Snyder 1978_Collective Violence a Research Agenda

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Collective Violence: A Research Agenda and Some Strategic ConsiderationsAuthor(s): David SnyderReviewed work(s):Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 1978), pp. 499-534Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/173732 .

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Collective ViolenceA RESEARCH AGENDA ANDSOME STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

DAVID SNYDERIndiana University

This paper is based on the premise that current empirical analyses of collective violenceare largely inadequate, and takes as its primary objective a detailed specification of alter-native methodological strategies. Quantitative research on violence is cited for problemsof measurement and causal inference, which stem from attempts to represent importanttheoretical concepts (relative deprivation, resource mobilization) at levels of analysisother than those at which they are formulated. Alternativestrategiesfor empirical investi-gation of violence include timeseries analyses of individual perceptions and data onorganized groups, as well as studies of crowd dynamics. Methods for linking the lattertype of qualitative approach to quantitative ecological analyses are indicated. In general,the conclusions strongly suggest a theoretical and empirical reorientation toward "dis-aggregated" approaches to collective violence, and away from global conceptual andcross-national methodological efforts. Although consideration is limited to the deter-minants of domestic violence, the concluding section outlines the potential relevance ofinternational linkages and the outcomes of violence to these central concerns.

Efforts to explain a range of phenomena variously labeled civil strife(Gurr, 1968), collective violence (Tilly, 1969, 1975), revolution (Davies,1962, 1969), and political instability (Feierabend and Feierabend, 1966)or violence (Hibbs, 1973) have advanced considerably over the past

AUTHOR'S NOTE: This is a much revised and shortened version of a paper originallycompleted in February 1977. Readers interested in elaboration and related issues notcovered here are encouraged to request copies of the longer manuscript. I am grateful toPaula M. Hudis and Ted Robert Gurr for helpful comments on an earlier version, butretain full responsibility for the views expressed here.JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 22 No. 3, September 1978? 1978 Sage Publications, Inc.

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500 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

fifteen years.1 Several coherent lines of theoretical development-particularly those emphasizing collective discontent (Davies, 1962;Feierabend and Feierabend, 1966; Gurr, 1968, 1970) and groups'mobilization and application of resources in political arenas (Tilly,1975; Snyder and Tilly, 1972; Oberschall, 1973; Gamson, 1975)-havestimulted abundent researchon important questions. Related empiricalprogress has also occurred through the widespread application ofquantitative methods to accumulating bodies of contemporary andhistorical aggregate (e.g., Gurr, 1968; Hibbs, 1973; Snyder and Tilly,1972; Spilerman, 1970) and individual level (e.g., Rude",1964; Caplan,1970) data.Despite these advances, more careful consideration of the state ofresearch on collective violence warrants substantial pessimism. Manyobservers note that existing theories specify neither comprehensive(Hibbs, 1973: 3; Snyder and Kelly, 1976: 135) nor unambiguous(Grofman and Muller, 1973) explanatory models. Empirical analyseshave at best slowly resolved these difficulties of theory building andtrimming because much of the evidence is contradictory, both acrossand within types of data employed (e.g., compare Feierabend andFeierabend, 1966, and Gurr, 1968, with Hibbs, 1973; Grofman andMuller, 1973; McPhail, 1971). However, even more problematic thanthis reliability of findings issue is that of validity: the major premise ofthis article (subsequently documented) is that most quantitativeanalyses of collective violence do not adequately address the relevantsubstantive arguments. Moreover, currentresearchlargely continues tofollow conventional empirical strategies (and for that matter, to refinerather than rethink available theoretical statements) that now yielddiminishing marginal results.In light of this pessimistic assessment, my objective is to indicate a setof promising, if infrequently used, strategies for (especially empirical)investigations of the determinants of collective violence. As a necessary

1. Collective violence as arbitrarilydefined here encompasses events which meetsome minimum criteria of size and damage to persons and/ or property. Following con-ventional usage of the term, internationalwars and acts of individualviolence are excludedfrom consideration. However, it should be noted that many of the studies cited abovevariously encompass events which are neither collective (e.g., some assassinations) norviolent (e.g., elections, some protest demonstrations). While such differences in opera-tional definitions have important implications (e.g., Nardin, 1971; Jacobsen, 1973; Tilly,1975), there is enough overlap in the phenomena of interest to warrant addressing thesestudies in a single context.



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Snyder / COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE 501

preliminary, I sketch some major theoretical orientations and analyticmethods in order to specify the lack of fit between them and identifyimportant substantive questions. But in the bulk of the discussion, Idraw on recent work in economics, political science, and sociology tosuggest alternative strategies of research design, data collection, andempirical analysis that more appropriately address such substantiveissues.

SOME MAJOR LINES OF ARGUMENTThis section considers two lines of theoretical development on the

determinants of collective violence, here labeled "relative deprivation"(e.g., Davies, 1962, 1969; Feierabend and Feierabend, 1966; 1972; Gurr,1968, 1970; Gurr and Duvall, 1973, 1976) and "resource mobilization"(e.g., Tilly, 1970, 1975; Gamson, 1975; McCarthy and Zald, 1977;Wilson and Orum, 1976; Oberschall, 1973; Snyder and Tilly, 1972)approaches. While this arbitrary division is not novel (see Korpi, 1974;Useem, 1975; McCarthy and Zald, 1977, for similar treatments), it isobviously selective and requires several immediate caveats. No com-prehensive review of various explanations (nor even detailed exposi-tion of the two considered) is attempted. My main purpose is to outlinesome widely employed arguments in order to illustrate problems ofconventional data and strategies in testing them. Approaches thatemphasize biological factors (Nelson, 1974, 1975), linkages with inter-national politics and/or conflicts (Rosenau, 1969; Rummel, 1963),structural-functional models (Johnson, 1966; Smelser, 1963), priorissues concerning the bases of conflict (see Fink, 1968; Dahrendorf,1959) or neo-Marxist analysis (reviewed in Salert, 1976) are not specifi-cally covered because of (1) failure to generate a corresponding body ofempirical work; or (2) the negative weight of available evidence; and/ or(3) duplication of the core strategic issues to be raised.2

2. While space consideration preclude full documentation of these assertions, littlequantitative researchexamines biological or strictly Marxist approaches (though excep-tions exist: e.g., Sugimoto, 1975). Also, previous research indicates little evidence of aregular relationship between international and domestic violence (see Zinnes, 1976: ch. 8,for a cogent review).And concerning specifications of functional theory, results on the dis-equilibrating effects of rapid changes such as urbanization on disorder (Hibbs, 1973;Lodhi and Tilly, 1973), participation of "dislocated"individualsin violence (Rude', 1964;Caplan, 1970), and even the intervening assumption that changes disruptnormative inte-gration (Freedman, 1950; Lewis, 1952; Kantor, 1965) are not supportive of the theory.



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For those concerned that omission of such approaches neglects toomuch of significance, I note that different categorizations of theories atleast partly reflect heuristic convenience and taste, and that manycentral ideas of the types "dismissed" above are contained in the lines ofargument addressed here. For example, relative deprivation theories(alternatively labeled collective discontent, social psychological,achievement deprivation; see Tilly, 1975; Gurr, 1973; Grofman andMuller, 1973) often include elements of structural-functional models.3Similarly, resource mobilization (sometimes group conflict or powerstruggle theories; Gurr, 1973; Korpi, 1974) relies on both Marxian andeconomists' rational choice arguments in identifying the importance(and problematic nature) of the organization of discontent. Whatshould be recognized is that relative deprivation (RD) and resourcemobilization (RM) approaches represent more general differences inemphasis-on perceptions, aspirations, beliefs, and values versus theformation of and interactions among competing collectivities-whichpersist across explanations of collective violence (and conflict itself).What should be avoided is missing these substantive distinctions amongthe varieties of terminological trees.

