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Hedonic Consequences of Social Comparison:A Contrast of Happy and Unhappy People

Sonja LyubomirskyUniversity of Ca lifornia, Riverside Lee RossStanford UniversityTwo studies tested the hypothesis that self-rated unhappy individuals would be more sensitive tosocial comparison information than would happy ones. Study 1 showed that whereas unhappystudents' affect and self-assessments were heavily affected by a peer who solved anagrams eitherfaster or slower, happy students' responses were affected by the presence of a slower peer only,These between-group differences proved to be largely independent of 2 factors associated withhappiness, i.e., self-esteem and optimism. Study 2 showed that whereas the unhappy group's re-sponses to feedback about their own teaching performance were heavily influenced by a peer whoperformed even better or even worse, happy students' responses again were moderated only byinformation about inferior peer performance. Implications for our appreciation of the liruk betweencognitive processes and "hedonic" consequences are discussed.

Self-perceptions and self-evaluations depend not only on theabsolute nature of one 's accomplishment and performance butalso on the way one measures up to relevant peers (Festinger,1954; Suls, 1977; Wills, 1981, 1991). Opportunities for suchsocial comparis on are ubiquitous, as everyday social interactionsand the media inundate us with information about other people'saccomplishments, actions, and lifestyles. Furthermore, the com-parison process itself often seems relatively automatic. Mostfind it next to impossible to hear about others' successes andfailures, or good and bad fortune, without reflecting on theirown accomplishments and status. People learn early in life thatsuccess often is a matter of relative rather than absolute perfor-mance and, consequently, strive to learn how they stand relativeto "relevant others." Indeed, such social comparison processesoften may be highly adaptive. As Festinger (1954) suggested,successful social func tioni ng requires people to evaluate themerits of their views and abil ities, and in the absence of objectiveinformation, such evaluation necessarily depends on socialcomparison.

Because Festinger and his colleagues so emphasized evalua-

Sonja Lyubomirsky,Department of Psychology, Universityof Califor-nia, Riverside;Lee Ross, Departmentof Psychology, Stanford University.This research was supported by a National Science Foundationgradu-ate fellowship, a National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) nationalresearch service award, and an NIMH research grant. We are gratefulto Robert Dickert and Gilbert Lo for their invaluable assistance in con-ducting Studies I and 2, respectively.Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to SonjaLyubomirsky,Departmentof Psychology, Universityof California,River-side, California 92521. Electronic mail may be sent via the Internet tosonja@citrus.ucr.edu.

tive needs and functions, the early literature on social compari-son focused primarily on the selection of comparison sourcesand the resulting "pressures to unifor mity" and motivation toimprove performance. More recently, however, researchers in-creasingly have shifted their focus from the dynamics of thecomparison process itself to the hedonic consequences of suchcomparison. Much of this work has proceeded from the simpleassumption that upward comparisons generally are threateningto well-being and self-esteem, whereas downward comparisonsare self -enhancing or reassuring. Many laboratory and field stud-ies (e.g., Morse & Gergen, 1970; Wheeler & Miyake, 1992)have supported this proposition, showing that greater increasesor smaller decreases in partic ipant s' subjective well-being (e.g.,elevated mood, enhanced self-esteem) follow downward com-parison (e.g., Hakmiller, 1966) and greater decreases or smallerincreases in subjective well-being follow upward comparison(e.g., Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985).

Empirical and anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that theaffective consequences of a social compar ison often may dependless on its direction than on the context and manner of its use(e.g., Br ickman & Bulman, 1977; Buunk, Collins, Taylor, Van-Yperen, & Dakof, 1990; Taylor & Lobel, 1989; Tesser, 1988).Thus, cancer patients may derive solace from comparisons withreal or hypothetical peers whose symptoms or circumstancesare even more dire than their own (Wood et al., 1985), but theymay also report feeling inspired, optimistic, and hopeful from"upw ard" contacts with good copers and long-term survivors(Buunk et al., 1990; Taylor, Aspinwall, Giuliano, Dakof, &Reardon, 1993). More generally, a peer's success can be asource of either envy and self-doubt or of inspi ration and motiva-tion, and a peer's misfortune may make one feel either fortunateto have escaped such a fate or afraid that a similar fate awaitsin the future.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1997, Vol. 73, No. 6, 1141-1157Copyright 1997 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0022-3514/97/$3.001141

