Socrates and Hedonism

8/12/2019 Socrates and Hedonism

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Socrates and Hedonism: "Protagoras" 351b-358d

Author(s): Donald J. ZeylReviewed work(s):Source: Phronesis, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1980), pp. 250-269Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182098.Accessed: 01/11/2011 13:55

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Socrates and Hedonism:Protagoras351b-358d.

DONALD J.ZEYLAn ancient quarrelpersistsamongstudentsof Plato'sProtagoras etweenthose whoclaim that Socrateshimselfholds the hedonistic hesison whichhe bases his argumentagainstakrasia(I shall call them6prohedonists"),and thosewho deny the claim ("'antihedonists").1ew will deny that thematterat issue is basic to the interpretation f Plato'searly dialoguesandhence to the reconstruction f the philosophyof Socrates,and until it isresolved,Socrates'place in the historyof moral thought will remainun-clear.The challenges which either camp must meet are well known andconsiderable. f Socratesdoes sincerelyaccepthedonism n the Protagoras,how is his hedonism here to be reconciled with his claims about thesupreme mportanceof virtue and the perfectionof the soul, andin parti-cular with his attackon hedonism in the Gorgias?2f, on the other hand,Socratesdoes not seriouslyrepresenthimselfas a hedonist n the argument,why does he use hedonismas a premise n an argumentwhoseconclusionhe surely takes seriously,and why does he allow his interlocutorso takehim asbelievingthat premise n allseriousness? f a newcase is to bemadeon eitherside of the issue it must be made on the basisof a closereadingofthe text, on a plausible account of Socrates'aims and strategy n theargument,and on a consideration f objections o both sides.In thispaperI shallpresentsuch a case. I shall arguefor theantihedonistnterpretationby showing hat t isconsistentwitha natural,unconstrainedeadingof thetext; that it is accountedfor by a plausiblereadingof Socrates'aimsandmethods in arguing against akrasia;that major objectionsto it can besatisfactorily nswered;and thatmajorobjections oaprohedonist ccountcannot be satisfactorily nswered. f I am successful n eachaspectof thecase,the ancientquarrelcan, I believe,be brought o an end.

II shall begin by examiningclosely thosepassageswithinPrt.351b-358d nwhich the hedonistic thesis is introducedor reassertedand which havebeen, or could be, taken to support a prohedonistaccount. In theexaminationI shall limit my attention strictlyto the issue of pro- or250


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antihedonism.I readily sacrifice elegance in favor of accuracyin thetranslations:(a) 351b3-e7:

"Do you say, Protagras," said,"that(I) some men live well and othersbadly?"Heassented."Then does it seem to you that (2) a man would live well if he lived indistress and suffering?"He demurred."(3)What if he should live a pleasant life tothe end? Doesn't it seem to you that he would have lived well like that?""It does,"he said."Therefore &pa) (4) living pleasantly s good, and unpleasantlybad.""(5)As long as he lived in the enjoymentof praiseworthy hings TotS xaXots)," he said."What,Protagoras? urely not you too call (6) some pleasantthings badandpainfulthings good, as the many do? I mean, (7) aren'tthey good in thatrespectin whichtheyarepleasant,disregardinganythingelse that may come fromthem?And again,aren't painful things bad to the extent to which they are painful?""I don't know,Socrates,"he said,"whetherI should answerso unqualifiedlyas you ask, that (8) allpleasantthings are good and all painful thingsbad; it seems to me safer,not onlywith respect to my present answer,but also all the rest of my life, to answer that (6')some pleasuresare not good, and some pains are not bad, though some are, andthirdly,some (sc. pleasuresand pains)are neutral,neithergood nor bad.""(9) Don'tyou call 'pleasant'," said, "the thingswhich partakeof pleasureor whichproducepleasure?""Indeed I do," he said. "Then this is what I mean, (7) whetherthingsaren't good to theextentthat theyare pleasant;I'm askingwhether pleasure tselfisnot good." "As you frequentlysay, Socrates,"he said, "let'sexamine it, and if ourexaminationappearsreasonable,and pleasant and good should turnout to be thesame, we shallbe in agreement; f not, we shall dispute it then."

I representthe numberedsentencesand phrasesby the followingstate-ments:1. Somemen live well, others badly.2. A manlives badlyif he lives in distressandsuffering.3. A man liveswell if he livesa pleasant ife to the end.4. Livingpleasantly s good; livingunpleasantlys bad.5. Living pleasantly s good only if one lives in the enjoymentof praise-worthy hings.6. Some pleasantthingsarebad; some painfulthingsare good.7. Pleasant hingsaregood in the respect nwhich / to theextentto whichtheyarepleasant;painful thingsare badin the respect nwhich/ to theextent to whichtheyarepainful.8. All pleasant hingsare good;all painfulthingsare bad.9. All thingswhichpartakeof or producepleasurearepleasant.The discussion n thispassageproceedsas follows: Protagoras greesthat1, 2 and 3 expresshis views. Socrates nfers4 from 2 and 3. Protagoras

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denies4 in its unqualified orm; he will accept t only if it is qualifiedas in5. Socrates inks5 to 6, a view whichhe attributes o the many.He proposes7as the view which Protagoras ught to accept nsteadof 5, and representsit as contradicting . 8 is Protagoras' ersionof 7, and 9 is an analytic ruth.6' and 7'aremerelyrepetitionsof 6 and 7.The discussion begins with Socratessecuring Protagoras'answers tothreequestions,and inferringaconclusion rom thoseanswers.We need todetermineboth the significanceof the questions and the conclusion andthe extent to whichthey can be taken asindicativeof Socrates' wn view.In assenting to 1, Protagorasmakes it clear that he is prepared toevaluate ivesasgood or bad. "Livingwell"(eV' iv)is a standard ynonymfor "doingwell" or "faring well" (?Vi Tp&'TTELV)and "being happy"(EVi-8aL[LoveLv).3He thus has some criterionor criteriaby whichhejudges livesas good or happy, andhis answers o 2 and 3 revealwhat these are.In hisanswer o 2 he states that living a (predominantly) ainful life is sufficientfor not living well, and living a (predominantly) leasant ife is sufficientfor living well.4 These answers and their implications bear close attention.If being a pleasant ife is a sufficientconditionfor beinga good life, itwillfollowthata predominance f pleasure n any life, no matterhowslightthepredominance,uffices to qualify thatlife as a good one, and similarlywith a painful life. Although this view does not at first disallow thepossibility hat factorsother thanpleasureandpain maycontribute o thegoodness or badnessof a life, suchfactors,no matterhow abundantly heyarepresent n a life, do not availagainstpleasureandpainto makeeven amarginallypleasant ife bad,or a marginallypainful ife good.Sincesuchfactorscannot contribute o thegoodnessor badnessof a lifecommensur-ably with pleasureand pain,it is doubtful hat2 and 3 are intended oallowfor them. Further,the conjunctionof 2 and 3, with the additionof thereasonableassumptionthat a life predominateseitherin pleasureor inpain, will entail that being a pleasant ife is theonly sufficient onditionforbeinga good life, and beinga painfullife the only sufficientconditionforbeing a bad life, and it will further follow that living (predominantly)pleasantly s both a necessaryand a sufficientconditionforlivingwell. Inhis answersto 2 and 3 Protagoras hus shows that he is committedto ahedonistic eudaemonistic heory: living pleasantlydefines or constituteslivingwellorhappily.5In 4 Socrates infers from Protagoras'answers a thesis about therelationship f living pleasantly owhatis good,andof living unpleasantlytowhatis bad.4 must then be understood n a suitablesenseso thatit doesindeed followfrom2 and3. Livingpleasantlyhasindeedbeenshowntobe252