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION

While this theory at least implicitly underlies a broader range ofanalyses (e.g., inequality-violence hypotheses; see Russett, 1964; Nagel,1974; Sigelman and Simpson, 1977), the central work of Davies (1962,1969), Feierabend and Feierabend (1966, 1972), and Gurr (1968, 1970;Gurr and Duvall, 1973, 1976) is known widely enough that only a fewmain points of theory and method need be identified. The importantcommon themes of this line of argument may be characterized asfollows. The scope and intensity of the gap between individuals' expectedand achieved welfare on some criterion produces the variations incollective discontent (and consequent frustration, anger, and potentialaggression) that are attributed as a, and typically the, major determinantof variations in collective violence. When such discontent is focused on

3. For instance, such convergence occurs where the effects of rapid change ormodernization operate indirectlyvia their influence on the expectations-achievments gap(Feierabend et al., 1969). More generally, Gurr (1970) treats anomie as a specific case ofthe global concept of collective discontent, while functional theorists such as Smelser(1963) attempt to incorporate discontent as a particular form of structural strain.



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governments or related political targets, the probability of manifestconflict increases. Finally, the (especially coercive) actions of govern-ments, and more generally a nation's institutional capacity for deflectingdiscontent into channels other than collective political action, areviewed as important influences (e.g., Huntington, 1968: ch. 1; Gurr,1970: chs. 8 and 9; Feierabend and Feierabend, 1966: 250-25 1).

There are of course significant differences among particular argu-ments. First, while all of this work invokes frustration-aggression theoryin its interpretation of aggregate patterns, the degree to whichindividual-level psychological explanations predominate varies con-siderably. For example, Davies (1969: 705) asserts:

This J-curve is a psychological, not a sociological explanation. The units of analysisare individual human beings. They may fall into visible categories (like blacks orstudents or working men or peasants), but their mental processes that relate tofrustration and aggression are fundamentally the same.

Conversely, Gurr's (1970) model is explicitly "sociocultural" andincorporates structural variables (e.g., the balance between regimes anddissidents of coercive or institutional support) that operate largelyindependently of individual-level constructs.4

A second major difference concerns multiple causality and the com-pleteness of theoretical models. Many RD arguments (e.g., Davies,1962, 1969; Feierabend and Feierabend, 1966, 1972) pay little attentionto factors other than collective discontent and neglect important ques-tions: how and why are grievances focused on political targets? how dodiscontented individuals come to undertake collective action? Again,Gurr's work (1970; see especially recent modifications in Gurr andBishop, 1976; Gurr and Duvall, 1976) is exceptional insofar as it at-tempts to deal systematically with such issues; specifies a joint influenceof discontent, justifications, and the balance of capabilities on violence;and (in response to criticisms such as Nardin, 1971) recognizes thatagents of the state often play central roles as parties to, not simplyregulators of, violence.

4. The foregoing discussion does not imply that any theory of collective violence is orcan be entirely psychological, particularly insofar as some factors exogenous to indi-viduals (e.g., Davies' J-curve) must be invoked to explain temporal shifts in manifestconflict.



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Despite these substantive differences, empirical work that explicitlytests RD has largely converged in aggregate (usually cross-sectional)analyses of relationships between indicators of discontent, other factorssuch as coercion, and measures of political conflict. While most suchstudies (e.g., Feierabend and Feierabend, 1966; Gurr, 1968; Gurr andDuvall, 1973; Bwy, 1968; Gurr and Bishop, 1976; Cooper, 1974) reportresults that are consistent with expectations, some other analyses of thistype (e.g., Hibbs, 1973; Snyder and Tilly, 1972; Nagel, 1974) presentnegative evidence. The point is not that the number of favorable andcontradictory findings (the former predominate) can be used to evaluatethe theory-more careful examination of the methods and results wouldbe necessary for that-but simply that the evidence available from thisconventional research strategy is mixed. Alternative research designs,including similar ecological analyses of subnational units (e.g., Spiler-man, 1970, 1971; Morgan and Clark, 1973) and individual-level datarecovered from arrest records or surveys of participants (e.g., Orum andOrum, 1968; Searles and Williams, 1962; McPhail, 1971), also yieldinconsistent findings, though the weight of the evidence from thesestudies tends to be less supportive of RD theory that reported in cross-national research.

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

While this line of argument developed partly in response to the mixedresults on RD and related conceptual approaches, RM is more explicitlyan alternative to what it views as incorrect or incomplete specificationsin previous work.5 A general characterization of RM approaches and(implicitly) their criticisms of other arguments include the following.

(1) Variations in discontent are either entirely (Tilly, 1975; Jenkinsand Perrow, 1977; Snyder and Tilly, 1972) or at best weakly (McCarthyand Zald, 1977: 1214-1215) related to collective political action. Thisargument is heavily influenced by rational choice theorists such as Olson(1965), who shows that whether individuals ever organize to pursue

5. Several of the criticisms indicated here are explicitly derived from RM perspec-tives, though this does not suggest that such views are themselves immune to challenge (seebelow). Similarly, the more extensive discussion of RM rather than RD argumentsproceeds on the assumption that the former is less familiar and therefore requires a moredetailed presentation of content and merits.



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common interests or redress shared grievances is highly problematicrather than inevitable (as is often assumed). It is also based on thepremise that a large enough stock of discontents to warrant extensivepolitical protest is invariably present.

(2) Therefore, the organization of discontent becomes a centralexplanatory variable (Tilly, 1975; Oberschall, 1973; Snyder and Tilly,1972; McCarthy and Zald, 1977), particularly insofar as it helps toaccount for how individuals come to participate collectively (at the sameplace, time, and often for the same purpose) in large-scale events. Conse-quently, processes of interaction beween individuals and groups, especi-ally the latter's mechanisms of recruitment and maintaining commit-ment, become important research questions.6

(3) Moreover, given that some sets of individuals will becomeidentifiable collectivities (groups and organizations) and others will not,fluctuations in existing groups' mobilization, or collective control, ofresources (e.g., loyalties, money, arms) exert important constraints onsuch groups' capacity to undertake collective action of any kind (seeEtzioni, 1968: ch. 15; Snyder and Tilly, 1972; Gamson, 1975; Jenkinsand Perrow, 1977).(4) To the extent that their mobilization levels permit (Tilly, 1975;Gamson, 1975), and depending on important variations in strategy andtactics (e.g., McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Gamson, 1975), groups attemptto apply their resources toward acquiring collective goods. Such at-tempts typically occur in the context of political arenas because politicaldecisions are so important to the flow and distribution of benefits. Somegroups, of course, have already achieved a measure of regular powerover allocation decisions in a polity and employ less visible influencestrategies (e.g., lobbying). But others have no such routinized means ofpressing their demands and necessarily use their resources in publicdemonstrations and shows of strength in order to gain particular bene-fits and to establish the legitimacy of their constituency's claims to a

6. Many of the mechanisms (e.g., ideologies that foster solidarity, calculations ofsuccess probabilities) specified as important in this literature (see McCarthy and Zald,1977; Fireman and Gamson, 1978) do not differ qualitatively from factors underlyingthedevelopment of normative and utilitarian justifications for political violence identified byGurr (1970: chs. 6-7). The relevant distinction here is whether such justifications promotepolitical violence by linking individuals to groups (which attempt to manipulate percep-tions as a conscious strategy in the RM approach) or by focusing discontent directly ongovernments.



