This article was downloaded by: [The Aga Khan University]On: 18 October 2014, At: 03:05Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK

Human Dimensions of Wildlife:An International JournalPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uhdw20

Social Capital and the Value ofHunting Club MembershipsCYNTHIA B. GREEN a , THERESE GRIJALVA b &STEPHAN KROLL ca St. Lawrence University Canton , New York, USAb Weber State University Ogden , Utah, USAc California State University , Sacramento,California, USAPublished online: 17 Aug 2010.

To cite this article: CYNTHIA B. GREEN , THERESE GRIJALVA & STEPHAN KROLL (2004)Social Capital and the Value of Hunting Club Memberships, Human Dimensions ofWildlife: An International Journal, 9:1, 57-68

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10871200490272179

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all theinformation (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness,or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and viewsexpressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, andare not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of theContent should not be relied upon and should be independently verified withprimary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for anylosses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages,and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or

indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of theContent.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan,sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone isexpressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found athttp://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

03:

05 1

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

57

Human Dimensions of Wildlife, 9:57–68, 2004Copyright © Taylor & Francis Inc.ISSN: 1087–1209 print / 1533-158X onlineDOI: 10.1080/10871200490272179

Social Capital and the Value of Hunting Club Memberships

CYNTHIA B. GREEN

St. Lawrence University Canton, New York, USA

THERESE GRIJALVA

Weber State University Ogden, Utah, USA

STEPHAN KROLL

California State University Sacramento, California, USA

When the state of New York purchased the Champion Lands in the AdirondackPark and subsequently terminated the leases of 48 hunting clubs on theselands, opponents of the purchase argued that: (1) a rich and unique culturewas being destroyed; and (2) that the State failed to include the loss of thissocial capital in an economic impact analysis as specified by the State Envir-onmental Quality and Review Act. In this study, responses to dichotomouschoice contingent valuation (DC-CV) questions are used to estimate thevalue a member attaches to a hunting club membership. The willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a hunting club membership (beyond other hunting-relatedexpenses) is estimated to be over $1,290, which corresponds to a total valueof about $1.9 million for the 1,500 hunters in the 48 concerned clubs. Theseestimates should be included in a full benefit-cost analysis of the purchase,and provide useful input to the societal debate regarding future landpurchases by states.

Keywords social capital, hunting clubs, contingent valuation, state landpurchases

We wish to thank Robert Berrens, Robert Blewett, Glenn Harris, Cliff Nowell, David Richardson,Jason Shogren, Jerry Vaske, members of the St. Lawrence County Environmental ManagementCouncil and two anonymous reviewers for their comments. Financial assistance by the Dean’s officeof St. Lawrence University is gratefully acknowledged.

Address correspondence to Stephan Kroll, Department of Economics, 6000 J-Street, CaliforniaState University, Sacramento, CA 95819-6082, USA. E-mail: skroll@csus.edu

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

03:

05 1

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

58 C. B. Green et al.

For the past 100 years, the Champion Lands in the Adirondack Park, New York,have been a prominent location for hunting clubs. When the state of New Yorkpurchased these lands from the Champion International Paper Company in 1998,and terminated the 48 hunting club leases, a historically rich activity and culturewas lost (Property Rights Foundation of America, Inc., 1999). Members of thehunting clubs lost exclusive hunting privileges to the area and the experiencesderived from them. Critics of the purchase argued that the consequences to huntingclub members were not properly evaluated and included in the State’s decisionmaking (Property Rights Foundation of America, Inc., 1999). These losses could beinterpreted as a loss of social capital. The purpose of this nonmarket valuation studyis to estimate the value of hunting club memberships on the Champion Lands.

The contingent valuation method (CVM) is used to estimate the value a memberattaches to a hunting club membership, which includes both recreational use andcultural nonuse values. Typically, contingent valuation (CV) elicits a respondent’smaximum willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a change in an environmental good orservice. The method, however, can be applied to wide variety of goods includingcultural activities or historical features. Although CV researchers have identifiedseveral errors that may arise in value measures derived from individual responses(e.g., strategic and hypothetical biases), there are a number of best-practiceguidelines available for designing contingent valuation surveys (Arrow et al.,1993; Carson, Flores, & Meade, 2001; Mitchell & Carson, 1989). In spite ofcriticisms, CV estimates are commonly accepted by federal or state agencies asproviding a direct expression of value and used as an informational input in landmanagement issues (Carson, 2000).

