SOCIAL EXCLUSION, MISGOVERNANCE AND AUTONOMY MOVEMENTS …serialsjournals.com/serialjournalmanager/pdf/1328684041.pdf · Social Exclusion, Misgovernance and Autonomy Movements

* Visiting Fellow, Anthropological Survey of India, Kolkata, E-mail: [email protected]

SOCIAL EXCLUSION, MISGOVERNANCE ANDAUTONOMY MOVEMENTS IN NORTHEAST INDIA

N. K. Das*

This paper discusses the issues of misgovernance and antagonistic policies ofadministration in northeast India, which had shaped diverse brands of identity politicsleading to various forms of rifts manifested in majority-minority syndrome and notionsof in-groups vis-à-vis out-groups. The critique suggests that several ethnic movementsin the region worked within the constitutional framework, while others opted for anextra-constitutional or secessionist path. The paper elucidates how the human rightsand civil society organizations have been active in the region and the greater activismwitnessed in the region in recent years on part of the government to stretch out to themilitant/underground sections. Several steps towards granting ‘autonomy’wereinitiated; yet the northeast experience reveals both the benefits and pitfalls offederalism. Federalism and devolution of power through it in northeast India hasreduced ethnic tensions but has not been a universal remedy, as some insurgent outfitssuch as Nagas still claim a sort of ‘sovereignty’. Numerous special provisions for self-governance and local development have been provided for the people in the northeast,such as the provisions in the Sixth Schedule, Autonomous District Councils, NorthEastern Council and Department of North Eastern Region (DONER). There has beenno dearth of development funds, but bureaucratic hurdles and corrupt practices haveretarded all attempts towards pragmatic implementation of the developmentprogrammes. The ongoing and proposed peace initiatives between militant leadersand government representatives indeed signify the determination of the nation-stateto resort to a broad-spectrum compromise within the federal set up. In doing so, however,both sides should show mature thinking towards vital issues by adhering to flexibilityand extendibility.

INTRODUCTION

The northeast region in India has remained in turmoil right from the pre-independenceera. Many troubles and tribulations faced by the people are a product of themisgovernance and continuous ill-treatment of the people. Indeed various antagonisticpolicies of administration right from the colonial era shaped diverse brands of identitypolitics influenced by predicaments of segregation and exclusion of groups, leadingultimately to various forms of rifts, often envisaged in binary stipulations such as

Humankind, Vol. 7, 2011, pp. 37-61

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majority-minority; sons of the soil-immigrants; local-outsiders; tribal-non-tribal; hills-plains; inter-tribal; and intra-tribal. Given the strategic and sensitive border areas, lowlevel of development, immense cultural diversity, and slow evolution of democraticprocesses, social exclusion of many sorts are discernible in the region, which areacutely felt in perceptions of marginalisation, deprivation and identity losses, all addingto the ethnic turbulence. This article explores the premises, principles and assertionsof social exclusion in the larger context of territoriality issue, regionalism, ethnicity,development politics and dilemmas posed by ill governance. We will discuss howsources of ethnic dissent and perceived notions of neglect, exclusion and marginalisationhad been transformed into movements based on regionalism, sub-nationalism, andethnic politics in northeast India, often leading to extremism and secessionism.

The term ‘social exclusion’ has come to be widely used by social scientists inrecent years. Social exclusion is a complex and multidimensional concept having social,cultural, political and economic ramifications. These dimensions are interwoven.Overcoming ‘exclusion’ constitutes the most elementary pre-requisite for building ademocratic society. The state has the responsibility to ensure equality to all citizensand is bound to take measures to remove discrimination and inequality. Withoutattaining this objective, an integrated and united nation cannot be built on a soundfooting. The potentialities and limitations of such protective measures need to be studiedcarefully. Discussion of social exclusion also relates to citizenship debates, as also tothe dichotomy between individualism and collectivism. Anthropologists andsociologists have paid greater attention to identity-based forms of disadvantage. Incertain areas,the identity issue may even relate to a distinct and restricted group ofpeople who are classified by their distinct cultural practices, varied economies, andmay be minority, in terms of religious or linguistic traits. In the broader national context,the issue of ‘social exclusion’ needs to be placed at the national policy level. If afailure is not because of any so-called ‘economic neglect’, but because of aninappropriate economic policy framework, which has created an unbalanced andunsustainable economy and destroyed the basis of social-economic transactions in theregion, the very policy needs to be reviewed. If social exclusion is the cause thataggravates disadvantages and sufferings, one must assess the main reasons for thefailure of the policy framework aimed at the upliftment of the economically backwardand isolated regions (http:socialexclusion.co.in). It may be stated that issues of neglect,social deprivation and marginalisation of minorities and others need to be discussedin the context of the history and economy of a wider region. Similarly, issues of culture,language, religion, environment, etc., need to be dealt with appropriately. Socialexclusion and inclusion remain issues of fundamental importance to democracy. Bothexclusion and inclusion relate to access to participation in the public realm, publicgoods and services for certain groups of people, who are minorities, marginalised anddeprived. Democratization has led to the inclusion of those previously excluded in the

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political process. Social exclusions in India remain the most solid challenges todemocracy and development. Communal clashes, ethnic riots, political secessionistmovements and extremist violence take place almost routinely, and are the outwardmanifestations of the entrenched culture of social exclusion in India. In recent years,Indian scholars have been concerned with the multidimensional problems of socialexclusion and inclusion (Bhattacharyya et al., 2009;Das, 2009).

NORTHEAST IN SOCIETAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The British nomenclature of North East Frontier has grown as the North East Regionin Modern India, implying a distinct geographic unit as also a discrete ethnic, culturaland entity. The British regarded it as a defence stratagem, source of raw material, andother products. Diverse tribes and some other communities speaking over 250 languagesand dialects inhabit this region. The northeast is mostly a hilly region (about 70%).The hills cover most of the states such as Arunachal, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Sikkimand Nagaland. Half of Tripura, 1/5th of Assam and 9/10th of Manipur are hilly zones.The North Eastern Region can be physiographically divided into the Eastern Himalayas,the northeastern hills, and the Brahmaputra and Barak Valley plains (dorabjitatatrust.org/northeast/articles_prioritizing_print.htm). Different streams of Mongoloid people camefrom the north and the east at different periods and partially or fully absorbed theAustraloid strains (B.M. Das, 1960, 1970). The diverse Mongoloid groups in courseof time settled down in different habitats and ecological settings of the northeasternregion and crystallized into distinct entities, which are referred to as tribes today(Bhagabati, 1988: 1-2; 1992: 1-2). The population of the NorthEast Region is 38.50million as per 2001 Census. Out of this, Assam alone accounts for 26.64 million.Mizoram has the lowest population of less than one million, i.e., only 0.891 million.The average population density in the region is 147 persons per square kilometer.Assam and Tripura have a fairly high population density of 340 and 304 persons persquare kilometer respectively, while Arunachal Pradesh has only 13persons per squarekilometer. Unique cultural diversity of the northeast is visible through the presence ofit’s over 260 communities; majority of the tribes live in the hills. Much has beenwritten about the different populations of the northeast and the seven volumes of thePeople of India project (Singh, 1996, 2002) provide basic ethnographies of allcommunities, castes and tribes in the plains and hilly areas, including religiousminorities. Parts of northeast India, mainly its vast hilly tribal regions, which are repletewith difficult terrain, history of lesser inter-ethnic contacts in the past, protracted recordsof isolation, had witnessed formation of three broad types of polity such as ‘tribe’,‘chiefdom’ and ‘state’ (Das, 1987, 1989a, 1993) with certain variants. There are recordsindicating that state-formation took place in the region right from the 4th century A.D.One of the longest surviving tribal states was that of the Ahom, which ruled Assam forsix centuries. The ruling dynasty of Manipur reigned almost uninterrupted for over

