may prevent farmers from applying certain conservation practices,for example reduced tillage, because fields are perceived to look ‘messy’. As more farmers adopt reduced tillage, peerpressure for maintaining ‘proper condition’ may now mean that soil conservation practices are viewed as theappropriate management (Prager, 2002). There was no evidence from the other cases that peer pressure wasimportant.

Farmers’ awareness and understanding of relevant soil conservation policies differed between cases. Although inthe German and Czech case studies farmers were generally aware of EU regulations, the Soil Protection Law andagri-environment schemes, and knew what was required for compliance or for applications, the farmers in theBulgarian case study ‘had heard’ of programmes and regulations, but did not have ‘a clear idea what thesedocuments are about’ (with reference to the Nitrates Directive, rules for Good Agricultural Practice and the RuralDevelopment Plan in Bulgaria) (Penov et al., 2011).

Perceptions of farmers in the three case studies also differed with regard to how trustworthy they perceiveauthorities to be. We consider trust as an informal institution. In the Czech case study, farmers trust that authoritieswill follow prescribed procedures and treat applicants justly; however, some respondents perceived the process asnot being transparent enough (Prazan and Dumbrovsky, 2008). The farmers interviewed in the German case trustauthorities but perceive the funding and policy-making process not to be transparent (Prager et al., 2008). Farmersin Belozem lack trust in authorities and are doubtful about the accountability of authorities and their transparency inprocessing funding applications. Indeed, corruption is sometimes assumed (Penov et al., 2008), which might alsoreflect the generally limited accessibility of information held by government and agencies to citizens (Almer andKoontz, 2004). This lack of trust has implications for soil conservation at the local level (see the example of wellregistration in the following section).

Property Rights and Land Tenure System

Property rights and the land tenure system are two aspects of the institutional context that influence how farmersoperate their business and decide on land management. The property rights that are practised determine the choicesof farmers by means of the constraints and incentives they offer.

Land ownership is fragmented in all three case study regions, as a consequence of land restitution to historicalowners and the dominance of small holdings in pre-collectivization land ownership. By way of restitution ordistribution, Central and Eastern European governments have transferred ownership of land, natural resourcesand other assets from state and collective entities to private actors. By the end of the 1990s, ownership patternsand farm structures had undergone massive changes, with shares of agricultural land under state and collectiveownership having decreased and land in private ownership having increased (Swinnen et al., 1997). Agriculturallegislation at both national and European levels connects rights to land with duties that serve the protection ofstate rights to the larger benefits originating from the land (Sikor, 2004).

In Belozem, there are many small farms that are owned privately and are mainly involved in subsistence farming.There are a few large operations which lease part of the land they farm (Di Falco et al., 2010) (Table 3). The irrigationinfrastructure and water – which are of particular importance for salinization – remain under state ownership(Sikor, 2004). In the Czech case study, a significant part of the land is cultivated by large farms (cooperatives,limited companies and civil law partnerships) for arable crop production (Table 3). They rent most of the land froma large number of small land owners. More than 83% of the land is under leasehold (Czech Statistical Office, 2007).The small and medium-sized farms are family farms. There are similarities between the Czech and the Germancase studies in that both have a large share of agricultural land under leasehold (81% in the Uckermark region)and that most land is cultivated by cooperatives undertaking large-scale farming.

62 K. Prager et al.


In all three cases, property rights and land-use structure have been affected greatly by central planningunder Communist rule. For the Czech case study we found that the current property rights structure (fragmentedland ownership) hampers the process of agricultural restructuring and allows unsuitable land-use structuresto persist. The land managers possess considerable power over the owners because of the ‘local monopoly’ ofland management (Prazan et al., 2005). This means that the large farms manage quite large uninterruptedareas. The owners of the small, often scattered plots face high transaction costs if they attempt to withdrawtheir plot in order to create a new farm of viable size. In addition, there is evidence which points to the issueof a lacking sense of ownership, i.e. that decades of weak property rights have prevented farmers from developing asense of ownership and responsibility, especially where a large proportion of land is still leased (Ministry ofAgriculture, 2007).