Conceptual Background

Social Capital

First used by sociologists (e.g., Bourdieu, 1986), the idea of “social capital” hasgained increasing popularity in other disciplines such as economics. Despite thispopularity, the concept remains controversial because the term itself is ambig-uous and there is no consensus on how to measure it (Durlauf, 2002a). Putnam(2000) defines social capital as “connections among individuals—social net-works and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” andstates that “social networks have value” and that “social capital can thus besimultaneously a ‘private good’ and a ‘public good’” (pp. 19–20). As Putnam(2000) notes, over the past 50 years many clubs and organizations in the UnitedStates have decreased dramatically; he interprets this as declining social capitaland civic engagement, with negative consequences for children’s welfare, streetsafety, economic prosperity, health, and happiness.

Economists have reviewed and criticized Putnam’s approach (2000). Sobel(2002), for example, believes that Putnam confuses cause and effect. Durlauf

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

03:

05 1

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

Hunting Club Memberships 59

(2002b, 2002c) asks whether the decline in memberships is a proof for thedecline of the stock of social capital or is it a consequence of that decline (pro-vided that there is causality at all). This controversial question, however, is lessimportant for our inquiry since Putnam (and Sobel) talk about voluntary declinesin memberships. We focus on an involuntary end of memberships.

Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) use an individualistic, microeco-nomic approach to define social capital. For them, social capital is a person’ssocial characteristic and as such is similar to other forms of capital. Just asattending college is an investment into human capital, joining a club is an invest-ment into social capital. Such investments generally generate positive socialexternalities. Hunting club members enjoy the benefits of their investment, aswell as those of others’ memberships. Once the club is disbanded and the land isopen to individual use, these positive externalities cease to exist. In addition, clubmembers often believe that they are better stewards of the land for which theyhave the exclusive rights than public agencies (Annen, 2002; Bowles & Gintis,2002; Paldam & Svendsen, 2000).

Most researchers of social capital point out that although social capital has apositive value for the members of a group, it might also generate negative values(Annen, 2002; Bowles & Gintis, 2002). Benefits from social capital for the insidersof a group could come at the expense of outsiders.

We estimate the economic value of one form of social capital (a huntingclub membership) using the contingent valuation method (CVM). Note, however,that we make no attempt here to conduct a full benefit-cost analysis that wouldinclude values that the public might attach to getting access to pristine areas thatare currently used exclusively by hunting clubs. This would warrant another,more extensive nonmarket valuation study. Note also that we do not estimate thedemand for hunting per se—hunting will still be allowed on the Champion Landsbut will be open to the public and not exclusively for hunting clubs. We are interestedin the social capital of the hunting club membership.

The Contingent Valuation Method

The contingent valuation method is a survey-based nonmarket valuation techniqueand is currently used by most federal and state agencies (Boyle, 2002; Carson, 2000;Mitchell & Carson, 1989). Survey respondents are asked to state their maximumwillingness-to-pay (or accept compensation) for changes in a nonmarket good. Thesimplest and most common CVM format is to ask respondents a dichotomouschoice (DC) question in a bidding (“would you pay $A for . . . ?”) or referendum for-mat (“would you vote yes for the following . . ., which will increase your taxes by$T?”). While most CVM studies have measured environmental values, the methodhas also been applied to value cultural heritage (Thompson, Berger, Blomquist, &Allen, 2002; Berrens, Brookshire, Ganderton, & McKee, 1998). Research publishedin recent special issues of the Journal of Leisure Research and the Journal of Park

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

03:

05 1

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

60 C. B. Green et al.

and Recreation Administration used CVM studies to measure the consequences ofrecreation fees (see the summary of results in Watson & Herath, 1999).