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ten centuries. The kingdoms of Kachari, Ahom, Jaintia, Koch, Tripuri and Meitei wereessentially ‘tribal-states’. Hinduism had minimal spread in the northeast. Despite strongimpact of neo-Vaishnavsim, the Brahmaputra Valley retains its original tribal beliefsystems. Sarania dharma of Shankar Dev influenced the tribes in the plains, but inmany instances, the tribes continued to pursue tribal religions (Das, 2003a). A largenumber of tribes pursued stateless polities; where the clans and age set systems prevailedthough they often functioned hierarchically — involving unequal statuses. In suchtribes, we notice acknowledged authority of kinship based ‘headmanship/bigmanship’(Das, 1987, 1993). Practically the entire frontier region is an international border:China to the north, Bangladesh to the southwest, Bhutan to the northwest, and Myanmarto the east. Indeed, vast mountain ranges of the NorthEast divide SouthAsia fromSouthEast Asia. Tibeto-Burman languages, unique material-culture traits and pristineeconomic practices in the mountain ranges and river valleys pursued by over twohundred tribes, reveal many parallels with South East Asian cultural traditions.Commerce, culture and faith travelled through mountain passes; and myths thrive thatmigrant flocks moved into this sparsely populated but richly endowed northeastregionfrom parts of Tibet, China and South East Asia. The emergence of the ‘Look EastPolicy’, as a result of this geopolitical situational advantage, is meant ultimately toaugment the economic and geo-political importance of the region.

SOCIAL-EXCLUSION, ADMINISTRATIVE MANOEUVRING AND UNRESTIN COLONIAL ERA

The elementary groundwork of socialexclusion in northeastern India took place veryearly in the Colonial era wherein we notice the slow growth of unrest against theauthorities. We may trace the perceived sense of marginalization and exclusion onpart of the native inhabitants in their hatred towards the strategy of ‘ExcludedArea’ (inthe hills) and by importing large numbers of tea plantation workers and other workersfrom different parts of India to protect the economic interests of the colony in Assam.The British administration categorised the hill areas as ‘Non-Regulated Areas’,‘Backward Tract’ and eventually as ‘Excluded’ and ‘Partially Excluded Areas’. An‘InnerLine’ was erected in the foothills which restricted the people from entering the‘restricted’ areas. These policies led to segregation of tribal populations. Historically,Assam was one of the last areas to come under the British rule. The annexation wasgradual and slow. The Brahmaputra Valley was first annexed in 1826. The region wasa part of the Lt. Governorship of Bengal up to early part of 1874. Assam became aGovernor’s Province in 1921. Manipur and Tripura remained princely states under theBritish paramount. Successive legal and administrative decisions between 1874 and1935 shaped the perception of local emerging elites about their destiny. Indeed thecolonial intervention in the areas of tribespeople was regularly resisted. There is along chronology of such resistance, which were depicted as ‘raids’ and ‘uprisings’


(N.K.Das, 1987, 1993:28). In 1860 and 1862 the entire Jaintia tribe and the Garos(1852-57, 1872) rose against imposition of taxes. There are records of Aka/Khamtiresistances (1835-1839); Naga resistances (1835-1852) and even an agrarian movementin 1893-94. The Sonaram (1902), Kuki (1917) and Jadonang-Gaidinliu movementssymbolized early ethnic unrest among the local people (Singh, 1982; Das, 1987, 1994,2007).

Besides the Inner Line Regulation (which continues to exist in Arunachal Pradesh,Mizoram and Nagaland), another factor which created a definite rift and considerableseclusion was the transformation of large sections of the tribespeople to Christianity.The villagers were thus divided into adherents of two beliefs, both celebrating theirfestivals and rituals separately, ‘excluding’ the others to a great extent. Introduction ofChristianity did not lead to any communal tension, thoughin some instances therewere organised protests against the imposition of Christianity, mainly in parts ofManipur, Assam and Meghalaya. The missionaries contributed significantly towardsthe education, growth of literature, and health services, which were provided to theChristiansas well as the non-Christians. The spread and penetration of Christianmissionaries and the gradual spread of education amongst the tribes and othercommunities infused a sense of self-esteem. Christianity also helped in widening theintra-tribal ethnicity and growth of self-identity. Education and engagement ingovernment and other professions led to growth of the middle class among the tribalsocieties. Under the relatively peaceful period of 1930s and part of 1940s, which maybe termed as ‘the silent phase of identity consciousness’, the tribespeople demandedminimal ‘participative representation’ in the Principal Legislative Assembly. The Khasi,Ahom, Naga, Mizo, Bodo-Kachari, Miri and Deuri were the first to demand such‘ethnic representation’. The Lalungs established a Durbar in 1967, and the Koch hadsimilarly been conscious about their minority status. The All Assam Garo Union wasestablished in 1983. The Hajongs in Assam urged the Government to recognize themas a Scheduled Tribe. Later the Nagas and Mizos launched strong autonomy/homelandmovements within the union, before shifting towards secessionist demands (Das, 1989).

IDENTITY CONSCIOUSNESS, ETHNIC DISSENT AND AUTONOMYPROTESTS IN POST-COLONIAL ERA

In the post-Colonial era the Indian (Provincial Constitutional) Order, 1947, by andlarge retained the provisions contained in the Colonial era’s Government of India Act,1935, including the regulation of the Inner Line as also the provision of administrationof justice in tribal areas as per the customary tribal laws. Partition had brought with itwaves of immigrants that disrupted the then existing demographic equations in Assamand the rest of northeast India. Post 1962, India and China sealed many of the previouslyporous borders and made the entire region into a tense security zone (www-conflict-prevention.net/page.php 23). The region’s vast connectivity with the international

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borders and cognizance of the tribespeople about their fundamental Tibeto-BurmanMongoloid linguistic-historical heritage associated with South East Asia provided animaginary reference point. Memories of such historical connectivity and exclusionand ethnicity factors had prompted the sustainment of a distinct in-group sentimentvis-à-vis the Indian nation state/‘Indians’, in the immediate post-colonial era. Ethnicunrest in the northeast had originally grown essentially through primordial affiliationsbased on the binary sentiments of in-group-out-group, perceived marginalisation, and‘minority-consciousness’ (Das, 1994, 2007).

Identity consciousness and the demand for a separate ‘Homeland’ or a ‘Hill State’first took roots in the Khasi-Jaintia Hills, mainly in the movement spearheaded by theKhasi National Durbar (KND), which commanded the respect of all the Khasis. TheKND submitted a memorandum to the then Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru,on October 19, 1952, pointing out a number of inadequacies in the Sixth Schedule ofthe Indian Constitution. In December 1952, the leaders of Garo Hills AutonomousDistrict Council resolved to form the Assam Hills Tribal Union, which was laterrenamed as the Eastern India Tribal Union (EITU), in October 1953, with the objectiveto form a hill state which would include all the hill areas of Assam, the whole ofManipur, Nagaland and the tribal belts of Tripura. Rev. JJM Nichols Roy opposed thecreation of a separate hill state arguing that the District Council would disappear withthe formation of the hill state. He feared that the non-tribes would then be able toacquire land in the hill district and they would push out the original inhabitants fromtheir ancestral land and property. Capt. WA Sangma called for a conference of leadersof all political parties of the hill areas on July 6, 1960, at Shillong. The conferenceresolved to constitute itself into a political entity, to be known as the All Party HillLeaders Conference (APHLC). A delegation of the APHLC met the Prime Ministerand proposed that no legislation passed by the Assam Legislative Assembly could beenforced in the hill areas without the consent of the representatives in the hill areas. In1970, the APHLC resolved to accept the Autonomous State Plan appealed to the DistrictCouncil of North Cachar Hills and Mikir Hills to join the autonomous State ofMeghalaya, and assured them that each autonomous district would get equal opportunityfor participation in the various fields of administration and development, andopportunity for preserving their distinct identity and culture. As a result of prolongedunrest and agitations,the Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, ultimately inaugurated,inShillong, the autonomous State of Meghalaya, consisting of the Garo Hills districtand the United Khasi & Jaintia district, on April 2, 1970; but the Mikir Hills and theNorth Cachar Hills did not join the new state. Indeed it was the ethnicity factor in thenortheast, which prompted the Government of India to confer statehood uponMeghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, and at a later date, to Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh.Ethnic unrest in northeast India is often discussed from a narrow ‘political’ angle,leaving aside the basic economic and cultural factors (Das, 1989a, 1989b). The


economic and infrastructure backwardness, unemployment and lack of developmentopportunities had become major factors that slowly led to unrest and anxiety amongstthe tribespeople, despite the formation of the ethnic states.