In the German case, leasehold does not seem to interfere with the implementation of soil conservationmeasures. Leasing farmers reported that there is no conflict with landowners. By contrast, landownerssometimes even encourage the farm manager to apply reduced tillage or other erosion control measures(Prager, 2002).

Compared with those of other East European countries, the institutions of Bulgaria have been very slow to changefrom their authoritarian past (Almer and Koontz, 2004) and the country is characterized by weak state capacity andgovernability (Andreev, 2009). In Bulgaria, the water resources are owned by the state. The power of the state tomonitor and enforce legal regulations governing the use of irrigation water and maintenance of infrastructurehas declined markedly, as markets and rural power relations exert stronger influences on farmers (Penov,2004). These changes in the governance structure had a strong impact on the property rights system regardingwater. As a result, the formal water property rights are only partially exercised by the state. This is expressed, forexample, by farmers avoiding registration of wells on their land. With neglected irrigation channel infrastructure,farmers use more groundwater for irrigation. Without reliable data on wells and the amount of water pumpedfrom them, the authorities cannot control or estimate water salinity, hence the threat of soil salinizationincreases (Penov et al., 2011).

Policy Measures Relating to Soil Conservation

Our analysis revealed that there is no coherent policy framework or integrated strategy for soil conservation in any ofthe three countries. Instead, policies have evolved over time and new policies emerged when an issue becameurgent, causing overlap between EU and national policies or soil and other environmental policies, and sometimeseven contradicting policies.

We distinguish between three broad groups of policies: mandatory policies (e.g. legislation, regulations),voluntary incentive-based policies (e.g. financial support for particular farming practices, agri-environmentalschemes) and hybrid policies that exhibit characteristics of both. Legislation impacts on property rights, meaning thatrights to land are associated with duties, as outlined in the previous section.

The policies relating to soil conservation in the three countries are summarized in Table 6. We haveidentified corresponding policies in each country, although their importance differs according to the con-text. We will focus the analysis and discussion on those policies that are most relevant in each case study(highlighted in Table 6) and make comparisons where appropriate. Policies were considered relevant ifthey had soil conservation as their explicit aim and/or were mentioned as important by the majority ofinterviewees.

Ideally, policies should react to an existing threat or provide for the protection of a resource before it hasbeen degraded. In our analysis we juxtaposed the main degradation issues in the case study areas with thepolicies that are applicable there. In addition, we identified which technical measures (soil conservationmeasures or farming practices that are beneficial to soils) are prescribed by each policy (Table 7). We foundthat policies often neither address a specific degradation threat nor prescribe precise technical measures.The effectiveness of a policy in addressing soil conservation depends in part on how well its contents andprovisions are targeted to a specific degradation type. The other substantial factor for policy effectivenessis their implementation and enforcement, which are described in the following section.



Bulgaria

Czech

Repu

blic

German

y

Man

datory

policies

SoilLaw

(200

7)So

ilProtectio

nLaw(199

2)FederalS

oilP

rotectionAc

t(199

9)Law

fortheOwnershipan

dUse

ofAg

riculturalL

and(199

1)FederalW

ater

ResourcesAc

t

Lawforthe

Preservationof

Agricultural

Land

(199

6)Bran

denb

urgWater

Man

agem

entAc

t

Water

UserAs

sociationLaw

(200

1)Law

forthePreservatio

nof

the

Environm

ent(200

2)Nationaltranspo

sitio

nof

Nitrates

Directive

notyetim

plem

ented,

butthereisthe

Water

Law(199

9)

Dire

ctiveon

Designa

tionof

Nitrate

VulnerableZo

nes(200

4)Fertilisatio

nOrdinan

ce(199

6)

Hybrid

policies

Obligations

existto

receivefull

per-hectarepaym

ents

Obligations

existto

receivefullSF

P.Obligations

existto

receivefullSF

P.SeeDire

ctPa

yments

Obligations

Act

Land

consolidationexists

inform

ally.

Itinfluences

user

rights.