There is an active debate regarding the reliability and use of the CVM inmeasuring environmental values (Diamond & Hausman, 1994; Hanemann, 1994;Portney, 1994). Central to this debate is a philosophical concern about the inclu-sion of passive-use values (e.g., existence, bequest, option or intrinsic values) ineconomic analysis or as an informational input in environmental policy decisions(Carson, Flores, & Meade, 2001). Passive-use values exist when consumerswould pay to preserve a particular resource or use of a resource even if they havenever visited the resource or may never use it. There is no reason to believe that pas-sive-use values such as existence values are unique only to environmentalresources. Consumers may receive nonuse benefits from many different types ofgoods including those in a cultural or traditional setting. Exclusion of passive-usevalues may result in little or no economic value being recognized for an environ-mental resource or cultural site or activity, even if consumers receive utility fromthe existence of these goods.

CVM is one of few economic methods available for measuring passive-usevalues. Perhaps more importantly, the approach has the ability to estimate thetotal economic value (TEV) of a good, which may include both use and nonusevalues (Carson, Flores, & Meade, 2001). Thus, in complex valuation settingssuch as valuing a hunting club experience that includes cultural and recreationaluse values, TEVs can be holistically estimated using the CVM (Randall, 1991).Attempts to estimate values of various services from an environmental resourceand then aggregate will likely lead to overvaluation of the resource (Carson,Flores, & Meade, 2001; Randall, 1991).

There is growing empirical evidence of the significance of nonmarket val-ues for social capital or a cultural heritage (Noonan, 2002). Indication of thisgrowth can be seen by looking at Contingent Valuation Studies in the Arts andCulture, a large online annotated bibliography assembled by Noonan (2002) as acomprehensive reader on the subject (http://culturalpolicy.uchicago.edu/workingpapers/Noonan11.pdf). The bibliography includes over 100 studies that use non-market valuation techniques to value a cultural or social heritage contained in thearts, historic sites, or uses of environmental resources. As an example, Lockwood,Tracey, and Klomp (1996) use the CVM to compare the TEVs of preserving agrazing tradition in the Australian Alps with conservation (i.e., stop grazing).They estimate a mean WTP of $81 per person for the continuation of grazing and$33 for conservation. The WTP for continued grazing would represent both useand passive-use values, in other words the TEV of grazing in the Australian Alps.

Study Context

Adirondack State Park is a six-million-acre area in 12 counties of central andnorthern New York. About 40% of the park’s land is publicly owned; the

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

03:

05 1

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

Hunting Club Memberships 61

other 60% is privately owned. Development and land use are strictly regu-lated through the Adirondack Park Land Use and Development Plan (forinformation about the park, see the web page of the Adirondack Park Agency,http://www.apa.state.ny.us/). The majority of the public land is a forestpreserve, which is protected by Article XIV of the NY State Constitution tobe “forever wild.” For private land, the State can acquire conservation ease-ments, which substantially and permanently limit or restrict development,management, and use.

In October 1997, the Champion International Corporation announced itsintention to sell its Northeast holdings, among them 143,000 acres of timberlandin four Northern New York counties. After year-long negotiations, New YorkState spent $24.9 million to acquire 110,000 acres located in the AdirondacksState Park as conservation easements and to purchase an additional 29,000,which it added to the Adirondack Forest Preserve. These purchases and easementarrangements assured that the entire Champion land in the park would be open tothe public and that some hunting clubs that currently lease Champion landsremove all camps and permanent installations adjacent to waterways by 2005 andall remaining camps by 2013.

Critics of the State’s purchase have complained that the State did not con-sider the economic and cultural impacts of this major action as specified by theState Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA). In addition to hunting expe-riences gained through membership, members value the social and traditionalaspects of their memberships. As in Bowles and Gintis’s (2002, p. F423) inter-pretation of social capital, “. . . ongoing relationships among community memberssupport trust, mutual concern, and sometimes simply effective multilateralenforcement of group norms,” and they were not accounted for in the State’sdecision-making process.

