Social Justice and Socioeconomic Stratification in a …lasa.international.pitt.edu/LASA98/Hostettler.pdfSocial Justice and Socioeconomic Stratification in a Maya Peasant Society:

Social Justice and Socioeconomic Stratification in a MayaPeasant Society:

A Case Study from Central Quintana Roo, Mexico

Ueli Hostettler1

Institut für EthnologieUniversität Bern

Länggassstr. 49aCH-3000 Bern 9

Switzerland

[email protected]

Current mail address:

29, 1st AvenueCorozal Town

Belize, Central America

Prepared for delivery at the 1998 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, ThePalmer House Hilton Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, September 24-26, 1998

DraftI appreciate comments and suggestions

© 1998 by Ueli Hostettler

Abstract

The paper explores the effects of socioeconomic stratification in a Lowland Maya peasantsociety. Both present-day and past situations are analyzed in the light of theories of socialjustice. The paper includes a discussion of the concept of local social justice, which serves as aframework of analysis of institutions that allocate goods and services and provide rules andnorms for social interaction.

Social Justice and Socioeconomic Stratification in a Maya Peasant Society -- LASA 98 / 2

I. Introduction: towards an empirical approach to social justice

President Ernesto Zedillo emphasized in his recent "Cuarto Informe de Gobierno" that "Méxicovive ya en la democracia". However, he also admitted that in order to achieve social justice inboth its formal and material aspects there remains a long way to go.2 More than half of Mexico'spopulation lives in poverty and faces oppressions in many forms and in various degrees andconjunctions. They include exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural domination andviolence and their existence indicates the precarious state of social justice in this country.

I will not engage in the theoretical debate on social justice. In this debate different versionsof universal and prescriptive conceptions, John Rawls' formulation (1971)is certainly the mostprominent among them, have been challenged in recent years by a postmodern critique. Thiscritique disapproves strongly of the belief that universal truths can be found and applied tosociety.3 For my purposes, I make use of a less far-reaching, less ambitious but empiricalconcept of social justice. One that is scaled down to particular local contexts where, dependingon the "sphere" in which distributions are being considered, forms of justice are different. Thus,standards of justice are relative to claims of need and entitlement made in particularsocieties(such approaches are often called “communitarian”, for discussion see e.g. Mapel1989). In this local context, I will look at changes in the economic system and in associatedforms of stratification. These transformations result from adaptations and adjustments made inthe local context in the course of its interaction with economic and social processes locatedoutside this local domain. An attempt is made, however, to avoid a simple reduction ofprocesses in the local context to the ones happening in the wider social fields.

In what follows, I will describe in some details the complex transformations of a LowlandMaya peasant economy over a period of a century (ca. 1880-1990). The continuity of aparticular social formation on the background of change depends on ongoing renegotiations ofsocial, political, economic and cultural boundaries. In the Mesoamerican context, manyarrangements of leveling mechanisms which hinder the mobilization of wealth and slow downthe effects of capitalism in local affairs have been described (e.g. Wolf 1957). Sucharrangements may be interpreted as elements of a complex "culture of resistance". However,one should not think of such a phenomenon exclusively in terms of an egalitarian ideologybecause socioeconomic stratification has been a fundamental feature of life in suchcommunities for a long time.

I will describe a special labor arrangement which I observed in milpa agriculture in thecontext of the Xcacal group of central Quintana Roo. This particular organization of labor iscalled kol bet ixim in Yucatec Maya and means “making milpa (i.e. felling) in exchange ofpayment in maize”. I will describe the system in terms of a leveling mechanism that can beinterpreted as an element of local justice or, in other words, as an institution that organizes theallocation of scarce resources. In this case, the concern is with the transfer of maize to thosewho suffer subsistence crisis or harvest loss. Maize is transferred to them from householdswhich either are not affected or have surplus grain stored form previous harvests. It is importantto note that maize is both the most important element of Maya diet and the "stuff of life" in thewider sense of religious practice and identity. A central claim is that we must pay carefulattention to the way such "locally" designed institutions are (or become) connected to economiccycles of the larger market system and that we must analyze their status in processes ofsocioeconomic stratification. This may contribute to an interpretation of "culture of resistance"seen as an important means to mediate relationships with the larger capitalist world. As thismediation always has the double character of resistance and of accommodation, it is importantto acknowledge its inherent complexities, ambiguities, and contradictions.4


II. Maya communities, economy, and socioeconomic stratification in Central QuintanaRoo

(1) Introduction

Most of the villages in central Quintana Roo were established by Maya people who foughtduring the prolonged and bloody Caste War of Yucatán between 1847 and 1901 against theirnon-Maya oppressors (Dumond 1997; Joseph 1985; Reed 1964). This paper focuses on aparticular group of villages, the so-called Xcacal group. This group split in 1929 from the mainbody of descendants of Maya rebels (see Figure 1 and Hostettler 1996a; Sullivan 1989; VillaRojas 1945).

After defeating the Maya in 1901, the Mexican authorities used strategies of “divide andrule” and "laissez faire” with the subsequent imposition of law and order to overcome localresistance towards integration and subordination. By the end of the 1920s, the government hadgained a definitive foothold in central Quintana Roo and started to implement its the maininstruments of integration such as the administrative apparatus, formal education, and theagrarian reform. Despite these government efforts, the Xcacal group had remained aloof untilthe mid-1930s when its leaders agreed to petition for a land grant (ejido). In return for the ejido,which granted them exclusive access to only a part of what they considered their rightfulhomelands, Xcacal group members had to give up resistance and open their villages toteachers and government officials (Sullivan 1989; Villa Rojas 1979).

This process of opening affected everyday life on various levels. In the domain of economy,the diversification of the local productive system increased and dependence on distanteconomic forces increased. Social stratification increasingly became related to money, ratherthan to prestige and rank. Likewise the importance of subsistence agriculture, based on shiftingcultivation of maize and associated crops by means of the milpa system, declined.5 The politicaland juridical systems, based before on self-government, were taken over by the state. Changesin cultural values and attitudes became visible in the decline of parental authority in enforcingobedience of the youth, the shift from compulsory participation in worship to one based on freewill, and in the emergence of new religious belief promoted by the Catholic and Protestantchurches (Bartolomé and Barabas 1977; Villa Rojas 1962; 1977). Both of these religiousorientations outspokenly oppose forms of religious practice centered upon the cult of the holycrosses (see Bartolomé 1974; Dumond 1985).