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regular share of influence over political decisions (Snyder and Tilly,1972; Gamson, 1975).7

(5) Since such demands lay claim to scarce and competitive re-sources, they are often met by organized resistance from other mobilizedgroups and (most often) from governments via their agents of officialforce. The subset of mobilization theorists that deal explicitly withcollective violence (e.g., Tilly, 1975) hypothesize that it results largely asa byproduct of interactions among collective actors (including policeand troops) in public settings,8 but recognize that violence sometimesoccurs more directly because "it is simply the most efficient means ofaccomplishing some collective end" (Tilly, 1975: 493).

The general merits of RM approaches lie in their greater (a) attentionto dynamic processes (e.g., of interactions among groups); (b) ability toaddress questions that are logical necessities in explaining collectiveviolence but are neglected or underemphasized in most other theories:how do collective events occur (via organization) and why are protestsso often "political" (because governments fundamentally effect thedistribution of goods that constitute desired collective ends)?; and (c)focus of strategies of research on collective violence at the group levelof analysis.9 But this is not to claim that RM theories lack problems. Amajor one (particularly in early efforts: e.g., Tilly, 1970, 1975; Snyderand Tilly, 1972) is the excessively centralized conception of mobiliza-tion, which makes it extremely difficult to account for apparentlyspontaneous events that lack evidence of any organizational base (e.g.,

7. Gamson's (1968) stable unrepresentation model is implicit here; a given group'sprobability of becoming involved in violence varies according to its position vis-a-vis a(typically, but not necessarily) national structure of power. As a specific example of thispoint, consider the experience of American labor organizations with respect to industrialviolence.

8. More precisely, authorities' actions are importnat in two ways: first, by initiatingcoercive measures (e.g., restrictions on associations and assembly) that diminish a group'sorganizational capacity, and second, by resisting partisan collective actions that do occur.9. However, this does not imply that RM approaches lack expectations concerning

aggregate variations in collective violence over time and / or across political units.McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1124) argue that the amount of wealth in a society (and conse-quently, of discretionary resources) will be positively related to the volume of social,including political, movement activity because resources available for mobilization will beincreased. Similarly, Snyder and Tilly (1972) report that nonviolent national politicalactivity (e.g., elections and cabinet changes) is positively associated with year-to-yearfluctuations in violence over a 130-year period in France. They interpret this finding toindicate that shifts in the centers of power stimulate collective demands from mobilizedgroups.



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racial disorders in American cities). A related concern is the neglect ofindividual actors, especially the mechanistic assumption that theirpropensity to act is entirely mediated through linkages with groups.However, as with the RD arguments there are significant variations inRM approaches, and several recent treatments (Oberschall, 1973;Fireman and Gamson, forthcoming; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Wilsonand Orum, 1976) address the nature and bases of individuals' recruit-ment and commitment to groups and propensities to participate incollective action.

Despite these difficulties, perhaps the greatest general merit of RM(at least in principle) is that it provides a plausible alternative to previousapproaches. In practice, of course, the relative advantages of RM willultimately be substantiated or vitiated by its ability to explain observedvariations in manifest political conflict, and the empirical evidence todate is sketchy. Much of the support for RM theories is indirect. Forexample, findings that collective violence is no more, and often less,likely to occur in periods of rapid change (Hibbs, 1973; Lodhi and Tilly,1973), or that the "uprooted" are less likely to participate (Rude", 1964;Caplan, 1970) are consistent with organizational interpretations. Ifviolence fluctuates with groups' capacity for collective action, then thedisintegrating effects of rapid industrialization or urbanization ought todepress that capacity. Similarly, Tilly's (1969, 1975) finding that (atleast in France) the modal episode of collective violence begins withprotests that are not intrinsically violent and is initiated (and most of thekilling and wounding done) by police and troops, are in line with thecentral RM arguments. To be sure, a few quantitative analyses directlylink measures of group mobilization to collective protest (Aminzade,1973; Shorter and Tilly, 1974; Snyder, 1975). However, in these studiesmobilization is usually measured by crude proxies, such as shifts ingroups' size, and the strongest supporting evidence pertains to fluctua-tions in industrial strike activity-a phenomenon that, given the impor-tance of unions, probably best fits the assumption of heavily centralizedmobilization mechanisms and neglect of individual actors.

In summary, the mainstream of work on the determinants of collec-tive violence is largely characterized by (1) competing RD and RMtheories, which are not themselves exhaustive, but instead reflective ofbroader differences in emphases on perceptions, symbols, and the likeversus organization and interaction; (2) quantitative research strategiesthat are dominated by cross-sectional analyses of ecological or indi-



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UNIT OF ANALYSIS "INDI)FPENDE'r"VARIABLES "DEPENDENT"VARIABLES

AGGREGATE /X1 Environmental A 1Y1 Frequency/lagnitude ofit(Nations, Cities, / Characteristics > Collective Violence inEtc.) I SpatiosTemporal UnitII

cOLL17(TIk'IT y x., :oIiciviti 4 . Collective Participation I(Groups/Organizat ions) - C:laracterist ices B \ in ViolenceDUA)l'

II)AI.d. dndiviudual.

Partic ipationCharacteristic'; I in (Collective) Violence/

Xi, Y1: sets of variables; AB, . N: relationships among variables; see text for fur-ther description and explanation of Figure.Figure 1: Units of Analysis Employed and Relationships Examined in Research on

Collective Violence

vidual-level data; and (3) evidence on each line of argument that is some-what inconsistent and (even for those inclined to interpret it as favoringone approach over the other) by no means fully adjudicates or otherwiseresolves the differences between alternative theories.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE:PROBLEMS AND ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES

PROBLEMATIC ISSUES

While the foregoing discussion suggests that current empiricalanalyses adequately test the relevant arguments, any implication of aclose fit between theory and evidence is highly problematic. Substanti-ating that assertion, as well as developing guidelines for alternativeempirical strategies, requires identification of major difficulties inextant quantitative work. Specification of such difficulties relies onFigure 1, which presents a heuristic diagram of units of analysis em-ployed and relationships examined in most empirical research. Al-though no formal representation of a causal system (e.g., Duncan,1966) is attempted, the Xi and Yi, respectively, designate sets of inde-pendent and dependent variables measured at a specified level of

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analysis. Associations within sets-e.g., between GNP and govern-mental coercion in X1-may be neglected for present purposes. LettersA, B, . . ., N represents relationships among sets of variables-forexample, E indicates the effects of aggregate political, economic, and soforth conditions on individuals' economic welfare or mental processes(perceptions of deprivation or government legitimacy). Finally, solidarrows (labeled A, C) indicate relationships that have received consider-able quantitative study-the ecological and individual-level analysiscited above-while broken arrows designate those accorded little, ifany, attention.

In terms of Figure 1, simple versions of RD (e.g., Davies, 1969) andRM (e.g., Snyder and Tilly, 1972) verbal statements could be specified,respectively, as ECI and DJB plus KJ sequences.'0 Of course, moresynthetic treatments in each line of argument (e.g., Gurr and Duvall,1976; McCarthy and Zald, 1977) would, with different weights, incorpo-rate those and additional linkages in the theoretical model. But the aimhere is not to accomplish an unambiguous mapping of any given argu-ment vis-a-vis Figure 1. Instead, it is to demonstrate that any theoreticalmodel involves linkages between levels of analysis in its a priori causalstatements and its interpretation of empirical results. The problematicconsequence is that the conventional analyses of areal aggregates orindividual participants which dominate empirical work cannot addressthe theoretically specified causal processes that operate across levels (orsometimes within them: e.g., the dynamics of interactions amonggroups). Moreover, it is precisely such processes-e.g., "environmental"(XI) effects on individual and group characteristics, the relative im-portance of perceptual and organizational factors in explaining collec-tive violence-that constitute both the central hypotheses stated byalternative arguments and the means of discriminating among them.