Methods

Data Collection

In this study, we employed the survey-based CVM to elicit respondents’ WTPfor membership in a hypothetical hunting club that owns land in the Adiron-dacks, but has otherwise the same characteristics as the hunting clubs that areabout to lose their leases.1 In the spring of 2001, surveys with stamped returnenvelopes were mailed to 708 members of 28 clubs (out of a possible 1,500members from 48 hunting clubs with leases on the Champion lands). The remain-ing clubs either did not want to participate in the survey or their officers couldnot be reached at the time the survey was conducted. About 65% of these surveyswere mailed directly; the rest were sent to club representatives, who dispersedthem among the members. Of the 708 delivered surveys, 343 members (48.4%)responded.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

03:

05 1

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

62 C. B. Green et al.

Analysis Variables

Each survey contained 23 questions related to the hunting experience of the clubmember, 14 general demographic questions, and several CVM questions (bothdichotomous choice and open-ended questions were asked) that were designed toelicit a hunter’s maximum WTP for the continued hunting club experience. Allsurveys were identical except for the DC-CV questions that randomized bid levelsacross the sample; the randomly assigned bid amounts were $625, $1,250, $2,500,$5,000, $7,500, or $10,000, which were obtained by visiting several hunting clubsand conducting informal prequestionnaire interviews. Subjects were askedwhether they were willing to pay a one-time lump-sum payment ($X) for themembership to a hunting club. The rationale behind using a DC referendumformat is that consumers are familiar with such a task as they make similaryes–no decisions when they purchase market goods (Arrow et al., 1993;Portney, 1994).

The WTP Model

In this study, WTP for a hunting club membership is estimated using responses tothe DC-CV questions—the method supported and promoted by a NOAA(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) blue ribbon panel thatincluded several Nobel Laureate economists (Arrow et al., 1993). Given thatWTP responses are not observed directly in the DC format, the practical questionis how to obtain expected WTP from DC responses. Following Cameron (1988)and Cameron and James (1987), we use a censored threshold approach to esti-mate WTP coefficients and associated standard errors directly.

In the DC-CV format, an individual’s true WTP is an unobservable variablethat can be statistically calculated from a yes or no response to a payment amountt that varies across the sample (it is key that t varies across the sample).

To begin, an individual’s true WTP can be represented by the following

,

where WTPi is the (unobserved) maximum WTP of respondent i, x is a vector ofexplanatory variables, β is the vector of corresponding parameter estimates, and eis an error term that is assumed to follow a normal distribution. Although in theDC framework an individual’s true WTP is not observed, responses to the DCquestion generate the binary dependent variable Wi that equals 1 if respondent ianswers the willingness-to-pay question with “Yes” and 0 if “No.” Wi is 1 if andonly if WTPi is larger or equal to a randomly assigned payment amount t. Theprobability of a yes response is

,

WTPi x′ βi ei+( )exp=

Pr yes( ) Pr W 1=( ) 1 Φlnti x′

iβ–

κ-----------------------

–= =

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

03:

05 1

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

Hunting Club Memberships 63

where κ is the shape parameter, and φ indicates the standard normal cumulativedensity function. The log-likelihood functions for n independent observations is

logL = {Wi log[1 − Φ((lnti −x′ iβ)/κ)] + (1 −Wi)log[Φ((lnti −x′ iβ)/κ)]} .

Because t is provided in the log-likelihood function, the scale parameter κ can beidentified, allowing the vector of coefficients, β, to be estimated along withasymptotic standard errors. An alternative to the censored approach wouldbe to introduce t as an explanatory variable in the discrete choice model;however, as shown by Cameron (1988), the censored procedure (which is just areparameterization of conventional discrete choice models) has the primaryadvantage of providing parameters and standard errors of the WTP functiondirectly and much more simply. For these reasons, the censored approach hasbecome the standard, and is the method employed here.

The econometric model is specified on the basis of economic theory andevidence from prior hunting studies and includes socioeconomic, hunting avidity,and experience as explanatory variables (Fried, Adams, Berrens, & Bergland,1995). Specifically, we include income (INCOME), education (EDUC), age(AGE), years of membership (MEMBER YEARS), the value of annual spendingon supplies (SUPPLIES), and, if on average, the hunter spent one or more daysper month at camp (DAYS). In addition, because members can belong to campslocated in three different areas in the Champion Lands (Santa Clara, Croghan,and Tooley Pond), each with different hunt characteristics, we included twodummy variables to represent the location of the hunter’s camp membership(CLARA CAMP and CROGHAN CAMP). We estimate three separate modelspecifications due to the correlation (0.60) between AGE and MEMBERYEARS: AGE is dropped from estimation in Model 1; MEMBER YEARS isdropped from estimation in Model 2; and all explanatory variables are includedin Model 3.