(2) Economic change and productive systems, 1890s to 1990s

The following is a sketch of the economic transformation of the past century (see Figure 2). Isee the production system as the total of available productive activities at a given moment andadopted by specific social groups. Its particular form, then, is related to the historical contextand a product of both internal and external factors. Alterations of a production system in timecan be understood as “structural change”. I will now discuss three major structural changes incentral Quintana Roo and point out their social and economic impact.

(a) A diversified economy of war

During the Caste War, the rebel society built a theocratic state based on military rank andprestige (See Sullivan 1997a; 1997b). Military leaders were privileged in many ways. Theycontrolled the best lands for their own agricultural enterprises and used prisoners of war to workthese fields . They also hold back great amounts of the spoils obtained during belligerentincursions into enemy territories. These spoils were never distributed equally among the troops(Jones 1971). The war-related income benefited in the first place high-ranking members of the


rebel society, who, at the same time, were responsible for guaranteeing the continuity of warfarethrough the supply of arms and ammunition. Maintaining a functioning army required groupcohesion, which depended on the redistribution of assets to lower ranks. The war-relatedeconomy changed when the Mexican government improved by the end of the 19th century itscontrol of trade between the rebels and British Honduras on the southern border and the mostimportant line of supplies was gradually cut off (Dumond 1997; Macías Richard 1997). Activities,such as the taking of war booty and prisoners and the distribution of concessions for forestexploitation ceased. Demographic loss and the physical isolation achieved by the Mexican armyafter 1901 contributed to the contraction of the Maya economy to the "core business”: thepursuit of bare survival through subsistence agriculture (milpa) and related activities.

(b) Isolation and economic disconnection

Early ethnographic reports of Maya lifestyle in Quintana Roo -- referring to the period between1900 and 1940 -- depict a society whose members were almost exclusively engaged insubsistence agriculture.6 Villa Rojas, for example, offers a homogeneous picture for the 1920sand 1930s and reports the existence of equal economic opportunities for all producers.Moreover, he affirms that “[n]othing one observes in their ordinary, daily behavior suggests theexistence of differences in accumulated wealth” (1945: 65). However, he admits the existence ofdifferences in individual property and he also clearly states that

This equality of opportunity is a recent matter, for some years ago when the chiefs hadgreater authority, the lands of the bush were distributed by them and the best portionpreserved for their own use. In some cases men were thus able to enrich themselvesthrough special advantage. (1945: 66)

The situation of isolation of Maya communities was interpreted by many observers as anexpression of a high degree of “Indianness” or even of a survival of the pre-Hispanic past (e.g.Redfield 1941). However, the above quotation from Villa Rojas indicates that isolation wasrather a transitory stage caused, above all, by the military defeat in 1901 and by war andepidemic-related demographic disasters. By the end of the 1910s and after roughly two decadesof reduced trade opportunities, this apparently isolated subsistence became connected to theworld market through the exploitation of chicle.7 This is a re-integration rather than the finalsurrender of a “traditional” or “pre-capitalist” society to capitalism.

(c) Economic re-integration

During the Mexican revolution the Mexican troops withdrew in 1915 from central Quintana Rooand local Maya leaders and their followers quickly adapted to the new situation. They imposedtaxes on the incipient exploitation of chicle carried out by foreign contractors. World War I hadmade chicle an important strategic raw material and its exploitation a booming business (Konrad1987). Later, the Maya themselves engaged in chicle gathering. Taxes resulted primarily inassets for high-ranking members (i.e. the officers), whereas the tapping of chicle providedincome to all levels of society. Due to the increasing importance of chicle, Mayas becameinvolved in more frequent and profound contacts with government institutions. However,precisely because some leaders were more inclined to respond to the government’s request fordialogue, conflicts over the issue of “speaking with the enemy” during the late 1920s split thegroup into several sub-groups, the Xcacal group being one of them (see Hostettler 1996a: 47ff.)

Maya households continued to diversify and intensify their economy by engaging in small-scale commerce and re-investing in the production of livestock and hogs. Domestic animalsbecame commodities, once again, much like maize and beans from milpa agriculture did.During the 1960s and 1970s, the construction of roads and the availability of electric power


improved communication and freed manpower. On local markets the demand for local productsincreased. In addition, government agencies introduced new productive activities including theproduction of tie for the Mexican Railroad Company,8 apiculture with European bees,horticulture, and the production of handicrafts. The construction of the large-scale tourismcomplex of Cancún starting during the 1970s multiplied wage labor opportunities(Daltabuit andPi-Sunyer 1991). Today, the Maya production system in central Quintana Roo is diversified andcharacterized by a mixed productive strategy directed simultaneously towards meetinghousehold needs and towards the market.

In sum, the impact of change on the social system since the 1960s was of a greatmagnitude. Better infrastructure contributed to an increase in the circulation of commodities andpeople. And consumption patterns gradually changed and new needs were firmly established.Although milpa agriculture remains important until today, the local production system has beendiversified and intensified over the past decades.

(3) The effects of socioeconomic stratification

Certainly the Xcacal group’s rapprochement with the Mexican government during the 1930s canbe seen as a major rupture. However, by 1960 the pace of change increased when thegovernment started to develop the region's basic infrastructure. Most of the rural inhabitantsattribute changes in their lifestyle and living conditions to the vicissitudes of the 1960s and1970s, rather than to those of the 1930s. Albeit change is a gradual and enduring phenomenon,I shall use 1960 here as a “turning point” in order to compare different stages of change and tounderstand its effects on the relationships in production.9 What happens to cycles of wealthaccumulation, to the composition of households and to those who are entitled to define meaningon behalf of others? What happens with socioeconomic stratification and with its material andsymbolic facets? I shall now briefly summarize what I consider to be the fundamental economicand social change and support my assessment empirically.

