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Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

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Phases of Social Engineering - Very similar to how Intelligence Agencies infiltrate their targets - 3 Phased Approach Phase 1- Intelligence Gathering Phase 2- “Victim” Selection Phase 3 -The Attack - Usually a very methodical approach

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Page 1: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Social EngineeringBy: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Page 2: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Techniques

Page 3: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Phases of Social Engineering- Very similar to how Intelligence

Agencies infiltrate their targets- 3 Phased Approach

Phase 1- Intelligence Gathering Phase 2- “Victim” Selection Phase 3 -The Attack

- Usually a very methodical approach

Page 4: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Phase 1 -Intelligence Gathering

- Phase 1 -Intelligence Gathering- Primarily Open Source Information

Dumpster Diving Web Pages Ex-employees Contractors Vendors Strategic Partners

- The foundation for the next phases

Page 5: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Phase 2 -”Victim” Selection

Looking for weaknesses in the organization’s personnel Help Desk Tech Support Reception Admin. Support Etc.

Page 6: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

- Phase 3 - The Attack

- Commonly known as the “con” - Primarily based on “peripheral”

routes to persuasion Authority Liking & Similarity Reciprocation

- Uses emotionality as a form of distraction

Page 7: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

3 General Types of AttackEgo AttacksSympathy AttacksIntimidation Attacks

Page 8: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Intimidation Attack Attacker pretends to be someone

influential (e.g., authority figure, law enforcement)

Attempt to use their authority to coerce the victim into cooperation

If there is resistance they use intimidation, and threats (e.g., job sanctions, criminal charges etc.)

If they pretend to be Law Enforcement they will claim the investigation is hush hush and not to be discussed etc.

Page 9: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Sympathy Attacks Attacker pretends to be a fellow employee

(new hire), contractor, or a vendor, etc. There is some urgency to complete some

task or obtain some information Needs assistance or they will be in trouble

or lose their job etc. Plays on the empathy & sympathy of the

victim Attackers “shop around” until they find

someone who will help Very successful attack

Page 10: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

The Ego Attack Attacker appeals to the vanity, or ego of the

victim Usually targets someone they sense is

frustrated with their current job position The victim wants to prove how smart or

knowledgeable they are and provides sensitive information or even access to the systems or data

Attacker may pretend to be law enforcement, the victim feels honored to be helping

Victim usually never realizes

Page 11: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

More info on attacks Attacks can come from

anywhere/anytime Social Engineering can circumvent

current security practices- What good is a password if everyone has it? No one is immune- Everyone has information about the company

Page 12: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Preventing Social Engineering

Page 13: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Training Warn Users of Imminent Attack - Users that are forewarned are

less free with information

Page 14: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Training Define Sensitive Information

Page 15: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Training Define Sensitive Information

Passwords

Page 16: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Training Define Sensitive Information

PasswordsDOB

Page 17: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Training Define Sensitive Information

PasswordsDOBMaiden Names

Page 18: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Training Define Sensitive Information

PasswordsDOBMaiden NamesSocial Security Number

Page 19: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Training Define Sensitive Information

PasswordsDOBMaiden NamesSocial Security NumberAccount Numbers

Page 20: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Training Define Sensitive Information

PasswordsDOBMaiden NamesSocial Security NumberAccount NumbersBilling Amounts

Page 21: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Training Users Passwords, phone numbers, other

data

Page 22: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Training Users Passwords, phone numbers, other

data

System Admins Tougher authentication protocol

for password resets

Page 23: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Testing Users - Reveal seemingly innocuous

data?

Page 24: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Testing Users - Reveal seemingly innocuous

data? System Admins – Divulge network

information?

Page 25: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Testing Users - Reveal seemingly innocuous

data? System Admins – Divulge network

information?

Helpdesk personnel – Reset passwords on faulty authentication?

Page 26: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Removing the Weak Link Remove the user’s ability to divulge

information - Remove all non essential phones

- Restrict to internal communications

- Remove Internet access - Disable removable drives

- Make false information accessible

Page 27: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Removing the Weak Link Forced strong authentication - Use secure software requiring

strong authentication for password resets

- Require callback to user’s directory listed number

Page 28: Social Engineering By: Pete Guhl and Kurt Murrell

Removing the Weak Link Secure Protected Doors

- Employ Guards- Use Revolving Door

- Two Door Checkpoint- Deploy CCTV to remote facility