Results

The summary statistics indicate that the average respondent is 54 years old, hasbeen a member of a hunting club for 24 years, and spends annually $748 and$465 on supplies and membership fees, respectively. The percentage of respond-ents living in the Adirondacks and neighboring towns is 32.2%. The sample isrelatively affluent with 55.2% earning an income above $50,000 in 2000, and99.7% of all respondents (all but one) are male (other summary statistics areavailable from the corresponding author on request).

Table 1 shows the frequencies of yes and no responses to the WTP questionswith varying bid amounts. As expected, a higher amount yields a lower frequencyof “yes” responses.

i 1=

n

∑

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

03:

05 1

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

64 C. B. Green et al.

Table 2 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of β and κ and their asymp-totic t-test statistics for all model specifications using a log-linear specification ofthe underlying WTP function. With a log-linear valuation function, the β coeffi-cients are interpreted as the percentage change in WTP for a one-unit change inthe level of the explanatory variable.

As expected, the coefficient on INCOME is positive across all model speci-fications (and statistically significant at the 0.05 level in Model 3). WTPincreases by more than 70% for hunters with an annual income level above$50,000. The results also indicate that more avid hunters, measured by annualexpenditures and days at camp, have a greater willingness-to-pay for a campmembership. Specifically, WTP increases minimally with each extra dollar spentin supplies (after taking into account scaling of these variables), yet increases bymore than 84% for hunters who spend one or more days per month at camp.These findings are similar to previous research on recreation demand that findthat income and avidity are positively correlated with a respondent’s WTP or rec-reation demand (Fried et al., 1995; Englin, Lambert, & Shaw, 1998). Further, thelocation of a hunter’s camp appears to affect WTP. For instance, WTP is lowerfor individuals whose camps are located in the Santa Clara and Croghan areas,yet only the coefficient on CLARA CAMP is statistically significant at the0.05 level across all models.

By using the censored regression approach, WTP is estimated directly(Cameron, 1988). The median of the fitted distribution for WTP is exp(x′i β) andthe mean is exp(x′i β +0.5 κ−2). Using the median to represent the centraltendency, WTP for a permanent hunting club membership ranges from $1,293 to$1,308. The mean WTP, which is typically larger than the median (see e.g.,Carson, 2000), is $1,435 to $1,449. These amounts represent a one-time lump-sum payment to guarantee a club membership for life, or essentially the totaleconomic value a member attaches to a hunting club membership. Compared tothe average initiation fees of $465, these amounts represent a significant loss insocial capital.

TABLE 1 Frequency of Willingness to Pay Responses

Bid amount

Number of validresponses

Number of “Yes”answers

Percentage of “Yes”answers

$625 65 37 56.9$1,250 48 26 54.2$2,500 61 28 45.9$5,000 45 17 37.8$7,500 47 11 23.4$10,000 55 5 9.1Total 321 124 38.6

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

03:

05 1

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

Hunting Club Memberships 65

TABLE 2 Estimation Results. “Dependent” Variable =Ln (Unobserved WTP)

a INCOME is a dummy variable indicating income over $50,000; EDUC is a dummy vari-able indicating a college education; AGE is the member’s age in years, scaled by 100;MEMBER YEARS is number of years respondent has been a member of a hunt club,scaled by 100; SUPPLIES is the value of annual supply expenditures, scaled by 1,000;DAYS AT CAMP is a dummy variable indicating that hunter spent more than 12 days peryear at camp; CLARA CAMP is a dummy variable indicating the hunter’s camp locationas Santa Clara; and CROGHAN CAMP is a dummy variable indicating the hunter’s camplocation as Croghan. b *, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. c Asymptotic t ratios from maximum likelihood estimation in parentheses. d LR and LU are the values of the log likelihood function for the restricted and unrestrictedmodels, respectively, where the restricted model restricts all parameters to zero. The stat-istic is distributed as χ2 with r (the number of restrictions) degrees of freedom.