Before 1960, socioeconomic differences correlate with success in milpa agriculture and withprestige. Surplus from the milpa is re-invested in animal production and the existing cash-income derives mainly from the exploitation of chicle. Members of poor households are forced towork for others. This indicates that the (re)production success in the local context depends onthe effective control of household labor and on the capacity to draw on the labor force of otherhouseholds. The rich also hold important ritual and political cargo. In general, they aresignificantly older and live in extended-family type households. Many of the characteristics ofthe rich derive from the principle of seniority.

The dynamic of economic stratification is limited by moral obligations such as the kol betixim labor system and other economic leveling devices. Ritual practice and the moral discourseprovide effective means to maintain solidarity among individuals and households within thecommunity in accordance with extra-economic institutions (e.g. kinship and military-religiousorganization).

Over the past three decades, rich households shifted from a milpa-centered economy tocommerce and transportation. Poor households, on the other hand, work small milpa plots.They are chronically affected by subsistence crisis and many of them are indebted to otherhouseholds. Members of poor households are forced to seek wage labor opportunities inside oroutside their community. The money earned by young people outside their villages, returns totheir communities and challenges the old-established rich. Members of poor households moreand more become semi-proletarians depending on both wages and a restricted and insufficientfood production.

The older system of seniority-based domination gives way to a situation of contest foreconomic, political and ideological power. The outcome is an incipient class formation withinthe community. It is based on the control of both capital and labor. Today, rich and poor are


distinguished by means of the cash-criterion (capital). Moreover, the categories of employersand employees are used as arguments to express the social division. Nonetheless, thetendency towards a basic stratification between households controlling transportation andcommerce and those depending on wages is not yet as clear as, for example, in HighlandChiapas(see Cancian 1992; Collier 1990; Flood 1994). That individuals and households nolonger operate within the same economic and social context as before is supported by thefollowing analysis of qualitative and quantitative data. However, it is important to note thatdespite thorough transformations, the community is far from falling apart.

(a) From maize to money: changes in the assessment of wealth

Reproduction in a milpa-centered and household-based economy is influenced more by internalfactors such as domestic cycles, relevant technical knowledge and experience than it is byexternal economic forces. This echoes Chayanov’s ideal type of the peasant household (1974).Well-being and wealth is manifest and measured in terms of the amount of produced maize. Inaddition, milpa agriculture is not solely aimed at producing food. It is also a “fait social total”governing institutions and practice in different domains of society.

Figure 3 illustrates changes in the relative importance of milpa agriculture in constituting,expressing, and assessing wealth. It compares criteria used by informants in their assessmentsof wealth of a “retrospective” wealth ranking referring to the late 1950s and one of the 1993-situation.10 For the late 1950s, the informants expressed wealth differences betweenhouseholds using five criteria: (1) the size of the milpa plots, (2) the number and type ofdomestic animals owned, (3) the amount of money savings, (4) participation in chicle gatheringand (5) different modalities of work.

Criteria one through four are quantitative variables and self-evident. The modalities of workrefer to the system of kol bet ixim. This system buffers harvest loss and subsequentsubsistence crisis through the moral obligation of those having maize to hand it over, inexchange for labor, to those in need. The system bears aspects of a leveling-device. But, at thesame time, kol bet also reinforces and engenders stratification between rich households who“pay milpa” and less fortunate households increasingly depending on kol bet payments forreproduction.

The commentaries used in the 1993-rankings depict major shifts in stratification. Theystress the successful handling of credit given by government institutions, the knowledge of howto invest cash, the shift to commerce and transportation, the commercial exploitation of forestresources, horticultural production, and temporary wage labor. In 1993, rich households ownedshops, engaged in intermediary selling of local produce, controlled transport facilities, obtainedcredits from the agrarian bank and other government agencies, and employed workers throughkol bet and, more frequently, by paying in cash.

(b) Being older no longer means being wealthier

Data presented in Figure 4 serve to analyze two idealized forms of wealth accumulation. (1) Inself-sufficient, family-based peasant households, wealth is related to the domestic cycle. Theessential regulative factor of differentiation lies within the household itself. Older households(here represented by the age of household heads) tend to be wealthier than young householdsare. This principle of seniority is further enhanced by cultural factors (e.g. cargo system). (2)The mixed subsistence-and-market production opens new channels for social and economicmobility. This contradicts the domestic cycle-based accumulation of wealth. Youngerhouseholds are able to accumulate outside domains related to milpa agriculture. Differentiationis the product of economic cycles of the larger market system and the outcome of the particularform of insertion of the local economies into the larger system.


While during the late 1950s wealth was exclusively the business of older households, datafor 1993 show a trend towards an age-independent form of wealth in the highest rank thatchallenges the privilege of old households. It is no longer a given that the very rich (always inlocal terms) are old households (i.e. household heads). However, with strata two through four,we see a pattern characteristic for an age-related form of accumulation. Households in stratumfour (poor) are significantly younger and those in stratum two (richer) are significantly older. Instratum three, households are neither significantly young nor old as both forms overlap.

(c) Do the rich and poor increasingly drift apart?

How does stratification work within the local framework? Do the rich become richer and the pooreven poorer? Figure 5 shows the relative distribution of household property by wealth in 1989and 1993. Data used here are based on household surveys. The graph shows that between1989 and 1993 stratification has increased, not in absolute terms, but in the way wealth isdistributed among the households in the sample. In 1989, the lowest fifth of poor householdsowned approximately 5.5 percent and the highest fifth of rich households controlled about 46percent of the total wealth. In 1993, four years later, the lowest fifth’s share was reduced toabout 3.3 percent, while the share of the highest fifth increased to 55 percent of the totalproperty.

This strongly indicates a deepening gap between rich and poor. However, is this trend aresult of the fact that the poor are getting poorer or that the rich are getting richer? And, will thepoor in a few more years cease to exist because there is nothing left they could possess? Datapresented in Figure 6 on property and income per household and wealth stratum address thesequestions. The influence of household types (i.e. extended vs. nuclear family) and their varyingsize and composition is neutralized by accounting for property and income per producer.Moreover, the amounts of wealth and income in the poorest stratum in 1989 are used as indicesand set each to 100 percent. All other values are computed in relation to these indices.