Empirical practitioners, particularly of ecological analyses, oftenacknowledge these limitations (Gurr, 1970: 63ff.; Snyder and Tilly,1972: 527-530) but do not appear unduly concerned by them. Standard

justifications for such analyses take several forms. One is that ecological

10. For example, Davies' RD treatment indicates that structural variables such aseconomic fluctuations affect (E) individuals' perceptions, which in turn determine (C) theprobability of participation in collective violence. Aggregate levels of violence are sums ofthese individual probabilities (I), while any collective pattern of participants is an inci-dental consequence (H) of individuals' shared sources of deprivation, frustration, andanger (Davies, 1969: 705).



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studies address "the relevance of the theory for the most general case ...but not. . . the microanalysis that would account more precisely for theforms, timing and targets of civil strife" (Gurr and Ruttenberg, 1971:189). Other, typically more subtle, warrants include reference to highR2, other studies with similar findings and interpretations or (sometimesexplicit) assumptions that areal measures adequately capture the dis-aggregated concept of interest. However, the objections raised hereconcern explanation (i.e., interpreting relationships) more than predic-tion, validity more than reliability, and examination of the very cross-level correspondence assumed to warrant research using ecological datain the first place. In principle, such objections could be met if aggregatevariables closely and linearly determine (and therefore serve as ade-quate proxies for) the disaggregated variables of interest. 11But availableevidence on that association is far from reassuring. One major case inpoint is that all ecological studies infer RD from measures of objectivewelfare in some populations (e.g., in Gurr, 1962; Feierabend andFeierabend, 1966, Bwy, 1968; Davies, 1962, 1969). However, recentsurvey results reported by Grofman and Muller (1973) and Miller et al.(forthcoming) show no close or linear correspondence between indi-vidual-level objective and perceptual indicators of deprivation. Inaddition, Hibbs' (1974) study of industrial strike activity containsserious implications for aggregate analysis of RD.12 He pools yearlytimeseries data for ten nations in order to test different specificationsof expectations-achievements gap arguments. Of three plausible repre-sentations of the gap between workers' expected and actual real wagechanges, only one of them (in which expectations are based on a long-run increase parameter and on actual wage shifts over several previousperiods) manifests much power in explaining strike fluctuations.However, the two weak models in Hibbs' analyses are important forpresent purposes. Despite several advantages of the RD criterion datacompared to those of cross-national investigations-Hibbs' measuresare dynamic (and permit explicit specification of how expectations areformed), more obviously salient to the population (in this case, workers)

11. It should be stressed that the core theoretical constructs in RD and RM treat-ments, respectively, concern individuals' perceptions and group formation and inter-actions.

12. Although labor-management disputes are not usually conceptualized as "collec-tive violence," there is a very close correspondence between theoretical explanations of thetwo phenomena (Hibbs, 1974; Snyder, 1975; Shorter and Tilly, 1974).



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at risk (than, say, indicators such as physicians per capita in Feierabendand Feierabend, 1966) and almost certainly measured with less error-two a priori plausible representations of RD are empirically inadequate.Given such results, the validity of aggregate measures of RD thatemploy objective indicators and less appropriate data surely warrantsconsiderable skepticism.

Such criticisms are by no means limited to analyses of RD. Problemsin testing mobilization theories with ecological data are more seriousinsofar as even heroic justifications for aggregate proxies of groups'collective control over resources are lacking. In fact, the only quantita-tive analyses of RM explanations of collective violence that employecological data (Snyder and Tilly, 1972; Lodhi and Tilly, 1973) areunable to include any empirical representation of the central mobiliza-tion variable. Moreover, the dynamic elements of groups' interactionsspecified in RM theory are entirely lost with such research designs.

It should be further emphasized that the levels of analysis issue isnot only a problem of measurement validity, but also concerns theambiguous interpretation of results where all measures are entirelyvalid. For instance, assume that governmental coercive capacity isperfectly reflected (it is not; see Hibbs, 1973: 85) in national budget ordefense expenditures or coercive force sizes (e.g., Bwy, 1968; Gurr, 1968;Snyder and Tilly, 1972). Should a negative effect of such indicators beattributed to an increase in individuals' anticipated punishment forparticipation in violence (Bwy, 1968) or to greater costs of collectiveaction for mobilized groups (Snyder and Tilly, 1972), or both, orneither? There is, of course, no unambiguous means of distinguishingamong those alternatives with ecological data, and interpretations ofsuch results typically reflect preexisting theoretical inclinations.

These problems of empirically representing the core RD and RMconcepts (and those of other arguments as well) by far constitute themost serious impediments to close fits between quantitative researchand theories of collective violence. But additional difficulties warrantmention, particularly since they are addressed by the alternative strate-gies proposed subsequently. While the following points have beendeveloped elsewhere, they continue to be ignored by the large bulk ofempirical work.

Several studies question the measurement of the dependent variable("collective violence") in ecological analyses. Most researchers nowrecognize that newspapers and related sources of event data do not



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adequately count and describe the behaviors of interest, and oftenemploy multiple sources as a corrective. However, measurement erroras a function of media bias remains problematic in many respects.Recent work indicates that (a) multiple sources are typically not inde-pendent insofar as they are mutually reliant on wire service reportingnetworks; (b) bias increases greatly with wider ranges of conflict be-haviors included; and (c) the degree of underreporting of some types ofevents is enormous (e.g., Danzger, 1975; Snyder and Kelly, 1977). More-over, all of the efforts to reduce measurement error occur at the datacollection stage; empirical analyses then proceed on assumptions ofentirely reliable and valid indicators, even when there are strong con-trary suspicions. Given the resources invested in ecological measuresof violence, it is both remarkable and disconcerting that virtually noresearch investigates the extent to which results and substantive con-clusions are altered by measurement error.

Even less attention is accorded to specification of appropriatemeasurement models (e.g., Jacobsen, 1973), especially with respect towhich indicators are included and the consequences of different opera-tionalizations across studies. Empirical treatments range from singleindicators (e.g., Russett, 1964), to factor analyses of several dozenphenomena (Feierabend and Feierabend, 1966), to all events meetingcertain criteria of size and damage regardless of "type" (Snyder andTilly, 1972). As an example of plausibly important differences, Feiera-bend and Feierabend treat elections and cabinet changes as componentsof political instability, while Snyder and Tilly consider these indicatorsto be distinct from but causally related to collective violence. Dimen-sionality distinctions between partisan and elite violence raise similarissues that are at least now being recognized (Nardin, 1971; Gurr andBishop, 1976; Morrison and Stevenson, 1973). But the standard factoranalytic measurement models provide no real solutions. They are"unable to discriminate the covariation which arises because separatemeasurements represent partially overlapping indicators of a commonunderlying variable from that which arises between separate causallyrelated variables" (Nardin, 1971: 21).