MAJORITY AND MINORITY SYNDROME, CULTURAL SUBJUGATIONAND LINGUISTIC ONSLAUGHT

Several ethnic groups, right from the colonial era, simultaneously felt the threat totheir language, culture and religious traditions. Among the earliest communitiesprotesting against the imposition of Christianity in the area, mention may be made ofsome Naga tribes and the Khasis, who launched specific movements under the bannersof Zeliangrong and Seng Khasi respectively (K. S. Singh, 1982; Das, 1987, 1994).These people also raised the issue of protection of language and traits of culturalidentity. The Zeliangrong movement grew as a religious-cultural movement, originallyagainst the spread of Christianity;however it later assumed an anti-colonial politicalovertone, led by Rani Gaidinliu. It was the only tribal movement in the northeast,which maintained links with the national freedom struggle (Das, 1989). TheZeliangrong People’s Conference (ZPC) demanded the recognition of ethnicnomenclature ‘Zeliangrong’, an acronym (Ze-Liang-Rong), for their people, whoinhabited contiguous areas of Manipur, Nagaland and Assam. In 1905, when the spreadof the Christianity was widely felt in Meghalaya, the Seng Khasi organization tookupon itself the responsibility of defending the Khasi religion. The members of theassociation called themselves the ‘Khasi-Khasis’ so as to distinguish themselves fromthose ‘Khasis’ who had adopted Christianity. Having initiated the process of revivalismand reformation of the Khasi religion, the Seng Khasi encouraged the people to abideby the matrilineal system of descent, to respect the kith and kin on the maternal andpaternal side, to believe in God, and to serve God through service of humankind. TheSeng Khasi flag depicts a crowing cock in white and red setting. The red signifiescourage and white represents the world. The Seng Khasi started organizing archerycompositions and traditional dance performances such as ‘Ka Shad Suk Mynsiem’and ‘the Nongkrem Dance’.

Language has always been in the centre-stage of ethnic turmoil in the northeast.Several factors such as medium of instruction, state language policy and even conversionof tribes to Christianity caused resentment. During 1960, when the Assam OfficialLanguage Bill was moved, there was an unprecedented polarization of non-Assamesecommunities both outside and inside the Assam Legislative Assembly. The movealienated the already estranged hill people, who had also apprehended the suppressionof their language and cultures in Assam. The Bodos and other tribes in the plains alsojoined the protests in course of time, and Assam became turbulent during early 1960s.The Bodos started a peaceful agitation in their territory since 1986,but the agitationsoccasionally turned violent. Fearing forced introduction of non-tribal languages and

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alien scripts on native communities, many Assam tribes revolted. In 1972 the Bodo-led Plains Tribes Council of Assam (PTCA) complained that the plains tribes havebeen ‘uprooted in a systematic and planned manner from their own soil’ and that the‘step motherly’ treatment of the administration, dominated by the Assamese-speakingpeople, has reduced them to‘second class citizens’in the state. The Bodo Sahitya Sabha(established in 1952) and PTCA somewhat succeeded in making Bodo language themedium of instruction (up to the secondary level). In doing so, the Bodo-leaders optedfor the Roman script — though they were ultimately convinced to accept the Devanagariscript. The Mishing Agom Kebang (Mishing Sahitya Sabha) formed in 1972, andseveral other Mishing organizations also worked consistently and succeeded in 1987to introduce Mishing language as a subject of study in primary schools. The rejectionof Assamese script by the Miris, Bodos and other tribes dismayed the Assamese, whofeared that without their tribal counterparts they would become a minority, overwhelmedby the Bengali-speaking population (Miri, 1993: 71). Following the recognition ofnative languages at the primary level in Bodo-Kachari and the Karbi areas, the Mishingperception of marginalisation sharpened. This led to the formation of Mishing LiteraryAssociation in 1972. In order to maintain a distinct minority linguistic identity vis-à-vis the majority Assamese, the Mishing were in favour of the Roman script. The AssamSahitya Sabha insisted that the Assamese script should be retained for ‘Mishinglanguage’. The Mishings were ultimately facilitated to use Roman script, and theirtext books came to be printed in the Roman script, so also some newspapers andjournals. The Bishnupriya Manipuri language issue, particularly in Assam, has alsoacquired the shape of an ethnic movement. Several tribes succeeded partly in securinga special status for their language and Meitei became the first indigenous language tobe formally included in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution. Earlier in ManipurValley the Meitei revivalist leaders had demanded that Manipuri language should benamed ‘Meeteilon’.

While in Assam we notice clear cleavages between the tribes and non-tribesemrging in terms of majority-minority alignments, fissures grew along the triballinesalso in the smaller hill states, in order to safeguard the smaller identity icons andendangered dialects of the sub tribes within the ‘tribal’ states. Indeed the post-colonialmini-states of northeast India are hardly culturally homogeneous; hence, we oftennoticeconflicts of interest between ethnic groups who have come to live in the newly acquiredsmaller states. In Mizoram, tension continued to prevail in the border areas alongManipur and Tripura. Violence erupted through the actions of the angry Bru communitymembers who initially staged a protest and sought the Central Government’sintervention, but later formed a Bru National Army, a local militant group. In Mizoram,tension existed between the Mizos and the Buddhist Chakmas. One issue that dividedthe Government of India and the Mizo leader Laldenga for some time was Laldenga’sinsistence that the Chakma Autonomous District Council, which gives the Chakmas a


certain amount of autonomy, be abolished. In the meantime, other communities suchas the Pawi and Hmar felt alienated and subjugated, and took actions. The Pawisformed a party called the Chin National Front. A Pawi leader pointed out in 1972,“When the Mizos had a District Council, we (the Pawis, Lakers and Chakmas) alsoshould have a District Council”. Another major instance of deprivation and culturalgenocide is that of the Hmars of Mizoram, who resisted ‘forced-assimilation’ withinthe dominant/majority culture of the Mizos and asserted their linguistic and culturaldistinctiveness from the Mizos. Way back in 1954, the first Hmar political association,called the Hmar National Congress (HNC), was formed. By 1964-66, the Hmar RegionalMovement demanded the creation of an Autonomous Regional Council;and in 1986-1994, the Hmar People’s Convention (HPC) demanded an Autonomous District Councilin North Mizoram where they claimed the Hmar Tribe was in majority. Theneed for anAutonomous Regional Council for the Hmars was influenced by the growth of similardemands made by minorities like Pawi (Lai) and Lakher (Mara). The Hmars arguedthat the area was backward in the field of education, medical establishment,communication and economy, because the Government neglected the region. Themovement was meant to ensure better development of the area; they perceiveddeprivation of their rights by the State Government, especially on comparing theirsocio-political and economic status with other regions, and naturally coveted the Pawi(Lai), Lakher (Mara) and Chakma tribes who were enjoying an Autonomous RegionalCouncil. The Hmars also resented the imposition of Mizo (Lusei) as thelingua francaamong the Christian converts in their areas of operation in Manipur and Mizoram(then Lushai Hills). Moreover, songs composed by the Hmars in the early days oftheir conversion to Christianity were copied in Mizo (Lusei). Thus grew the feelingthat Hmar language was likely to die a natural death and the very existence of Hmar asa distinct ethnic tribe would be eliminated. Soon after the Mizo Accord (June 30,1986) they decided to form the Mizoram Hmar Association (MHA), to further thecause of the Hmars in cultural fields. Soon the association was transformed into apolitical organization and was named the Hmar People’s Convention (HPC), whichmade constitutionaldemands,first for the creation of ‘Hmar Ram’, through a people’s‘plebiscite’ % a home land for the Hmars to enable them to preserve their culture,customs and language. After a phase of underground acts, came the final signing ofthe Accord on 27th July, 1994, between the HPC and the Government of Mizoram.This brought an end to the eight-yearlong movement. The Accord provided for thesetting up of Sinlung Hills Development Council in the area ‘to be specified withinthe HPC Demand Area of Mizoram…’ It may be summed that element of ‘socialexclusion’ had naturally forced the subjugated Hmar people to employ the means of‘ethnicity’ and ‘regionalism’ seeking autonomy within Mizoram, which was itselfcreated after a larger autonomy movement led by the Lushais. It may be surmised thatthe Hmar ethnic group which inhabited a more or less compact area in north Mizoramfelt their region being relatively deprived. Hence the movement for a homeland (Vide