Lawon

Land

Con

solidation(200

2)influences

prop

erty

rightsan

duserig

hts,an

dintro

ducesselected

soilprotectionmeasures

Land

consolidationhaslegalbasebu

tdue

tofield

sizesitisno

trelevant

inthecase

stud

yarea

Voluntary,

incentive-based

policies

Prog

rammeforDevelop

men

tof

Rural

Region

sin

Bulgaria

RuralD

evelop

mentP

lanforthe

CzechRe

public

RuralD

evelop

men

tPlan

Bran

denb

urg/Be

rlin

for20

07–20

13Mod

ernisatio

nscheme

EU-co-fina

nced

AESfrom

2008

onwards,

dono

tinclude

anyparticular

soilmeasures

AEScovercrop

s(since

2004

)Va

rious,b

utno

specificAE

Sforsoilcon

servation

inBran

denb

urgat

presen

t(EU-co-fina

nced

AESsince1992

)AE

Sconversion

ofarableland

tograsslan

d(since

1995)

Table6.

Policymeasuresrelatin

gto

soilconservatio

nNote:Th

epo

liciesthat

have

been

iden

tified

asthemostimpo

rtan

tineach

case

stud

yarea

arehigh

lighted

inbo

ld.A

ES,agri-enviro

nmen

talschem

es;S

FP,S

ingleFarm

Paym

ent.

64 K. Prager et al.


Selected

policies

Shortdescrip

tion

Technicalm

easures*

includ

edTargetingwhich

threat

Belozem

–Salin

ization,

declinein

organicmatter,soilcompa

ction

LawforWater

User

Associations

Voluntaryorganizatio

nsof

agric

ultural

prod

ucersthat

organize

theirrigation

anddraina

geactivities

ontheirterrito

ry

Mainten

ance

andman

agem

ent

ofdrainage

andirrigationinfra

structure

Salin

ization

LawforthePreservatio

nof

theEn

vironm

ent,

SoilLaw,L

awforthe

Preservatio

nof

Agric

ulturalL

and

Soilan

dwater

mon

itorin

g(groun

dwater

tables,salinity

ofwater)

Non

eIndirectlysoilsalin

ization

Per-hectarepa

ymen

ts(Cross

Com

pliance)

Toreceivethesepa

ymen

tsfarm

ersmust

beregistered

andsubm

itan

application

specifyingthearea

andcrop

sthey

cultivate

Non

eNon

e

RuralD

evelop

men

tPlan

Mod

ernizatio

nof

agric

ulturalenterprises:

aimed

atincreasing

farm

s’capa

city

toperfo

rmactivities

relevant

totheconservatio

nof

agric

ulturallan

d

Non

eNon

e

Svratkariv

erbasin–So

ilerosion,

compa

ction,

declinein

organicmatter

Lawon

SoilCon

servation

Define

srulesforwith

draw

alof

agric

ultural

land

from

prod

uctio

nNon

eIndirect

preven

tionof

soil

degradation,

e.g.

soilsealing

Land

Con

solidationLaw

Project-b

ased

plan

ning

instrumen

tmainly

targetingconsolidationof

fragmen

tedland

owne

rship,

butalso

includ

ingprovisions

for

design

ofland

scap

estructures

that

supp

ort

soilconservatio

n

Reorganizatio

nof

fields

and

perm

anen

tmeasuressuch

asfieldbanks

Indirectlyim

pactingon

soilerosion

Agri-en

vironm

entschemes

(RDP)

Com

pensationpa

ymen

tsto

farm

ersfor(a)

conversion

ofarable

land

tograsslan

d,an

d(b)grow

ingcovercrop

s

Con

versionof

arable

land

tograsslan

d;grow

ingcovercrop

s(a)So

ilerosion,

and(b)soil

erosionan

dpreven

ting

loss

ofnitrog

enNationa

limplem

entatio

nof

theNitrates

Dire

ctive

Basisfortheprep

arationof

Actio

nPlan

sfor

NitrateVu

lnerableZo

nesrequ

iring

farm

ers

topreven

twater

pollutio

n

Non

eIndirectlysoilcontam

ination

andsoilerosion



Selected

policies

Shortdescrip

tion

Technicalm

easures*

includ

edTargetingwhich

threat

Uckermark–Erosion,

compa

ction,

declinein

organicmatter

FederalS

oilP

rotectionAc

t}17define

stheCod

eof

Goo

dAg

ricultural

Practice

Gen

eralprescriptio

nsuch

as‘cultivationshou

ldbe

adap

ted

tolocalsoilcon

ditio

ns’