Individual-level studies do not require the detailed considerationgiven to ecological analyses because they are seldom proposed as com-plete tests of the arguments and, in any case, manifest problems similarto those already discussed (e.g., inferring RD from objective indicators).However, some criticisms of individual studies suggest more general



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difficulties. For example, McPhail (1971) addresses weak relationshipsbetween a person's objective and subjective characteristics and measuresof participation in racial disorders. He indicates that the typical indi-vidual's involvement is very intermittent and heavily dependent onsituational factors such as interactions with other people and locationwith respect to the flow of events. Based on these observations, McPhail(1971: 1068) argues that the "singular and continuing tendency" impliedin measures of prior attributes necessarily produces inadequate ex-planations of actual riot behaviors. Although McPhail focuses illustra-tively on racial violence, his points reflect broader criticisms of "formu-lating theory in terms of variables that describe initial states, on the onehand, and outcomes, on the other, rather than in terms of processeswhereby acts and complex structures of action are built, elaboratedand transformed" (Cohen, 1965: 9; cited in McPhail, 1971: 1070; Starket al., 1974: 866; see Couch, 1970; Berk, 1974; McPhail and Miller,1973, for similar arguments). Researchers often acknowledge the sub-stantive importance of such "processes"-e.g., how individuals as-semble in time and space for collective participation (McPhail andMiller, 1973; Weller and Quarantelli, 1973); patterns of escalation anddeescalation after the initiation of violence; and the interactions thatproduce violence in some "intrinsically nonviolent" events and not inothers (Tilly, 1970). However, critics concur that quantitative analyseseither ignore or fail to capture these and other relevant processes.

In summary, the range and extent of problems in empirical treat-ments of the determinants of collective violence are quite serious. Thatis not to deny that conventional studies have any merits, or that someaggregate or individual-level investigations address hypotheses at thelevel of analysis on which they operate. However, considerable re-orientation of empirical work appears necessary if past errors are to beavoided and further progress accomplished.

STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES FOREMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

Not surprisingly, the proper cures are less obvious and tractable thandiagnosing the ills themselves. However, alternative directions forempirical investigation of collective violence are specified or implied in



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some recent research. These alternatives are developed according tothe general categories of empirical problems identifed above.

(1) MEASUREMENT OF CENTRAL THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS

Relative deprivation. Although RD is an individual-level theoreticalconstruct and ecological approaches often suggest disaggregatedmeasures (e.g., Gurr, 1970), serious attempts to index it with survey dataare very recent. The Grofman-Muller (1973; see also Muller, 1972) studyis novel in its use of both objective conditions and individuals"'expecta-tions" concerning their welfare, and in relating the latter measures to anindicator of (potential for) political violence (PPV). Despite its im-portance in addressing RD more directly with perceptual indicators("achievement deprivation," or AD) and demonstrating nonlinearity inthe objective welfare-AD and AD-PPV relationships, the Grofman-Muller approach is not generally optimal. The cross-sectional surveyevidence introduces possible biases (e.g., in retrospective assessments)and precludes identification of the exogenous conditions that affectindividuals' perceptions (at a single time point, such conditions do notvary across observations). In addition, the dependent variable (PPV)reflects respondents' assessments of their probable behavior, on theassumption (from Gurr, 1970) of a direct causal linkage between poten-tial for political violence and its manifestation. However, it is preciselysuch links between individual propensities and the occurrence of violentevents that constitutes a central dispute between RD and RM ap-proaches. '3 And, given the negative evidence on attitude-behavior con-sistency (e.g., Wicker, 1969), the Grofman-Muller results plausibly bearmore on "political radicalism" attitudes than on political violence.

Miller et al. (forthcoming) retain this emphasis on perceptualmeasures, but make strategic advances in using such information. Theyemploy repeated questions in the biannual Michigan election surveys

13. In fact, even if a strong relationship were demonstrated between individual ADand participation in violence, such findings could not by themselves indicate the relativeimportance of perceptual versus organizational factors. It would remain plausible thatorganizational variables are crucial in transforming the subjective states into collectiveevents and that violence would not generally occur in situations which are comparableexcept for the absence of such mechanisms. The appropriate research design for investi-gating this alternative would require information on several settings, across which varia-tion in the organizational factors could be observed.



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(1956-1968) to examine relationships between fluctuations in RD andthe timing of racial disturbances. The time-ordering of these datapermits analyses of (a) the correspondence between perceptions ofdeprivation and the extent of violence itself (rather than "potential");and (b) the effects of changes in objective conditions on the perceivedwelfare of the subpopulations of interest. Furthermore, given the costsof initiating surveys and necessary lags in waiting for several "waves," aswell as the increasing availability of comparable series (Glenn, 1973),such use of archival survey timeseries may be the most promisingstrategy for assessing RD at the individual level.

Despite these advantages, no survey design will by itselfconstitute anoptimal strategy for isolating determinants of collective violence. Forexample, difficulties in ascertaining the relative importance of percep-tual and organizational factors remain. An even more serious limitationis that appropriate survey information is not regularly available,particularly for historical and some comparative research.

Researchers will therefore necessarily continue to rely largely on eco-logical measures and tests of RD concepts, but need not repeat paststrategic errors of aggregate data collection and analysis. For instance,economists' general work on the formation of price expectations(Toyoda, 1972; Turnovsky and Wachter, 1972) and related specifica-tions of expectations-achievements gap models of strike fluctuations(Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969; Hibbs, 1974; Snyder, 1975) indicateempirically feasible and substantively informed procedures. Thesestudies employ timeseries information in which (typically economic)deprivation criterion variables, such as wage changes, are periodicallyobserved. Measures of RD are constructed from these objective indica-tors on the plausible assumption that a population's current expecta-tions are based largely on actual conditions over several previousperiods. Substantively different expectations processes are representedby varying the time lags and weights assigned to them (e.g., very recentexperience may be weighted more or less heavily).'4 These models'

14. In the simplest case, the difference between periods t-l and t are in some objectiveindicator makes the (usually unrealistic) assumption that current expectations are basedonly on the experience of the most recent period. However, analyses of collective violencemight be informed by the findings of studies of industrial strike activity, which generallyindicate tht the best fit is achieved with an inverted-U shaped lag structure (see Ashenfelterand Johnson, 1969; Hibbs, 1974, for details on underlying assumptions and model specifi-cation). It is also plausible that, in comparable analyses employing data for subpopula-tions within some national polity, the objective gap between "reference groups" should beincorporated in such RD specifications.



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successful applications to industrial conflict (Ashenfelter and Johnson,1969; Hibbs, 1974; Snyder, 1975) suggest their utility for investigationsof theoretically similar phenomena such as collective violence.'5

Implementing this empirical strategy involves two further considera-tions. First, results from aggregate specifications do not necessarilyindicate that people actually make the hypothesized economic calcula-tions, only that they act as if they do (Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969).Comparisons with the survey timeseries on perceptions would moreconclusively validate aggregate procedures. Moreover, construction ofmathematical representations of survey and aggregate measures interms of the other would increase both the precision of and confidencein ecological proxy variables in the typical situation where only theyare available. Second, these procedures obviously demand paralleldevelopment of timeseries information on collective violence as well asdeprivation criteria. The very few attempts to provide data along theselines (Taylor and Hudson, 1972; Banks, 1971) are not entirely adequatebecause (a) measures of violence are limited to frequency and typicallyinsensitive to the validity problems discussed earlier; and (b) economicand other indicators are not reported in a comparable (yearly) format(Taylor and Hudson, 1972), or else the intervening observations areoften interpolated (Banks, 1971). Therefore, collection of timeseriesdata on political conflict and other variables with the care and detailgenerally reserved for single nation studies (e.g., Tilly, 1969; Levy, 1969)is required. But such efforts must be implemented for several countriesin order to investigate the effects of institutional and cultural factorsthat cannot be captured in a single nation analyses (see Hibbs, 1974, forappropriate technical procedures with pooled timeseries). Moregenerally, these considerations suggest a partial moratorium on the useof widely available cross-sectional data and reorientation towarddeveloping longitudinal information that will more appropriatelyaddress the substantive arguments.

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

Empirical representations of resource mobilization are still extremelyprimitive (e.g., usually limited to group membership as a global proxy).15. The criteria for "successful applications" in this case include the consistency ofresults across studies, the sensitivity of findings to alternative specifications, and thestrong relationship with the dependent variable.