Variablea Model I Model II Model III

Intercept 6.367***b 7.117*** 7.481*** (8.96)c (7.38) (7.44) INCOME 0.690* 0.718* 0.771** (1.70) (1.78) (1.88) EDUC 0.402 0.403 0.389 (0.96) (0.97) (0.93) AGE — −1.319 −2.684 (−0.96) (−1.49) MEMBER YEARS 0.300 — 2.068 (0.23) (1.23) SUPPLIES 0.384* 0.386* 0.354 (1.64) (1.67) (1.53) DAYS AT CAMP 0.850* 0.885* 0.826* (1.75) (1.83) (1.71) CLARA CAMP −0.990** −0.996** −1.108** (−1.91) (−1.93) (−2.10) CROGHAN CAMP −0.532 −0.707 −0.732 (−0.83) (−1.09) (−1.12) κ 2.212*** 2.189*** 2.186*** (5.67) (5.69) (5.68) Number of Observations 297 295 295 Total Log-likelihood −173.28 −170.59 −169.80 Likelihood Ratio

Statisticd = −2(LR −LU) 18.62*** 20.38*** 21.96***

Median WTP =exp(x′ iβ) $1308.67 $1292.76 $1293.07 Mean

WTP =exp(x′i β +0.5κ−2) $1449.46 $1434.99 $1435.68

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

03:

05 1

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

66 C. B. Green et al.

Conclusion

When the State of New York purchased land and easement rights in the Adiron-dacks and subsequently terminated the leases of 48 hunting clubs on these lands,opponents argued that the State had not appropriately analyzed the economic andcultural impacts of this decision. They pointed out that a hunting club member-ship is important economically and culturally, providing recreational, cultural,and social values to many generations.

This article measures the value of a hunting club membership using theCVM. Although CVM remains controversial, its prominence is due to its abilityto estimate total economic value, including passive use or nonuse values. Thus,in the context of this study, cultural experiences gained through a membership ina hunting club can be considered a passive-use value. This article adds to thegrowing body of empirical research that applies nonmarket valuation techniquesto measure the values of historical and cultural activities.

Using responses to DC-CV questions, the median willingness-to-pay for a per-manent membership in a hunting club is estimated to be over $1,290, which corre-sponds to an aggregate value of about $1.9 million for the 1,500 hunters in the 48concerned clubs. There are, however, two reasons why these numbers might bebiased: (1) some hunting clubs can keep their camps and exclusive hunting rightsuntil 2013, 12 years after the survey was conducted, when today’s average huntingclub member would be 67 years old, and it is not clear whether the respondents dis-counted future benefits when answering the survey; and (2) as behavioral economistspoint out, people usually overreact to losses because they exaggerate how long sen-sations of losses will last and under-predict adaptation possibilities (Rabin, 2002).

This study is only a partial study on one group involved and does not replacea complete benefit-cost analysis to capture all benefits and costs to all groups.However, there are several implications to this study. First, WTP estimates shouldbe included in a full benefit-cost analysis of the State’s purchase. Second, theresults show a significant loss in social capital and provide useful information todecision makers and future researchers regarding the impacts of terminating hunt-ing or other clubs. Last, CVM is an appropriate nonmarket valuation technique tomeasure the values gained through club memberships, which, similar to environ-mental goods and services, may include use and passive-use values.

Note

1. The total economic value of a hunt club membership could be obtained using awillingness-to-accept (WTA) compensation for the loss strategy as opposed to a willing-ness-to-pay for the gain. It would be expected that WTA compensation would be greaterthan WTP amounts. The appropriate measure to use for a benefit-cost analysis depends onthe property right. According to the nature of the situation, the implicit right was given tothe State’s purchase of Champion Lands; as such, the policy-relevant question becomeswillingness-to-pay for a membership.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

03:

05 1

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

Hunting Club Memberships 67

References

Annen, K. (2002). Social capital, inclusive networks, and economic performance. Journalof Economic Behavior and Organization, 50, 449–463.

Arrow, K., Solow, R., Portney, P., Leamer, E., Radner, R., & Schuman, H. (1993).Report of the NOAA Panel on contingent valuation. Federal Register, 58,4601–4614.

Berrens, R. P., Brookshire, D., Ganderton, P., & McKee, M. (1998). Exploring nonmarketvalues for the social impacts of environmental policy change. Resource and EnergyEconomics, 20, 117–137.