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Paul B. Chonzik www- mizoramexpress.com/index.php/2010/06/hmar-autonomy-movements-in-mizoram, Hmar Conference, July 3, 1954, Memorandum of 1954, HmarNational Congress; Lal Dena, ‘Hmar People’s Boycott Movement, 1946-49’ inResistance, (13.7.79), p. iii, P. Singh, ‘Political Violence in India’, New Delhi, 1989:100, Memorandum of Settlement, Aizawl 27th July, 1994, HPC Memorandum –1988,1992, Lal Dena, ‘Nationality Problem in North East India’ in The North East Voice,Weekly Journal, 1994-19).

There are numerous smaller tribes sandwiched between the larger and dominant‘tribes’ who came to enjoy and derive maximum benefits from political reorganisationsand special economic packages. Thus, we notice several smaller ‘minority-tribes’feeling neglected and marginalised, by way of exclusion from development. Amongthe smaller tribes, we may mention the Garos who consider themselves deprived bythe Khasis and others. Thus, the Garos formed a militant outfit and called it ‘AchikNational Volunteer Council’ (ANVC) in 1995 with the aim of carving out ‘Achikland’in the Garo Hills of Meghalaya. The Khasis formed an outfit called the ‘HynniewtrapNational Liberation Council’ (1992), which aimed to free themselves from alldominations. Soon after the formation of the BTC in 2003, there grew demand amongthe plains tribes of Assam to agitate for the creation of BTC-style territorial councils.Most recently, seven statutory Tribal Councils, outside the Sixth Schedule, have beenformed in Assam, for the Tiwas, Rava-Hasongs, Sonowal Kacharis, Mishings, Deoris,Thengal Kacharis and the tribals of Barak Valley. Other tribal groups in Assam arealso demanding a similar status. All of them want to be included in the Sixth Scheduleof the Constitution, while the Bodos demand a separate state. As many as nineDevelopment Councils for the ethnic groups of Morans, Motoks, Ahoms, Chutias,Koch Rajbangshis, Tea Tribes, Gorkhas, Sarania Kacharis and Amri Karbis are underthe process of being set up. The Sixth Schedule provides for elected councils whichenjoy powers to levy taxes, constitute courts for the administration of justice involvingtribes and law-making powers on subjects including land allotment, occupation or useof land, regulation of jhum or other forms of shifting cultivation, establishment andadministration of village and town committees, appointment or succession of chiefs,inheritance of property, marriage and social customs. One of the basic problems of theSixth Schedule Autonomous Councils is that the funding from the Government ofIndia is through the State Government. Most of the State Governments are burdenedwith overdraft problem. So, the funds meant for the tribal areas do not reach the tribalAutonomous Councils. The second issue is the personnel, the bureaucracy % thereshould be a separate cadre for the tribal Autonomous Councils. In order to protect thecultures of the indigenous tribes, the Legislative Assembly passed a Bill called ‘TheArunachal Pradesh Protection of Customary Laws and Socials Practices Bill, 1994’,for protecting native tribal institutions. The All Arunachal Pradesh Students Union(AAPSU) opposed the demands of the Chakma and Hajong ‘settlers’ for citizenship.


The Nepalese of Assamese origin demanded ‘special protected status’ under theConstitution. They aimed to thwart attempts at branding them as ‘foreigners’/illegalinfiltrators. However, the fact remains that the Nepalese did face the Khasi angermanifested in the ‘ethnic cleansing’ during the late 1980s, which had triggered thelarger Nepalese demand for Gorkha Land (Das, 1989;The Statesman, 18 July 2002).In September 1994, the NorthEastStudentsOrganization (NESO) alleged that the IllegalMigrants (Determination of Tribunal) Act, 1993, was full of loopholes, which madedetection and expulsion of illegal migrants in North East difficult. There have beenstrong reactions to threat of infiltration of outsiders in varied manners. Thus, theNational Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah) made it mandatory for the non-Nagas living ‘all over Nagalim’ to make identity cards for themselves and their families.

Assam witnessed various types of protests and militancy in the past. The ULFAand Bodo issues are not the only tangles. There are many smaller organisations andethnic outfits that have been fighting for their just demands for a long time. Aftermultiple reorganisations, Assam was left with 23 tribes, (14 hill tribes in Karbi Anglongand North Cachar Hills and nine plains tribes in Brahmaputra Valley). Seeing thedevelopment in the hills, many plainstribes and analogous communities such as Ahombecame conscious to renew the demand for re-scheduling their Scheduled Tribe status.In order to push forward the demand for a separate Ahom State, the ‘Tai-Ahom LandCommittee’ was formed, by merging older organisations (Das and Gupta, 1982). In1995, the Ahoms placed a 17-point charter of demands. The then Ahom Chief Ministerof Assam, Hiteshwar Saikia, highlighted the unique cultural heritage of the Ahompeople (Das, 1994, 2007). Similarly the Karbis, who are in fact an officially declared‘primitive’ tribe, formed the Karbi National Council, which demanded in 1986 anautonomous district. Later the Karbi Students Association and the Autonomous StateDemand Committee (ASDC) spearheaded the movement for creation of a separateKarbi State. In the meantime other smaller ‘tribes’ had launched autonomy movements,prominent amongst them being the Mishing, Rabha and Tiwa. They submittedmemoranda and highlighted the neglect of their areas and exposed the exclusionarypolitics. Seeing the ever growing demands of the ‘minority tribes’, the AssamAdministration granted Sixth Schedule status to some plains tribes, such as the Mishing,Rabha and Tiwa. The North East Indigenous and Tribal People’s Forum, comprising15 diverse tribal organisations resolved that “The entire region has been swamped byalien people migrating from neighbouring countries and also from other parts of India”(The Telegraph, 6 October, 1994). [* File contains invalid data | In-line.JPG *] Themigrant tea-labour tribes of Assam, who continue to call themselves ‘Adivasi’, are astrong segment of the working class. In Assam, the Adivasis today can broadly bedivided into two communities, the tea garden workers and those who came out of thetea gardens at the end of their contracts and settled in and around the tea gardens afterprocuring some land. Through gradual expansion these Adivasis now form nearly

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20% of the state’s population, but their representation in the legislative assembly issaid to be markedly lesser (Other Backward Class, 5 May 2008, India Together NewsService). The All Assam Adivasi Students’ Asso-ciation along with Assam Tea TribalStudents’ Association (strong in Sibsagar, Dibrugarh and Laximpur districts of upperAssam) have been agitating for years demanding recognition for tea tribals and Adivasisas Scheduled Tribes. The latest response from the Registrar General is that somerelatively homogeneous groups among this population may be considered for inclusionunder the list if the State Government agrees (Gohain, 2007;Economic and PoliticalWeekly, December 8, 2007). The neglect and mistreatment of the Adivasi segments,which contributed enormously to the economy of the state, is a fine example ofmarginalisation and social exclusion.