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good, and living painfullybad, but to be so in a strong sense: they are,respectively, necessaryand sufficientgood,anda necessary ndsufficientevil.6If a theoryaboutwhatis good in thisstrong enseis a theoryaboutthedefiningconditionsof livingwell or beinghappy,then the theory mpliedin 2-4 is nothingshortof evaluativehedonism.Socrateshas reason,therefore, o takeProtagoras' nswers o 2 and3 ascommitting he sophistto hedonism,andhe does so explicitly n 4. Isthereany suggestionthat2-4 expressSocrates'own view? Somecommentators,relyingon the fact that Socratescustomarilyexpresseshis own views asquestionsto which he invites the interlocutor's ssent,claimthat1-3 maybe takenas expressionsof his own view, whetherhe advocates t sincerelyorironically.7Butthiswillnotworkhere:Socrates'questionsdo notsimplyhave the form, "p?",but the form, "doyou think(say) thatp?" Socrateswants to elicit Protagoras'views, rather than to express his own (cf."XEyeLt," b3; "8oxri ot," b4; So~v . . coO boxe " b6,7), and his questionsprovide no evidence for his own views on the matter. They are simplydiagnostic.8Asweshallsee in the next section,Socrateshas someinterestnobtainingProtagoras' iews about the relation betweenpleasureand thegood.Protagoras ejects4 as a statementexpressiveof his view,at least in itsunqualifiedform: it is not living pleasantly impliciter cf. 'a&Xws,7) thatconstitutesliving well, for if it were (one might imaginehim thinking),someone who lived as a catamite cf. Grg.494e) would livewell. Shrinkingback from this,Protagoras mends Socrates' onclusion n 4 to readthat itis living in the enjoymentof XaX&nly thatconstitutes ivingwell.The qualification amountsto a surrenderof the view that pleasureassuch is sufficient for livingwell, and his subsequentadmission hat somepains are good9suggests thathe gives up the view that it is necessaryaswell. Onlypraiseworthy leasure the pleasurederived romexperiences ractivitieswhich arexaXa) counts in determining he goodnessof a life. Heis thusadmittinga standardof value otherthanpleasure,andone by whichpleasures hemselvesareapprovedas good or disapprovedas bad,so thatonly praiseworthypleasuresare good, i.e. make a contribution o a goodlife. Disgracefulpleasuresarepresumablybad. If so, then his view is thatpleasure s as such neithergood nor bad:only praiseworthy leasuresaregood, only disgracefulpleasures are bad, and pleasuresneither praise-worthynordisgracefulareneithergood norbad (cf. d4-7).SocratesassociatesProtagoras' iew with a view which he attributes othemany,10 iz., that somepleasuresare badand some painsare good. Onthe interpretation f 5 just given, this association s justifiedto the extent

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that5 does indeed entail the firstconjunctof 6. Byaccepting6 as a whole(see n.9) he acceptsa viewwhich swholly ncompatiblewith4. 5 and 6 arenot statementswhich, in Socrates'view, Protagoras ught to accept.Herecommends,rather nsistently,7 instead. 7 must then be read in a waywhich will make evident its incompatibilitywith 6. Now in 5 Protagorasmaintained hata life is a good one to the extent that it consistsof praise-worthypleasuresand notmerelyto theextent that it consistsof pleasureassuch.It is theimportof 7 to affirmwhatwas denied in 5. So 7 insists hatitismerelyquapleasant hatanything includinga life) is good, and thusthatthe restriction n 4 importedby 5 is improper."

Why does Socratesurge 7 againstProtagoras' rofessionof 5 and thegeneral view of the relation between pleasant and good which thatprofession mplies?It is universallyassumed,certainlyby prohedonists,12but also by antihedonists,whether they take Socrates to be assertinghedonism ironically in 7'3 or not asserting it at all,14 that Socratesrepresents7 as his own view. This assumption s never argued,and it isopen to challenge.To understandSocrates'use of 7we need to recalltheearliersteps in the argument.In securingProtagoras' ssent to 2 and 3Socrateshad reasonto takethe sophist as committed o hedonism,andheexplicitlydid so in 4. But Protagoras hrank from acceptinghedonismoutrightbyproposing5, andthus he will notstandby theimplicationof hisearlieranswers.So now Socrateshas reasonto objectto Protagoras' ro-posalof 5 and thenon-hedonistic iewof the relationofpleasantandgoodwhich it entails as stated in6, not becausehe thinks that5 and 6 arefalse,butbecausethey areinconsistentwith thesophist'searlieranswers.Prota-goras s vacillatingbetweentwo views aboutthat relation,a hedonisticoneto which his actual evaluations commit him, and a non-hedonisticonewhich alone his scruplesallow him to accept explicitly.In urging7 uponhim Socrates s pressing his interlocutor o be consistent: f Protagoras'"real"position s revealedbyhis answers o 2 and 3, then his disavowalof 4is a fainthearted oncessionto the unpopularityof hedonism as a theory.Socrates'associationof 5 with the apparentnon-hedonismof the manyplays on the sophist'scontempt for the masses on whose approvalhisreputationand livelihoodneverthelessdepend.15The attempt to make Protagorasconsistent helps to explain, then,Socrates'sponsorhipof 7. But it does not explainit completely.Consis-tencycouldequallywell havebeenachieved f Protagorasouldhave beenallowedto retractor modifyhis answers o 2 and 3 to makethemcompat-ible with 5, and this line would probablyhave been more welcome toProtagoras.Socratesmay have reasons to take advantageof Protagoras'254


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(probablyunguarded)answers o 2 and3, i.e., reasons o extractanexplicitcommitmentto hedonism from Protagoras as I shall argue in the nextsection), and if so, then his attempt to make Protagorasa consistenthedonistrather han a consistentnon-hedonistwill be explained n a waywhichdoes not requirehis own endorsementof 7.16(b) 353e5-354al:

"Then isn't it evident to you, gentlemen,as Protagorasand I aresaying, that thesethings are bad forno otherreasonthan thattheyterminate n painsanddepriveoneof otherpleasures?"I have italicized the crucialclause in the sentence. At first glance, andoutside of its context, it seems ambiguous. It could indicate (a) thatSocratesandProtagorashemselves laimthat mmediatelypleasant hingsare bad because they resultin greaterpains. In this case Socrates s un-ambiguouslydeclaring hat he and Protagoras rehedonists.On the otherhand, it could indicate (b) that Socrates and Protagoras laim that it isevident o themanythatthesethings arebad,etc.Therearequitedecisivereasons n favorof(b). Against a) is the factthaton its readingSocrateswould be identifyingnot only himself, but Prota-gorasas a hedonist,whenthesophisthaspreviously esisted heimputationof hedonismto him. Evenif Socratesshouldbe right n diagnosingProta-goras' "real" position as hedonistic, this context is inappropriateforrevealing hatdiagnosis.In favorof (b) is the factthat it fits well in itsownimmediatecontext.In the preceding ines(d6-e4)Socratesand Protagorashave been discussingbetween themselveswhat the many would say inresponse o a questionthatmight be put to them;that is, theypredicthowthemanywouldanswer hatquestion.In thesentenceunderdiscussion hemany are being asked that questiondirectly,and the prediction s beingtested.What"Protagoras nd I aresaying"was saidat d6-el.'7(c) 356b3-cl:

"If you weigh pleasant thingsagainstpleasantthings you should always take thegreaterand the more; ... you should do thataction in which(pains areexceeded bypleasures) . ."The injunctiongiven here'8 s Socrates' esponse o anobjection 356a5-7)to the precedingargumentwhichshowedthat the positionof the manyonakrasia s absurd.19 ocratesdisallowsthe plea that one pleasuremay bepreferred o anothersimplybecause it is nearer n time.He is thusstrictlyenforcing the hedonisticprinciple,which his opponents have accepted,

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that the only factorwhich makes one pleasurepreferableto anotherisdifference n quantity(355d6-e2;356al-5). The injunctionhas forceonlyfor those who accept the hedonisticprincipleon which the precedingargumentagainst akrasia depended, and so provides no independentevidencein favorof prohedonism.(d) 357a5-7:

"Since the salvation of our lives has turnedout to consist in the right choice ofpleasureand pain . . ."One might thinkthat Socratescommitshimselfto the truthof the state-mentcontained n thisclause,especially n thelightof his contrastbetweenthis accountof "thesalvationof ourlives"and thetwo clearlycounterfac-tual accounts mentioned earlier(356c8-e4;e5-357a5).An antihedonistaccountwouldrequire hepresent nstance o becounterfactual s wellforSocrates.But Socrates s heremerelyrecalling heapplicationof the resultof the akrasiaargumentfor choice and action (356a8-c3;cf (c) above),whichhas forceonly againstthosewho acceptthe premisesof thatargu-ment. As before, Socratesis not includinghimself among those againstwhom the argumenthas force, thoughequallyhe takesno pains to dis-sociate himselffromit.20(e) 357d3-7:

"Foryou too have agreed that those who go wrong in the choice of pleasuresandpainsgo wrongthrough ack of knowledge,- and these are goods and evils, - andnot merely of knowledge, but of that which earlierwe agreed was knowledge ofmeasurement."The hyphenatedclause,thoughnot givenin oratioobliqua,represents heview of the many and need not be takenas representingSocrates'ownview.(f) 358al-b6:

"Thiswould be our answerto the many. AndI askyou, Hippiasand Prodicus,alongwith Protagoras let the argumentbe sharedby you), whether I seem to you to bespeaking trulyor falsely."It seemed quite emphaticallyto all that what had beensaid was true. "You agree, then (&pa)," said, "thatthe pleasantis good and thepainfulbad.". . . Prodicus miled and gave hisassent,and so did the others."'Whatabout this, then, gentlemen,"I said, "aren't all actions that aim at painless andpleasantliving praiseworthy xacaX)?And the praiseworthyaccomplishmentgoodand beneficial?"They all thoughtso.

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In thesequelto theargumentwiththemanywhichbeginswith thispassageHippias and Prodicus are drawn into the discussion. They are askedwhether they, too, (as well as Protagoras,whose silence implies consent)acceptas true "what Socrates)hasbeensaying".The twosophistsexpresstheir emphatic approvalof Socrates'argument. They immediately ac-knowledge hat n accepting hatargument hey accept he thesisbasicto it,that the pleasantis (the) good21and the painful (the) bad. Thusthey takeSocratesas not only having represented hepositionof the many correctlybut also as sharing their hedonism.22Like Protagorasearlier (351e),Hippiasand Prodicusareprohedonists.

It does not follow, however, hattheyareright.Socrates'question sbestinterpreted as a diagnostic one: do Hippias and Prodicus think thatSocrates has offered a sound argument cf. Boxav',iv)?Theiraffirmativeanswerdoes not implythat Socrates hinksthathis argument s sound;hemaythink that it is merelyvalid. And Socrateshasgoodreason,aswe shallsee, not to discourage heir readingof his own position.By not challenging Socrates' nference (as Protagorashad challengedanother nference to the same conclusion, 351b7-cl) the two sophistsandpresumably lsoProtagoras,who does not repeathis formerprotest,23mustacceptthe hedonistic criterionfor praiseworthy ctions.Contrary o thatprotest(5 above), that ToxaXov s the measurewhich distinguishesgoodpleasures rom bad ones, pleasureas such is now acceptedas a measureofwhat is xaXov.The hedonistic criterion,coupled with the admissionthatwhat is praiseworthy s good and beneficial, s used later in the argument(at 359e5-360a5) o argue for the unity of courage and wisdom. Not onlythe manybut also the sophists have overtly acceptedhedonism,and theiracceptanceof it can be used by Socrates to support positionswhich hethinksthey are wrong to deny.Theexaminationof the preceding extshas yielded thefollowingresults:(1) In none of them are we requiredby a natural,unconstrained eadingofthe text to interpretSocrates'use of the hedonistic thesisas implying hisown endorsementof that thesis; and (2) Socratesdoes not explicitlydis-sociatehimself fromhedonism,and allowshis interlocutorso think hat hedoes hold it. It will now be our task to interpretSocrates' trategy n a waythatmakes sense of these results.II

Any interpretation f Socrates'dialecticalposture in thispart of the Pro-tagoras must relate that posture to Socrates' motives and tactics in the257


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dialogue as a whole. Fifty yearsago Grube arguedconvincingly,p. 203,that "the Protagoras s an attack upon the sophistsas representedbyProtagoras, he greatest of them,"and Vlastos, 1956,pp. xxiv-xxviandSullivan, pp. 11-18have given an accountof his methods n carryingoutthe attack.RecentlyKlosko has arguedforcefully,p. 126,"thatthe dis-cussion in the Protagoras s meant to be read as a(n) ... eristicdebate."Ifthesereadingsof thedialogueas a whole arecorrect,as I thinktheyare,thepresumption s strongthat they apply to the passageunderstudy in thispaper.Socrateswill be lessconcerned o defendpositions whichall agreearerecognisablyhisown)withargumentswhichrepresenthis ownreasonsfor holding these positions, than to attack the contradictoriesof thosepositionsas these aremaintainedby his opponents,and to do so by usingthe most effective means his offensive purposeand the conventions oferisticdebatewillallow.The passage of the Protagoras rom 351 to 358 bridgestwo attempts,unsuccessfuland successfulrespectively, o argueforthe unity of courageandwisdom.The passagecontainsan argument or a thesiswhich is usedas a premise n the secondattemptandaccountsfor its success.This is thepsychological laim that"no one who knowsor believes thatotherthingsarebetter thanthose he is doingand arepossible to do subsequentlydoesthemwhenhe coulddo the better" 358b7-c1).24 rotagoras nd theothersophistsmust,then, be persuaded o acceptthis"Socraticparadox" f thefinalargument s to succeed.Butby whatarguments an theybe persuad-ed?Professor Vlastos has proposed an argument which supports theparadox,and whose premisesconsistof well knownSocraticdoctrines.25The argument s as follows:(SI) If one knowsthat X is betterthanY, one willwant X morethanY.(S2) If one wantsX morethan Y, one willchoose X rather hanY(S3) All mendesirewelfare.(S4) Anythingelse theydesireonlyas a means to welfare.(S3) and(S4) representwellknownSocratic enets,and theirconjunction,according o Vlastos,entails(Si).26 Theconjunctionof (SI) with(52) (anapparentlyuncontroversial tatement of the connection between desireand choice)entailsthe paradox: f one knows thatX is betterthanY onewillchoose X rather hany.27SinceSocrateshas the resources o constructwhathe wouldregardas asoundargument or the paradox,one may well wonderwhyhe resorts oanotherwhich he (as antihedonistswill claim) regardsas unsound, es-258


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pecially if the premise which he rejects is at first also denied by his inter-locutor. Socrates takes some pains to get Protagoras to admit the premise,and though he is justified (as I have argued) in attributing it to the sophist,he must think that it is worth the pains. Clearly Socrates thinks that theargument based on hedonism has greater cogency for Protagoras and theother sophists than the argument from (SJ)-(S4). And so it has.

Anyone who doubts or denies the Socratic paradox will regard theargument from (SJ)-(S4) with suspicion because it rules out the possibilityof akrasia, and anyone who believes that akrasia does occur will havereason to doubt one or more premises in that argument. He will certainlyreject (SI), and hence at least one of (S3) and (S4). (S4) is the likeliercandidate for rejection.28The doubter will maintain that the occurrence ofakrasia proves the existence of welfare-independent desires, and that thedenial of akrasia on the basis of the non-existence of welfare-independentdesires merely begs the question against him. He may press his case byclaiming, against (SI), that even though one knows that X is better than Y,one may still want Y more than X because, for instance, (one knows orbelieves that) Y is more pleasant than X. He thus claims, against (S4), thatone's desire for pleasure is a welfare-independent desire.

There is only one way for Socrates to dismantle this defense, and that isby showing that the defender of akrasia is not entitled to his claim thatone's desire for pleasure is a welfare- or good-independent desire. If thatclaim can be dismantled independently, (S4) and (SI) will not be chal-lengeable, for then a conflict between a desire for X qua good and for Y quapleasant is not possible. If to desire Y for its pleasure is just to desire it forits good (cf. 354c3-5), then it cannot even be claimed that X is the better,but Y the more pleasant alternative.

This, I believe, is the advantage the argument from hedonism has overthe argument from (S1)-(S4) against a hedonistic opponent. And, I believe,against such an opponent only.29 Conceivably Socrates might try to con-vert a non-hedonistic defender of akrasia to hedonism first, in order toexercise this advantage. Whether he would actually do so, even given thelicense allowed by eristic conventions, may be doubted. In any case he isnot doing it in the Protagoras. He does not argue for hedonism againstProtagoras' protest, nor against the many. He has, as we saw, good reasonto believe that they are hedonists already, whatever their professions.

If an argument from hedonism has greater cogency against a hedonisticopponent than some alternative argument, Socrates will have a goodreason (a) to determine whether his interlocutor is a hedonist prior tolaunching such an argument, and (b) to press his interlocutor, should he be

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foundto usehedonisticcriteriaof evaluationbut to be too confusedortootimid to acceptthetheory mpliedby hisevaluations, o accept hattheory.Moreover,he will havegood reason(c) to suppresshis own disavowalofthat theory.For if he openly questionedor rejectedhedonism,he wouldlose the strategicadvantageof hisposition:thelocusof debatewouldshiftaway from the issue under discussion,that of supplyinga scaffold tosupport he thesisof the unity of courageandwisdom.30Worse,he wouldbe encouragingdoubtin hedonism,andthusunderminehisown denialofakrasia.31That argumentmakes use of hedonism by taking advantageof thesubstitutability f "good"for "pleasant"or "pleasure") nd of "painful"for"bad",32 nd in thisway showsthe thesisof the many thatsometimesone does what one knowsto be bad overall,becauseone is overcomebypleasure, o be absurd:howcan one possiblycredittheexplanationgiven,that theagentdidwhat he didbecausehe wantedpleasure/goodnesswhenone of the givens in the descriptionof the act is the stipulation hat theagentknew that he would get less pleasure/goodness rom that act thanfrom some alternativeequally open to him? That is like explainingsomeone'schoiceof a less lucrativeob by his desirefor wealthandat thesame time insist that the individualknew at the time he made his choicewhichof thejobs was themore ucrativeone.The "logicof explanation"svitiatedif the explanationofferedto make an actionintelligibleconflictswith the description of the action it is supposed to explain.33Does the greatlogicaladvantagewhich Socratesgainsfromthe use ofhedonism in arguing against akrasia imply that Socrates acceptshedonism? It certainly need not. First, to get this logical advantage,Socratesdoesnot need hedonismas such,buta premisewhichwill insure(a) that thegoodsof boththe chosenandthe rejectedalternative reof thesamekind,and(b) that it is by a good of thatkind thatthe agentis said tobedefeated.It is indeedhardtosee whatother dentification f "good"willsatisfy (a) and (b) so neatly, and so Socrateshas good reasonto use thehedonistic premise where he can. This, however,does not mean thatSocrateshimselfacceptshedonism.If Ican defenda view of minebyeitherof twoarguments, nly one of which I acceptassound butwhosepremisesmay be hard to defend, while I regardthe otheras valid, dependingonpremisessome of which I do not accept, and I realize that the latterargumentwould have greatercogencyagainstsomeonewho does acceptthesepremises han theformer, mayhave excellentreason o usethelatterargumentto defend my view. This, I believe, is exactly the positionofSocrates in the Protagoras.260


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IIIIt is timenow to considerand evaluatesome majorobjectionsto antihe-donism andto raiseandpresssomeobjections o prohedonism.(1) It is sometimesflatly assertedthat prohedonism s requiredby anaturalreadingof the text,and thatantihedonistsdo violence to the plainsense of the text. Thus Grote finds hedonism "directly stated" bySocrates,34 view that is echoed by Hackforthand Dodds,35 he lattercharacterizing ntihedonistargumentsas "moreingeniousthan honest."Themotivesof antihedonists realsosuspect:"Thecommentators esort othis (sc.antihedonist)hypothesis,partlybecause the doctrine s one which(sic) they disapprove .. ." (Grote); "It is only because hedonism is anaughty view that there are reservationsabout saying that Socratesmaintainst in theProtagoras"(Crombie,p. 240). "Scholarswhoresent hesuggestion hat Plato everchangedhis mind have tried to paperover thiscrack n the 'unity'of his thought. . ."(Dodds). Theseallegationshavebythemselvesno probative orcewhatever.(2) A moresubstantialobjection is derivedfrom the observation hathedonism s not a position towhich eitherProtagoras r themanyclaim toadhere;thatposition, t is claimed, s "forced" Hackforth,p. 41) on themby Socrates,and if hedonism s not the positionof Socrates'opponents,adefense of antihedonism which interprets Socrates' argument as adhominem collapses. Why else should Socratestry to persuadethem toaccepthedonism,unless he thoughtthat that view was true?36 he objec-tionis answered f it can be shown, as I have triedto show,that Protagorasand themanyare, despitetheirdisclaimers, edonists,and thusopponentsagainstwhomSocrates'hedonisticargumentagainstakrasia will be effec-tive.(3) It is frequentlypointedout thatSocrates ontinues o makeprofitableuse of thehedonisticpremiseafter theargumentwiththemany scomplete.Partlyon thestrengthof thispremisehe argues orthe unityof courageandwisdom,a thesiswhich he surelyaccepts.To recommend hatargumentassound would be uncharacteristicallyinsincere"(Hackforth,p. 42), andwould show him, implausibly, o be "arguingwith consciousdishonesty"(Taylor,p. 209;cf. Gulley, p. 112).An appeal to Socrates' incerity o limitthe viability of antihedonismwas made by Vlastos in 1956(p. xl, n. 50;retracted n 1969),who stated that "it is mostunlikely thatSocrateswoulddeliberatelyoffera falsepropositionasa premise orestablishinghisgreatproposition that knowledge is virtue) .. . It would have encouragedthelistener to believe a falsehood . . ." (his italics). It may be pointed out in

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response,however,that Socratesdeliberately ecuresthe sophists'consc-ious assentto the hedonisticpremiseafter the argumentwith the many isover (358al-6; cf. I (f) above), and is thus careful to solicit explicitlyalicense to carryover his use of that premise.Whether hat concealment smorally ustifiedor whether t makeshim liableto the chargeof insincerityor dishonestywill depend on what we take to be permissiblewithin hisstrategy.We shouldbe carefulnot to reduceSocratic ronytoa moral ault,nor fail to appreciate he eristiccharacterof the discussion n the Prota-goras.37(4) Irwinhas argued (p. 106) that hedonismis indispensable o a non-question-beggingargumentagainst akrasia.A principle of "hedonisticprudence"which combinesethicaland psychologicalhedonism s needed,he argues, o give backingto the Socraticdoctrine hat no one will choosewhat he knowsor believesto be the lesserof the availablegoods(cf. his 3.,p. 105). Whetherthat Socraticdoctrine is assumed n the argumentmaywell be doubted, but even if it is, the suitabilityof the identificationofgoodnesswithpleasure o givebacking o thatdoctrineand itsusefulness nthis argumentis contingenton the fact that the opponent has alreadyaccepteda principleof hedonisticprudence. f the opponenthad acceptedsome other identificationof the good, then thatidentificationwould haveservedto give backing o the Socraticdoctrine.That doctrineconstitutesageneralpsychological laimabout whatever ne knowsor believes o be thegood, and theprincipleof hedonisticprudence s one case of thatclaim. Itis because themanyalreadyacceptthe principle hat they mustalso acceptthe doctrine;but it does not follow that Socratesmust accepttheprinciplebecause he accepts the doctrine. It is only because the (theory-in-dependent)explanationgivenof akrasiaby the manyis the agent'sbeingovercome by pleasurethat Socrateshas an interest n mountinghis argu-menton a principleof hedonisticprudence,as I have explainedabove; itdoes not followthatSocrateshimselfacceptsthat principle.I have thus farargued thatan antihedonistic eadingof the Protagoraspassage is fully plausible,and free from the objectionsthat have beenraisedagainstit. Prohedonistsmay claim, however,that theirreading sequally supportedby the text (a claim which I have not contested)andexplainedby Socrates'aimsin the argumentwhich, n theirview,wouldbeto give a sound, non-question-beggingrgumentagainstakrasia.To arguefor thepreferability f antihedonism o prohedonismwe needto examinethe implicationof readingthe Protagorasprohedonisticallyn the lightofthe evidence of other dialogues.Thereare two relatedproblemsto which a prohedonisticallyeadPro-262