Property accounts primarily for the economic performance of households in the pastwhereas income is a measure of the actual economic condition of a household. The averageproperty for all households in both years remained the same, indicating that in absolute termsno change occurred. At the same time, the disparity between the strata has increased in 1993and their property has dropped if compared to 1989. Only in stratum two, property hassignificantly increased (+130), mainly because some households have acquired vehicles since1989 and invested in transportation service. Stratum one is affected by a massive loss (-200)followed by stratum three (-57) and four (-40). Moreover, the lower strata (four and three) andthe upper (two and one) have moved closer; more specifically, stratum three approaches fourand two moves up to one. This causes the gap between both pairs to widen.

In 1993, both the overall average income and the strata-specific averages have increased.Stratum four shows the largest increase (+48) while stratum one lags considerably behind (+9).One possible explication for the good performance of stratum four can be found in the fact thathouseholds in the poorest stratum have benefited to higher degree -- in relative terms -- fromgovernment subsidies which only became available for individuals after 1989 (i.e. the “ProgramaNacional de Solidaridad” PRONASOL). Focusing on income, one can observe that the poorestgain ground with respect to the better off by almost equaling the standing of stratum three. Atthe same time the rich lose ground. In addition, the gap between the lower and upper strata-pairs does not change.

These observations indicate that (1) if we look at the distribution of property, the gapbetween rich and poor is deepening and (2) if we look at the distribution of income, the verypoor gain ground. In other words, the poor appear to hold their own over time -- they maintain aconstant number of household animals and bee hives and of other indispensable items -- while,at the same time, wealthier households create and capture new wealth by letting “money work”.


This means that the poorer will lose terrain relative to the expanding wealthy without, however,being inevitably driven into desperate poverty in the near future. The threat of a drift into miseryis further moderated by the fact that the access to land, which is the most important resource forboth subsistence agriculture and for cash-crop production, remains open on a wealth-neutralbasis.

Along with the general trend toward increasing stratification and, eventually, the shift from amainly subsistence-oriented livelihood, to one firmly inserted into the market system, we canrecognize conditions for the creation of enduring local classes. The local stratification thenbecomes articulated more closely with broader systems of stratification. However, at the sametime, it is locally recognized that the wealthy became wealthy not by “stealing” from their poorerneighbors but rather by creating and capturing new wealth. As long as the stratification processdoes not deprive people of their right to work the resources god provided them (i.e. land, forest,maize, etc.), local explications attribute stratification to the unequal distribution of humancapabilities and proclivities. In addition, when compared with Highland Chiapas (Cancian 1992;Collier 1990), the situation in central Quintana Roo promises less disruptive developments forcommunity, community authority and participation in ritual.

III. The organization of labor in milpa agriculture: kol bet ixim

In general, tasks related to milpa agriculture are carried out exclusively by members of thehousehold. However, men will also hire out their labor force to work for another household ifcircumstances urge them to do so. The most common cause for engaging in this kind of labor isa subsistence crisis. With maize reserves diminishing every day, one will easily engage in workfor others if offered. Due to the fact that the primary motivation for working in another person’splot comes from one’s own lack of maize, it is obvious that, in past decades, such labor waspaid in kind rather than with money. This work system is called in Yucatec-Maya kol bet ixim,which as stated above, means "making milpa or felling bush in exchange of payment withmaize". Villa Rojas observed the system back in the mid-1930s (1945: 69). Although felling isthe most frequently executed task under this labor agreement, other tasks such as planting,weeding, and harvesting may also be done following the same logic (i.e. payment in kind).According to the input of labor required for each task, an equivalent of payment in maize isestablished. The hardest work is the felling of high forest. Harvesting and planting areconsidered to be the least strenuous of these tasks.

Villa Rojas clearly distinguished between village members who work for co-villagers forpayment in kind and non-villagers who are recruited for the same tasks, although usually undera wage agreement. In most cases, these are men from the state of Yucatán, who enter centralQuintana Roo in times of scarcity in their home villages or towns. They are usually provided withshelter and food during their labor engagement, and their wage is based on rates previouslyagreed upon. This pattern of labor in milpa agriculture survived with some modifications until thepresent time. Still today, non-villagers, primarily from the Valladolid area, are recruited to workmilpas in Yaxley. They are paid in money after completing their work. On the other hand, locallaborers who engage in preparing or maintaining the milpas of their co-villagers are still mainlypaid in kind. Or, when a wage agreement is made, the amount of money paid is based on anequivalent actual value of the amount of maize corresponding to a certain task. A laborer alsomay wish to obtain the agreed payment part in kind and part in money.11

I have already stated above that the kol bet system tends to generate and perpetuatedifferences between the two extremes, the poor households on the one hand and rich ones onthe other. In past decades, wealth was mainly related to milpa agriculture (i.e. the amount ofmaize a household produces). By investing some of the surplus maize in kol bet arrangements,rich households are able to expand their milpa and domestic animal production beyond theconstraints imposed by household labor resources. In the case of poor households, members


who do work for other households will limit their potential labor input in their own plots. This is, inmy view, the basic logic of the system at the present time. However, several factors must beconsidered in order to assess the impact of such a system.

Given the high variability (in time and space) of the main agroclimatic factors -- i.e. rain,drought, winds, pests, and depredators -- losses in milpa agriculture can be interpreted in termsof pure chance. In other words, everybody may suffer losses independently of his / hersocioeconomic situation, and the role of being an employer or a laborer is the result of chancerather than of structurally fixed processes of differential accumulation. Then the system will notautomatically lead to a process of polarization between those who employ laborers and thosewho sell their labor force. Instead it may be interpreted as a system of mutual aid providing acertain degree of leveling of disparities in subsistence agriculture. And, as such, it helps toprevent the community from falling apart.