Non

e;soilprotectio

nin

gene

ral

Fertilizatio

nOrdinan

ce(N

itrates

Dire

ctive)

Targetsthenu

trient

balanceof

agric

ultural

soils

e.g.

limita

tionof

170kg

N/hafororganic

fertilizer;so

ilan

alysis

every6years;

banon

theap

plicationof

fertilizer

with

considerable

nitrog

enconten

tbetween1Novem

beran

d31

Janu

ary

Redu

ctionof

water

pollutio

n.So

ilconservatio

nisby-produ

ct

Dire

ctPa

ymen

tObligations

Act(Cross

Com

pliance)

Farm

ersne

edto

complywith

asetof

EUDire

ctives

tobe

eligiblefordirect

paym

ents

Mainten

ance

ofgrasslan

d,preservatio

nof

land

scap

eelem

ents;croprotatio

n(three

crop

s);

restric

tions

onplou

ghing

Soilconservatio

nisby-produ

ct.

Impa

ctson

soilerosionan

dsoilorganicmatter

Agri-en

vironm

ent

schemes

(RDP)

Paym

ents

tofarm

ersfor(a)en

vironm

entally

friend

lycultivatio

nan

dmainten

ance

ofgrasslan

d,(b)en

vironm

entaland

anim

al-

friend

lyagric

ulture

andho

rticulture

and

gene

ticdiversity,a

nd(c)organicfarm

ing

Note:soil-specificschemes

forintercrops,

undersow

ncropsandreducedtillage

have

been

closed

(a)Ap

plicationof

man

urean

dfertilizer

isforbidden;

restric

tions

onpe

riods

ofgrasslan

duse;

(b)greenb

eltsetting

forfruit/vegetableprod

uctio

n;an

d(c)

e.g.

restric

tionon

useof

fertilizer,ban

ongrasslan

dconversion

Impa

cton

soils

isaby-produ

ct,

indirect

effectson

soil

erosion,

compa

ctionan

ddiffu

sepo

llutio

n

Table7.

Soil-relatedpo

liciesan

dfarm

ingpractices

coveredby

themeasureswith

anindicatio

nof

thedegradationprocesstargeted

*Note:Technicalm

easuresinclud

esoilconservatio

nmeasuresan

dfarm

ingpractices

with

abene

fitforsoils.R

DP=Ru

ralD

evelop

men

tPlan

.

66 K. Prager et al.


Implementation and Governance Structures

Mandatory Policies

National legislation applies to the whole country. In Germany, due to its federal structure, legislation andincentive schemes can also be created at regional level, and hence reference is made to Brandenburg Statefor some policies.

Soil Protection LawsMost relevant for soil protection are those pieces of legislation that directly refer to agricultural soil use. All threecountries have a Soil Protection Law which was established independently of European regulation. However, theprovisions of this law differ considerably. In the Czech Republic, the soil law defines rules for conversion ofagricultural land to alternative use (e.g. construction), as well rules for the penalization of soil damage. Intervieweesstated that the wording in the law did not sufficiently define the penalties for non-compliance or for causing severesoil degradation on agricultural land. As a result, the law is weak and is generally used by authorities as a toolto push those actors causing the external damage (e.g. soil on the roads) to remediate the damage (e.g. cleanthe roads). In Bulgaria, the soil law lays the basis for soil monitoring but makes no additional prescriptionsfor soil protection. The German soil law contains a single paragraph on agricultural soil protection whichdefines the Code of Good Agricultural Practice in general terms. No provisions are made for authorities toactually act in case of non-compliance, and farmers are generally assumed to adhere to the good agriculturalpractice (Prager et al., 2011a).