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1142 LYUBOMIRSKY AND ROSSThe nature of one's relationship with a social comparison

target, and the nature of the evaluative dimension, may similarlyplay a role. A peer's success or good fortune obviously canproduce depression, jealousy, and lowered self-esteem, but italso can be a source of inspiration, pride, and optimism, pro-vided that one identifies with that " supe rio r" peer (Tesser, 1988;Wheeler, 1966; Wills, 1981; for empirical evidence , see Major,Testa, & Bylsma, 1991; Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988) . Con-versely, although a peer's failure or bad fortune can boost one' ssense of relative worth or status, it also can be depressing oreven threatening if one feels connected with or similar to thatpeer, especially if the relevant evaluative dimension is one onwhich one' s own status is likely to deteriorate. Again, however,such effects are variable and are likely to depend on highlysubjective factors that are similar ly variable and circumstantial .For example, cancer patients who believed that they had rela-tively little control over the course of their disease experiencedmuch more negative affect after exposure to very sick patientsthan did patients who believed that they had relatively morecontrol (Buunk et al., 1990).

Individual DifferencesLaboratory and anecdotal evidence of the flexibility of social

comparison, and the resulting variability of its hedonic conse-quences, naturally prompts us to consider the phenomenon ofindividual differences. Everyone can identify individuals whoseemed to feel deflated rather than delighted when their room-mate graduated summa cum laude or found a new love, andwho felt relieved rather than disappointed or sympathetic whentheir colleague was rejected in seeking some new honor, promo-tion, or relationship. Moreover, whereas some people's moodand more enduring sense of well-be ing seemingly depend heav-ily on social comparison, other people's happiness or unhappi-ness seems to depend little on such information. Our presentresearch essentially sought to reverse the emphasis o f such anec-dotal observation. We sought to show that characteristicallyhappy and unhappy people differ in the extent and manner oftheir responsiveness to social comparison information. Specifi-cally, we hypothesized that happy individuals are more inc linedthan unhappy ones to " us e" such information sparingly, and touse it selectively to protect their well-being and self-esteem.

Our curren t research represents another step in a more generalresearch undertaking on the links among affective t emperament,motivation, cognitive processes, and hedonic consequences. Inone recently completed set of studies (Lyubomirsky & Ross,1997), we sought to show the mediating role that temperamentmay play in determining the cognitive and motivational conse-quences of choice or restriction of alternatives. Our findingssuggested that self-rated happy and unhappy individuals re-sponded differently--and in a manner supportive of their af-fective tempe rame nts- -in reducing dissonance in the aftermathof decision making. Whether in choosing fancy desserts or se-lecting among prospective colleges, happy people tended to besatisfied with a l l of tfieir options--even those they did notultimately choose or re cei ve- -an d to reduce dissonance in theface of real ego threat (e.g., by devaluing colleges that rejectedthem). By contrast, unhappy people generally reduced disso-nance by deciding that what they chose or received was medio-

cre but that what they were denied was even worse. In earlierpilot research (Lyubomir sky & Ross, 1990), we explored groupdifferences in recollect ion and in assessment changes over timewith respect to a wide range of recent positive versus negativelife events. Happy and unhappy respondents, we found, differedneither in the frequency of occurrence nor in the objective mag-nitude of the positive and negative events they faced. But happyparticipants resolved ambigui ty about both types of events morefavorably and adaptively, showed more rapid decl ines in nega-tive affect, and were more likely to see humor and didactic valuein adversity.