Both Villa Rojas’ account and my own inquiries in Yaxley support an interpretation of thepast situation as one of unsystematic occurrence of losses in agricultural production. Moreover,I am also inclined to argue that in the past (i.e. before 1960), milpa agriculture, as a crucial partof household economies, received much more attention than it does today. This emphasis onmilpa had two important effects. More labor was allocated to milpa agriculture, and the potentialof this agriculture to meet subsistence needs was greater. During the first four decades of thiscentury, self-sufficiency based on greater efforts directed towards the milpa and on a greatervariety of crops grown was a vital element for the social reproduction in central Quintana RooMaya society. It seems then that the agricultural system was better prepared to respond tosubsistence crisis, whether affecting individual households or villages as a whole. In sum, Iwould argue that situations causing individuals to work for others did not present themselves asfrequently as today. By the same token, such situations could happen to everyone on a ratherrandom basis.

On the other hand, if those who are pressed to engage in kol bet labor and those who willprovide them with this opportunity remain the same over an extended period, the system ofmutual aid in guaranteeing subsistence within a local setting must have received a significanttransformation. My argument here is that in central Quintana Roo, the randomly determined kolbet labor system was transformed over the past years into a system characterized more andmore by the dynamics of polarization.

Of course, I have no quantitative data regarding kol bet arrangements in past times whichcould be compared with the actual situation. However, the following data may be interpreted asa clear illustration of the present-day polarization dynamics of this system. Data presented inFigure 7 is divided into five sections. What follows is a brief explanation of how these data weregathered and processed.

The first section of the table contains data from the household survey, including thecomposition of the social unit. Consumers are counted according to a consumption index.12

Adult male producers are males over 14 years of age who carry out work in milpa agriculture.The average size of the milpa plot is based on data taken from all households and the averagesare computed per stratum and per household (i.e. figures represent the average size of themilpa of households in the particular stratum). The same procedure was applied to averageyields.

For the following four sections of the table, all adult male member of all households wereasked if they worked the milpa plots of others or if they paid kol bet. This survey included thetype of work paid or done and the amount of cash or maize received or paid. From these data Icomputed for each household (1) the amount of labor required to work the household’s plots, (2)the amount of labor carried out in the household’s plots by others under a kol bet agreement,and (3) the amount of work members of the households carried out in other than thehousehold’s plots.13 Then, a balance of labor, maize and cash income or expenditure wasmade.


While the second section shows how many households of each strata paid or worked kolbet (in nominal and relative numbers), the following three sections display average data perstrata (i.e., averages are based on the total number of households in a given strata and not onlyon those really carrying out or paying kol bet).

The following are some general features provided by Figure 7. First, wealthier householdsshow greater labor resources but also more consumers. Second, they invest more labor permale adult producer into milpa agriculture. Third, wealthier households produce more maize perconsumer than do poor households. This allows them to invest part of this maize in kol bet,which at the same time is an important factor for maintaining the higher standard of theirproduction.

I will now turn to the issue of kol bet labor arrangements. It is clear from the second sectionof Figure 7 that both aspects -- to pay or to work kol bet -- show a wealth-stratified distribution.Wealthier households are more likely to pay others for work, and poor households more likely towork for others. One may expect that in between-poor-and-rich-households both patterns dooverlap. In the lower middle stratum, which may be viewed as the in-between situation(representing roughly 33 percent of all households), five households paid labor while nineworked for others.

Together with wage labor, kol bet arrangements serve poor households as an importantsource of additional income (in kind or cash) in order to bridge subsistence and capitalbottlenecks.14 At the same time, both strategies undermine the particular household’s capacityto achieve subsistence from the household’s agricultural production. This results in a viciouscircle. This situation of ‘the more they work outside their own milpa, the less they reachsubsistence’ and ‘the less they reach subsistence, the more they have to work outside their ownmilpa’, places an enormous pressure on poor households. On the other hand, kol bet and wagelabor, serves rich households in consolidating and increasing both their agricultural productionand their standard of living. And, as a side effect, it frees labor resources which could be allottedto other tasks of a more diversified household economy. The present-day system of kol bet,then, serves increasingly to maintain and accelerate the stratification process betweenhouseholds rather than functioning as a leveling device to cushion the negative effects harvestloss and subsistence crisis.

IV. Conclusions

I have emphasized the complexities of the kol bet system. It prevents, adds, and perpetuatesdifferences. The system's quality of resistance is characterized in the first place by fixedequivalents between labor and payment. Even when the system increasingly moves formpayment in kind to monetary recompenses, the ratio remains tied to the basic exchange of afixed amount of labor for a fixed amount of grain. This contrasts starkly with wage labor, whererates are defined by "market forces". Another important aspect is opportunity. Poor and richagree on the importance of kol bet opportunities. Given the cultural importance of subsistenceagriculture and especially of maize (i.e. food and "stuff of life"), kol bet is not simply aneconomic issue. It also has a strong cultural dimension which regulates, in terms of need andentitlement, the availability of the basic grain. Many transactions between households in thelocal context follow a capitalist logic, but when it comes to maize and subsistence this logic is, atleast, partially blocked. Of course, this does not really help poor households to overcomepoverty, but it helps to buffer an acute subsistence crisis.

This leads to the other side of the coin. The system as a leveling device is preceded by asituation of inequality. Many forms of inequality may have a temporary status. However, onceexisting differences become structurally defined by the broader economic and social system,also needs and opportunities increasingly become defined by broader systems of exploitationand injustice. Hence at the same time, kol bet still helps to buffer inequality, but also contributes


to an incipient process of local class formation. However, I have argued that the "take off" of therich in the local context is manly the result of their ability to access new and more dynamicforms of income than it is resulting from direct exploitation of the poor.

Culturally integrated institutions such as kol bet (among others15) help to mediaterelationships with the broader capitalist world. This improves the ability of communities such asthe Xcacal group to maintain their distinctiveness in the context of ongoing changes. The recentdiscussion of specific cultural (i.e. Mayan) rights and autonomy in the context of the state ofQuintana Roo16 illustrates that this "distinctiveness" can contribute to a stronger position in thenegotiation of a less unjust future.