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My discussion therefore emphasizes general strategies of researchdesign and data collection, and ignores the conceptual and methodo-logical complexities that detailed measurement practices wouldrequire. 16 The measurement of mobilization actually involves twoseparate issues: first, identifying the conditions under which collectiveswill form (as well as the particular ones that will emerge from anenormous set of potentials) before they actually do; and second,measuring the collective control of resources by already identifiablegroups.17 While there is some overlap in strategies, the first (labeled"protomobilization") issue is obviously less easily tractable.

As a first approximation to defining an exhaustive list of groups thatcould mobilize in some population, Tilly (1970: 11-12) proposes astrategy that entails identifying every status distinction (which impliesa difference in "interests") employed in the population; generating theimmense list of all combinations; and "eliminating those which have noreal persons within them (e.g., Chinese-Jewish-cowboy-grandmother)."Tilly (1970: 12) concedes that such procedures are virtually impossible"for large populations organized in complicated ways," because thevery detailed attribute and relational (interaction/communicationnetwork) data for each individual are unlikely to be available. Researchon protomobilization processes will, at least in the short run,necessarilyinvolve populations in which (a) the potential interest/ cleavage dimen-sions and total number of members are both relatively small and (b)relational data can be recovered for each person.

Those guidelines mitigate against studies randomly selected "natural"populations, and instead favor data collection in more strategicallychosen settings. Natural sites that have fairly rigid boundaries constituteone viable option. For example, formal organizations are boundedsettings in which numbers of potential interests and members may be

16. Such complexities are illustrated by the following questions: what should beincluded in an exhaustive list of resources that could be collectively controlled (mobilized)by groups? how should qualitatively different kinds of resources, such as loyalties, money,and weapons, be weighted in constructing collectivities' mobilization scores? how should"substitution effects" among different types of resources be calculated? should the weight-ing scheme vary across "types" of groups (i.e., are some resources intrinsically more valu-able to certain kinds of groups than others)?

17. In strict terms, mobilization is defined as an increase in collective control overresources [Etzioni, 1968; Tilly, 1970] (which also specifies some conditions under whichdemobilization occurs). In the present context, "mobilization" is considered to be the levelof resources controlled by a group, which must be adequately measured before changescan be assessed.



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limited by selection of cases.18 Moreover, characteristics of each indi-vidual in the "population" would be available (personnel records,questionnaires), and a full matrix of communications networks could begenerated by observations and interviews. Opportunities for this typeof study will also occasionally occur in settings isolated by ecologicalboundaries (e.g., Loukinen's [1975] analysis of networks in a Michiganfarming community) or for which uniquely rich data exist (Aminzade,1976).

Experimental designs in which the relevant parameters (populationsize, communication opportunities) may be constrained by the re-searcher are a second possibility. Gamson's effort (see Fireman et al.[1976] for a complete description) to induce rebellions-anticipated byhis (1969) simulation game-is one promising approach. Of course,problems of external validity may be considerable, but the relativeease of gathering and analyzing experimental data may also informsubsequent investigations of protomobilization in natural populations.

Whatever the data collection strategy, RM and RD approachessuggest several plausible explanatory variables for models of the condi-tions under which this first stage of mobilization occurs. Such factorsinclude the number of potential members (i.e., those who share thecommon interest or grievance), demographic (e.g., better educatedpeople may have greater organizational skills), and perceptual (depriva-tions, loyalties) characteristics of individuals, the presence of leadership,communication patterns, and so on. In fact, the detailed informationavailable in bounded settings may provide unusual opportunities toexamine the relative importance of determinants specified by thealternative theoretical statements.The measurement of mobilization in its "second stage"-i.e., assess-ing collective control over resources in already organized groups-presents less formidable difficulties. The very "visibility" of such groupsincreases the identifiability of the units of analysis, the feasibility ofsampling operations, and the likelihood of existing documentary evi-dence. Assuming solution in principle of the problem of specifying

18. Zald and Berger (1978) demonstrate several analogues between macropoliticalevents and comparable phenomena that regularly occur in organizations but are rarelyinvestigated there. Those analogues suggest the current strategy, which is opposite Zaldand Bergers' (i.e., organizations may be convenient arenas within which to study processesthat also occur in macropolitical settings).



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which resources to measure (see Aminzade, 1973; Clark, 1968: 57-67;Tilly, 1970, for suggestions), procedures that generate such informationfor large numbers of groups over long time spans would be mostdesirable. Gamson's (1975) study of the conditions under which"challenging groups" gain entry into and advantages from the nationalpolity most closely approximates these specifications. He employs awide variety of historical accounts and sampling procedures to generatean unbiased list of protest groups and information on their character-istics (including the outcomes of their political challenges). Gamson'sstrategy approaches the ideal framework for generating data on mobili-zation processes, except for the important drawback that informationon each collectivity is culled exclusively from the historical accounts.These accounts are sketchy (even group size, the most frequentlyreported indicator, can be coded only in crude intervals), as they will befor any random sample. Moreover, the temporal dimension is at-tenuated because data are not available at regular period-to-periodintervals.

Modifications of Gamson's strategy must develop far richer detail ofinformation while preserving the essential design of following groupsover time. As in the analysis of protomobilization, only "samples ofconvenience" in this case, explicitly choosing groups for which datasources such as membership lists, financial statements, and so on, areknown or likley to exist-will generate the necessary information. Thebias introduced by such procedures is obvious (Gamson, 1975: 22-23).However, difficulties arise not because of sampling bias per se but in the(frequent) circumstance that the direction and extent of the bias (andtherefore the validity of inferences to the population of interest) areunknown. In light of that consideration, researchers could implement adual strategy that incorporates the advantages of representativeness anddetailed information. First, Gamson's methods could be used to definethe entire population of groups and make rough assessments (from thesecondary accounts) of characteristics, such as size, success, and soforth, for a sample of them. Data could then be collected for a secondsample of well-documented collectivities to be analyzed intensively.Analyses of the latter would be weighted according to differences incomparable characteristics of the biased and unbiased samples.

Although empirical representation of collective resource control isthe principal issue in quantitative testing of RM arguments, two relatedmatters warrant brief mention. The first deals with the employment of



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these longitudinal data once they are collected. A pooled timeseriesdesign (see Hibbs, 1974) in which fluctuations in groups' measuredlevel of mobilization are related to their (sometimes violent) collectiveactions is the most appropriate analytic framework. This, of course,assumes that data on actions of each group are available from thenewspaper, archival, and secondary sources whose use has becomestandard (see Jenkins and Perrow [1977] for a recent group-specificexample). Second, the relationship between mobilization and collectiveviolence (as well as levels of each) should vary according to several otherfactors (e.g., a group's political position, the "openness" of the polity,repression). While measurement of these additional variables is im-portant, a detailed treatment is not strictly necessary insofar as (a) suchmeasures can be easily incorporated into the longitudinal designspecified above and (b) preliminary indexing procedures have beendeveloped. For example, Pearson (1970) employs the number andcontent of discussions concerning all groups mentioned in roll call votesof the French Chamber of Deputies as a rough measure of these collec-tivities' political positions,19 and a variety of strategies for representinggovernmental coercion exist (e.g., Taylor and Hudson, 1972; Jenkinsand Perrow, 1977). This is not to claim either that the proceduresinvolved will be anything but labor-intensive or that the finer points ofmeasurement have been satisfactorily worked out. However, two pointsshould be stressed: first, that the data and methods for intensive researchon mobilization are available in fact rather than "in principle"; andsecond, that such investigation must be undertaken if RM argumentsaie to be empirically specified and tested.