Bourdieu, P. (1986). Forms of capital. In J. G. Richardson (Ed.), Handbook of theory andresearch for the sociology of education. Westport: Greenwood Press.

Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2002). Social capital and community governance. EconomicJournal, 112, F419–F436.

Boyle, K. (2002). Contingent valuation in practice. In P. Champ, K. Boyle, and T. Brown(Eds.), A primer on nonmarket valuation. Boston: Kluwer.

Cameron, T. A. (1988). A new paradigm for valuing non-market goods using referendumdata: Maximum likelihood estimation by censored logistic regression. Journal ofEnvironmental Economics and Management, 15, 355–379.

Cameron, T. A., & James, M. D. (1987). Efficient estimation methods for “Closed-Ended”contingent valuation surveys. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 69(2), 269–276.

Carson, R. T. (2000). Contingent valuation: A user’s guide. Environmental Science andTechnology, 34(8), 1413–1418.

Carson, R. T., Flores, N. E., & Meade, N. F. (2001). Contingent valuation: Controversiesand evidence. Environmental and Resource Economics, 19(2), 173–210.

Diamond, P., & Hausman, J. (1994). Contingent valuation: Is some number better than nonumber? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8, 45–64.

Durlauf, S. N. (2002a). Symposium on social capital: Introduction. Economic Journal,112, F417–F418.

Durlauf, S. N. (2002b). Bowling alone: A review essay. Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization, 47, 259–273.

Durlauf, S. N. (2002c). On the empirics of social capital. Economic Journal, 112,F459–F479.

Englin, J., Lambert, D., & Shaw, W. D. (1998). A structural equations approach tomodeling consumptive recreation demand. Journal of Environmental Economics andManagement, 33, 33–43.

Fried, B. M., Adams, R. M., Berrens, R. P., & Bergland, O. (1995). Willingness to pay fora change in elk hunting quality. Wildlife Society Bulletin, 23, 680–686.

Glaeser, E. L., Laibson, D., & Sacerdote, B. (2002). An economic approach to socialcapital. Economic Journal, 112, F437–F458.

Hanemann, W. M. (1994). Valuing the environment through contingent valuation. Journalof Economic Perspectives, 8, 19–43.

Lockwood, M., Tracey, P., & Klomp, N. (1996). Analysing conflict between culturalheritage and nature conservation in the Australian Alps: A CVM approach. Journalof Environmental Planning and Management, 39(3), 357–370.

Mitchell, C., & Carson, R. (1989). Using Surveys to Value Public Goods: The ContingentValuation Method. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

03:

05 1

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

68 C. B. Green et al.

Noonan, D. (2002). Contingent valuation studies in the arts and culture: An annotatedbibliography. Working Paper, Cultural Policy Center, University of Chicago.

Paldam, M., & Svendsen, G. T. (2000). An essay on social capital: Looking for the firebehind the smoke. European Journal of Political Economy, 16, 339–366.

Portney, P. (1994). The contingency valuation debate: Why economists should care.Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8, 3–17.

Property Rights Foundation of America, Inc. (1999). St. Lawrence County votes to joinlawsuit challenging state acquisition of Champion International Land, December 7,1999. Stony Creek, New York.

Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community.New York: Simon and Schuster.

Rabin, M. (2002). A perspective on psychology and economics. European EconomicReview, 46, 657–685.

Randall, A. (1991). Total and nonuse values. In J. B. Braden and C. D. Kolstad (Eds.),Measuring the demand for environmental quality. New York: Elsevier Science Pub-lishing Company Inc.

Sobel, J. (2002). Can we trust social capital? Journal of Economic Literature, 40, 139–154. Thompson, E., Berger, M., Blomquist, G., & Allen, S. (2002). Valuing the arts: A contingent

valuation approach. Journal of Cultural Economics, 26, 87–113. Watson, A. E., & Herath, G. (1999). Research implications of the theme issues “Recreation

Fees and Pricing Issues in the Public Sector” (Journal of Park and RecreationAdministration) and “Societal Response to Recreation Fees on Public Lands” (Journalof Leisure Research). Journal of Leisure Research, 31, 325–334.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

03:

05 1

8 O

ctob

er 2

014