Water and Nitrate RegulationsLegislation on fertilization is of relevance due to the close connection between physical and chemical processes ofwater and soil. Germany’s Fertilisation Act and Fertilisation Ordinance were established before the EUNitrates Directive but had to be adjusted to comply with the requirements of the EU Directive. The CzechRepublic implemented the Nitrates Directive by means of national legislation (Table 6). Although this legislationdoes not have soil protection as its main objective, it has an indirect impact on soil protection by influencingthe load of fertilizers (e.g. nitrogen) and by preventing bad practice in nutrient management. In the Czechcase, the required measures are targeted only at the Nitrate Vulnerable Zones in the upper part of the studyarea.

The Water Law in Bulgaria requires land owners to register their wells with the Regional Basin Office. Wellregistration is of particular importance in the Belozem area because it allows the monitoring of underground waterlevels and the salinity level of water used for irrigation in order to prevent secondary soil salinization. However, aconsiderable number of wells are still not registered. This is partly because there was not enough information atthe time and partly because now that the deadline for registration has passed, farmers expect a long procedureand suspect that the state will put high prices on well water. Without cooperation from the farmers, the state officialshave little chance of finding or controlling the wells that are scattered around large fields and can easily be hidden.The Law for the Preservation of the Environment and adjacent pieces of legislation (see Table 7) establish a nationalsoil and water monitoring system. However, no specific soil conservation measures emerge from this policy. TheWater User Association (WUA) Law is the legal basis for the establishment of this voluntary association. Agriculturalproducers may form a WUA to organize the irrigation and drainage activities on their territory. The stateprovides financial support to associations, initially transferring use rights and later ownership rights of theinfrastructure. Although this policy has been moderately successful for the region as a whole, it has been unsuccessfulfor Belozem due to the lack of social capital and financial incentives for larger farms (Penov et al., 2011). The lack of socialcapital is not a problem specific to Belozem but also for the rest of the country (as well as transition countries in general,see Uslaner, 2003). This is partially due to memories from the collectivization period and partially to the increaseduncertainty during the transition period. Volatility in the institutional settings made long-term commitments riskyfor the individuals. Therefore, people tend to cooperate only for smaller tasks and shorter periods. Obviously, thelevel of cooperation is not sufficient in the area to run the large irrigation infrastructure built in the past to servelarge production units.



Hybrid Policy Measures

Cross Compliance and Single Farm PaymentAlthough the regulations related to the Single Farm Payment are mandatory, they are linked to payments, which is acharacteristic of incentive-based policies. The Cross Compliance Regulation1 is of particular relevance. It requiresfarmers to comply with 19 EU directives and regulations if they want to receive the full Single Farm Payment. InGerman law this is regulated in the Direct Payments Obligations Act (which makes reference to the FertilisationOrdinance) and prescriptions are more detailed than the general Code of Good Agricultural Practice (Table 7).Bulgaria, as the most recent accession country, has special provisions in place. The per-hectare paymentsprogramme was introduced in 2007 and includes both general and environmental per-hectare payments. Untilspring 2008 (the time of the interviews), only the general per-hectare payment had been introduced. Farmersneed to comply with ‘good cultivation practices’ in order to receive the full payment, and therefore the schemeis expected to benefit soil conservation. However, the question about how cultivation practices will be monitoredefficiently is still open. Farmers who receive support under the Rural Development Program are obliged to keepbooks (records) in which they document the chemicals they have used on the fields. These books are checkedwhen the authority responsible for the implementation of the programme visits the farms.

Land ConsolidationLand consolidation is a hybrid policy that is of particular relevance in the Czech Republic. While land consolidation isbased on law (Table 6) and would therefore qualify as a mandatory policy, the involvement of landowners is vol-untary. The land consolidation process is initiated by landowners or a state agency. Although land consolidation for-mally exists in Germany, interviewees did not assess it as relevant. Bulgaria has land ownership structures similar tothose in the Czech Republic and there is formal legislation regarding land consolidation. However, there is noconsistent land consolidation policy. Instead, ownership of agricultural land in Bulgaria is regulated by the Law forOwnership and Use of Agricultural Land and the Law for Preservation of Agricultural Land (Table 6).