(2) PROBLEMS OF INFERENCE

While the foregoing prescriptions for measuring the independentvariables of RD and RM arguments should alleviate improper construc-tion and interpretation of empirical models, two further sources ofambiguous inference must still be addressed. Both of them are relatedto level of analysis problems. The first deals with more refined testing of

19. Tilly (1977) provides a detailed and more accessible report of these procedures,their limitations (e.g., such methods are "best suited to the detection of groups whoseposition is changing, rather than [those] calmly enjoying long-established benefits"), andsome alternative strategies.



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the "indirect linkages" (represented by dotted lines in Figure 1), speci-fied by various arguments. For example, longitudinal data on groupsand aggregate economic timeseries could indicate whether mobilizationlevels tend to increase in prosperous times, but not whether that occursbecause individual members of those groups have more resources uponwhich collective claims can be made (linkage EF). The second and moreimportant issue concerns empirical adjudication among alternativearguments where the respective concepts of interest are (assume per-fectly) measured at different levels of analysis. Consider, for instance,the situation where timeseries survey data on relative deprivation andmobilization information for a sample of groups are available. A criticaltest of these alternatives would require the inclusion of both measuresin the same analysis. But in most cases there will be a lack of fit betweenthe populations "at risk" in the respective indicators and consequentdifficulties in undertaking such tests.

The ideal solution to both of these problems is the accumulation ofdata on large numbers of groups, individuals, and the links betweenthem. However, it is again unrealistic to expect such data to be readilyaccessible. A more tractable procedure is employment of mobilizationand deprivation indicators which fortuitously apply to the same (sub)-population and to aggregate one set of measures to correspond to thelevel of analysis of the other. The timeseries investigations of industrialconflict cited earlier, in which labor organizations are the relevantgroups, provide an example of this strategy. Wage series aggregatedfrom survey data have been used to construct measures of labor'sexpectations-achievements gap, which are then incorporated with unionmembership indicators of mobilization in a single analysis (e.g., Snyder,1975). However, it need not always be the RD measures that are aggre-gated. Consider a national-level representation of an expectations-achievements gap that is known to be valid (on the verification recom-mendations proposed earlier). In this case, procedures for constructingan aggregate series of mobilization scores (i.e., summing over all groupsfor each observation period) could be implemented. The general pointconcerning ambiguous results and inferences is that problems of "fit"between units of analysis should be resolved by measuring the conceptof interest at the appropriate level and then aggregating if necessary.This strategy is opposite the conventional (and highly dubious) one ofinferring umeasured group- or individual-level phenomena from aggre-gate indicators.



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(3) MEASUREMENT: DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Previous criticisms of collective violence measures identified twoproblems: (a) measurement error, particularly differential underreport-ing across types of events and ecological units; and (b) dispute, largelyengendered by different substantive models, concerning precisely whichindicators should be included in "collective violence" (or relatedphenomena). Some of the alternative research designs suggested abovewill reduce these problems to an extent. For instance, the strategy offollowing collectivities over time would specify groups' involvement inviolence as the dependent variable. Therefore, certain often includedevent types that pertain to political systems (e.g., national elections,cabinet changes) would not be incorporated in "collective violence" onlogical grounds. However, that is in no sense a solution, particularlybecause much research will necessarily continue to rely on aggregate(ecological) data.

First consider the specification issue, which has not been empiricallytractable because standard ("exploratory") factor analysis cannotdiscriminate among alternative causal structures (e.g., Nardin, 1971).For example, assume (for the moment, perfectly measured) four stand-ard indicators: the number of riots, civil wars, cabinet changes, andelections for some sample of nations. Figures 2a and 2b present twosimple causal models which characterize predictions of RM (Snyder andTilly, 1972) and RD (Feierabend and Feierabend, 1966) theories ofviolence or political instability, respectively. A factor analysis of all fourindicators could not choose between models 2a and 2b. Although apriori decisions to delete or include cabinet changes and elections asindicators of the (bracketed) unmeasured construct are of coursepossible, there are simply no consensual substantive criteria for suchdecisions.

Some possibility for settling these disputes derives from methodsdeveloped by J6reskog (1969, 1970) and his collaborators (Werts et al.,1973; Jdreskog and Van Thillo, 1972) for the analysis of structuralequations models that include multiple indicators of unmeasuredvariables. While the cited works fully explicate the details of thesetechniques (sometimes labeled "confirmatory" factor analysis), theiradvantage over standard approaches may be briefly summarized. First,a single (maximum likelihood) procedure is used to estimate an entiresystem of coefficients (equations), including those pertaining to the



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(a)

EXOGENOUS VARIABLES

Cabinet Changes[C follective Violence]

National ElectionRiots Civil

Wars

(b)

EXOGENOUS VARIABLES -[Political Instability]

Cabinet National Riots fivilChanges Elections Wars

Figures 2a and 2b: Alternative Causal Models of Interrelationships Among SelectedPolitical Variables

unmeasured factors. This contrasts with the typical situation in whichfactor scores are calculated and only then included in the desiredanalyses. More important, Jdreskog's methods provide a (chi-square)goodness of fit measure which tests the null hypothesis that the positedcausal structure could have generated the observed interrelationships inthe data at a given probability level. The relative goodness of fit achievedby alternative specifications such as those in Figures 2a and 2b may beevaluated. Moreover, assumptions concerning measurement error areeasily incorporated, and the fit of entire models may be assessed accord-ing to differential indications of the location and degree of such error.

Despite the obvious utility of these empirical techniques, substantivecriteria cannot be neglected in constructing and estimating measure-ment models of collective violence. For example, indicators of officialforce should not be included in measures of collective violence and ofcoercion (as in Feierabend and Feierabend, 1972). There are strongarguments (that cross-cut most of the theoretical approaches) for treat-ing violence and repression as conceptually distinct but mutually



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dependent variables (Nardin, 1971; Tilly, 1975; Gurr and Duvall, 1976;Hibbs, 1973). Similarly, guidelines that specify the conditions underwhich particular indicators of conflict events are likely to be invalid(e.g., Snyder and Kelly, 1977) will inform efforts to capture theeffects of measurement error in these models. Greater attention to theseissues is mandatory if the results and conclusions of ecological analysesof collective violence are not to be vitiated by improper measures of thedependent variable.

(4) INTERACTION AND PROCESS VERSUSINPUT-OUTPUT ANALYSES

Most empirical analyses of collective violence-including the alter-natives proposed here-primarily attempt to explain how muchviolence will characterize groups, nations, and the like. These analysesgenerally (even necessarily) specify some "outcome" variable (frequencyor magnitude of violence) in terms of prior characteristics of groups,areas, and the like. Researchers who are critical of such "input-output"studies for neglecting processes typically address questions concerninghow rather than how much violence (more broadly, collective behavior)occurs. In doing so, they generally focus intensively on single episodesof crowd behavior, often use observational methods, and attempt tounderstand the interactions of individuals with each other and theimmediate ecological environment (cf. McPhail and Miller, 1973; Berk,1974; Couch, 1970; Stark et al., 1974, which illustrate various ap-proaches to crowd dynamics).Although the purpose of these studies has largely been empiricalassessment of theoretical statements on crowds per se, several points ofdirect relevance to the determinants of violence provide strong warrantsfor pursuing this relatively neglected line of inquiry. First, studies ofinteraction and process can be quite useful in theory construction. Forexample, McPhail and Miller's (1973) examination of assemblingprocesses explains "mobilization" for certain (spontaneous) forms ofcollective violence that conventional RM perspectives treat inade-quately. They argue that the occurrence of (in this case, nonperiodic)asemblies or collective events depends on the interaction of three broadclasses of factors: (1) "instructions" or "cues" (both verbal and non-verbal); (2) the availability of individuals in time and space; and (3) the



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propensities of those individuals to respond toward rather than from thecue. Specifically, certain events (e.g., hostile police-citizen encountersin racial disorders) constitute nonverbal instructions to assemble forindividuals within visual and/or aural proximity. The likelihood thatindividuals will be "available" depends on the distribution of theiractivities (e.g., extent of competing demands) in time and space.Participants are also "mobilized" indirectly, through verbal instructionstransmitted via informal communications networks. McPhail andMiller demonstrate that this account of how assembling occurs is con-sistent with a variety of evidence on patterns of racial disorder participa-tion and related phenomena.