Although we know of no research that has specifically exam-ined social compar ison processes among happy versus unhappyindividuals, there is some suggestive evidence (albeit from stud-ies using paradigms very different from our present ones) thatindividual differences related to enduring levels of happinessmay be associated with differences in the way such processesare used. Low self-esteem in particular seems to be associatedwith the tendency for people to compare themselves with lessfortunate others (e.g., Cialdini & Richardson, 1980; DeVelliset al., 1990; Taylor, Wood, & Lichtman, 1983; Wood, Giordano-Beech, Taylor, Michela, & Gaus, 1994; see Wills, 1981, for areview), to derogate others (Cialdini & Richardson, 1980;Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987 ), and to suffernegative consequences from social comparison in general andupward compari son, in particular (e.g., Buunk et al., 1990;Gibbons & Gerrard, 1989; Wheeler & Miyake, 1992). Lowself-esteem seems also to increase people's reliance on socialcomparisons for self-evaluation (e.g., Brickman & Berman,1971; Wayment & Taylor, 1995; see also Morse & Gergen,1970). Clinica lly inspired studies investigat ing the conse-quences of mild to moderate depression are similarly suggestive;that is, depression appears to be correlated with reliance onsocial comparison information, especially unfavorable informa-tion (e.g., Gibbons, 1986; Swallow & Kuiper, 1988, 1990, 1992)and negative responses to such information (e.g., Ahrens, 1991;Weary, Elbin, & Hill, 1987).

The Current StudiesOur working hypothesis in the present research was that

happy individuals would be less sensitive to unsolicited socialcomparison information in general, and less vulnerable to unfa-vorable social comparison information in particular, than un-happy individuals. In Study 1 we allowed participants to solveanagrams at whatever rate they were capable of, but we manipu-lated the ostensible performance of a school peer so that partici-pants experienced relative success (i.e., their peer performedworse than they) or relative failure (i.e., their peer performedbetter than they). In Study 2 we manipulated participants' ap-parent success or failure in a teaching task (by means of "ex-pert " feedback) and examined the extent to which relative socialcompari son information (i.e., information suggesting that a peerhad done even better or even worse) would moderate the effectsof their own absolute success or failure.

Beyond the featured comparis on of happy and unhappy parti-cipants, our two studies shared a number of common features.First, to minim ize possible experimental demand characteristicsand suspicion on the part of participants, and to better simulate

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CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL COMPARISON 1143typical real-world social comparison contexts, we provided so-cial comparison lnforrnation indirectly in both studies. That is,the experimenter never explicitly offered any comparison ofperformances, although through careful staging, such informa-tion was made hig hly salient to the participants. Second, in bothstudies, the relevant task and evaluation dimension was onelikely to be at least moderately important to the participants,yet it was a dimension about which they were unlikely to haveobjective standards for evaluating their performan ce. Finally, inboth studies, participants enjoyed wide latitude in "ma nag ing "the relevant social comparison process. They were free to mini-mize or max imize the self-relevance, importanc e, and controlla-bility of the dimension under evaluation; they were free to com -pete with, identify with, or simply ignore their more successfulor less successful peer; and they were free to attribute their ownperformance or that of their peers to whatever factors (stablevs. unstable, global vs. specific, internal vs. external, etc.) theywished.

S tudy 1M e t h o d

O v e r v i e wIn the context of a purported study of cognitive performance, self-

rated happy and unhappy female undergraduates solved anagram puzzleswhile a supposed peer (who was actually an experimental confederate)ostensibly completed the same puzzles much faster or much slowerthan the participants. Participants rated themselves with respec t to theircurrent mood, confidence, and anagram-solving ability both before andafter the completion of their task.

P a r t i c i p a n t sFifty female introductory psychology students at Stanford Universityreceived course credi t for thei r participation in this study. Participants

were selected on the basis of their responses to four Likert-type ratingsof their own happiness presented in the context of a mass-administeredomnibus questionnaire. The first item asked them to characterize them-selves using absolute ratings ( 1 = a very unhappy person; 7 = a veryhappy person). The second item asked them to characterize themselvesrelative to Stanford peers ( 1 = much less happy; 7 = much more happy).The third and fourth items, respectively, characterized happy people("Some people are generally very happy; they enjoy life regardless ofwhat is going on, getting the most out of everything") and unhappypeople ("Some people are generally not very happy; although they arenot depressed, they never seem as happy as they might be" ), and eachitem asked participants to what extent each characterization describedthem ( 1 = not at all," 7 = a great deal). Responses to the four items,which showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's a = .94), werecombined and averaged to provide a single composite score, rangingfrom 1.0 to 7.0, with a median of 5.5 on the 7-point scale?