In the Czech Republic, the initiating landowners are formally part of the land consolidation process. In addition,the process also includes consultation with other stakeholders (e.g. municipality, land managers) and measures haveto be agreed by the key parties involved. Land consolidation processes contribute to the objective of reallocating landand rationalizing field size to create more viable holdings while instigating soil protection and erosion preventionmeasures. It is applied at the cadastral level and has implications for property rights and use rights (see the sectionon Property Rights). The process includes the reorganization of fields and shapes, thus allowing adoption ofconservation practices such as contour ploughing, as well as the construction of permanent soil protectionmeasures (e.g. field banks, ditches). It is compulsory to include locally adapted conservation measures for soil,water and biodiversity. However, because these measures are subject to negotiation and agreement, some measuresmay not be approved. Which soil conservation measures are approved depends to a large degree on the personalityof the person leading the project and their commitment to soil conservation. Usually, the process is organized andfacilitated by a professional company hired by the state. The process is hampered by the fairly high cost of the measuresand the long time that it takes to complete a process, which is coupled with a limited administrative capacity in certainregions. Demand by farmers to participate in the scheme is greater than can be dealt with by local authorities (Prazanand Dumbrovsky, 2008).

Voluntary Incentive-Based Policies

The most relevant voluntary policy measure for soil conservation is agri-environmental schemes (AES). AES are ofdiffering importance in the three countries. Bulgaria introduced AES in 2008 but no particular soil conservationmeasures are included. Under the national Rural Development Plan farmers can apply for financial support for purchaseof farm equipment. If investments are made in equipment that allows the application of soil conservation practices, thisis expected to be beneficial for soils.

1Cross compliance is a horizontal tool for both pillars of the Common Agricultural Policy and compulsory since 2005 (Council Regulation (EC)1782/2003).

68 K. Prager et al.


Until 2007, Brandenburg State offered AES addressing soil conservation issues such as reduced tillage and covercrops (intercrops). Some interviewed farmers in the Uckermark continued to apply these conservation measuresalthough they are no longer receiving compensation payments.

AES play an important role for soil conservation in the Czech Republic. From the mid 1990s, extensive grasslandmanagement and conversion of arable land to grassland was supported by national schemes. These measures wereincluded in agri-environmental measures during EU accession. Support for maintaining cover crops over winterwas introduced as a new agri-environmental measure. No extensive evaluation was carried out but intervieweesassumed that arable land conversion and cover crops, in particular, have a significant positive influence on soiland water protection.

Farmers in the upper part of the Czech case study area have had experience with converting most sensitive arablefields to grassland since about 1995. This measure was offered by the Water Authority specifically for this area. Theauthority negotiated with farmers, and provided technical assistance and financial support for applying this veryeffective soil conservation measure, basically adopting the role of the missing extension service. Compensationpayments from the Water Authority are no longer available but personal contacts with farmers were still nurturedduring the time of the survey. Most of the questioned farms (six of eight) still adhere to this scheme.

Information and Advice

Information and capacity-building measures do not represent a soil-related policy as such. However, the availabilityof easily accessible extension systems is a crucial component for the implementation of policies. The appropriatedistribution of information can be decisive for the success or failure of a policy measure (see, for example, the caseof well registration in Bulgaria). The three countries have different models for providing advice on soil conservationto farmers and landholders (Table 8).

Bulgaria has adopted a centralized model where the regional agricultural advisory services’ specialists aresupposed to provide consultancy services free of charge to all registered agricultural producers. However, theirresources are considered insufficient to provide enough advisory services and information at local level, both inquantity and in quality.

In the Czech Republic, the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) is responsible for providing farm advisory services.Regional officers of the MoA attend seminars on AES and are trained to provide seminars to farmers. However,interviewees reported that the advisory services do not fulfil their role sufficiently. Available advisors do not coverenvironmental and soil conservation issues, and there is no cohesive extension service available for soil-relatedpolicies. A limited numbers of farmers have access to advisors because, for example, there are not enough trained

Case study Organizations and individuals providing advice

Belozem Regional agricultural advisory servicesConsultantsLocal office of the Ministry of Agriculture

Svratka river basin Farm advisorsMorava River Water AuthorityInstitute of Agricultural Economics and Information (UZEI), responsible for information transfer inagriculture and the supervision of the farm advisory service (i.e. providing certificationand training)

Agricultural Chamber (in some regions only)The Hunting Association (marginally)

Uckermark Various locally active advisory groups such as the Manure Association, Local Agriculture Authority andUpper State Authorities. For example, the Agricultural Agency offers training seminars for privateadvisors (consultants).