TYPOLOGY OF ETHNIC UNREST: AUTONOMY MOVEMENTS ANDINSURGENCIES

The northeast region has a long tradition of ethnic unrest, regional autonomy movementsand insurgencies. The Bodo movement may be portrayed as the longest socialmovement in the plains of Assam. The first two phases of the Bodo movement were ofsocial reformist nature (1947-1967) focusing on consolidation of the Bodo identityvis-à-vis the Assamese community (1967-1987). An even earlier phase of the Brahmamovement (1907 onwards) was a short-lived ‘Sanskritization movement’ led by theMech-Bodos. Undoubtedly these cultural awakenings had led to the formation of theBodo Sahitya Sabha in 1952, which raised the first ethnic demand to make Bodolanguage as the medium of instruction at the secondary level. Since then the Bodomovement passed through many ups and downs. In its modern phase (1967 onwards)a new section of Bodo elite emerged, who demanded a greater share in political power.In the early 1960s the Plains Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA), a political formationrepresenting Bodos and other plains tribes of Assam, realized that tribal belts andblocks were gradually being acquired by rich landlords and new immigrants throughillegal means. Moreover, Bodos had little or no access to the economic aid providedby the Central Government. Without economic package to the Bodo-dominated areas,education was a distant cry. In those days, there were hardly any roads that connectedBodo dominated areas to the main cities in Assam. In the 80s and beyond the Bodomovement matured considerably and witnessed several splits, including the formationof an underground segment. After mass protests, there was a Bodo Accord signed inFebruary 1993 that led to the creation of a Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC).The BAC was a non-starter, as the territorial boundary issue remained unresolved.Finally, on October 2, 2001, the Bodo Liberation Tigers gave up its demand for aseparate Bodoland State and reconciled itself to politico-administrative arrangementsfor autonomy under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. This led to thesigning of a Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) for the creation of the Bodo Territorial


Council (BTC) on February 10, 2003, between the representatives of the UnionGovernment, the Assam Government and a BLT delegation. The main provisions ofthe MoS relate ‘to creation of the BTC, an autonomous self-governing body withinthe State of Assam, and under the provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitutionof India to fulfil economic, educational and linguistic aspirations, the socio-culturaland ethnic identity of the Bodos; and to speed up the infrastructure development in theBTC areas. The BTC Accord is seen as a fulfilment of the sub-national aspirations ofthe Bodos of Assam. Under the BTC understanding, the Government of Indiaprovides financial assistance of Rs.100 crores per annum for 5 years for projects todevelop the socio-economic infrastructure (Das, 2005, 2007).

The Naga movement, in which both ‘ethnicity’ and ‘extreme nationalism’ wereused as operational strategies, is regarded as the mother of all movements in northeastIndia. The origin of ethnicity and unrest among the Nagas may be traced first to theformation of a Naga Club in 1918, which consisted of the Naga headmen and membersof English educated Naga middle class (Das, 1982). The Nagas were amongst the firsttribes who launched a systematic ethnic movement right from the pre-independentera, seeking greater autonomy. Even after the formation of Nagaland, the Nagamovement had not passed away, and the demand of a greater Nagaland or Nagalimlived on (Das, 1982, 1994, 2007). Like the Nagas, the Mizos raised the ethnicity issueby giving birth to the concept of Mizo nation, by calling their organisation as the‘Mizo National Front.’ The Mizo movement effectively came to prominence rightfrom the mid 1960s. Assertive tribes such as the Nagas and Mizos ultimately succeededin attaining the status of ‘statehood’ with greater autonomy and thus changed theirminority status to that of a majority status in their respective hilly states. While theMizo issue was resolved through the peace parleys and peace agreement, the Nagaissue remains alive and the talks are going on right now. Even though the Naga issueremains unresolved, the fact remains that the Nagas probably enjoy the most extensiveand broad-minded provisions within the federal set up of Indian polity. Besides regularfinance support and other facilities from the centre, the special constitutional safeguardsprovided to the Nagas under Article 371-A of the Indian Constitution, are unique. Asper Article 371-A, “no Act of Parliament shall apply to Nagaland in relation to religiousor social practices of the Nagas, Naga customary law and procedure, administrationof civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to the Naga customary lawand ownership and transfer of land and its resources”. During the recently held peaceparleys between Naga leaders of NSCN and the Government of India, the issue ofextensive powers for the Nagas came up. Anthropologists (such as B. K. Roy Burman)have proposed ‘internal self-determination’ for people like the Nagas, implying theright of the people to determine their own social, economic and political system, todepose their resources and to create conditions for their own development within anexisting state. Here the European Sami autonomy pact is seen as a good example of

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the implementation of internal self-determination. The Samis have their own parliamentin three different European countries, wherein they have autonomous powers pertainingto traditional livelihoods; the development issues, teaching of Sami language, and theprogress of social and health services; though Sami people are not independent, theirautonomous status has elements of external self-determination (Lal Dena -Schizophrenic Alienation of NE India: Its Historical Roots, www -pao.net/epSubPageExtractor.asp?src=news).

Providing yet another pragmatic solution,B.G. Verghese argues that there are ‘manymini-constitutions’ or special dispensations within the Indian Constitution, spelt outin Articles 370, 371, and 371-A (pertaining to Nagaland) to 371-I and the Fifth andSixth Schedules, and extend to special affirmative action covenants pertaining to theScheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, the OBCs and religious and linguisticminorities. Wider devolution is possible through Article 258 under which the Centreis empowered to ‘entrust’ to a state “any matter to which the executive power of theUnion extends”. None of this will affect the unity and integrity of the country becauseof the accommodative genius of the Indian Constitution. ....the solution lies not interritorial reorganization, which will be resented and resisted, but in the coming togetherof these other Naga-populated areas in a non-territorial entity. This would permit acoming together of all Nagas for purposes of economic, social and cultural developmentwithout derogation of the current administrative jurisdictions. In a non-territorialdistinctively Naga area in Nagaland,Assam, Arunachal and Manipur, people could beempowered to administer common programmes of economic and social development(B.G. Verghese,The Tribune online edition-Thursday, March 11, 2010, Chandigarh).

The birth of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) in 1979 marked thebeginning of insurgency in Assam. Operating in the background of the popular Assamagitation (led by the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU) against illegal influx fromBangladesh), the outfit’s objective was to “liberate Assam through armed nationalliberation struggle from the clutches of the illegal occupation of India” and to “establisha sovereign independent Assam”. ULFA militancy was triggered off with the goal ofousting the illegal migrants from Bangladesh who poured into the state in the aftermathof the Indo-Pak War 1971, which saw the rise of the new country % Bangladesh (i.e.,East Pakistan). The issue of ‘outsiders’ is a major concern in all northeastern states.There is a long history of incursion of outsiders, and emigration and resettlement inAssam. One can see this broadly in four spheres: tea plantation related manual labour,Bengali Muslim emigration (mostly occupying agriculture), Bengali Hindu migration(mostly occupying service sector), and Marwari migration in the trading sector. TheBangladesh War resulted in over 10,00,000 ‘refugees’ taking shelter, who neverreturned. Modern Bangladeshi ‘infiltration’ is however said to be a more severephenomenon. It was alleged that Bangladesh Char area dialects spoken by the migrantMuslims, were declared as Assamese dialect to the census enumerators. Politicians