Two further justifications for investigating event dynamics have notbeen explicitly recognized by analysts of crowd behavior, but illustrateeven more direct linkages to quantitative analyses of violence. Onceviolence initiates, patterns of interaction among individuals and/ orgroups (including authorities) are likely important in determiningregularities of escalation and deescalation. Knowledge of those regulari-ties should inform empirical studies that incorporate dimensions ofviolence (e.g., participants, damage, duration) other than frequency.Spilerman (1976) and Bergesen (1976) provide preliminary examplesthat indicate the significant effects on riot severity of temporal shifts inpolice tactics.

Finally, there are further possibilities for integrating "process" intoquantitative analyses of the occurrence (i.e., frequency) of violence. Forinstance, McPhail and Miller's description of how assembling occurscan be extended to construct a model of the probability (i.e., how much)of violence across ecological units. In the case of racial disorders,frequency could be specified as a function of intercity differentials in (a)the probability of a precipitating incident or "nonverbal cue" to as-semble (see Morgan and Clark, 1973: 616-617, for modeling sugges-tions); (b) the "availability" of persons for assembling (e.g., number ofyoung or unemployed black men); (c) ecological conduciveness toassembling at the scene of a precipitating incident (e.g., the number ofmajor intersections within ghetto areas, coded from detailed maps, orpatterns of housing concentration); and (d) the density of informal com-munications networks (possibly represented by ghetto populationdensities, though this is the weakest of all these proxy measures). Such amodel plausibly interprets the (substantively equivocal) effect of non-white population size that predominates empirically in ecological



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studies of disorder proneness (e.g., Spilerman, 1970, 1971). While themeasures of the relevant conditions that facilitate assembling areadmittedly crude, they indicate a potentially promising direction formerging qualitative analyses of crowd dynamics into quantitativeecological treatments.20 This is not to claim that "processes" per se canbe directly captured in such studies. It does suggest that specifying theconditions under which such processes are likely to occur can bothinform substantively and improve empirically models of collectiveviolence.

The alternative strategies advocated here range from longitudinalsurveys of individual perceptions to intensive analyses of organizedgroups' life histories to examinations of crowd dynamics. Perhaps theonly common features of these strategies are their reliance on types ofdata that are less readily available than those usually employed andtheir consequent labor-intensive character. But given the difficulties ofconventional empirical approaches, methodological shifts in thedirections proposed here must be implemented if the continuingproblematic issues in collective violence are to be adequately addressed.

A NOTE ON THEORYAlthough this paper has been oriented toward quantitative strategies,

a brief note on theory is warranted because it guides the design and inter-pretation of empirical research. In particular, the most serious impedi-ment to further advances in theories of collective violence is the general(though sometimes implicit) assumption of universal applicability ineach line of argument. Such assumptions appear untenable in view ofcontradictory empirical findings on the major approaches and someevidence (e.g., Snyder, 1975) that explicitly indicates differentialvalidity of RD and RM arguments according to variations in structuralsettings.

In light of these considerations, two alternative theoretical strategiesare more promising. One is theoretical integration of alternative

20. Snyder (forthcoming) provides a (partially complete) application of these proce-dures, but one that still indicates their empirical superiority over conventional ecologicalmodels of the distribution of racial disorders across cities.



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approaches.2' Korpi's (1974) "power balance" model of political conflictis illustrative. While not yet empirically tractable, the power balancemodel is theoretically appealing because it introduces more behavioralcontent (via motivational components and actors' calculations) thanmost RM arguments while continuing to specify the mechanismsthrough which collective action occurs. Equally important for presentpurposes, Korpi's treatment plausibly reconciles contradictory empiri-cal evidence in that his integration of RD and RM approaches generatesempirical predictions that differ from those of either argument separ-ately (1974: 1576).

A second possibility concerns specification of the structural condi-tions or "critical dimensions" across which the validity of explanationsvaries. For example, the relationship between income inequality andpolitical violence (e.g., Sigelman and Simpson, 1977) likely depends ona nation's economic structure (predominantly agricultural versus indus-trial), which in turn determines the relative salience of income versusother inequality criteria (e.g., land) for individuals' perceptions ofdeprivation. As another case in point, the applicability of conventionalmobilization theories (Tilly, 1975) appears to vary according to thedegree of centralization associated with particular forms of collectiveaction. RM variables' strong empirical relationships with highlyorganized forms of conflict such as strikes (Shorter and Tilly, 1974;Snyder, 1975) and their inability to account for spontaneous events ofthe type specified by McPhail and Miller (1973) support that conten-tion. Similarly, RM arguments (e.g., Tilly, 1975; Gamson, 1975;McCarthy and Zald, 1977) have been developed largely in the context ofWestern political processes and may not hold so well elsewhere. Addi-tional hypotheses could of course be suggested. But the point to beunderscored is that conditional theories along these lines constitutemore promising strategies for organizing, explaining, and generatingfurther empirical work. Attempting to fit all results within one oranother of the major arguments is simply not a tractable endeavor.

21. Despite some important trends toward convergence (e.g., Gurrand Duvall, 1976;McCarthy and Zald, 1977), most efforts to do so still fall mainly within one line of argu-ment (either RD or RM). Similarly, multivariate causal analyses, such as Hibbs (1973),should not be considered as theoretical integration.



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CONCLUSIONS

The general prescriptions for research on collective violence offeredhere strongly suggest shifts toward "disaggregated" treatments, boththeoretically and empirically. No theoretical explanation as currentlyformulated is universally valid. Even more modest attempts to explaincertain relationships (e.g., between coercion and violence) rather than"violence in general" should avoid assumptions of relational univer-sality that characterize most analyses.Similarly, there are compelling reasons for disaggregation in empiri-cal investigations of collective violence. Many difficulties in quantitativestudies stem from attempts to measure relevant conceptual variables at(aggregate) levels of analysis other than those (individuals, groups) atwhich they are formulated. Probably the most important methodo-logical guideline is to measure core concepts with respect to the appro-priate units of analysis. This prescription does not mean that aggregatestudies should be expunged from researchers' analytic repertoires. Insome cases they may constitute the logically most suitable level ofanalysis. In others, aggregate investigations will be necessary if notoptimal, but can be undertaken with some confidence if the measuresemployed have either been independently validated or cumulated fromdata gathered at the appropriate level. Another necessity that trans-cends all of the specific research strategies concerns development oflongitudinal data and implementation of time-ordered analyses.Although virtually every substantive argument is specified in dynamicterms, cross-sectional investigations continue to dominate empiricalwork on collective violence.

These global summary statements are not to claim that all relevantissues in the determination of collective violence have been considered.In particular, relationships between (1) international linkages (includ-ing but not limited to conflict) and domestic violence and (2) violenceand "social change" are two areas of inquiry that are potentially verysalient to the central concerns of this paper. The former is ignored partlyin view of the practical considerations imposed by the enormous litera-ture on international-domestic linkages, but more so because the bulk ofempirical work has yet to demonstrate regular strong effects of inter-national on domestic conflict (as conventionally measured). Conse-quently, an implicit assumption of the present treatment is that the

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Snyder 1978_Collective Violence a Research Agenda