Farmers’ Union and breeders’ associations

Table 8. Organisations and actors providing advice to farmers



advisors and the Agricultural Chamber is active only in some regions. While in the past the Water Authoritysuccessfully adopted the role of the extension service in the upper part of the catchment (see previous section) thereare no advisory services available for the soil-related AES at present.

But not only state authorities can take the role of advisory services. In the Czech case study, the implementationof feeding strips for wildlife was successful because the Hunting Association acted as a partner for farmers andprovided advice. This led to an increase of scheme uptake by farmers even though the establishment of feedingstrips is demanding and not economically beneficial to farmers. In contrast, the introduction of grassland stripsacross slopes (erosion prevention measure) failed because farmers were not well informed about the measure, therewas no point of contact at the local level and thus uptake was low. Experiences with past and present AES show thatfarmers need assistance for applying demanding measures or when high opportunity costs arise.

The implementation of the Nitrates Directive in the Czech Republic can serve as a different model for informationdistribution. It included a massive information campaign targeted at farmers, using regional seminars, leaflets, websiteexchanges and other methods and was assessed as successful by all interviewees – farmers are well aware of theDirective and its requirements.

In Brandenburg, farm extension is privately organized; there are no state advisory services (Thomas, 2007).However, local district authorities and upper state authorities provide information to farmers and private advisors.While Aenis et al. (2002) found that agricultural training and extension services do not sufficiently communicate soilconservationmeasures, we found that farmers are generally well informed about available measures (Prager et al., 2008).

Discussion and Conclusion

This paper describes the institutional arrangements surrounding agricultural soil conservation in transitioncountries and identifies which institutional arrangements support or impede effective soil conservation by farmers.We analysed soil conservation policies, property rights and governance structures that influence the implementationof soil conservation practices and impact on soil quality in case studies in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and EastGermany. We also discuss informal institutions such as farmer perceptions and trust.

Soil degradation exists in all three case study areas and farmers are aware of the risk and consequences associatedwith soil degradation. Each country has national legislation that formally addresses the management of agriculturalsoils. The laws are of a restrictive rather than a proactive nature in that they prohibit soil-degrading activities ingeneral terms but do not prescribe soil conservation measures.

The three countries also have policies which are based on transpositions of EU legislation. For Bulgaria and theCzech Republic, European policy signifies an entirely new institution placed into post-socialist governancestructures. East Germany merged with an existing democratic system and could thus adopt existing administrativestructures. The result has been a comparative advantage and the ability to draw on institutional knowledge and ex-perience with the implementation of European regulations and directives.

Germany and the Czech Republic have a similar set of policies in place to tackle agricultural soil degradation,which may in part be a response to their similar degradation problems (soil erosion and compaction). Both countrieshave more than a decade of experience with AES, in part specifically targeting soil erosion. The Nitrates Directive,although only indirectly impacting on soil degradation, has been fully implemented and regular checks ensurecompliance. Implementation capacities appear sufficient to comply with European requirements.

Although some authors claim that transition countries in general have much less developed governancestructures (Gatzweiler and Hagedorn, 2004; Gay et al., 2009) we found that there are differences among transitioncountries. Of the three investigated cases, Bulgaria seems to struggle most to put rules into practice. Salinizationand decline in organic matter are the most relevant soil degradation problems in the Bulgarian case and theelaborate system of national legislation and strategic documents (Table 6) is formally capable of addressingthese issues. Interviewees emphasized that legislation is sufficient and covers agricultural soil conservation.However, there is a gap between formally established legislation and the rules-in-use similar to the incongruitybetween formal rules and rules-in-use that Theesfeld (2009) found for Bulgaria’s irrigation sector. Sikor (2004)reported that the discrepancy between legal texts and rights-in-practice leads to the exclusion of wider interests

70 K. Prager et al.


in favour of individual interests in the management of common pool resources, resulting in resource deterioration anddwindling resource stocks. Although this issue is most obvious in the Bulgarian case, it can also be noted to a lesserextent in the Czech and German cases.