too encouraged the Bangladeshi Muslims and other minorities into Assam, givingthem voting rights. This was a narrow exercise in electoral politics (Dixit, 1998, 2003).This last wave of illegal exodus from Bangladesh is a more dangerous phenomenon,as some among these infiltrators got involved in terrorist activities in parts of urbanIndia. It is said that the fear within the native Assamese community of beingoverwhelmed by the unabated influx of illegal Bangladeshi migrants from across theporous border triggered off the long-drawn ‘Anti-Foreigner mass uprising, 1979-1985’,spearheaded by the AASU. It ended with an agreement, the Assam Accord % 15 August1985. The Accord fixed 25 March 1971 as the cut-off date for detection and expulsionof the illegal foreign migrants. The Assam movement was led by AASU. The AllAssam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP), which was an umbrella organization forseveral outfits including the Asom Sahitya Sabha, emerged as the political forum ofthe AASU. In 1985, the AAGSP swept the elections on the wave of anti-foreignersentiments. The ULFA’s inception dates back to the frenzied years of the AssamMovement when a section of the militant youth lost faith in the peaceful programmesof AASU and the AAGSP. The AASU-led agitation ended with the signing of theAssam Accord in 1985, but the subsequent years witnessed ULFA’s influence andenhancement of its military prowess. While the Assam agitation was primarily amovement against the illegal Bangladeshi migrants in the state, the ULFA too raisedsimilar concerns, but emphasised the neglect and ‘marginalisation’ of Assam, and thiscontributed to ULFA’s popularity in the initial phase.

Hopes of an end to the 30-yearlong armed insurgency in Assam have brightenedwith leaders of the secessionist ULFA expressing willingness to enter into unconditionaltalks with the Indian Government. The ULFA founder-chairman, Arabinda Rajkhowa,who was released from jail recently, opined so. Talks with ULFA will mark an importantturning point in Assam’s history. Massive counter-insurgency operations through the1990s failed to break the ULFA’s back. The ULFA also reportedly benefited immenselyfrom the largesse extended to it by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence and sectionsof Bangladesh’s security establishment. Close ties with other powerful insurgent groupsin the region as well as sanctuaries in Burma, Bangladesh and Bhutan helped theULFA leaders and cadres escape India’s counter-insurgency operations (SudhaRamachandran –www-atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/MA08Df01).

It is amazing to note that at one point, more than 120 militant groups operated inIndia’s northeast. They provided assortment and a typology of ethnic unrest spelt outin terms of their basic nature and objective, which ranged from minimal autonomy tomature secession. There was a time when many outfits formed an alliance through theIndo-Burmese Revolutionary Front (IBRF). This consisted of many militant groupssuch as the NSCN, ULFA, KNF (from India) and the Chin National Front (Myanmar).The influence of IBRF diminished gradually. Until recently, the NSCN (IM), NSCN(K), Bodo Security Force (BSF), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB),

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ULFA and the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) remained the most forcefuland assertive groups. In the meantime, quite a few Muslim extremist outfits too hadbecome active in the region (Das, 1994).

Both in the pre-Independence and post-Independence eras, Tripura witnessed aregular inflow of emigrants, and land alienation of tribals was rampant. The tribespeoplethus became a minority in their own homeland. The tribal leaders of Tripura, rightfrom 1974, voiced demands for reservation, restoration of tribal land %especially therestoration of native Kok-Borok as one of the official languages, and lastly theAutonomous District Council. The language and script issue, which engulfed Tripurafor a long time, has hardly been addressed in right earnest. Kok-borok or Kok Borok(also referred as Tripuri) is the native language of the Borok people of Tripura, andparts of Bangladesh. Kok-borok had a script known as Koloma which has disappearednow. The First effort for giving the language a printed shape was the grammar ofKokborok named ‘Kok-Borokma’, a creation by Radhamohan Thakur published in1900 AD. Most of the ethnic movements were launched to place genuine problems ofsurvival and development before the newly carved nation-state. Even though somemovements became secessionist and confrontational, the continuous efforts of thestate, using tactics from negotiations to military operations to root out militants, yieldedpositive results. Progress in this front right from 1994 onwards has helped restorenormalcy and achieve peace in many areas.

Peace initiative has a long history in the region. Right now most parts of thenortheast region, mainly Manipur and Assam, continue to be blemished with ethnicconflict and violence. Manipur has a long tradition of insurgency. The most prominentof the insurgent groups are the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the United NationalLiberation Front (UNLF). Tripura is home to militant outfits like ‘National LiberationFront of Tripura’ (NLFT), which came into force in March 1989. The ‘All TripuraTiger Force’ (ATTF) formed in 1990, intends to retain the original tribal characters ofthe state by expelling the immigrant refugees (Bengalis from the then Pakistan/Bangladesh) who have usurped the lands of indigenous tribes and native populationsof the state over the decades (Das, 2009).

RICH BIODIVERSITY, DEVELOPMENT IMPASSE AND ‘LOOK EASTPOLICY’

North East India is rich in terms of its ecological and economic resources, but itsinhabitants remain poor and backward. The region contains more than one-third ofthe country’s total biodiversity and is considered one of the 18 hotspots of the world.It is also rich in terms of genetic and ecosystem diversity. Some of the important genepools of citrus, banana and rice are reported to have originated from this region. Theecosystem diversity of the region ranges from tropical ecosystems to alpine ecosystemsin the Himalayan ranges, and also includes wetlands, flood plains, riverine and aquatic


ecosystems. A wide variety of man-modified ecosystems such as jhum (shiftingcultivation) agro-ecosystem, wet rice agro-ecosystem and alder based agro-ecosystemcontribute towards the rich ecosystem diversity. Forest constitutes about 64% of thetotal geographical area of the North Eastern Region. The percentage of forest area ishighest in Mizoram (86.9%) and lowest in Assam (30.1%). In the interior, timber andminor forest produce are the principal sources of livelihood. The basic land managementand ownership pattern including rights over forests differ in the different states of theregion. In the hilly regions, the ownership rests with the local communities and,therefore, the proportion of reserved forests in those hill states is quite small. In viewof the alarming rate of extraction of timber and the resulting deforestation in the forestsin the northeast, there has been a blanket ban on logging and non-forest activities inthe forestland in the recent past. Among all the NE states, Assam has the highest areaboth in terms of available cultivable land and net sown land. In the whole NE Region,agriculture system is predominantly traditional. The overall geographical land-to-manratio for the NE Region is 0.81 hectares/person, which is much higher than the nationalaverage (0.39 hectares/person). This could be attributed to the fact that the areas coveredby hills in this region are more in comparison to the national average. Among the NEstates, the geographical land-to-man ratio is highest in Arunachal Pradesh (9.69hectares/person) and lowest in Assam (0.35 hectares/person). About 80% of the farmersin the NE Region belong to the small (< 1.44 ha) and marginal (< 0.40 ha) category.Over the years, the average landholding is reduced owing to the increase in populationat a rapid pace. Although, the land-to-man ratio is high, the average size of landholdingfor the NE Region (1.60 ha) is broadly the same as the national average (1.57 ha).Among the NE states, the average size of landholding is highest in Nagaland (6.92 ha)and lowest in Tripura (0.97 ha). About 55.6% of the holdings are only 0.43 hectares orless. This is primarily because hilly terrain constitutes nearly two-thirds of the region’sgeographical area. Thefact remains that the tribes in the hilly areas, with their meagerpopulation size, are still comfortable in utilizing their land/forest resources in anuninterrupted manner. Every tribe in the hills has enough land and forest area to offer toits people. In the absence of landlessness, the type of poverty found in many other partsof India does not exist in most of the hilly states of the region. Nevertheless, subsistencefarming is predominant in the NE hilly region, and there is hardly any commercialsurplus. The percentage of cultivable area over the geographical area in the region(24.69%) is much less than the national average (59.22%). The NorthEast Region has aconsiderable natural and mineral resource reserve. It hosts 37% of the country’s riverwaters, 20% of the hydrocarbon (oil & gas) potential, large quantities of low ash coalresources, limestone and dolomite deposits, as well as a few other minerals, yet to beexplored. Water resources could prove to be vital in the economic development of thearea (M. Biswanath Sinha, Report on North-East India: The Development Paradigm,2000; Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Division, Economic Survey,2000-2001, February 2001, Government of India Press, New Delhi).