V. Notes

1 Research for this paper was made possible by a grant from the Swiss National Science Foundation and by theinstitutional support I received from the Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social(CIESAS) in Mexico. Both institutions are gratefully acknowledged. I am indebted to Susanne C. Jost and PaulSullivan for helpful comments and suggestions. Of course, I keep the responsibility for all errors of judgment in thispaper. Finally, I wish to thank the people of Yaxley for their hospitality and support.2 A condensed version of the "Informe" was published in all major newspapers (for an example, see La Jornada,miércoles 2 de septiembre de 1998).3 I found David Harvey's Error! Bookmark not defined. discussion of this debate very helpful to understand the mainlines of the employed arguments.4 The following works may be consulted for further details Error! Bookmark not defined..5 For detailed information on milpa agriculture in the area see especially Error! Bookmark not defined..6 The early ethnographic record concerning central Quintana Roo Maya has been produced by a series of nationaland foreign observes Error! Bookmark not defined..7 Sap of the sapodilla-tree (Manilkara zapota) used to manufacture chewing gum Error! Bookmark not defined..8 The state-sponsored Plan Piloto Forestal (PPF), taking effect after 1984, promoted major changes in exploitationmodalities of forest resources towards improved economic and ecological sustainability Error! Bookmark notdefined..9 The ethnographic record may be used illustrate this rupture. Compare, for example, Villa Rojas' early writing on theXcacal group Error! Bookmark not defined. with his own later writings and those of later generation researchersError! Bookmark not defined.. This assessment is also supported by the interpretation of change by local peopleError! Bookmark not defined..10 The applied ranking method is based on Barbara Grandin’s “Wealth Ranking in Smallholder Communities: A FieldManual” Error! Bookmark not defined.. Several informants were asked to divide all households -- defined as unitsof shared subsistence production and consumption -- into socioeconomic groups according to their own criteria. In asecond step, their explanations for wealth differences were recorded. For 1989, the sample consists of 71households. In 1993, I made two kinds of rankings. The first referred to the actual situation and included the 1993total of 84 households. A second ranking was made in a “retrospective” manner for the situation in the late 1950s andincluded 24 households. I reconstructed these households from a petition letter for an ejido grant addressed in 1957to the governor of the then Federal Territory of Quintana Roo (see Archivo Central de la Secretaría de ReformaAgraria, México, D.F.: Exp. 23/28367, Legajo 1: Carta de los vecinos de Yaxley y de pueblos circunvecinos alGobernador de Quintana Roo, Yaxley, February 19, 1957). For this ranking three informants were chosen who hadintimate knowledge of the wealth situation in the 1950s Error! Bookmark not defined..11 Villa Rojas Error! Bookmark not defined. stated that the payment for one mecate (25 mecates equal one hectare)of high forest (nukutch k’aax, in Yucatec Maya) as of 7.7 kg of ordinary maize (or 3.8 kg of seed maize). Informationgathered in Yaxley indicates that approximately 30 years ago, every four mecates felled from high forest was paid 45kilograms of maize. During the 1970s, the system was modified. The present-day equivalents are now as follows: onecarga of maize (45 kg) now pays five mecates of high forest (nukutch k’aax), five mecates of secondary forest (bat i


hubche’), seven mecates of secondary forest (maskab i hubche’), and ten mecates of second year milpa (sak’ab).These rates are also used to determine cash equivalents for these tasks on the basis of current maize prices. Othertasks such as weeding and sowing are done with cash arrangements. If the principle is applied to the harvest (calledhoch bet nal), the worker receives the second class maize (alnal) he harvests as a payment. In general, for everyfive cargas of good maize (inal) he delivers to the granary he receives two cargas of alnal as payment. Inal is maizesuited for storage in the granary. Alnal refers to cobs which are damaged and therefore only suited for immediateconsumption Error! Bookmark not defined..12 I used the index proposed by Richard Wilk Error! Bookmark not defined. to calculate consumer / worker ratios:

Production ConsumptionAge Female Male Age Female Male0-9 0 0 0-4 0.3 0.310-13 0.2 0.3 5-13 0.6 0.614-54 1 1 14-54 0.8 1>54 0.5 0.5 >54 0.7 0.8

Note: Wilk noted (p. 243): “I have calculated CW ratios according to the following schedule… . I count women as fullproducers, as the work they do is just as essential as that of men. The rest of the figures were worked out with aKekchi informant.”13 Based on information provided by four men from Yaxley in 1989. The following rates were used to calculate laborrequirements (workdays of 7 hours). For nukutch k’aax a total of 41.5 workdays per hectare; for bat i hubche’, 33.5workdays per hectare, for maskab i hubche’, 30 workdays per hectare, and for sak’ab, 29 workdays per hectare. Atotal of 16 workdays is added per milpa to include the construction of the granary and for burning. Each different task,such as weeding and planting, was also calculated for those carrying out these tasks under kol bet agreements. Forother reports on labor requirements in milpa agriculture in the wider area (i.e. Yucatán Peninsula), see SteggerdaError! Bookmark not defined., Ewell Error! Bookmark not defined., Ewell and Merrill Sands Error! Bookmarknot defined..14 People seek wage labor mainly outside the village. In most cases, wage labor is only a temporary occupation andis adjusted to the schedule of work in the milpa. Younger people, who have not yet established independenthouseholds, commonly engage in wage labor for longer periods of time. Frequently they also pursue defined goalssuch as earning money to finance their marriage. While some years ago only men engaged in wage labor, nowadaysalso young women work outside the household. They do so mainly in the domestic service.15 One of the most important buffers in this context is "free" (i.e. wealth-independent) access to the land which is themost important resource. Although land use is regulated today by the ejido legislation, it also reflects older indigenousconcepts based on usufruct rights rather than on private property. I have discussed these issues in some detailselsewhere Error! Bookmark not defined..16 See Diario de Yucatán, 5/20/1998 "Jerarcas mayas piden a Villanueva Madrid [the state governor] que losindígenas tengan mayor presencia en el gobierno. Quieren respuestas por escrito, 'no sólo de palabra'"; andReforma, 5/20/1998 "Acepta Villanueva autonomía indígena". This process ended in the "Ley de Derechos Hunamos,Cultura y organización Indígena del Estado de Quintana Roo" which was approved unanimously by the "Camara delCongreso" on July 30, 1998.