In addition to legislation and policy, we discussed the differing property rights regimes and land-use rights. In the Czechcase, in particular, they impact on the types of degradation problems and impede the implementation of suitable measures.

Each country has differing traditions in the provision of advisory services. Our findings confirmed that advice is a keyrequisite for the implementation of policies and conservation measures. Advice is important for the distribution of ade-quate information about financial schemes and specific soil conservation practices, for supporting farmers’ funding appli-cations (filling in forms correctly) and registration procedures. Advice is also crucial to (continually) enhance farmerawareness of soil degradation, and awareness of legal requirements such as cross compliance. Providing this kind ofadvice is a particular challenge for advisors who until recent years have only provided agronomic advice.

Taking advice from a state advisory service would require accessibility of such advice (which has been identifiedas a problem in the Bulgarian and the Czech cases) and farmers trusting the officials. As Almer and Koontz (2004,p. 489) conclude, ‘For years under communist rule, government officials worked to obscure and conceal information; itis no small feat for citizens to now view government officials as trustworthy information providers, and for governmentofficials to take on this new role.’ The lack of trust in administrative authorities is a serious problem in Bulgaria and hasbeen highlighted by several authors (Andreev, 2009; Theesfeld, 2009).

Financial incentives for activities enhancing soil quality are only provided by AES in the Czech case, and marginallyin the German case because schemes targeting soil conservation have been closed. Nevertheless, AES have consider-able potential for targeting soil erosion because this policy can be adapted to local conditions (Prager et al., 2011a). InGermany, this policy may be designed at the regional level because the individual states have policy-making authority.Indirect incentives are provided by the Czech land consolidation process but the magnitude of this policy is limited bylack of resources and the extensive duration of the process (Prazan and Dumbrovsky, 2011).

Farmers’ previous experience with conservation measures (and initial financial compensation) motivated manyto continue the application of reduced tillage and cover crops in the German and Czech case. If practices are no lon-ger economically viable there is a risk of these farmers converting back to conventional practices.

Most of the mandatory soil-related policies have no enforcement mechanism in place; for example, in Germanyfarmers are assumed to comply with the Code of Good Farming Practice and authorities have no provisions tomonitor and enforce these broadly phrased principles. Similarly, the Soil Protection Law in the Czech Republic and wellregistration in Bulgaria suffer from lack of enforcement. A penalty structure exists but lacks an effective enforcementmechanism. This is reflected in the result that interviewed farmers perceive the threat of penalties to be low.

Overall, we found no integrated strategy for agricultural soil conservation in any of the case study countries, whichwas identified as a shortcoming by many of the government and civil society actors interviewed. Monitoring structuresand evaluation procedures are not well developed. An additional shortcoming is that policies do not specify soil con-servation objectives, rarely target the (locally) relevant degradation issues and – with few exceptions – do not encourageappropriate practices. These factors impede effective soil conservation at the farm level and limit the evaluation of theimpact of policies, not only in transition countries but in other European countries as well.

Our comparative study supports Gatzweiler and Hagedorn’s (2004) finding that the adaptation of national legislationto EU rules and directives is insufficient and does not guarantee similar outcomes, because institutional arrangementsand their evolution play a major role in the effectiveness of agricultural soil conservation policies. The comparative effectof different institutional arrangements on the implementation of EU and national policy on the ground – as illustrated inthis paper – suggests that to enhance effectiveness, policies have to be accompanied by advice, incentives and enforce-ment tailored to the regional context . This recommendation applies not only to soil conservation policy but also to otherenvironmental policy areas.

Acknowledgements

Part of this work was funded by the European Commission project Sustainable Agriculture and Soil Conservation (SoCo), Workpackage 2: Soil Conservation and Policy Measures: the Case Studies (SoCo-CS), tender no. J05/21/2007. We are very grateful toall those who agreed to be interviewed.



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Documents

Soil Conservation in Transition Countries: the Role of Institutions