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Apart from limited industrial activity in Assam, the region is primarily agricultural.The initial economic activity, consequently, has to start from this sector. For a start,the agriculture of the region must be commercialised. There is a tremendous scope fortea plantations, horticulture, rubber plantations, floriculture, sericulture, etc. As it is,the share of cash crops in the total agriculture production in the region is substantial.However, the region has not been able to attract investors or to produce skilled labourand entrepreneurial resources, and has failed to transform the ‘primitive’ agriculturalpractices of the region into improved technology-based practices even if not for moderncommercial agriculture. Though tea was grown in different places of upper Assamearlier, it is grown today in almost all parts of Assam. The Barak Valley in Assam alsohas its own significant share in this sector. Assam contributed nearly 74% of the totalforeign exchange earnings of India in 1966.

Assam has about 1,196 registered tea estates. It is significant that the GuwahatiTea Auction Centre, established in 1970, is the third largest Auction Centre in theworld, in terms of the total tea sold. In recent times, a revolutionary concept of kitchen-garden tea plantation is spreading very fast. This concept is getting popular and thenumber of small gardens is about to touch a five-digit figure now. Unlike in the hills,tribes in the plains suffer from economic backwardness. Grinding poverty in largerparts of the plains in the northeast region is accompanied by high incidences of infantand maternal mortality, life expectancy at birth, lack of safe drinking water and pooraccess to sanitation facilities. Frequent natural disasters, particularly the severe floodseach year, cause further deprivation among a large proportion of the state’s population,damage to the landmass and also cause depletion of resources. According to PlanningCommission’s estimates, Assam’s 36.09% population was ‘Below Poverty Line’ (BPL)in 1999-2000. This shows that poverty in Assam was worse than the average of all thestates in India. The more unfortunate fact in this context is that there has not been anyconsiderable improvement over the years, with the absolute number of people belowthe poverty line increasing consistently. The incidence of unemployment, measuredas a percentage of the labour force is increasing in Assam.

A way out of the unemployment and insurgency is to promote self-employment.This is where the areca nut leaf-plate industry comes in. Cheers to an organizationthat has tapped the opportunity in this sector, providing employment to not just theentrepreneurs but also to many others. The funds available for relief and rehabilitationare so meagre that it becomes impossible to neutralize the losses (H. N. Das, “FinancingDisaster Response”, India Disasters Report, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000).Against the all-India PCI of Rs. 14,712 in 1998-99, as given in the Economic Surveyfor 2000-2001, Assam’s figure was Rs. 8,700, while Tripura’s was Rs. 9,187, Manipur’swas Rs. 10,599, Arunachal’s was Rs.12,929 and Meghalaya’s wasRs. 10,607. Mizoram’s figure for 1997-98 was Rs.11,667. No official figures forNagaland were available. These figures indicate that all thestates in the northeastern


region are placed below the national average in per capita income (Government ofIndia, Ministry of Finance, Economic Division, Economic Survey, 2000-2001, February2001, Government of India Press, New Delhi). The position remains the same even interms of the poverty ratio. Against the Planning Commission’s BPL figure of 26.10%for the country (1999-2000), Assam’s figure was 36.09%, Tripura’s was 34.44%,Manipur’s was 28.54%, Arunachal’s was 33.47%, Meghalaya’s was 38.87% andNagaland’swas 32.67%.

The present economic policy framework for the northeast region, based on itspolitical economy with a rather bureaucratic approach, is not adjusted with a regionalplanning model. It is implemented from the top, mainly through the PlanningCommission and the Northeast Council. Despite huge financial investments, this hasfailed to produce the desired results. A new policy framework for the region will haveto be based on the market approach, although basic political and cultural factors cannotbe ignored altogether (satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume6/Fault6-GSach-F.htm, India’s Northeast Rejuvenating a Conflict-driven Economy, Gulshan Sachdeva).In order to accelerate economic development in the region, various schemes for thedevelopment of infrastructure have been formulated. The schemes include the formationof the Northeast Council, Hill Area Development Projects and Sub-plans, Tribal AreaSub-plan, and Tribal Development Agency Projects to name a few. In addition, thenortheasternstates have been declared as Special Category States; this entitles them toget 90% of Central Assistance as a grant and the remaining 10% as loan. Some publicsector units have also been set up in the region. The policies of industrial licensing,concession, finance and investment subsidy, growth centres, as well as freightequalisation of some major industrial inputs have also been used to promote economicdevelopment. Unfortunately, what seems to be a huge effort in the economic domaindoes not seem to be yielding the right results. The State and Sectoral plans of thePlanning Commission have not been able to provide enough impetus for localdevelopment, or generate processes for self-sustained growth. Expectations were raisedhigh, but they could not be fulfilled through the centrally sponsored schemes. Thepolitical economy approach has inordinately relied on the capacity of the state (readCentral Government) and its bureaucratic arrangements for economic development,and the approach has manifestly failed. Creation of smaller states in the region mighthave been a sensible policy from a larger national perspective,but there is no indicationthat these states would become financially viable %decades have passed and theeconomies of the region continue to suffer. A report on Integrated Rural Development(IRDP) held the upsurge of insurgency in Assam responsible for practically nodevelopment activities in the rural areas. In June 2001, the then Union DevelopmentMinister warned, “The centre would stop disbursing rural development funds to states,where the bulk of the funds go to the coffers of the extremist outfits” (Asian Tribune –www-asiantribune.com/news/2004/07/26/rumbling-north-east-states). Despite some

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pockets of high literacy, the combined literacy rate in the region is 64.5%, which isbelow the national average. Non-availability of trained teachers is yet another problem.The situation was particularly bad in Assam and Nagaland, where only about 30%teachers at the secondary and higher secondary levels were trained. Further, as per theMinistry of Human Resource Development, except in Manipur, all the states in theregion had high gross dropout rates at all stages. Even in a state like Mizoram, whichhas almost 90% literacy, about 76% students could not complete high school (SachdevaGulshan, 2006). One economic constraint is also absence of labour. There arerestrictions on labour movement due to Inner Line regulations in Arunachal Pradesh,Nagaland and Mizoram. Sachdeva has rightly observed that we need to demystify theregion, create basis institutions of market economy and start working towards linkingthem with dynamic Asian economies.Indeed, without such initiatives it will be futileto launch such (Sachdeva Gulshan, 2006,”Demystifying Northeast Dialogue”, January- March, 2006, Volume 7, No. 3) an ambitious programme as the ‘look east policy’.

India’s ‘look east policy’, which was formulated in 1991 on the heels of India’seconomic liberalization, was a foreign economic policy initiative towards South EastAsia. The northeast, which is geographically situated between mainland India andSoutheast Asia, is supposed to have immense developmental benefits as a result ofthis initiative and hence, have synergy effects on reducing poverty in the region; aswell as on insurgency and armed conflict. The region’s diverse natural resources, richbio-diversity and enormous hydro-electric potential, among others, could also helpovercome the widespread feeling of backwardness among its inhabitants. However,there is an increasing debate regarding the impact of increased introduction of marketimperatives on the traditional society of the region, which has an irreversible impacton the people’s culture and life, and would also lead to increased settlement of mainlandpeople. Thereby it is very important that the announced opening should take place ina regulated frame and through cooperation with the local people; otherwise it couldaggravate tensions between the center and the region (Conflict in Northeast India:Issues, Causes and Concern — Introduction, www, boell-india.org/web/52-259.html).According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), India’s north eastern states havesuffered from dearth of investment because of their remoteness, mountainous locations,long distance from markets, high levels of poverty and unemployment, and limitedprivate sector interest. In recent years, however, one witnesses some private and publicinitiatives. Recently, the ADB has come forward to assist capital cities in fivenortheastern states, including Sikkim, with the objective of improving infrastructureand sanitation. The project represents one of the largest externally funded infrastructureinvestments ever seen in the North East Region. Under the look east policy of theGovernment of India, the Ministry of Development of North-Eastern Region (DoNER),has been showcasing the strengths of NE to the neighbouring countries so as to set upnew industries, attract foreign investments, boost tourism and enhance business and


trade. According to the union minister in charge of the region, the centre has earmarkedRs. 500 crore for thenortheast.

Penetration of active and participatory democracy, through devolution of powerat the grass-root levels, is the best guarantee to ensure eradication of poverty anderase deprivations. It is therefore important that the democratic institutions meant forequal distribution of economic opportunities and equitable sharing of power structureis ensured. Here we see the importance of the Sixth Schedule, which meant, amongothers, to redress and tackle the ethnic aspirations and help protect tribal institutions.Autonomous District Councils were formed in the tribal districts of Assam, except inthe Naga Hills District. The first set of Autonomous District Councils came to operatein 1952. There was further extension of the provision in Mizoram and,later in thetribal areas of Tripura. In due course, separate Autonomous District Councils wereformed in the Jowai and North Cachar Hills Districts. The Nagas had opposed fromthe beginning the ‘controlled’ design of self-governance such as the AutonomousDistrict Councils. Unfortunately, the model of the Sixth Schedule Autonomous Councilsended up creating multiple power centers instead of bringing in a genuine process ofdemocratization or autonomy in the region. The introduction of the sub-federal entityin the shape of the Sixth Schedule was meant to protect the rights and particular waysof life of the tribespeople. However, the domination of the ‘majority’ tribes in thedistrict councils created further fissures. Thus, the Dimasas came out openly againstthe N. C. Hills autonomous council, as they felt marginalized by the ‘dominant’ tribes.They even took up arms demanding the creation of a separate ‘homeland’ as theyfelthelpless in safeguarding their culture and identity under the provision of the SixthSchedule within the State of Assam.

Other examples have already been discussed in this paper. Nagaland has been apioneer in terms of innovation in the field of devolution and decentralization of powerto the grass-roots, and specifically in terms of transparent implementation of ruraldevelopment. Nagaland’s Village Development Board concept is one of the first toachieve true devolution and decentralization of powers to the grass-roots in the country(other innovative resource mobilization schemes in operation are adequate bankinginfrastructure and Matching Cash Grant (MCG), Post Office Time Deposit (POTD)scheme). The idea of grass-root level planning and development took shape duringthe 7th Plan and the concept of the Village Development Boards became a reality in1980-81 (Enactment of the Village and Area Council Act, 1978, and functions as perthe VDB Model Rules, 1980). The State of Nagaland has been exempted from thepurview of the 73rd Amendment of the Constitution due to the existence of traditionallocal self-government bodies like the Village Councils and the VDBs. The primaryobjective of the VDB is to achieve de-centralized planning through involvement ofthe VDBs at the grass-root level. The VDBs function under the concerned VillageCouncils, but are ultimately under the control of Deputy Commissioners, who act as

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the Chairmen of the development schemes. The VDBs prepare the Annual Plan, andtake care of its implementation and proper utilization of funds. Naga villagers constitutethe General Body of the VDBs with full rights. The Management Committee of theVDBs has 25% compulsory representation of women. Regular monitoring helps tolaunch all schemes of rural development in a balanced and judicious manner.

RECAPITULATION AND DISCUSSION

The northeast region of India has remained in turmoil right from the pre-independenceera. Many troubles and tribulations faced by the people earlier continue to persist.We have discussed how misgovernance and antagonistic policies of administrationshaped diverse brands of identity politics leading to various forms of rifts envisagedin binary stipulations such as majority-minority; local-outsiders; tribal-non-tribal;hills-plains, etc. Growing ethnic unrest was caused by the increasing sense ofalienation, exclusion and identity loss. Such strife was manifested in variousmovements ranging from demands of autonomy to insurgent movements. Numerousethnic groups felt threats to their language, culture and religious traditions. Languagehad been an element of ethnicised politics in the region. Several factors such asmedium of instruction; state language policy and lack of vernacular textbooks hadcaused resentment, mainly among the ‘minority’ tribes and other groups. Examplesof such linguistic deprivations are equally felt in the hills as well as in the plains.Our critique has suggested that several ethnic movements in the region had workedwithin the constitutional framework, while others opted for an extra-constitutionalor secessionist path. To deal with militancy,security forces were brought in the area,they often resort to excesses. There are numerous stories of human torture. Humanrights and civil society organizations have been active in the region, includingmothers’ association in Manipur and Nagaland.

During the last few decades, the northeast region witnessed greater activism onpart of the Union Government and the respective state governments to stretch out tothe militant/underground sections. The ruling class recognised the greater value offederalism from an early period and thus a number of ethnolinguistic territorial unitswere createdin the northeastthrough statereorganisation. The northeast experience,however, has revealed both the benefits and pitfalls of federalism. By and large, majorethnic groups seem to have been satisfied with state formation and administrativeautonomy. Federalism and devolution of power through it in northeast India has reducedethnic tensions but has not been a universal remedy, as some insurgent outfits such asthe Nagas still claim sort of ‘sovereignty’. Indeed, the limited autonomy or ‘devolutionof power’ as envisaged through ethnic stateformation and strengthening the‘Autonomous District Councils’ for ethnically homogeneous regions has not turnedout to be a foolproof strategy. In states like Mizoram, the ‘minority’ tribes have beenchallenging the state apparatus. We also reviewed how the once deprived communities,


on attaining dominant positions in their ‘homelands’, often tried to subjugate andignore the genuine claims of other ‘minority’ tribes.

Numerous sspecial provisions for self-governance and local development areprovided for the people in the northeast, particularly through such provisions as theSixth Schedule, Autonomous District Councils, North Eastern Council and theDepartment of North Eastern Region (DONER). The latter two have specially workedtowards effectively tackling problems such as unemployment, under-employment andeconomic backwardness in the region. Our review suggested that there has been nodearth of development funds, and central grants have been never ending. However,bureaucratic hurdles and corrupt practices retarded all attempts towards pragmaticimplementation of the development programmes. It needs to be noted that economicbackwardness was not the only cause fuelling ethnic unrest and insurgency in thenortheast. Basic issues of cultural and linguistic rights of the people also came to theforefront, as, in many instances, the minority language groups have been subjugatedby dominant groups. People’s concern for the various perceived threats to their distinctethnic identities, their anxiety for preservation of culture and language, and their demandfor autonomy cannot be seen as dysfunctional for a strong civil society. Thepolitics ofethnic identity and genuine demand for autonomy does not indicate repudiation of thenation-state;their aspirations should be seen rather as prerequisites for distributivejustice. In more recent years, peace initiatives such as the bilateral cease-fire and thepeace talks have been held,or are proposed to be held, between militant leaders andgovernment representatives. This signifies the determination of the nation-state toresort to a broad-spectrum compromise within the federal set up. In doing so, however,both sides should show mature thinking towards vital issues by adhering to flexibilityand extendibility.

Acknowledgement

The author is grateful to Professor K.K.Misra, Director IGRMS and AnSI for his encouragementand support provided for writing this article. The article is based on reinterpretation of severalarticles published by the author on similar themes during the last decade. The views expressedhere are personal views of the author.

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