VI. Figures and Tables

FIGURE 1: Yucatán Peninsula and Township (municipio) of Felipe Carrillo Puerto


FIGURE 2: Chronology of Different Productive Activities in central Quintana Roo, 1840 to 1990

1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990

Railroad ties

Timber

Embroidery

Transportation

Horticulture

Honey (European bees)

Commerce

Chicle gathering

Tax collected on chicle production

Wage labor

Taking of war booty

Spoils traded for arms

Concessions for forest exploitation

Forced labor of prisoners

Ransoming of prisoners

Sale of Sugar Cane

Sale of livestock

Sale of hogs

Milpa with credit

Sale of milpa surplus

Milpa (subsistence)

Note: Data presented in this figure are approximate only and present onset and end of a given productiveactivity without taking into account regional differences. Milpa (subsistence) includes hunting-gatheringactivities and the production of hogs and poultry for subsistence needs. Commerce includes shop keeping andintermediary trading. Embroidery refers to the manufacture of traditional women’s dress (ipil) for regional andtourist markets.


FIGURE 3: Characteristics for Socioeconomic Strata, late 1950s and 1993 WealthRankings

a

Late 1950s / 1 late 1950s / 2 1993 / 1 1993 / 2150-200 mec. of milpa (b) great amounts of maize stable economy large milpa plot12 head of cattle (c) at least one horse pay milpa (every year) pay milpa (every year)15 hogs 10-15 hogs bank account money savedpay milpa (every year) (d) pay milpa (every year) store / transportation shop / transportationmoney saved money saved handle credit (e) handle creditchicle gathering chicle gathering masonry house Invest money100 mec. Of milpa extended family household cattle3 head of cattle great amounts of maize big milpa plot10 hogs do not pay milpa pay milpa (not e. year)do not pay milpa money saved partner in father’s business little money savedsmall amount of money chicle gathering pay milpa (not every year) handle creditchicle gathering handle credit trade railroad ties (f)80 mec. of milpa masonry house3 head of cattle6 hogs lesser milpa milpa = principal activityno money kol bet (not every year) do not pay milpachicle gathering little money saved few handle credits

chicle gathering cut railroad ties50 mec. of milpa work only their own milpa2 hogs wage labor (not every year)do not pay milpa kol bet (not every year)chicle gathering 30 mec. of milpa buy only necessary goods little milpa

1-2 hogs cut railroad ties (f) kol bet (not every year)kol bet (every year) sell ties to others

40 mec. of milpa chicle gathering1 hogkol bet (not every year) (d)

work little milpavery little milpa wage labor (every year) very little milpa1 hog kol bet (every year) kol bet (every year)

30 mec. of milpa few chicken spend money easily (beer) sell ties to othersno hog kol bet (every year) cut railroad ties indebtedkol bet (every year) chicle gathering nuclear family household spend money easily

a Strata are arranged in the table from top (rich) to bottom (poor).b Milpa agriculture was the principal economic activity in late 1950s and in 1993 (25 mecates [mec.] = 1

hectare).c Earnings of chicle gathering were invested during the 1930s in livestock and pack animals. Later, in the

early 1960s, cattle were sold again. Only since the mid-1970s, a few wealthy households invested in cattleagain.

d In the late 1950s, paying milpa meant to pay the felling of bush in kind (kol bet). Later, wage laborarrangements were also made. The payment in kind follows an established equivalent of area felled andquantity of maize received (5 mec. of high bush = 1 carga or 46 kg of shelled maize).

e In the 1970s, government agencies (Banrural, COPLAMAR, SARH, and INI) provided a series of credits


for different economic activities.f The production of railroad ties began during the 1980s. First, ties were traded through the Unión de ejidos

and later through the Sociedades civiles (established by the Plan Piloto Forestal). Some of the rich householdengaged in intermediary trade, because poorer households are forced to sell their production before the officialpurchase time.


FIGURE 4: Cross Tabulation of Wealth by Age, late 1950s and 1993a

Count Residual Adjusted residualOldb Youngb Old Young Old Young

late 1950s, N=281. (richer)c 6 0 1.9 -1.9 1.9 -1.92. 3 3 -1.1 1.1 -1.1 1.13. 7 3 0.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.24. (poorer) 3 3 -1.1 1.1 -1.1 1.1

1993, N=841. (richer)c 2 3 -0.6 0.6 -0.6 0.62. 20 4 7.4 -7.4 3.6 -3.63. 14 14 -0.7 0.7 -0.3 0.34. (poorer) 8 19 -6.1 6.1 -2.9 2.9

a Data from the 1993 survey. Residuals and adjusted residuals were computed with SPSS for Windows6.0.

b For each sample (e.g., late 1950s and 1993) the cutting point for age was: old ≥ 39 and young ≤ 40 inthe year of the ranking (for the late-1950s sample, the year was defined as 1960).

c Strata as computed on the basis of informant wealth ranking.

Note: The table includes two sets of data (late 1950s, 1993), each one arranged in an eight-cell table. For each cell, the count, the residual, and the adjusted residual are displayed.Residuals are the count minus the expected cases, based on the marginals and theassumption that the variables are not related. Residuals vary with the strength of therelationship and the number of analyzed cases. If variables are not strongly related, thevalue of residuals nears zero. When the variables are related and when the number ofanalyzed cases is large, the residuals may obtain high values (even when the relationship ofvariables is very weak). Following Cancian (Cancian 1992: 190 see also his notes 3 and 4,p. 279), adjusted residuals have the following advantages

(1) they vary with the strength of the relationship; (2) they compensate for thenumber of cases, making the size of the statistic less dependent on the number ofcases involved; (3) they compensate for chance variation that may be introducedwhen a small number of cases with high variance is involved; and (4) they provide arule of thumb that can be used to interpret results -- specifically, a value of 2 or morefor the adjusted residual suggests the relationship is worth of thinking about as asubstantive one.

These characteristics make adjusted residuals appealing in the data presented here. Allthree data sets are small in number and the aim is to reveal patterns.