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tagoras givesrise.The first is the questionof the consistencyof the Prota-goras with other dialogues;the second is the questionabout the philo-sophical positionof the historicalSocratesor at least about Plato'sbeliefsabout thatposition,or the positionPlato took on the relationof pleasureand goodnessat the time he wrotethe Protagoras. On the firstof these,allprohedonistshave acknowledged hat there is a problemof consistency,though some have minimized it.38The verbal similaritiesbetween thethesissupposedlyendorsed n theProtagoras and the thesis attacked n theGorgias are considerable,however,39 nd so mostprohedonistshavegivenother accountsof the discrepancy.Few are as radicalas Grote,who dis-missesattempts o address hisproblem:"We haveno right o require hat(the dialogues) hallbe consistentwitheachother n doctrine"p. 316).ButalthoughPlatodoeschangehismind,sometimesdrastically, e neverdoesso withoutsuggestingreasons or thechange,andwe haveno suchreasonsin the present case. In the Gorgias (which I assumeto be later than theProtagoras but still essentially"Socratic") edonism s representedas thetotal antithesisof the Socraticconceptof the happy life; Socrates s notrepresented s havingsecond thoughts,as movingfroman oldpositionto anewone, but as implacablyopposed to a positionwhich he regardsas mostdestructive orhappiness.The positionof theApology and theCrito (both of which I assumeto beearlierthanthe Protagoras) is of a piece with the Gorgias, and equally atvariance with a prohedonisticProtagoras. The appeals to the supremeimportanceof virtue and the perfectionof the soul seeminconsistentwiththe viewthat pleasure s thegood. We mighttry to harmonize heseappealswith that view by claimingthat virtue and the perfectionof the soul arenecessaryand infalliblysufficientmeans to pleasure, and in that sensesupremely important, and such an attempt has been seriously maderecentlyby Irwin.I canonly say here that I do not think that theattempt ssuccessful,40 or do other attempts seem promising.4'There is an irre-concilableincompatibilitybetween the claim that virtue and the care ofone'ssoul is supremely mportant,and the claim that pleasure s the onlyultimategood.If the "Socrates" f the Protagoras is representedby Plato as a seriousadvocateof hedonism, hen(a) (Plato believed that) the historicalSocratesdid(at one time) hold thatview, or (b) Plato did himself(at one time) holdthatview. It is unlikelythat Plato would seriouslyascribe o his dramatic"Socrates" nywhere n thedialoguesa view with which neitherhe himselfnor, so far as he wouldknow,his masterwas in sympathy.Thussome havesuggested hatthehistoricalSocrateswas indeed a hedonist.42f this is true,

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however, hen neithertheApology and theCrito on theone hand, northeGorgias on the other depict (what Plato believed was) the historicalSocrates,or else (Platobelievedthat) Socrateschangedhis view. As to theformer, surely the Apology and the Crito are intended to portraythehistoricalSocrates,andwe mustnot begthatquestionwiththe Gorgias.Asto thelatter,howarewesupposed o chart his change n Socrates' iew?Bythe dramaticdates of the dialoguesor by their sequence n composition?Further, the absence of any extra-Platonic estimoniafor a hedonisticSocrateshas persuadedone prohedonist ommentator hatthe historicalSocratesdid not espousehedonism.43Alternatively, he hedonismis Plato'sown, and a temporarylirtation.This is the viewof Hackforth p. 42) whothinks hatit is Plato'sattempt omakesense of the Socraticequationof virtue andknowledge,an attemptwhichhe rejectedwhen he came to writethe Gorgias.Thereis, however,equallyno evidenceoutsideof thedialogues or thisview astherewas nonefor a hedonisticSocrates cf.Gulley, p. 113),and it requiresus to postulateequallyunchartable hangesof view to him:if he wrotetheApology andCrito first,then he was probablynot a hedonist to beginwith(assumingthat these dialogues are both Socraticand representative f Plato'sownviewat the time).At sometime thereafter,whenhe wrotetheProtagorashewas a hedonist,and at some timeafterthatwhenhe wrotethePhaedo andtheRepublic (leavingasidethechronological elationof theGorgiasto theProtagoras) he rejectedhedonism.The mostthat can be saidfor a Platonicinterest n hedonismat the time the Protagoras waswritten s that it mighthave been a "thoughtexperiment",not somethingwhichPlatoseriouslybelieved,and perhapsthis is all that Hackforthmeant.But even this isunlikelyif Plato makes"Socrates" he serious spokesmanonly forviewsseriouslyheldby the masteror byhimself.I conclude,then, that the weightof evidenceis heavilyin favor of theantihedonistcase: it is thoroughlycompatiblewith the text of the Prota-goras; it is intelligible n the lightof a plausibleaccountof Socrates' ims;and it can meetobjections oitwhereasa prohedonist ccountcreatesmoreproblems than it solves.44The Centerfor Hellenic StudiesThe Universityof Rhode Island

1 An antihedonist nterpretations at leastas old as MarsilioFicino(1433-1499)quoted(with disapproval)by Grote, p. 314, n. 1.(All works cited are listedin the Bibliography

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below.) Prohedonistsmay differ about whether the historicalSocratesshouldor shouldnot be credited with hedonism, and antihedonists about whether Socrates adoptshedonisminsincerelyor ironically,or not at all.2 Claims about virtueand the soul are found at Apology 28b; 29b-30b;31b; 32a-e; 36c;Crito47e-48a;48b-49a.The attackon hedonism is at Gorgias492d-500d.3 Cf. Aristotle,Nic. Eth. 1095al8-20: "Forboth ordinaryand sophisticatedpeopleunderstand ivingwell andfaringwell to be the samethingasbeinghappy."Cf. alsoRep.354a.4 Assuming that no life is purely pleasant or purely painful. Living pleasantly andpainfullyare thusmattersof degree,as are iving well andlivingbadly.This will allowfora commensurabilitybetween degrees of living well and living pleasantlywhich will beimportant or interpreting ome later statements n the argument.See n. II below.5 I thus thinkthat2 and 3 aremoreimmediatelyhedonisticthanTaylor(p. 164)suggests.At firstsightgoods other thanpleasureand evils other thanpainare not ruledout, but ifthey are intended to have some weight in determiningwhether a life of exactly equalpleasureandpain(a mere theoreticalpossibility, urely) sgoodorbad,and can affectthedegreeof the goodness or badness of a life beyond itsdegreeof pleasureand pain, thensurely a large quantityof suchevilscould suffice to make a slightlypleasant ife bad,anda largequantityof goods a slightlypainful life good. But 2 and 3 do not allowthis;henceit is likelier thattheydo notenvisagegoods otherthan pleasureandevilsotherthanpain.6 That is, a good whose attainmentconstitutes iving well or being happy, and an evilwhose incurrenceconstitutesliving badly. The Euthydemusdefines happiness as thepossessionof good(s), 278e; and the Meno identifies such possession as the object ofdesire,77b-78b. 4 should thus be read as stating, not merely that living pleasantlyis agood thing and livingunpleasantlya bad thing,but that they are thatgood and that evilwhosepossession is constitutiveof happinessor misery,as requiredby the interpretationof 2 and 3 given above.I On this basisCrombie (p. 240) settles for a prohedonistreadingof theProtagoras,andSullivan adopts the view that Socratesis consciously and deliberatelyassuming thehedonisticposition,but is doing so ironically pp. 21-2).8 The diagnosticreading of thesequestions is confirmed at 352a2-6.Using the image ofthe medical examiner, Socrates interprets the discussion at 351b-e as an attempt todetermine"how(Protagoras) tand(s)with regardto the pleasant and thegood"(a7).9 That some pains are good is stated in 6, a propositionwhich Socrates links with 5.Protagorasdoesexplicitly say "thatsome pains are not bad"(at 6) presumably herebyaccepting6.10This view isexplicitlyassignedto themanylater (at353cff.)whereSocratesshows thatthoughit appearsto be a denial of hedonism it can yet be construed as consistent withhedonism, and it isonly on such a construction hat themanyareallowedto maintaintheview, given their hedonistic criteria of evaluations. Here, however, Socrates pressesProtagoraso deny it, withoutallowing him to consideritshedonisticconstruction.11 Thus 7cannot be used to defendantihedonismbyclaimingthat itallowspleasure o bea good, one of a pluralityof goods, asVlastosdoes (1969, pp. 76-8and n. 24). In context,the purpose of 7 is not to state thatpleasant things are good quapleasantwhereasotherthingsmay be good qua somethingelse as well, but that all pleasantthings,whethertheyare praiseworthyor not, are good merely qua pleasant, and not qua pleasant in somespecific way. Goods other than pleasure and evils other than pain have alreadybeen

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eliminatedfrom consideration n thediscussion(cf. nn. 5 and 6 above).The use of xn'O". . . xorrnTOro (c4) and xamW'oov.. (xarr TooGo'Tovo be supplied beforexax6, c6)suggestsboth a qualitative and a quantitativecorrelation between being pleasantandbeing good: things aregood in the veryrespect n whichthey arepleasant,and to the verydegree o which they arepleasant.Sinceother goods andevils do not playany part n theargument,7can be takenin a strongsense: things aregood only in the respect n which,and to the degree to which, they are pleasant;bad only in the respect n which, and to thedegree to which, they are painful. A more explicit way of assertingthe identity ofgoodness and pleasurecould hardly be found, and Protagoras s not confused (paceVlastos, ibid.) n taking 7 to be a statementof thatidentity, at e4-6.12 See e.g., Taylor, p. 166,sub 351c2-3 and 351c4.13 See Sullivan, p. 21subfin.14 See Vlastos, ibid.; Cf. n. I I above.15 Protagoras' ontemptfor the many has been in evidence since 317a;cf. 352e3,4, and353a7,8. His hesitation to dissociatehimself from the views of the many (a hesitationexplicablebywhatwe knowof his epistemology) s clear at 333c; cf. 359c.16 The introductory lause at c4, "kyQ &pXiyw"cannot here be readas introducingastatementexpressing the speaker'sview, for it introducesa direct question and not anindirectstatement,as that readingwould require.17Taylor p. 176) missesthis backwardreferenceof the clause. He finds(b) "less attrac-tive" than (a) but also thinks that "on either reading the sentencepresents he difficultythat it asserts a unanimitybetween Socratesand Protagoraswhich is not justified byanythingsaid previously."He does not saywhy he thinksthis is true for(b)."8Thegerundives expressmoral or prudentialnecesity,not psychologicalnecessity.SeeTaylor, pp. 189-190;Dyson, p. 33.19 For my account of the natureof the absurdityand its location in the text,see Zeyl.20 Incaseone is tempted to think thatSocratesdoes include himself,as shownby his useof 'p.iv n ". . . Niq&vetv.. .", it should be pointedout that this dativeis possessiveandmodifies aT-rqpia o0Iov, as it clearlydoes at 356e5.21 It is not clear whetherEfV,Lhereindicates predicationor identity.Identitystatementsabout the good sometimes lack the article,as, e.g., at Philebus11b4. The absence of thearticlemaybe explained by the monistictendencyof Greek eudaimonism:fsomething sproposed as good in the sense that it provides the standard wherebyother thingsarejudged good, thengiven thattendency, t is the only such goodor thegood.This exclusiveuse of the predicatewas already n evidence, I believe, at 35IcI (= 4 above).In any case,in the present passage the sophists'assentis takenas an acceptanceof hedonism,for theassent is recalled at 360a3 as implying acceptanceof the view that if anything s praise-worthy and good, it is pleasant.22 This answersa question raisedby Taylor, p. 201 sub 358a1-5.23 The protest occurredat 351c1,2. Taylor(pp. 201-2)rightlyconcludesthatProtagorasmust have changed his mind during the precedingargument,at thepointwherethemanywere supposed to be persuaded that they accept no other standardof goodness thanpleasure.But Protagorasneed not have believed that Socrateswas tryingto prove thehedonisticthesis; he may simply have realized that he had no altemativestandardofgoodnessto propose,whether on the many'sbehalf or on his own.24 The inclusion of belief in the statementof the paradox,when theprecedingargumentconcernedonly the "powerof knowledge" s puzzling.For my accountof the puzzleseeZeyl.266


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25 Vlastos, 1969,pp. 83-4. Vlastos makes the Protagorasargumentdepend on the argu-ment from (S1)-(S4). For my criticism,see n. 33 below.26 Two auxiliary premises are needed to get the entailment:(I) If X and Y are bothmeansto one's welfare(= contributeto one'swelfare) and one knows that X contributesmore to one's welfare than Y, one will want X more thanY; and (2) X is betterthan Y ifand only if X contributes more to one's welfare than Y. These auxiliarypremisesmayeasily be granted Socrates, given the logical structureof his eudaemonism: if welfareisthe only thing desired for itself (S3) then the degree of one's desire for anythingelse iscommensuratewith the extentof the contributionone believes the thing to make to one'swelfare; and one's criterion for judging one thing to be betterthan another is just thedifferencein the extent of their contributions.27 As Irwin has noticed, p. 308, n. 13.2, the argument from (SJ)-(S4) is related to theargumentat Meno 77b-78b. I am indebted to Irwinfor an appreciationof the inadequacyof such an argument in the presentcontext.28 (S3) is never doubted by a Socratic nterlocutor,and Socratesthinks that it would besilly to doubt it, Euthydemus 78e3-6; cf. Meno 78a4,5. It expresses the central thesis ofGreek eudaemonism.29 Given the explanation, "because the agent is overcome by pleasure", he argument snot effective against a non-hedonisticopponent who merely recognizespleasuretobeonegood among others(contra Vlastos, 1969, pp. 86-7). The only way a non-hedonistcouldexplainthe agent's defeat by pleasure as defeat by a good would be to say thatthisgooddiffered qualitatively from that of the rejected option as well as quantitatively. ButSocrates expressly disallows any criterion other than quantity to determine the "worthi-ness" of the goods in question (355d6-e2; 356a1-5), and this a non-hedonist would notaccept.30 Note that Socrates does not take Protagorasup on his offer to "examine" he issue ofthe identity of pleasure and the good (35 1e3-7), and with good reason.If Socrates s not ahedonist then to argue for the identity explicitly would be to compromise his non-hedonism, and to argue against it would undermine his own argumentagainstakrasia.31 Protagoras'acceptance of the "power of knowledge" (352c8-d3) is hardly consistentwith his own non-cognitiveview of virtue (his notion of "teaching" s quite unsocratic: tappearsto be little more than social conditioning;cf. 322d-326e),expressedmostrecentlyat 351b1,2. He is persuadedby Socrates'rhetorical ourdeforceon behalf of the powerofknowledge,which is not so much Socrates'own impassioneddoxology to knowledgeas adeliberate rhetorical( ) device aimed at securing Protagoras'assent to a positionwithwhich he ought to disagree. Note that in accepting it Protagorasappeals, not to therelation of that thesis to his other beliefs, but to his personalposition and interests. Inmaking"the many" bear the burden of views which Protagoras ught to accept, Socratescreates an "alter tu" for Protagoras.This is an ingenious dialectical maneuver whoseadvantagesshould be obvious.32 The legitimacy of the substitutionshas been questionedby Taylor, pp. 180-181.Foracriticismof Taylor, see Zeyl.33 For a development and defense of this view of the absurdityagainst other accounts,see Zeyl. I must mention here Vlastos' account (1969), for hisview of the absurdity eadshim to construe the argument in the Prt. as dependent on the argumentfrom (SI)-(S4).The absurdity, on his view, is that the many's explanation of akrasia characterizes heagentaschoosing knowinglygreaterevils as the price for lesser goods. I believe that thisis

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wrong (see also Taylor, p. 185, Irwin, p. 308, n. 12), for if the many's explanation ofakrasia is on analysis found to be a knowingchoice of greaterevils, it is hard to see how itis on analysis supposed to be ignorance,as the argumentrequires.Even if Vlastos s right,however, it is not at all clear that the argument from (S1)-(S4) could be persuasivewithout begging the question.34 Grote, p. 314. Cf. ibid.,"Throughout ll the Platoniccompositions, here is nowhere tobe found any train of argumentmore direct, moreserious,and more elaborate,thanthatby which Sokrateshere proves the identityof the good with pleasure,or pain with evil (p.351 to end)."35 Hackforth, p. 41: "Socrates originally propounds the doctrine and propounds itseriously . ."; Dodds, p. 21, n. 3: "The dialoguecontains no hint that the assumption smade merely for the sake of argument. ..36 Thisargumenthasbeen widelyusedby prohedonists: ee Grote, pp. 314-5; Hackforth,p. 41; Dodds, p. 21, n. 3; Irwin, p. 309,n. 13.37 Prohedonistsregularly underratethe irony of the passage; cf. nn. 34 and 35 above.Although I do not accept the view that Socrates is explicitly representinghimself as ahedonist, but only ironically(Sullivan'sview), the irony in the passageis inescapable toone not already partialto a prohedonistview. Socratic rony (if not sarcasm) s seldom soblunt as it is at 357e, where Socrateschides the many forfailing to purchase ) a sophistic( ) education. "This is more than an ironical aside in an otherwise straightforwardexposition:it is rathera cluethatSocrates snotbeingstraightforwardtall"(O' Brien,p.138).38 So Taylor, p. 170,arguesfor distinguishing he thesishe takesSocrates o be endorsingin the Protagoras romthatwhichhe attacks n the Gorgias.And Crombie writes,p. 248,". . . Evenif at the (probably early) date at which hewrote the GorgiasPlatohad thoughtthat it was in one sense true to say that all pleasant thingsaregood, it would have suitedhis purpose betterto stressthe sense in which this is false."39 The similaritiesarenoted by Adamand Adam, p.000.40 Irwin, p. 93. Irwin's position has been criticized by Vlastos in the TimesLiterarySupplement,Feb. 22, 1978,and in subsequentcorrespondence.41 The temptation to credit Socrateswith a rarefiedhedonism,such thatonly the pleas-ure experienced n virtuousaction, etc. ispleasure n anacceptablesensemustbe resisted,since it findsno support n the Protagorasandseemsto be rejectedby Socrates'objectionto Protagoras' qualification that only pleasure at praiseworthy things counts indetermining hegoodnessof a life (35lc 1,2;cf. I (a) above).Norwill theProtagoras llowa pluralityof ultimategoods (pleasureandvirtue)if Socratesbelieveswiththe manythatthere is no other standardof goodness than pleasure(353c9-354e2).42 Adam and Adam, p. xxxii; Taylor, p. 210.43 Gulley, p. II 3f.44 Research on this subject was begun during a seminar sponsored by the NationalEndowmentforthe Humanities n thesummerof 1978,and thepaperwas writtenduringthe tenureof a Junior Fellowship at the Center for Hellenic Studies.I wishto thankbothinstitutions ortheir support.I am especiallygrateful o ProfessorGregoryVlastosfor hiscriticismand encouragement.

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BibliographyAdam,J. and A. M. Adam, PlatonisProtagoras,Cambridge, 1893.Crombie,I. M., An Examinationof Plato'sDoctrines,Vol. I, Plato on Man and Society,London and New York, 1962.Dodds, E. R., Plato, Gorgias,Oxford, 1959.Dyson, M., "Knowledge and Hedonism in Plato's Protagoras",Journal of HellenicStudies,vol. 96, 1976, pp. 32-45.Grote, G., Plato and the OtherCompanionsof Sokrates, new edition Vol. II, London,1888.Grube,G. M. A., "TheStructuralUnity of the Protagoras",ClassicalQuarterly, ol. 27,1933, pp. 203-207.Gulley, N., ThePhilosophyof Socrates,London, 1968.Hackforth,R., "Hedonism in Plato'sProtagoras",ClassicalQuarterly, ol. 22, 1928, pp.39-42.Irwin,T. H., Plato's MoralTheory:TheEarlyand MiddleDialogues,Oxford, 1977.Klosko, G., "Toward a Consistent Interpretationof the Protagoras" ArchivfurGeschichtederPhilosophie,vol. 61, 1979,pp. 125-142.O'Brien, M. J., TheSocraticParadoxesandthe GreekMind, Chapel Hill, 1967.Sullivan,J. P., "The Hedonism in Plato's Protagoras",Phronesis,vol. 6, 1961,pp. 10-28.Taylor, C. C. W., Plato:Protagoras,Oxford, 1976.Vlastos, G., ed., Plato, Protagoras, ndianapolis, 1956.Vlastos,G., "Socrateson Acrasia",Phoenix, vol. 23, 1969,pp. 71-88.Zeyl, D. J., "The SocraticArgument Against Akrasiain the Protagoras",unpublished.Publicationexpected.

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Socrates and Hedonism