A sample of 25 happy and 25 unhappy participants, that is, thosewhose composite scores were respectively either in the top or bot tomquarter of the distribution (but excluding participants who scored 7 andabove on the short form of the Beck Depression Inventory [BDI; Beck &Beck, 1972; see Beck & Beamesderfer, 1974]) , were recruited for thestudy by telephone. The correlation between participants' BDI scoresand their scores on our happiness composite, we should note, was rela-tively modest (r = -. 38 ). The happy participants' group mean on therelevant happiness scale was 6.55 (S D = 0.66), whereas the group meanfor the unhappy participants was 3.44 (S D = 1.17). 2 We should note

that the omnibus questionnaire used in selecting these participants in-cluded two scales, Rosenberg's (1965) Self-Esteem Scale (a = .90)and Scheier and Carver's (1985) Life Orientation Test (an optimismscale; a = .87), measuring constructs conceptually and empiricallylinked to happiness. The inclusion of these scales, although not specifi-cally intended for this purpose, later allowed us to pursue issues ofdiscriminant validity.

P r o c e d u r e a n d M a t e r i a l sIn each experimental session, two individuals, a female participant

and a female confederate pretending to be another participant, completedthe relevant questionnaires and experimental tasks together. The experi-menter, a young male (who was not in formed of participants' happinessstatus), explained that participants were being paired simply to "savetime."

The experiment was introduced as a study of "cognitive perfor-mance," one in which we " hop ed to learn how personality and varioussituational variables af fect performance on a problem-solv ing task."Accordingly, participants were told, they would be asked to solve a seriesof anagrams during the experimental session. To bols ter this purportedrationale for the study, we embedded a number of filler items, includingquestions about how often participants solved puzzles, how much theyenjoyed them, and how important it is for them to be good at them, as

z In previous research in our laboratory, this composi te measure hasdemonstrated high internal consistency (Cronbach's alphas range from.85 to .95 in seven different studies), high t est-r etest stability (Pearson'sproduc t-momen t correlation = .90 for 4 weeks and .71 for 3 months).It further has been shown to correlate highly with peer ratings o f happi-ness (r = .65) solicited in a telephone follow-up; with Scheier andCarver' s (1985) Life Orientation Test (r s range from .47 to .62 in fourstudies); with Rosenberg's (1965) Self-Esteem Scale (rs range from.53 to .58 in four studies) ; with the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck &Beck, 1972; rs range from -. 49 to - .6 5 in four studies); with extrover-sion (r = .36) and neuroticism ( r = -. 50 ), as assessed by the EysenckPersonality Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975); and with posi-tive emotionality (r = .48) and negative emotionality (r = -.39), asasses sed by Tellegen's (1985) Differential Personality Questionnaire.Furthermore, our composite measure has shown strong relationshipswith other widely used scales of subjective well-being, such as Brad-burn's (1969)Affect-Balance Scale (rs range from .49 to .64 in threestudies) and his Global Happiness item (rs range from .57 to .69 inthree studies), Andrews and Withey's (1976) Terrible-Delighted Scale(r s range from .59 to .71 in three studies) , and Diener, Emmons, Larsen,and Griffin' s (1985) Satisfaction With Life Scale (r s range from .6lto .69 in three studies). No significant correlations have been foundbetween our composite happiness measure and college grade point aver-age, math and verbal ability, age, gender, and education. (For furtherinformation on the characteristics and correlates of this composite mea-sure, see Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1997. )2 Given the absolute values of these means, one could argue that theunhappy group might better be labeled as "not happy" or even "aver-age." We were guided, however, by research showing that on measuresof current or long-term affective state, and indeed on most measures ofwell-being, life satisfaction, or sel f-esteem, people tend to show overallmeans that are on the high or above average end of the scale (Bradburn,1969; A. Campbell, Converse, & Rodgers, 1976; Rosenberg, 1965; Wat-son, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Accordingly, the self-ratings of our cur-rent unhappy participants, which were just slightly below the midpointof 4.0 on the relevant scale, meant that they were unhappy relative notonly to our self -labeled happy participants but also to their peers in thepopulation as a whole.

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1 1 4 4 L Y U B O M I R SK Y A N D R O S Swe l l a s t h e i r S AT s c o re s , i n t h e v a r i o u s q u e s t i o n n a i r e s a d m i n i s t e r e dt h ro u g h o u t t h e s t u d y .

B e f o r e u n d e r t a k i n g t h e p r i m a r y e x p e r i m e n t a l t as k , p a r t i c ip a n t s c o m -p l e t e d a p r e l i m i n a r y q u e s t i o n n a i r e a s s e s s i n g t h e i r p r e m a n i p u l a t io n , o rb a s e l i n e , m o o d o n 9 - p o i n t L i k e r t -t y p e s c a l e s a s k in g h o w g o o d , h a p p y ,a n d d e p r e s s e d t h e y c u r r e n t l y w e r e f e e l i n g . T h e s e s c a l e s w e r e c o m b i n e dt o p r o v i d e a s i n g l e m o o d i n d e x o n w h i c h m o r e p o s i t i v e s c o r e s r e f le c t e dm o r e p o s i t i v e m o o d s ( a = . 8 8 ) . W e u s e d t h e i n d iv i d u a l L i k e r t - t y p es c a l e s , r a t h e r t h a n l o n g e r m o o d i n v e n t o r i e s , t o a v o i d a l e r t i n g p a r t i c i p a n t st o o u r s p e c i f ic t o p i c o f c o n c e r n a n d o u r h y p o t h e s e s ? P a r t i c i p a n ts a l s op r o v i d e d b a s e l i n e m e a s u r e s a s s e s s i n g h o w g o o d t h e y i n i t i a l l y t h o u g h tt h e y w e r e at s o l v i n g a n a g r a m s ( 1 = v e r y p o o r ; 7 = e x c e l l e n t ) a n d h o wt h e y t h o u g h t t h e y w o u l d r a n k r e l at i v e t o t h e i r p e e rs ( i . e ., h o w m a n y o fa r a n d o m l y s e l e c t e d g r o u p o f 1 0 0 S t a n f o r d s t u d e n t s w o u l d b e b e t t e rt h a n t h e y w e r e a t s o l v i n g a n a g r a m s ) .

A n a g r a m - s o l v i n g t a s k a n d s o c i a l c o m p a r i s o n m a n i p u l a t i o n . A f t e rt h e p a r t i c i p a n ts h a d c o m p l e t e d t h e p r e l i m i n a r y q u e s t i o n n a i r e , t h e e x p e r i -m e n t e r g a v e t h e m i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r t h e 2 0 - m i n a n a g r a m - s o l v i n g t as k . H eb e g a n b y h a n d i n g e a c h o f t h e m a " s a m p l e " p u z z l e c a r d c o n t a i n in gt h r e e a n a g r a m s - - t h a t i s , Y - O - W - N - S ( S N O W Y ) , N - O - T - I -X ( T O X I N ) ,a n d A - S - S -I - B ( B A S I S ) - - a n d i n d ic a ti n g th a t s u c h c a r ds w o u l d b e u s e dt h r o u g h o u t t h e s o l u t i o n t a sk . H e f u r t h e r e x p l a i n e d t h a t u p o n u n s c r a m -b l i n g a n y t w o o f t h e t h r e e a n a g r a m s o n a g i v e n ca r d , p a r t i c ip a n t s w e r et o w r i t e t h e i r s o l u t i o n s a n d t h e c a r d n u m b e r o n t h e ir a n s w e r s h e e t, t h e nh a n d t h e c a r d b a c k t o t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r an d r e c e i v e a n e w c a r d c o n t a i n in gn e w a n a g ra m s . P a r t i c i p a n t s we re a l s o g i v e n a n o t e b o o k t o u s e a s s c r a t c hp a p e r ( o n e p a g e p e r c a r d ) . A t t h a t p o i n t , t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r i n s t r u c t e dt h e m t o b e g i n s o l v in g a n a g r a m s a n d h a n d i n g i n t ~ i r c a r d s . W h a t t h ep a r t i c ip a n t s d i d n o t k n o w , o f c o u r s e , w a s t h a t t h e ir c o p a r t i c i p a n t w a sa n e x p e r i m e n t a l c o n f e d e r a t e w h o h a d b e e n i n s t r u c t ed t o m o n i t o r t h e irp a r t n e r ' s p a c e a n d s o l v e ei t h e r a p p r o x i m a t e l y 5 0 % m o r e o r 5 0 % f e w e ra n a g r a m s t h a n s h e d i d - - a t a s k th e y a c c o m p l i s h e d v e r y su c c e s sf u l l y .T h e b a c k - a n d - f o r t h h a n d i n g o f t h e a n a g r a m c a r d s a s t h e p a r t i c ip a n t a n dc o n f e d e r a t e w o r k e d s i d e b y s i d e t h r o u g h o u t t h e 2 0 - m i n p e r i o d , a l o n gw i t h t h e c o n s e c u t i v e n u m b e r i n g o f t h e c a r d s a n d t h e t u r n in g o f n o t e b o o kp a g e s , s e rv e d t o m a k e i t h i g h l y s a l i e n t t o p a r t i c i p a n t s t h a t t h e i r p e e r ' sp e r f o r m a n c e w a s e i t h er h i g h l y s u p e r i o r o r h i g h l y i n f e r i o r to t h e i r o w n .

W h i l e t h e p a r t i c ip a n t a n d t h e c o n f e d e r a t e w e r e p e r f o r m i n g t h e a n a -g ra m -s o l v i n g t a s k , t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y r a t e d t h e p a r t i c i -p a n t ' s a p p a r e n t l e v e l o f a n x i e t y a n d d y s p h o r i a , u s i n g 7 - p o i n t L i k e r t -t y p e s c a l e s ( 1 = n o t a t a l l; 7 = a g r e a t d e a l ) a f t e r 5 r a i n a n d t h e n a g a i na f t er 1 5 m i n . T h e s e t w o p a i r s o f r a t i n g s w e r e s u b s e q u e n t l y c o m b i n e d t op r o v i d e a s i n g l e i n d e x o f a p p a r e n t n e g a t iv e m o o d ( a = . 8 9 ) .

P o s t p e r f o r m a n c e q u e s t io n n a i re s . I m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g t h e 2 0 - m i na n a g ra m t a s k , t h e p a r t i c i p a n t a n d t h e c o n fe d e ra t e we re p u t i n s e p a ra t er o o m s , a n d t h e p a r ti c i p a n t w a s a s k e d b y t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r t o c o m p l e t ea s e c o n d s e t o f s e l f - a s s e s s m e n t s o f m o o d a n d a n a g r a m - s o l v i n g a b i li t ie s .P a r t i c i p a n t s we re r e q u i r e d t o r a t e h o w g o o d , s a d , a n d h a p p y t h e y c u r -r e n t l y we re f e e l i n g , u s i n g 9 -p o i n t L i k e r t - t y p e s c a l e s ( a = . 9 2 ) . T h e yfu r t h e r we re a s k e d t o u s e s i m i l a r 9 -p o i n t L i k e r t - t y p e s c a l e s t o r a t e ,r e t ro s p e c t i v e l y , h o w f ru s t r a t e d , h a p p y , d o wn , a n d a n x i o u s t h e y r e c a l l e dh a v i n g f e l t e a r l i e r (~ = . 81 ) , wh i l e a c t u a l l y s o l v i n g t h e a n a g ra m s . T oa s s e s s c h a n g e s i n p a r t i c i p a n t s " p e rc e p t i o n s o f t h e i r o wn a b i l i t y i n l i g h to f t h e i r p e r f o r m a n c e a n d t h e a p p a r e n tl y s u p e r i o r o r i n f e r i o r p e r f o r m a n c eo f t h e i r p e er , w e a s k e d p a r t i c i p a n t s t o a g a i n r a t e h o w g o o d t h e y t h o u g h tt h e y we re a t s o l v i n g a n a g r a m s ( 1 = v e r y p o o r ; 7 = e x c e l l e n t) a n d t oe s t i m a t e t h e i r p r o b a b l e r a n k i n g i n a r a n d o m l y s e l e c t e d g r o u p o f 1 0 0S t a n fo rd s t u d e n t s , P a r t i c i p a n t s we re a l s o a s k e d t o r a t e t h e i r o wn j u s t -c o m p l e t e d t a s k p e r f o r m a n c e a n d t h a t o f t h e c o n f e d e r a t e u s i n g s i m p l e 7 -p o i n t s c a l e s ( 1 = v e r y p o o r ; 7 = e x c e l l e n t ) . T o fu r t h e r b o l s t e r o u rp u rp o r t e d r a t i o n a l e fo r t h e s t u d y , a n d t o d e f l e c t p a r t i c i p a n t s ' a t t e n t i o nf r o m o u r p r i m a r y c o n c e r n s , w e a l s o a s k e d p a r t i c ip a n t s a t v a r io u s p o i n t si n t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e t o r e s p o n d t o a n u m b e r o f f i l l e r i t e m s a b o u t t h e

a n a g r a m - s o l v i n g t a s k ( i . e. , w h a t s t r a t e g i e s t h e y u s e d ) a n d a b o u t p r o b l e ms o l v i n g i n g e n e ra l .

F i n a ll y , w h e n a ll d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b l e m e a s u r e s h a d b e e n c o l l e c t e d ,p a r t i c ip a n t s c o m p l e t e d a d e b r i e f i n g q u e s t i o n n a ir e i n w h i c h t h e y f i r s tw e r e g i v e n a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o d e s c r i b e t h e i r f e e l i n g s , c o n c e r n s , a n d s u s p i -c i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e s t u d y a n d t h e n w e r e a s k e d t o r a t e h o w m u c h t h e yl i k e d t h e e x p e r i m e n t o v e ra l l ( 1 = n o t a t a l l ; 7 = a g r e a t d e a l ) . I n o r d e rt o c h e c k o n w h e t h e r o u r p r o c e d u r e s w e r e s u c c e s s f u l i n m i n i m i z i n gs u s p i c i o n a n d p o s s i b l e e x p e r i m e n t a l d e m a n d c h a r a c t er i s t ic s , p a r t i ci p a n t sw e r e t h e n a s k e d , b o t h o n a d e b r i e f i n g q u e s ti o n n a i r e a n d d u r i n g o r a ld e b r i e f i n g , t o s h a r e t h e i r h u n c h e s a b o u t t h e h y p o t h e s e s o f t h e s t u d y a n dt o r e p o r t a n y o t h e r s u s p i c i o n s a b o u t t h e s t u d y . As i t t u rn e d o u t , n o n e o ft h e p a r t i ci p a n t s g u e s s e d t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e s t u d y o r d i s c e r n e d t h e l i n kb e t w e e n t h i s s t u d y a n d t h e r a t i n g s o f h a p p i n e s s t h e y h a d c o m p l e t e ds e v e ra l we e k s e a r l i e r. T h e e n t i r e s e s s i o n l a s t e d a p p ro x i m a t e l y I h r ,

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M e a s u r e s c o m p l e t e d p r i o r to t h e a n a g r a m - s o l v i n g t a s k s u g -g e s t e d n o b e t w e e n - g r o u p d i f f e r e n c es i n a b i li ty o r e x p e r i e n c e .T h a t i s , h a p p y a n d u n h a p p y p a r t i c i p a n t s d i d n o t d i f f e r s ig n i f i -c a n t l y i n t h e i r S A T s c o r e s , i n t h e i r i n i ti a l s e l f - r a t i n g s o f a b i l i tya t s o l v i n g a n a g r a m s , i n t h e i r r e p o r t s o f h o w o f t e n t h e y s o l v e da n a g r a m s , i n h o w m u c h t h e y e n j o y e d s o l v i n g th e m , o r i n h o wi m p o r t a n t i t w a s f o r t h e m t o b e g o o d a t s o l v i n g t h e m ( a l l t s