FIGURE 5: Lorenz Diagram Showing the Relative Distribution of Household Property byWealth, 1989 and 1993

0

1 0

2 0

3 0

4 0

5 0

6 0

7 0

8 0

9 0

1 0 0

0 2 0 4 0 6 0 8 0 1 0 0

poor richs = 1989; n = 1993

Note: Data from the 1989 and 1993 surveys. In the graph, households are ranked from right (rich) to left(poor) according to the amount of property owned in 1989 (s ; N=71) and in 1993 (n; N=84). The curves showthe total proportion of all accumulated property by a given household as well as those with less property.


FIGURE 6: Household Property, Income and Levels of Subsistence, 1989 and 1993 a

Strata b

4. 3. 2. 1. all(poorer) (richer)

Household Property (in percent and stratum 4. / 1989 = 100%) c

1989Per Producer 100 198 275 819 242

1993Per Producer 60 133 415 619 242

Household Income (in percent and stratum 4. / 1989 = 100%) d

1989Per Producer 100 117 146 278 135

1993Per Producer 148 150 180 287 171

Government Subsidies (PRONASOL) (in percent of annual income per household)

1993Share 28 24 17 6 20

Levels of Subsistence e

1989Fulfill Household Needs - - - + nd

1993Fulfill Household Needs - + + + nd

Share of Households per Stratum (in percent) f

1993Sell Maize 15 29 68 60 37

Must Buy Maize 100 71 38 20 68

a Data from the 1989 and 1993 surveys.b The strata are based on informant wealth rankings in both years Error! Bookmark not defined.. Strata

composition 1989 (N=71): Stratum 4 = 23 households (32.4 percent); 3 = 23 (32.4%); 2 = 21 (29.6%); 1 = 4(5.6%). Strata composition 1993 (N=84): Stratum 4 = 27 households (32.1 percent); 3 = 28 (33.3%); 2 = 24(28.6%); 1 = 5 (6.0%).

c Property per household per producer per stratum. Based on survey 1989; includes household animalsand other items of household property. The values of producers account for difference in age and sex ofhousehold members. Nominal properties for 1989 are compared with “deflated” properties in 1993 by applyinga “deflator” (1.972) based on the annual variation of the official consumer price index. The property of stratum4, 1989 is set at 100 percent and used as an index for other strata.

d Income per household per producer per stratum. Based on survey 1989. The values of producersaccount for difference in age and sex of household members. Nominal incomes for 1989 are compared with“deflated” incomes in 1993 by applying a “deflator” (1.972) based on the annual variation of the officialconsumer price index. The income of stratum 4, 1989 is set at 100 percent and used as an index for otherstrata.


e Indicates whether households of a given stratum were able to fulfill household subsistence needs or not.f Data from the 1993 survey, based on reports by all households (N=84). “Must buy Maize” means that a

given household has to buy maize before the onset of the new harvest (i.e. subsistence deficit).


FIGURE 7: Characteristics of Kol Bet Labor and Milpa in Yaxley 1992-93, by Wealth Strataa

Lower Upper Upper MiddlePoor Middle Middle Rich and Rich All

MilpaHouseholds (N) 27 28 24 5 29 84Adult Male producersb 1.37 1.73 1.96 2.4 2.03 1.72Consumersc 3.65 4.72 5.15 6.1 5.32 4.58Size of milpa (ha) 1.78 3.31 4.84 8.2 5.42 3.55Maize yields (kg) 460 935 1,713 3,220 1,973 1,141Kol bet‘Pay’ kol bet

(n of N)d 1 5 14 5 19 25Percent per Strata 3.7 17.9 58.3 100 65.5 29.8

‘Work’ kol bet(n of N)d 13 9 2 0 2 26Percent per Strata 48.1 32.1 8.3 0 6.9 31.0

Labor Balance by Strata(days / household) e

Labor required 72.4 124.0 174.2 277.1 192.0 130.9Paid kol bet 0.4 1.8 15.7 36.5 19.3 7.4Worked kol bet 8.9 5.0 0.5 0 0.4 4.7Labor Balance 81.0 127.2 159.0 240.6 173.1 128.2Per adult male prod. 59.1 73.5 81.2 100.3 85.1 74.5Maize Balance by Strata

(kg / household)f

Maize yields 460 935 1,713 3,220 1,973 1,141Balance 530 991 1,605 2,937 1,835 1,134Variation +70 +56 -108 -283 -138 -7Maize per consumer 145.3 210.1 311.4 481.5 345.0 247.6Cash Balance by Strata (N$ / household)g

Paid or received +102.1 +20.8 -193.0 -483.0 -243.0 -44.2a Data from the 1993 survey. Averages refer to strata as wholes (P=27; LM=28; UM=24; R=5; UM+R=29;

All=84).b Male adult producers are those individuals of households who are older than 13 years of age. Up to 54

years of age are counted as 1, those older then 54 years are counted as 0.5 Error! Bookmark not defined..c Consumers are counted according to the same table.d Refers to those households performing the specified activity.e Labor requirements were computed according to data presented in Hostettler Error! Bookmark not

defined.. The first category ‘labor required’ refers to the total amount of labor which must be invested for thecultivation of the household’s milpa. ‘Paid kol bet’ means labor carried out by paid non-household workers. Inthe labor balance, this is subtracted from the total labor required. Finally, ‘worked kol bet’ refers to additionallabor carried out by household members in non-household milpas. This is added up to the labor required.‘Labor balance’ shows the result of this calculation. Moreover, the total labor per household and strata isdivided by the number of male adult producers to show a value for comparison which is independent of thehousehold type.

f Yields are averages of reported harvest data. ‘Balance’ reflects the final amount of maize available to thehousehold after adding up additional maize obtained or subtracting maize invested for labor. This is shown bythe category ‘variation’. Then, again, in order to obtain a value for comparison, the amount of maize is dividedby the number of consumers.

g This category shows the amount of money received from or spent for kol bet.


VII. References Cited

Contact either the author or LASA for a copy of the references.

Documents

Social Justice and Socioeconomic Stratification in a …lasa.international.pitt.edu/LASA98/Hostettler.pdfSocial Justice and Socioeconomic Stratification in a Maya Peasant Society: